

***Mediterranea***  
*International journal on the transfer of knowledge*

Vol. 4 — 2019



*Mediterranea*  
*International journal on the transfer of knowledge*

<http://www.uco.es/ucopress/ojs/index.php/mediterranea/index>

Vol. 4 — 2019

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# THOMISTIC LOGIC IN RENAISSANCE ITALY GIROLAMO SAVONAROLA, PAOLO BARBÒ, CRISOSTOMO JAVELLI\*

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## Abstract

This paper is devoted to the formation of a ‘Thomist logic’ in Renaissance Italy. After having expounded the principles that should inspire any logic *ad mentem Divi Thomae*, the article focuses on three textbooks of ‘Thomist logic’: Girolamo Savonarola’s *Compendium Logicae*, Paolo Barbò’s *Expositio in Artem veterem*, and Crisostomo Javelli’s *Compendium Logicae*. I show that these textbooks display common features, such as the presentation of logic according to the order of the books traditionally included in the *Organon*. Savonarola maintained that propositions can only be in the present tense and cannot generate *insolubilia*. Barbò’s contributions to philosophy of logic are conspicuous and include an original discussion of the *subiectum* of logic and of the doctrine expounded in the *Categories*. Under the possible influence of Renaissance humanism, Javelli’s textbook includes a history of logic and historical and philological analyses.

## Key Words

Thomism, Girolamo Savonarola, Paolo Barbò, Crisostomo Javelli, Renaissance Thomism, History of Logic.



Was there ever a ‘Thomistic logic’? Thomas Aquinas’s contributions to logic are limited and one might argue that his system does not really include a logical section. But if ‘Thomism’ simply refers to the practice of teaching and learning

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\* I thank Barbara Bartocci, who read an earlier draft of this paper and made invaluable comments on it. I thank the two anonymous reviewers of *Mediterranea* for their detailed comments on a penultimate version of this paper. Remaining shortcomings and mistakes are only mine.

philosophy and theology ‘according to the mind of saint Thomas’ (*ad mentem Divi Thomae*), logic was certainly included in Thomist philosophy.<sup>1</sup> ‘Thomistic logic’ took shape in the schools where the Dominican fathers taught philosophy *ad mentem Divi Thomae*. In this paper, I describe a moment of the history of Thomism in which logic became one of the disciplines included in the system. Three Italian Renaissance Thomists gave a significant contribution to outline a ‘Thomistic logic’: Girolamo Savonarola, Paolo Barbò, and Crisostomo Javelli. In what follows, I present their most significant logical doctrines.

### I. A recipe for a Thomistic logic

Aristotle’s theory of deduction is expounded mostly in his *Topics* and in his *Prior Analytics*, but Thomas Aquinas did not write any commentary on either of these works. His contributions to the field are limited to the treatise *De fallaciis*<sup>2</sup> and the short treatise *De propositionibus modalibus*.<sup>3</sup> But as soon as Aquinas’s thought became mandatory within the Dominican Order,<sup>4</sup> some logic textbooks were

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<sup>1</sup> According to Jacob Schmutz, later authors maintained that they were writing « ad mentem divi Thomae » in order to present themselves as orthodox: see JACOB SCHMUTZ, « *Bellum scholasticum*. Thomisme et antithomisme dans les débats doctrinaux modernes », *Revue thomiste*, 108/1 (2008), p. 131–182.

<sup>2</sup> *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. XLIII, Editori di San Tommaso, Roma 1976, p. 383–418.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 419–422. Both treatises are of doubtful attribution. The Leonine editors maintain that there is some evidence for claiming that both treatises were written by Aquinas (cf. *Ibid.*, p. 386–387). However, René-Antoine Gauthier, who would later edit Aquinas’s commentary on the *De Interpretatione* and on the *Posterior Analytics*, maintained that the treatise *De Fallaciis* is not authentic (cf. RENÉ-ANTOINE GAUTHIER, « Préface » to THOMAS DE AQUINO. *Expositio libri peryermeneias*. *Editio altera retractata*, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M.*, vol. I.1\*, Commissio Leonina–Vrin, Roma–Paris 1989, p. 56\*–58\*). Even if the treatise *De propositionibus modalibus* were to be authentic, we should conclude that Aquinas’s contribution to logic is limited to a couple of pages.

<sup>4</sup> Several general chapters of the Dominicans proposed the study of Aquinas as mandatory. Especially, the general chapters of 1309, 1313, and 1315 wanted to promote his canonization, and prescribed the study of Aquinas’s doctrine; cf. BENEDICTUS MARIA REICHERT (ed.) *Acta Capitulum Generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, vol. II: *ab anno 1304 usque ad annum 1378*, Institutum Historicum Fratrum Praedicatorum, Rome–Stuttgart 1899 (Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica, 4). On the formation of the first Thomistic school among the Dominicans see ANDREA A. ROBGLIO, *La sopravvivenza e la gloria. Appunti sulla formazione della prima scuola tomista (sec. XIV)*, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna 2008 (Sacra doctrina, 53/1); on the model of sainthood which assumed particular connotation after the canonization of Aquinas, see *Id.*, « Se un ‘savio omo’ diventa santo. Un aspetto della reputazione di Tommaso d’Aquino per gli studenti del Trecento », in GIOVANNI GRADO MERLO, GIUSEPPINA DE SANDRE GASPARINI, ANTONIO RIGON (eds.), *Studia, studenti, religione*, Cierre, Verona 2009 (Quaderni di storia religiosa, 2009), p. 159–172.

needed for students.<sup>5</sup> The so-called *Summa totius logicae Aristotelis* is an excellent introduction to Aristotle's logic and it is not surprising that this treatise had been attributed to Thomas Aquinas himself.<sup>6</sup>

If we limit our attention to Aquinas's authentic writings, it is certain that any possible Thomistic logic should be grounded on Aristotle's *Organon*. In the *Proemium* to his commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, Aquinas expounds his concept of logic and states that each part of the discipline has been described in the books of Aristotle's *Organon*. Aquinas says that there are three operations of the intellect.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Aquinas was aware of the *curriculum studiorum* that was practiced in Late Antiquity, as it is clear from his *Proemium* to his commentary on the *Liber de causis*: « [Philosophi] scientiam de primis causis ultimo ordinabant, cuius considerationi ultimum tempus suae vitae deputarent: primo quidem incipientes a logica quae modum scientiarum tradit, secundo procedentes ad mathematicam cuius etiam pueri possunt esse capaces, tertio ad naturalem philosophiam quae propter experientiam tempore indiget, quarto autem ad moralem philosophiam cuius iuuenis esse conveniens auditor non potest, ultimo autem scientiae divinae insistebant quae considerat primas entium causas » (THOMAS DE AQUINO. *In librum de causis expositio*, ed. CESLAO PERA, Marietti, Torino 1955, p. 4, l. 7–8). From passages like this, Thomists might have concluded that logic was an essential part of the philosophical *curriculum* even according to the doctrine of Aquinas.

<sup>6</sup> This work was taken to be a selection of passages from various works of Aquinas, arranged according to the order of Aristotle's *Organon*, by some sixteenth-century editions. See, for example, S. Thomae Aquinatis Praeclarissima commentaria in libros Aristotelis Peri hermenias et Posteriorum analyticorum; Cum antiqua textus translatione, atque etiam noua Ioannis Argyropyli itemque Thomae Caietani cardinalis Supplementum commentariorum in reliquum secundi libri Peri hermenias. Nuper ex emendatissimis exemplaribus diligentissime recognita. Logicae quoque totius summa nunc addita est, ex eiusdem diui Thomae opusculis excerpta, et in tractatus & capita diuisa, iuxta ordinem librorum ab Aristotelis in logicis obseruatum. His praeterea index nouus adiectus est, apud Hieronymum Scotum, Venetiis 1562. It is worth noting that the title of this edition is misleading, inasmuch as the unknown author of the *Summa* speaks of syllogisms only after having dealt with dialectics, and the section corresponding to the *Categories* is introduced by some chapters devoted to the *praedicabilia*, which rather corresponds to Porphyry's *Isagoge*. PIERRE MANDONNET already denied the authenticity of this work in his *Des écrits authentiques de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, St. Paul, Fribourg 1910, p. 149. There are also other short logical treatises which were wrongly attributed to Aquinas, like the *De inventione medii* and the *De natura syllogismorum*.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO. *Expositio libri Posteriorum. Editio altera retractata*, I.1, proem., in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. I.2\*, ed. RENÉ-ANTOINE GAUTHIER, Commissio Leonina–Vrin, Roma–Paris 1989, p. 4, l. 32–p. 5, l. 50: « Oportet igitur logice partes accipere secundum diuersitatem actuum rationis. Sunt autem rationis tres actus. Quorum primi duo sunt rationis secundum quod et intellectus quidam: una enim actio intellectus est intelligencia indiuisibilium, siue incomplexorum, secundum quam concipit quid est res, et hec operatio a quibusdam dicitur informatio intellectus siue ymaginatio per intellectum; et ad hanc operationem rationis ordinatur doctrina quam tradit Aristotiles in libro Predicamentorum; secunda uero operatio intellectus est compositio uel diuisio intellectuum, in qua est iam uerum et falsum; et huic rationis actui deseruit doctrina quam tradit Aristotiles in libro Peryermeneias. Tercius uero actus rationis est secundum id quod est proprium rationis, scilicet discurrere ab uno in aliud, ut per id quod est notum deueniat in cognitionem ignoti; et huic actui deseruiunt reliqui libri logice ».

According to Aquinas, the first operation of the intellect deals with concept formation (*primae intentiones*).<sup>8</sup> Concepts are classified according to ten categories and the logical doctrine which corresponds to the first operation of the intellect is discussed in Aristotle's *Categories*. The second operation of the intellect is about the connection of concepts in order to form propositions. Aquinas states that Aristotle treated this doctrine in the treatise *De Interpretatione*. The third operation of the intellect consists in producing arguments, so that from known propositions we can infer unknown propositions. Aquinas is clearly referring to syllogistic and states that the *Prior Analytics*, the *Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Refutations* are designed to expound the doctrine of argumentation. Dialectic is also included in the general doctrine of argumentation, because dialecticians argue by means of syllogisms.<sup>9</sup>

This presentation of the parts of logic could have been questioned by later logicians, because late medieval logicians considered also other topics and did not reduce argumentation to syllogistic. This becomes clear if we take into account the work of Dominican logicians of the Late Middle Ages, like Francis of Prato.<sup>10</sup> Francis

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<sup>8</sup> Aquinas distinguishes these three operations of the intellect also in the opening lines of his commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*: « Sicut Philosophus dicit in III De anima, duplex est operatio intellectus: una quidem que dicitur indiuisibilium intelligencia, per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essenciam uniuscuiusque rei in se ipsa; alia est autem operatio intellectus componentis et diuidentis; additur autem et tertia operatio ratiocinandi, secundum quod ratio procedit a notis ad inquisitionem ignotorum » (THOMAS DE AQUINO. *Expositio libri peryermeneias*, proem., p. 5, l. 1–8). In the same opening lines, Aquinas states that the treatises included in the *Organon* correspond to the three operations of reason: « Cum autem logica dicatur rationalis scientia, necesse est quod eius consideratio uersetur circa ea que pertinent ad tres predictas operationes rationis: de hiis igitur que pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, id est de hiis que simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristotiles in libro Predicamentorum; de hiis uero que pertinent ad secundam operationem, scilicet de enunciatione affirmatiua et negatiua, determinat Philosophus in libro Peryermeneias; de hiis uero que pertinent ad tertiam operationem determinat Aristotiles in libro Priorum et in consequentibus, in quibus agitur de sillogismo simpliciter et de diuersis sillogismorum et argumentationum speciebus, quibus ratio de uno procedit ad aliud; et ideo secundum predictum ordinem trium operationum, liber Predicamentorum ad librum Peryermeneias ordinatur, qui ordinatur ad librum Priorum et consequentes » (Ibid., p. 5, l. 15–32).

<sup>9</sup> For Aquinas on the status of logic see BRUNO TREMBLAY, « Thomas d'Aquin et la logique comme savoir contemplatif », *Revue Thomiste*, 111 (2011), p. 179–209. Tremblay underlines that Aquinas understood logic as a theoretical discipline, contrary to later authors like Ockham, according to whom logic is a practical discipline.

<sup>10</sup> On Francis of Prato see FRANCESCO AMERINI, *La logica di Francesco da Prato con l'edizione critica della Loyca e del 'Tractatus de uoce univoca'*, SISMEL-Edizioni del Galluzzo, Firenze 2005; FRANCISCUS DE PRATO, *Logica*, ed. CHRISTIAN RODE, Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 2002; CHRISTIAN RODE, *Franciscus de Prato. Facetten seiner Philosophie im Blick auf Hervaeus Natalis und Wilhelm Ockham*, Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 2004; FRANCESCO AMERINI, CHRISTIAN RODE, « Franciscus de Prato's *Tractatus de ente rationis*. A Critical Edition with a Historico-Philosophical Introduction », *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 76 (2009), p. 261–312.

was active after Ockham and reacted against the English Franciscan's logic. Francis's criticisms might be said to be aimed at defending some 'Thomistic' ideas, but his logic goes beyond the Aristotelian 'orthodoxy' that Thomas Aquinas proposed in his *Proemium* to the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, because it includes the so-called supposition theory, that Aristotle did not consider in his *Organon*.<sup>11</sup> Renaissance Thomists, on the other hand, were closer to the 'Aristotelian orthodoxy' endorsed by Aquinas, even though their writings show that they were also acquainted with later developments of logic.

If by 'Renaissance logic' we refer to the logic developed in the fifteenth century and at the beginning of the sixteenth century, it is safe to maintain that a radical change took place: logicians started to deal with different topics and abandoned many themes that enjoyed popularity in the Middle Ages.<sup>12</sup> Renaissance logicians kept discussing the status of logic, its subject matter, the transcendentals, the *antepredicamenta*, etc., but they paid little attention to the theory of argumentation (syllogistic, the theory of *consequentiae*, etc.). Thomist philosophers make no exception to this general claim. The extant works on logic by Dominicans and by other Thomists of this period have as a common trademark the attempt to present logic according to the content matter of Aristotle's *Organon*, and their 'philosophy of logic' echoes Aquinas remarks on the status of logic. If other

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<sup>11</sup> On Francis's supposition theory and his criticism of Ockham's logic see FRANCESCO AMERINI, « Il trattato *De suppositionibus terminorum* di Francesco da Prato O. P. Una rilettura della dottrina ockhamista del linguaggio », *Medioevo*, 25 (1999/2000), p. 441–550; ID., « La dottrina della significatio di Francesco da Prato O. P. (XIV secolo). Una critica tomista a Guglielmo di Ockham », *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale*, 11 (2000), p. 375–408.

<sup>12</sup> For a clear presentation of the traditional logic between 1350 and 1600, see E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH, « Traditional Logic », in CHARLES B. SCHMITT, QUENTIN SKINNER, ECKHARD KESSLER, JILL KRAYE (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, p. 143–172. Humanists were more reluctant to accept this way of doing philosophy, and dismissed much of the logical technicalities, which were considered by scholastic authors. See for example the criticisms that Lorenzo Valla (c. 1406–1457) raised against Aristotelian logic: « Ipsi potius digni quibus insultetur atque illudatur tum quia magistrum Aristotelem tanquam deum habent, tum quia ne Aristotelici quidem satis scire, Graecarum litterarum imperiti, nec ullam doctrinam plane tenere possint, suae, idest Latinae, linguae parum imperiti. Quos ut ab errore quoad possum revocem et ad vere theologandum posteriores reducam, Aristoteles atque Aristotelicos confutabo » (LORENZO VALLA, *Dialectical Disputations*, I.17–18, ed. and trans. BRIAN P. COPENHAVER, LODI NAUTA, vol. I, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA–London 2012 [The I Tatti Renaissance Library, 49], p. 10); on Valla's reform of logic see LODI NAUTA, *In Defense of Common Sense: Lorenzo Valla's Humanist Critique of Scholastic Philosophy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2009 (I Tatti Studies in Italian Renaissance History). For a dismissive assessment of humanist logic see MARTHA KNEALE, WILLIAM C. KNEALE, *The Development of Logic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1962, p. 298–300; a balanced presentation of humanist logic may be found in LISA JARDINE, *Humanist Logic*, in SCHMITT, SKINNER (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, p. 173–198.

doctrines are incorporated, these authors pay attention to integrate these doctrines within such a general frame.<sup>13</sup>

Most Thomists were Dominicans, because the Order of Preachers decided to be faithful to the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. Logical textbooks were needed for the formation of younger friars and if we restrict our attention to the extant textbooks of logic written in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by Italian Dominicans, we have the *Compendium logicae* by Girolamo Savonarola, the *Expositio in Artem Veterem* by Paolo Barbò from Soncino, and the *Compendium logicae* by Crisostomo Javelli from Casale Monferrato. Dominic of Flanders wrote a commentary on Aquinas's commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*. Outside the Dominican Order, 'Thomistic' logic was at the centre of the attention of the Franciscan Georgius Benignus Salviati, whose *Dialectica nova* was intended to show the fundamental agreement between the doctrines of John Duns Scotus and of Thomas Aquinas.<sup>14</sup>

The three above mentioned 'Dominican' textbooks were drafted to present a 'Thomistic logic', i.e. a logic that follows the order of presentation of Aristotle's *Organon* and that is understood as section of a philosophical system *ad mentem Divi Thomae*. But Thomist logicians inevitably incorporated doctrines developed by later Medieval authors as well. As we shall see in what follows, the discussions on the subject matter of logic, which is said to be the *ens rationis*, might be traced back to Aquinas's texts. It is nonetheless reasonable to speculate that Herveus Natalis's insistence on the existence of an objective realm of *entia rationis* might have been familiar to later Thomists.

In what follows, I will concentrate on Savonarola, on Barbò, and on Javelli, whose works showcase the formation of 'Thomistic logic' in the Italian Renaissance.

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<sup>13</sup> This shift of attention in the logical textbook of this period has been underlined by E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH in her paper « Developments in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries », in DOV M. GABBAY, JAMES WOODS (eds.), *Handbook of the History of Logic*, vol. II: *Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic*, Elsevier Amsterdam, 2008, p. 609–643. Ashworth underlines that Renaissance logicians wrote handbooks whose structure reflected that of Aristotle's *Organon*. I will show that Thomists make no exception to this general claim. I think, however, that they were faithful to Aristotle's logic, because they found that Aquinas might have implicitly suggested that. Other logicians had other reasons to go back to Aristotle. On the allegiance of medieval logic up until the sixteenth century, see EAD., *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period*, Reidel, Dordrecht–Boston 1974 (Synthese historical library, 12).

<sup>14</sup> Juraj Dragišić (Latin: Georgius Benignus) was born in 1445 in Srebrenica. He taught in Florence, where he entered the cultural circle gathered around the Salviati family. He added the family name 'Salviati' to his own family name. Salviati taught in Rome from 1500, in 1507 he became bishop of Cagli and in 1512 he was moved to the see of Nazareth (the bishop of Nazareth at that time was based in Barletta, Italy). He died in 1520.

II. *Girolamo Savonarola: a précis of Thomistic logic*

Girolamo Savonarola's interest in Aristotle's philosophy is well known.<sup>15</sup> His *Compendium logicae* was first published in Pescia in 1492 and was widely read, as its many sixteenth-century editions attest. The treatise was written in 1484<sup>16</sup> and contained the lecture notes of Savonarola's classes on logic. The famous preacher was teaching logic in the early eighties of the fifteenth century in the priory of San Marco, Florence. As has been noted,<sup>17</sup> Savonarola's treatise aims at reconstructing Aristotle's logic « according to the usual practice of mathematicians » (*more mathematico*).<sup>18</sup> This observation does not imply that Savonarola wanted to employ the mathematical method in developing his logic: he simply wanted to write a clear and short introduction to logic, taking as example the analogous mathematical treatises of his time.<sup>19</sup> Although he cannot be taken as a forerunner of the mathematization of logic, his contributions to logic were highly original.<sup>20</sup>

Savonarola's *Compendium logicae* is divided into eleven books. The very structure of the text shows the originality of Savonarola's doctrine:

- I. On the principles of syllogistic (definition of 'term', of 'predicable', the Aristotelian *praedicabilia*, definition of 'proposition', the relations among propositions, the rules of conversions);

<sup>15</sup> His main philosophical writings have been edited by GIANCARLO GARFAGNINI, EUGENIO GARIN, in GIROLAMO SAVONAROLA, *Scritti filosofici*, Angelo Belardetti Editore, Roma 1982 (Edizione nazionale delle opere di Girolamo Savonarola, 1). Savonarola composed also some notes on Plato's and Aristotle's philosophies. These notes have been edited by LORENZA TROMBONI in her monograph *'Inter omnes Plato et Aristoteles': gli appunti filosofici di Girolamo Savonarola*, Brepols, Turnhout 2012 (Textes et études du Moyen Âge, 66); on Savonarola's philosophical treatises see also DAVID A. LINES, « Pagan and Christian Ethics: Girolamo Savonarola and Ludovico Valenza on Moral Philosophy », *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 17 (2006), p. 427–444. On the controversial figure of Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1498), see ROBERTO RIDOLFI, *Vita di Girolamo Savonarola*, Le Lettere, Firenze 1997, and DONALD WEINSTEIN, *Savonarola: the Rise and Fall of a Renaissance Prophet*, Yale University Press, New Haven 2011; on Savonarola's philosophy see also EUGENIO GARIN, « Ricerche sugli scritti filosofici di Girolamo Savonarola », in ID., *La cultura filosofica del Rinascimento italiano*, Sansoni, Firenze 1961, p. 201–212.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. GIANCARLO GARFAGNINI, « Nota critica », in SAVONAROLA, *Scritti filosofici*, p. 373–393, at p. 373–379.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. MASSIMO MUGNAI, « Logic and Mathematics in the Seventeenth Century », *History and Philosophy of Logic*, 31/4 (2010), p. 297–314, at p. 299.

<sup>18</sup> HIERONYMUS SAVONAROLA. *Compendium logicae, praefatio*, in ID., *Scritti filosofici*, ed. GARFAGNINI, GARIN, p. 3, l. 18.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. WOLFGANG KÜNNE, « Über Lügner, 'Lügner' und harmlosen Selbstbezug. Bolzano vs. Savonarola und die Geschichte einer Antinomie », in ANNE REBOUL (ed.), *Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan*, Université de Genève, Geneva 2011, p. 20–21, fn. 73.

<sup>20</sup> See for example JOSEPH M. BOCHENSKI, *Formale Logik*, Karl Aber, Fribourg–Munich 1956 (Orbis Academicus. Problemgeschichten der Wissenschaft in Dokumenten und Darstellungen, 3/2), p. 190–191.

- II. on division (*genera* and *species*; elucidations on how the genus is related to its differences);
- III. on definition (principles for a sound definition; the book largely reproduces the doctrine expounded by Aristotle in *Topics* VI);
- IV. on categorical syllogistic;
- V. on modal syllogistic;
- VI. *de potestate faciendi syllogismorum* (Savonarola deals with some metatheoretical properties of syllogistic, with the so-called *inventio medii* and with the theory of *consequentiae*);
- VII. on hypothetical syllogistic;
- VIII. on demonstrative syllogistic (Savonarola expounds his theory of science);
- IX. on dialectical syllogistic;
- X. on sophistical syllogisms;
- XI. on various logical questions (the status of logic, the utility of logic, etc.).

If we compare the structure of this book with that of other logic textbooks of the late Middle Ages, like Paul of Venice's *Logica Parva*, it is clear that Savonarola's text is in many ways highly innovative. In late medieval logic, syllogistic was no longer the core theory of inference dealt with by logicians, and Paul of Venice deals with it only in a few paragraphs, whereas he devotes entire treatises to the theory of consequences, to the *insolubilia*, to the theory of *suppositio*, and to the *obligationes*, i.e. to the 'new logic' that the Medieval authors had developed.<sup>21</sup> Savonarola, on the contrary, sticks to the structure of Aristotle's *Organon*: book I draws mostly from the material of the treatise *De Interpretatione*,<sup>22</sup> books II and III from the *Topics* (especially from books II, IV, and VI), books IV to VII draw from *Prior Analytics*, book I, whereas the *Compendium*'s book VIII is supposed to expound the doctrine of the *Posterior Analytics*. Book IX draws again from the *Topics* (especially from books I and VIII), whereas book IX deals with fallacies, expounded by Aristotle in his *Sophistical Refutations*. By going back to Aristotle, Savonarola ended up being original. His originality may be better appreciated if one considers the many points in which he departs from Aristotle or from Aquinas.

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. PAULUS VENETUS. *Logica Parva*, ed. ALAN R. PERREIAH, Brill, Leiden 2002. By following the structure of Aristotle's logic, Savonarola made a choice analogous to that of his fellow Dominican Johannes Versoris (d. c. 1485), who wrote commentaries on the whole *logica vetus*, on Aristotle's *Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*, and on Aquinas's *De ente et essentia* (cf. JOHANNES VERSORIS. *Quaestiones super totam veterem artem Aristotelis*, Köln 1494 [reprint Minerva, Frankfurt am Main 1967]; Id. *Super omnes libros novae logicae*, Köln 1494 [reprint Minerva, Frankfurt am Main 1967]). In so doing, these Dominicans were attempting to revitalize the tradition of the logic of the thirteenth century.

<sup>22</sup> In *Compendium logicae*, I.8–18, Savonarola summarizes the contents of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, whereas at I.19–42 the Dominican Preacher epitomizes the doctrines expounded by Aristotle in the *Categories* (with the significative addition of the 'Thomistic' doctrine of analogy at I.21).

## II.1 Savonarola on Future Contingents and on the Liar Paradox

### II.1.1. Tomorrow there will be a sea-battle

The major point of disagreement between Savonarola and (most commentators of) Aristotle concerns the nature of propositions. We can look into the nature of propositions by considering two well-known puzzles, i.e. the puzzle concerning the truth-value of sentences describing future contingent events and the so-called ‘liar paradox’.<sup>23</sup> If we accept the principle of bivalence, according to which every proposition is necessarily either true or false, we have several difficulties in solving the above mentioned puzzles.

If there are only two truth-values for a proposition like:

(i) Tomorrow there will be a sea-battle

determinism seems to be an unavoidable option. Aristotle, however, was not a determinist. Most scholars believe that, according to the Stagirite, a proposition like (i) may have a third truth value (‘indeterminate’). Hence, the principle of bivalence does not hold.<sup>24</sup>

Similarly, if there are only two truth-values, a proposition like:

(ii) The proposition (ii) is false

does not seem to be intelligible: if (ii) is true, then it is false (because it would be true that ‘the proposition (ii) is false’); if (ii) is false, then it is true (because it would be false that ‘the proposition (ii) is false’).

In this case too, i.e. in what is commonly referred to as the ‘liar paradox’, one might be tempted to abandon the principle of bivalence.

Savonarola’s solution is radically different: he would rather claim that neither (i) nor (ii) are propositions. This enables him to claim that the principle of bivalence is valid for *all* propositions.

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<sup>23</sup> A ‘liar paradox’ is an argument that arrives at a contradiction. It is called the ‘liar paradox’ because it could be formulated thus: (\*) ‘I am lying’. Suppose that there are two truth-values and that to lie is to utter falsehood. If (\*) is true, then I am lying, i.e. I am uttering falsehoods. However, since I am uttering (\*), if (\*) is true, then it is false. Similarly, if (\*) is false, then it is false that I am lying, i.e. it is false that I am uttering falsehoods. If I am not uttering any falsehood, I am uttering a truth, i.e. (\*) is true. Hence, if (\*) is false, then it is true. On the late medieval history of the liar paradox see STEPHEN READ, « The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine », *Vivarium*, 40/2 (2002), p. 189–218.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. ARISTOTELES, *De Interpretatione*, 9, 19a23–b4. This passage has been interpreted in many ways. Most scholars maintain today that Aristotle did not accept the principle of bivalence for future tense singular assertions; cf. e.g. PAOLO CRIVELLI, *Aristotle on Truth*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, p. 198–233; RUSSELL E. JONES, « Truth and Contradiction in Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione* 6–9 », *Phronesis*, 55 (2010), p. 26–67.

In I.47, Savonarola considers the tense of propositions and states that the logician is only interested in present-tensed propositions.<sup>25</sup> A few pages later, he maintains that declarative propositions (*propositiones enuntiativae*) have only two truth-values, i.e. ‘true’ and ‘false’ (cf. I.49).

Savonarola’s solution to the puzzle of sentences about future contingent events may be summarized as follows:

- (a) the bearers of truth and falsity are present-tense ‘propositions’ (type-sentences) and not ‘utterances’;<sup>26</sup>
- (b) among the many types of propositions,<sup>27</sup> the logician deals only with the *indicativa* or *enuntiativa*, i.e. the « discourse that signifies the true or the false » (« oratio significans verum vel falsum »);<sup>28</sup>
- (c) from the above claims, Savonarola may infer the conclusion that « in the singular future contingent <contradictory pairs of sentences>, it is necessary that one of the contradictory <propositions> is true and that the other is false, <and this is necessary> jointly, not in the divided sense » (« in singularibus contingentibus de futuro necesse est alterum contradictorium esse verum et alterum falsum, coniunctim non autem divisim »).<sup>29</sup>

This conclusion is hardly surprising and reproduces Aristotle’s own conclusion to the puzzle. Savonarola, however, infers that a singular future-tense sentence cannot be said to be true or false because it is not a proposition, namely it is not a

<sup>25</sup> SAVONAROLA. *Compendium logicae*, I.47, p. 22, l. 22–26: « [u]titur autem logicus verbo indicativi modi praesentis temporis, praesertim hoc verbo substantivo, sum, es, est, in praesenti tempore. Et hoc est maxime verbum apud ipsum in quod reliqua verba resolvuntur ».

<sup>26</sup> According to CRIVELLI, Aristotle considered *utterances* to be the bearers of truth and falsity (cf. *Aristotle on Truth*, p. 72–76). For a different reading of truth-bearers in Aristotle see DAVID CHARLES, MICHAEL PERAMATZIS, « Aristotle on Truth-Bearers », *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 50 (2016), p. 101–141.

<sup>27</sup> Savonarola lists the following kinds of propositions: « est autem quaedam oratio imperfecta, ut homo albus. Quaedam sunt perfectae, et harum quaedam sunt imperativae, quaedam optativae, quaedam deprecativae, quaedam indicativae » (*Compendium logicae*, I.48, p. 23, l. 1–4). In doing so, Savonarola remains faithful to the *littera* of Aristotle (cf. *De Interpretatione*, 4, 16b33–17a7) but detaches himself from those late medieval theories according to which also other kinds of proposition are bearers of truth and falsity. For discussion of this topic, see GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, *Theories of Propositions. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity*, North Holland, Amsterdam–London 1973 (North-Holland Linguistic Series, 8), p. 266–268. According to Nuchelmans, Paul of Venice, in his *Logica Magna*, allows for other propositions apart from *enuntiationes* to be bearers of truth and falsity; in his *Logica Parva*, however, Paul writes that « sola oratio indicativa est propositio non autem imperativa nec optativa » (cf. PAULUS VENETUS. *Logica Parva*, I.12, p. 4, l. 10–11). On medieval theories of propositions see also LAURENT CESALLI, *Le réalisme propositionnel. Sémantique et ontologie des propositions chez Jean Duns Scot, Gauthier Burley, Richard Brinkley et Jean Wyclif*, Vrin, Paris 2007 (Sic et Non).

<sup>28</sup> SAVONAROLA. *Compendium logicae*, I.49, p. 23, l. 7–8.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, I.61, p. 26, l. 11–13.

truth-bearer. It is still legitimate to state that it is necessary that either of the events represented by a singular future-tense sentence will be the case. Savonarola's language, however, does not seem to be very precise. If a future-tense sentence does not have a truth-value, it is not entirely correct that in any contradictory pair one sentence is true and the other is false.<sup>30</sup> Savonarola probably intended to say that any future-tense contradictory pair is a case of the law of the excluded middle. Accordingly, in the case of future contingent contradictory pairs of sentences, it is necessary *de sensu composito* that either is the case and the other is not. In fact, even if neither of the sentences has a truth-value, the very fact of their being a contradictory pair makes it impossible to affirm both at the same time. Accordingly, it is necessary (*de sensu composito*) to affirm one of them, and deny the other.

But the lack of a truth-value of a future tense sentence entails that any other sentence that includes it has no truth-value either, if the first sentence is not part of a logical law as the law of the excluded middle as in the above example. Consequently, the following sentence has no truth-value and is not a proposition:

(i\*) it is necessary that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow

In fact, if (i) does not have a truth-value and is not a proposition, so (i\*) cannot have a truth-value either. Even though (i\*) is in the present tense, it is syntactically different from a well-formed proposition. In a well-formed proposition, a modal operator ('it is necessary that' and the like) can only be added to a well formed proposition. But (i) is not a proposition. Hence (i\*) is not a proposition either.

On the contrary, the following proposition is a logical truth:

(iii) it is necessary that either there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, or there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow

The sentence (iii) is an instance of the principle of excluded middle ( $p \vee \neg p$ ). Regardless of the tense of the sentence  $p$  and, more generally, regardless of  $p$  being a proposition or not, the whole sentence (iii) displays the syntax of well-formed propositions: we have a contradictory pair and their conjunction is negated. On the basis of the truth-value tables of connectors such as the negation and the conjunction, (iii) is a well-formed proposition. In addition, the proposition is in the present tense, as all truth-bearers should be. Savonarola's insistence on the present tense of the truth-bearers might mean that in his opinion logic has to deal with type-sentences (that are commonly formulated in the present tense) and not with utterances (that are commonly pronounced in past, present and future tenses). This might be the case because logic is meant to be an instrument of scientific inquiry and science is about what is always the case.

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<sup>30</sup> This rule is known in the literature as Rule of Contradictory Pairs. According to JONES, Aristotle did not subscribe to an unqualified version of the Rule of Contradictory Pairs either (cf. « Truth and Contradiction in Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* 6-9 », p. 26-67).

Savonarola's solution to the puzzle raised by sentences about future contingent events was probably not available to Aristotle.<sup>31</sup>

### II.1.2. *The Liar Paradox*

Savonarola considers the 'liar paradox' in the tenth book of his *Compendium*, which is devoted to sophistical arguments.<sup>32</sup> According to Savonarola, a self-falsifying statement like:

(iv) This proposition is false

belongs to the *insolubilia*, i.e. to that set of semantic paradoxes that lead to contradiction.

