

POLITICAL ANIMALS AND LOGOSFORMELN

ON CARLO GINZBURG'S *THE SOUL OF BRUTES*

MATTIA MANTOVANI
KU LEUVEN



This collection finally makes four essays by Carlo Ginzburg available to a wider English-speaking readership.¹ These include: *Civilization and Barbarism* (2017), the only essay previously published in English; *The Soul of Brutes: A Sixteenth-Century Debate* (2005); *Calvino, Manzoni, and the Gray Area* (2014); and *Schema and Bias: A Historian's Reflection on a Double-Blind Experiment* (2017).

As the titles suggest, the essays cover a wide range of topics and figures, from Plato to Feyerabend, via Polybius and Machiavelli and Goya, Lucretius, and Pomponazzi. It is a *tour de force*, like many of Ginzburg's collections: intriguing, challenging, splendidly written – almost impossible to review. Ginzburg continuously pushes his readers beyond their comfort zones, sometimes even off balance, as his arguments take unexpected turns across centuries, traditions, and media. This is a lucid, crisp booklet. The editor describes it as « scintillating », and this is no marketing boast.

The overarching theme of the collection is never explicitly stated. Like the panther of medieval bestiaries, it is sensed everywhere yet never directly seen. With no introduction to guide them, readers must rely on their wits. Ginzburg, prolific as he is, must have had specific reasons for republishing *The Soul of Brutes* after almost twenty years and making it the title piece of the collection. Indeed, though diverse, the four essays engage in a subtle yet profound dialogue, prompting readers to rethink their nature as cultural animals organized in political communities – a reflection that passes through history. This proves true for the collection itself.

The book was published in celebration of the fortieth anniversary of Seagull Books and its founder, as reflected in Ginzburg's dedication: « These essays, in their diversity, are a small homage to my friend Naveen Kishore: to his inventiveness, his energy, his courage ». And Kishore is indeed a remarkable

¹ CARLO GINZBURG, *The Soul of Brutes*, Seagull Books, Kolkata, India – London – New York 2022.

figure. In 1982, he began publishing Indian theatre pieces in Kolkata. Today, Seagull Books is an internationally renowned publishing house, distributed worldwide by the University of Chicago Press.

Ginzburg's essays serve as tributes to this editorial and cultural endeavour. The second essay of the collection, for instance, discusses a manuscript that remained in Pordenone for a century before Gabriel Naudé published it in 1648 under a slightly altered title to fit the Parisian debates of his time. Ginzburg endorses Kristeller's observation that « in this case, as in many others, the editor was more important than the author » (p. 48): a fitting remark for honouring a publisher. This attention to the editorial process also features prominently in the following chapters, which recount summer gatherings at Rhêmes-Notre-Dame attended by « coworkers and friends of the Einaudi publishing house » and discussions between Calvino and Primo Levi about translating Queneau's *Petite cosmogonie portative* (Einaudi, 1982) (p. 56). The final piece develops a broader reflection on historiography, using the example of ancient manuscript copyists as « editors » (p. 102). The opening essay, which examines encounters between different cultures and languages, underscores the urgency and global significance of Kishore's editorial agenda.

It is difficult to imagine a more elegant homage to a publisher who champions world literature: three-quarters of Seagull's catalogue consists of translations, a paradigmatic case of the 'Transfer of Knowledge' to which the present journal is devoted. It is worth noting that the series featuring Ginzburg's book, *The Italian List*, is one among nine such curated lists at Seagull, alongside numerous other series that are not language-focused. The editorial vision of the series is evident, as seen in its director, Alberto Toscano, the English translator of several works by Alain Badiou. The catalogue includes works by Franco Fortini, Elsa Morante, Sandro Penna, Luigi Pintor, and Rossana Rossanda, along with more recent authors like Giorgio Agamben (*Studiolo, Pinocchio, Hölderlin's Madness*) and Massimo Cacciari (*Hamletics: Shakespeare, Kafka, Beckett*). Ginzburg's *The Soul of the Brutes* is to be read within this context. Moreover, Ginzburg has framed this collection with this readership in mind.

Ginzburg carefully selects the publishers of his books, this attention to editorial and cultural policy is rooted in his personal history. His father, Leone, co-founded the publishing house Einaudi in 1933 and, during the Fascist regime and Nazi occupation of Italy, directed a clandestine newspaper. Carlo Ginzburg published his earliest books with Einaudi, works that earned him international recognition: *I benandanti: Stregoneria e culti agrari tra Cinquecento e Seicento* (1966) and *Il formaggio e i vermi: Il cosmo di un mugnaio del '500* (1976), later translated into English as *The Night Battles: Witchcraft and Agrarian Cults in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983) and *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). In 1994, following

Einaudi's acquisition by Gruppo Mondadori, owned by the Berlusconi family, Ginzburg left the publisher. After a decade with Feltrinelli, he moved to Quodlibet and Adelphi. In addition to revised editions of his major works, Ginzburg published with Adelphi a few new collections of essays, including *Nondimanco: Machiavelli, Pascal* (2018), *La lettera uccide* (2021), and *Paura, Reverenza, Terrore* (2015), which launched the 'Imago' series. The latter was published in English in 2017 by Seagull Books as *Fear, Reverence, Terror*.

Therefore, Ginzburg and Naveen Kishore share a bond that goes back many years. Yet, *The Soul of Brutes* is more than an homage to a gifted publisher. It brings together one of the world's leading historians and one of its most significant publishing houses. While the collection certainly reflects a private dialogue between Ginzburg and Kishore, its publication at this moment suggests broader, more urgent reasons, of public concern, which shine throughout all four chapters of the collection.

I. Civilization and Barbarism

The first chapter reconsiders the Aristotelian background of the Valladolid debate (1550–1551) concerning the moral status of the « Indios of the New World ». This debate was a crucial episode in the colonization of the Americas and a dramatic confrontation between different cultures. Indeed, « Sepúlveda argued for the Indios' natural inferiority [...] whereas Las Casas fought for their rights, making a decisive contribution (as it is widely considered today) to the idea of human rights » (p. 10). Sepúlveda employed one of the most infamous concepts from Aristotle's *Politics* to claim that « Indios [...] are slaves by nature ». As Ginzburg notes, for Aristotle, « slavery is a natural phenomenon, like being a woman » (p. 7) – or, one might add, like being rational or not, an argument that takes centre stage in the second chapter of the collection. Ginzburg demonstrates that Sepúlveda, a translator and commentator of Aristotle, interpreted him through the lens of Aquinas' commentary on the *Politics* – a pattern Ginzburg has identified in several early modern thinkers, including Machiavelli.² Expounding on Aristotle, Aquinas asserted:

Hunting is necessary amongst beasts that are naturally subject to man, as well as against barbarian men who are naturally slaves, as one has already stated; and if such a war ever takes place, it is a just war.³

² CARLO GINZBURG, « Letture intricate. Machiavelli, Aristotele, san Tommaso », in Id., *Nondimanco. Machiavelli, Pascal*, Adelphi, Milano 2018, p. 79–99.

