ISSN: 1579-9794
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation
La Prónesis aristotélica y el dilema de su traducción
ZOHREH TAFAZZOLI
z_tafazzoli@sbu.ac.ir
Shahid Beheshti University
RAED FARIDZADEH
(Corresponding author)
r_faridzadeh@sbu.ac.ir
Shahid Beheshti University
Fecha de recepción: 26/09/2021
Fecha de aceptción: 24/03/2022
Abstract: The Greek Phronesis is among the key concepts in Aristotle’s
ethics and politics. It appears especially in the Book VI of his Nicomachean
Ethics. The translators of Aristotle’s work could only render those aspects of
its meaning that they were able to comprehend. The present study examines
how phronesis is transmitted into Arabic in the revised version of the first
known translation of the Nicomachean Ethics by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunain (9
th
century) where he renders it to ta‘aqqul, ‘aql or fahm, and the translation
made by ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (20
th
century), who translates it as fiṭna.
The findings are occasionally compared with the English and German
translations of the same text by two significant commentators of Aristotle.
The paper concludes that while Ibn Ḥunain’s renderings are historically
justified, all in all, Badawī has translated the Greek terms with relative
faithfulness, although he occasionally fails to establish a correlation between
the concepts.
Keywords: Phronesis, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunain,
‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī
Resumen: Phrónesis es uno de los conceptos clave en la ética y la política
de Aristóteles. Aparece especialmente en el Libro VI de su Ética
Nicomáquea. Los traductores de la obra de Aristóteles solo pudieron
traducir aquellos aspectos de su significado que pudieron comprender. El
presente estudio examina las formas en que la phrónesis se transmite al
árabe en la versión revisada de la primera traducción conocida del NE por
Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunain (siglos III / IX) donde lo traduce a ta‘aqqul, ‘aql o fahm, y la
traducción realizada por‘ Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (siglos XV / XX), que lo
traduce como fiṭna. Los hallazgos se comparan ocasionalmente con las
276 Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation […]
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
traducciones al inglés y al alemán del mismo texto. El artículo concluye que,
si bien las representaciones de Ibn Ḥunain están históricamente justificadas,
en general Badawī ha traducido los términos griegos con relativa fidelidad,
aunque ocasionalmente no logra establecer una correlación entre los
conceptos.
Palabras clave: Phrónesis, Aristóteles, Ética Nicomáquea, Isḥāq Ibn
Ḥunain, ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī
I
NTRODUCTION
Phronesis (φρόνησις) is among the key concepts in Aristotle’s ethics
and politics, commonly referred to as «practical wisdom» or «practical
reason» or «moral knowledge». It originated in the Greek language, long
before Aristotle, as a by-product of classical intellectual culture. It was,
however, Aristotle’s attention and interpretation, especially his detailed
discussion on phronesis in the Book VI of his Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter
NE), that endowed the concept with broad semantic latitude. Throughout the
ages,
the translators of Aristotle’s work who have rendered the term
phronesis into different languages, in their laborious efforts in transmitting
the concept, could only render those aspects of its meaning that they were
able to comprehend according to, and within the limits of, their own cultural
training.
The Book VI of NE makes it quite clear that finding a single term in
other languages to convey the full meaning of phronesis is extremely difficult
if not impossible. The complexity and multifaceted nature of this concept
have led Aristotle to approach it from different angles to refine its connection
with the adjacent concepts as well as its usage in the common language.
Thus he creates a complex network of correlated concepts to explain
phronesis. The reader/translator in his/her turn is required to form a proper
understanding of this network and clarify its semantic field. In other words,
one must carefully examine the neighbouring concepts as well as their
interrelations in the source language, and try to translate that network of
concepts into the target language. Then and only then it will be possible to
produce a translation of phronesis consistent with its original meaning.
The present study takes the observation raised above as its
hypothesis and critically examines how the term phronesis is transmitted into
Arabic in the revised version of the first known translation of the NE, limiting
the scope of the investigation to the text of Book VI only. Based on this, the
article aims to analyse how far the interconnected network of the different
interpreted concepts related to the Greek phronesis renders the different
meanings as was intended by Aristotle. In this regard, the Arabic text will
Zohreh Tafazzoli and Raed Faridzadeh 277
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
also be occasionally compared with the English (Aristotle, 2019) and the
German (Aristoteles, 1998) translations of the same text, in the hope that the
comparative reading would demonstrate how Aristotle defines phronesis.
Both English and German texts were directly translated from Greek by two
significant commentators on Aristotle.
The first Arabic translation of the NE was made during the Abbasid
translation movement by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunain (circa 9
th
century)
1
. According to
Ibn Nadīm in Al-Fihrist, there existed a complete Arabic translation of NE by
Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunain in the 4
th
/10
th
century (Ibn Nadīm, 1871, Vol. I pp. 248-
252). As M. A. Molavī has aptly pointed out, scholars regard Isḥāq’s Arabic
translation as clearer and more reliable compared to the Latin translations
from Greek, so it has been consulted for a better understanding of Aristotle’s
texts (Molavī, 1998, p. 233). Scholars have reasons to believe that Isḥāq’s
translation received attention, particularly from Muslim philosophers who
developed an interest in Aristotle and his philosophy of politics and ethics. In
the Arabic sources, the NE was generally referred to as Kitāb al-aḫlāq (The
Book of Ethics) (Dunlop, 1962, p. 21).
Until the second half of the 20
th
century, almost the entire text of Ibn
Ḥunain Arabic translation of NE, now kept at a library in Rabat, Morocco,
2
was in effect unaccounted for. The second half of it (Books VII-X) was
discovered by the British orientalist A. J. Arberry in 1951 in the Qarawīyīn
library in Fez, Morocco. Arberry introduced it in an article he published in
1955 A few years later, D. M. Dunlop, another British orientalist, continuing
Arberry’s research, found the first part of the NE (Books I-V and the last few
lines of Book VI) in the same library in Fez, and published his findings in
1962. Dunlop dedicated the rest of his life working on the Arabic manuscript
of NE and translated it into English but did not get a chance to publish it
before his death in 1989. Anna Akasoy and Alexandra Fidora edited
Dunlop’s work and published it in 2005. In this edition, they remain loyal to
the manuscript of Arabic translation; hence, the missing Book VI, except for
the last few lines, is absent in Dunlop’s revised version of the Arabic NE and
its English translation.