For Savonarola, (iv) is neither false nor true. Hence, (iv) is not a proposition, because propositions are bearers of truth and falsity.<sup>33</sup>

In his analysis of the Liar Paradox, Savonarola employs the so-called *consequentia mirabilis*.<sup>34</sup> Suppose that:

(v) Every proposition is false

<sup>31</sup> The Stagirite seems to accept the idea that the bearers of truth and falsity may display tenses different from the present (cf. *De Interpretatione*, 5, 17a9–12: ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα λόγον ἀποφαντικὸν ἐκ ῥήματος εἶναι ἢ πτώσεως· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος, εἴαν μὴ τὸ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἢ ἦν ἢ τι τοιοῦτο προστεθῆ, οὕτω λόγος ἀποφαντικός). Hence, Aristotle implicitly maintains that future tense sentences have a truth-value. If this interpretation is correct, Aristotle is forced to give up the principle of bivalence for future contingent statements, in order to avoid subscribing to determinism. Aristotle's ideas on future contingents have been discussed by many scholars; for a map of this scholarly literature see VINCENZA CELLUPRICA, *Il Capitolo 9 del 'De interpretatione' di Aristotele: Rassegna di studi, 1930–1973*, il Mulino, Bologna 1977 (Pubblicazioni del Centro di studio per la storia della storiografia filosofica, 1); JULES VUILLEMIN, *Nécessité ou contingence. L'aporie de Diodore et les systèmes philosophiques*, Éd. de Minuit, Paris 1984 (Le sens commun); RICHARD GASKIN, *The Sea Battle and the Master Argument. Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future*, de Gruyter, Berlin–New York 1995 (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, 40); C. W. A. WHITAKER, *Aristotle's 'De Interpretatione': Contradiction and Dialectic*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996.

<sup>32</sup> Bernhard Bolzano (1781–1848) discusses at length Savonarola's solution to the 'liar paradox' in his *Wissenschaftslehre*. On Bolzano's reception of Savonarola see WOLFGANG KÜNNE, *Epimenides und andere Lügner*, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2013, p. 71–91. This small book by Künne includes many insights on the the history of the liar paradox, and provides many possible sources for Savonarola's own treatment of the paradox (for example, at p. 140–144 Künne underlines that the liar paradox was clearly stated by saint Jerome in his homily on Psalm 116; Jerome chooses the reading « omnis homo est mendacium », because he finds that the alternative reading « omnis homo est mendax » would have implied the liar paradox, and this was not acceptable for Jerome).

<sup>33</sup> See SAVONAROLA, *Compendium logicae*, X.18, p. 152, l. 1–3: « cum postea queritur an sit vera vel falsa respondetur quod nec est vera nec falsa, nec propositio, sed est propositio insolubilis ».

<sup>34</sup> Savonarola's treatment of the 'liar paradox' has been carefully studied by KÜNNE (« Über Lügner, 'Lügner' und harmlosen Selbstbezug », esp. p. 24–25). As far as Savonarola's argument is concerned, Künne speaks of a « schwache Version » of the *consequentia mirabilis*.

Let us assume that (v) is a proposition, and that in our world *w* there is but one proposition, namely (v).

1. If (v) is true, then at *w* all propositions are false. If all propositions are false, (v) is false as well. Hence, if (v) is true, then (v) is false.
2. If (v) is false, then at *w* there is at least one proposition which is true. But at *w* there are no propositions but (v), therefore (v) is true. Hence, if (v) is false, then (v) is true.

Savonarola's conclusion is that (v) belongs to the *insolubilia*, because we cannot establish whether it is true or false. Therefore, (v) is not a proposition.<sup>35</sup>

## II.2. Savonarola on the 'praedicabilia' and on the theory of argumentation

In the remaining sections of his logical textbook, Savonarola does not depart from the Aristotelian orthodoxy, but expounds nevertheless an original doctrine.

In II.12 (p. 33, l. 17–23), Savonarola observes that a genus might be divided in several ways. This doctrine is consistent with what Aristotle says in *De partibus animalium* I.2–4, but might also be taken to be reminiscent of Aquinas's claim that we do not know the essential differences of many beings.<sup>36</sup> The combination of the Aristotelian background with Aquinas's doctrine becomes clearer a few pages later, when Savonarola maintains that there is no definition of God.<sup>37</sup> In Savonarola's exposé, the real definition is provided by the true genus and by the true difference, and the genus is predicated of a subject as its what-it-is (*in quid*), whereas the difference is predicated as a quality of the subject (*in quale*).<sup>38</sup> Aristotle's *Topics* presented this doctrine, along with the idea that the difference is genus-like, and thus might be predicated *in quid* as well.<sup>39</sup> Savonarola is clearly

<sup>35</sup> Savonarola's solution resembles the theory of 'cassation', according to which « one who utters an insoluble proposition 'isn't saying anything' » (PAUL VINCENT SPADE, STEPHEN READ, « Insolubles », in EDWARD N. ZALTA [ed.], *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, [Fall 2018 Edition], <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/insolubles/>>, § 2.5).

<sup>36</sup> Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO. In *duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, VII, lect. 12, § 1552, ed. MARIE-RAYMOND CATHALA, RAIMONDO M. SPIAZZI, Marietti, Torino 1964, p. 374; ID. *De ente et essentia*, ch. 5, in *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, vol. XLIII, Editori di San Tommaso, Roma, 1976, p. 376, l. 76–78.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. SAVONAROLA. *Compendium logicae*, III.19, p. 51, l. 1–5.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, III.2, p. 38, l. 5–6.

<sup>39</sup> Aristotle says that the difference is a quality of the genus in *Topica*, IV.6, 128a27 and VI.6, 144a18–19 (at IV.2, 122b16 Aristotle adds that the difference does not express the *τί ἐστι* of the thing; *sed contra*, in *De generatione et corruptione*, I.3, 318b14–16, Aristotle maintains that the differences refer to the *τὸδε τι*). However, he says that the difference is predicated *ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν* in *Topica*, IV.6, 128a20–29 and in *Topica*, VII.3, 153a16–19; in *Analytica Priora*, I.27, 43b6–7 what is predicated *ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν* is contrasted with *praedicabilia* like *propria* and accidents (on the basis of *Topica*, I.4, 101b18–19, where the difference is associated to the predicable 'genus', one might be tempted to take *Analytica Priora*, I.27, 43b6–7 as further evidence in favour of the claim that the difference is

interpreting Aristotle's text in order to eliminate any apparent inconsistency and, in so doing, he creates an original system.

The logic of argumentation is the objects of books IV–IX and, despite its Aristotelian flavour, Savonarola's presentation displays again originality. Savonarola's definition of syllogism<sup>40</sup> is identical to Aristotle's one.<sup>41</sup> But unlike Aristotle's, Savonarola's syllogistic deals with singular terms too.<sup>42</sup>

From Savonarola's perspective, the proof by *ἔκθεσις* is a syllogism,<sup>43</sup> even though Aristotle does not seem not to treat the proof by *ἔκθεσις* as a syllogism at all. This 'proof' has puzzled many interpreters, because it does not seem to rely on any formal principle.<sup>44</sup> Savonarola's treatment avoids the difficulty raised by the alleged non-logical status of *ἔκθεσις*,<sup>45</sup> but involves other problems, because if the *ἔκθεσις* is a syllogism, there is circularity in the demonstrations within the syllogistic system.

Aristotle uses the *ἔκθεσις* (or a procedure similar to *ἔκθεσις*), in order to prove the validity of the law of conversion for universal negative propositions (CUN). On the basis of CUN, Aristotle proves all the other laws of conversion (cf. *Prior Analytics*

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predicated *ἐν τῷ τί ἔστιν*). Savonarola's solution is an attempt to solve the inconsistencies of Aristotle's treatment of the difference.

<sup>40</sup> See SAVONAROLA, *Compendium logicae*, IV.1, p. 44, l. 4–6: « syllogismus est oratio in qua positus quibusdam aliud quiddam ab his quae posita sunt ex necessitate accidit eo quod haec sunt ».

<sup>41</sup> Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Analytica Priora*, I.1, 24b18–20.

<sup>42</sup> See the example of syllogism provided shortly after the definition of syllogism, in SAVONAROLA, *Compendium logicae*, IV.1, p. 44, l. 7–13. It is controversial whether Aristotle's syllogistic deals with singular terms, and most interpreters say that it does not (see e.g. JAN ŁUKASIEWICZ, *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1957<sup>2</sup>, esp. p. 1–2). All the examples of syllogisms in the section devoted to categorical syllogistic in *Analytica Priora*, I.2, 4–7 include quantified premises and conclusions. It is well known, however, that in the *Prior Analytics* there are also examples of syllogism with singular terms, see e.g. *Analytica Priora*, II.27, 70b15 and ff. See also JOHN LANGSHAW AUSTIN, « Critical Notice », *Mind*, 61 (1952), p. 395–404, esp. p. 396–397.

<sup>43</sup> An *ἔκθεσις* is an 'exposition'. Aristotle proves the validity of the law of conversion for universal negative propositions by *ἔκθεσις*, i.e. by 'exposing' a particular term. The proof runs as follows: if universal negative propositions do not convert *simpliciter*, it is false that AeB ('No A is B') implies BeA ('No B is A'). Hence, AeB would be compatible with the contradictory of BeA, i.e. BiA ('Some Bs are A'). If some of the Bs are A, then there is a term, say C, such that C is B and is A. The 'exposition' (*ἔκθεσις*) consists in pointing to the existence of this hypothetical C. If there is a C, such that C is B and is A, then some As are B (because C, that is an A, is also a B). On proof by *ἔκθεσις* see MICHEL CRUBELLIER, MATHIEU MARION, ZOE MCCONAUGHEY, SHAHID RAHMAN, « Dialectic, the *Dictum de omni* and *Ecthesis* », forthcoming in *History and Philosophy of Logic*. Savonarola presents the proof by *ἔκθεσις* in *Compendium logicae*, IV.7, p. 45, l. 23–28.

<sup>44</sup> See GÜNTHER PATZIG, *Die aristotelische Syllogistik. Logisch-philologische Untersuchungen über das Buch A der Ersten Analytiken*, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen 1959 (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philologisch-historische Klasse. 3. Folge, 42), p. 172.

<sup>45</sup> On this difficulty, see especially ŁUKASIEWICZ, *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, p. 59–66.

I.2). In Savonarola's presentation, the *ἐκθεσις* is replaced by the *sylogismus expositorius*. The proof runs as follows:

Thesis:

(a) (1) 'No A is B' converts into (2) 'No B is A'

If (a) is not the case, then (1) 'No A is B' is compatible with the contradictory of (2), namely

(3) 'Some Bs are A'

Let us assume that the Bs, which are A, are referred to by C. As a consequence, all Cs are A, and all Cs are B. We have a *sylogismus expositorius* which infers that

(4) 'Some A are B'

This, however, contradicts our premise (vi). Therefore, CUN is a valid law.

Savonarola's proof would be sound, if only this *sylogismus expositorius* were not a *Darapti*.<sup>46</sup> However, as Savonarola knows,<sup>47</sup> *Darapti* is proved to be valid in virtue of the conversion of the minor premise. Thanks to this conversion, *Darapti* is 'reduced' to the first figure mood *Darii*. The conversion of a universal affirmative into a particular affirmative relies on the validity of CUN, as Savonarola admits with Aristotle.<sup>48</sup> In other words, Savonarola's account of the validity of CUN and of the validity of *Darapti* appears to be circular.<sup>49</sup>

Apart from this inconsistency, Savonarola's presentation of categorical syllogistic is faithful to Aristotle's *littera*.<sup>50</sup>

The modal syllogistic is the less original part of the treatise. Savonarola maintains that LLL-syllogistic (both premises and conclusion are necessary) is shown to be valid thanks to the conversions for modal premises, and to the demonstration *per impossibile* of the validity of *Baroco* LLL and *Bocardo* LLL.<sup>51</sup> This is certainly true, but, since logic requires that all assumptions are made explicit, one should add to what Savonarola says that also LLL-*Barbara*, LLL-*Celarent*, LLL-*Darii*, and LLL-*Ferio* should be taken to be valid syllogisms.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Cf. SAVONAROLA. *Compendium logicae*, IV.9, p. 46, l. 15–26. *Darapti* is the name of a type of syllogism and has the following structure: 1) all M are P; 2) all M are S; therefore 3) some S are P.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, IV.14, p. 51, l. 20–21.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, IV.3, p. 45, l. 9–13.

<sup>49</sup> The only way out is not to consider the *sylogismus expositorius* to be a standard syllogism. This treatment of the *sylogismus expositorius*, as a self-standing logical rule, was common in the Middle Ages and may also be found in the *Summa totius logicae Aristotelis* of pseudo-Aquinas. On the *sylogismus expositorius* in the Middle Ages see SIMO KNUUTTILA, « Generality and Identity in late Medieval Discussion of the Prior Analytics », *Vivarium*, 48 (2010), p. 215–227.

<sup>50</sup> For example, in SAVONAROLA. *Compendium logicae*, IV.25, the Dominican Preacher stresses that there are only three figures; this doctrine is a trademark for 'orthodox' Aristotelian syllogistic.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, V.5.

<sup>52</sup> If *Barbara* is a valid syllogism, is it the case that LLL-*Barbara* is valid as well? One might argue that *Barbara*'s validity relies on the *dici de omni*; analogously, LLL-*Barbara*'s validity relies on a L-*dici de*

In books VI and VII, Savonarola makes a bold claim about the non-monotonicity of syllogistic. He states that the middle term cannot be too general, otherwise it would be difficult to infer any interesting conclusion from it; furthermore, it cannot be a singular term, because we do not quantify over singular terms.<sup>53</sup> Book VII aims at reducing (part of) propositional logic to syllogistic. The definition of hypothetical propositions captures sentences that display the following structures:  $(h^*) 'p \rightarrow q'$  or  $(h^{**}) 'p \vee q'$ .<sup>54</sup> But even if he makes room to hypothetical propositions in his logic, Savonarola is faithful to the Aristotelian tradition in maintaining that some rules of propositional logic, like the *modus ponendo ponens*, should not be employed in a deductive system, because they are not able to yield any new information.<sup>55</sup> In Savonarola's view, the information in the conclusion of a *modus ponendo ponens* is not 'new' inasmuch as it appears already in the premises.<sup>56</sup> The information included in the conclusion of a *Barbara* syllogism, on the other hand, does not appear in the premises, because these display different predicative relations.

The remaining books of the *Compendium* do not show an equal degree of originality.<sup>57</sup>

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*omni* (if A is said of necessity of all B, then A is said of necessity of all of which B is said of necessity; Aristotle seems to adopt this argument in *Analytica Priora*, I.8, 30a2–3). Now, it is possible to argue that if the *dici de omni* is a true formula, then the L-*dici de omni* is also a true formula. This entails, however, the adoption of the necessitation rule, and of the K axiom. Such a move might be problematic for a student of Thomas Aquinas (there is evidence to maintain that Thomas would have rejected the K axiom, see LORENZ DEMEY, LUCA GILI, « Thomas van Aquino, niet-normale modale logica's en het problem van toekomstige contingenties », *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 79/2 [2017], p. 259–276). Savonarola, however, needs to argue in a similar way, in order to maintain his modal claims.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. SAVONAROLA, *Compendium logicae*, VI.5, p. 73, l. 26–p. 74, l. 8.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, VII.1, p. 85, l. 3–13.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, VII.20, p. 95, l. 6–29.

<sup>56</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias is probably the first Aristotelian philosopher who tried to downplay propositional arguments because they were not producing 'new' information; see LUCA GILI, *La sillogistica di Alessandro di Afrodisia*, Olms, Hildesheim 2011 (Spudasmata: Studien zur klassischen Philologie und ihren Grenzgebieten, 138), p. 101–102.

<sup>57</sup> In book XI of the *Compendium*, Savonarola dwells on some issues pertaining to what we would rather call today 'philosophy of logic' and his claims are fairly conventional (*pace* GARIN, « Ricerche sugli scritti filosofici di Girolamo Savonarola », p. 208). See for example Savonarola's solution to the *vexata quaestio* of the position of the *Categories* within Aristotle's *Organon*: according to the Dominican Preacher, the logician considers the ten categories, inasmuch as they are second intentions; one might infer that the metaphysician studies the categories inasmuch as they are first intentions (cf. *Compendium logicae*, XI.30, p. 175, l. 11–17). Analogously, Savonarola relies on Thomas Aquinas's writings when dealing with topics like the *materia signata quantitate* (which he takes to be the principle of individuation) and the analogy of being.

III. Paolo Barbò from Soncino (Soncinas)

The date of birth of Paolo Barbò is unknown.<sup>58</sup> He joined the Order of Preachers and was a pupil of Peter Maldura of Bergamo (d. 1482). Peter of Bergamo was *regens studiorum* in Bologna from 1471 to 1477, while Paolo Barbò was a student friar in the same convent. Peter is the author of the *Tabula Aurea*, an index to philosophical and theological topics from Aquinas's works<sup>59</sup>. Jindráček, author of several meticulous studies on Paolo Barbò, claims that Barbò was influenced by Peter of Bergamo's Thomism.<sup>60</sup> Barbò became a doctor in theology in 1494 and died in 1495. His works include editions of texts by other authors and three original works: a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, a commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on Aristotle's *Categories*, and a summary of Capreolus's *Defensiones*. Among his editions, it is worth mentioning a collection of short works by Thomas Aquinas. The book, published in Milan in 1488 (« per magistros Benignum et Johannem Antonium fratres de Honate »),<sup>61</sup> does not include logical treatises like the *Summa totius logicae Aristotelis* – evidence that Barbò was probably uncertain about their authenticity. The collection includes however other inauthentic logical writings, i.e. the treatises *De modalibus*, *De natura accidentis*, *De natura generis*, *De natura syllogismorum*, *De sensu respectu singularium et intellectu respectu universalium*, *De inuentione medii*.<sup>62</sup> Future research on Barbò's logic will have to draw attention to the presence of the doctrine outlined in these pseudonymous works in Barbò's own writings.

As I anticipated, the Dominican Master from Soncino wrote three major works: a commentary *per quaestiones* on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,<sup>63</sup> a summary of Capreolus's *Defensiones theologiae*,<sup>64</sup> and a running commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on

<sup>58</sup> Efrem Jindráček suggests that Paolo might be born around the year 1458. On Barbò's life and works see EFREM JINDRÁČEK, « Paolo Barbò da Soncino: La vita ed il pensiero di un tomista rinascimentale », *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, 78 (2008), p. 79–148. Jindráček's contribution is supported by a vast research in the archives and corrects many incorrect information included in the entry « Paolo Barbo » written by Cesare Vasoli for the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. VI, Treccani, Roma 1964.

<sup>59</sup> On Peter of Bergamo's *Tabula aurea* see BERTRAND-GEORGES GUYOT, TIZIANO STERLI, « La *Tabula aurea* di Fra Pietro Maldura da Bergamo O.P. entro la storia del Tomismo », *Angelicum*, 80 (2003), p. 597–660.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. JINDRÁČEK, « Paolo Barbò da Soncino », p. 91.

<sup>61</sup> The colophon is quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 113, fn. 9.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 115–116.

<sup>63</sup> A partial edition of Barbò's commentary has been published in EFREM JINDRÁČEK, *Paolo Barbò da Soncino: Questioni di metafisica. Introduzione alla vita ed al pensiero di un tomista rinascimentale*, Angelicum, Roma 2017.

<sup>64</sup> The treatise was published with the title *Diuinum epitoma questionum in quattuor libros Sententiarum a principe thomistarum Ioanne Capreolo tholosano disputatarum* in Lyon (Lugduni), « per Joannem Crespinum », in 1528.

Aristotle's *Categories*, that was first published in Venice in 1499 with the title *Expositio magistri Pauli Soncinatis super Artem Veterem*.<sup>65</sup> This book was published again in 1587,<sup>66</sup> with the title *In universalia, seu Isagogen Porphyrii, et Aristotelis Praedicamenta subtilis et lucida expositio*, and in 1600,<sup>67</sup> together with Dominic of Flanders's *Quaestiones perutiles* on Aquinas's commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*.<sup>68</sup>

Barbò's commentary deals only with the first operation of the intellect in Aquinas's scheme, namely with concept formation. In the *Prooemium*, Barbò expounds the subject of logic and displays a certain degree of originality, by contrasting Albert's and Scotus's opinions with Aquinas's and Aristotle's conclusions, that Barbò defends and endorses:<sup>69</sup>

Scotus maintains that the syllogism is the subject of logic, Albert the Great <maintains that> argumentation <is the subject>, whereas saint Thomas and the Philosopher <maintain that> the being of reason (*ens rationis*) <is the subject>. Hence, in order to present the truth of this doubt, first, the opinion of saint Thomas will be expounded by means of some conclusions, second, it will be expounded what is true in the opinions of Scotus and Albert.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Cf. THOMAS KAEPPEL, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatoris Medii Aevi*, vol. III: I-S, ad Sanctam Sabinam, Roma 1980, p. 203.

<sup>66</sup> In Venice, « apud Michaellem Berniam bibliopolam Bononiensem ».

<sup>67</sup> Again in Venice, « aput Haeredem Hieronymi Scoti ».

<sup>68</sup> The complete title of this edition is *Dominici de Flandria Ordinis Praedicatorum Theologi ac Philosophi celeberrimi In D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria super Libros Posteriorum Aristotelis, necnon in eiusdem Fallaciarum opus Quaestiones Perutiles, Pauli quoque Soncinatis eiusdem ordinis, lucida et subtilis expositio in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Praedicamenta, cum suis quaestionibus in unaquaque expositione utiliter disputatis*. Dominic of Flanders is one of the most prominent figures of Renaissance Thomism in the fifteenth century. Born Balduinus Lottin de Mervis, he was master of arts in Paris in the 1450s. He became a Dominican friar in 1461, and he taught in Bologna, in Florence, and in Pisa. He died in the priory of Santa Maria Novella (Florence) in 1479. He is well known for his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, but he also commented on the *Posterior Analytics*, on the *Categories*, and exposed the different opinions of many scholars on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. These two last works are preserved in a manuscript in the former Dominican Priory of Taggia; cf. KAEPPEL, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatoris*, vol. I: A-F, ad Sanctam Sabinam, Roma 1970, p. 316-317. The first text has this title: *Super libros Analyticorum Posteriorum. I: Declaratio eorum que inveniuntur in scripto Thomae de Aq.; II: Problemata que sunt inter doctorem sanctum et alios doctores circa libros Posteriorum*, and is preserved in MS Taggia, Biblioteca del Convento Domenicano, 4, fol. 45-58 (15<sup>th</sup> cent.), The commentary *Super Praedicamenta* is preserved in the same manuscript at fol. 39-45.

<sup>69</sup> Barbò's exposition of analogy, which is also original and interesting, has been discussed by MICHAEL TAVUZZI, « Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy », *Angelicum*, 70 (1993), p. 93-121, esp. p. 98-102. Tavuzzi speculates that Barbò « might well have been one of Cajetan's teachers » (p. 99), and suggests that Cajetan's famous doctrine of analogy might well have been reliant on some of Barbò's speculations.

<sup>70</sup> *Expositio magistri Pauli Soncinatis super Artem Veterem*, Venetiis 1499, p. 1a: « Scotus arbitratur subiectum logice esse syllogismum, Albertus Magnus argumentationem, Divus vero Thomas et philosophus ens rationis. Ut ergo pateat huius dubii veritas, primo declarabitur quibusdam conclusionibus opinio sancti Thome, secundo quid veritatis habeat opinio Scoti et Alberti » (my

To present Aquinas's position on the subject of logic, Barbò distinguishes three senses of the expression *ens rationis*:

I state that something can be said to be a 'being of reason' (*ens rationis*) in three ways. (1) Something is said <to be> a 'being of reason' when 'of reason' is understood in an intransitive way, and in this way the 'being of reason' is nothing but reason itself. (2) Something is said <to be> a 'being of reason' because it exists in reason itself; in this sense, the intelligible species and the acts of the intelligence and the concepts created by means of these acts are said <to be> 'beings of reason'. Logic is not about the 'being of reason' understood in these two ways, because such beings – in relation to their constitutive being (*quantum ad eorum entitates*) – are the object of the third book <of Aristotle's> *On the Soul*. (3) 'Being of reason' is taken as distinguished from 'real being'.<sup>71</sup>

According to Paolo Barbò,

- (a) *ens rationis* can be referred to the *ratio*, i.e. to the mind;
- (b) *ens rationis* may refer to the mental representation of a concept, i.e. to the entity existing in the mind;
- (c) *ens rationis* is something that is *not* a real being nor a representation of a real being: this third type of *ens rationis* includes privations and negations, which do not exist *in ipsa rerum natura*.

Barbò states that Aristotle studies the *ens rationis* according to the first two senses in his *De anima*, book III. The *entia rationis* of the third kind are the subject of logic. According to Barbò, this is Aquinas's position, whereas Albert the Great maintained that 'arguments' are the subject of logic,<sup>72</sup> and Scotus suggested that 'syllogisms' are the proper subject of this discipline.

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translation; I number the pages according to their succession, and I number as p. 1 the first page of text; the copy of the first edition of Barbò's work at the Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze, which I have consulted, does not have page numbers).

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.: « Dico quod tripliciter potest aliquid dici ens rationis. Uno modo dicitur aliquid ens rationis secundum quod ly rationis construitur intransitive et hoc modo nihil est aliud ens rationis nisi ens quod est ipsa ratio. Alio modo dicitur aliquid ens rationis quia est in ipsa ratione existens quo modo species intelligibilis et actus intelligendi et conceptus per tales actus formati dicuntur entia rationis. De ente rationis his duobus modis accepto non est logica: cum talia entia pertineant ad tertium librum de anima quantum ad eorum entitates. Tertio accipitur ens rationis ut distinguitur contra ens reale » (my translation).

<sup>72</sup> Albert's ideas on the subject of logic have been studied by BRUNO TREMBLAY in his paper « Albert le Grand et le problème de la science logique », *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 22 (2011), p. 301–345.

The *entia rationis* of the third type include privations, negations, and relations.<sup>73</sup> Barbò maintains that only relations of reason (*relationes rationis*) are the proper subject of logic. To defend this claim, Barbò refers to a passage of Aquinas (*De veritate*, q. 21, art. 1) where the relation of the knowable (*scibile*) to science is taken to be a relation of reason. According to Thomas, if X depends on Y, the relation of X to Y is real, but the relation of Y to X is a relation of reason. Science depends on the knowable (*scibile*), but the reverse is not the case, hence the relation of the knowable to science is a mere relation of reason, i.e. a relation that finds no correspondence in reality.

Barbò thinks that the relations such as  $R_{x,y}$  ('X is the genus of Y'), or  $R_{z,w}$  ('Z is the species of W') are relations of reason. Barbò's argument is not explicit, but it is reasonable to suppose that he should have argued along the lines of Aquinas's argument: the genus X does not depend on its species Y for being the genus of Y, nor the species Z depend on the individual W for being its species. As a consequence, *genera*, *species*, etc. are *respectus rationis*, i.e. relations of reason.

Logic is not about privations and negations [...], because such things do not belong per se to a scientific habit, as is said in the first <book> of <Aristotle's> *Posterior Analytics*. Hence, <logic> can only be about relations of reason. [...] As a real relation consists in an order of things, a relation of reason consists in an order that the intellect discovers and attributes to what is said in a relative way. Such are the relations that the intellect attributes to things that are grasped, *qua* grasped <by the intellect>, as in the case of the relation of the genus, of the species, of the universal, of the predicable, and of other such things.<sup>74</sup>

This discussion of the subject of logic is one of the most original contributions that Barbò brought to the discipline. In the rest of his work, he expounds the categories and the *praedicabilia*.

Barbò goes back to the status of logic in his opening lines of his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. The debate on the status of 'categories' (*predicamenta*) has been heated already in antiquity: are they classes of words or of things? Is the treatise about real beings or about our language?

<sup>73</sup> Barbò maintains that this further distinction has to be found in *De veritate*, q. 21, art. 1. Aquinas is asking himself whether the notion of the good adds something to being, and in his answer he makes some remarks on relations, and distinguishes real relations from relations of reason.

<sup>74</sup> *Expositio magistri Pauli Soncinatis super Artem Veterem*, Venetiis 1499, p. 1b: « De priuationibus et negationibus [...] non est logica, cum talia non cadant per se sub habitu scientifico, ut dicitur in primo Posteriorum, ex quo relinquitur quod sit de relationibus rationis. [...] [S]icut relatio realis consistit in ordine rerum, sic relatio rationis consistit in ordine, qui est per intellectum inuentus et attributus ei, quod relative dicitur, et huiusmodi sunt relationes, que attribuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis ut intellectae sunt, sicut est relatio generis, et speciei, et universalis, et praedicabilis, et aliorum huiusmodi » (my translation).

Barbò does not shy away from the controversy. He upheld the traditional response, according to which the *Categories* are about ‘words signifying things’, but he presents this solution according to Aquinas’s distinction between a ‘material object’ and a ‘formal object’ of a science.

Barbò begins by stating that the word ‘category’ has several meanings.

I answer that, in order to make clear this question, I anticipate that this name ‘category’ (*predicamentum*) is a term of second imposition and refers to (*significat*) a certain relation of reason discovered by reason and attributed to things *qua* existing in the intellect. Second, I anticipate that such relation is a certain order of priority and posteriority, or of superiority and inferiority. For outside of the intellect, ‘animal’ is not prior to ‘man’ or ‘horse’ or the other species of animal, because it does not have existence (*esse*) outside of its species. I say the same about ‘substance’ relative to ‘body’ and about anything superior relative to <its> inferior, but it is the intellect that found this order and that attributed such order to things *qua* existing in the intellect and named <such order> with this name ‘category’. Hence, the category is a certain order among superior and inferior <items>. And something is said to be in a category because it is <placed> in such an order. Third, I anticipate that a category can be taken (*potest accipi*) in three ways: (1) as the things themselves to which the intellect attributes the abovementioned order; (2) as the order itself; (3) as the concept by means of which the intellect attributes this order to things. We can add a fourth way of taking a category, <i.e.> (4) as the things not in an absolute way, but *qua* ordered by the abovementioned order by means of the concept of the intellect.<sup>75</sup>

According to Barbò, the word ‘category’ refers to an order between elements that are prior and elements that are posterior in a hierarchy. This ‘order’ is a *respectus rationis*, i.e. a relation of reason. This is consistent with Barbò’s opinion about the object of logic. If logic is about relations of reason, its parts should be consequently dealing with particular types of relations of reason. Hence, the word

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 41a–b: « Respondeo pro notitia huius questionis premitto quod hoc nomen predicamentum est terminus secunde impositionis et significat quondam respectus rationis adinventum a ratione et attributum rebus secundum quod sunt in intellectu. Premitto secundo quod talis respectus est quidam ordo prioritatis et posterioritatis sive superioritatis et inferioritatis. Nam extra intellectum animal non est prius homine et equo et aliis speciebus animalis cum non habeat esse praeter species suas. Idem dico de substantia respectu corporis et de quolibet superiori respectu inferioris, sed intellectus est qui hunc ordinem excogitavit et talem ordinem rebus attribuit ut sunt in intellectu et nominavit hoc nomine predicamentum. Est ergo predicamentum quedam ordinatio superiorum et inferiorum. Et dicitur aliquid esse in predicamento eo quod est in tali ordine. Premitto tertio quod predicamentum potest accipi tribus modis. Uno modo pro ipsis rebus quibus intellectus attribuit predictum ordinem. Alio modo pro ipso ordine. Tertio pro conceptu quo mediante intellectus hunc ordinem rebus attribuit. Potest addi quartus modus ut accipiatur predicamentum. Quarto modo pro rebus non quidem absolute, sed ut stant sub predicto ordine mediante conceptu intellectus » (my translation).

'*predicamentum*' can refer either to the *things* that are ordered according to the above-mentioned relation of reason, or to the order itself, or to the psychological state of a mind that is actually categorizing extra-mental realities. The word '*predicamentum*' can also refer to things considered not in themselves, but inasmuch as they are in an order of priority and posteriority.

According to Barbò, the material object of the science expounded in the *Categories* is the real world as it is divided into ten genera of beings. The formal object is the *ordo*, i.e. the *respectus rationis*, in virtue of which this order is attributed to things. It is worth stressing that this *ordo* is not mind-dependent in Barbò's view – this probably explains why he distinguished the *ordo* itself from the psychological concept in virtue of which a mind attributes categories to the world. I suggest that the distinction between the third and fourth senses of the '*ordo*' is meant to distinguish between a merely psychological activity of ordering things within the mind (third sense of '*ordo*') and the very extra-mental things qua suitable of being ordered by a mind whatsoever (fourth sense of '*ordo*'). For this reason, Barbò is able to state that the object of logic is mind-independent, even though it is related to the activity of a possible mind.

#### IV. Crisostomo Javelli

Crisostomo Javelli was born in 1470 c., presumably in Piedmont, joined the Dominicans, and died in 1538.<sup>76</sup> He is the author of a *Compendium Logicae*, which includes eleven treatises. The structure of Javelli's work mirrors Ockham's *Summa logicae* in many respects, but also Paul of Venice's *Logica Parva* (unlike Paul of Venice, however, Javelli does not deal with obligations and insolubles).

The eleven treatises deal with the following topics:

- I. Introductory remarks, which include a short history of logic;
- II. terms (this part corresponds to the doctrine dealt with by Aristotle in *De Interpretatione* 2–5);
- III. propositions;
- IV. the five *praedicabilia* (this section corresponds to Porphyry's *Isagoge*);
- V. the *antepraedicamenta*, the doctrine of the categories (*praedicamenta*), and the *postpraedicamenta* (this treatise, as is clear, corresponds to Aristotle's *Categories*);

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<sup>76</sup> On Javelli see ÉTIENNE GILSON, « Autour de Pomponazzi: problématique de l'immortalité de l'âme en Italie au début du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle », *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 28 (1961), p. 163–279 (esp. p. 259–277); MICHAEL TAVUZZI, « Chrysostomus Iavelli OP (c. 1470–1538). A Biobibliographical Essay: Part I, Biography », *Angelicum*, 67 (1990), p. 457–482; ID., « Chrysostomus Iavelli OP (c. 1470–1538). A Biobibliographical Essay: Part II, Bibliography », *Angelicum*, 68 (1991), p. 109–121.

- VI. syllogism;
- VII. supposition theory;
- VIII. *ampliatio* and *appellatio*, i.e. changes in the supposition of a term and changes in the tenses of verbs;
- IX. theory of *consequentiae*;
- X. *de probatione terminorum* (this treatise deals with the ways in which it is possible to show the truth, or the probability of a proposition);
- XI. demonstrative syllogism (this part aims at expounding what Aristotle says in his *Posterior Analytics*).

The treatise was first published in 1540 in Venice. The *Compendium* was rather successful, and went « through some thirty editions between 1540 and 1629 ». <sup>77</sup> Javelli had many teaching positions within the Dominican Order and, most probably, he wrote his *Compendium logicae* for didactic purposes. The tendency to systematize the ‘new’ logic of the late medieval authors and to present it as consistent with Aristotle’s logic is even more evident than in Savonarola’s *Compendium*. Javelli was also influenced by the humanists, inasmuch as his treatises draw attention to the linguistic, and historical context in which ancient logic arose. If Lorenzo Valla criticized Paul of Venice for the latter’s unfamiliarity with the Greek language, Javelli dwells on the etymology of many key terms of logic, and shows a certain familiarity with both Greek and Latin. In his historical section, Javelli maintains that Socrates and Plato « were not strong in answering and solving <puzzles> because they did not have logic, even though they were strong in asking questions or in raising doubts » (« licet potentes essent ad interrogandum sive dubitandum, non tamen ad respondendum et solvendum propter logice carentiam » <sup>78</sup>). Logic was founded on its proper grounds by Aristotle, for whom Javelli has words of deep admiration:

Hence, the Author of nature gave us Aristotle, who first discovered true logic with his almost divine mind and organized and brought it to completion in all its parts, so that we could discover the true rule of knowing that guides the human mind in arts and sciences. <sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> TAVUZZI, « Chrysostomus Iavelli OP ... Part I », p. 461, fn. 15.