³ Quoted by Ginzburg at p. 18 (his emphasis). See p. 11 and 18 for discussion of Aquinas' *Commentaria in octo Politicorum Aristotelis libros* and their humanist editions.

While Aquinas was theorizing in an abstract scenario, Sepúlveda applied this argument to justify the killing of indigenous people by European colonizers, whom he equated to wild animals – a dreadful comparison to which Ginzburg returns in the second essay of the collection (p. 51–51). Aristotle might have approved of this conclusion or, at least, so thought Las Casas, who explicitly distanced himself from « The Philosopher » in the name of « Christian charity and truth » (p. 17–18).

Valeat Aristoteles, « Farewell, Aristotle », wrote Las Casas. Yet, as Ginzburg shows, he countered Sepúlveda using another Aristotelian distinction, drawn from the latter's *On Interpretation*: the contrast between speaking « absolutely » (*haplôs*) and speaking « with reference to time » (*katà chrónon*), which Boethius later translated as *simpliciter* versus *secundum quid*: « absolutely » versus « according to circumstances ». This conceptual opposition was a cornerstone of university teaching for centuries and framed many early modern debates – including Galileo's condemnation, as Ginzburg has argued elsewhere.⁴ Armed with these distinctions, Las Casas argued that Native Americans

are not barbarians *simpliciter* (absolutely) but rather barbarians *secundum quid*: and therefore, they should not be spoken of as proper barbarians but rather as barbarians due to a series of accidental circumstances (*ex accidente*) (p. 13).

« Barbarians » to Europeans, who knew nothing of their languages and cultures; but the opposite is also the case. Still, they are human beings, entitled to full natural rights. Ginzburg argues that while Sepúlveda and Las Casas reached opposite conclusions, they both filtered their understandings of these distant populations through the lenses of ancient and medieval philosophy. Distance in space and time, the technique of *Verfremdung*, and the metaphor of perspective: these are concepts Ginzburg has explored for decades, reflecting on both their potential and their challenges.⁵

Indeed, the contrast between different civilizations has shaped human thought since at least Herodotus' observations on the Persians' « custom » (*nomos*). These ancient debates continue to resonate in contemporary discourse, making such questions « seem more urgent than ever ». In reading Herodotus and Las Casas, Ginzburg notes, we experience « the unsettling feeling [...] that we are facing something contemporary » (p. 4). However, he warns against simplistic analogies:

⁴ GINZBURG, *Nondimanco*.

⁵ See especially CARLO GINZBURG, *Wooden Eyes. Nine Reflections on Distance*, Columbia University Press, New York 2001, p. 113. First Italian edition, *Occhiacci di legno. Nove riflessioni sulla distanza*, Feltrinelli, Milano 1998, more recently reprinted with one additional essay (Quodlibet, Macerata 2019).

Today, somebody would translate the opposition between *physis* and *nomos*, nature and convention, into a question rife with political implications: « Do cultural differences have a biological origin? » (p. 7).

This, Ginzburg argues, would be « a blatant anachronism » (p. 7). A historically grounded answer requires careful attention to « the historical sequence » and the evolving contexts in which ideas emerge. His analysis of the Valladolid debate invites us to reflect on the historical construction of the categories we use to define both ourselves and others. He calls for a case-by-case approach – both as historians and as historical actors confronted with « massive migratory currents » and the tensions they generate (p. 23).

Yet, these conceptual tools extend beyond colonialism. Ginzburg suggests that contemporary bioethical debates provide the most striking modern instance of Boethius' *secundum quid* distinction and its reworkings by Jesuit casuists, all topics to which he has devoted numerous essays in recent years. The conclusion is provocative: « We must learn from the Jesuits – and from Pascal » (p. 23).

This conceptual opposition – absolute versus relative, *simpliciter* versus *secundum quid* – continues to shape contemporary thought, whether we are aware of it or not. Some certainly are. Just months after the publication of this collection, the first Jesuit Pope commemorated the 400th anniversary of Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) and his *Lettres Provinciales*, the most scathing critique ever written against Jesuit casuistry and their theology of grace. « Before concluding, I must mention Pascal's relationship with Jansenism »: the embarrassment is palpable, the issue still touchy. « Some of his <Pascal's> own statements, such as those on predestination, drawn from the later theology of Augustine and formulated more severely by Jansen, do not ring true ». Yet even these charges against orthodoxy might be qualified, provided one takes context into account:

We should realize, however, that, just as Saint Augustine sought in the fifth century to combat the Pelagians, who claimed that man can, by his own powers and without God's grace, do good and be saved, so Pascal, for his part, sincerely believed that he was battling an implicit Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism in the teachings of the 'Molinist' Jesuits [...] Let us credit Pascal with the candour and sincerity of his intentions.⁶

Pascal too, the Jesuit Pope concluded, was in the end a good Catholic – if only *secundum quid*.⁷

⁶ POPE FRANCIS, *Sublimitas et miseria hominis* (Apostolic Letter, 23 June 2023). Available at <https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_letters/documents/20230619-sublimitas-et-miseria-hominis.html>.