In addition to Arberry and Dunlop, the renowned contemporary
Egyptian philosopher, ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī too developed an interest in
the Arabic translation of NE. He compared Isḥāq’s translation with the
original Greek as well as several other European translations of the NE,
translated the missing sections of the manuscript, including the Book VI,
1
Recently, it has been raised an alternative opinion about the arabic translation by Manfred
Ullmann. It will be mentioned later.
2
dated H 619/AD 1222.
278 Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation […]
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
from Greek into Arabic and eventually published his book in 1979 with a
comprehensive introduction.
Recently, Manfred Ullmann has offered a new description of the
mentioned manuscript, in a two-volume edition. He also raised an alternative
opinion about the presence of two different translators. According to Manfred
Ullmann’s recent study (2011), Frederique Woerther has pointed out:
…Whereas modern critics, following the testimony of lbn an-
Nadim's notice, tend to attribute the whole of the Arabic translation
to Isḥāq b. Ḥunain.
3
In fact only Books 1-4 are in reality the work of
Isḥāq b. Ḥunain, while Books 5-10 were translated into Arabic by
Eustathius, probably at the request of al-Kindi (Woerther, 2019, p.
38).
Ullmann's approach may need to be critically analysed. However, in
the present study, we will mainly examine Badawī’s translation of Book VI in
comparison with Ibn Ḥunain’s translation of other sections of the NE.
4
It
should be noted that the terms used in Book VI do also appear in other
sections of the NE. Therefore, one can understand Ibn Ḥunains’s
interpretation of Arabic terms and concepts only by following them within the
context of the whole manuscript. This will simultaneously allow us to
determine the appropriacy of Badawī’s translation of Book VI.
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s German translation and interpretation of the
NE is a unique event in itself because translation itself plays a major role in
his philosophy. Moreover, as Robert J. Dostal observes, «one of the most
important features of Gadamer’s work, in general, is his attempt to recover
Aristotelian phronesis, practical wisdom.» (Dostal, 1997, p. 297) To be sure,
Gadamer’s reading of phronesis presents it as the pivotal concept of
Aristotelian ethics and politics. In his Truth and Method, Gadamer refers to
the NE frequently, especially where he discusses «the recovery of the
fundamental hermeneutic problem» and the reinterpreting of phronesis
becomes one of his main subjects (Gadamer, 2004, pp. 312-20). Gadamer’s
German translation of the NE will occasionally be consulted in this study to
inquire about his unique understanding of certain terms or concepts.
Sir W. D. Ross, a prominent twentieth-century British philosopher and
a leading authority on Aristotle, has left us with his monumental multi-volume
English translation of Aristotle’s complete writing. No scholarly research on
3
‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī attributes the whole of Arabic translation to Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunain
(Badawī, «Introduction» in Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p. 45.)
4
In the present study we have focused on ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī’s interpretation and
translation of the ancient text, so we assume his fundamental premise about attribution the
whole arabic translation to Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunain.
Zohreh Tafazzoli and Raed Faridzadeh 279
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
Aristotle and his thinking, including this study, can dispense with his work,
because, as J. J. Mulhern writes:
… he was, like Aristotle, a person of wide experience ... Ross’s
version continues to aid interpretation because of his experience
and because of his broad grip on Aristotle’s ways of thinking
across the corpus. (Mulhern, 2010.11.44)
So in the present study, Ross’s English Translation of the NE
(hereafter NE.eng) will be the main reference to translate Greek terms or
concepts of the NE.
Ever since its translation, the Arabic translation of NE has been a
source of considerable influence on the Islamic philosophical scholarship, as
it is reflected in the frequent references to it by the Muslim thinkers of the
classical era. Dunlop aptly raised the issue in his introductory remarks,
followed by Anna Akasoy in her article «The Arabic and Islamic Reception of
Nicomachean Ethics» (2013) and Josh Hayes in his essay, «The Arabic
Reception of the Nicomachean Ethics» (2015). For whatever reason, neither
of these recent studies, however, has examined the concept of phronesis.
1. THE GREEK ‘PHRONESIS (φρόνησις)’ AND ITS TRANSLATIONS
The term ‘phronesis’, Jana Noel writes, «has been translated and
interpreted with several different English phrases in the attempt to capture
the full meaning of the term. Translations have included, among others,
practical reasoning, practical wisdom, moral discernment, moral insight, and
prudence» (Noel, 1999, p. 273).
This all too apparent diversity in translation
is seemingly caused by the complexity of the conception of phronesis itself,
which even forced Aristotle to describe a network of related concepts to
elucidate the meaning of phronesis. Thus, interpreting it as «practical
wisdom» in effect emphasizes the relation between practice and phronesis,
immediately considering phronesis as a type of wisdom. As for «prudence»
(Aristotle, 1934, p. 333) and «practical knowledge», two other translations,
«prudence»
5
emerges as a foresight which underlines a special virtue and
notable feature in some persons, while «practical knowledge» inherently
reflects a type of wisdom that can generally exist in humans.
In the German translation, the situation is almost similar. Klugheit
emphasizes a certain form of genuine giftedness like «prudence.» But
Vernünftigkeit is more about rationality; and das praktische Wissen is more
about «practical wisdom.» Gadamer’s reading of phronesis highlights not
only the complexity of the term but its resistance to translation:
5 «The Latin translation of phronesis as prudentia abetted the failure to see the real state of
affairs, a failure which still haunts contemporary «deontic logic.» (Gadamer, 2004, p. 378.)
280 Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation […]
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
… It shows how difficult it is to translate the term and the broad
extent of its semantic field. As it is not only a matter of individual
rationality, but it also takes on a sense of political and social
responsibility (eine Art politischer und sozialer Verantwortlichkeit),
discussing at once the issue of conscientiousness. For this reason,
I have chosen two words for the translation of phronesis:
Vernünftigkeit (rationality), or Gewissenhaftigkeit
(conscientiousness). In Greek, both of these meanings are in one
word: «Phronesis.»
(Gadamer, 1998, p. 14)
In his Truth and Method, Gadamer directs our attention to the fact that
Aristotle considers phronesis an intellectual virtue; but it is at once a special
kind of knowledge (moral Knowledge) (Gadamer, 2004, p. 312) and an
intellectual virtue.
Practical knowledge, phronesis, is another kind of knowledge.