<sup>78</sup> *Logicae Compendium Peripateticae, ordinatum per Reuerendum Magistrum Chrisostomum Iauellum Canapicium ordinis praedicatorum, ex officina Ioannis Blauij de Colonia, Olyssipponae 1556* (henceforth, IAVELLUS. *Compendium logicae*), fol. 4v.

<sup>79</sup> IAVELLUS. *Compendium logicae*, fol. 4v: « Ut igitur vera sciendi regula directiva humani intellectus in artibus et scientiis inveniretur, datus est nobis ab authore naturae Aristoteles, qui suo pene divino ingenio primus logicam veram invenit, et secundum omnes partes ordinavit ac perfecit » (my translation).

These words implicitly show the ideological background of the *Compendium logicae*, that is designed to expound Peripatetic logic. Javelli was aware that many topics of his treatise had not been discussed by Aristotle, but he nevertheless thinks that these doctrines are at least Aristotelian in spirit. When Javelli introduces the theory of *suppositio*, in the seventh treatise of his textbook, he states that doctrines like the *suppositio*

are consistent with Aristotelian philosophy, even though Aristotle did not propose them <explicitly>, and this will be clear to you once you progress in logic, philosophy of nature and in metaphysics under the guidance of Aristotle.<sup>80</sup>

Javelli's attitude in finding an agreement between the doctrines of Aristotle (and of Aquinas) and those of later thinkers has been already underlined by Michael Tavuzzi,<sup>81</sup> and may be said to be a trademark of his *Compendium*.

After his sketchy history of logic, Javelli defines logic as a *rational science*<sup>82</sup> and states that its generic subject is mental being.<sup>83</sup> The subject of logic, as a distinct discipline, is the «ens rationis ratiocinativum, quod est idem quod argumentatio».<sup>84</sup> This remark echoes Barbò's claim that the object of logic is the *ens rationis*, but Javelli seems to harmonize the 'Thomist' solution with the position of Albert the Great, because the *ens rationis* is qualified as *ratiocinativum* and this is said to be identical to *argumentatio*. According to Barbò, Albert the Great taught that the object of logic is 'arguments': Barbò noticed the similarity with what he took to be Aquinas's position, but stressed nevertheless the difference between the two medieval Dominicans. Javelli implicitly unifies their positions.

According to Javelli, logic is a science and not empirical knowledge, because it has proper subject and proper principles: the presence of these two elements is enough to hold that it falls under the rational sciences,<sup>85</sup> and is divided into sub-disciplines according to the scheme that Aquinas introduces in the *Proemium* to his

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., fol. 183v–184r: « etsi non habeantur ab Aristotele, tamen doctrinae peripateticae consonant, ut tibi constabit postquam in Aristotelis disciplina tam in logicalibus quam in physicis atque metaphysicis eruditus fueris » (my translation).

<sup>81</sup> Cf. MICHAEL TAVUZZI, « Herveus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism of the Renaissance », *Doctor Communis*, 45 (1992), p. 132–152, esp. p. 148–150.

<sup>82</sup> JAVELLUS, *Compendium logicae*, fol. 5v: « [l]ogica est scientia rationalis discretiva veri a falso ». Javelli adds that « [l]ogica est ars artium et scientia scientiarum, qua aperta omnes aperiuntur, et qua clausa omnes alie clauduntur » (fol. 6r); this statement echoes Peter of Spain's claim that « dialectica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens' » (*Petri Hispani Summulae Logicales cum Versorii Parisiensis clarissima expositione*, apud F. Sansovinum, Venetiis 1572, tr. 1, fol. 2v).

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., vol. 8r: « [s]ubiectum in illa universalissime sumptum est ens rationis, id est ens fabricatum ab intellectu et non habet esse extra intellectum ».

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., fol. 8v.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., fol. 11r.

commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*.<sup>86</sup> In his treatise on terms, Javelli stresses that terms signify *ad placitum*,<sup>87</sup> and that verbs are always tensed.<sup>88</sup> Javelli has something interesting to say about propositions. According to him, a proposition is defined as « discourse that signifies the true or the false by pointing out [something] » (« oratio verum vel falsum significans indicando »);<sup>89</sup> the clause ‘*indicando*’ is meant to exclude prayers, utterances of wish, etc. from the set of propositions. Javelli adds that only present tensed propositions are propositions in the fullest sense, because past-tensed and future-tensed utterances do not signify anything that *is* the case or that *is not* the case, and thus cannot be true or false:

The phrases (*orationes*) in the past and future indicative tenses do not signify primarily and per se ‘true’ and ‘false’, unless they are transformed into a phrase in the indicative present tense.<sup>90</sup>

This is not sufficient evidence to suggest that Javelli’s understanding of propositions was analogous to Savonarola’s and, regrettably, Javelli does not add many details to his definition. In the same third treatise, Javelli deals with modal propositions as well, and in this case the didactic aim of his exposition could not be more evident. He deliberately avoids all technicalities and limits himself to stating some basic principles of modal logic: modal propositions are defined as categorical propositions to which a modal operator has been attached as a prefix. There are four modal operators for Javelli: necessary, contingent, possible, and impossible.<sup>91</sup> Javelli maintains that also ‘true’ and ‘false’ are modes, and by doing so he refers to a traditional doctrine, which has been endorsed also by Aquinas in his *De propositionibus modalibus*. Javelli adds that also ‘*per se*’ and ‘*per accidens*’ are modes, and they correspond to ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ respectively:

Nam licet prima [i.e. ‘per se’] aequipolleat modali de necesse, et secunda [i.e. ‘per accidens’] modali de contingenti, tamen <non> sunt formaliter modales.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., fol. 12r–13r.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. ARISTOTELES. *De Interpretatione*, 2, 16a19–20.

<sup>88</sup> This claim, although consistent with Aristotle’s *littera* (cf. *De Interpretatione*, 3, 16b6–7), is at odds with Savonarola’s exposition. This suggests that ‘Thomist logic’ was not a monolith and there were several debated issues.

<sup>89</sup> IAVELLUS. *Compendium logicae*, fol. 26v.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. fol. 28v: « Orationes etiam modi indicativi temporis praeteriti et futuri non significant primo et per se verum et falsum, nisi reducantur ad unam temporis praesentis indicativi » (my translation).

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., fol. 58v.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., fol. 59r. I suggest to add a ‘non’ to the sentence to make it intelligible.

This observation seems to suggest that modal syllogistic is grounded on Aristotle's theory of predication.<sup>93</sup> Javelli, however, does not expand this interesting intuition. Furthermore, even though he is aware of the distinction *de sensu composito/de sensu diviso*, he does not consider the problems that such a distinction may create within modal syllogistic.<sup>94</sup> His exposition of modal logic is intentionally simplified for didactic reasons; after having expanded modal conversions, Javelli adds: « that would be enough for now, lest you get confused, young man » (« haec pro nunc sufficient ne tu iuvenis confundaris »).<sup>95</sup>

The tendency to simplify the core notions of medieval logic brings sometimes Javelli to modify significantly these doctrines, as is the case in his supposition theory. Medieval authors did not understand the theory of *suppositio* as a mere theory of reference, but as a theory of meaning, namely as a theory for interpreting sentences.<sup>96</sup> Javelli, on the contrary, seems to consistently maintain that the supposition theory is what we would nowadays call a theory of reference.<sup>97</sup> According to him,

the supposition is said to be the positing of a term instead of another, i.e. instead of one of its meanings. In this sense, we say that in this utterance 'God is good', the

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<sup>93</sup> It is perhaps worth mentioning that such an interpretation has gained an increasing consensus among contemporary scholars: cf. PAUL THOM, *The Logic of Essentialism: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic*, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1996 (The New Synthese Historical Library: Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy, 43); MARKO MALINK, *Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2013.

<sup>94</sup> The laws of conversions for necessity propositions are valid *de sensu composito*; mixed necessity syllogisms (like *Barbara LXL*) are valid only if the modal operator is read *de sensu diviso*. This seems to suggest that Aristotle's modal logic is inconsistent. Javelli, however, seems not to be aware of this philosophical problem. His exposition of the distinction between *de sensu composito* and *de sensu diviso* is as follows: « in modali de sensu composito modus aut praeponitur aut postponitur toti dicto [...], in modali autem de sensu diviso modus nec praeponitur nec postponitur dicto, sed mediat inter partes dicti » (IAVELLUS, *Compendium logicae*, fol. 61r).

<sup>95</sup> IAVELLUS, *Compendium logicae*, fol. 62r.

<sup>96</sup> According to CATARINA DUTILH NOVAES, *suppositio* provides mechanic rules, by means of which we can list all possible interpretations of an ambiguous sentence. The theory of the *suppositio* may also serve the purpose of finding the references of the elements of a sentence in certain context; writing about Ockham, Novaes observes that « supposition theory is better seen as a theory of propositional meaning in the sense that one of its main purposes is to provide an analytical procedure for determining what can be asserted by means of a given proposition – a procedure including, but by no means limited to, the determination of the entities that the proposition may be about, i.e., its possible *supposita*, as it would be the case if it were a theory of reference » (« An Intensional Interpretation of Ockham's Theory of Supposition », *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 46 [2008], p. 365–393, here p. 367).

<sup>97</sup> PETER T. GEACH presented supposition theory as a theory of reference in his classical monograph *Reference and Generality. An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 1962 (Contemporary Philosophy).

term ‘God’ stands for its meaning, so that the sense is: what is signified by ‘God’ is good.<sup>98</sup>

Javelli relies on the definitions of *suppositio* provided by Peter of Spain and by Peter of Mantua,<sup>99</sup> but in his view the supposition theory is a theory of reference:

A substantive term in or outside a proposition, taken in itself, has a meaning, but it has a reference (*non supponit*) only in a proposition. To make this clear, note that ‘to signify’ precedes ‘to have a reference’ [...]. For ‘to signify’ is to introduce a term or a sound to represent a given something. [...] As a consequence, it is up to the first authors who give names to things to make it possible to signify. ‘To have a reference’ is to take an already given meaningful term so that it can refer to any of its meanings or references in a proposition.<sup>100</sup>

According to Javelli, ‘*supponit*’ may be translated with ‘refers to a *suppositum*’. Javelli was faced with two alternative interpretations of the *suppositio*. But surprisingly, he endorses the one that is more at odds with his understanding of *suppositio* as a theory of reference. Javelli writes that Thomists were debating among them as to whether a term can suppose (*supponere*) only in a proposition or also in itself. Javelli maintains that a term *supponit* only in a proposition – a conclusion that is certainly more consistent with an understanding of supposition theory as a theory of meaning.<sup>101</sup> Javelli points out that this debate originated from the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I<sup>a</sup>, q. 39, art. 4, ad 3. Javelli summarizes Aquinas’s position as it follows:

In his answer to the third <objection>, <he> says that ‘man’ per se refers to (*supponit*) a person (*persona*), whereas ‘God’ per se refers to nature. [...]. After having said that God per se refers to nature, saint Thomas clarifies such supposition and forms this supposition where it is said ‘God creates’. [...] For <‘God’> never refers to a Person, unless <the word> is determined by its corresponding predicate, such as in ‘God

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<sup>98</sup> IAVELLUS. *Compendium logicae*, fol. 184v: « dicitur suppositio positio termini pro alio, id est, pro aliquo suo significato. In quo sensu dicimus quod in hac oratione ‘Deus est bonus’, ly ‘Deus’ ponitur pro suo significato, ut sit sensus, id quod significatur per ly ‘Deus’ est bonum ».

<sup>99</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, fol. 184v.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 185v: « terminus substantivus in propositione et extra [propositionem] per se sumptus significat, sed non supponit nisi in propositione. Pro cuius notitia advertere quod significare praecedat supponere [...]. Nam significare est imponere terminum sive vocem ad aliquid certi repraesentandum. [...] Unde facere significare spectat ad primos authores qui rebus nomina imponunt. [...] Supponere autem est accipere terminum iam impositum ad significandum ut stet in propositione pro aliquo suo significato vel supposito ».

<sup>101</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, fol. 186r.

generates', 'God is Father', 'God is Son'. Hence <the word> 'God' refers to a Person not by itself, but in virtue of such predicate.<sup>102</sup>

It is not clear who are the Thomists who endorsed the view, according to which Aquinas maintained that a term *supponit* both in a proposition and independently. Cajetan's commentary on *Summa Theologiae* I<sup>a</sup>, q. 39, art. 4, ad 3 is not very helpful in this regard. Capreolus seems to endorse a view similar to that rejected by Javelli. According to Capreolus, '*significare*' and '*supponere*' are distinct, as much as they are for Javelli. However, from such a premise Capreolus concludes that a name has a meaning that is different from its corresponding *suppositum*:

even though <a name> means (*significet*) a substance with a quality, a name properly means (*significat*) a quality, i.e. the form on the basis of which the name is attributed <to the thing>; <a name> however refers to (*supponit*) a substance, i.e. to the thing to which such name is attributed<sup>103</sup>.

This leads Capreolus to maintain that « this <proposition> is false: 'God does not generate God' » (« ista est falsa 'Deus non generat Deum' »).<sup>104</sup>

If we were to follow Javelli's view, it is possible, I think, to maintain that a proposition like '*Deus non generat Deum*' may also be true, inasmuch as the term '*Deus*' in this context may be taken to refer not to a Person. Consequently, it would be true to say that God, *qua* Trinity, does not generate God, *qua* Trinity.<sup>105</sup>

This example shows that Javelli had original ideas, even though he never wanted to explicitly detach himself to the core tenets of that 'Thomistic school', to which he belonged.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid., fol. 186r-v: « in responsione ad tertium dicit quod homo per se supponit pro persona, Deus autem per se supponit pro natura. [...] [P]ostquam beatus Thomas dixerat quod Deus supponit per se pro natura, statim declarans huiusmodi suppositionem format hanc suppositionem, ut cum dicitur 'Deus creat'. [...] Numquam autem supponit pro persona, nisi determinetur per praedicatum relativum, ut 'Deus generat', 'Deus est pater', 'Deus est filius', ergo Deus non ex se, sed respectu talis praedicati supponit pro persona ».

<sup>103</sup> *Johannis Capreoli Tholosani OP Thomistarum Principis Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis*, vol. I, ed. CESLAS PABAN, THOMAS PÈGUES, Alfred Cattier, Tournonibus 1900, p. 222: « nomen, licet significet substantiam cum qualitate, proprie tamen significat qualitatem, hoc est formam a qua nomen imponitur; supponit vero pro substantia, hoc est pro re cui imponitur tale nomen ».

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p. 224.

<sup>105</sup> According to the Catholic dogma, it is God the Father who generates God the Son. In other words, if we assume that the term '*Deus*' *supponit pro persona* independently (and, hence, in every context), it follows that a proposition like 'God does not generate God' should be false.

<sup>106</sup> The sections on syllogistic are the less original parts of Javelli's treatise.

### V. Conclusion

Savonarola, Barbò, and Javelli wrote textbooks and not original logical treatises. But their works are scattered with original ideas. The common feature of these treatises is that they go back to Aristotle's logical works and bypass the rich logical tradition of the late Middle Ages. This might be a consequence of the Thomists' reading of Thomas Aquinas's passages, in which the Doctor Angelicus refers to the *Organon*, when he is distinguishing the parts of logic. By going back to Aristotle, the Italian Thomists imitated the humanist logicians. Unlike them, they were not horrified by late medieval logical theories: they saw their value (that did not consist in the elegance of the Latin language, but in their logical content) and they tried to integrate these doctrines within an Aristotelian framework. Savonarola appears to have had many original ideas also in purely logical domains, Barbò had an original 'philosophy of logic', Javelli was mostly concerned with the clarity of exposition and with the desire to harmonize late medieval logic and the *Organon*. These three works bear witness to the importance that logic had within Thomistic circles in Renaissance Italy and show that the didactic practice, that prompted the creation of a 'Thomistic logic', transmitted original ideas. The very activity of synthesizing a heterogeneous body of doctrines and of expounding it *ad mentem Divi Thomae* was a fruitful endeavour, that generated new logical insights.

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# MAIMONIDES'S FIRST RECEPTION IN LATIN PHILOSOPHY\*

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## Abstract

The *Sententia cum questionibus in libros De anima I-II Aristotelis* (c. 1240) by Petrus Hispanus provides the first quotations of the *Guide for the Perplexed* by Maimonides in a Latin commentary to the *De anima*. This paper aims to show the textual context of these references and to provide some remarks on the role they play in the theory of the intellect in this commentary.

## Key Words

Prophecy, Intellect, *Guide for the Perplexed*, Petrus Hispanus, Medieval Epistemology.



*There are as many different opinions concerning Prophecy  
as concerning the Eternity or Non-Eternity of the Universe.*

MAIMONIDES, *Guide*, II.32<sup>1</sup>

At least two Latin medieval translations of the *Guide for the Perplexed* (*More Nebujim* in Hebrew) already existed in the thirteenth century, corresponding to translations by Shmuel ibn Tibbon and Yehudah al-Harizi, respectively.<sup>2</sup> According to Herbert Davidson and Gorge Hasselhoff, the translation from al-Harizi was the most-used and was probably disseminated from the Parisian *milieu*

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\* This paper is part of the projects « The Early Latin Reception of Aristotle's *De anima*. Critical Edition and Systematic Study of the Psychological Works attributed to Petrus Hispanus », SFRH/BPD/95373/2013 and « Critical Edition and Study of the Works Attributed do Petrus Hispanus - 1 » Ref. FCT: PTDC/MHC-FIL/0216/2014, IP: Jose Meirinhos. I would like to thank Alexander Fidora and Jose Meirinhos for their suggestions.

<sup>1</sup> MAIMONIDES, *The Guide for the Perplexed*, II.32, trans. MORIZ FRIEDLANDER, Dutton and Company, New York 1936, p. 219.

<sup>2</sup> There seems to exist at least one other Latin translation, which was used for the work *De erroribus philosophorum* by Giles of Rome, cf. GORGE K. HASSELHOFF, « Die Schriften von Moses Maimonides », *Bulletin de philosophie medievale*, 46 (2004), p. 48–52.

around the year 1240, but, according to Wolfgang Kluxen, al-Harizi's text was translated to Latin earlier, between the years 1230 and 1235.<sup>3</sup> In any case, this translation was the one used by some important theologians or masters related to the University of Paris. Indeed, Maimonides made valuable contributions to the Latin philosophical tradition, mainly related to the problem of creation, proofs of the existence of God or the interpretation of the law. Nevertheless, not all of his views were always well understood or correctly appropriated. For this reason, Kluxen prefers to use the expression 'Maimonides's image' because his texts were not always well known in this first Latin reception, and quite frequently, the allusion to his explanations reflects only some *opinioniones communes*.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, many important figures related to the Parisian *milieu* seemed to have contact with Maimonides's doctrines. Moneta of Cremona, according to Kluxen, was the first to introduce Maimonides by name in his *Summa* (1232–1234).<sup>5</sup> Other authors quoting Maimonides were William of Auxerre, William of Auvergne, Philip the Chancellor, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Siger of Bravant, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas. For the history of Maimonides's Latin reception, nonetheless, it is also important to include Petrus Hispanus, who is the author of the only known commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* where the *Guide* is used as a source.

### I. *The Theory of Prophetic Knowledge in the 'Guide' and Its First Latin Reception*

Maimonides wrote on prophecy in several works, as seen in his *Commentary on the Mishnah*, the *Mishneh Torah*, and his *Epistle to the Jews of Yemen*.<sup>6</sup> His theory of

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. WOLFGANG KLUXEN, « Literargeschichtliches zum lateinischen Moses Maimonides », *Recherces de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 21 (1954), p. 23–50, here p. 34–41; HERBERT A. DAVIDSON, *Moses Maimonides: The Man and His Works*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, p. 427; GÖRGE K. HASSELHOFF, « Las traducciones latinas medievales de la obra maimonidiana », in CARLOS DEL VALLE RODRÍGUEZ, SANTIAGO GARCÍA-JALÓN DE LA LAMA, JUAN PEDRO MONFERRER SALA (eds.), *Maimónides y su época*, Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, Madrid 2007, p. 487. As DAVIDSON points out, the one by al-Harizi was not the most reliable translation: « Not only is it a translation of a translation, and not only does it derive from the less reliable of the two medieval Hebrew translations; it is incomplete » (*Moses Maimonides*, p. 427).

<sup>4</sup> WOLFGANG KLUXEN, « Maimonides and Latin Scholasticism », in SHLOMO PINES, YIRMIYAHU YOVEL (eds.), *Maimonides and Philosophy*, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht–Boston–Lancaster 1986 (Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, 114), p. 224. Cf. DAVIDSON, *Moses Maimonides*, p. 404: « Quite apart from the out-and-out eclectics, a long line of authors managed to construe the *Guide* as saying something different from what, at least on the surface, the words do say. »

<sup>5</sup> Cremoneta attributed to Maimonides a book *contra antiquitatem mundi*, cf. KLUXEN, « Maimonides and Latin Scholasticism », p. 225.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. HOWARD KREISEL, *Prophecy. The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy*, Kluwer, Dordrecht–Boston–London 2001 (Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought, 8), p. 156–209.

prophecy in the *Guide for the Perplexed* is explicitly developed in the second part, from chapter 21 to chapter 48. Like some other important doctrines in that book, his view shows an assimilation of Aristotelianism – an assimilation also seen in the doctrines of some other Arabic authors, such as al-Farabi or al-Kindi before him.

According to Maimonides's account in book II, chapter 32, there are three main opinions on what a prophecy is: one is the opinion of ignorant people who believe that God provides the gift of prophecy to human beings without considering intellectual dispositions and only considering moral characteristics. A second position, which, according to Maimonides, is closer to the truth, is that of the philosophers, who define prophecy as a state of perfection of a man who, with the help of a good imagination and the perfection of intellectual and moral capacities, has a natural capacity to prophesy. The third and final opinion is the position on prophecy sustained by Jewish Law, which is, to Maimonides, the most correct:

1. Among those who believe in prophecy, and even among our coreligionists, there are some ignorant people who think as follows: God selects any person He pleases, inspires him with the spirit of prophecy, and entrusts him with a mission. It makes no difference whether that person be wise or stupid, old or young [...].
2. The philosophers hold that prophecy is a certain faculty of man in a state of perfection, which can only be obtained by study. [...] for prophecy is a natural faculty of man. It is impossible that a man who has the capacity for prophecy should prepare himself for it without attaining it [...].
3. The third view is that which is taught in Scripture, and which forms one of the principles of our religion. It coincides with the opinion of the philosophers in all points except one. For we believe that, even if one has the capacity for prophecy, and has duly prepared himself, it may yet happen that he does not actually prophesy. It is in that case the will of God [that withholds from him the use of the faculty]. According to my opinion, this fact is as exceptional as any other miracle, and acts in the same way. For the laws of Nature demand that every one should be a prophet, who has a proper physical constitution, and has been duly prepared as regards education and training.<sup>7</sup>

To Maimonides, prophecy is defined by Jewish Law in almost the same way as it is defined by the philosophers, in the sense that it is received only by men who attain the highest intellectual level; nonetheless, it differs in one central point because its actuality depends on the divine will. Maimonides states that prophecy is only produced with the 'permission' of the divine will.

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<sup>7</sup> MAIMONIDES, *The Guide for the Perplexed*, II.32, p. 219–220.

The most synthetic description of prophecy is given in *Guide* II, chapter 36. There, besides the exposition of the different grades of prophecy, the Jew states:

Prophecy is, in truth and reality, an emanation sent forth by the Divine Being through the medium of the Active Intellect, in the first instance to man's rational faculty, and then to his imaginative faculty; it is the highest degree and greatest perfection man can attain.<sup>8</sup>

This one, which involves intellect and imagination, is conceived as the highest manifestation of prophecy, and it consists of emanated knowledge provided by God via the agent intellect (« Active Intellect »), a transcendent and incorporeal being that spreads this emanation to the human intellect and imagination. As Maimonides continues to explain in chapter 45, the prophecy is the transmission of some divine message that comes in the form of some kind of spiritual 'vision' inspired by God though the action of this separated intelligence.<sup>9</sup> Maimonides, in this account, leaves out the extraordinary and unique case of Moses, whose prophecy came directly from God without mediation.<sup>10</sup>

Despite its frequent explanations of prophecy, the *Guide* introduces some difficulty to the understanding of this phenomenon and its real nature. The controversy and the discrepancy among interpretations has its basis in the text itself, which can be read at different levels in relation to the divine or natural causality of the phenomenon.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, Maimonides stands up for divine causality, but he explicitly establishes speculative training and good ethical practice as a previous condition. Consequently, ethics and the study of metaphysics are presented as conditions *sine quibus non* of prophecy.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., II.36, p. 225.

<sup>9</sup> As DAVIDSON points out, « The last rung in the hierarchy of transcendent incorporeal beings consisting in pure thought and subordinate to God in Maimonides' picture of the universe is an incorporeal being known as the active intellect. Maimonides further understood – and here he was following the Arabic philosopher Avicenna in particular – that the active intellect continually and invariably emanates the entire range of abstract human thoughts. Human beings tap into the transmission of the active intellect to the extent that their intellects are attuned for doing so. Although the active intellect is the immediate source, the emanation may be said to come from God » (*Moses Maimonides*, p. 371).

<sup>10</sup> MAIMONIDES, *The Guide for the Perplexed*, II.35, p. 224–225: « Your mind must comprehend the distinction of the prophecy and the wonders of Moses, and understand that his greatness in prophetic perception was the same as his power of producing miracles. If you further assume that we are unable fully to comprehend the nature of this greatness, you will understand that when I speak, in the chapters which follow this, on prophecy and the different classes of prophets, I only refer to the prophets which have not attained the high degree that Moses attained. »

<sup>11</sup> Cf. KREISEL, *Prophecy*, p. 148–315.

<sup>12</sup> MAIMONIDES, *The Guide for the Perplexed*, II.32, p. 220: « As for the principle which I laid down, that preparation and perfection of moral and rational faculties are the sine qua non, our Sages say

Maimonides seems to establish a continuity between this specific type of revelation and natural intellectual knowledge. This aspect will be controversial in both the Jewish and Latin medieval *milieux*, with Maimonides being frequently accused of rationalizing the faith.<sup>13</sup>

It is well known that Albert the Great was one of the first Latin thinkers to be strongly influenced by the explanations of prophecy in the *Guide*.<sup>14</sup> Albert quoted Maimonides many times<sup>15</sup> but specifically addressed prophecy in two of his works, namely the *Questio de propheta* (c. 1245) and the commentary on *De somno et vigilia* III (c. 1254).<sup>16</sup> Nonetheless, only in the latter is found a real presence of the *Guide*, explicitly or implicitly, pointing to the fact that Albert did not yet have interest in or access to the *Guide* when he wrote the former text.<sup>17</sup>

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exactly the same: 'The spirit of prophecy only rests upon persons who are wise, strong, and rich.' We have explained these words in our Commentary on the Mishnah, and in our large work ». Cf. also MAIMONIDES, *Epistle to Yemen*, trans. ABRAHAM HALKIN, DISCUS. DAVID HARTMAN, The Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia 2009, p. 124: « Transcendent wisdom is a sine qua non for inspiration. It is an article of our faith that the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only to the wise, the strong, and the rich. Strong is defined as the ability to control one's passions. Rich signifies wealthy in knowledge ».

<sup>13</sup> Cf. DAVIDSON, *Moses Maimonides*, p. 411: « The *Guide* was nevertheless criticized for specific perceived errors. [...] The common denominator was unhappiness with Maimonides' rationalizing of the Jewish religion ». Nonetheless, Giles of Rome, in the *Errores philosophorum*, only accuses Maimonides of defending the sufficiency of man of receiving the gift of prophecy in the *Dux perplexorum* (called there *De expositione legis*): « Vltorius errauit circa prophetiam, credens hominem se posse sufficienter disponere ad gratiam prophetiae, et quod Deus non elegit in prophetando quemcumque hominem singularem, sed illum qui se adaptat ad talia. Vnde uisus est uelle diuinam gratiam dependere ex operibus nostris. Haec autem patent II° libro De expositione Legis, cap. XXXII° » (AEGIDIUS ROMANUS. *Errores philosophorum*, XII Maimonides, error 7, ed. JOSEF KOCH, transl. JOHN O. RIEDL, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee 1944, p. 62).

<sup>14</sup> According to JAMES A. WEISHEIPL, Albert the Great was in Paris between 1243 and 1248 (« Life and Works of St Albert the Great », in ID. [ed.], *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980*, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 1980 [Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Studies and Texts, 49], p. 21–28). HASSELHOFF even considers Albert the Great as the first Latin author to quote the *Guide*, a bit later than 1245 (« Las traducciones latinas medievales de la obra maimonidiana », p. 487). Actually, 'rabi Moyses' is also named in the *Summa* by Alexander of Hales, but since the chronology of the composition of this work is insufficiently known, it is not possible to say that Alexander of Hales was the first, cf. CHRISTOPHER M. CULLEN, « Alexander of Hales », in GORGE J. E. GRACIA, TIMOTHY B. NOONE (eds.), *Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Blackwell, Malden 2002, p. 105.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. MANUEL JOËL, *Verhältnis Albert des Großen zu Maimonides*, Groß, Breslau 1863, p. 14–21.

<sup>16</sup> On Albert the Great's chronology, see WEISHEIPL, « Life and Works of St Albert the Great », p. 13–51.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. JEAN-PIERRE TORRELL, *Recherches sur la Théorie de la Prophétie au Moyen Âge. XIIe–XIVe siècles. Études et Textes*, Éditions universitaires, Fribourg 1992 (Dokimion, 13), p. 173. ANNA RODOLFI includes more works in what she names the « corpus propheticum » of Albert the Great, cf. EAD., « Sogno e profezia in Alberto Magno », in STEFANO PERFETTI (ed.), *Scientia, Fides, Theologia. Studi di filosofia medievale in onore di Gianfranco Fioravanti*, Edizioni ETS, Pisa 2011, p. 193–215.

Indeed Albert in the commentary adopted some of Maimonides's explanations, such as the distinction among vision, prophecy and dream, or his account of the different common opinions on prophecy.<sup>18</sup> But since Albert considered Maimonides's theory of prophecy too much naturalistic, he situated it in the context of the *prophetia naturalis* or prophecy according to the philosophers. Thus, the Dominican is categorical in distinguishing his own vision of prophecy from that of Maimonides.

In his vision, prophecy is not only because of divine causality but also has divine nature:

Taliter igitur et talis uocatur uisio in prophetia: prophetia enim proprie uocatur quando homo per raptum intellectus sui illustratur de scientia futurorum uel aliorum occultorum ad quae deueniri non potest per inquisitionem et rationem.<sup>19</sup>

To Albert, prophecy is a revealed knowledge of future events; it occurs by grace and it supposes a break with the natural realm, as described in the Scriptures and also defended by the theologians.<sup>20</sup> Albert thus denies that prophecy can belong to the *lumen naturale* or have real continuity with speculation and the rational exercise. Prophecy is, according to the Dominican, a supernatural cognitive dimension.<sup>21</sup>

His most brilliant disciple, Thomas Aquinas, quoted the *Guide* many times, as he was strongly influenced by Maimonides's explanations of the demonstrations

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. KLUXEN, « Maimonides and Latin Scholasticism », p. 225.

<sup>19</sup> ALBERTUS MAGNUS. *De somno et vigilia*, III.3, in *B. Alberti Magni ... Opera omnia*, ed. AUGUSTE BORGNET, vol. IX, Vivès, Paris 1890, p. 181.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193: « Omnibus his quae dicta sunt habitis, non est difficile scire quid sit prophetia apud philosophos [...]. Est autem et aliud genus uisionis et prophetiae secundum altissimos theologos qui de diuinis loquuntur inspirationibus, de quibus ad praesens nihil dicimus omnino. [...] si quid enim forte propriae opinionis haberemus, in theologis magis quam in physicis, Deo uolente, a nobis proferetur ». Cf. KLUXEN, « Maimonides and Latin Scholasticism », p. 225.

<sup>21</sup> As JACOB GUTTMANN states: « Albertus' attitude toward Maimonides' doctrine of prophecy was peculiar; he could scarcely avoid being powerfully influenced by Maimonides' ingenious exposition of this problem. Albertus' explanations concerning the difference between divination in the dream and vision, as well as his explanations of the fundamental diversities in the natural dispositions of men, by which also the varying capacity of different people for knowing the future and hidden things is accounted for (*De somno et vigilia*, III, 'De Diuinatione', chap. iii. et seq.), are undoubtedly taken from the Moreh Nebukim. But since, according to his distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge, prophecy proper can not belong to the *lumen naturale*, he adopts the view of Maimonides for the explanation of natural prophecy only, as it occurred also in the pagan world » (« Albertus Magnus », in *The Jewish Encyclopedia. A Descriptive Record of the History, Religion, Literature, and Customs of the Jewish People from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, vol. I, Funk and Wagnalls, New York 1901, p. 323–324, now online at <<http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/1082-albertus-magnus>> (accessed 20 November 2017).

of the existence of God, creation, the divine attributes and prophecy. According to Ruedi Imbach, in addition to the eighty-two explicit citations of Maimonides in Aquinas's *Summa*, there are many other implicit references.<sup>22</sup> The treatise on prophecy, in the *Secunda Secundae*, contains some of them, but this fact does not imply that Thomas agrees with all of Maimonides's opinions; indeed, Aquinas does criticize the author of the *Guide* with regard to the role of natural causation in producing prophecy. As Aquinas argues, in agreement with Albert, prophecy can happen without any preparation or human disposition because it is produced just *ex inspiratione diuina*.<sup>23</sup> In sum, this revelation (because prophecy is a kind of revelation) is a form of superior knowledge that comes from God *per gratiam*.<sup>24</sup>

## II. Rabi Moyses in Petrus Hispanus's 'Sententia cum questionibus'

The *Sententia cum questionibus in libros De anima I-II Aristotelis* is a Latin commentary from the thirteenth century (c. 1240).<sup>25</sup> It is considered to possibly be among the first commentaries on the *De anima* in the Latin tradition.<sup>26</sup> The

<sup>22</sup> RUEDI IMBACH, « Alcune precisazioni sulla presenza di Maimonide in Tommaso d'Aquino », in DIETRICH LORENZ, STEFANO SERAFINI (eds.), *Instituto San Tommaso. Studi*, (Studia Pontificiae universitatis a S. Thoma Aquinate in Urbe, n.s., 2), Pontificia Università S. Tommaso D'Aquino, Roma 1995, p. 48–64.

<sup>23</sup> THOMAS DE AQUINO. *Summa theologiae*, II<sup>a</sup>–II<sup>ae</sup>, q. 172, a. 3, co., in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis ... Opera omnia ... Leonis XIII. P. M. edita*, vol. X, Polyglotta, Roma 1899, p. 380: « Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, prophetia uere et simpliciter dicta est ex inspiratione diuina, quae autem est ex causa naturali, non dicitur prophetia nisi secundum quid. Est autem considerandum quod, sicut Deus, quia est causa uniuersalis in agendo, non praeexigit materiam, nec aliquam materiae dispositionem ».