⁷ In *La lettera uccide* (Adelphi 2021), Ginzburg brings to light the Jesuit background of another, most contentious statement by Pope Francis: « I believe in God – not in a Catholic God; there is no

II. *The Soul of Brutes*

The second essay in the collection explores the sixteenth-century debate on the soul of brutes and its classical sources, with a particular focus on a dialogue by Gerolamo Rorario, examined in light of Aristotle and Plutarch. Rorario (1485–1556) was active in some of the most important courts and administrations of his day, including those of the Emperors Maximilian and Charles V, and the Popes Leo X and Clement VII. However, his enduring fame stems from a short treatise entitled *Quod animalia bruta saepe ratione utantur melius homine*, often translated as *Brutes Are Often More Rational than Men*. When Gabriel Naudé published this manuscript in 1648, he deliberately suppressed the qualifier *saepe* (« often »), transforming the title into an unqualified assertion of brute superiority over humans: an exemplary case of *libertinage érudit*. This editorial decision turned Rorario's work into a significant contribution to the contemporary *querelle de l'âme des bêtes* and made it into a literary case. Bayle dedicated an entry to « Rorarius » in his *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, using it as a platform to critique Descartes and Leibniz, and further cementing Rorario's posthumous influence.

In his dialogue, Rorario compiles anecdotes purporting to demonstrate that non-human animals – « the brutes » – possess superior cognitive skills and frequently outsmart humans. He blends personal observations with classical examples, drawing primarily from Plutarch's dialogue *Whether Land or Sea Animals Have More Intelligence*, known in Latin as *De sollertia animalium* (the original Greek is *phronesis*). Indeed, Ginzburg suggests that the mid-sixteenth-century vulgarizations of Plutarch's animal treatises may shed light on the development of the text. In particular, a manuscript preserved in Siena, attesting to an earlier version of Rorario's text, remains to be studied in detail (p. 45, 49).

The study of Rorario's dialogue and its reception thus provides a case study of how the rediscovery of ancient texts revealed conceptual possibilities and constraints, shaping the European encounter with new realities (p. 49). This intellectual dynamic was for Ginzburg a defining feature of early modern thought, with far-reaching consequences. Aby Warburg famously coined the concept of *Pathosformeln*, « formulas of emotion », to describe the persistence of ancient visual formulas in Renaissance art. On this model, Ginzburg proposes the notion

Catholic God (*non esiste un Dio cattolico*). There is God, and I believe in Jesus Christ, his incarnation » (*La Repubblica*, 1 October 2023, A Conversation with Eugenio Scalfari). In his recent collection of essays *La lettera uccide*, Ginzburg devoted a fine essay to this statement, tracing its intellectual genealogy back to the 17th- and 18th-century debates on the Chinese Rites controversy. These debates are still shaping our lives. In those same months, asked about the presence of gay persons in the Church, Pope Francis commented « Who am I to judge? ». The statement scandalized the conservative front and deprived them of a powerful weapon. Three years later, after decades of struggles, Italy finally approved a bid to allow same-sex partnerships.

of *Logosformeln*, « formulas of reasoning », the conceptual counterpart of Warburg's iconographic schemes.⁸

A significant portion of Ginzburg's essay is devoted to demonstrating that Plutarch – and, in his wake, Rorario – challenged the notion that humans are the only « rational animals » by exploiting a tension in Aristotle's own psychology. Ginzburg's analysis centres on Aristotle's treatment of *phantasia* (imagination), a topic still widely debated among scholars. Ginzburg argues that the ambiguous status of this faculty, positioned between sensation and intellect, provided conceptual space for blurring the clear-cut divide between human and non-human animals, a divide defended in many other places in Aristotle's corpus, particularly in the *Politics*.

This tension in Aristotle's thought was already recognized by Strato, his second successor at the Lyceum, who asserted that « it is not at all possible to have perception without mental action (*noein*) ». Plutarch interpreted this to mean that sense perception is always accompanied by reason. Consequently, he argued that the difference between human and animal intelligence is one of degree, not kind:

Let us therefore not say of beasts, if their understanding is less keen and their thought processes inferior <to ours>, that they do not understand or think at all, and that they have no reason, but rather that their reason is weak and clouded, like an eye that is dim-sighted and confused.⁹

Plutarch moves fluidly between terms such as *phronesis* (practical wisdom), *dianoia* (thought), *logismos* (reasoning), and *noein* (intellect), treating them as near-synonyms, much to his interpreters' dismay.¹⁰ This lexical flexibility might well reflect Plutarch's rejection of a strict cognitive hierarchy, as if he had embraced the ambiguity of Aristotle's *phantasia* and made it into a feature of his psychology and cognitive vocabulary.¹¹

⁸ See the above-mentioned *Wooden Eyes*.

⁹ PLUTARCH, *De sollertia animalium* 963B, in *Plutarch's Three Treatises on Animals*, ed. and transl. STEPHEN T. NEWMYER, Routledge, London – New York 2021, p. 25.

¹⁰ See PLUTARCH, *De sollertia animalium* 959A–961B.

¹¹ On the issue, see PHILIP SIDNEY HORKY, « The Spectrum of Animal Rationality in Plutarch », *Apeiron*, 50/1 (2017), p. 103–133. The difficulty in interpreting the Greek cognitive vocabulary is especially evident in translations. Thus, for example, in the above-mentioned fragment by Strato, *noein* is variously rendered as « some action of the intelligence » (the translation adopted by Ginzburg, p. 39), as « mental action » (Newmyer, quoted above), or as « thinking », as in Gillian Clark's translation of Porphyry's *On Abstinence from Killing Animals*, 3.21.8, Bloomsbury, London 2000 p. 175, who notes (f. 487) that « usually *nous* and related words are translated 'intellect', but in this passage 'mind' for *nous*, 'thinking' or 'thought' for *noein*, are more natural English ». The same difficulty holds true of *sollertia*, whereby Latin humanists tried to capture the spectrum of Plutarch's terminology.

Aristotle famously argued that « nature does nothing in vain », concluding that non-human animals exist for the benefit of humans. Plutarch, in contrast, used the same principle to argue that non-human animals must possess reasoning skills, since otherwise they would be incapable of providing for their own well-being, rendering their senses useless:

For nature, which they correctly say does everything toward some purpose and goal, did not create a sentient being for the single purpose of perceiving when something is happening to it [...]. But since there exist many things which are akin to it and foreign to it, a being would not survive for a moment if it did not learn to avoid some things and to enter into association with others. Now, perception supplies the knowledge of both of these to each being. Creatures born with no capacity to reason or judge or recollect or attend could not by any means perform those actions of pursuing and seizing upon things that follow upon a perception of usefulness and of steering clear of and fleeing those things that are harmful and troublesome.¹²