Primarily, this means that it is directed towards the concrete
situation. Thus it must grasp the «circumstances» in its infinite
variety. (Gadamer, 2004, p. 19)
Gadamer highlights the multifaceted nature of phronesis:
He [Aristotle] sees it [phronesis] not only as a capacity (dunamis),
but as a determination of moral being [hexis] which cannot exist
without the totality of the «ethical virtues,» which in turn cannot
exist without it.
(Gadamer, 2004, p. 20)
In his Arabic translation of the Book VI, Badawī interpreted phronesis
as
ﺔﻨﻄﻓ fiṭna throughout the text. fiṭna at once means «discretion» and
engages with a mental, internal faculty such as «acumen», and additionally
provokes a kind of intellect. It seems that the multifaceted nature of
phronesis has led Badawī to select this Arabic term; however, fiṭna does not
correspond with Isḥāq’s translation perhaps because of Badawī’s reading of
the word. In addition to Book VI, phronesis appears multiple times in the
Books I, VII and X. Depending on the context of its appearance, Isḥāq Ibn
Ḥunain translated it as
ﻞﻘﻌﺘﻟا at-ta‘aqqul (Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, pp. 83, 236, 352)
6
,
ﻞﻘﻌﻟا
al-‘aql (Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p. 259)
7
or ﻢﮭﻓ fahm (Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p. 70).
ta‘aqqul, from the root ‘aql, means «contemplation and deep thinking»; this,
in turn, means «to become gradually rational.» It appears that ta‘aqqul,
semantically relatively close to «practical wisdom» in English, sounded
rather appropriate to Ibn Ḥunain as the translation of phronesis.
Much to the multifaceted and ambiguous nature of phronesis, Aristotle
tried a different way to shed light on this concept by describing and
6
In this context, he translated phronimos as al-muta‘aqqil (Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, pp. 235, 236, 352).
7
Elsewhere, he trasnlated phronimos as al-‘āqil (Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, pp. 60, 96, 259, 262).
Zohreh Tafazzoli and Raed Faridzadeh 281
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
explicating phronimos (φρόνιμος). Phronimos means one who embodies
phronesis, that is, one who is practically wise. Badawī translated phronimos
as faṭin, which means one who embodies fiṭna. Again, his translation varies
from Ibn Ḥunain’s, who, in agreement with his translation of phronesis,
rendered it as al-muta‘aqqil and al-‘āqil, as they come from the same root.
To sum up, the Arabic translators offered three different terms for
phronesis. An examination of these translations shows that each term
highlights only one aspect of phronesis. As it can be shown, a term like fiṭna
does not necessarily relate to «practice»; hence, by only considering these
equivalents the relevance and application of phronesis in ethics will not be
clear. Moreover, «Acumen» appears to be more of an individual virtue; but
such a narrow reading of the term will readily distance its application from
the social and political context. But if we consider all these individual virtues
as prerequisites to proper participation in the political and social context,
then phronesis can have a full presence and participation in the social and
political activities. This is the reason why Aristotle combines phronesis with a
certain level of social consciousness and commitment (Gadamer, 1998, p.
14). Thus, as it was mentioned above, a network of related concepts must
be considered in the process of translation so that the reader may have a
clearer and more relevant perception of the term.
2. P
HRONESIS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BOOK VI
NE is Aristotle’s main book on ethics. According to him, the aim of this
book is not the mere reading of the essence of ethical virtues; rather, it is to
present the question of how to be virtuous. Therefore, he focuses his inquiry
on «praxis» (πρᾶξις), that is, how we should act (Aristotle, 2009, II.2, 1103 b
33). In the first five chapters of the book, Aristotle advances on issues
regarding happiness and the good, moral virtues; and after a compelling
argument over moral virtue, he comes to the important conclusion that moral
act «determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between
excess and defect, being following correct reason [orthos logos/ὀρθὸς
λόγος]» (Aristotle, 2009, VI, 1138 b 24-5). Then he adds that although this is
true, it is by no means clear. Thus, finding a standard or criteria in a situation
where everything is in a state of change and variation is the main objective
of this inquiry. In other words, the task is to determine the intermediate in the
moral act.
Aristotle sets out to answer two important questions: First, what is
orthos logos (correct reason)? And second, what is the standard that fixes
it? (Aristotle, 2009, VI, 1138 b 35; Brown, 2009, p. 236) Interestingly, Badawī
translated this key phrase to
ﺔﻤﯿﻘﺘﺴﻣ ةﺪﻋﺎﻗ qā‘idah mustaqimah (correct/straight
rule), unlike Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunain who interpreted it as
باﻮﺼﻟا ﺰﯿﻤﺘﻟا at-tamyīz aṣ-
282 Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation […]
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
ṣawab (right discernment) (Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p. 88), the utter untranslatability
of the Greek expression in a context like the following notwithstanding:
Now, that we must act in accordance with correct reason (orthos
logos) is a common principle and must be assumed … it will be
discussed later, i.e. both what correct reason [orthos logos] is, and
how it is related to the other virtues. (Aristotle, 2009, II.2, 1103 b
32-4)
After a short introduction on the soul at the beginning of Book VI,
Aristotle continues on moral action and its relevance to proper choice
(προαίρεσισ) (Aristotle, 2009, VI, 1139 a 23). Action is related to a good life
(eupraxia). The origin of action –it’s efficient, not its final cause– is choice
(proaíresis /προαίρεσις). According to Aristotle, a ‘proper choice’ is grounded
on two things: a right desire, and reasoning that is aimed at the good life.
Thus, the choice is the consequence of the interaction between desire and
reasoning, in other words, the outcome of deliberated desire.
8
In a proper
and contemplated choice, what is necessary for reason is to agree with the
right desire: «The origin of action — its efficient, not its final cause — is
choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end»
(Aristotle, 2009, VI, 1139 a 30-35). Therefore, it is possible to say that to act
morally is to act in accordance with reason. Here lies one of Aristotle’s most
important accomplishments in the Book VI of his NE: determining the activity
of intellect in the state of making the proper choice and taking the
appropriate action, that is, phronesis. As for the choices of its Arabic
translation, it seems that its ninth-century translation as ta‘aqqul properly
reflects the interrelation of phronesis with wisdom and intellect, unlike the
term fiṭna which describes rather an acumen.