<sup>24</sup> Cf. MERCEDES RUBIO, *Aquinas and Maimonides on the Possibility of the Knowledge of God. An Examination of the 'Quaestio de attributis'*, Springer, Dordrecht 2006 (Amsterdam studies in Jewish Thought, 11), p. 200: « The answers to the arguments contribute to explain the contemplation of the prophets and other individuals who experienced a very high kind of knowledge in this life. According to Aquinas, what the prophets saw were forms or images that led them to a certain apprehension of the knowledge of God ». Cf. ANNA RODOLFI, 'Cognitio obumbrata'. *Lo statuto epistemologico della profezia nel secolo XIII*, SISMEL–Edizioni del Galluzzo, Firenze 2016 (Micrologus Library, 74), p. 135.

<sup>25</sup> There is an old edition in PEDRO HISPANO, *Obras Filosóficas II. Comentario al 'De anima' de Aristóteles*, ed. MANUEL ALONSO ALONSO, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid 1944 (henceforth, PETRUS HISPANUS. *De anima*). The texts here are from our new edition in progress.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. BERNARDO CARLOS BAZÁN, « 13th Century Commentaries on *De anima*: From Peter of Spain to Thomas Aquinas », in GIANFRANCO FIORAVANTI, CLAUDIO LEONARDI, STEFANO PERFETTI (eds.), *Il commento filosofico nell'occidente latino (secoli XIII–XV): Actes du colloque international de Florence–Pise, Octobre 2000*, Brepols, Turnhout 2002 (Rencontres de philosophie médiévale, 10), p. 126; JOSÉ MEIRINHOS, *Metafísica do homem. Conhecimento e vontade nas obras de psicologia atribuídas a Pedro Hispano (século XIII)*, Afrontamento, Porto 2011 (Biblioteca de Filosofia, 29), p. 27 and 36. In particular, see the latter for the psychological doctrines of this work and for a more dedicated study of the work attributed to Petrus Hispanus entitled *Scientia libri de anima* (edited in PEDRO HISPANO, *Obras*

author, Petrus Hispanus, has been traditionally identified with Pope John XXI, an identification that has not been sufficiently documented.<sup>27</sup>

The commentary itself only addresses the *De anima* book I from chapters 1 to 3 and book II from chapters 1 to 4. The translation used by Petrus Hispanus should have been the *Vetus*, from the Greek, by James of Venice, which was the most used by the Latin commentators. The context is clearly the Faculty of Arts, where the treatise by Aristotle was read and taught, and the text is quite possibly the *reportatio* of an oral course divided into *lectiones*.<sup>28</sup> This commentary manifests some doctrinal syncretism, which is characteristic of the commentaries produced around 1240. Thus, whereas the principal source was the Aristotelian book, the discussion on this book was enriched by the previous Latin tradition and by the Arabic texts, which had been recently translated into Latin.<sup>29</sup> Authors such as Avicenna and Averroes were very influential on the reception of Aristotle's text and its theory of knowledge. In this particular respect, the commentary is interrupted long before it begins to address the most inspiring parts of the *De anima*, namely those on intellect and intellectual knowledge. Nonetheless, it is possible to reconstruct part of Petrus Hispanus's epistemology from the extant text.<sup>30</sup>

The references to the *Guide for the Perplexed* are provided in relation to this specific subject, the intellect, in two different parts of the commentary. The importance of the existence of these quotations to Maimonides has not been underlined by the bibliography,<sup>31</sup> despite being one of the first Latin texts quoting the *Guide* and the only commentary based on the translation *Vetus* of the *De anima* to make use of Maimonides's theory of prophecy.

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*Filosóficas I. De anima*, ed. MANUEL ALONSO ALONSO, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid 1941, repr. Juan Flors, Barcelona 1961<sup>2</sup>).

<sup>27</sup> See this issue in JOSÉ MEIRINHOS, « Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis? Elementos para uma diferenciação de autores », *Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval*, 3 (1996), p. 51–76; ANGEL D'ORS, « Petrus Hispanus, O.P., Auctor Summularum (I) », *Vivarium*, 35 (1997), p. 21–71; ID., « Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum (II). Nuevos documentos y problemas », *Vivarium*, 39 (2001), p. 209–254.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. JOSÉ MEIRINHOS, « Comentar Aristóteles na primeira metade do século XIII. A *Sententia cum questionibus in De anima* atribuída a Pedro Hispano », *Revista da Faculdade de Letras-Série de Filosofia*, 23 (2005), p. 127–160.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. MEIRINHOS, *Metafísica do homem*, p. 28–33.

<sup>30</sup> CELIA LÓPEZ ALCALDE, « Self-knowledge in Petrus Hispanus' Commentary on the *De anima* », *Vivarium* (forthcoming).

<sup>31</sup> In this respect, GÖRGE HASSELHOFF, in his study of the first Latin reception of Maimonides, refers to Petrus Hispanus as identified with Pope John XXI, for whom was prepared a manuscript of the work, now in Todi (*Dicit Rabbi Moyses. Studien zum Bild von Moses Maimonides im lateinischen Westen vom 13. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert*, Königshausen und Neumann, Würzburg 2004, p. 126). Nonetheless, as we have said, the identification of the Pope and the author of the *corpus petrinum* – which includes the commentary – is quite problematic, despite still being assumed by many scholars, cf. fn. 27.

II.1. *First quotations (Book I, lect. 6)*

Three of the five quotations of Maimonides are inserted in the second question of Book I, lect. 6, in the commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* I, 403a, in the part where Aristotle asks if there is any proper and separable action of the soul.<sup>32</sup>

Following the scholastic method of arguments *pro* and *contra*, the authority of Maimonides – explicitly called Rabi/Raby Moysi (or just Moyses) – is invoked in the two arguments in favor of the existence of a proper action of the soul.

In the first one, Maimonides together with al-Ghazali are quoted to speak about the operation of the intellect. Both thinkers appear to be adequate authorities to show that the more intellect is separated from the body, the more it can develop its own action, i.e. *intelligere*. However, understanding is not the only thing that happens in this situation, as a contemplative state can also be attained from this process of separation or *exitus*:

Omnis substantia que quanto corpori magis est permixta tanto magis sua potentia et sua operatio debilitatur, et fit obscurior et quanto magis a corpore distat, tanto magis sua potentia confortatur et uiget et illuminatur, et sua operatio habet propriam operationem que siquidem cessante aspectu ad corpus et cessante operatione corporali in ipsa exercetur. Set anima intellectiua est huiusmodi, ergo habet operationem propriam. Hec autem non est nisi intelligere, ergo intelligere est propria operatio anime intellectiue. Maior patet, quia *quando sopitur in operatione per applicationem ad corpus et illuminatur per separationem habet operationem sine corpore, et hoc est quod dicit Moyses. Et quando anima maxime separatur a corpore tanto magis operatur et uiget eius operatio, et hoc patet de illis quibus apparent uisiones. Hoc enim est per distantiam anime a corpore, et similiter apparent uisiones.* Tunc enim et quasi exit ipsa anima corpus et distat a corpore, et inspectio eius non figitur corpori, et dicit Algazel super hoc: apparent ei uisiones in sompno per inspectionem in libris seruatis, qui dicuntur intelligentie.<sup>33</sup>

Indeed, the fifth treatise of *Physics* in al-Ghazali's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* deals with the actions of the active intellect, a reality that impresses and influences the soul. These actions enable types of existence from abstract concepts to visions and prophecies.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> ARISTOTELES. *De anima*, I, 403a: « Si quidem igitur est aliquid anime operum aut passionum propria, continget utique ipsam separari. Si uero nulla est propria ipsius, non erit separabilis, sed sicut recto in quantum est rectum multa accidunt, ut tangere aeneam speram secundum punctum, non tamen tanget hoc separatum rectum. Inseparabile enim est, siquidem semper cum corpore quodam est ».

<sup>33</sup> PETRUS HISPANUS. *De anima*, I, lect. 6, q. 1, *prima ratio* (in the edition by ALONSO, p. 292). Italics are mine (*passim*).

<sup>34</sup> AL-GHAZALI. *Metaphysics*, ed. JOSEPH THOMAS MUCKLE, St. Michael's College, Toronto 1933, p. 183–197. Cf. ANTHONY H. MINNEMA, *The Latin Readers of Algazel, 1150–1600*, Ph.D. Diss., University of Tennessee 2013, p. 201: « The fifth treatise of the *Physica* focuses on the last intelligence or

The next reference to Maimonides is provided in the second *ratio*, which departs from the Neoplatonic double *status* of the soul, a view that influenced both the Latin and Arabic traditions.<sup>35</sup> Petrus Hispanus assumes that view referring to the *Liber de causis* (proposition VII) and the double mode of the soul:

Sicut habetur in libro *De causis*, omnis substantia spiritualis habet duplicem modum: operationem unam per quam respicit primam causam que est supra tanquam creata ab ea et aliam per quam respicit illud quod est sub se tanquam illud cuius est causa et quod regit. Set anima intellectiua est huiusmodi, ergo habet aliquam operationem propriam. Hec autem maxime inter omnes intelligere est, ergo intelligere est propria operatio anime. Maior patet, quia scripta est. Minor patet quia operatio per quam ordinatur anima ad creatorem inspiciendo ipsum tanquam suam causam non est ammixta corpori. Operatio autem per quam regit corpus est ammixta corpori, ergo anima intellectiua habet operationem propriam, que est intelligere suam causam. Et quod hec operatio non sit ammixta corpori patet per Dionysium dicentem: intelligentia cum respicit primam lucem que illuminat omnem lucem uiuentem uel uenientem in hunc mundum clarescit, cum autem diuertitur ab ea tunc obscuratur et deprauatur intellectus eius. Et similiter anima intellectiua quanto magis respicit suum creatorem tanto magis clarescit; quanto uero ab eo magis diuertitur, tanto magis obscuratur [...].<sup>36</sup>

Here, the double mode of the soul means that the soul has a double orientation by nature: indeed, the soul deals with the body and corporeal realities in order to understand and manage them. Nonetheless, the soul is also oriented to its spiritual creator. Thus, in the first case, the soul acts through the body, but when the intellectual soul, separated from sensible conditions, looks at the superior realm, at the first light, the soul itself appears as a pure spiritual being.<sup>37</sup>

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Agent Intellect, which is responsible for the workings of the sublunary world and the human souls that inhabit it. Algazel further divided this treatise into ten chapters, each of which treats a quality that ‘flows’ from the Agent Intellect or that the Agent Intellect ‘imprints’ on souls. The ten qualities include the power to comprehend abstract concepts, rather than rely on the senses, as well as the ability to see visions, predict the future, perform miracles, and prophesy. »

<sup>35</sup> Cf. JEAN ROHMER, « Sur la doctrine franciscaine des deux faces de l’âme », *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge*, 2 (1927), p. 73–77; JOÃO FERREIRA, « A doutrina das duas faces da alma, em Pedro Hispano », *Cultura*, 14 (2002), p. 219–231. Here, Ferreira speaks about this double face of the soul in Petrus Hispanus’s work. Ferreira gives a synthetic explanation, considering the two works to be written by only one author and making some mistakes in some of the references, mixing and confusing the texts.

<sup>36</sup> PETRUS HISPANUS. *De anima*, I, lect. 6, q. 1, *secunda ratio* (in the edition by ALONSO, p. 292–293).

<sup>37</sup> On the double aspect of the soul, see also in the commentary: « Set tamen distinguendum est quod anima duplicem habet cognitionem: unam quam habet a suo creatore a quo exit, et hanc habet naturaliter, et hec est cognitio summi boni et sui ipsius. Hec enim cognitio insita est ei naturaliter et potencia ad hoc, et hec est ei innata. Est autem alia cognitio anime quam habet mundanorum, quam per fantasmata acquirit, et hec est ei acquisita et non innata, et de hac loquuntur omnes philosophi qui dicunt quod cognitio anime est acquisita; de prima autem non

In this state, looking at the *prima lux*, light is spread over the agent intellect and subsequently reaches possible intellect and, finally, sensibility. The description of this phenomenon is provided in the following lines, with a clear – but inexact – quotation of the description of prophecy provided by Maimonides:

Et hoc est quod dicit rabi Moysi: *quando anima separatur a conditionibus ita quod non intendit eis, tunc respicit lucem primam et irradiatur illa lux primo supra intellectum agentem, et deinde supra possibilem. Et tunc supra uirtutes sensibiles irradiatur ita quod homo uidet secreta, et in hoc est recte dicens.*<sup>38</sup>

These reasons in favor of the existence of a proper action of the soul seem to be assumed in the *solutio*, where Petrus Hispanus explains the two kinds of knowledge that the human intellect is able to have. The manoeuvre used by Petrus Hispanus to integrate this Neoplatonic aspect of the double reality of the soul into the Aristotelian framework provided by the *De anima* consists of conceiving this duality in terms of Aristotle's bipartition of agent and possible intellect. Accordingly, the agent intellect is responsible for the knowledge of superior (spiritual) things, whereas the possible intellect permits the knowledge of corporeal reality and its domination by the soul:

Dicendum est ad hoc quod anima intellectiua habet duplicem aspectum: unum, scilicet ad creatorem a quo exit in esse quem cognoscit, quoniam illius est causa. Iterum habet aspectum ad substantias superiores sibi similes separatas a materia et ad corpus quod dirigit et ad ea que ad corpus ordinantur que sub ipsa sunt. Et secundum duplicem aspectum duplicem habet potentiam: unam per quam comparatur ad superiora et per quam nata est separari et que est lumen ipsius anime illuminata, et hec potentia est intellectus agens, et hec est ei propria. In hac enim non indiget corpore uno modo. Alia autem potentia eius est intellectus possibilis per quam cognoscit corpus et ista inferiora et regit corpus.<sup>39</sup>

For our purpose, however, the most relevant fragment comes immediately next, when Petrus refers specifically to the knowledge of the superior realm, identified

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est uerum. Anima enim illuminata est a primo et data est ei uirtus a principio ut cognoscat se ipsam et diuinum bonum, et de hac cognitione uerum est quod est ei innata » (Ibid., I, lect. 1, q. 2, p. 66, repeated at p. 166–167). In his view of the soul's double face, Petrus Hispanus is not following Avicenna's double face as postulated in his highly influential *Liber de anima*, which, in contrast, gathers the two intellectual spheres in man, namely, the speculative and the practical intellects. In Petrus Hispanus's account, this knowledge, in which both the possible and agent intellect are involved, is closely related to the data from the senses, cf. MEIRINHOS, *Metafísica do homem*, p. 98, fn. 162.

<sup>38</sup> PETRUS HISPANUS. *De anima*, I, lect. 6, q. 1, *secunda ratio* (in the edition by ALONSO, p. 293).

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., *solutio* (in the edition by ALONSO, p. 294–295).

with God. There is given the last reference to Maimonides related to the prophetic phenomenon, as described in the *Guide*:

Et quia anima intellectiua ordinatur in cognitionem creatoris duplici modo disponitur ad ipsum: uno modo per inmediatectionem, sicut patet in anima que cognoscit primum non est per ista inferiora, set per distantiam a corpore cognoscit ipsum et dicitur quasi separata. Vnde non figitur eius cognitio corpori set cognoscit ipsum per aspectum ad ipsum et hec est *quoniam separatur a conditionibus materialibus ita quod eis non intendit et tunc respicit primam lucem, sicut dicit rabi Moysi. Et irradiatur illa lux supra animam et ipsam illuminat et similiter sensus, ita quod eis ostendit secreta.* Alio modo disponitur ad primum secundum quod cognoscit ipsum per posteriora sicut per effectus suos et operationes et sic cognoscitur per organa et oritur illa cognitio ab intellectu potenciali. Sicut autem iste status est duplex, ita duplex est operatio anime ipsius: una communis et alia propria, et una appellatur intellectus agens, alia uero intellectus possibilis. Set potentia suprema, que est intellectus agens, dirigit inferiorem, que est intellectus possibilis excitando ipsam et illuminando et ducendo ipsam ad effectum et ad actum cognitionis [...].<sup>40</sup>

Indeed, this and former references are based on the description seen above of prophecy, given by Maimonides's *Guide for Perplexed* II, chapter 37 in the Latin text:

Scito quod ueritas prophetiae et substantia sua est largitas a creatore effusa mediante intelligentia agente super potentiam anime rationalis primo demum super imaginatiuam uirtutem et ille est finis gradus hominis et finis perfectionis quae inueniri potest in eius specie et hoc est finis perfectionis uirtutis imaginatiuae.<sup>41</sup>

The quotation is apparently quite literal but in fact there is a significant modification. The agent intellect, in the *Sententia*, is far from being an entity that is exterior to and separated from the human soul irradiating knowledge to the human soul, as it is the *intelligentia* in the *Guide*.<sup>42</sup> Petrus Hispanus adapts Maimonides's account of this superior knowledge into the framework of his own interpretation of the double aspect of the soul.<sup>43</sup> According to Petrus, this double aspect means that, on the one hand, both intellects, agent and possible, are responsible for the production of knowledge as described by Aristotle in the *De*

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> *Rabi Mossei Aegyptij Dux Seu director dubita[n]tium aut perplexorum in Treis Libros Diuisus* (henceforth, MAIMONIDES. *Dux seu director*), II.39, ed. AGOSTINO GIUSTINIANI, ab Jadoco Badio Acensio, Paris 1520, fol. 63b.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Ibid., fol. 65: « Et oportet quod illud sit in uirtute rationali: quia ueritas istius intelligentie agentis est super ipsam et extraxit eam ad actum ».

<sup>43</sup> Cf. MEIRINHOS, *Metafisica do homem*, p. 99.

*anima*. However, whereas both in combination, and in combination with the body, are responsible for speculative knowledge when operating together and looking at the physical world, only the agent intellect, which is proper to the human soul, can, by means of the first light, see (*vivet*) the Creator and the creature's secrets in a non-speculative knowledge. This indicates that Petrus Hispanus conceives of Maimonides's prophetic knowledge not specifically as *scientia futurorum* but as *cognitio secretorum*, related to the creation and Creator.<sup>44</sup> The illumination will include the sensibility, as Maimonides and other thinkers stated in dealing with prophecy. This knowledge is a transcendent knowledge that comes not via species but via divine illumination.

From the comparison of texts, it is obvious that Petrus Hispanus assumes Maimonides's view of prophecy but with some substantial and not hazardous modifications. The agent intellect is to the Latin master also the principal actor of this superior knowledge, but there is a dramatic difference in the fact that this agent intellect is inside the human soul, which is *lumen*, and is illuminated by nature directly by God. This illumination, which occurs in a pure way in the agent intellect when separated from the sensual realities, is actualized by God showing the secrets of the divinity itself. At this point, there is no impediment to this contemplative state, which seems to be less oriented to the vision of future things and more to the divine reality, eternal.

Thus, what Maimonides considered a 'prophetic phenomenon' is in Petrus Hispanus's view integrated among the potentialities of human knowledge, possible due to a natural disposition or potentiality of the agent intellect, proper to all human beings. The factuality of this knowledge, which would always be active if human intellect did not have an existence united to the body, is instantaneous when the intellect is separated from its material conditions. Having achieved this state, the agent intellect and the whole soul are irradiated by the first light or God directly, with no mediation at all. In the context of Aristotle's psychology, we can see, thus, the background of Augustine's doctrine of divine illumination.

Therefore, the inclusion of Maimonides's description of prophecy, as it is provided, assumes a significant role in the theory of knowledge of Petrus Hispanus in the *Sententia cum questionibus*; namely as one kind of potential knowledge that the human soul is able to have. The fact that the author of the *Sententia* refers in this context to Maimonides and not to other authorities in a commentary of the *De anima* makes sense despite its eccentricity, since the *Guide*

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<sup>44</sup> In the Latin tradition the prophecy has this double aspect introduced by Gregory the Great, according to RODOLFI, *Cognitio obumbrata*, p. 16: « Gregorio introduce una variante e precisa che oggetto dell'annuncio profetico insieme al futuro (*futura*) è anche la spiegazione dei misteri, cioè di quelle realtà nascoste (*occulta*) cui si accenna nella Scrittura, realtà che possono perciò riguardare anche il presente e il passato ».

is not a philosophical book in essence but rather an exegesis of Scriptures with many philosophical approaches.<sup>45</sup> This transcendent approach, via Maimonides, to Aristotelian psychology fits well with Petrus Hispanus's own view of the soul, who, like Albert the Great, seems to perceive Maimonides as a peripatetic thinker.

This is the reason why Maimonides is quoted in this context and not Avicenna, who would be a more expected authority, since Avicenna himself exposes its own view on prophecy in his *Liber de anima* V.6. Thus, this text would have been the most natural and expected source in our Commentary because of its inclusion of superior knowledge in the soul:

Possibile est ergo ut homo in seipso habeat ingenium et ex ratione sua, sine doctrina, faciat syllogismum [...] Possibile est ergo ut alicuius hominis anima eo quod est clara et cohaerens principiis intellectibilibus, ita sit inspirata ut accendatur ingenio ad recipiendum omnes quaestiones ab intelligentia agente, aut subito, aut paene subito, firmiter impressas, non probabiliter, sed cum ordine qui comprehendit medios terminos (probata quae sciuntur ex suis causis non sunt intelligibilia). Et hic est unus modus prophetiae qui omnibus uirtutibus prophetiae altior est. Vnde congrue uocatur uirtus sancta, quia est altior gradus inter omnes uirtutes humanas.<sup>46</sup>

Nonetheless, Avicenna's general theory of knowledge, with its exterior agent intellect, which emanates the intelligibles over the human intellect,<sup>47</sup> was well known by the Latin authors and also rejected by many of them, including Petrus.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Cf. DAVIDSON, *Moses Maimonides*, p. 350–351.

<sup>46</sup> AVICENNA. *Liber de anima*, V.6, ed. SIMONE VAN RIET, vol. II, Peeters–Brill, Louvain–Leiden 1972, p. 152–153. Cf. GÉRARD VERBEKE, « Introduction » to AVICENNA. *De anima*, vol. II, p. 66\*: « Il est d'ailleurs à remarquer que, d'après Avicenne, l'intellect humain peut recevoir les intelligibles par l'intermédiaire des sensibles; mais il peut les recevoir aussi directement sans cet intermédiaire: dans ce dernier cas, l'Intellect agent intervient de façon immédiate pour informer l'intellect humain et lui communiquer les intelligibles Avicenne admet d'ailleurs que l'information venant de l'intellect agent peut se faire aussi par l'intermédiaire des âmes des corps célestes (celles-ci émanent, comme on le sait, des Intellects pour autant qu'elles ont le regard fixé sur la perfection qui les précède immédiatement). Si l'information se fait par les âmes des corps célestes, elle a comme sujet récepteur la faculté imaginative, ce qui n'est donc pas le privilège que des prophètes ». Avicenna also addresses prophecy in *Metaphysics*, X.1.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. VERBEKE, « Introduction », p. 66\*: « Les intelligibles ne proviennent donc pas des données sensibles; ce n'est pas en se basant sur les données de l'expérience que l'intellect humain parviendra par lui-même à élaborer l'intelligible ».

<sup>48</sup> Nonetheless, see DAG NIKOLAUS HASSE on the reception of Avicenna's theory of the active intellect on the one hand, and the real position or intention of Avicenna on the other: « How then did Avicenna come to be identified with the doctrine of the separate active intellect? Avicenna himself, who explores so many questions of the Peripatetic tradition in detail, does not discuss or even raise the question of whether the active intellect is separate. It was not a specific topic for him, but rather a Peripatetic commonplace. Thus, we have the strange situation that

This 'externalism' in Avicenna's epistemology also shapes Avicenna's view of prophecy provided in his *Liber de anima*, and, consequently, did not seem to fit well with Petrus Hispanus's general description of the human soul and knowledge.

## II.2. Second Quotations (Book I, lect. 10)

Next quotations have the particularity that they are not provided in the edition of Alonso because they appear only in the manuscript of Venice (fol. 68va–b and 70vb, respectively), which has been only partially edited.<sup>49</sup> They belong to Book I, lect. 10.

The first one appears in the discussion on the intellect as the motor of the world. Maimonides is referenced in the third argument in favor, in the discussion on the intellect as the first motor, in q. 1:

*Tertia ratio talis: sicut dicit raby Moysi recte in hoc dicens: solus intellectus et agentis per cognitionem est proprium quod, cum mouet, unus et idem immobilis perseuerans et inuariabilis, sit principium multarum operationum. Sed motor uniuersalis est motor a quo mediante ipso inuariabili et uno multa fluxerunt, ergo est solum agens per intellectum et uoluntatem, quia causa que producit in esse conseruat eas et per ipsam mouetur res et uniuersaliter uiuunt, ergo a tali solo mouere per intellectum exierint a tali solo mouetur, ergo omnis res mouetur per intellectum et intellectum mouet omnia.*<sup>50</sup>

The argument claims that the intellect is the universal mover, which, despite being invariable and immobile, is the cause of all the dynamic reality. This supreme intellect, the cause of all movement, is firstly postulated in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* XII, chapters 7 and 9. To Petrus Hispanus, this intellect is God itself, from which all was created through His divine will.

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Avicenna is often quoted as stating the proposition 'intellectum agentem esse separatum', which does not appear in his translated works. An important factor is Avicenna's analogy of the sun (Aristotle had compared the activating intellect to light). It not only served as a link to Augustine's comparison of God with the sun, it also implied Avicenna's conviction of the separateness of the active intellect. This is obvious for instance from the early testimony (1225) of Anonymous (Gauthier), *De anima et de potentiis eius*: 'In this Avicenna erred, because he made the active intellect, i.e. the intelligence or angel, separate from the soul, just as the sun is separate from sight' » (*Avicenna's 'De anima' in the Latin West. The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300*, The Warburg Institute–Nino Aragno, London–Turin 2000, p. 222–223).

<sup>49</sup> Cf. JOSÉ MARIA DA CRUZ PONTES, « Un nouveau manuscrit des *Questiones libri de anima* de Petrus Hispanus Portugalsis », *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale*, 43 (1976), p. 167–201. The edition by Alonso is based only on the manuscript in Kracow (Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 726).

<sup>50</sup> Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Lat. Z 253 (1826), fol. 68vb.

The next and last reference to the *Guide* is given in the same *lectio*, in q. 5, « circa quintam sic proceditur et queritur utrum intellectus primus qui est motor uniuersalis sit forma uel natura ». Here the answer is negative: in summary, the first intellect is not the formal cause of the world or nature, since God should be considered an agent essentially different from its action. Only by means of His generous will is God the cause of all created beings:

Vnde agens in illa multiplicat dona, scilicet dator et non suam substantiam, et causa huius est multiplicatio per extrinseca quam facit. Principium ergo hoc tertio modo multiplicauit creaturas et non primo nec secundo modo sed tertio modo, scilicet largitudo, sicut dator multiplicat dona sua, scilicet largitudo sua. Vnde dicit Raby Moysis bene dicens in hoc quod creature exeunt a creatore non sicut radius a lumine uel sole nec sicut filius a patre, sed sicut donum a datore et a largitate.<sup>51</sup>

To Petrus Hispanus, the first intellect cannot be understood as form or nature because there is a large gap between God, as the creator of everything, and creation. The negation here, thus, has to do with considering the cause (i.e. God's essence) as the formal cause and deducing, by means of His effects (the creation), the essence of God.

Indeed, Maimonides addressed the topic of God as the first intellect or intellect in act in part I of his *Guide*. He states that divine wisdom and will are the same in essence, an identification that makes it possible to consider God's will as the real cause of creation of the world.<sup>52</sup>

This second context is thus related to the other big topic in the reception of Maimonides's *Guide*, the defense of creation in time, which is not defended by Aristotle since the Greek philosopher conceived the world as eternal, the same as the first motor. Disagreeing with this interpretation on Aristotle, Maimonides says that in fact the Greek is not defending the eternity in an explicit way but only providing plausible arguments.<sup>53</sup>

Thus, according to Maimonides, the right doctrine is the one that defends creation of the world in time. This creation is produced by the act of the divine will of the supreme intellect as appears in the *Guide for Perplexed* I, chapter 52 in the Latin text:

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., fol. 70rb.

<sup>52</sup> MAIMONIDES, *The Guide for the Perplexed*, p. 104: « According to either opinion, the series of the successive purposes terminates, as has been shown, in God's will or wisdom, which, in our opinion, are identical with His essence, and are not any thing separate from Himself or different from His essence ».

<sup>53</sup> Cf. DAVIDSON, *Moses Maimonides*, p. 369. Indeed, the eternity of the world would make the assumption of this precise point of Aristotle's metaphysics and cosmology very problematic.

Cum ergo fuerit intentio nostra in dicendo ipsum sapientem esse, quia est apprehensio suae substantiae, erit uita ipsius et sapientia res una. Ipsi uero non intendunt huic rationi, sed attendunt apprehensionem ipsius erga eius creatura. Similiter etiam sine dubio nec potentia nec uoluntas inuenitur in creatore ad substantiam ipsius: quia non est potens super substantiam suam, nec uolens ad eandem substantiam suam [...]. Dispositiones autem et nominationes cogitauerunt in probationem diuersarum operationum inter creatorem et sua causata, quoniam Creator creare quod creat et uult facere creatura esse secundum quod fecit ipsa esse et scit ea quae fecit esse, sic ergo probatur tibi quod istae dispositiones non conueniunt ei cum intendimus in substantiam eius, sed cum intendimus in creatura ipsius. [...] sic non dicemus quod in eo est res addita, per quam est res uolens et res secunda per quam est potens et res tertia alia, per quam scit creatura sua, sed substantia eius est una, simplex, super quam non est res aliqua addita ullo modo. Et ipsa substantia creauit quicquid creatum est, et scit id quod sicut, non per aliquam additam ullo modo.<sup>54</sup>

To Maimonides, God produced the world by the act of his divine will and not by means of emanation or by participation of his essence. This explains the fact that God cannot be known through the knowledge of the creature but only by negation.<sup>55</sup> The text by Maimonides probably referenced here is the *Guide for the Perplexed* I, chapter 57 in the Latin text:

Et dicimus quod Creator est antiquus: hoc est quod non habuit causam quae dederit ei esse. Post hoc apprehendimus quod huius entis essentia non est eiusmodi: ut sibi soli sufficiat ut sit sic: sed emanauerunt ab eo entia multa, nec illa emanatio est sicut calor ab igne proueniens: neque sicut lux a sole: sed est splendor largitans, iuuans ea.<sup>56</sup>

Maimonides's explanations on Aristotle's position partly allow for a good point of departure to Petrus Hispanus's considerations on God as the first intellect. Even

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<sup>54</sup> MAIMONIDES. *Dux seu director*, I.52, fol. 20.

<sup>55</sup> At this respect, see KENNETH SEESKIN, *Maimonides on the Origin of the World*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2005, p. 189: « By looking at the world as the object of God's will, Maimonides gains several advantages. First, he can invoke the idea that the will does not have to bring about a given effect right away but can will what it wants when it wants. Even though God is eternal, it does not follow that the world or its material component is eternal as well. Second, he can avoid the 'one cause, one effect' principle and point out, as he does at GP 2.22, that a single act of will can accomplish many different things. It is true that God's will can be viewed as a cause to the degree that it has the power to realize anything that is logically possible. We saw, however, that it is not the sort of cause that forces us to posit a resemblance between it and its effect. Unlike a natural cause, the will does not pass something of itself to the object willed: it simply desires that the object come to be ». Cf. EDWARD C. HALPER, « Maimonides on the Scope of Divine and Human Self-Knowledge », *Quaestio*, 15 (2015), p. 299–308.

<sup>56</sup> MAIMONIDES. *Dux seu director*, I.57, fol. 22.

though Petrus Hispanus does not discuss this subject in the commentary, as it is not pertinent to the general topic addressed, he uses it to show the relation between the human and the divine intellect, which manifests, as all things, the distance between God and the creature.

### *Concluding remarks*

The *Sententia cum questionibus* is, as far as we know, the only Latin commentary from the middle of the thirteenth century (including Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas's texts) that adjusts Maimonides's description of prophetic knowledge into a theory of human knowledge in commenting on the *De anima*, a book of natural philosophy. In the *De anima*, book of natural philosophy, human knowledge is grounded in the process of abstraction, departing from the senses. In contrast, the 'prophetic' knowledge assumed by Petrus Hispanus is beyond natural knowledge and is caused directly by the generosity of God, the same as the creation and the movement of the world. As Kreisel notes, to Maimonides, both prophetic knowledge and creation refer to the divine will,<sup>57</sup> and this link is probably not against Petrus Hispanus's own convictions.

The advantage that Maimonides's view provides to our author has to do with the perception of Maimonides as a peripatetic thinker, who supplied some undeniable authority to Petrus Hispanus's aim of integrating some kind of non-abstractive knowledge.<sup>58</sup> Real knowledge of God can come via the light of the human agent intellect, in parallel to the knowledge that can be from God's effects, namely from the knowledge of the creature. Thus, there is the possibility

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<sup>57</sup> KREISEL, *Prophecy*, p. 223: « The third opinion, identified by Maimonides as the opinion of the Law, stakes a course between these two approaches. Maimonides stresses his agreement with the opinion of the philosophers, with one crucial proviso. One who possesses all the requisite preparations for prophecy may still fail to become a prophet due to an act of divine will. This is similar to the occurrence of any miracle in his view. He continues his discussion by adducing examples of God withholding prophecy. The rest of the chapter is devoted to a vigorous defence of the principle that only the perfect can become prophets. The naturalism of the philosophers' approach to prophecy is upheld in this opinion, while the necessity characterizing their approach is negated. God acts primarily through the order of nature but can also perform wilful acts independent of the order. The similarity between Maimonides' approach to divine governance and his approach to prophecy is striking. He indicates his agreement with Aristotle's approach to divine governance on all issues except for the question of creation (Guide 2.6). At stake in this issue, according to Maimonides, is the notion of divine will ».

<sup>58</sup> Cf. THIERRY ALCOLOUMBRE, « Vers la prophétie », in ID., *Maimonide et le problème de la personne*, Vrin, Paris 1999, p. 141: « La doctrine du prophétisme permet à Maimonide d'articuler le fondement historique de la tradition avec les acquis de la 'science' aristotélicienne. A l'instar de la Providence, intégrée à l'ordre de la nature physique, la Révélation est intégrée dans la structure du psychisme humain ».

of another *cognitio* far from the senses, with another source and mode, inside the human soul, that comes when the soul does not attend to the corporeal reality.<sup>59</sup>

The adoption of this partially modified lecture on Maimonides's view of prophecy, therefore, does not reveal any criticism of Maimonides's possible rationalism or naturalism; quite the opposite, since Petrus Hispanus integrates it as a natural disposition of human intellect provided by God in the very moment of its creation. Thus, Maimonides is an authority carefully selected by Petrus Hispanus in this context, as could be appreciated by the expressions (*bene dicens, recte dicens*, etc.) that accompany the quotations.<sup>60</sup>

In any case, this 'adapted' integration of some aspects of Maimonides's view of the intellect, which, in this case, does not assume the action of agent intelligences upon the human intellect, fits very well in Petrus Hispanus's Neoplatonic and Christian epistemological framework, which admits the existence of a further contemplative state with divine revelation is provided but does not assume the reception of universal knowledge from a superior entity, as Avicenna conceives it. In this regard, Petrus Hispanus seems to see Avicenna's theory far from both Aristotle and his own view on the soul and knowledge. At this point, the authority of Maimonides, who combined peripatetic philosophy and Scriptural exegesis in his *Guide*, seems to be the most adequate one to support Petrus Hispanus's syncretic conception of knowledge.