Plutarch's primary targets were the Stoics and their emphasis on reason and language as elements that sharply opposed man to all other animals (p. 37). « They don't have syntax, so we can eat them », as Sorabji caustically put it.¹³ In the passage above, Plutarch turns key Stoic concepts – *oikeiosis* and finalism – against them, using their own philosophical principles to reach the opposite conclusion. This was not merely a dialectical manoeuvre but a deeply held conviction, central to Plutarch's philosophy and way of life. Here the lucid, fictional dialogue between Plutarch's father Autobulus and a friend, Soclarus, suddenly becomes emotionally charged and brings back the ring of Plutarch's own voice:

Those creatures that you deprive altogether of expectation, memory, intention, preparation, hope, fear, inclination, and grief, have no use for eyes and ears, though they have them. It would be preferable to be free of all sensation and representation if one has no means of making use of these faculties than to experience pain and distress and anguish if one has no means of evading them!¹⁴

As Ginzburg observes, Plutarch supports his argument by extensively citing Aristotle's *History of Animals* and, « more importantly, he developed [...] concepts put forward by Aristotle, especially in his treatise *On the Soul* » (p. 37).¹⁵

¹² PLUTARCH, *De sollertia animalium* 960E, p. 22.

¹³ RICHARD SORABJI, *Animal Minds and Human Morals. The Origins of the Western Debate*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1993.

¹⁴ PLUTARCH, *De sollertia animalium* 960F, p. 22.

¹⁵ Ginzburg makes clear that he is « not opposing Plutarch and Aristotle on this subject » (p. 53).

Ginzburg is undoubtedly right, but the reception of Aristotle's works suggests insisting more on the tensions between Aristotle's psychological and zoological writings: on the one hand, *De anima* and the so-called *Parva Naturalia*; on the other, the works devoted to the 'history', the generation, the movement, the parts, and the 'progression' of animals (*Historia animalium*, *De generatione animalium*, *De motu animalium*, *De partibus animalium*, *De incessu animalium*), sometimes grouped as *De animalibus*.¹⁶ Indeed, in his zoological writings, Aristotle grants non-human animals a vast array of cognitive skills that are not always easy to square with the tripartite model of the 'faculties' defended in *On the Soul*. In particular, in his *History of Animals*, Aristotle went as far as to differentiate animals based on their *nous*, and some passages seem to imply a continuity with humans.¹⁷ Also, in these writings, Aristotle attributed to non-human animals a form of « practical intelligence » (*synesis*), whose exact status and nature are all but clear.

Taken together, Aristotle's writings appear to uphold a rigid distinction between humans and animals based on intellect. However, one can understand how Plutarch could call upon Aristotle's zoological works to argue the opposite. This ambiguity was later exploited by Porphyry, who quoted (often verbatim) and expanded upon Plutarch's key arguments in the third book of *On Abstinence from Killing Animals*, a text that would exert significant influence in the early modern period. Porphyry went even further than Plutarch in enlisting « The Philosopher » to his cause: « Aristotle and Plato, Empedocles and Pythagoras and Democritus, and all who have sought to grasp the truth about animals, have recognized that they share in *logos* ».¹⁸

This tension troubled Aristotelians for centuries. In 1594, the Jesuit commentators of Coimbra were still arguing against Porphyry's and Plutarch's interpretations. More than a century later, Bayle presented all their arguments in his *Dictionnaire*, in the entry on « Pereira », thereby exposing them to an even broader readership – a remarkable set of Chinese boxes, to use one of Ginzburg's favourite metaphors (p. 90).¹⁹

Adding a few intermediary « boxes » may help us better appreciate the nuances between the extremes of this intellectual tradition. In the collection's first essay, Ginzburg already demonstrated that these *Logosformeln* did not remain dormant during the Middle Ages, but instead evolved into slightly different formulations

¹⁶ On Aristotle's reception around Plutarch's times, see RICCARDO CHIARADONNA, « Interpretazione filosofica e ricezione del *corpus*. Il caso di Aristotele (100 a.C.–250 d.C.) », *Quaestio*, 11 (2011), p. 83–114.

¹⁷ Respectively, Aristotle, *Historia animalium* IX.3 (610b20–610b21) and I.1 (488b15–16).

¹⁸ PORPHYRY, *De abstinence ab esu carniū* 3.6.7 in ID., *On Abstinence from Killing Animals*, transl. GILLIAN CLARK, Bloomsbury, London 2000, p. 84.

¹⁹ PIERRE BAYLE, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, Brunel et alii, Amsterdam 1740, 5th edition, III 650, « Pereira ». Cf. CECILIA MURATORI, *Renaissance Vegetarianism. The Philosophical Afterlives of Porphyry's On Abstinence*, Legenda, Cambridge 2020, especially p. 177–183.

and meanings, even within the commentary tradition. This is even more evident in independent treatises.

For centuries, Arabic and Latin thinkers struggled to account for animals' responsive behaviour – Plutarch's main argument for their possession of intellect – by expanding Aristotle's psychology. Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), for instance, introduced an additional pre-intellectual « power », known in Latin as the *vis aestimativa*, which allowed animals to « evaluate » things, perceiving them *insofar* as they are advantageous or harmful. Thanks to this faculty, Avicenna argued, a lamb could distinguish between friendly and hostile creatures, and follow its flock, and flee from a wolf. This theory enjoyed immense popularity in the Latin Middle Ages and was further elaborated with the addition of yet more faculties of the sensory soul: the *virtus distinctiva*, the *vis cogitativa*, the *logistica*. The ambiguity Ginzburg detects regarding *phantasia* is just one example of a broader conceptual difficulty.

For Arabic and Latin Aristotelians, a set of « internal senses » existed between the five traditional external senses (touch, taste, smell, hearing, sight) and the intellect. These internal senses included the *imaginativa*, the *sensus communis*, and the *memoria*. Their classification remained a subject of heated debate well into the early modern period. In fact, many Latin thinkers identified the dividing line between humans and animals precisely in terms of the *virtus aestimativa* and the *cogitativa*.