3. L
OGISTIKON (λογιστικόν): PHRONESIS IN RELATION TO PRACTICAL REASON
Relying on his attempt to clarify the relationship between reason and
its parts to the elements in the soul; In Book VI, Aristotle begins with the
analysis of the element which has reason (logon); and based on the division
of things into variable and invariable, he considers logon as consisting of two
parts: logistikon (λογιστικόν) and epistemonikon (ἐπιστημονικὸν) which
mostly are translated as «scientific» and «calculative» (Aristotle, 2009, VI.2,
1139 a 10-5).
Accordingly, the realm of epistemonikon consists of things being and
becoming of which is necessary and we can only «know» them. In this
invariable realm, man cannot make any change. Metaphysics, mathematics
and natural sciences fall under this rubric, yet, logistikon is a kind of
8
προαίρεσισ ὄρεξισ βουλευτική
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Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
contemplation directed towards whatever is variable (Aristotle, 2009, VI.2,
1139 a 10-5), like making decisions or practising or creating things. In other
words, the subject of this latter category emerges as the affairs that are
calculated, deliberated and determined by man.
For each of these two parts, Aristotle assigns two virtues: sophia to
the scientific part (epistemonikon) and phronesis to the calculative part
(logistikon) (Aristotle, 2009, VI.2, 1143 b 14-6). As it is noted, logistikon is
interpreted as «calculative» (Aristotle, 2009, VI.2, 1139 a 13-5);
nevertheless, this interpretation misleads our understanding of the term by
focusing on accounting and quantity while such semantic aspect is not
dominant in this Greek word. Conversely, it is related to logic and logos
(logistikon). Sure enough, logistikos (the man who have logistikon) in its
different uses in the ancient Greek texts is expressed as following: Skilled or
practiced in calculating (Plato), endued with reason, rational (Aristotle), using
one’s reason, reasonable.
9
But, one should keep in mind that here Aristotle
is opting for an understanding of orthos logos which is semantically
connected to logistikon. By focusing on its translation as «calculative,»
eventually one loses this connection.
Gadamer translates epistemonikon as auf Wissen beruhend
(knowledge-based) and logistikon as auf Überlegung beruhend (thought-
based) (Aristoteles, 1998, p. 27) by way of which he emphasizes on its
deliberating aspect, without a reference to calculation. Thus, we may have a
better understanding of logistikon: when the soul is thinking about a variable
affair. In fact. the deliberative part of reason is contemplating, evaluating and
calculating in order to consider a suitable action.
In the Arabic translation, Badawī renders logistikon to
يﺮﯾﺪﻘﺘﻟا at-taqdīrī
and proposes
ﻲﻤﻠﻌﻟا ءﺰﺠﻟا al-ǧuz al-‘ilmī versus يﺮﯾﺪﻘﺘﻟا ءﺰﺠﻟا al-ǧuz at-taqdīrī
(Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p. 209). The term at-taqdīrī’ has multiple meanings like
evaluative and discretional. It stems from the root
رﺪﻗ qadr meaning
‘measure’; so
ﺮﯾﺪﻘﺗ taqdīr also means «calculating» and «determining.» The
root qadr does not only mean «quantity», but also «position and status,» and
«the place and portion that God has defined for everything.» (Quran 65, p. 3)
In the light of Badawī’s translation, the latter meaning may be reformulated
as: this contemplation is in fact for finding out the portion that deserves the
matter in question.
It is also worth mentioning that the term taqdīr, like logos, has two
meanings: it refers to humans as well as God, just as logos refers to the
human mind as well as to the divine word. Therefore, it is possible to say
9
https://logeion.uchicago.edu/λογιστικός (accessed December 19, 2019).
284 Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation […]
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
that taqdīrī is a more suitable choice than «calculative» as the equivalent for
logistikon, while one must keep in mind that translation of logistikon to taqdīrī
and logos to qā’idah loses the all-important correlation between logos and
logistikon for the simple reason that the two Arabic terms do not share the
same origin.
4. K
ALOS BOULEOSTAI (καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι): PHRONESIS AS WELL
DELIBERATION
After alluding to the difference between techne, episteme, Phronesis,
Sophia and nous (Aristotle, 2009, VI.2, 1139 b 17-8.), which are all related to
logos, Aristotle distinguishes Phronesis as a reasoned and true state of
capacity to act and the virtue of soul’s rational part in praxis (Aristotle, 2009,
VI.5, 1140 b 20-1).
10
He begins the main discussion on Phronesis by
considering who the persons are credited with it, and with the examination of
the traits of phronimos:
Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom
[phronimos/φρονίμους] to be able to deliberate well
11
[kalos
bouleostai/καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι] about what is good
12
[agatha/ἀγαθὰ] and expedient
13
[sympheroneta/συμφέροντα] for
himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of
thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing
conduce to the good life
14
in general. (Aristotle, 2009, VI.5, 1140 a
25-7)
To effectuate the discussion, he concentrates on explaining its key
concepts which are «deliberating» (Bouleostai/βουλεύσασθαι) and «good»
(Agatha/ἀγαθὰ). A quick inspection of the translations reveals that the
translators’ understanding of Phronesis depended critically on grasping the
meaning of these key concepts.
Bouleostai (βουλεύσασθαι), often translated as deliberating, is a kind
of wisdom different from other types of thinking (Aristotle, 2009, VI.8, 1142 a
1) and specific to calculating part of soul. Earlier in the Book VI, Aristotle
mentions Bouleostai in order to explain soul’s calculating state
(logistai/λογίζεσθαι):
10
«Practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to
human goods.»
11
ar-rawīya-t-uṣṣaḥīḥah (trans. by Badawi)
12
ḫayr (trans. by Badawi)
13
nāfiʿ (trans. by Badawi)
14
al-ḥayāt as-saʿīdah (trans. by Badawi)
Zohreh Tafazzoli and Raed Faridzadeh 285
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
To deliberate (βουλεύσασθαι) and to calculate (λογίζεσθαι) are the
same thing. But no one deliberates about the invariable. (Aristotle,
2009, VI.2, 1139 a 14-15)
Regarding the calculating part of the soul, Bouleostai focuses on
decision and action during which a human «searches» for something
(Aristotle, 2009, VI.9, 1142 b 2, 16); but it is not just seeking because he
also sifts
15
and calculates (Arisṭūṭālis, 2009, p. 223). He searches for the
best possible action in a particular condition. In fact, he deliberates about
possible actions in relation to desires and objectives as well as conditions
and situations. Bouleostai could be a self-consultation that flourishes in the
domain of things that lead to Agatha and eupraxia:
16
«About things which
have an end which is a good that can be
brought about by action (πρακτὸν
ἀγαθόν).» (Aristotle, 2009, VI.8, 1141 b 12-3)
Bouleostai stems from the Greek word βουλά, which means «course
of action or a plan», and in its plural form is defined as «counsels,
deliberations, designs;» it also means determination and will, especially
when it is used to refer to gods.