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<sup>59</sup> On the relations among and the *sapientia*, which includes this superior knowledge, *scientia*, and *philosophia*, cf. GIULIO D'ONOFRIO, *Vera philosophia*, Città Nuova, Roma 2013.

<sup>60</sup> Neither Averroes nor Avicenna nor other authors frequently quoted in the *Sententia* receive so much approbation by means of these or other similar words.

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# SEARCHING FOR THE ROUTES OF PHILOSOPHY MARSILIO FICINO ON HERACLITUS

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## *Abstract*

Marsilio Ficino is well known for his efforts to expand the philosophical canon of his time. He exhibited great interest in Platonism and Neoplatonism, but also endeavoured to recover understudied philosophical traditions of the ancient world. In his *Theologia platonica de immortalitate animorum*, he commented on the Presocratics. Ficino thought of the Presocratics as authorities and possessors of undisputed wisdom. This article seeks to explore the way in which Ficino treated the philosophy of Heraclitus in the *Theologia platonica* in order to formulate his own philosophical ideas.

## *Key Words*

Presocratics, Heraclitus, Ficino, Renaissance Philosophy.



During the fifteenth century, interest in Presocratic philosophy became more intense in part because of the aversion felt by early humanists towards Scholastic philosophy, but mainly due to the availability of texts and intentional return to classical philosophical thought. Fifteenth century humanists, notably Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), reappraised the importance of Presocratic philosophy and acknowledged its influence on ancient Greek philosophy. Ficino's work could not possibly lack any references to Presocratic philosophers since the Florentine humanist attempted to broaden his philosophical scope by systematically dealing with Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophical literature. Since the *terminus technicus* 'Presocratic' was a later invention, Ficino commented at length on a number of philosophers who predated Socrates, including the Eleatics and the Pythagoreans. Furthermore, he incorporated into his understanding of Presocratic

philosophy a number of later works attributed to figures who allegedly predate Socrates – including Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, and Orpheus. Ficino considered the Presocratic as authorities to whom he could resort in order to support and strengthen his positions. Moreover, in Ficino's thought, there is clearly an eternal and indestructible continuity entity in knowledge, which starts from the distant past and continues into the future.<sup>1</sup> Namely, Ficino holds that Plato was merely a link in a much older succession of theologians and transmitters of wisdom. The Ionian, Italic, Thracian, Egyptian and Chaldean sources shaped Platonic philosophy.<sup>2</sup>

In this article, I focus on the *Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum* (1482) – Ficino's *opus magnum* – so as to present and analyse the way he deals with the philosophy of Heraclitus, a leading representative of the Ionian school, in order to assess Ficino's approach to Presocratic philosophy. In this study, I will rely predominantly on the *Theologia Platonica* because in this specific book Ficino analytically presented his own philosophical views.

I must admit that Ficino referred to Heraclitus and to other Presocratic thinkers also in his other numerous commentaries and translations; but, in these cases, he primarily reacted to the references of the original author. Here, his comments lack the profundity and the originality of his arguments and insights found in the *Theologia Platonica*, where Ficino articulated his magnificent philosophical synopsis. Thus, the scattered references to the rest of the Ficinian corpus that are included in this article aim rather at the elucidation of his view on Heraclitus in the *Theologia Platonica*, and do not represent an attempt to present a complete record of Ficino's references to the Ephesian philosopher. However, omission does not indicate insignificance, for in addition to his studies, Ficino's admiration for Heraclitus is proved by the fact that he decorated his lodge at Careggi with a painting that depicted Democritus and Heraclitus, where the latter weeps over the misfortunes of humanity.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> MOSHE IDEL, « Prisca Theologia in Marsilio Ficino and some Jewish Treatments », in MICHAEL J. B. ALLEN, VALERY REES, MARTIN DAVIES (eds.), *Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy*, Brill, Leiden–Boston–Köln 2002 (Brill's studies in intellectual history, 108), p. 137–158; DANIEL P. WALKER, « Prisca Theologia e Philosophia Perennis: Due temi del Rinascimento italiano e loro fortuna », in GIOVANNANGIOLA TARUGI (ed.), *Il pensiero italiano di Rinascimento e il tempo nostro. Atti del V Convegno internazionale del Centro di studi umanistici. Montepulciano 8–13 agosto 1968*, Leo S. Olschki, Firenze 1970, p. 211–236.

<sup>2</sup> MICHAEL J. B. ALLEN, « Pythagoras in the Early Renaissance », in CARL A. HUFFMAN (ed.), *A History of Pythagoreanism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, p. 435–437, 453; CHRISTOPHER S. CELENZA, *Piety and Pythagoras in Renaissance Florence: The Symbolum Nesianum*, Brill, Leiden 2001 (Studies in the history of Christian thought, 101), p. 2–4, 16–25; DENIS J.-J. ROBICHAUD, *Plato's Persona: Marsilio Ficino, Renaissance Humanism, and Platonic Traditions*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2018, p. 153.

<sup>3</sup> ALBERT BLANKERT, « Heraclitus en Democritus bij Marsilio Ficino », *Simiolus: Netherlands Quarterly for the History of Art*, 1/3 (1966–1967), p. 128–135; EUGENIO GARIN, « The Philosopher and the

As it will be shown in this article, Heraclitus's philosophy was crucial for Ficino, because it offered to the Florentine philosopher critical concepts for his metaphysics of light and the understanding of becoming. Since this article is part of a broader research project on the reception of the Presocratics by Ficino, I focus on exemplary cases that allow the reader to draw some preliminary conclusions. In addition, I attempt to trace Ficino's possible sources and evaluate his proper knowledge, understanding, and treatment of the philosophy of Heraclitus.

The extent of his faithfulness to Heraclitus's quotes is crucial, because it provides the opportunity to understand Ficino's approach to the Presocratics. I argue that Ficino did not think of himself as a mere exegete or a commentator; rather he creatively reappraised ancient Greek philosophy so as to reinforce his own views.

## I

In addition to Plato and the Neoplatonists, Ficino was interested in almost all influential ancient intellectual traditions, including magic and mysticism. Ficino's works marked a new and innovative reading of the Presocratics.

In the very first pages of the *Theologia Platonica*, there are already references to Heraclitus. More specifically, while investigating immortality, Ficino attempted to prove that, apart from the inert mass of the bodies – to which the followers of Democritus, Cyrenaics, and Epicurus restricted their thinking – there is an active quality or power towards which the Stoics and Cynics oriented their research. Furthermore, apart from this quality, which is divisible according to the dimensions of matter and is subject to all modes of change, there is a higher sort of form, which does not promote the division in the body despite being variable in some aspect. According to Ficino, the ancient theologians held that this form constitutes the seat of the rational soul.<sup>4</sup> Ficino argued that a similar view is found in the works of Heraclitus, Marcus Varro, and Marcus Manilius. Lucia Saudelli argues that Ficino resorted to Heraclitus in order to substantiate his view that the soul is placed in the center of the physical universe and the metaphysical order.<sup>5</sup>

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Magus », in EUGENIO GARIN (ed.), *Renaissance Characters*, trans. LYDIA G. COCHRANE, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1991, p. 125; PAUL O. KRISTELLER, *Marsilio Ficino and His Work after Five Hundred Years*, Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1987 (Istituto nazionale di studi sul Rinascimento. Quaderni di Rinascimento, 7), p. 11; JOHN L. LEPAGE, *The Revival of Antique Philosophy in the Renaissance*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2012, p. 106.

<sup>4</sup> MARSILIUS FICINUS. *Theologia Platonica*, I.1.2 (= MARSILIO FICINO, *Platonic Theology*, ed. JAMES HANKINS and trans. MICHAEL J. B. ALLEN, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2001); CHRISTIAN K. KLEINBUB, *Vision and the Visionary in Raphael*; Penn State Press, University Park, PA 2011, p. 65–66.

<sup>5</sup> LUCIA SAUDELLI, « Lux sicca Marsile Ficin exegete d'Héraclite », *Accademia*, 10 (2008), p. 38.

According to Michael J. B. Allen and James Hankins,<sup>6</sup> Ficino's position was based on Aristotle's *De Anima*.<sup>7</sup> In Aristotle's text, Heraclitus seems to argue that the soul flows and moves. According to Ficino, this movement was interpreted as a kind of change. It is important to clarify here that the Aristotelian text refers to the soul and not to the Heraclitean Logos (Λόγος), which is a concept that could be interpreted as a unifying or symmetrical arrangement of things, but also as a real component of physical objects that has the same area of application as the primary cosmic element, namely fire.<sup>8</sup>

Ficino continued along the same lines. Specifically, he stated that the essence of the rational soul remains unchanged, which can be proved by stability of memory and the will. However, the soul practically tends to change because it thinks everything over gradually and not instantaneously. The same happens with its contribution to the growth of the body: physical power remains unchanged because it grows constantly neither being able to increase nor to disappear. Nonetheless, acquired power changes because it is moved from potentiality to actuality, and from actuality to habit, and so on. Once more, Ficino considered this to be the position of Heraclitus, Marcus Terentius Varro (116–127 BC), and Marcus Manilius (1<sup>st</sup> century AD).<sup>9</sup>

Heraclitus actually thought that the soul is mutable since it originates from humidity, falls into fire in its proper functioning and ends as liquid in the phase of its decline. In addition, the soul moves within the body. According to Heraclitus, the human intellect should be located in the soul.<sup>10</sup> However, a more careful study of Ficino's text shows that the Florentine philosopher does not faithfully interpret Heraclitus's views. In particular, Ficino understands Heraclitus's soul as the seat of

<sup>6</sup> FICINO, *Platonic Theology*, p. 323.

<sup>7</sup> ARISTOTELES. *De anima*, 405a28–31: καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι φησι ψυχὴν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἧς τὰλλα συνίστησιν· καὶ ἀσωματώτατόν τε καὶ ῥέον ἀεὶ· τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ γινώσκεισθαι· ἐν κινήσει δ' εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κάκεινος ᾤετο καὶ οἱ πολλοί.

<sup>8</sup> THEODOROS CHRISTIDIS, DEMETRIUS ATHANASSAKIS, « On Heraclitus' Concept of Λόγος », *Philosophical Inquiry*, 32 (2010), p. 61–71; ARISTOTELES, *Physics Book VIII*, ed. DANIEL W. GRAHAM, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1999, p. 66–67, 155; GEOFFREY S. KIRK, JOHN E. RAVEN, MALCOM SCHOFIELD, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, p. 204; ADAM DROZDEK, *Greek Philosophers as Theologians: The Divine Arche*, Ashgate, Aldershot 2007, p. 31–32; RONALD POLANSKY, *Aristotle's De Anima: A Critical Commentary*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, p. 79; KEVIN ROBB, « Psyche and Logos in the Fragments of Heraclitus », *The Monist*, 69 (1986), p. 315–351; THOMAS M. ROBINSON, « Heraclitus on Soul », *The Monist*, 69 (1986), p. 305–314; ID., « Heraclitus and Logos – again », *ΣΧΟΛΗ: Ancient Philosophy and The Classical Tradition*, 7 (2013), p. 318–326.

<sup>9</sup> FICINUS. *Theologia Platonica*, I.5.1.

<sup>10</sup> ARYEH FINKELBERG, *Heraclitus and Thales' Conceptual Scheme: A Historical Study*, Brill, Leiden–Boston 2017 (Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture, 23), p. 84–125; GEOFFREY S. KIRK, *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1954, p. 339–342; GABOR BETEGH, « On the Physical Aspect of Heraclitus' Psychology », *Phronesis*, 52 (2007), p. 3–32.

rational soul, not as the soul *per se*, as Heraclitus had suggested.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, according to Ficino, the angelic mind – which is the only mind, which remains unchanged – exists beyond the rational soul.

Heraclitus does not understand the Logos according to the Neoplatonic way in which Ficino understands the rational soul or the angelic mind. It is a matter of one concept with different semantic content; indeed the Logos may even constitute the composing element of material things. On the other hand, Heraclitus's soul – which has no limits – cannot be separated from the human mind.<sup>12</sup> Thus, Ficino's interpretation is not entirely consistent with Heraclitus's philosophy.

Furthermore, Ficino resorted to Heraclitus on other different topics related to the soul.<sup>13</sup> In particular, Ficino used Heraclitus's quote: *ἀύγη ξηρή, ψυχή σοφωτάτη*.<sup>14</sup> Ficino's translation is: « dry light, the wisest soul » (*Lux sicca, anima sapientissima*). It is worth noting that Ficino does not reproduce the most common variations<sup>15</sup> of the Heraclitean quote (*ἀύγη ξηρή ψυχή σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη* and *αὔη ψυχή σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη*)<sup>16</sup> and draws instead from the Neoplatonist Hermias (5<sup>th</sup> cent. AD), namely, the only author who separates the phrase with a comma and presents a shorter variation of the quote.<sup>17</sup> The Florentine Platonist prefers the same translation (*Lux sicca, anima sapientissima*) of the Heraclitean passage in his *De vita libri tres* (1489).<sup>18</sup>

<sup>11</sup> MARK JOHNSTONE, « On 'Logos' in Heraclitus », in BRAD INWOOD (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, vol. XLVII, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, p. 18–19.

<sup>12</sup> PAUL S. MACDONALD, *History of the Concept of Mind*, vol. I: *Speculations About Soul, Mind and Spirit from Homer to Hume*, Routledge, Abington 2017, p. 28–35; GIANNIS STAMATELOS, *Plotinus and the Presocratics: A Philosophical Study of Presocratic Influences in Plotinus' Enneads*, State University of New York Press, Albany 2012 (SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy), p. 174.

<sup>13</sup> FICINUS, *Theologia Platonica*, VI.2.20.

<sup>14</sup> DK12 B118.

<sup>15</sup> ROBERT B. ENGLISH, « Heraclitus and the Soul », *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 44 (1913), p. 176–177. The Byzantine scholar Michael Glykas (12<sup>th</sup> century) gives a different version of the Heraclitean quote: *ψυχή ξηροτέρη σοφωτέρη*. SERGE MOURAVIEV, *Héraclite d'Éphèse. La tradition antique et médiévale*, vol. IV: *De Maxime le Confesseur à Marsile Ficin*, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 2003 (Heraclitea. 2: Traditio. A. Témoignages et citations), p. 826.

<sup>16</sup> SAUDELLI, « *Lux sicca* », p. 32.

<sup>17</sup> HERMIAS. In *Platonis Phaedrum scholia*, 1.29.28; MICHAEL J. B. ALLEN, « Two commentaries on the Phaedrus: Ficino's indebtedness to Hermias », *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 43 (1980), p. 110–129; Id., « The Soul as Rhapsode: Marsilio Ficino's Interpretation of Plato's Ion », in JOHN W. O'MALLEY, THOMAS M. IZBICKI, GERALD CHRISTIANSON (eds.), *Humanity and Divinity in Renaissance and Reformation: Essays in Honor of Charles Trinkaus*, Brill, Leiden 1993 (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 51), p. 132; ANNE SHEPPARD, « The Influence of Hermias on Marsilio Ficino's Doctrine of Inspiration », *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 43 (1980), p. 97–109.

<sup>18</sup> MARSILIO FICINO, *Three Books on Life*, I.5, ed. CAROL V. KASKE, JOHN R. CLARK, Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Tempe, AZ 1998 (Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 57), p. 74–75.

According to the vast majority of the ancient scholars who commented on Heraclitus' quote, the Ephesian philosopher intended to show that the dry soul is the wisest and best. It is obvious that Ficino's view on Heraclitus is mediated by the approach of the Neoplatonists. Nevertheless, Ficino's aim here is to prove that souls exist in heavenly orbits and are enclosed spheres of light. Thus, Ficino misinterprets Heraclitus's philosophy, following Hermias's, Galen's and Macrobius's interpretation of the Heraclitean quote.<sup>19</sup>

The Greek philosopher argued that the dry soul is the wisest and the best, and likewise the burning soul is capable and active. The liquid soul loses much of its ability.<sup>20</sup> Conversely, Ficino puts Heraclitus's position in the frame of a Neoplatonic type of metaphysics of light. In particular, he claims that nothing offers more pleasure to the soul than light. Even during its dwelling on earth, it craves the light of spiritual beings.

Ficino's inaccurate interpretation of the specific passage from Heraclitus is repeated later when Ficino states that, according to Orpheus's disciples and to Heraclitus, « light is nothing else than the visible soul (all things return to life because of this) and the soul is invisible light ».<sup>21</sup> This particular argument is used by Ficino to prove the invariance of the mind. Once more, Ficino interprets Heraclitus's passage with a very loose and inaccurate way in order to adapt it to what he desired to support.

While Allen and Hankins believe that, at this point, Ficino freely reproduces the aforementioned passage from Aristotle's *De Anima*,<sup>22</sup> there is another possible interpretation. Since Ficino refers, in the same paragraph, to the spiritual, intangible sunlight, which originates from the soul of the sun, it is likely that the connection that Ficino is trying to make to Heraclitus's philosophy comes from the passage from Diogenes Laertius where the soul is attributed to the sun.<sup>23</sup> Similarly,

<sup>19</sup> SAUDELLI, « *Lux sicca* », p. 32–33.

<sup>20</sup> JONATHAN BARNES, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Routledge, London–New York 1982, p. 43–62; FINKELBERG, *Heraclitus and Thales*, p. 85–87; CHARLES H. KAHN, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981, p. 245–246; RICHARD D. MCKIRAHAN, *Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary*, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis–Cambridge 2011, p. 139–141; MARTHA NUSSBAUM, « Psychê in Heraclitus », *Phronesis*, 17 (1972), p. 1–16, 153–70; Heraclitus, *Fragments, A Text and Translation with a Commentary*, ed. THOMAS M. ROBINSON, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1991, p. 158–159.

<sup>21</sup> FICINUS, *Theologia Platonica*, VIII.13.1.

<sup>22</sup> ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, 405a28–31.

<sup>23</sup> DK12 A1 56.12–13: *ὅτι τε ὁ ἥλιός ἐστι τὸ μέγεθος οἷος φαίνεται. λέγεται δὲ καί· 'ψυχῆς [...]' ἔχει ALEXANDER MOURELATOS, *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2014, p. 223–224. Ficino, in *De sole*, supported that Heraclitus called the sun fountain of celestial light (cf. Marsilio Ficino, *Liber de sole et lumine*, VI, Antonio di Bartolommeo Miscomini, Florence 1493).*

the distinction that Ficino attempts to make between the immaterial and material light is attributed to Heraclitus by Clement of Alexandria.<sup>24</sup>

Saudelli maintains that although Ficino draws from pre-Platonic sources, he interprets them through the lens of Christian Platonism so to establish his « psychology of the light ». <sup>25</sup> It is well known that the Light is a key concept of Ficino's metaphysics. Heraclitus's views on the soul enable the Florentine philosopher to explain the diffusion of light in the created universe within the broader context of his theology.

Later on, dealing with Plato's positions on the soul, Ficino asserts that the Athenian philosopher expressed truths related to the soul. However, the way Plato interpreted the paths of the soul was poetic and metaphorical, and hence the true meaning, hidden behind the words, must be sought. Indeed, Ficino notes that Plato was not the one who conceived these paths; rather, he simply reproduced them. The first ones to speak about the soul's paths were the Egyptian priests who defined them through the process of the purification of the soul. Orpheus, Empedocles, and Heraclitus held similar views, in a poetic and lyrical way.<sup>26</sup>

According to Heraclitus's philosophy, the soul constitutes the vehicle of personal identity and character, and it is the center that coordinates people's thoughts and actions. In fact, the soul constitutes the essence of man. Death cannot exist as a permanent condition. Instead, it is an instantaneous phase in an ultimate limit of the cycle. Life and death are the same since, when these change, others happen and when other change, these happen, as Heraclitus characteristically states.<sup>27</sup> Death could mean the advanced decay of the body and mind, even in case the human being has not actually died. On the contrary, the kind of death that occurs heroically in the peak of life is not thought of as death because the soul continues to exist in an excellent condition. The corpse – a body without a soul – has absolutely no value and is equated with compost.<sup>28</sup> According to Heraclitus, the soul is simultaneously mortal and immortal; also, it is continuously subject to death and can get back to life at any time.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, Ficino's interpretation

<sup>24</sup> CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS. *Paedagogus*, II.10.99.5.: Λήσεται μὲν γὰρ ἴσως τὸ αἰσθητὸν φῶς τις, τὸ δὲ νοητὸν ἀδύνατον ἐστίν, ἢ ὡς φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος· τὸ μὴ δύνόν ποτε πῶς ἂν τις λάθῃ; JAAP MANSFELD, « On Two Fragments of Heraclitus in Clement of Alexandria », *Mnemosyne*, 37 (1984), p. 447–451.

<sup>25</sup> SAUDELLI, « *Lux Sicca* », p. 39–41.

<sup>26</sup> FICINUS. *Theologia Platonica*, XVII.4.1; DK12 A15 ARIST. *De anima* A 2. 405a 24: καὶ Ἡ. δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι ψυχὴν (wie Diogenes 64 A 20), εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν [B 12], ἐξ ἧς τὰλλα συνίστησιν. MACROB. *S. Scip.* 14, 19 (*animam*) *H. phisicus scintillam stellaris essentiae*. AËT. IV 3, 12 (D. 389) Ἡ. τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγρῶν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμιάσεως, ὁμογενῆ.

<sup>27</sup> DK12 B88: Ε ταῦτό τ' ἐνὶ ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός καὶ [τὸ] ἐγρηγορός καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κάκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα.

<sup>28</sup> DK12 B96: νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι.

<sup>29</sup> DK12 B62: ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεώτες.

is designated to the side that relates Heraclitus's philosophy to Plato's concerning the immortality of the soul. Of course, all these are in the broader context of the philosophical thought of Heraclitus and Plato, since, in the details, their opinions do not coincide with Ficino's.

Ficino seems to differ again from the ancient sources, since he claims that Heraclitus's poetic mood, in his works, is more efficient. This is not correct, since Heraclitus – unlike Empedocles and Parmenides – does not seem to articulate his philosophy in verse form. Moreover, it is well known that Heraclitus had repeatedly disputed the poets.<sup>30</sup>

On the topic of the invisibly articulated and allusive philosophy of Heraclitus, Ficino follows the ancient sources. Particularly, Diogenes Laertius, Timon Phliasius and Cicero<sup>31</sup> referred, among many others, to Heraclitus's secrecy since his aim was that powerful and influential people understand his work, not the mob.

Nonetheless, the indirect association of Heraclitus with the Egyptian priests and Orpheus is interesting. This demonstrates that Ficino thought of Heraclitus as a mystic and continuer of hidden religious currents of the popular Greek religion.<sup>32</sup>

## II

Apart from psychology, Ficino regarded Heraclitus as a valuable ally to prove that the mind is the subject of eternal truth and connects to an eternal object, accepting the immaterial kind and the eternal rational principles. This view of Ficino was based on the volatility of the natural world. In particular, Ficino held that the starry night sky fills a stream with the images of its stars reflected on water. Even though the ignorant ones considered that the images of the stars remain unchanged in water, they were actually continuously renewed as the water changes. Similarly, God, congested with Ideas, emanates images of his Ideas in constantly changing matter. According to the Platonists,<sup>33</sup> these Ideas remain simply images, and not true species, although some natural philosophers believe

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<sup>30</sup> GLENN MOST, « What Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry? », in PIERRE DESTRIÉE, FRITZ-GREGOR HERRMANN (eds.), *Plato and the Poets*, Brill, Leiden 2011 (Mnemosyne. Supplementum, 328), p. 5.

<sup>31</sup> CICERO. *De Finibus*, II.15: « quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, 'cognomento qui skoteinpw perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit', aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis »; DK12 A1, 54.42–55.4: τὸ δὲ φερόμενον αὐτοῦ βιβλίον ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ συνέχοντος Περὶ φύσεως, διήρηται δὲ εἰς τρεῖς λόγους, εἷς τε τὸν περὶ τοῦ παντός καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ θεολογικόν. ἀνέθηκε δ' αὐτὸ εἰς τὴν Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερὸν, ὡς μὲν τινες, ἐπιτηδεύσας ἀσαφέστερον γράψαι, ὅπως οἱ δυνάμενοι <μόνοι> προσίοιεν αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ δημόδους εὐκαταφρόνητον ἦι. τοῦτον δὲ καὶ ὁ Τίμων [fr. 43 D.] ὑπογράφει λέγων· 'τοῖς δ' ἔνι κοκκυστῆς ὀχλολοΐδορος Ἡράκλειτος αἰνικτῆς ἀνόρουσε.

<sup>32</sup> Censorinus (3<sup>rd</sup> c. AD) also connected Heraclitus to Orpheus. Cf. KIRK, *Heraclitus*, 300.

<sup>33</sup> DIONYSIUS PSEUDO AREOPAGITA. *De divinis nominibus*, 869D.

that they are true species.<sup>34</sup> Ficino resorts to Heraclitus so as to prove that even these images do not remain constant; rather, they constantly change since matter – despite the beliefs of the ignorant ones – constantly changes.<sup>35</sup>

A few paragraphs later Ficino returns to the same subject.<sup>36</sup> Specifically, Ficino claims that, according to Heraclitus, we cannot pass through the same water of a river twice or similarly touch the same place of a moving wheel; thus, the disposition of the body does not remain stable from one moment to another.<sup>37</sup> Ficino cites Plutarch<sup>38</sup> and Proclus<sup>39</sup> as proponents of this view. In Allen and Hankins's edition, it is wrongly indicated that Ficino copies at this point from Plato's *Cratylus*<sup>40</sup> and *Theaetetus*<sup>41</sup> where the famous view of Heraclitus is explained. Ficino's wording, associated with Heraclitus's philosophy, suggests that we cannot enter twice in the same waters, but we can enter twice in the same river. The river will be the same while the waters will have changed. According to Daniel W. Graham's interpretation of the passages A6, B12, B49a and B91a from Heraclitus, some things can remain the same while changing. Had the water of the river not changed, it would no longer be a river, but a lake.<sup>42</sup> This interpretation leads us to a more careful reading, which demonstrates that not only does Ficino base his wordings on Plato's *Cratylus*, but also on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.<sup>43</sup>

Initially, Ficino differs from Plato's *Cratylus* not only in the syntax, but also in what refers to the water of the river and not to the river itself. Plato uses the optative mood, namely potential optative, which indicates the possible. Conversely, Aristotle chooses a syntax – verb and infinitive – where absolute certainty is highlighted. Ficino follows Aristotle's syntax (*non possumus bis intrare*). In his own version, Aristotle argues that, according to the fifth-century philosopher Cratylus, you cannot enter even once into the same river, while Plato, in the dialogue *Cratylus*, holds that you cannot enter into the same river twice,

<sup>34</sup> FICINUS. *Theologia Platonica*, XI.4.15.

<sup>35</sup> PLATO. *Cratylus*, 402a8–10: λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι “πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει,” καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῆ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς “δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης”.

<sup>36</sup> FICINUS. *Theologia Platonica*, XI.6.4

<sup>37</sup> FICINO, *Platonic Theology*, vol. III, p. 301.

<sup>38</sup> PLUTARCHUS. *De E apud Delphos*, 392b7–c1: ποταμῶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ καθ' Ἡράκλειτον οὐδὲ θνητῆς οὐσίας δις ἄψασθαι κατὰ ἕξιν· ἀλλ' ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς ἴσκιδνησι καὶ πάλιν συναίγει, μᾶλλον δ' οὐδὲ πάλιν οὐδ' ὕστερον ἀλλ' ἅμα συνίσταται καὶ ἀπολείπει καὶ πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισιν.

<sup>39</sup> PROCLUS. *In Platonis Cratylum commentaria*, 142.1–11.

<sup>40</sup> PLATO. *Cratylus*, 402a8–10.

<sup>41</sup> PLATO. *Theaetetus*, 160d6–8: κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον οἶον ρεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα.

<sup>42</sup> DANIEL W. GRAHAM, « Heraclitus », *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2011 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/heraclitus/>> (Accessed October 2018).

<sup>43</sup> ARISTOTELES. *Metaphysica*, 1010a13–15: ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπέτιμα εἰπόντι ὅτι δις τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι· αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ' ἄπαξ.

without making reference to the water of the river. Ficino copies the syntax of Aristotle, but departs conceptually from both Aristotle and Plato. Plutarch, whom Ficino mentions, also follows the syntax of Aristotle.<sup>44</sup>

Moreover, a byzantine *Scholion in Plutarchum* follows the interpretation of Heraclitus's quote, according to which we cannot enter twice the same river.<sup>45</sup> It is worth noting that Ficino's view is in agreement with the author of the *Scholion in Georgium Pachymerem*, who claims that, according to Heraclitus, we cannot put our finger twice into the same water of a river.<sup>46</sup> Thomas Aquinas, from his part, supports that « Heraclitus dixit quod non est possibile aquam fluvii currentis bis tangere ».<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* Aquinas presents a slightly different version of the Heraclitean quote, which lies closer to the Ficinian version: « non potest homo bis intrare in eodem flumine, quia antequam intret secundo, aqua quae erat fluminis iam defluserat ».<sup>48</sup> In the fourteenth century, also Petrarch comments on Heraclitus passage. His translation is: « in ipsum flumen bis descendimus et non descendimus ». Petrarch resorts to Seneca's comments in order to hold that the river is the same, while the water has changed.<sup>49</sup>

Several scholars<sup>50</sup> think it is very likely that Aristotle's variation, the syntax of which Ficino follows, is not necessarily based on the version of Plato's *Cratylus*; rather, it is based on the same source of the version of Arius Didymus, a Stoic philosopher of the first century BC, as it was delivered to us by Eusebius (260/65–339/40) in *Evangelical Preparation*.<sup>51</sup> The Platonic version of the sentence indicates that the river is not the same for two consecutive moments and everything in nature resembles the river, since everything is in constantly flux. In the wording of Arius Didymus, the river is the same, but different. The wording of Arius Didymus is consistent with other passages from Heraclitus where the philosopher supports the concurrence of opposites. However, even from a literature point of view, the version of Arius Didymus seems more authentic. The versions of Plato and Arius Didymus lead to the conclusion that Heraclitus meant that the world remains the same while its constituent parts change incessantly.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>44</sup> PLUTARCHUS, *De E apud Delphos*, 392b8: "ποταμῶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δις τῶ αὐτῶ" καθ' Ἡράκλειτον.

<sup>45</sup> MOURAVIEV, *Héraclite*, p. 884.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 889.

<sup>47</sup> THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, q. 84, art. 1 and 3.

<sup>48</sup> *Id.* In *Arist. Metaph. Expos.* IV.12, 684.

<sup>49</sup> MOURAVIEV, *Héraclite*, p. 945–948.

<sup>50</sup> KIRK, *Heraclitus*, p. 366–384; LEONARDO TARÁN, « Heraclitus: The River Fragments and Their Implications », *Elenchos*, 20 (1999), p. 9–52.

<sup>51</sup> DK12 B12: ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαινουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ.

<sup>52</sup> BARNES, *The Presocratic*, p. 49–52; FRANCESCO FRONTEROTTA, « Heraclitus, the Becoming and the Platonic-Aristotelian Doxography », *Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental*, 15 (2015), p. 117–128; DANIEL W. GRAHAM, « Heraclitus: Flux, Order, and Knowledge », in

From his side, Ficino argues that, within temporality, the heavens continue moving forward without stopping although the super-celestials remain unchanged in their eternity. According to Ficino, since the heavenly order does not remain constant, the same phenomenon is observed with a greater intensity in the sublunary world under the influence of the heavens. Consequently, the location of the body can never remain exactly the same or similar as time goes by. Therefore, one quality said to exist, could at the same time been said not to exist. It switches instantly from non-being to non-being. Since time is running faster than language and thought, at the time when something is said, it exists and does not exist. Therefore, change and becoming, in the manner described above, seem to actually exist and not exist.

The rest of Ficino's argument proves that the Italian philosopher deals with the views of the philosopher Cratylus, whose interpretation Aristotle reproduces in his *Metaphysics*. The former had argued that the continuous flow was associated also with the language that made communication difficult.<sup>53</sup> In other words, Cratylus did endorse an early form of skepticism, which Ficino does not seem to accept. It is clear then that Cratylus's view misinterprets and distorts Heraclitus's philosophy. In fact, Ficino approaches, without probably realizing it, the deeper meaning of the philosophy of Heraclitus who does not challenge the senses at any point in the rest of his surviving or attributable work; rather, he considers their cooperation with the mind as necessary for the formation of knowledge. Heraclitus appears to argue that he prefers what is learnt by sight and hearing, and that people, who seek wisdom, must investigate many things.<sup>54</sup> Human experience cannot be exceeded.<sup>55</sup>

In reality, Ficino distances himself, on this point, from Plato's reading of Heraclitus's philosophy in the *Cratylus*. Ficino is closer, than anyone before him, to the authentic and unmediated ontology of the Ephesian. Heraclitus argued that everything is an eternal fire and everything ends up in fire through visible but not real changes, as demonstrated by Jonathan Barnes.<sup>56</sup> The world as a whole is a huge

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PATRICIA CURD, DANIEL W. GRAHAM (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, New York 2008, p. 169–188; MARY M. MACKENZIE, « Heraclitus and the Art of Paradox », in JULIA ANNAS (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, vol. VI, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1988, p. 1–37; DAVID G. STERN, « Heraclitus' and Wittgenstein's River Images: Stepping Twice into the Same River », *The Monist*, 74 (1991), p. 579–604.

<sup>53</sup> PLATO, *Cratylus*, 435d–440e; BRIAN CALVERT, « Forms and Flux in Plato's Cratylus », *Phronesis*, 15 (1970), p. 26–47; BERNARD WILLIAMS, « Cratylus' theory of names and its refutation », in MALCOM SCHOFIELD, MARTHA NUSSBAUM (eds.), *Language and Logos*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009, p. 83–93.

<sup>54</sup> DK12 B35.

<sup>55</sup> DK12 B3, B102; EDWARD HUSSEY, « Heraclitus », in ANTHONY A. LONG (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999 (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy), p. 93–94.

<sup>56</sup> BARNES, *The Presocratic*, p. 45–48.

fire whose parts are switched on, while others respectively are switched off, such as the entire fire does not burn simultaneously.<sup>57</sup> Not only does the fire ensure the contrast of the opposites, but it also ensures their unity through competition. The other cosmic composing elements, namely water, air, the ethereal fire and earth, are considered as forms of fire – *πυρός τροπαί* – as Heraclitus puts it.<sup>58</sup> In *De Caelo*, Aristotle expresses in the strongest possible way Heraclitus’s view that, while other things are in the process of creation and flow and no one subsists in one specific way, only one thing continues to exist as a substrate and all the other things undergo its natural reconstitution.<sup>59</sup> Logos never changes; it is eternal because changes do not disrupt the overall ratio, and the Logos is closely related to the fire. Across the range of secular change, one quantity of equivalent fire remains continually alive. Heraclitus tried to discern the way with which people perceive things by their true nature; Ficino attempted to do exactly the same.