These « internal senses » became so central in the thirteenth century that some thinkers argued for distinctions between humans and non-human animals even at the level of *external* senses. The case of Roger Bacon is particularly telling: he was among the very few to grant « brutes » a *virtus logica*, *id est rationalis* and yet simultaneously proposed a different account of human and animal perception, particularly regarding vision, leading to divergent apprehensions of the so-called « common sensibles ».²⁰

The role of the internal senses becomes even more prominent in cognitive operations beyond sense perception. One of the most striking pieces of evidence comes from Roger Bacon's contemporary (and rival), Albert the Great, who was also Aquinas' teacher. In his massive treatise *On Animals*, composed primarily in the 1260s, Albert devoted nineteen books to presenting Aristotle's zoological writings, before introducing two treatises of his own. A substantial portion of the twenty-first book, *On Perfect and Imperfect Animals*, is dedicated to « pygmies »,

²⁰ See MATTIA MANTOVANI, « *Visio per sillogismum*. Sensation and Cognition in 13th-Century Theories of Vision », in ELENA BĂLTUȚĂ (ed.), *Medieval Perceptual Puzzles. Theories of Sense Perception in the 13th and 14th Centuries*, Brill, Leiden 2020, p. 111–152. Id., « The First of All Natural Sciences. Roger Bacon on *perspectiva* and Human Knowledge », *Vivarium*, 59 (2021), p. 186–214. On the late medieval debate about animal cognitive skills see, more generally, ANSELM OELZE, *Animal Rationality. Later Medieval Theories, 1250–1350*, Brill, Leiden 2018.

which Albert – I would suggest – constructs as a thought experiment to explore the highest possible achievements of the internal senses in the absence of intellect. He discusses their language, crafts, and political organization but ultimately concludes that, despite surface similarities to human behaviour, pygmies differ fundamentally and in kind due to their lack of intellect. Even when pygmies *sound* just like humans, Albert insists that this is no reason to equate them with « us »:

And thus, the pygmy, although it speaks, nevertheless does not argue or speak of the universals of things, but rather its voices are directed at the particular things of which it speaks. Its speech is caused by a shadow echoing in a defect of reason (*causatur enim loquela sua ex umbra resultante in occasu rationis*).²¹

« A certain shadow of reason », « an obscure echo of reason »: Albert is clearly struggling to push to their limits the pre-rational skills of non-human animals and, in want of best, is ready to trade metaphors for concepts. Yet these metaphors would have very real consequences in the long run.

Albert's *pygmei* are a philosopher's thought experiment and a thing of a marvel, the deformed echo of travel reports and fables, such as takes of mortal fights between pygmies and cranes. But his *On Animals* would acquire novel significance in the sixteenth century, as evidenced by its 1513 reprint in Venice, an elegant folio edition curated by Marco Antonio Zimara.²² Indeed, as Ginzburg observes, « from Plato onwards, all discourses on the soul were also, at least implicitly, discourses on the body politic » (p. 39–40). These debates often unfolded, explicitly or implicitly, against the backdrop of Aristotle's definition of human beings as the only « political animals » – a status granted by virtue of intellect.

Following the lines of the first essay in Ginzburg's collection and the wicked legacy of Aquinas' *Commentary on the Politics*, one can thus easily imagine how Sepúlveda and Las Casas might have interpreted Albert's remarks on the pygmies' lack of *civilitas*:

However, perfection of this sort – the « shadow of reason » mentioned above – is next in rank beneath the human, so that the pygmy does not uphold a perfect political system or laws (*etiam pigmeus civilitatem perfectam et leges non custodit*), but rather follows the impulse of nature in such matters, just as other brute animals do.

²¹ ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *De animalibus*, ed. HERMANN STADLER, Aschendorffschen, Münster 1916–1920, I. XXI, c. 2, 1328; Albertus Magnus, *On Animals. A Medieval Summa Zoologica*, transl. KENNETH F. KITCHELL JR., IRVEN MICHAEL RESNICK, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore – London 1999, II 1417: « for his speech is caused by the shadow resulting from the setting of reason ».

²² ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *De animalibus libri vigintisex novissime impressi, emendati per M.A. Zimaram*, heirs of Ottaviano Scotti, Venice 1513. (I could not consult this work). On this edition, and for a presentation of the relevant literature, see LUCA BIANCHI, *Studi sull'aristotelismo del Rinascimento*, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2003, p. 209–223.

For Albert, even the most striking similarities between human and pygmy bodies should not lead us astray. Indeed, what challenged the Aristotelian framework on brutes was not only artificial creations but also the very bodily constitution of these creatures – their ability to produce artifacts in the first place. Albert is perplexed by the pygmies' posture and even more so by their hands, which Aristotle had identified as the « organ of organs », « the instrument of all instruments ». Yet Albert insists that the defining mark of humanity is not the external organs themselves but the hidden faculty that governs them:

But it <the pygmy> walks erect. And it does not use a hand as an instrument of intellect or as a kind of tool (that is, an organ), but rather, just as certain animals use their front feet for various tasks – like some mice that pick up food and direct it to their mouths – so too the pygmy uses its hand for multiple purposes, but not for works of art [...]. For this reason, it always dwells in the forests, belonging to no political system whatsoever (*et ideo semper silvestris manet nullam prorsus civilitatem custodiens*).²³

Here we encounter yet another *Logosformel* dating back to pre-Socratic Greece. Albert clearly has in mind a passage from *On the Parts of Animals*, where Aristotle argues against Anaxagoras, that « it is not the possession of these hands the cause of man being of all animals the most intelligent » but, to the contrary, « man has hands because of his superior intelligence ». ²⁴ This fragment – one of the few surviving texts from a philosopher exiled from Athens for impiety – was preserved only because an opponent recorded it in order to refute it. But, as Ginzburg wryly notes, « unintended consequences are, as always in human history, the norm » (p. 84).

Thus, we return to the questions raised in the collection's first essay, and this is no coincidence. The uneasy grounding of human culture in its physical embodiment is a problem that has long fascinated Ginzburg. Thus, In *Storia notturna: Una decifrazione del sabba* (Einaudi, 1989), translated as *Ecstasies: Deciphering the Witches' Sabbath* (Hutchinson Radius, 1990), he attempted to explain

²³ ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *De animalibus*, ed. STADLER, XXI, c. 2, 1328–1329; transl. II 1417. Ginzburg does not quote Albert, but he himself remarks that « even Mexican builders, according to Sepúlveda, could not be regarded as evidence of human ingenuity, since bees and spiders build things no human can imitate » (p. 51). Sepúlveda had clearly in mind the sophisticated debates about animal *techne* (*ars*) by Latin Aristotelians, as in commenting on *Physics* II 8–9 and on the zoological treatise, for example in relation to birds' nesting. On the Medieval discussion about the « political animal » see, more generally, JUHANA TOIVANEN, *The Political Animal in Medieval Philosophy. A Philosophical Study of the Commentary Tradition, c.1260–c.1410*, Brill, Leiden 2020.