17
From this root, the word bouleosis has
been coined in NE (Aristotle, 2009, III.2, 1111 b 26-7) which means «wish»
and engages with rational desire. In its Greek context, the verb bouleostai
/βουλεύσασθαι has been used in various ancient texts, meaning «take
counsel, deliberate, determine or resolve after deliberation (in past tenses),
take counsel with oneself.»
18
In bouleostai, the emphasis is on choices and
decisions. It is only about possible things, and does not apply to necessities
as these are not calculated and cannot be «decided.»
Libra is considered as the root of the verb «to deliberate,» meaning
«scale.» hence, in English, the verb connotes an «evaluative
contemplation.» Gadamer translated bouleostai as Sich beraten (consulting
with oneself) (Aristoteles, 1998, p. 27) and Überlegen (contemplation)
(Aristoteles, 1998, p. 34). It appears that these two definitions are the same
for Aristotle, while Beraten in German means «consulting», and Sich-beraten
means «consulting with oneself.» In fact, Überlengen (contemplation) is
nothing but a self-referential form of counseling.
In the Arabic translation of Book III of NE, Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunain translated
bouleostai/βουλεύσασθαι in its infinitive form as
ﮫﯾور ar-rawīyyah and يوﺮﺗ
tarawwī (Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p. 114). These two terms both stem from a
common root. Badawī too in his translation of Book VI used the same terms.
15
«wa man yurawwī … yabḥaṯu wa yaḥsabu.» (Arisṭūṭālis, 2009, p. 223.)
16
This will be discussed shortly in the following pages.
17
https://logeion.uchicago.edu/βουλεύω (accessed December 19, 2019)
18
https://logeion.uchicago.edu/βουλεύω (accessed December 19, 2019)
286 Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation […]
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
Rawīyyah in Arabic means «contemplation, careful consideration of
actions», and it appears that it is the proper rendering of bouleostai. The root
word of ar-rawīyyah means «to be saturated» or «to strengthen (like in joints
and muscles),»
19
or «to tighten up (a knot).»
20
The semantic element of
«being saturated» precisely highlights the relation between tarawwī
(Bouleostai) and «desire.» However, the verb tarawwī does not in itself
embody any part of the meaning «determining and deciding»; rather, the
emphasis is on the activity of reason when the mind is contemplating and is
gradually coming to maintain strength and consistency; the process
continues until the stream of thought begins to be formed and saturated with
regard to a particular issue, and eventually determines the form of an action.
As it can be seen, this image is slightly different from the image of evaluation
or calculation in «deliberation.» In the Arabic translation, the word does not
mean «consultation and counselling,» while in the Greek and German terms
«consultation» is semantically emphasized.
5. A
GATHA (ἀγαθὰ): PHRONESIS AS GOODNESS
Bouleostai is oriented «toward» something. That is, when one
deliberates, his deliberation is «for» something. The question is, «toward»
what this deliberation is inclined, and «for» what it has been formed? It is
possible that, for instance, someone has been contemplating and evaluating
conditions so that he could become rich in a short time. This is not a proper
example of good bouleostai. Aristotle calls these individuals «clever» or
smart (Aristotle, 2009, VI.13, 1144 a 12-3) rather than phronimos. Hence, we
learn that the duty of phronimos lies in «eu-boulestai», namely, one should
deliberate «well», and his deliberation should be directed towards
«good/agatha»; it is attainable for man, that is, good in its practical sense.
To this end, Aristotle notes:
The man who is without qualification good at
deliberating (εὔβουλος) is the man who is capable of aiming in
accordance with calculation
21
(λογισμόν) at the best for man of
things attainable by action. (Aristotle, 2009, VI.8, 1141 b 13-5)
19
https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/ﺔﯾوﺮﻟا / (accessed December 19, 2019).
20
Muntaha-'l-arab fī luġāt al-ʿArab
https://archive.org/details/MuntahalArabRubEDuvumFarsi/page/n219 (accessed December 19,
2019).
21
In Ross’s text it is translated as «calculation». Yet, as mentioned, the word «calculation» is
not a proper translation for Logismon. In this case, the Arabic translator has made a mistake
and translated logismon into burhan (Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p.218).
Zohreh Tafazzoli and Raed Faridzadeh 287
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
He cautions that there could be much evil
22
if logistikon and
calculation weren’t set to good /Agatha (Aristotle, 2009, VI.9, 1142 b 20).
Man deliberates to practice in a particular moment and situation;
hence, deliberation becomes a matter of good and appropriate choice.
According to Aristotle, the meaning of ‘agatha’ in relation to Phronesis is not
only good in its general sense but also in its practical and concrete sense; a
form of good that is related to the realm of possibility and can be realized in
a concrete situation. This good involves a particular condition, and, at the
same time, it points to human happiness or good life (eupraxia). In this
respect,
phronimos must be able to recognize the practical form of agatha,
and this is why Aristotle regards phronesis as a special kind of knowledge
which can understand practical and particular good/agatha among a plethora
of possibilities in a situation.
(Aristotle, 2009, VI.8, 1142 a 1-3)
Phronesis is not a knowledge that can be achieved through intuition or
education; rather it can be achieved by life experience. This is why a young
person can never be a phronimos, as he lacks this experience (Aristotle,
2009, VI.8, 1142 a 15-6). Phronimos has repeatedly been in the position of
making decisions and practising, and each time has faced different
situations and tried to make the best decision and act accordingly. In this
way, a kind of hexis is achieved, so that he can handle new situations. This
knowledge highly depends on individuals, but it is not purely a personal good
/agatha. Phronimos can see what is good for men in general too (Aristotle,
2009, VI.5, 1140 b 8-10); and who can do that «is good in managing
households or states.» (Aristotle, 2009, VI.5, 1141 b 9-10)
Good/agatha is the skopos of moral practice, namely, what we look at.