### III

Furthermore, Ficino dealt with the life of Heraclitus.<sup>60</sup> Namely, he asserted that Heraclitus, like many other great philosophers, had tendencies of seclusion. In particular, he abandoned civic life due to the intensity of his study. Ficino presented his own version of the story, which is entirely different from that of Diogenes Laertius whose work is the most important and extensive source available about Heraclitus’s life and philosophical teachings. Diogenes Laertius explains his departure because of his aversion of the politically organized life in Ephesus and of people in general.<sup>61</sup> Ficino deliberately misinterprets Diogenes Laertius’s report in order to support his general argument on the Greek philosophers and their aversion to the material life. I could argue that Ficino interprets Heraclitus in correspondence to the testimonies of Neoplatonists from the life of Plotinus and other proponents of this stream.

<sup>57</sup> DK12 B30.

<sup>58</sup> DK12 B31, B90; RICHARD NEELS, « Elements and Opposites in Heraclitus », *Apeiron*, 4 (2018), Retrieved 18 Oct. 2018, from doi:10.1515/apeiron-2017-0029.

<sup>59</sup> ARISTOTELES. *De caelo*, 298b29–32: *Οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαι φασὶ καὶ ρεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθέν, ἐν δὲ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν ὅπερ εἰκόσκι βούλεσθαι λέγειν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος.*

<sup>60</sup> FICINUS. *Theologia Platonica*, XIII.2.2.

<sup>61</sup> DIOGENES LAERTIUS. *Vitae Philosophorum*, 9.3: *κεκρατήσθαι τῆς πονηρᾶς πολιτείας τὴν πόλιν. ἀναχωρήσας δ' εἰς τὸ ἱερόν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος μετὰ τῶν παιδῶν ἠστραγάλιζε· περιστάντων δ' αὐτὸν τῶν Ἐφεσίων, “τί, ὦ κάκιστοι, θαυμάζετε;”, εἶπεν· “ἢ οὐ κρεῖττον τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν πολιτεῦεσθαι;” Καὶ τέλος μισανθρωπήσας καὶ ἐκπατήσας ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι διηγάτο, πόσας σιτούμενος καὶ βοτάνας. καὶ μέντοι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περιτραπείς εἰς ὕδρον κατήλθεν εἰς ἄστνυ καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν αἰνιγματωδῶς ἐπυνθάνετο εἰ δύναντο ἐξ ἐπομβρίας αὐχμὸν ποιῆσαι· τῶν δὲ μὴ συνιέντων, αὐτὸν εἰς βούσασιν κατορύξας τῆς τῶν βολίτων ἀλέᾳ ἤλπισεν ἐξατμισθῆσεσθαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἀνύων οὐδ' οὕτως, ἐτελεύτα βίους ἔτη ἐξήκοντα.*

Moreover, Ficino argues that many people who excel in some art are melancholic by their nature, like Heraclitus, Aristotle and Chryssipus or they become so, like Democritus, Zeno of Citium, Avempace the Arab and Averroes.<sup>62</sup> Ficino's source is a passage from Diogenes Laertius.<sup>63</sup> It is clear that Ficino misinterprets once more. Following Aristotle's interpretation of the word melancholy, Theophrastus does not grant it the meaning intended by Ficino.<sup>64</sup> When referring to melancholy, Aristotle and Theophrastus mean impulsivity, which Heraclitus understood as such.<sup>65</sup>

#### IV

In conclusion, it is worth noting that Ficino resorted to Heraclitus in order to renew and enrich his philosophy. In this endeavor, he resorted mainly to Neoplatonic commentaries and Diogenes Laertius. His predilection for Hermias's version of the Heraclitean passage on the soul is indicative. Furthermore, Ficino interpreted the philosophy of Heraclitus through a Neoplatonic lens, because he wished to have his Platonism vindicated. He used the Presocratics as authority, as sages of the ancient world who confirmed his philosophy, something that exuded a strong flavor of Platonism and Neoplatonism. As a result, Ficino's philosophical insights on Heraclitus are partial as he missed the chance to evaluate Heraclitus's thought *per se*. Although Ficino had the opportunity to examine in depth ancient philosophical traditions and offer new interpretations that would have advance philosophical discussions, – as it is demonstrated by his comments on Heraclitus and Cratylus – he was not always interested in such an endeavor. Going as far as justifying his own Platonism through authority of the Presocratics was more than enough for him. Pico della Mirandola would only come later to make the first attempts to incorporate Presocratic thought in a concrete philosophy.

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<sup>62</sup> FICINUS. *Theologia Platonica*, XIV.10.5; Ficino commented on Heraclitus's alleged melancholy also in his letters (cf. LEPAGE, *The Revival*, p. 106–107).

<sup>63</sup> DIOGENES LAERTIUS. *Vitae Philosophorum*, 9.6.4–9: τοῦτον δὲ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ὑπογράφει λέγων τοῖς δ' ἐνὶ κοκκυστῆς, ὀχλολοῖδορος Ἡράκλειτος, αἰνικτῆς ἀνόρουσε. Θεόφραστος δέ φησιν ὑπὸ μελαγχολίας τὰ μὲν ἡμιτελῆ, τὰ δ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντα γράψαι.

<sup>64</sup> JAMES HANKINS, « 'Major Melancholy': Ficino and the Physiological Cause of Atheism », *Rinascimento*, 47 (2007), p. 3–23.

<sup>65</sup> ARISTOTELES. *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1150b25.

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# FROM PARIS TO GOTHA

## THE CIRCULATION OF TWO PARISIAN JESUIT COURSES BETWEEN THE 16<sup>TH</sup> AND THE 17<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY\*

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### *Abstract*

This article traces back the history of a collection of manuscript academic course-notes taken by a German student at the end of the sixteenth century and today preserved at the Research Library of Gotha (Thuringien, Germany). It focuses, in particular, on two of them, which transmit texts dictated in Paris: they testify to the large circulation of academic doctrines through the practice of the copy of the course-notes by students.

### *Key Words*

Gotha, Parisian Jesuits, Jesuit Colleges, Academic Courses-notes; 16<sup>th</sup> Century Theology, Predestination.



The Gotha Research library, founded in 1647 by the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, Ernst I, and situated in the Friedenstein Castle (Thuringien, Germany), holds, among the others, a unique collection of manuscript sources from the time

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\* Research for this article began during a 3 months-stay at the Gotha Forschungsbibliothek, thanks to a grant of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, and was later completed and supported by the European Regional Development Fund-Project « Creativity and Adaptability as Conditions of the Success of Europe in an Interrelated World » (No. CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16\_019/0000734). Special thanks to Martin Mulsow, Daniel Gehrt, Dominic Olariu, Paolo Rubini, Sascha Salatowski, Triin Jerlei, Daniele de Santis and the whole Library staff in Gotha. I also wish to express my gratitude to two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions.

of the Reformation<sup>1</sup>. This manuscript collection includes autographs of Luther, Melancton, Spalatin and other Protestant Reformers; it does not only bear the mark of the cultural heritage of the region, theater of the Lutheran Reformation in its making, but is also one of the library's specificities. Within this important archive, the library of Gotha preserves a small group of Jesuit manuscript courses dictated in the sixteenth century between Germany and France. These manuscripts formerly belonged to two Protestant theologians, Johann Gerhard<sup>2</sup> (1582–1637) and his son Johann Ernst (1621–1668). As Gerhard's library was absorbed in Gotha's in 1673, they integrated the history of the library from the very beginning. The reason for their presence within the manuscript library of the German theologians might be resumed by the adage 'know your enemy'<sup>3</sup> (to fight her better): Johann Gerhard spent the most of his life fighting against the Jesuits, as, in his day, they were the most conspicuous representatives of the Catholic party in Germany<sup>4</sup>. His son inherited his library, and the Gerhard's *Nachlass* counts in total twelve Jesuit courses-notes taken by students. These manuscripts form a

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<sup>1</sup> This manuscript collection has been described in the online database HANS, edited by the Forschungsbibliothek of Gotha: <<http://hans.uni-erfurt.de/>>, which includes manuscripts', autographs', and manuscript libraries' descriptions, as well as by Daniel Gehrt (who is also the editor of HANS, which, in some cases, provides the reader with more information on single manuscripts): see DANIEL GEHRT, *Katalog der Handschriften aus den Nachlässen der Theologen Johann Gerhard (1582–1637) und Johann Ernst Gerhard (1621–1668), Aus den Sammlungen der Herzog von Sachsen-Coburg und Gotha'schen Stiftung für Kunst und Wissenschaft*, Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2016 (Die Handschriften der Forschungsbibliothek Gotha, 3). Besides, the seventeenth-century catalogue prepared by the erudite Cyprian (Cyprianus) still offers a precious instrument for the researchers: ERNST SALOMON CYPRIAN. *Catalogum codicum manuscriptorum bibliothecae Gothanae*, apud Io. Frider. Gleditsch et filium, Lipsiae 1714.

<sup>2</sup> For Gerhard's biography, see ERDMANN RUDOLPH FISCHER. *Vita Iohannis Gerhardi...*, apud Ioh. Christophorum Coernerum, Lipsiae 1723; now transl. into English: Id., *The life of John Gerhard*, transl. RICHARD J. DINDA, ELMER HOHLE, TX Repristination Press, Malone 2001.

<sup>3</sup> This adage is a famous quote by Sun Tzu, *The art of War*. This sixth century-classical text of military strategy has been translated in all the languages and many times published; for an English translation see Sun Tzu, *The art of war*, transl. SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example: PATRIZIO FORESTA, « Die Ekklesiologische Auseinandersetzung zwischen Roberto Bellarmin und Johann Gerhard anhand der Loci de Ecclesia und *De conciliis* », in MARKUS FRIEDRICH, SASCHA SALATOWSKY, LUISE SCHORN-SCHÜTTE (eds.), *Konfession, Politik und Gelehrsamkeit. Der Jenaer Theologe Johann Gerhard (1582–1637) im Kontext seiner Zeit*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2017, p. 133–145. On the opposition between Gerhard and Bellarmin, see also MARTIN HONECKER, « Die Kirchengliedschaft bei Johann Gerhard und Robert Bellarmin », *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 62 (1965), p. 21–45; Id., *Cura religionis magistratus christiani. Studien zu Kirchenrecht im Lutherthurm des 17. Jahrhunderts insbesondere bei Johann Gerhard*, Verlag Claudius, München 1967 (Jus ecclesiasticum, 7). For the standard view of the Jesuits as champions of Catholicism against the Reformers, see for instance GERARD SMITH, *Freedom in Molina*, Loyola University Press, Chicago 1966, p. 219; JOHN W. O' MALLEY, *The First Jesuits*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1993), p. 243–283.

family within the Gerhard collection: they all focus on theology and are, mostly, courses-notes of different parts of the *Summa theologiae* by Thomas Aquinas.<sup>5</sup>

In this article, I will focus, more particularly, on three of them – Gotha, Chart. A 28, Chart. B 2 and Chart. B 6 –, whose provenance is said to be Paris.<sup>6</sup> Just like the other Jesuit manuscript courses-notes preserved in Gotha, these three manuscripts are almost unknown to scholars and to specialized literature.<sup>7</sup> They preserve courses dictated in Paris; they thus provide information on the Jesuit teaching at the Parisian College in its first phase of activity, which is still not very well-known to scholars, as well as on their transmission in and outside France. To study them, I will put them in relation to other Jesuit manuscripts held in Gotha, thereby shedding light on the following points: (1) the circulation of academic manuscripts in a relatively wide geographical area, which goes from Paris to Mainz; (2) the texts that they transmit and vehiculate, which provide additional information on the Jesuit teaching in the sixteenth century and, eventually, (3) on their ‘usage’. For instance, Gotha Chart. B 2 offers an interesting case-study. With a focus on predestination, this notebook preserves the notes taken by the student Christoph Weber as well as his own dissertation, defended (and published) in Mainz at the end of his *cursus* of theology.

### I. From Paris to Gotha...

The recent catalogue of the Gerhard manuscripts library, prepared by Daniel Gerht (2016), claims that three manuscripts formerly belonged to the German Protestant

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<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, the Gotha manuscripts are not reviewed in the classical reference work by ANTON MICHELITSCH, *Kommentatoren zur Summa theologiae des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, Styria, Wien–Graz 1924 (repr. Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim 1981). These manuscripts would indeed deserve more attention by scholars, for they preserve courses-note from different institutions, as we will see – the Jesuit colleges of Pont-à-Mousson, Mainz and Paris.

<sup>6</sup> See *infra*, Section II.2.

<sup>7</sup> For instance, Carlos Sommervogel does not mention them, whereas Paul Oskar Kristeller shortly reviews the manuscript Gotha Chart. B 6. In the *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*, Sommervogel refers to other *reportationes* preserved in Gotha, but not to those just mentioned. He refers, for instance, to the lectures by the Jesuits Jean Bleuses (vol. I, col. 1545) and Juan Leo (vol. IV, col. 1692–1693), which correspond to the manuscripts Gotha Chart. B 5 and Chart. B 12 (Bleuses) and Chart. B 3 (Leo). Cf. CARLOS SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*, 12 vols., Éd. de la Bibliothèque S. J., Heverlee 1960 (Bruxelles–Paris 1890–1932<sup>1</sup>). For Kristeller, see PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER, *Iter Italicum*, vol. III: *Alia Itinera I. Australia to Germany*, Warburg Institute–Brill, London–Leiden 1983, p. 394. Kristeller shortly describes the content of the Gothan manuscripts Chart. B 4–11, but he did not see them in person; he arbitrarily excludes from his review the manuscripts Chart. B 2, Chart. B 3 and Chart. B 12, which have a very similar content (lectures on the *Summa theologiae*, theological texts). The criteria for their exclusion are thus difficult to understand: perhaps they depend on the fact that he based himself on the seventeenth-century catalogue by Cyprianus.

theologians preserve texts coming from Paris.<sup>8</sup> This information is, as we will see, wrong: only Chart. A 28 and Chart. B 6 preserve texts of Parisian provenance.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, the three manuscripts together add indeed a piece of information to the history of the Parisian Jesuit College. Up to the present day, the Parisian Jesuit College's teaching and methods are still largely unknown. Which texts were taught there,<sup>10</sup> and mostly, how, are questions that still need to be answered. Despite excellent historical works, like Dupont-Ferrier's referential study,<sup>11</sup> or the most recent literature,<sup>12</sup> little is known about its protagonists and the lectures they taught there. One of the reasons is that most part of the courses taught by the Jesuits in Paris are still unpublished.<sup>13</sup> Differently from the Roman College, wherein the courses taught by Francisco de Toledo were selected for their clarity as scholastic handbooks, soon becoming authentic best-seller works all over the world until mid-seventeenth century, not only the Parisian, but also the French Jesuits in general did not publish any of their philosophical or theological

<sup>8</sup> Cf. GEHRT, *Katalog*, p. 13-15 (Chart. A 28), p. 240 (Chart. B 2), p. 242 (Chart. B 6).

<sup>9</sup> By 'provenance', I mean the place where these courses-notes have been dictated. On the academic practice of the dictate, see ANN BLAIR, « Note-Taking as an Art of Transmission », *Critical Inquiry*, 31 (2004), p. 85-107, and EAD., « The Rise of Note-Taking in Early Modern Europe », *Intellectual History Review*, 20/3 (2010), p. 303-316. On the same topic, see EMIDIO CAMPI, SIMONE DE ANGELIS, ANJA-SILVIA GOEING, ANTHONY T. GRAFTON (eds.), *Scholarly knowledge. Textbooks in Early Modern Europe*, Droz, Genève 2008 (Travaux d'humanisme et Renaissance, 447).

<sup>10</sup> Beside the texts of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, namely the references and the textual base for teaching in philosophy and theology, respectively, there is still up to the present day no information or actual study concerning the Jesuit teaching at the Parisian College. The bibliography on the lectures held by Jesuit professors are, usually, extrapolated from the internal regulations which accompany the development of the institutions founded by the Society before the publication of the *Ratio studiorum* (1599). It is mostly to the previous forms of internal regulations that rely on these studies: CHARLES H. LOHR, « Jesuit Aristotelianism and sixteenth century metaphysics », in HARRY GEORGE FLETCHER III, MARY BEATRICE SCHULTE (eds.), *Paradosis: Studies in memory of Edwin A. Quain*, Fordham University Press, New York 1976, p. 203-220; JACOB SCHMUTZ, « Les normes théologiques de l'enseignement philosophique dans le catholicisme romain moderne (1500-1650) », in PHILIPPE CAPELLEJ-DUMONT (ed.), *Anthologie des relations entre la philosophie et la théologie*, vol. III: JEAN-CHRISTOPHE BARDOUT (ed.), *Philosophie et théologie à l'époque moderne*, Cerf, Paris 2010 (Philosophie et théologie), p. 129-150; CRISTIANO CASALINI, « The Jesuits », in HENRIK LAGERLUND, BENJAMIN HILL (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Sixteenth-Century Philosophy*, Routledge, New York-London 2017 (Routledge philosophy companions), p. 159-188.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. GUSTAVE DUPONT-FERRIER, *Du Collège de Clermont au Lycée Louis-le-Grand*, 3 vols., Bocard, Paris 1921-1925.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. PIERRE DELATTRE, *Les établissements des jésuites en France depuis plus de quatre siècles*, vol. III: *Macheville-Pinel*, Enghien-Wetteren: Institut Supérieur de Théologie-Imprimerie De Meesster Frères, 1945, col. 1106-1135; LAURENCE BROCKLISS, *French Higher Education in the 17th and 18th Centuries: a Cultural History*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987; MARIE-MADELEINE COMPÈRE, *Les collèges français. XVIe-XVIIe siècles*: Paris, CNRS, Paris 2002, p. 359-422.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. DUPONT-FERRIER, *Du Collège de Clermont*, p. 176-177, *passim*.

courses.<sup>14</sup> This is probably due to two main reasons: the difficulties they encountered to install themselves in France, and the sixteenth century religious wars.<sup>15</sup> Targeted by the Gallican party but protected by the nobles and soon part of the religious élite in France, the Parisian Jesuits authentically struggled to conquer their right to teach in Paris. The stages of their many-times-interrupted teaching have been well described by historians; but, besides the two mentioned reasons, there are two additional factors that are worth considering for understanding the almost total absence of a publishing policy by the Parisian Jesuits. First, time: not every professor enjoyed the conditions to prepare his courses for publication. The *Monumenta paedagogica* registers for instance the complaint of Jacobus Borrassa, a Jesuit professor teaching in Paris, about the heavy charge of teaching he had to accomplish in one academic year.<sup>16</sup> Of course, this document does not apply to every case, but it offers an example of the practical difficulties of a Parisian Jesuit professor in the sixteenth century. The second factor is intention: not every academic had the intention of publishing his own course. The case of Juan Maldonado, one of the first Jesuit teachers in Paris, and a brilliant philosopher and erudite humanist, is exemplar: he did not publish anything during his life. His works were published posthumously by other Jesuits and not directly edited by him. Nevertheless, his lectures and works had a great dissemination all over Europe. Such dissemination still deserves to be studied and understood: almost every big library in Europe hosts at least a copy of one of his lectures.<sup>17</sup> Gotha makes no exceptions: the manuscript Chart. B 6 preserves two of

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<sup>14</sup> This point has been highlighted by JACOB SCHMUTZ in ID., « L'invention jésuite du sentiment d'existence ou, comment la philosophie sort des collèges », *Dix-septième siècle*, 4 (2007), p. 615–631.

<sup>15</sup> For the French Jesuits' history, see the very instructive text by PAUL SCHMITT, *La Réforme Catholique. Le combat de Maldonat (1534–1583)*, Beauschesne, Paris 1985 (Théologie historique, 74).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. LADISLAUS LUKÁCS (ed.), *Monumenta Paedagogica Societatis Iesu*, vol. III, n. 264, Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, Roma 1974 (henceforth, MP III), p. 441–442. The text by Jacobus Borrassa, also known as 'Valentinus' (1538–1581), is a letter addressed to the General Francisco de Borja, one of the founders of the Society, and based in Rome, which dates 1568: the Parisian College was opened since four years. Borrassa thereinto states that teaching philosophy in Paris was for him « an infinite task » (« es trabajo infinito leer aquí filosofía », p. 442). He alone had taught, in two years, much more than the professors did in Rome in three years. Moreover, he had to teach a wide range of different subjects: logics, ethics, natural philosophy; he also read the *De meteoris*, *De partibus animalium*, *De generatione animalium*, and taught mathematics, geometry, astronomy and metaphysics (cf. p. 441). The cause for this heavy charge of work was, according to Borrassa, that in Paris the teachers had to lecture twice more than those in Rome; he does not specify why, but we can hypothesize, according to the evidences which accompany the first years of the College's opening, that the real cause was the great affluence of students at the Collège de Clermont on the one hand and, on the other, its practical organization: the College was opened since four years only and had already encountered many obstacles on its way.

<sup>17</sup> Sommervogel does not list of course all the manuscript *reportationes* by Maldonado's courses, nor does it exist a complete catalogue of them. As Maldonado taught philosophy and theology in Paris

his courses. But, before entering the details concerning the texts, let us start by following their dissemination, namely how they arrived in Gotha.

I.1. ... via Pont-à-Mousson: the 'iter' of a student

As we already said, one specificity of the manuscripts Gotha Chart. A 28 and Chart. B 6 is that they preserve theology courses-notes either dictated at the Jesuit College of Paris between 1569 and 1570 or, as it is the case of Chart. B 2, by a professor who taught in Paris, like Jean Chastelier.<sup>18</sup> The three manuscripts belong to the Gerhard's *Nachlass*, and in particular to the same 'family' composed of twelve Jesuit manuscripts (Chart. A 28, Chart. B 2–12). We call them a family, because of their similar content (theological courses-notes by Jesuits teaching in Mainz and in Pont-à-Mousson), and because they most probably had the same possessor. With the exception of the Gotha manuscripts B 8–11, which bear the ex-libris and other possession marks of Heinrich Biebers, student at the Jesuit College of Mainz, the others share material (format, initials/emblems on the hard-cover, paper, watermarks, paleographical aspects/hands of the copyists) and content aspects (dates, places, personal notes), which all point out to the same possessor: Christoph Weber (Seligenstadt, 1560–Köln, 1633). In our case, the 'family' – in the person of Christoph Weber – provides the answer to the question concerning how these texts arrived in Germany – first in Mainz and, lately, in Goth.<sup>19</sup> Weber's career was oriented toward priesthood, and his uncle Stephan, bishop of Mainz, was entrusted with his care since his young age. Thus, Weber started studying philosophy in

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between 1564 and at the beginning of the 1570s only, this dissemination records the success of his Parisian courses.

<sup>18</sup> This is most probably the reason why Daniel Gehrt indicated Paris as the provenance of Gotha, Chart. B 2: most of the (poor) biographical records about Chastelier (Poitiers, 1554?–La Flèche, 1630) refer that, in the beginning of his academic career, he taught philosophy and theology in Paris. Nevertheless, the indications of date and place which usually accompany every item of these manuscript notebooks, describe another geographical *iter*: Chastelier started to dictate his course on the *Pars Prima* in Pont-à-Mousson in 1584; because of the plague, his lecture was interrupted in June 1585. Professors and students thus moved to Verdun and the courses started off again in November 1585. In December, Chastelier ended up his lecture on the q. 23 of the *Summa theologiae*. This calendar is confirmed by secondary literature: cf. GASTON GAVET, *Diarium Universitatis Mussipontanae (1572–1764)*, Berger–Levrault: Paris–Nancy 1911, p. 62, and NICOLAS ABRAM, *L'Université de Pont-à-Mousson. Histoire extraite des manuscrits*, L'écureux, Paris 1870, p. 440. On the first years of teaching of Chastelier, and the difficulty to clearly trace back his academic appointments, see ANTONELLA ROMANO, *La Contre-Réforme mathématique. Constitution et diffusion d'une culture mathématique jésuite à la Renaissance*, École française de Rome, Rome 1999 (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 306), p. 329–330, p. 338–342.

<sup>19</sup> In his catalogue, Gehrt attributes with certainty to Weber the shelf marks B 2 and B 4–7 only; he nevertheless recognizes that also Chart. A 28, Chart B 3 and B 12 have been copied by the same hand, which prevails in the notebooks held by Weber. Cf. GEHRT, *Katalog*, p. 245. In the wake of material and content aspects, I hold that Weber was the possessor of these three manuscripts as well.

Mainz, at the *Jesuitengymnasium*.<sup>20</sup> The manuscript notebook Chart. B 3, which Weber owned, conserves nonetheless the note of a student, who dates his arrival at the Jesuit College of Pont-à-Mousson, in Lorraine, in 1582.<sup>21</sup> The same hand, different from those who copied other items of Chart. B 3, happens to be the one, which copied almost entirely the manuscript notebook Chart. B 2, and abundantly annotated the other notebooks owned by Christoph Weber. Other sources testify to the fact that Weber spent five years at the Jesuit College of Pont-à-Mousson to study theology;<sup>22</sup> this, together with the evidences of his usage of the manuscripts, convinced us that the student who arrived in Lorraine (« in Lotharingiam perveni ») on 9 October 1582 is Weber himself.

Knowing the identity of the first – or of one of the firsts –<sup>23</sup> possessors of these manuscripts helps us indeed in tracing their history. In this case, it is the history of the whole family of manuscripts which can be traced and clarified: the presence of Weber at the College of Pont-à-Mousson explains why, beside courses-notes taken in Mainz, there are also courses-notes dictated in Pont-à-Mousson – and in

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<sup>20</sup> On the University of Mainz, see LEO JUST, *Die alte Universität Mainz von 1477 bis 1798. Ein Überblick mit einem Anhang: Quellen zur Geschichte der Universität in der Zeit nach der Restauration von 1784*, F. Steiner, Wiesbaden 1957 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Universität Mainz, 4), and FRITZ KRAFFT, « Jesuiten als Lehrer an Gymnasium und Universität Mainz », in HERMANN WEBER (ed.), *Tradition und Gegenwart. Studien und Quellen zur Geschichte der Universität Mainz*, F. Steiner, Wiesbaden 1977 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Universität Mainz, 11), p. 259–350.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Gotha Chart. B 3, fol. 440v: « Anno 1582 nono octobris ipso festo die SS. Dionisii et sociorum Martyrum Mussipontum in Lotharingiam perveni, et a Festo D. Luca 18 die octobris juridicas lectiones frequentavi, usque ad festivitatem sancti Marci eiusdem anni, diem nimirum 25 aprilis, a quo lectiones theologicas prosecutus sum. Ita tamen ut omnem theologicis, juris studium coniungerem usque ad finem anni 83 ».

<sup>22</sup> Cf., for instance, *Archiv der Historisches Vereins von Unterfranken und Aschaffenburg*, vol. IV, Historischer Verein von Unterfranken und Aschaffenburg, Würzburg 1838, p. 209; FRIEDHELM JÜRGENMEIER, « Der Mainzer Weihbischof Christoph Weber (1615/1616–1633). Informativprozeß und Lebensskizze », in WINFRIED AYMANS, ANNA EGLER, JOSEPH LISTL (eds.), *Fides et ius. Festschrift für Georg May zum 65. Geburtstag*, Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg 1991, p. 351–361; ERWIN GATZ (ed.), *Die Bischöfe der Heiligen Römischen Reiches: ein biographisches Lexicon*, vol. II: 1448 bis 1648, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1996, p. 738–739. This fact that many German students came to study at the University of Pont-à-Mousson, which the Jesuits had been entrusted with, was due to the prestige it apparently enjoyed as well as to the constant exchange facilitated by the geographical proximity of Lorraine and Germany: this point is highlighted by all the pieces of bibliography relative to the history of this University that we quote in the following notes.

<sup>23</sup> Gotha Chart. A 28 differs from Chart. B 2 and Chart. B 6, which present almost identical material characteristics: Chart. A 28 has bigger dimensions (28 x 19 cm instead of the 20,5 x 15,5 cm of the other notebooks Chart. B 2 and Chart. B 6, which are externally identical), and is made of three items, which differs in format and hand of the copyist. They might have been bound together by Weber – who might have bought separately the second and the third items (the first item has been copied most probably by his hand) – or lately, by Johann Gerhard, whose blazon (a heart with Jesus's initials) is well visible on the fore-edge of the volume, which has also been painted in red. Unfortunately, as the binding of the notebook Chart. A 28 is modern, and very tight, it is impossible to count the booklets to study its codicological features.

Paris. From Weber's biography, we find out that he never went to Paris; nor did he attend Maldonado's or Mariana's courses. Pont-à-Mousson was, at his arrival, a ten-years old university ruled by the Jesuits on the behalf of the Bishop of Lorraine<sup>24</sup>. According to his plans, Pont's geographical position – at the border with Germany, but distant enough from Metz, wherein the Protestant party had gained the city – and the Jesuits' strong organizational skills had to make of it a real bastion of Catholicism.<sup>25</sup> The Parisian lectures copied (or bought, when they happen to have been copied by other copyists for instance) by Weber had been dictated almost a decade before his arrival in Pont-à-Mousson. Thus, what can we retain from the indication of place, 'Paris', which accompanies the indications of date in the Gotha manuscripts Chart. A 28 and B 6?

The most probable case is that these manuscripts were copied in Pont-à-Mousson: part of them (the first item of Chart. A 28, B 2, and B 6) by the same Weber, the rest by unknown copyists. Weber might have copied himself some of the Parisian courses and bought others, preserved in individual booklets, in Pont-à-Mousson, to collect notes of courses which interested him particularly, as we will see in a more detailed way. Concerning the circulation of these Parisian courses, another observation that can be made: Juan Maldonado, namely one of the Parisian professors whose courses have been copied in Weber's notebooks, enjoyed high prestige at the Jesuit College of Pont-à-Mousson. Thus, it is not surprising that his courses circulated or were copied even long time after their deliverance in Paris. The Spanish Jesuit was called at the Lorraine University six years after its foundation to establish its internal regulations.<sup>26</sup> Until then, the Jesuit College observed the regulations of the German (and close) University of Dillingen, wherein the Dean had studied.<sup>27</sup> Maldonado spent six months only in Pont-à-

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<sup>24</sup> On the foundation of the University of Pont-à-Mousson, and its custody to the Jesuits, cf. ABRAM, *L'Université de Pont-à-Mousson*, p. 1–38. On the Jesuits, as 'link' between Germany and France, see LOUIS CHATELLIER, « Un lien entre la Lorraine et le Saint-Empire: la Compagnie de Jésus », in JEAN-PAUL BLED, EUGÈNE FAUCHER, RÉNÉ TAVENEUX (eds.), *Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine*, Presses universitaires, Nancy 1988, p. 81–90, and JOSEPH M. O'KEEFE, « The Pedagogy of Persuasion: the Culture of the University of Pont-à-Mousson », *Paedagogica historica*, 34/2 (1998), p. 421–442. I am grateful to the blind reviewer who suggested me this and other bibliographical records on the history of the universities in France, and in Germany.

<sup>25</sup> The Society was founded, from the beginning, to defend the Catholic values, and the Roman Church in general; this is one of the aspects that the independent Gallican party in France always reproached to the Jesuits. See DELATTRE, *Les établissements des jésuites en France*, vol. III, col. 1106–1135.

<sup>26</sup> On the role of Maldonado as visitor in Pont-à-Mousson, see ANN LYNN MARTIN, « The Jesuit Mission to France », in THOMAS M. MCCOOG, *The Mercurian Project. Forming Jesuit Culture. 1573–1580*, Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu–The Institute of Jesuit Sources, Rome–St. Louis 2004 (*Bibliotheca Instituti historici Societatis Iesu*, 55), p. 265–266.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. CHARLES HYVER, *Maldonat et les commencements de l'Université de Pont-à-Mousson*, Collin, Nancy 1873, p. 30–31. On the University of Dillingen, it is possible to refer to the recent study by ULRICH G. LEINSLER, *Dilinganae Disputationes. Der Lehrinhalt der gedruckten Dissertationen an der Philosophischen*

Mousson, as a ‘visitor’<sup>28</sup>, and an excellency in matter of authority.<sup>29</sup> Doubtlessly, Hyver exaggerates when he defines Maldonado as « le premier Père de l’Université de Pont-à-Mousson » (« the first Jesuit of the University of Pont-à-Mousson »).<sup>30</sup> The Spanish Jesuit failed in imposing his view on the rules of the College,<sup>31</sup> which were finally written down by another Jesuit. But he left indeed a trace there: the first edition of his commentary on the Gospels was prepared and published in Pont-à-Mousson, some years after his death.<sup>32</sup> His prestige as a professor in Paris is, most probably, the reason why Weber copied his courses. The same explanation applies to the case of Juan de Mariana (Talavera de la Reina, 1536–Toledo, 1623). Just like Maldonado, Mariana was one of the first professors who inaugurated the Jesuit Parisian College, where he taught theology from 1569 to 1574. We might hypothesize that, at the time Weber copied these courses, Mariana enjoyed, just like Maldonado, of a certain fame and prestige.

## II. Weber’s notebooks: three case-studies

We owe our knowledge of Christoph Weber to the fact that, once he completed his studies in theology, he became auxiliary Bishop of Mainz. There are thus some records of his activities as *Weihbischof* (auxiliary bishop); furthermore, his dissertation in theology has been published (Mainz, 1588). To study the three ‘Parisian’ codices preserved in Gotha, his figure is central, as he was the person gathering these courses-notes. His intention of collecting material for writing down his own dissertation is clear. But, before heading to this conclusion, let us shortly present each manuscript, its content, and some new outputs as well.

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*Fakultät der Universität Dillingen 1555–1648*, Schnell & Steiner, Regensburg 2006 (Jesuitica: Quellen und Studien zu Geschichte, Kunst und Literatur der Gesellschaft Jesu im deutschsprachigen Raum, 11).

<sup>28</sup> As an inspector of the quality of teaching, according to the Society of Jesus’s regulation. Cf. LYNN MARTIN, « The Jesuit Mission to France », p. 278–281.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. PRAT, *Maldonat*, p. 450.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. HYVER, *Maldonat*, p. 47.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 44–45; PRAT, *Maldonat*, p. 452–455; SCHMITT, *La Réforme Catholique*, p. 480–481.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Joannis Maldonati ... Commentarii in quatuor evangelistas ...*, ex typographia S. Mercatoris, Mussiponti 1596 (1597<sup>2</sup>). The publication of Maldonado’s commentary was the result of the teamwork by a group of Jesuits teaching in Pont-à-Mousson: Fronton du Duc and Toussaint Roussel prepared the manuscript by Maldonado for publication, whereas Clement Dupuys and Leonard Perrin wrote down the preface for the reader and the dedication to the Duke of Lorraine Charles III. Cf. HYVER, *Maldonat*, p. 62.