²⁴ ARISTOTLE, *De partibus animalium* IV.10, 687a6–8, in *Complete Works of Aristotle*, The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. JONATHAN BARNES, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1984, vol. I, p. 95, modified, emphases added.

the transcultural diffusion of myths and rites centred on asymmetric deambulation, from Oedipus to Cinderella, by appealing to the « elemental, minimal perception that the human species has of itself – of its corporeal image » as a bipedal animal.²⁵ No « cultural universal », therefore, let alone a « collective unconscious » à la Jung, but rather the human body as a matrix for cultural creations. Significantly, *Storia notturna* takes as its epigraph a fragment of another Pre-Socratic thinker, Xenophanes' B15: « If horses and oxen had hands and could draw pictures, their gods would look remarkably like horses and oxen ».

The rational animal, the political one, the only animal with a proper hand, and « gifted by the creator [...] with an upturned face » (*opifex rerum [...] os homini sublime dedit*), « the featherless biped »: so many and diverse were the accounts worked out over the centuries for humans to secure their pre-eminence over all other, « lower » animals. But not all of them – not all of us – felt so far apart from these « brutes », and among them was one of the most skilled draughtsmen of the sixteenth century. Thus, in *The Soul of Brutes*, Ginzburg brilliantly argues that Parmigianino's *Self-Portrait with a Bitch* (Fig. 1) was meant to ridicule Ovid's and Plato's definitions of the human being. According to Ginzburg, the very style of the drawing expresses a quite different understanding of the status of humans and animals: « the fluid, sensitive line conveys the physical and emotional closeness between two very different beings: the sitting man and the standing, pregnant bitch » (p. 26).

²⁵ CARLO GINZBURG, *Storia notturna: Una decifrazione del sabba*, Einaudi, Torino 1989, p. 193: « Il mito <on the origin of humankind, from Ceram Island> ci invita a riconoscere nella simmetria una caratteristica degli esseri viventi. Se ad essa aggiungiamo una caratteristica più specificamente, anche se non esclusivamente, umana – la stazione eretta – ci troviamo di fronte a un essere vivente, simmetrico, bipede. La diffusione transculturale dei miti e dei riti imperniati sull'asimmetria deambulatoria ha verosimilmente la sua origine psicologica in questa percezione elementare, minima, che la specie umana ha di se stessa – della propria immagine corporea. Ciò che altera quest'immagine, su un piano letterale o metaforico, appare quindi particolarmente adatto ad esprimere un'esperienza oltre i limiti dell'umano: il viaggio nel mondo dei morti, compiuto in estati o attraverso i riti d'iniziazione ».



Fig. 1: Parmigianino, *Self-Portrait with a Bitch*.
Public-domain image, from Wikipedia Commons.

A few decades later, Montaigne went one step further and looked at himself through the eyes of his pet: « When I am playing with my cat, who knows whether she has more sport in dallying with me than I have in gaming with her? ».²⁶

²⁶ MONTAIGNE, *Les Essais* II 12, *Apologie de Raymond Sebond*, ed. JEAN BALSAMO, CATHERINE MAGNIEN-SIMONIN and MICHEL MAGNIEN, Gallimard, Pléiade, Paris 2007: « Quand je me joue à ma chatte, qui sait si elle

Plutarch's « most famous sixteenth-century reader » (p. 52) described his and his cat's mutual entertainments as « de singeries réciproques », bringing into play the brute who posed the greatest challenges to mankind's purported exceptionalism.

Albert discussed apes right after the pygmy, remarking in astonishment that they are able to grasp the « intentions » of other animals, humans included – a prototypical « theory of mind » in Michael Tomasello's fashion. The theory of the « internal senses » had ended up posing yet another challenge to any neat opposition between humans and superior mammals.

Albert hastened to explain away this anomaly but only made more visible the conceptual possibilities opened by Aristotle's comparative ethology, leaving it to others to explore them. Still in 1882, just a few months before his death, an acclaimed naturalist of the time pointed out that even his « two gods », Linnaeus and Cuvier, were « mere schoolboys to old Aristotle ». Largely forgotten nowadays, for centuries Aristotle's zoological treatise proved an inspiration to some extraordinary readers: Plutarch, Avicenna, Charles Darwin.²⁷

III. *Calvino, Manzoni, and the Gray Area*

Casuistry features prominently in the third essay of the collection, *Calvino, Manzoni, and the Gray Area*, which is, in fact, an essay on Primo Levi. *La zona grigia* is the title of the key chapter of Levi's last book, *I sommersi e i salvati* (Einaudi, 1986), rendered into English as *The Drowned and the Saved*.

Ginzburg reconstructs the emergence of this theme in Levi's writing, starting from the preface to Levi's 1976 translation of Jacob Presser's *The Night of the Girondins* (1957). In a 1979 interview, Levi explained that he wanted to re-examine his experiences in the concentration camp in order to investigate « the extreme ambiguity of that place, the gray band that separated the oppressed from the oppressors ».²⁸

Manzoni's *The Betrothed* proved crucial for Levi in articulating his ideas and was likely a key source for him: Manzoni's novel was – and still is – mandatory reading in Italian high schools. In Ginzburg's words, « Levi chose Manzoni as a guide for advancing towards the slippery slope of ambiguity » (p. 62):

When Renzo Tramaglino threatens don Abbondio with a knife, Manzoni observes that the oppressor, don Rodrigo, is also responsible for the minor acts of oppression

passe son temps de moi plus que je fais d'elle? ». As Ginzburg remarks « the uniqueness of human beings was cast into doubt by stressing their similarity with allegedly inferior animals » (p. 31).

²⁷ See ALLAN GOTTHELF, « Darwin on Aristotle », *Journal of the History of Biology*, 32/1 (1999), p. 3–30.