And it shows us the way to find the intermediate. Yet, at the same time,
recognition of this goal is not possible for all; Aristotle insists that «good»
does not come to light except in the eyes of a good man, because the evil
infects the soul and he cannot recognize the skopos and is not able to
practice well (Aristotle, 2009, VI.13, 1144 a 34-5). In other words, a man
can't be phronimos without being good (Aristotle, 2009, VI.13, 1144 a 35-7).
In fact, although «phronesis, though it is an intellectual virtue, cannot
develop independently of the moral virtues.» (Brown, 2009, p. XVI.) Thus,
once we understand the importance of good/agatha in phronesis, it becomes
even clearer that translating phronesis as «acumen», «subtlety» or fiṭna (in
Arabic) is not very appropriate, for it leaves out an important aspect of the
concept. Subtlety, sharpness, or intelligence are features in men that refer to
a faculty that can be applied in the direction of good or evil, while the
22
Like a thief who has calculated all conditions so that he could have a proper chance to steal.
288 Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation […]
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
concept of phronesis (in Greek) includes good, and in Aristotle’s perception,
an acuteness that doesn’t lead to good can’t accompany phronesis.
Agatha, which is usually translated as «good» in English, and as «gut
und gerecht» in German, is translated as
ﺮﯿﺧ ḫayr in Arabic. The Arabic ḫayr,
at the same time, means ‘good’, ‘better’ and ‘the best’ depending on the
context. Its root meaning is ‘what is chosen and selected’. The word
ﺧارﺎﯿﺘ
iḫtiyar, which means choice and in the present text is used as the equivalent
of proairesis, is a derivative of the root.
6. SYMPHERONTA (συμφέροντα): THE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE PROPER
In phrasing the definition of phronimos, Aristotle uses the word
sympheronta/συμφέροντα to describe «well deliberation,» which
semantically implies that here good is not considered in its pure sense;
rather, it depends on a particular situation. A correct perception of
sympheronta is therefore necessary for our understanding of phronesis. The
definition of this Greek term is «to bring together» and «to gather, collect,
contribute,» as well as «to be in harmony with, adapt oneself to, agree with,
agree together.»23 Accordingly, «appropriate» and «expedient» appear to
be the proper equivalents for «sympheroneta». In English translations, the
term has appeared as «beneficial» or «advantageous,» while in Arabic it is
rendered as
ﻊﻓﺎﻧ nāfiʿ (profitable) (Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p. 213). Gadamer has
translated the term to gut und nützlich (good and expedient) (Aristoteles,
1998, p. 33). In each case of these renderings, an important aspect is
missing. In other words, they have altered the meaning of phronesis so
much so that what actually means «the ability to understand the proper»24
has been translated as «beneficial choice.» In our contemporary
understanding of the respective languages, the words «expedient», nützlich
or ‘nāfiʿ convey a sense of practice or use, while sympheroneta in the
classical Greek had a wider definition. Phronimos is someone who can
understand the relation between matters, such as the relation between
praxis in each particular situation with agatha in general.
7. PHRONETIC KNOWLEDGE: UNDERSTANDING THE PARTICULAR
Aristotle insists that praxis is concerned with particulars (Aristotle,
2009, VI.5, 1141 b 17) and concrete situations: «doing is always doing some
23
https://logeion.uchicago.edu/συμφέρω (accessed December 19, 2019)
confer a benefit, be useful or profitable, it is of use, expedient
literally: to be carried along with,
Gramm: to be constructed with, agree in form with.
24
The distinction between what should and should not be done includes the distinction between
the proper and the improper. (Gadamer, 2004, p. 20.)
Zohreh Tafazzoli and Raed Faridzadeh 289
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
particular action. Reasoning which remains at the level of universals cannot
result in action» (Brown. 2009, p. 239). According to him, the main problem
in the realm of human actions is that here we are not dealing with the realm
of necessity and there is no regular natural rule that exactly specifies how
human beings must act. One can’t always act well only by his general
knowledge. To act, it is important and necessary to recognize what works in
this particular situation. Choosing the right action depends always on the
acting person.
…Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only. it must
also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice
(πρᾶξις
) is concerned with particulars. (Aristotle, 2009, VI.5, 1141 b
15-17)
In this respect, phronesis at once is both universal and particular
knowledge; although the particular one has the higher priority (Aristotle,
2009, VI.8, 1141 b 22-4). Phronimos is the intermediary between the
universal and the particular. In deliberation, in fact, he is oscillating between
the universal and the particular. Meanwhile, this oscillation determines the
domain of particular and extends the meaning of the universal. This is what
Gadamer intends to describe as «application»
(Gadamer, 2004, p. 313) by
considering the universal rule, the agent understands the particular situation
and reflects on the action in this situation, then takes the appropriate action.
Recognition of the occasion (sympheronta) of the situation with the universal
and «good» is what the soul demonstrates during good deliberation.
8. O
RTHODES (ὀρθότης): PHRONESIS AND THE CONSISTENCY OF DELIBERATION
Aristotle uses orthos as a special trait to elucidate the meaning of
«good deliberation» (eubolia). He accurately shows that goodness in
«euboulestai» actually means the existence of orthodes
25
(ὀρθότης)
(Aristotles, 2009, VI.9, 1142 b 16-7), namely, a kind of consistency and
stability in deliberation. Hence, in addition to seeing and attaining the good,
the goodness of deliberation
26
is also the discovery of a practice that is
appropriate to that skopos (good life in general).
There is more than one meaning for orthodes (Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p.
223), so Aristotle defines its proper meaning for good deliberation
25
«correctness» (English translation by Ross): Aristotles, 2009, p. 111.
«aṣ-ṣawāb» (Arabic translation by Badawī) : Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p. 223.
26
Aristotle mentions several traits for deliberation, all of which describe a «good» state for this
type of thought. One of them is kalos bouleostai/καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι. In the ancient Arabic
translation, the translator translated it into «ar-rawīyya-t-uṣṣaḥīḥah», and εὖ βουλεύσασθαι to
«ḥusn ar-rawīyah». In another place, it has been translated as «rawīyat ǧayyidah.»