II.1 *Gotha, Chart. A 28: a new evidence of Juan Mariana's 'De sacrae scripturae intelligentia'*

The manuscript *Gotha, Chart. A 28*, has bigger format than the other notebooks by Weber (see *infra*, Appendix). It preserves three items. The first and the second have been copied by Weber, whereas the third, which has a different layout, has been probably assembled to them – perhaps, by the same Weber. The first item is the course «for the understanding of Holy Scriptures» (*De sacrae scripturae intelligentia*), dictated by Juan de Mariana in Paris in 1570. In the first page of the text, Weber copies the correct place and date of the course deliverance (Paris, 13 February 1570). This manuscript evidence is up to the present-day unknown to scholars, whereas three other copies of the same course (two in St. Gallen, Switzerland, and one in Albi, France) have been included by Reinhardt in his catalogue of the Spanish Commentators of the Bible.<sup>33</sup> Mariana never lectured in Pont-à-Mousson. Differently than Maldonado, after a brief period in Paris (1569–1574), he went back to Spain. We can thus hold that, in the wake of Mariana's popularity, his course-notes circulated outside Paris, namely in Pont-à-Mousson. Moreover, personalities such as the Jesuit Louis Richeome, a former student of Maldonado in Paris,<sup>34</sup> settled down there, perhaps helping such manuscript course-notes circulation.

The second item has been copied in Pont-à-Mousson, in 1583. It is part of the lecture on the *Pars Prima Secundae* of the *Summa theologiae* by an unknown theology professor, perhaps Clement Dupuys, who lectured on Thomas Aquinas in Pont-à-Mousson during Weber's stay. Parts of Dupuys's lectures on the *Summa* actually belong to Weber's notes' collection.

The third item has a different layout than the first two; it is the *reportatio* of a logic course whose author I could not identify. No mentions of date or place, or notes, are recorded. The hand of the copyist is different from those present in all the notebooks owned by Christoph Weber, which entered the Gerhard's collection. This text is most probably the reason why on the spine of the notebook someone noted «Annotationes de Aristotelis predicamentis». This latter is the only philosophical text present in Weber's collection of notes preserved in *Gotha*.

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. KLAUS REINHARDT, *Bibelkommentare Spanischer Autoren (1500-1700)*, vol. II, CSIC, Madrid 1999 (*Medievalia et humanistica*, 5), p. 38–39.

<sup>34</sup> In the preface of his treatise on the immortality of the soul, Richeome evokes his attendance of Maldonado's course, the first taught at Clermont; see LOUIS RICHOEME, *L'immortalité de l'ame declaree avec raisons naturelles, tesmoignages humains et divins pour la Foy Catholique contre les Athees et Libertins...*, Sébastien Cramoisy, Paris 1621, p. 5–6.

II.2. Gotha, Chart. B 2: focus on predestination

The notebook Chart. B 2 shares the same material features of the other notebooks owned by Weber (size, quality of the paper, watermarks, copyists). His initials, together with the date 1588, are engraved on the hard cover. The year probably corresponds to the moment in which Weber let bind the booklets together with the printed folios of his dissertation in theology, which is the seventh item of this notebook: Weber defended it – and published – in Mainz in 1588.

The whole notebook is representative of Weber's theological apprenticeship. It collects councils and heresiological literature (items 1–5) as well as three texts focusing on predestination: Jean Chastelier's lecture on Thomas Aquinas' *Pars Prima* (q. 1–23), which occupies most part of the notebook,<sup>35</sup> Weber's own final dissertation and a short text, undated, on the cause of predestination (« An possit dari causa praedestinationis »). This text stems from the lectures held in Mainz by another Jesuit, the Spanish Juan Leo.<sup>36</sup> The item, whose provenance has been erroneously said to be Paris, is the sixth and corresponds to the course-notes of the French Jesuit Chastelier. Although this course has been dictated by the Jesuit in Pont-à-Mousson and Verdun between 1584 and 1585,<sup>37</sup> it is nonetheless linked to the history of the Parisian College: a few years later, Chastelier taught philosophy there and lectured again on the first questions of the *Pars Prima*.<sup>38</sup> A manuscript evidence of this Parisian lecture (dated 1589) is still preserved in Paris, at the Bibliothèque sainte-Geneviève.<sup>39</sup> After a short verification, I was able to observe that the Parisian manuscript preserves the same text previously dictated by Chastelier in Pont-à-Mousson.<sup>40</sup> It is thus possible to conclude that the French

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<sup>35</sup> Fol. 97r–382v.

<sup>36</sup> On Leo, see SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque*, vol. IV, col. 1692–1693.

<sup>37</sup> See *supra*, fn. 18.

<sup>38</sup> I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting me to highlight that, if the French Chastelier lectures on the *Summa*, Maldonado (cf. *infra*, Section II.3), who preceded him in Paris on the chairs of philosophy and theology, still lectured on the book of the *Sentences*: this fact records the sixteenth-century passage, in the study of theology, from the practice of commenting on the medieval *Sentences* to that of lecturing directly on the *Summa* by Thomas Aquinas. This phenomenon has recently made the object of the works by LIDIA LANZA, MARCO TOSTE, « The *Sentences* in Sixteenth-Century Iberian Scholasticism », in PHILIPP ROSEMANN (ed.) *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. III, Brill, Leiden 2015, p. 416–503, and by JACOB SCHMUTZ, « From Philosophy to Theology: the Changing Status of the *Summa theologiae*. 1500–2000 », in JEFFREY HAUSE (ed.), *Aquinas's 'Summa theologiae': A Critical Guide*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2018 (Cambridge Critical Guides), p. 221–241.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Paris, Bibliothèque sainte-Geneviève 266, fol. 1r–262v. This manuscript has been shortly reviewed in MARCEL THOMAS (ed.), *Catalogue général des manuscrits latins*, vol. V: 3278–3535, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris 1966, p. 404, 418. The possessor of this manuscript was the French student Jean Seguyer.

<sup>40</sup> I compared the beginning of the lecture by Chastelier, and, more accurately, the *quaestio* 23 on predestination. There are but a few and not significant differences between the two *reportationes*.

Jesuit used his courses-text twice: first in Pont-à-Mousson and then, probably without introducing substantial changes,<sup>41</sup> in Paris.

The reason why Weber gathered many texts, which focus on predestination, is clear: the problem of human salvation is the topic of his final dissertation. In his work, he contends with the conciliation of human free will of choice and divine grace.<sup>42</sup> Most probably, this is the reason why he collected those texts and tried to interrogate them in order to provide an answer to the question concerning the cause(s) of salvation: whether it depends on the cooperation between the Creator and the creature and, mostly, how it is possible. As it is well-known, such issues had a peculiar weight in Weber's day: it is, by simplifying (or, by simply following Weber's own work), the theological watershed between Protestant and Catholic theologies. Catholic theologians made a strong point in highlighting their own defence of human free will of choice by portraying Calvinist and Lutheran doctrines as ascribing human salvation exclusively to human grace and predestination; in such a view, all room for human freedom was eliminated. The Council of Trent being the proximate background, these issues were far from belonging to the past: the last, big sixteenth century-controversy, which stemmed from the publication of the *Concordia liberi arbitri cum gratiae dono* (1588) by the Jesuit Luis de Molina, still had to explode. But whereas Molina's text would mainly generate a war between Catholics – Dominicans against Jesuits, but also Jesuits against Jesuits –, when Weber was studying the complex matter of predestination, such themes were still evoking, uniquely, the battle opposing Catholic and Protestant theologians.

This opposition is very clearly represented in the lectures by Chastelier, which are an important piece in Weber's courses-notes. The lecture by the French Jesuit on the first part of the *Summa* is in fact not very equilibrated, as it draws more attention to some topics than to others: it is the case of the *quaestio* 23, which focuses on divine predestination and foreknowledge and which occupies a consistent part of its lectures. Weber has abundantly annotated Chastelier's text, which has thus a double value: on the one hand, it offers a polemic and detailed study on the Protestants' main theses, and a historical evidence of how the Jesuits fought the Protestant party within their classes as well. For instance, it is noteworthy that, among the Protestants, Chastelier mentions not only Luther and Calvin, but also other protagonists of the fight, which carried on in his own day. It

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Be this as it may, I have not checked the whole text by Chastelier, but only that of the q. 23, which focuses on predestination.

<sup>41</sup> See *supra*, fn. 40.

<sup>42</sup> The extensive title of his dissertation is: *De cohaerentia liberi arbitrii et contingentiae rerum, cum scientia et praedestinatione divina*, ex Officina Gasparis Behem, Moguntiae 1588.

is the case of his contemporary, the French religious Claude des Sainctes.<sup>43</sup> Chastelier's is what we might call a 'war' commentary, as it evokes the religious fight dividing France. Another feature of Chastelier's lectures is that, since Weber bound them together with his own theological dissertation, it is immediately possible to verify its reception and most direct influence, on a sixteenth century student. In the last section of this work, we will examine how Weber reemploys in his text what he had learned by the Jesuits in his text; before, we will briefly expose some features of Chastelier's commentary.

As we already said, Aquinas's *quaestio* 23, which deals with predestination, is discussed at length by Chastelier and occupies great part of his course. By following Aquinas's text, the Jesuit expounds – and rejects – Luther's and Calvin's positions. The main and most discussed is the Protestant view that entirely ascribes mankind's salvation to God's will, thereby eliminating any room for human freedom.<sup>44</sup> The Jesuit traces a vast history of this theological position by drawing upon many and different sources, going from the medieval heresy of Gottschalk of Orbais to his contemporary, the polemist Claude de Sainctes. Chastelier describes the repetition of this old error, which originated from a specific reading of Augustine, in different times, and that was newly arising in his day through the dissemination of Protestantism.<sup>45</sup> In his reading of Aquinas,

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<sup>43</sup> Cf. Chart. B 2, fol. 341v. Chastelier refers to de Sainctes's *Examen doctrinae calvinianae et bezanae de Coena Domini, ex scriptis auctorum ejusdem collectum, per F. Claudium de Sainctes* (apud C. Frémy, Parisiis 1567) as to one of his sources. On de Sainctes, cf. MARCO PENZI, « L'histoire tragique et mémorable de Claude de Sainctes, évêque d'Evreux », *Cahiers du Centre des recherches historiques*, 44, (2009), p. 9–26. De Sainctes was a great admirer of Maldonado, and a collector of his Parisian *dictata*; their good relations ended up abruptly, because of a misunderstanding by de Sainctes: he retained Maldonado responsible for the problematic obtention of his episcopate in Evreux. Cf. SCHMITT, *La Réforme Catholique*, p. 431.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Chart. B 2, fol. 341r: « Tres sunt opinioniones, prima e Lutheranis et Calvinistis, quod absque operum previsionem aiunt, non solum Deum quosdam elegisse et quosdam reprobase, verum etiam, mera sua voluntate et ab aeterno, nulla habita ratione operum, voluisse aliquos homines ad vitam aeternam, alios vero ad damnationem creare, ut in illis misericordiam suam orderet, in his vero iustitiam. Id enim aperte docet Calvinus, in libro suo de aeterna Dei predestinatione, et libro tertio Institutionum, cap. 21, sect. 5. Verba Calvini sunt, 'praedestinationem vocamus aeternum Dei decretum, quod apud se constitutum habuit quod de unoquoque fieri vellet. Non enim pari conditione creantur omnes, sed aliis vita aeterna, aliis damnatio aeterna preordinati. Itaque prout in alterum finem quisque conditus est, ita vel ad vitam vel ad mortem praedestinatum dicimus.' »

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Chart. B 2, fol. 341v: « Eundem errorem [Godeschalchi] suscitaverunt postea Wiclif et Iohannes Hus et nostris temporibus Lutherani omnes et Calviniani, qui in eo superiores impietate superarunt, quod quamvis affirmarent illi, Deum alios creasse ad vitam, alios ad mortem; non tantum audebant Deum peccatorum auctorem facere, quod isti non reformidarunt, deteriores etiam sunt Simone mago, qui homine a malo Deo creatum dicebat, summam impietatem esse putans optimo Deo tamquam blasphemiae notam iniurere. Hanc igitur opinionem impiam esse, et rationi Scripturae Concilii ac patribus repugnantem paucis ordemus ». On the history of the reactions to Augustine's doctrine, bibliography is extensive, and it is not our scope to provide a

Chastelier leaves room to creatureal freedom: he claims that both human beings and angels cooperate to their salvation by responding to the divine gifts of grace.<sup>46</sup> Chastelier appeals to the doctrine of the secondary causes,<sup>47</sup> which are, under a certain respect, free from God's direct influence, and ties it to divine foreknowledge of the merits to explain predestination.<sup>48</sup> In a nutshell, Chastelier's strategy is to accord the first cause of predestination to God's will, and the second, to God's foreknowledge of the reactions of angels and human beings to His gifts of grace. Such strategy is cautiously exposed by Chastelier, who does not oppose himself to Aquinas, but seems to draw it from him as well as from other authoritative sources. His reading is complex and rich of digressions, which make sometimes difficult to understand the balance between free will and divine grace,

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complete list of the works dedicate to it; we will only mention but a few of the most recent works, containing extensive bibliographical references. For a general and historical overview, see for instance ALLAN D. FITZGERALD (ed.), *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia*, William Eerdmans Publishing Company, Cambridge 1999, as well as the most recent KARLA POLLMANN, WILLEMIEN OTTEN (eds.), *Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*, 3. vols., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, with many entries on the Renaissance. On the controversy 'de auxiliis', triggered by the publication of the *Concordia liberi arbitrii* by Luis de Molina again, bibliography is extremely rich. We confine ourselves to quote the most recent work by SYLVIO DE FRANCESCHI, for it contains most of the bibliography on the earlier period. Cf. *Thomisme et théologie moderne. L'école de saint Thomas à l'épreuve de la querelle de la grâce (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle)*, Artège-Lethielleux, Paris-Perpignan 2018 (Sed contra). For the impact of Augustine in the seventeenth century, see also the very rich work by GAETANO LETTIERI, *Il metodo della grazia: Pascal e l'ermeneutica giansenista di Agostino*, Edizioni dehoniane, Roma 1999 (Biblioteca di ricerche teologiche).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Chart. B 2, fol. 336v–337r: « Minor videtur difficultas si rationem ipsam consuleremus, quamvis si scripturas et theologorum opiniones attenderemus; haec opinio difficultate non careret, sint autem omnia prius efficaciter esse volita diceremus, quam Deus ea tanquam futura presciveret. Maior multo videret esse difficultas, potissimum si cum omnibus circumstantiis in particulari a Deo essent praedeterminata, cum hac enim voluntatis divinae determinatione, ut prior concipit prescientia futurorum, vix ac ne vix quamdam libertatem po(ss)e consistere, art. 8 q. 19 demonstravimus. Minima autem difficultas esset, si multa diceremus etiam libere. Futura prius a voluntate divina determinata ut essent, non in cunctis omnibus circumstantiis in particulari quam ab eo praecognoscerent. Multa etiam caussis secundis relictas, quae determinate a Deo non sunt volita nisi posita eorum praevisionem, et hanc opinionem caeteris probabiliorem esse iudicamus ».

<sup>47</sup> For Aquinas's doctrine, see the very helpful text by PETR DVORAK, « The Concurrentism of Thomas Aquinas: divine causation and human freedom », *Philosophia*, 41/3 (2013), p. 617–634.

<sup>48</sup> Twenty years before, by confronting the same *quaestio* (and question), the Jesuit Francisco de Toledo had elaborated a very similar strategy, by very explicitly claiming, against Aquinas, that divine foreknowledge of human acts is the secondary cause of predestination: such bold claim encountered severe criticism and censorship at the *Collegio romano*, where Toledo taught, at the point that he had to recant his reading. Despite of the unfortunate result of Toledo, divine foreknowledge provides the successive Jesuit generations with the 'maneuver area' to elaborate a more structured doctrine of human freedom, like in Molina's system. On Toledo, see JUAN CRUZ CRUZ, « Predestination as Transcendent Teleology: Molina and the First Molinism », in MATTHIAS KAUFMANN, ALEXANDER AICHELE (eds.), *A Companion to Luis de Molina*, Brill, Leiden 2014 (Brill's companions to the Christian tradition, 50), p. 89–124, esp. p. 104–105.

as well as to draw clear-cut conclusions. Chastelier's text was dictated to a students' audience and before the 'bomb Molina' exploded: far from being as clear (and punishable) as his forerunner Francisco de Toledo's was, or a systematic treatise, like Molina's *Concordia*, it aimed mostly at presenting students with a specific point: in order to escape the same heresy as Luther's and Calvin's, it was necessary to maintain that human free will of choice has a role in salvation.

### II.3. Gotha, Chart. B 6: an unknown text by Juan Maldonado

If Chart. B 2 collects theological disputations on predestination, the third 'Parisian' manuscript preserved in Gotha, Chart. B 6 gathers important Jesuit names, such as those of Juan Maldonado and Peter Canisius (1521–1597).

The first item preserves a part of Maldonado's lecture on the Third Book of the *Sentences*, a commentary *De poenitentia*. This text, which has been dictated in Paris by the Jesuit after he had taken on the chair of theology, has been published posthumously, and has a complex story:<sup>49</sup> it has long been debated whether the attribution to Maldonado was authentic. Be this as it may, Weber, who probably bought the booklets containing this text, annotated on the right margin of the first page « Paris », as well as the name of Maldonado. The date of the course has been cut off, probably after the acquisition and new binding of the notebook by Johann Gerhard.

The second item preserves a text, which has been copied by Weber's hand. It is the commentary by Maldonado on the *Quattuor novissimis*, a devotional treatise by the Dutch theologian Gerardus of Vliederveen (d. 1402). No other information about this course by Maldonado have come down to us; if the attribution (only based on Weber's notes) is correct, to my knowledge, the Gothan manuscript is the first manuscript evidence of this text.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, there are but a few known Jesuit commentaries on this text from this period (late '80s of the sixteenth century). The *Quattuor novissimi* was usually read within the Marian congregations, a sort of Jesuit 'third order', which involved laymen and reached out great part of the society through devotional practices and social assistance to the poor.<sup>51</sup> This institution was parallel to the Jesuit colleges' scholar activities but collected students from the colleges. It is thus possible that this reading by Maldonado follows from his extra-curricular activity in the Parisian Marian congregation.<sup>52</sup> Another possibility is that the Spanish Jesuit lectured on this devotional text during one of his numerous

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<sup>49</sup> See *infra*, Appendix.

<sup>50</sup> It would be important to raise the question as to the authorship of this text. Unfortunately, this is a problem that goes far beyond the scope of the present research, which is to be deemed only a first and preliminary step toward a more systematic discussion. I am very grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. O' MALLEY, *The first Jesuits*, p. 197.

<sup>52</sup> About which I have no records, though.

apostolical missions – like the one in Metz, in 1571 –<sup>53</sup> or during his stay in Bourges in 1577, where he gave some courses at the local Church.<sup>54</sup> In Pont-à-Mousson, he founded a Marian and a Holy Sacrament congregation.<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, there are no evidences that he ever lectured there.

If the text preserved in Gotha really is by Maldonado, unfortunately we do not have additional information on it; it might have sorted out by the Jesuit's pen almost in any time of his career as a theology professor and a preacher. Indeed, Weber's notebook helps us in circumstantiating the Jesuit practice of lecturing on the *Quattuor novissimi*. In another book preserved in Gotha, Chart. B 5, he notes that the Irish Richard Fleming,<sup>56</sup> Jesuit professor in Paris and then, in Pont-à-Mousson, interrupted his lecture on the *Quattuor novissimi*, which had already been commented on by many, to dedicate more time to his lecture on *The sacraments* (the topic of the third book of the *Sentences* by Peter Lombard). As an example, in the same note Weber refers to his own copy of the *Quattuor novissimi* – Gotha Chart. B 6 –, as contained in the « second volume of the commentaries on the *Sentences* by Maldonado ». <sup>57</sup> There are three things to observe: firstly, Weber does not refer to the *Quattuor novissimi* as to a text by Maldonado; he limits himself in stating that many authors (« multi auctori »<sup>58</sup>) had already commented on the *Quattuor novissimi*. Thus, it was a popular text within the Jesuit colleges, already in 1585–1586 (date of the course by Fleming preserved in Gotha Chart. B 5). Furthermore, Weber alludes to a second tome of Maldonado's commentaries on the *Sentences*, a sign that, most probably, he had a more extensive collection of the Spanish Jesuit's courses-notes, whose parts are today lost.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. LOUIS VIANSSON-PONTÉ, *Les jésuites à Metz*, Association des anciens de Saint-Clément, Strasbourg 1897, p. 10–11: « Pendant un mois, devant le Palais, le Père [Maldonado] fit tous les jours le catéchisme aux dissidents qui eurent ordre d'y assister. Il leur exposa spécialement la doctrine chrétienne touchant le sacrifice de la messe et le purgatoire. Ses instructions produisirent des fruits merveilleux, etc. » For the mission in Metz, see SCHMITT, *La Réforme Catholique*, p. 395–397.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. SCHMITT, *La Réforme Catholique*, p. 470.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. PRAT, *Maldonat*, p. 451; SCHMITT, *La Réforme Catholique*, p. 479.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque*, vol. IX, col. 345. Fleming taught theology in Paris since 1569, and then moved to Pont-à-Mousson, where he became chancellor of the University.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Gotha, Chart. B 5, fol. 390v: « Quod longior et accuratior fuerit Reverendus et Eximius Professor P. Richardus in commentariis sacramenti poenitentiae ob quotidianum magisquam necessarium eius usum, ideo reliqua ob temporis brevitatem tanquam faciliora celerius pertransiit. Ob eandem causam intermisit tractatum Novissimorum, quod passim a(lio modo) multis auctoribus ea de re scribatur: compendiosum tractatum eorundem quare in tomo 2 commentariorum in Magistrum Sententiarum R. P. Maldonati, quem eundem in Cursu Moguntinensi Theologiae invenies ».

<sup>58</sup> See *supra*, fn. 57.

III. A good pupil? What Weber learned from the Jesuits

As we already said, Christoph Weber published in Mainz his theological dissertation (1588).<sup>59</sup> The printed folios of this text have been bound by him to the notebook Chart. B 2. A direct link to the courses he followed – or to those he simply copied, like the Parisian lectures by Mariana for instance – is self-evident: Weber gathered texts on the themes of predestination and grace to prepare his own final dissertation. His work is a synthesis, simpler than the thorough commentary by Chastelier: it counts less than 50 printed folios, and his theological references are indeed less important than in the French Jesuit's course. Just like Chastelier, though, Weber refers to his day and to the historical moment he experienced as a Catholic and a theology student as well: in the dedication to his uncle, the Archbishop of Mainz Stephan Weber, the student refers to the « most painful conditions » (*haec luctuosissima tempora*) in which Catholic faith was, in the wake of the assaults of « the corruptors of the sacred doctrine » (*novatores et corruptores catholicae doctrinae*).<sup>60</sup> His point of view is, thus, very clear and explicit: Weber stands against the Protestant reformers Luther and Calvin and takes on the role of the Catholic party's champion. The theme around which his dissertation is structured is the conciliation of human freedom with divine grace; he focuses on that which he describes as the worse error by the Protestant, who eliminated from their account of salvation any room for creatural freedom.

Weber divides his text into two parts, dealing first with free will of choice, and with divine attributes (*proprietas*) such as foreknowledge, grace and will in the second part. To the Protestants he first reproaches the anarchical component of their doctrine, which, by fully attributing salvation to divine grace, eradicates the intermediate role of the Church.<sup>61</sup> Weber thus proves the necessity of human free will of choice by the Church Fathers' authority and, also, by that of not specified « philosophers ». <sup>62</sup> Weber often refers to Aristotle to conciliate Catholic faith and true philosophy, which is a feature proper to most of the Jesuit literature of his

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<sup>59</sup> That is the reason why this text is today more accessible than the Gothan manuscripts; an online digitalization is for instance consultable on googlebooks.

<sup>60</sup> Weber's work has no pagination; we can thus refer to its paragraphs. Both references come from the first page of the dedication to Stephan Weber.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. WEBER. *Disputatio theologica, pars prima*, §5–7: « Haud quaquam admittimus insulsam seditiosa illam Lutheri et Calvinii sententiam, qua Christianorum conscientias a quibusvis hominum legibus exemptas dicunt. Siquidem hanc sacrae leges non probant, sancti Ecclesiae doctores prorsus rejiciunt et explodunt. Quin potius Apostoli ipsi, ut est in actis, legem humana constituerunt. (...) In Deut.: dicitur, *Qui sacerdoti non obedierit, morte moriatur*. (...) Etenim haec Calviniana libertas, scripturis adversatur quin potius servitus dicenda est, ut quae omnis disciplinae expers, latam illam patefaciat portam, quae ducit ad perditionem, huiusmodi inquam libertate fretus (quod divinis literis contrariari thesi quinta probatum fuit) nulli quisquam se legi subijciet, nihilque boni faciet ».

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, §27–29. See also n. 66, for the reference to Cajetan as 'a philosopher'.

time. In their writings, the sixteenth-century Jesuits often referred to the Bull *De apostolici regiminis* (1513), which inaugurated the century, thereby claiming, as much as they could, the important and indissoluble alliance between true faith and true philosophy.<sup>63</sup> Besides, the reference to Aristotle and to Aristotelian anthropology<sup>64</sup> is not surprising, as Aristotle was, for the Jesuits – but not only – the authority to follow in matter of philosophy.<sup>65</sup> From Aristotle and from the Church Fathers Weber derives, against Luther and Calvin, that « differently from the beasts, man is the master of his own actions ».<sup>66</sup> In the first part of his dissertation, Weber sketches human free will of choice as something, which requires divine intervention to be accomplished: in accordance with the Council of Trent, which he refers to, he claims that a cooperation between creatures and Creator is needed.<sup>67</sup> How this happens (*quomodo*), makes the object of the second part of his dissertation. The terrain to save free will of choice is that of divine foreknowledge (*praescientia*); although God's science of the future is perfect, there is room for contingency and freedom of the creatures.<sup>68</sup> Just like Chastelier, whom

<sup>63</sup> On the importance of the *Apostolici regiminis* (text published in GIOVAN DOMENICO MANSI, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova, et amplissima collectio...*, vol. XXXII, Welter, Paris 1902, col. 842–843) in the sixteenth century, see for instance JOHN MONFASANI, « Aristotelians, Platonists, and the Missing Ockhamists: Philosophical Liberty in Pre-Reformation Italy », *Renaissance Quarterly*, 46/2, (1993), p. 247–276; ANNALISA CAPPIELLO, MARCO LAMANNA, « Il principio dell'unicità del vero dalla bolla *Apostolici regiminis* (1513) alla Rivoluzione scientifica », *Quaestio*, 14 (2014), p. 229–256; DAG NIKOLAUS HASSE, *Success and Repression. Arabic Sciences and Philosophy in the Renaissance*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2016 (I Tatti Studies in Renaissance History), p. 179–247. For its importance by the Jesuits, see CRAIG MARTIN, *Subverting Aristotle, Religion, History and Philosophy in Early modern Science*, John Hopkins University press, Baltimore 2014), p. 88–95.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. almost all the *pars prima* and §10.

<sup>65</sup> See *supra*, fn. 10.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. WEBER, *Disputatio theologica, pars prima*, §37: « teste Aristotele, solus homo qui rationis est compos, sit Dominus suarum actionum, qui et possit et non possit facere ». For a list of the Church Fathers' opinions, see §47–61.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, §35–36: « Sed vero a longe aberrat, contraria huic nostri temporis haeticorum sententia, qui libertatem arbitrii prorsus enervant ac tollunt. Quamvis enim Catholica Ecclesia definiat exordium Iustificationis a dei per Christum praeveniente gratia sumendum esse, et quod nihil eorum, quae iustificationem praecedunt, sive fides sive opera, eam promereantur, attamen recte etiam docet, dispositiones quae iustificationem praecedunt, et bona opera eam sequential, peccata non esse, ut asserunt haeretici. Ad haec non minus vera est Ecclesiae assertio, qua definit liberum arbitrium hominis, ante quam per gratiam sanatum sit, in actionibus piis et salutaribus non esse prorsus inane quoddam instrumentum, mere passive se habens, sed adiuvanti opemque ferenti Deo cooperari ». See also *Ibid.*, §40–41.

<sup>68</sup> Weber takes on Cajetan's reading of Aquinas (§13), and can thus claim that (*pars altera*, §14): « effectus iuxta Philosophorum sententiam non superioribus causis, sed proximis respondent. Si quidem sol et homo, non solem, sed hominem generant. Itaque etiamsi superiores caussae essent necessariae (quod quidam Aristotelem sensisse contendunt), modo inferiores sunt libere, vel contingentes (...) ».

he follows almost literally,<sup>69</sup> Weber claims that the divine will is the only cause of salvation (*predestinatio*); nevertheless, divine predestination follows from God's foreknowledge of how both angels and human beings will react to the gifts of grace through their actions (*opera*).<sup>70</sup> Luther's and Calvin's « most absurd opinion » (*absurdissima opinio*),<sup>71</sup> according to which God punished the creatures since eternity (1) before original sin and (2) before any prevision of their actions, is thus definitely rejected by Weber, who sides with Chastelier's reading.

#### IV. *Some conclusive considerations*

The geographical *iter* of the manuscripts, today preserved in Gotha, testifies alone of the vitality of the course-notes dictated within different academic institutions of the sixteenth century. Like Weber's case shows, the practices of notes-taking and, mostly, of notes-copying by the students, allowed, through local exchanges, the circulation (*via* copies made from other copies) of courses, which had been dictated in different times and places. Such practice should indeed deserve a larger attention by scholars. First, because what it reveals is not the circulation of some esoteric and obscure doctrines but of highly debated academic doctrines, in a day wherein manuscript and printed texts played different roles. It suffices to mention the importance of students' note-taking in more modern times – which appears clear, if one evokes Hegel's or De Saussure's courses, both published from manuscript notes taken by students –, to understand how, in the sixteenth century, the practice of notes-taking was crucial for vehiculating doctrines, nowadays known and studied in most cases only *via* the contact with some – few – printed texts. To remain closer to Weber's times, it is also worth mentioning the

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<sup>69</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, §60: « Licet totius praedestinationis, secundum omnes suos effectus sumptos, neque ex parte hominis neque ex parte angeli causa vel ratio assignari possit, sed sola divina voluntas immensa ». Cf. Gotha, Chart. B 2, fol. 337r: « Ultimam et maxime in tota hac disputatione notandum est, cum agitur de causa praedestinationis, an aliqua in nobis detur. (...) Certa fide tenendum est, neque in angelis neque in hominibus ullam esse suae praedestinationis causam, sed tam angelos quam homines ex mera Dei voluntate et gratia a Deo esse ad haec omnia bona dilectos et predestinatos, quod inductione quadam per omnia illa causarum gratia facta manifestum fieri ».

<sup>70</sup> See previous note but also, *Ibid.*, §60-62: « non tamen ideo absurdum videri debet, causam in utroque, id est homine et angelo, alicuius in particulari effectus dari: quemadmodum nec illud, ut aliquid ipsorum potestate esse dicatur, adiuvante scilicet divina gratia, quod in praevisione divinae infallibiliter coniugantur cum tota praedestinatione, nempe rationalis creatura cooperatio, qua divinae gratiae praeventienti et vocanti in finem, perseverantes cooperantur ratione cuius cooperationis, in quantum illa infallibili lege divinae misericordiae, cum tota praedestinatione est coniuncta; [...] [Deus] nullum ante praevisionem operum a gloria excludere, sed omnibus, sufficientissima media conferre voluit, quorum bono vel malo usu praeviso, praedestinandi vel reprobandi fuissent, aliquos enim tum futuros fuisse reprobos probabile est ».

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, §64.

large dissemination, in the Protestant world, of manuscript courses and notes, extending from other, more private contexts, like the private teaching by Protestant theologians like Johann Gerhard. The case of the Gotha Library provides us with a fortunate case, which would deserve more attention for many and different reasons: (1) the presence of new evidences of early modern Jesuit lectures on the *Summa theologiae*, for example; (2) the information they provide on academic institutions, whose history is not very well known; (3) last but not the least, they allow to map out – and to know better – the tradition of specific doctrines, which extended from the sixteenth century. It is the case of the debate on predestination, which opposed the Protestant and Catholic parties. The Jesuit Society having not yet elaborated a uniform line of defense concerning such delicate matter – if they ever succeeded doing that –, the Gothan manuscripts allow to take a picture of such an attempt in its very making.

## Appendix

### The two 'Parisian' manuscripts: Chart. A 28 and Chart. B 6

#### I. Chart. A 28

*Shelfmark:* Chart. A 28

*Old shelfmark:* Ch. N. 27

*Origin:* South Germany (Bavaria – see watermarks)

*Date:* [1570]

*Material description:* 213 fols., 28 x 19 cm, blazon of Johann Gerhard on the fore-edge of the volume (heart); fore-edge coloured in red; pages have been cut-off again probably after new binding by Gerhard (see the marginal notes, which are cut off and not fully readable), 35 lines/page; red ink underlines in item 2.

*Watermarks:* From a comparison with the Piccard-online database, many watermarks present in the MS were produced in Amorbach (Bavaria, Germany).

*Ex-libris:* Front paste-cover: « Bibliothecae Gerhardinae »; fol. 5r: « Bibliotheca ducalis Gothana ».

*Indication of date/notes by the copyist(s):* fol. 5r: « Parisiis, 13 fe(bruar)ii 1570 »; fol. 60r: « Hactenus 20 (?) 1570 »; fol. 64r: marginal note beside the title, « Mussipo(nti) anno 83 ».

*History:* Christopher Weber was the owner of this manuscript before Gerhard.

*Content:*

(1) fol. 5r–60r: *Commentarius de scripturae intelligentia D. Mariani Societatis Nostris Jesu.*

*Incipit,* fol. 5r: « Universam de scripturis disputationem in duas partes dividam, acturus in priori de scripturae autoritate, in posteriori vero de eiusdem difficultate, prima pars secunda continebit tractatus. In primo agam de scripturis autoritate sumpta ab antiquitate, veritate et nobilitate eiusdem, in posteriori de autoritate singularium editionum. 'Primus tractatus de autoritate scripturae ab eius antiquitate'. Ut ergo ad primum tractatum accedamus mirum est qua ratione omnes Antiqui Patres in eo laborarunt, ut efficiant scripturam nostram actam et religionem in illa contentam esse omnium antiquissimam ».

*Explicit,* fol. 60r: « Denique in decretis pontificis id observandum, ne omnia que dicuntur existimamus esse fidei dogmata, sed tantum ea quae ex professo proponuntur (et non obitet aut praeter rem, ea etiam quae ex forma ipsa dicendi proponuntur), tanquam definita quam exedenda ab omnibus fidelibus; solet enim aliquando in suis decretis pontifices tantum opinative loqui ».

For the titles of the 20 questions composing Mariana's treatise, see Gehrt (2006). fol. 60v–63v: blank folios.

- (2) fol. 64r–95v: Pars of a commentary on Thomas Aquinas, *Pars Prima Secundae* (q. 85–89, on the nature of sins): *Disputatio de peccato originalis*.

*Incipit*, fol. 64r: «Theologi operam et studium in aliquam quaestionem exigere solent, difficultas et necessitas ea nec maxime in proposita materia locuta sint, prioris testis est Augustinus ».

*Explicit* [q. 89, *De peccato veniali secundum se*], fol. 95v: « Resp. ipsemet D. Thomae q. 87 precedenti articuli 5 ad secundum et tertium, secundo sententiarum dist. 42 quaest. I art. 5 ad 7; cum originali et solo veniali discederet proveniendum per sempiterna in inferno ».

- (3) fol. 96r–209r: Anonymous, *De facultate logice(s) in genere*.