²⁸ PRIMO LEVI, *The Voice of Memory. Interviews, 1961–1987*, ed. MARCO BELPOLITI, DAVID GORDON, Polity, New York 2000, p. 131, emphases added. Quoted by Ginzburg, p. 60.

carried out by his victims. It is a theme that I recognize too well. It is a stupid mistake to see all the demons on one side and all the saints on the other. It was not like that at all [...]. To divide into black and white means not to know human nature.²⁹

Levi insisted that understanding human beings, and the tragedy of the *Lager* specifically, demands that we confront human complexity and « take a stance in front of ambiguity ». The context-sensitive, case-by-case reasoning studied in the first essay of Ginzburg's collection finds here a most dramatic formulation. But « understanding is not pardoning »: the versatility of intelligence does *not* entail the malleability of moral standards. « The condition of the offended does not exclude culpability », Levi wrote, « but I know of no human tribunal to which one could delegate the judgment ».³⁰ As Ginzburg argues, Levi, an atheist of Jewish origins, was here engaging in a mental dialogue with « a Catholic convert who did recognize divine judgment as the decisive appeal » (p. 64). Manzoni was an eager reader of Pascal and strongly opposed the Jesuits' casuistry. Yet their circumstantial analyses provided Manzoni – and, in his footsteps, Levi – with finer cognitive tools for inquiring into human agency.

Ginzburg's reconstruction is convincing, even if indirect: he supports his case by quoting Levi's use of the expression « cases of conscience » in his preface to Langbein's *People in Auschwitz*, which dates, however, to a few years later (1984). But Ginzburg could have cited an earlier text to further support his reading.

Before appearing in *The Drowned and the Saved*, a first version of the concluding part of *The Gray Zone* chapter was published on 20 November 1977 in the Italian newspaper *La Stampa* under the title *Il re dei Giudei* (*The King of the Jews*). The piece centres on Chaim Rumkowski, the head of the Jewish Council of Elders in the Łódź Ghetto, appointed by Nazi Germany during the German occupation of Poland: a profoundly « ambiguous » figure (if any), analogous in many respects to the camps' *Sonderkommandos*. In closing his portrait of Rumkowski, Levi put forward a more general remark:

È tipico dei regimi in cui tutto il potere piove dall'alto, e nessuna critica può salire dal basso, di svigorire e confondere la capacità di giudizio, e di creare una vasta zona di coscienze grige che stanno fra i grandi del male e le vittime pure: in questa fascia va collocato Rumkowski.³¹

²⁹ PRIMO LEVI, « A Conversation with Primo Levi (1979) », interview by Giuseppe Grassano in LEVI, *The Voice of Memory*, p. 131–132.

³⁰ PRIMO LEVI, *I sommersi e i salvati*, Einaudi, Torino 2007 [ed. or. 1986], p. 30, here too with a reference to Manzoni; PRIMO LEVI, *The Drowned and the Saved*, transl. RAYMOND ROSENTHAL, Vintage, New York 1989, p. 44. Quoted by Ginzburg, p. 64.

³¹ I quote from the 1981 Einaudi's edition of *Il re dei Giudei*, within *Lilit e altri racconti* (p. 85; emphasis mine).

A « vast area » populated by « gray consciences », halfway between the oppressors at the top and the pure victims: for Levi, this was the « band » in which we are to place Rumkowski. In the final version of *The Drowned and the Saved* (1986), Levi shortened the passage to one line, which now seemed slightly out of place:

In questa fascia di mezze coscienze va collocato Rumkowski, figura simbolica e compendiaria.³²

In the book version, « gray » shifted from qualifying « consciences » to the « zone » and « band » in which these ambiguous figures move, and the expression *coscienze grige* disappeared altogether. Arguably, it was while reworking this passage that Levi came to single out *la zona grigia* as the precise expression for articulating his questions and confronting ambiguity. Thus, in the book version Levi added a specific sentence to this effect, amidst the general remarks about Rumkowski's case, already presented in the 1977 piece:

Una storia come questa non è chiusa in sé. È piena, pone più domande di quante ne soddisfa, riassume in sé l'intera tematica della zona grigia, e lascia sospesi.³³

The 1984 interview quoted by Ginzburg re-establishes the link, suggesting that Levi never ceased reflecting on this « gray zone » in relation to consciences and their difficult cases.³⁴

This is further confirmed by yet another addition in the 1986 book version. In *The Drowned and the Saved*, Levi inserted a few lines before the opening already used in *The King of the Jews* of 1977 (« Al mio ritorno da Auschwitz »): a preliminary remark about the « *impotentia judicandi* » that « paralyzes » one when faced with Rumkowski's case.³⁵ A Latin expression, in brackets: Levi clearly had a reference in mind.

A preliminary survey did not bring to light relevant sources. Levi scholars, as far as I have been able to determine, are understandably struck by the phrase, but leave it unexplained. Yet, to decipher it, one only needed to read it against the light. According to Christian theology, *potentia judicandi* and *scientia discernendi* – the « science of discerning » and the « power to judge » sins – were the prerogative

³² LEVI, *I sommersi e i salvati*, p. 51, emphasis mine.

³³ Compare *Il re dei Giudei* of 1977 (p. 84) and *I sommersi e i salvati* (p. 49); emphasis mine.

³⁴ On Ginzburg's understanding of Primo Levi's « gray zone » see also VITTORIO FOA, CARLO GINZBURG, *Un dialogo*, Feltrinelli, Milano 2003, p. 95–114, and especially p. 105–109.

³⁵ LEVI, *I sommersi e i salvati*, p. 44: « La stessa 'impotentia judicandi' ci paralizza davanti al caso Rumkowski. La storia di Chaim Rumkowski non è propriamente una storia di Lager, benché nel Lager si concluda: è una storia di ghetto, ma così eloquente sul tema fondamentale dell'ambiguità umana provocata fatalmente dall'oppressione, che mi pare si attagli fin troppo bene al nostro discorso. La ripeto qui, anche se già l'ho narrata altrove ».

of confessors and the true meaning of the two keys of heaven mentioned in the Gospel of Matthew, the ultimate signs of the Church's authority.³⁶ Ginzburg was right: in his efforts to grapple with « ambiguity », Levi turned to the conceptual tools of Christian examinations of conscience, and concluded that they failed.