290 Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation […]
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
(euboulestai):
27
«rightness (orthodes) in respect both of the end, the
manner, and the time.» (Aristotles, 2009, VI.9, 1142 b 18-28)
If, then, it is characteristic of men of practical wisdom (φρονίμων)
to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation (εὐβουλία) will
be correctness (orthodes/ὀρθότης) with regard to what conduces
(sympheron/ συμφέρον)
28
to the end (τέλος) which practical
wisdom apprehends truly. (Aristotles, 2009, VI.9, 1142 b 33-5)
At the beginning of Book VI, orthos as a trait was used for logos, and
the main purpose of the book was to clarify the meaning of orthos logos. In
his reading of logistikon and bouleostai, Aristotle explains a specific kind of
logos which relates to «practice.» bouleostai is the specific kind of reasoning
which could be described by orthodes. therefore, it is necessary to explain
what the term orthodes is.
Orthodes/ὀρθότης in Greek means «erectness, upright posture,
straightness and fixity,
29
and as its secondary definition it means
«correctness and rightness». Orthos is also an adjective meaning «upright
and standing.» It can also mean «straight» if it discusses the features of a
line, namely, a line without digression or distortion, and in geometry, it
means vertical or right angle;
30
however, it also means an object that stands
upright and straightforward.
31
Although the term has secondary been used to
refer to features such as correct, true and right. It seems that when this
feature is used to describe a state of the soul, it may be interpreted as
«being consistent.» This image is present in the Greek sense of the word,
but if it is translated as truly and correctly, the specific meaning of orthos,
which is specific to the deliberation (bouleostai), would be lost. Gadamer
translates it into Richtigkeit that means «correctness and rightness.»
(Aristoteles, 1998, p. 47).
Ibn Ḥunain translates orthos/ὀρθὸς in all cases to
باﻮﺻ ṣawāb
(accurate) and
ﺢﯿﺤﺻ ṣaḥīḥ (correct); and orthos logos as باﻮﺼﻟا ﺰﯿﻤﺘﻟا at-
tamyīz aṣ-ṣawāb (Aristotle, II.2, 1103 b 33; Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p. 88),
ﺰﯿﻤﺘﻟا
ﺢﯿﺤﺼﻟا
at-tamyīz aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ (Aristotle, 2009, III.12, 1119 a 20; Arisṭūṭālis, 1979,
p. 138),
ﺢﯿﺤﺼﻟا لﻮﻘﻟا al-qawl aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ (Aristotle, 2009, VI.3, 1147 b 1;
Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, pp. 241-2) and
ﺢﯿﺤﺼﻟا سﺎﯿﻘﻟا al-qīyas as-ṣaḥīḥ (Aristotle,
2009, VII.9, 1151 a 21-2; Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p. 256). This variation in
27
«rawīyyah ǧayyidah» Arabic trans by Badawī. (Arisṭūṭālis, 1979, p. 223.)
28
Bringing together what is appropriate and expedient for attaining the end (what is good).
29
https://logeion.uchicago.edu/ὀρθότης (accessed December 19, 2019)
30
https://logeion.uchicago.edu/ὀρθὸς (accessed December 19, 2019)
31
like when a horse stops on two legs, and turns its body upright.
http://logeion.uchicago.edu/ ὀρθὸς (accessed December 19, 2019)
Zohreh Tafazzoli and Raed Faridzadeh 291
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
translation indicates that Ibn Ḥunain duly understood the multi-faceted
meaning of logos. aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ (correct) means
ﻢﯿﻠﺴﻟا as-salīm (healthy) which
stems from
ﺔﺤﺻ ṣihhat (health). In the Persian translations, the term orthos
logos is mostly rendered as aql-e salīm (correct reason-common sense)
(Arasṭāṭālis, 2002, p. 9). Both of these attributes, that is, salim and ṣahih,
refer primarily to an image of the state of health and illness, and in the
secondary meaning to the state of correctness and falsehood.
Badawī translated orthos in its adjective form as ﺔﻤﯿﻘﺘﺴﻣ mustaqīmah
(straight). Yet, he took orthodes as
باﻮﺻ ‘ṣawāb’. The fact is, because of the
root difference in these two words, the link between orthodes and orthos,
which is notable in Greek, has been ignored. The Arabic ṣawāb in its noun
form means «right,» the antonym for «wrong.» It comes from the root ṣawb
which means «to ascend» and «the falling rain.»
32
It also means ‘to descend
from a height’. The semantic connection between ṣawāb and the root ṣawb
is provided by the straightness and smoothness of raindrops when they fall
to the ground. Basically, the image of ‘right’ is different in the two words
mustaqīmah (straight) and ‘ṣawāb (right).
On the other hand, the conceptual metaphor of the word ṣawāb is
completely the opposite of the word orthodes. ṣawāb is rightness and
correctness in something that falls straight from the top, but orthodes means
«correctness and straightness» in the sense that something becomes firm
and stands firmly and becomes consistent. This difference in conceptual
metaphor has also consequences and in turn, makes a difference in
understanding. Consistency as a semantic component in orthodes comes
from phronimos; however, in the case of ṣawāb, its rightness and
correctness stem from conforming with a right thing coming from the outside.
9.
PHRONESIS IS ORTHOS LOGOS
Aristotle sets out to answer two important questions: first, what is
orthos logos? And second, what is the standard that fixes it? (Aristotle, 2009,
VI, 1138 b 30; Brown, 2009, p. 236) Following a detailed discussion on
phronesis, he refers to orthos logos at the end of Book VI. He implicitly says
that in matters such as practice, phronesis is actually orthos logos:
… now correct reason (orthos logos) is that which is in accordance
with practical wisdom (phronesis). All men, then, seem somehow to
divine that this kind of state is virtue, namely, that which is in
accordance with practical wisdom. But we
must go a little further.
32
Muntaha-'l-arab fī luġāt al-ʿArab
https://archive.org/details/MuntahalArabRubEDuvumFarsi/page/n585, (accessed December 19,
2019).
292 Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation […]
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
For it is not merely the state in accordance with correct reason, but
the state that implies the presence of correct reason, that is, virtue;
and practical wisdom (phronesis) is correct reason (orthos logos)
about
such matters. (Aristotle, 2009, VI.13, 1144 a 20-25)
Aristotle saw orthodes or consistency in deliberation. Hence, orthos
logos is a consistent intellect that evaluates well and deliberates regarding
the good. orthos logos does not mean the universal rule or principle outside
phronimos. Rather, it is his conscientious, consistent intellect, which guides
to the good. Aristotle corrects this famous statement that «virtue must be in
accordance with orthos logos by relying on the fact that a virtuous person
must himself possess orthos logos, that is to say, be a phronimos (Brown,
2009, 243), rather than conforming with something outside of himself.
Therefore, its Arabic translation as qāʿidah mustaqīmah is far from its
original meaning, and perhaps rendering it to ʿaql-e salīm (correct reason)
(Arasṭāṭālis, 2002, p. 9) or at-tamyīz as-ṣaḥīḥ (correct distinction) is more
appropriated. Choosing ‘at-tamyīz (distinction) for logos in the term orthos
logos, reveals that Ibn Ḥunain considered the meaning of the words in their
combinations as well. Although logos per se usually does not translate to at-
tamyīz (distinction); but its description with orthos, and its relationship with
phronesis in this context lead Ibn Ḥunain to choose this appropriate
equivalent. at-tamyīz also renders an active meaning for logos that are close
to the meaning of deliberation and at-taʿaqqul, unlike the passive concept of
qāʿidah.
We noted that Badawī translated logos as qāʿidah (rule) and orthos as
‘mustaqīmah’ (straight). The term qāʿidah, from the root quʿūd (sitting down),
has also been used in the sense of «principle» and «the law,» as well as «to
be set and put in place» like the base and foundation of a building.
mustaqīmah, on the other hand, is from the root qāma (standing) and a
cognate of qawām (to be firm). Mustaqīm is also occasionally used to
convey the meaning of «true and correct.»
Apart from being the translation of orthos logos, the term qāʿidah
mustaqīmah seems to warrant a different kind of attention as a compound
word, which offers a somewhat static and passive dimension of the concept.
Here, the strength and straightness come from the base or rule (namely
qāʿidah) like the foundation of the building. While the combination of the
attribute orthos with the noun logos shows that logos receives its
consistency and strength not from somewhere outside itself, but from its
inner uprightness and standing, its inner consistency and its tendency to
approach skopos or the «good.» In fact, logos gradually rises and stands
while reasoning by way of deliberation (tarawwī). It seems that in the
discussion of orthos logos regarding practice, the translation of logos into the
Zohreh Tafazzoli and Raed Faridzadeh 293
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
term qāʿidah is not quite adequate, for there is a kind of uncertainty in this
kind of reasoning that gradually acquires consistency and strength during
bouleostai or deliberation. The art of medicine or navigation
33
as examples
that Aristotle uses in the Book II (Aristotle, 2009, II. 3, 1104 a 9) shows that
this kind of reasoning does not necessarily depend on the resources on
which it stands, but it relies on a kind of tactfulness, an ability of distinction
and decision-making.
The relative inadequacy of rendering orthos logos to qā‘idah
mustaqīmah seems to have a matter in itself. It takes us back to the point
raised at the beginning of our discussion that one must carefully examine the
neighbouring concepts as well as their interrelations in the source language,
and try to translate that network of concepts into the target language. Failure
to do so is in fact due to the lack of attention to the network and the
interconnectivity between all the linguistic devices in the text that makes the
emergence of original meaning possible. The impression one gains from the
concept of orthos logos in the source language is completely different from
the impression out of qāʿidah mustaqīmah in the target language. The
understanding that emerges from the Greek network of concepts is that, in
order to have moral life, one has to be trained and strengthen his practical
reason. However, the meaning transmitted in Arabic is that the moral act
derives its strength from compliance with the rules and laws; therefore, in
this kind of ethics, the primary effort is to extract or to establish general
rules.
C
ONCLUSION
The present study was intended to critically examine how the term
phronesis is transmitted into Arabic in the revised version of the first known
translation of the NE, relying on the interpretation of English and German
commentators of Aristotle. Due to the complexity and multifaceted nature of
this concept, it is more than difficult to find a single term in other languages
to convey the full meaning. Aristotle creates a complex network of correlated
concepts to explain phronesis. The reader/translator in his/her turn is
required to form a proper understanding of this network and clarify its
semantic field. One must carefully examine the neighbouring concepts as
well as their interrelations in the source language, and try to translate that
network of concepts into the target language.
Based on these considerations the results of this study may be
summed up as follows: First, a comparative review of the Arabic translation
33
«two branches of skill or expertise that offer a neat parallel for moral virtue, since each is an
expertise, not a matter of chance, but to be an expert does not consist in knowing and being
able to apply a set of rules.» (Brown, 2009, p. 212)
294 Aristotelian ‘Phronesis’ and the dilemma of its translation […]
Hikma 21 (1) (2022), 275 - 296
of Book VI with the rest of the ancient translated text reveals that in his
translation of the terms, ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī does not adhere to the
framework of interpretation applied by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunain. Therefore, it cannot
be said that his translation properly aligns with Ibn Ḥunain’s, forming an
integrated, harmonious text. One reason for this lack of conformation may be
the historical difference brought about by the change and modification in the
meaning of some of the terms. One of the most pivotal examples of this
difference lies in the interpretation of phronesis. It seems that in the classical
Arabic language taʿaqqul was semantically very close, if not exact, a term for
phronesis; however, it has, over time, undergone so many conceptual
changes that Badawī seems to be uneasy in selecting ʿaql and taʿaqqul as a
proper rendering for phronesis, so he consequently translates it to fiṭna.
In some cases, the contextual importance of the etymological
connection between Greek words is somehow overlooked. For example, the
close semantic proximity of logistikon and logos is completely lost in their
translation into taqdīrī and qāʿidah respectively. One of the most practical
ways to overcome this hurdle may be that in translating certain key terms
one would also cite the original word or phrase next to its rendering so that
the reader does not lose sight of the conceptual coherence of the text and
would be able to retrieve what is lost in the translation by way of noticing the
etymological connection of the terms.
A comparative reading of the translation of Book VI of NE along with
the original Greek text shows that Badawī translates the Greek terms with
relative faithfulness, although he occasionally fails to establish a correlation
between the concepts. This serves as a good example to confirm the
hypothesis that it is not enough to translate the meaning of the words and
independent terms correctly. Rather, one should also consider the
relationship between the terms, the network of concepts, the metaphor and
the impressions through which these terms become meaningful.
A
BBREVIATIONS
• (NE): The Nicomachean Ethics
• (NE. Eng): Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Transl. by
David Ross. Revised with an introduction and notes by Lesley
Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
R
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