Cases like Rumkowski's continue to defy our understanding, but reflecting on them compels all of us to stay alert and watchful of our own « essential frailty ». As Levi described it in *Se questo è un uomo* (1947), it is the frailty of an animal: the « human animal in the struggle for life ».³⁷ Behind Manzoni and the manuals for confessors, one seems to recognize one of the oldest extant statements on the relationship between humans and animals, and their shared fate, from the Hebrew *Bible*:

For the fate of humans and the fate of animals is the same; as one dies, so dies the other. They all have the same breath, and humans have no advantage over the animals; for all is vanity. (*Ecclesiastes* 3:19)

IV. Schema and Bias. A Historian's Reflection on a Double-Blind Experiment

Ginzburg has long been reflecting on the methodology of historical research and on « the historian's craft » (p. 78, 80, and 95), in the wake of Marc Bloch's *Métier d'historien*. These inquiries have often led Ginzburg to investigate the emergence of history itself as a discipline, modelled, among others, on Arnaldo Momigliano's *History between Medicine and Rhetoric* (1985), another landmark inspiration for Ginzburg. He even considered « History between Medicine and Law » as a possible title for the fourth and last essay of the present collection, had it not been « presumptuous » (p. 90). The essay continues Ginzburg's dialogue with many great intellectuals of the past century, with explicit references to his student years in Pisa (p. 102–103). Many of them happen to be Italian: Momigliano, for one, but also scholars and intellectuals such as Giorgio Pasquali, Arsenio Frugoni, Sebastiano Timpanaro, and Vittorio Foa, some of whose exchanges with Ginzburg were already published in 2003. And, indeed, the essay is dedicated to Foa, an anti-fascist activist who endured nine years of imprisonment, later became a member

³⁶ See notably Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* IV, dist. 18 (*De remissione sacerdotis*), q. 1.

³⁷ PRIMO LEVI, *If This Is a Man and The Truce*, transl. STUART WOOLF, Abacus, London 2002, p. 93. Quoted by Ginzburg at p. 59. In *I sommersi e i salvati* – and especially in chapter *La zona grigia* – Levi insists on the ethological grounding of hierarchical and social oppositions; LEVI, *I sommersi e i salvati*, p. 24: « è talmente forte in noi, forse per ragioni che risalgono alle nostre origini di animali sociali, l'esigenza di dividere il campo fra 'noi' e 'loro' »; Ibid., 32: « è verosimile che una certa misura di dominio dell'uomo sull'uomo sia iscritta nel nostro patrimonio genetico di animali gregari ». Levi's goal is two-fold: knowing « the human species » in general (p. 27), and the innumerable « varietà dell'animale-uomo » (p. 112).

of the Italian Constituent Assembly, and was a leader of the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI). Non-Italian readers, or those unfamiliar with Ginzburg's work, might find it challenging to follow all the threads and implications of this dense essay. But it is a luxury problem one is glad to confront.

Over the years, these methodological reflections have become increasingly urgent for Ginzburg, in response to the « fashionable, yet superficial scepticism which has, for decades, affected (or infected) the humanities and social sciences », the explicit target of the present essay and several of his earlier writings (p. 104). It is not merely a scholarly debate: for years, top political officials have been speaking of « alternative facts » and govern accordingly. « At stake in this debate », Ginzburg warns, « is the meaning – no more, no less – we ascribe to terms like 'knowledge,' 'truth,' 'reality' » (p. 75).

As a historian, Ginzburg confronts the problem by reflecting on the status of testimony, both in the abstract and in specific historical cases. His reading of *Art and Illusion* (1962) was seminal in this regard. The essay opens with Ginzburg presenting the core argument of Ernst Gombrich's critique of the notion of the « innocent » or « unbiased eye » (p. 76), extending it to all forms of testimony – « visual, verbal, whatever » (as for *Pathosformeln*, Ginzburg reworks ideas from art criticism by extending them to non-visual sources):

Any testimony speaks, first of all, deliberately or not, of itself, of the ways in which it has been produced [...] But it also speaks, in a more or less deliberate, more or less distorted way, of an outside reality (p. 74).

The challenge for historians is to uncover the « schemata » through which historical witnesses – like anyone else – perceive the world, along with the « biases » they carry. Researchers themselves are no exception and must undergo equally rigorous scrutiny: « One must sterilize the instruments of analysis [...] but the first instrument which must be sterilized is, of course, the historian himself (or herself) » (p. 99).

One can thus easily understand Ginzburg's fascination with double-blind experiments in the medical sciences, which he views as a « simplified model » of the perspective from which historians should approach fundamental phenomena of human behaviour (p. 82). He highlights the

coexistence of a concern for proof [...] and an acute and [...] unusual awareness of the possibility that those who do research might unwillingly distort its results through a projection of expectations and biases, along with hypotheses and schemata (p. 99).

For this reason, in randomized clinical trials, the efficacy of medical treatments is tested against a control group, which receives no medication, only a placebo. Both

groups, as well as those administering the treatment, remain unaware of whether they are receiving the so-called « verum treatment » or an inert replica. The aim is to eliminate variations due to emotional responses by ensuring that all participants believe they are receiving the same treatment. A consensual illusion, pursuant to the rituals of a standardized procedure.

With one crucial difference: historians, unlike natural scientists, cannot conduct experiments on historical actors, nor on their contemporaries. As the essay progresses, it becomes clear that Ginzburg is primarily interested in the asymmetries between these two groups of researchers – in their methods, the objects of their inquiries, and the very forms of reasoning they employ. « The rationality which inspires the historian », he argues, « aims, on the contrary, to take the actors' emotions as seriously as possible, and then to turn them into an object of analysis » – their « expectations, hopes, and fears », all the « background noise » that clinical trials are designed to eliminate.³⁸ These pages are among the most complex in the collection, as Ginzburg himself acknowledges: « What I am doing is an experiment on an experiment » (p. 82), further complicated by comparisons between the practices of historians, philologists, and judges – turning it into « a historiographical experiment raised to the square » (p. 89).

The intended conclusion, however, is unmistakable. Against simplistic relativism, Ginzburg makes a forceful case that these data – « indirect, untestable, distorted » as they may be – are still, « first of all, *data*, which are, according to the Latin etymology of the word, given rather than constructed, as in the double-blind experiment » (p. 93–94). Factual truth may be difficult to attain, but this should only strengthen our resolution never to abandon the inquiry. This is the original meaning of *historia* – « inquiry » – a quest that calls the researcher herself into question, and transforms her in the process.

« Research is endless » (p. 104, *explicit*).

³⁸ Respectively, p. 94 and 92. Ginzburg emphasizes that these « expectations, fears and hopes are animal reactions which disregard the boundary between nature and culture » (p. 96), thereby implicitly connecting this essay to the first two chapters of the collection.