*Incipit*, fol. 96r: « Sectio prima: de facultate logice(s) in genere. Prima disputatio. Quaestio I. Quid nomen logices significet. Pronunciatum primum logica apud Isidorum libro secundo Etimologiarum dicta est verbo graeco logos, secundum pronunciatum ».

End, fol. 209r: « Disputatio de postpraedicamentis ».

On the spine of the notebook, it is possible to read « Annotationes de Aristotelis praedicamenta ».

*Commentary*: Other textual evidences of the first item (fol. 5r–60r) are preserved at the Stiftsbibliothek of St. Gallen (Switzerland) and at the Municipal Library (Médiathèque municipale Pierre Almaric) of Albi (France). St. Gallen: Cod. Sang. 1115, p. 33–269 (copy by Moritz Enk) and Cod. Sang. 1129\_2 part. (copy by Joachim Opser). Both manuscripts are fully accessible online: <<https://www.e-codices.uni-fr.ch/en/csg/1129/2>>. The shelfmark of the Albi manuscript is 57 (description in the CGM, the *Catalogue général des manuscrits conservés dans les bibliothèques publiques de France*, accessible online: <[http://www.bonnespratiques-ead.net/sites/default/files/structure\\_CGM\\_imprime.html](http://www.bonnespratiques-ead.net/sites/default/files/structure_CGM_imprime.html)>). This text by Mariana has been described in REINHARDT, *Bibelkommentare Spanischer Autoren*, p. 38–39, but Chart. A 28 is not listed among the manuscripts preserving the *Isagoge in sacra scriptura*. The author(s) of the texts preserved in items 2 and 3 is/are unknown. The second item, which is part of a commentary on Aquinas, *ST Ia IIae*, has been dated « Pont-à-Mousson 1583 »; at that time, Mariana was already back in Spain. It might be Clement Dupuys (see Chart. B. 3, which contains another lecture on *ST Ia IIae*). The item 3, a text of logics, has completely different features (see paper, watermarks, folio layout, number of lines, copyists) than items 1 and 2; it might have been bound to them in a posterior moment. There are no indications of date or colophons.

*Bibliography*: CYPRIAN, *Catalogum codicum manuscriptorum bibliothecae Gothanae*, p. 50, n. XXVII; Fr. JACOBS, F. A. UKERT, *Beiträge zur ältern Litteratur, oder Merkwürdigkeiten der Herzogl. Öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Gotha*, Dyk'sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig 1836, p. 79; GEHRT, *Katalog*, p. 13–15.

Chart. B 6

*Shelfmark:* Chart. B 6

*Old Shelfmark:* Chart. n. 12

*Origin:* Germany (watermarks from Amorbach)

*Date:* [1569]–1588

*Material description:* The edges of the pages have been cut off, probably contemporarily to the new binding (which is modern, of the same kind of the other notebooks previously owned by Ch. Weber). Marginal notes are thus cut-off and not fully readable; probably, different formats and different booklets have been bound together to form the actual notebook. The *Cordiale, de quattuor novissimi* has lost some pages.

*Ex-libris:* Front paste-cover: « Bibliotheca Gerhardina »; fol. 1r: « Bibliotheca ducalis Gothana ».

*History:* The notebook belonged to Christoph Weber before entering Johannes Gerhard's library. His blazon is painted in red on the fore-edge cut of the book.

*Watermarks:* (1) On the blank pages used to separate the booklets, same watermarks than Chart. A 28, B. 2, B. 5: emblem (Amorbach 1591): e.g. fol. 1–2, 314–323; (2) First item: spread-winged eagle with a circle on the top of the head, big and small size: e.g. fol. 7–8 (small), 11–12, 15–19, 20–21, 30–31, 39–40, 53–55, 86–87, etc., 222 (very clear); (3) Second item: other spread-winged eagle with a sort of crest on top, see e.g. fol. 224, 226–227; and (4) other eagle not fully readable because of the thickness of the notes: e.g. fol. 230 (eagle less visible) 233 (less visible), 239, 240, 242 (*infra textus*); blank folios separating items: fol. 243–245, 246 other eagle top; f. 314: crowned eagle (same watermark than Chart. B 5).

*Hands:* The copyist of the first item is unusual in Christoph Weber's collection of booklets preserved in Gotha; he has copied in a very accurate and clean way the text by Maldonado. It might have been a luxury copy, realized in order to be sold.

*Indication of date:* fol. 242v: on a marginal note: « jul. a<nn>o. 1569 »; fol. 314r: « Anno 1584 circiter 29 julii ».

*Content:*

(1) fol. 1r–221v: *De penitentia* (part of Maldonado's lectures on *De Sacramentiis*).

*Incipit*, fol. 1r: « Disputatio de poenitentia septem partibus continetur. In prima agendum est de nomine, in secunda de origine, in tertia de natura, in quarta de partibus, in quinta de causis, in sexta de effectum, in septima de ceremonijs. (*Incipit*) Hinc habuerunt originem omnes haereses nostri temporis, quod quidam ad nominem poenitentiae nimium adhaerent ».

*Explicit*, fol. 221v: « Nam Deus esset profecto crudelissimus si propter unam orationem dominicam, quae non diceretur, animam pro qua fundit suum

sanguinem, detineret in tantis tormentis. [...] De extrema unctione, ordine matrimonio, fine mundi»

Other parts of the *De sacramentis*, are announced but not present in the volume.

(2) Presence of a loose leaf, between fol. 146v and 147r: « Antiphona: (r) Adesto Deus unus etc. Oremus. Actiones nostras quaesumus Domine aspirando praeveni, et adiuvando prosequerere, ut cuncta nostra oratio et operatio a te semper incipiat, et per te caepta finitatur. Per Christum Dominum nostrum. (v) Post partum virgo inviolate permansisti. Resp. Dei genitrix etc. Oremus. Deus, qui salutis aeternae beatae Mariae virginitate fecunda humano generi ».

(3) fol. 223r–242v: [P. Maldonatus, Gerardus de Vliedervhovens, *Cordiale*] *de quatuor novissimis*.

*Incipit*, fol. 223r: « Haec disputatio duas habet partes generales: prima, an mundus sit abiturus finem (et quo modo) secunda, de homine quid accidit si finiatur mundus. Prima potest haberi vel cum philosophis vel cum christianis ».

*Explicit*, fol. 242v: « Item, lib. 5 contra Iulianum, c. 8 q. 6 dubitaverit pretes non baptizatos in damnatione omnium minimos esse futuros ».

fol. 243v–247v: blank folios

(4) fol. 248r–314r: *In catechismum R. Patri Canisii Societatis Iesu Doctoris theologi*.

*Incipit*, fol. 248r: « Quinque sunt praetermittenda. Primo de antiquitate de lectioni catechisticae, secundo de acceptione vocis, tertio de modo docendi catechismum in antiqua ecclesia, quarto de ordine huius catechismi quem summa misericordia interpretaturi. Quinto de utilitate».

*Explicit*, 314r: « Finis art. septimi. Reliqua huius catechismi pars desideratur ideo quod professor huius lectionis in Scotia ablegatus, nihil praeter haec docuerit. Anno 1584 circiter 29 Juli ».

*Internal Notes*: fol. 1r, right edge: « Parisiis. Reverendi Patri Societatis Iesu Doctoris Maldonati praecellentissimi Theologi per Franciam ». Notes in Hebrew (e.g. fol. 37v). fol. 314r.

*Commentary*: The three parts of the notebook Chart. B 6 have different formats and have probably been bound together by its first possessor. Unfortunately, the modern binding does not allow considering the booklets; what is observable easily, is the difference of folios' format for every component part: it suffices to consider the marginal spaces separating the text from the edge of the page.

*Hypothesis*: Christoph Weber might have bought in Pont-à-Mousson the notes of the courses dictated in Paris by Maldonado ten years before.

*Notes on the texts*: The attribution of the *De poenitentia* to Maldonado has been contested. The text is a part of Maldonado's lecture on the *Sentences*, namely the fourth part (*De sacramentis*). The Gotha manuscript preserves the same text published in Lyon in 1614: *Ioannis Maldonati Andalusii Societatis Iesu Theologi*,

*disputationum ac controversiarum decisarum et circa septem Ecclesiae Romanae Sacramenta inter Catholicos praesertim et Calvinistas, ... tomi duo, quorum priores, quae circa Baptismum, Confirmationem, Eucharistiam: Alter, quae circa Poenitentiam, Extremam Unctionem, Ordinem et Matrimonium versantur.* Sommervogel (*Bibliothèque*, vol. V, p. 407) observes that this edition is not very correct (« édition peu correcte »). In the *Index librorum prohibitorum et expurgandorum* published in Madrid in 1667, the attribution of this work to Maldonado is contested, and the whole work prohibited: « Ioanni Maldonado liber falso adscriptus, ementito impressionis loco Lugduno, pro Francofurto, impressoris nomine supresso, cum hac inscriptione, Disputationum, et controversiarum decisarum, circa septem Sacramenta, prorsus prohibetur ». Nevertheless, the same text has been published in Brussels (typis Henrici Fricx, 1676). Sommervogel (*Bibliothèque*, vol. V, p. 408) collects other evidences about these *Disputationes* by Maldonado – a letter on the poor fortune of this work (published in the *Bibliothèque critique* de R. Simon, Amsterdam, 1708, IV, p. 71–78) and a letter, by the same author (Rich. Simon), on this, and other works by Maldonado as well (published in the *Lettres choisies* by Rich. Simons, Amsterdam, 1721, p. 156–165). « Simon dit qu'il a vu le MS de cet ouvrage qui était de la main d'un élève du P. Maldonat, nommé Yvelin ». There is another work attributed and published under the name of Maldonado, which contains the same material, namely the text on the sacraments (= Book IV of the *Sentences*; see Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque*, vol. V, p. 408, n. 6 among Maldonado's works): *Ioannis Maldonati ... Opera varia theologica tribus tomis comprehensa. Ex variis tum Regis, tum doctissimorum Virorum Bibliothecis macima parte nunc primum in lucem edita. Hic accesserunt ejusdem auctoris Praefationes, Orationes, et Epistolae*, apud Andream Pralard, Lutetiae Parisiorum 1677. In the *praefatio ad lectorem* contained in this edition, which lists the works by Maldonado, Alegambe's refusal to ascribe to the Jesuit the *Disputationes* is discussed and rejected:

Tam egregium opus, quod ubique magnum et excellens auctoris ingenium, acre iudicium, summam eruditionum pari pietate conjunctam refert, non debuit a viro prudente, et alias erudite temere et inconsiderate configi: nec dignitati Societatis, aut honori, me iudice, derogasset Alegambius, si horum Commentariorum verum et genuinum auctorem sincere et liberaliter agnovisset Ioannem Maldonatum; quod nemo quidem inficiabitur, nisi qui meridiana luce voluerit caecutire. Omnes enim omnino Manuscripti codices, qui non pauci sunt, Ioannis Maldonati nomen, stylum, ac ingenium repraesentant. Unum penes me habeo, qui omnia, ut eduntur, ad verbum exhibit, quique annum et diem annotat, quo hos tractatus dictavit et absolvit Maldonatus. Hic codex olim fuit D. Henault Doctoris Theologi Parisiensis e Societate Navarraica, cui haereditario iure obvenerat a consanguineo quodam suo, qui Maldonatum in Collegio Claromontano docentem audierat eiusque scripta exceperat. Praeter caeteros autem MSS. Codices Maldonati nomen praeferentes indubitatae maxime fidei sunt illi, quorum alterum penes se habet D. Ant. F. sacrae facultatis Theologiae Parisiensis Doctor, maximumque decus et ornamentum

singulare, vir exquisita eruditione omnium longe instructissimus; alterum vero habet vir eruditissimus Stephanus Baluzius, quotot eximiis libris in lucem editis nomini suo famam laudemque eduntur in quartum lib. Sententiarum ad verbum continens dictante Maldonato exceptit, propriaque manu descripsit vir illustrissimus Mericus de Vic Regis Christianissimi quondam apud Helvetios Legatus, Reginumque sigillorum Custos, dum adhuc iuuenis Theologiae operam daret, ipsumque Maldonatum in schola Claromontana docentem audiret. Quorum etiam codicum apographum diligenter ad exemplar exscriptum in Bibliotheca Regia asservatur, sicut et alia plura Maldonati opera manuscripta.

In this edition, Maldonado's work is held for authentic. According to Montfaucon, other witnesses of this text are MSS Vendôme, Bibliothèque du Parc Ronsard, 149 and Grenoble, Municipal Library, 303 (cf. Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque*, vol. V, p. 410). Other manuscript evidences of Maldonado's *De poenitentiae* are preserved in Paris, such as that quoted by Alegambe in the aforementioned text: MSS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Lat. 3225, and Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Lat. 5454 A. To attempt providing a full list of the manuscripts preserving Maldonado's works is not our task here, but part of a larger project: for manuscripts preserving his lectures are present almost in every important European library.

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# DIE REZEPTION DER WAFFENSALBE UND DES SYMPATHETISCHEN PULVERS IM OSMANISCHEN REICH DES 17. JAHRHUNDERTS

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## *Abstrakt*

Im siebzehnten Jahrhundert erlebte das naturmagische Denken in der Medizin eine Blütezeit. In der medizinischen Praxis verbreiteten sich Rezepte, die durch Sympathie und Antipathie zwischen Makro- und Mikrokosmos begründet wurden, wie etwa die Waffensalbe und das Sympathetische Pulver. In der zweiten Hälfte des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts fand die Iatrochemie durch Übersetzungen aus dem Lateinischen ins Arabische den Weg in das Osmanische Reich, wie es bei der *Basilica Chymica* von Oswaldus Crollius (gest.1609) der Fall war. Das Werk enthält eine Vorschrift für die Waffensalbe «*Unguentum sympatheticum seu stellatum Paracelsi*», die ins Arabische übersetzt wurde. Diese Studie analysiert Textstellen im Zusammenhang mit der Transmission der Waffensalbe und des Sympathetischen Pulvers im arabischen und osmanischen Schrifttum des siebzehnten und achtzehnten Jahrhunderts und rekonstruiert die Übertragungsmodalitäten magischer Konzepte, welche der Verwendung der Waffensalbe zugrunde lagen. Die Studie zeigt, dass die lateinischen Texte einem Transformationsprozess auf textueller Ebene, aber auch hinsichtlich der astrologisch-magischen Konzepte unterlagen. Außerdem zeigt der Beitrag, dass ein europäischer Arzt das Sympathetische Pulver im Istanbul des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts therapeutisch einsetzte.

## *Schlagwörter*

Arabische Medizin, *magia naturalis*, Šāliḥ b. Naṣrallah, Ibn Sallūm al-Ḥalabī, *unguentum armarium*, Sympathetisches Pulver, Waffensalbe.

## *Abstract*

The seventeenth century saw the spread of natural magic in medicine. Several remedies based on concepts of sympathy and analogy between microcosm and macrocosm were introduced into therapy, such as weapon salve and powder of sympathy. In the second half of the seventeenth

century, European iatrochemical knowledge was introduced into the Ottoman Empire through translations from Latin into Arabic, such as the translation of the *Basilica Chymica* by Oswaldus Crollius (d. 1609). The book contains a recipe for weapon salve with the title «Unguentum sympatheticum seu stellatum Paracelsi» that was translated into Arabic. This study addresses the transition of weapon salve and powder of sympathy to the Ottoman Empire by examining Arabic and Ottoman texts from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It also addresses the modalities of translation and transfer of magical concepts underlying the usage of sympathetic remedies. This paper reveals that the Latin texts underwent a transformation process on a textual as well as on a conceptual level, especially regarding astrological and magical concepts. The study shows that a European physician was probably using powder of sympathy in Istanbul in the late seventeenth century.

*Key Words*

Ottoman Medicine, *magia naturalis*, Šāliḥ b. Naşrallah, Ibn Sallūm al-Ḥalabī, *unguentum armarium*, Powder of Sympathy, Weapon Salve.



*I. Einleitung*

Zwischen dem fünfzehnten und dem achtzehnten Jahrhundert erlebte das magische Denken im europäischen Kontext eine Blütezeit, die durch Rückgriff auf neuplatonisches, hermetisches und kabbalistisches Gedankengut begründet war. Im Bemühen, die Naturkräfte zu verstehen, wurden im Rahmen einer Analogie zwischen Makro- und Mikrokosmos Beziehungen von Sympathie und Antipathie postuliert, die durch astrologische Praktiken und sympathetische Mittel beeinflusst werden konnten. Die Einflussnahme auf die Naturkräfte durch Kenntnis ihrer Gesetzmäßigkeiten nannten Gelehrte *magia naturalis* und setzten sie als Gegenpol zur *magia illicita* oder *magia daemoniaca*, deren Wirkung sich durch Vermittlung von Dämonen entfalten sollte.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Siehe BERND-CHRISTIAN OTTO, *Magie: Rezeptions- und Diskursgeschichtliche Analysen Von der Antike Bis Zur Neuzeit*, de Gruyter, Berlin 2011 (Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten, 57), p. 414–491, 509–517; HEINZ SCHOTT, *Magie der Natur: historische Variationen über ein Motiv der Heilkunst*, vol. II, Shaker Verlag, Aachen 2014, p. 12–47; KURT GOLDAMMER, *Der göttliche Magier und die Magierin Natur: Religion, Naturmagie und die Anfänge der Naturwissenschaft vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Renaissance*, Mit Beiträgen zum Magie-Verständnis des Paracelsus, Steiner, Stuttgart 1991 (Kosmosophie, 5); WOLF-DIETER MÜLLER-JAHNCKE, *Magie als Wissenschaft im frühen 16. Jahrhundert: die*

In der Heilkunde schlugen sich die auf der *magia naturalis* beruhenden iatromagischen Vorstellungen von Sympathie und Empathie in zahlreichen Behandlungsmethoden nieder, die primär mit Paracelsus (1493/94–1541) und den Paracelsisten in Verbindung gebracht wurden.<sup>2</sup> Hier sind beispielweise die Heilung durch magische Zahlen, das Tragen von Amuletten, die Verabreichung von Arzneien mit menschlicher Mumie als Zutat und nicht zuletzt die Behandlung von Wunden durch die Waffensalbe und das sympathetische Pulver zu nennen.<sup>3</sup> Allmählich wurden einige sympathetische Mittel von namhaften Schulmedizinern und Naturforschern, wie Daniel Sennert (1572–1637),<sup>4</sup> Robert Boyle (1626/27–1691/92)<sup>5</sup> oder Johan Baptista van Helmont (1580–1644),<sup>6</sup> beschrieben und in der Therapie eingesetzt. Einige, wie die Waffensalbe und das sympathetische Pulver, blieben nicht auf das lateinische Europa beschränkt, sondern fanden den Weg in benachbarte Weltregionen.<sup>7</sup>

Im siebzehnten Jahrhundert wuchs das Interesse osmanischer Ärzte an europäischen medizinischen Werken der Neuzeit und an iatrochemischen Präparaten der sogenannten *aṭıbbā'-ı kīmyāvīler* (Iatrochemiker) dergestalt, dass der Obermedicus des Osmanischen Reiches, der Aleppiner Şāliḥ b. Naşrullāh Ibn Sallūm al-Ḥalabī (gest. 1669), einen christlichen Arzt namens Nīqūlāwus damit beauftragte, Werke des erwähnten Daniel Sennert ins Arabische zu übersetzen.<sup>8</sup> Dieser übersetzte Teile nicht nur von Sennerts Werken *Institutionum medicinae, Practicae medicinae* und *De Chymicorum cum Aristotelicis et Galenicis consensu ac*

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*Beziehungen zwischen Magie, Medizin und Pharmazie im Werk des Agrippa von Nettesheim, 1486–1535*, Diss. an der Universität Marburg an der Lahn 1973; WILL-ERICH PEUCKERT, *Pansophie: Ein Versuch zur Geschichte der weißen und schwarzen Magie*, Schmidt, Berlin 1956<sup>2</sup> (Pansophie, 1); WILL-ERICH PEUCKERT, *Gabalıa. Ein Versuch zur Geschichte der magia naturalis im 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert*, Schmidt, Berlin 1967 (Pansophie, 2).

<sup>2</sup> Zu Iatromagie siehe KARL EDUARD ROTHSCHUH, *Iatromagie: Begriff – Merkmale – Motive – Systematik*, Springer, Opladen 1978 (Vorträge der Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Geisteswissenschaften, 225); ID., *Konzepte der Medizin in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, Hippokrates-Verlag, Stuttgart 1978, p. 106–158.

<sup>3</sup> Siehe beispielsweise die Kapitel «De Verborum & Characterum» und «De Curatione Magnetica» bei DANIEL SENNERT, *De Chymicorum Cum Aristotelicis Et Galenicis Consensu Ac Dissensu Liber I.: Controversias plurimas tam Philosophis quam Medicis cognitu utiles continens*, Schürer, Wittenberg 1619, p. 606–638.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 624–638.

<sup>5</sup> RICHARD SUGG, *Mummies, Cannibals, and Vampires: The History of Corpse Medicine from the Renaissance to the Victorians*, Routledge, London 2016, p. 59–64.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40–42.

<sup>7</sup> Zu den aus dem Lateinischen ins Arabische und dann ins Osmanische angefertigten Übersetzungen von ausgewählten Werken siehe: NATALIA BACHOUR, *Oswaldus Crollius und Daniel Sennert im frühneuzeitlichen Istanbul: Studien zur Rezeption des Paracelsismus im Werk des osmanischen Arztes Şāliḥ b. Naşrullāh Ibn Sallūm al-Ḥalabī*, Centaurus Verlag & Media, Herbolzheim 2012 (Neuere Medizin- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 23).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

dissensu, sondern auch von Oswaldus Crolius' (1560–1609) *Basilica Chymica*, von Luís Mercados (1520–1606) *De Febre pestillenti et de maligna ac de accidentibus, quae ijs et reliquis putridis succrescunt* und von Johannes Jacob Weckers (1528–1586) *Antidotarium generale et speciale*.

Durch Zusammenfügung übersetzter Auszüge aus verschiedenen lateinischen Werken entstanden die in der Medizingeschichte des Osmanischen Reichs einflussreichen Schriften *aṭ-Ṭibb al-kīmiyāʾī al-ğadīd* (Die neue chemische Medizin), mit *al-Kīmiyāʾ al-malakiyya* (Die königliche Chemie), und das enzyklopädische Werk *Ġāyat al-itqān fī tadbīr badan al-insān* (Die höchste Perfektion in der Behandlung des menschlichen Körpers).<sup>9</sup> Das letzte Werk wurde nach Ibn Sallūms Tod fertiggestellt, indem sein Sohn Yaḥyā Efendi einem Arzt namens Aḥmad Abū al-Isʿād die Entwürfe seines verstorbenen Vaters anvertraute, der sie in Abhandlungen, Kapitel und Abschnitte ordnete (*amara hādā l-faqīr bi-an yurattib hādā al-kitāb ʿalā maqālāt wa-fuṣūl wa-abwāb*).<sup>10</sup>

Die Verbreitung dieser beiden arabischen Werke wurde dann durch Übersetzungen ins Osmanisch-Türkische gefördert. Die Übersetzung des enzyklopädischen Werks *Ġāyat al-itqān* wurde unter dem Titel *Nūzhet ül-ebdān fī tercemet Ġāyat al-itqān* (Der Spaziergang der Körper in der Übersetzung der Höchsten Perfektion) im Jahr 1728 fertiggestellt.<sup>11</sup> *Aṭ-Ṭibb al-kīmiyāʾī al-ğadīd* mit *al-Kīmiyāʾ al-malakiyya* erlebte drei vollständige Übersetzungen, nämlich als *Ġāyet ül-münā fī tedbīr il-marzā* (Das Ziel der Wünsche bei der Behandlung von Patienten) durch den Palastarzt (*ṭabīb-ı hāṣṣa*) Ḥasan Efendi, als *Ġāyet ül-müterakkī fī tedbīr il-marzā* (Das Ziel des Aufsteigenden bei der Behandlung von Patienten) durch einen unbekanntem Übersetzer und zuletzt als *Mürşid ül-elibbā fī tercemet ispağiryā* (Wegweiser der Verständigen bei der Übersetzung der Spagyrik) durch den Obermedicus Gevrekzāde Ḥāfız Ḥasan Efendi (1727–1801).<sup>12</sup> Dadurch blieb die Iatrochemie nicht nur ein europäisches Phänomen, sondern erlangte eine globale Dimension, und mit ihr auch die Waffensalbe und das sympathetische Pulver, die in den übersetzten Werken Erwähnung finden, wie im Folgenden erläutert wird.

Die Waffensalbe *unguentum armarium*, auch bekannt als sympathetische Salbe *unguentum sympatheticum* oder Sternensalbe *unguentum stellatum*, ist eine Präparation in Salbenform. Sie wird auf die Waffe aufgetragen, die eine Wunde

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 72–134.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 90–91.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 365–367.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 367–369. Außerdem wurden zwei weitere Teilübersetzungen ins Osmanisch-Türkische angefertigt, die in größere medizinische Werke integriert wurden. Die erste bildet den theoretischen Teil in ʿÖmer b. Sinān el-İznīkīs (geb. 1704?) *Künüz-ı ḥayāt il-insān kânün-ı aṭıbbāʾ-ı feylesüfān* (Schätze des menschlichen Lebens, Kanon der philosophischen Mediziner). Die zweite ist im allgemeinen Teil in ʿÖmer Şifāʾī el-Burüsevis (gest. 1155/1742) *Kitāb uṭ-ṭıbb il-cedīd il-kīmiyāʾī* (das Buch über die neue chemische Medizin) zu finden. Diese Übersetzungen enthielten allerdings keine Erwähnung der Rezeptur der Waffensalbe (Ibid., p. 369–372).

verursacht hat, und heilt die Verletzung durch Fernwirkung.<sup>13</sup> Ihre ursprüngliche Vorschrift ist in der *Archidoxis Magica* des Pseudo-Paracelsus unter der Bezeichnung « Waffensalb » zu finden.<sup>14</sup> Diese Rezeptur übernahm Oswaldus Crollius in leicht veränderter Form in sein weitverbreitetes Werk *Basilica Chymica* unter der Bezeichnung « Unguentum sympatheticum seu stellatum Paracelsi ».<sup>15</sup> Außerdem beschrieb Giovanni Battista Della Porta im achten Buch seines Werks *Magia naturalis* die Waffensalbe des Paracelsus, dessen Rezeptur er aus zweiter Hand durch einen Adligen vom Hofe Maximilians I. (1459–1519) erhalten habe. Paracelsus habe nämlich Kaiser Maximilian die Salbe verschrieben, welcher sie zeitlebens anwendete und hochschätzte.<sup>16</sup>

Zwei Rezepturlinien der Waffensalbe zirkulierten in den Schriften des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts: zum einen die des Giovanni Battista Della Porta und die der *Archidoxis Magica* mit Blut, Fett und Mumia als aus dem menschlichem Körper gewonnenen Zutaten, und zum anderen die Version von Oswaldus Crollius, welche nur die Mumia enthält, sowie weitere Versionen davon, die auf die Mumia ganz verzichten.<sup>17</sup> Allen Rezepturen gemeinsam ist allerdings die Usnea – das ist das auf der Hirnschale eines gehenkten Menschen gewachsene Moos.

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<sup>13</sup> CHRISTOPH FRIEDRICH, WOLF-DIETER MÜLLER-JAHNCKE, *Geschichte der Pharmazie. Band II: Von der frühen Neuzeit bis zur Gegenwart*, Govi-Verlag, Eschborn 2005, p. 304–306.

<sup>14</sup> WOLF-DIETER MÜLLER-JAHNCKE, « Magische Medizin bei Paracelsus und den Paracelsisten: Die Waffensalbe », in PETER DILG, HARTMUT RUDOLPH (eds.), *Resultate und Desiderate der Paracelsus-Forschung*, Steiner, Stuttgart 1993, p. 43–55; PSEUDOPARACELSUS, *Archidoxis Magia: liber primus*, in JOHANNES HUSER (ed.), *Zehnder Theil Der Bücher und Schrifften, des Edlen, Hochgelehrten und Bewehrten Philosophi unnd Medici, Philippi Theophrasti Bombast von Hohenheim, Paracelsi genannt, Bd. 10, Dieser Theil (welcher der Dritte unter den Philosophischen Schrifften) begreiffet fürnemlich das treffliche Werck Theophrasti, Philosophia Sagax, oder Astronomia Magna genannt: Sampt ettlichen andern Opusculis, und einem Appendice*, Conrad Waldkirch, Basel 1591, p. 81.

<sup>15</sup> OSWALDUS CROLLIUS, *Basilica Chymica: continens philosophicam propria laborum experientia confirmatam descriptionem et usum remediorum chymicorum; Tractatus novus de signaturis rerum internis*, impensis Godefridi Tampachii, Frankfurt a. M. [ca. 1611] (reprint Hildesheim–Zürich 1996), p. 278–282; ID., *Basilica Chymica oder Alchymistische Königlich Klynod: Ein Philosophisch, durch sein selbst eigne erfahrung confirmierte vnd bestätigte Beschreibung vnd gebrauch der aller fürtrefflichsten Chimischen Artznÿen so auß dem Liecht der Gnaden vnd Natur genommen, in sich begreiffent. Beneben angehengtem seinem neuen Tractat von den innerlichen Signaturm oder zeichen der dinge*, Gottfried Tampachen, Frankfurt a. M. 1623, p. 242–246.

<sup>16</sup> GIOVANNI BATTISTA DELLA PORTA, *Magia naturalis libri viginti: Ab ipso quidem authore adaucti, nunc vero ab infinitis, quibus editio illa scatebat mendis, optime repurgati: in quibus scientiarum Naturalium divitiae & deliciae demonstrantur*, Petrus Leffen, Lugdunum Batavorum 1631, p. 354.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. WOLFGANG HILDEBRAND, *Magia naturalis: das ist Kunst und Wunderbuch, Darinnen begriffen wunderbare Secreta, Geheimnisse und Kunststücke*, 4 Bücher, Birnstil, Darmstatt 1616, p. 92–94; sowie KENELEM DIGBY, ANDREAS TENTZEL et al. *Theatrum Sympatheticum auctum, exhibens varios auctores. De Pulvere Sympathetico quidem Digbaeum, Strausseum, Papinium, Et Mohyum. De Ungeuento vero armario: Goclenium, Robertum, Helmontium, Robertum Fluddum, Beckerum, Borellum, Bartholinum, Servium, Kircherum, Matthaëum, Sennertum, Wechtlerum, Nardium, Freitagium, Conringium, Burlinum, Fracastorium, Et Weckerum, Praemittitur His Sylvestri Ratray, Aditus ad Sympathiam et Anti-Pathiam*.

Wie bei der Waffensalbe glaubten einige Mediziner, dass das sympathetische Pulver Wunden durch Fernwirkung heilen könne. Im Gegensatz zur Waffensalbe enthielt das Pulver allerdings keine menschliche Körpermaterialien, sondern ausschließlich weißes Vitriol (Zinksulfat) oder grünes Vitriol (Eisensulfat). Man löste das Vitriol in Wasser auf und setzte es 360 Stunden der Sonne aus, wodurch das Pulver die Kräfte der Himmelskörper aufnehmen und vermischt mit ein wenig Blut aus der Wunde seine Fernwirkung entfalten sollte.<sup>18</sup> Das sympathetische Pulver beschrieb Henri de Mohy zum ersten Mal in seinem 1639 erschienenen Werk *Eburinis Pulvis Sympatetici*.<sup>19</sup> Danach folgten zahlreiche Schriften, deren Autoren die Wirkung des sympathetischen Pulvers und anderer sympathetischer Mittel einschließlich der Waffensalbe heftig debattierten und die in dem Sammelwerk *Theatrum sympatheticum auctum* nachgedruckt sind.<sup>20</sup>

Die Waffensalbe und das sympathetische Pulver sind im europäischen Kontext hinsichtlich ihrer textlichen Überlieferung, der mit ihnen verbundenen magischen Vorstellungen und der durch sie ausgelösten Debatten von Peuckert,<sup>21</sup> Amadou,<sup>22</sup> Müller-Jahncke,<sup>23</sup> Ziller-Camenietzki,<sup>24</sup> Hedrick,<sup>25</sup> Fink,<sup>26</sup> Lobis<sup>27</sup> und andere gut erforscht. Der Rezeption der Waffensalbe im außereuropäischen Kontext schenkte die Forschung jedoch wenig Beachtung. Die Studie der Verfasserin zur Rezeption von Paracelsismus im Osmanischen Reich des 17. Jahrhunderts zeigt, dass die Rezeptur der Waffensalbe ins Arabische übersetzt wurde. Jedoch untersucht sie den Text der Waffensalbe nicht hinsichtlich des Übersetzungsvorgangs und der Übertragung von Konzepten.

Dieser Beitrag versucht nun, die Rezeption der Waffensalbe und des sympathetischen Pulvers im Osmanischen Reich des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts darzustellen. Nach Auffindung relevanter Textstellen in verschiedenen Schriften

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*Editio novissima, correctior, auctior multisq. parasangis melior*, Endter, Norimberg 1662, p. 223–224, 508, 517, 554, 579, 585, 627.

<sup>18</sup> FRIEDRICH, MÜLLER-JAHNCKE, *Geschichte der Pharmazie*, p. 371–372.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 371; SETH LOBIS, *The Virtue of Sympathy: Magic, Philosophy, and Literature in Seventeenth-Century England*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT–London 2015 (Yale Studies in English), p. 41–44.

<sup>20</sup> DIGBY, TENTZEL. *Theatrum Sympatheticum auctum*.

<sup>21</sup> PEUCKERT, *Gabalialia*, p. 224–232.

<sup>22</sup> ROBERT AMADOU, *La poudre de sympathie: un chapitre de la médecine magnétique*, Nizet, Paris 1953, p. 24–38.

<sup>23</sup> MÜLLER-JAHNCKE, « Magische Medizin ».

<sup>24</sup> CARLOS ZILLER-CAMENIETZKI, « La poudre de Madame: la trajectoire de la guérison magnétique des blessures en France », *Dix-septième siècle*, 211/2 (2001), p. 285–305.

<sup>25</sup> ELIZABETH HEDRICK, « Romancing the Salve: Sir Kenelm Digby and the Powder of Sympathy », *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 41/2 (2008), p. 161–185.

<sup>26</sup> BÉATRICE FINK, « De la poudre de sympathie et de ses effets surprenants », in THIERRY BELLEGUIC, ÉRIC VAN DER SCHUEREN, SABRINA VERVACKE (eds.), *Les discours de la sympathie: Enquête sur une notion de l'âge classique à la modernité*, Presses de L'université Laval, Québec 2007, p. 67–76.

<sup>27</sup> LOBIS, *The virtue of sympathy*, p. 36–68.

des siebzehnten und frühen achtzehnten Jahrhunderts werden die arabischen und osmanisch-türkischen Texte kontrastiv zur lateinischen Übersetzungsvorlage im Hinblick auf Zutaten, Zubereitung, Anwendung und Begründung der Wirkungsweise analysiert. Dabei ist das Augenmerk auf die Modalitäten des Wissenstransfers gerichtet. Kann die Rezeption als Übernahme, Assimilation oder Verzerrung beschrieben werden? Wurden die der Rezeptur zugrundeliegenden iatromagischen Gedanken verstanden? Auf welche Erklärungsmuster griff der Übersetzer zurück, um die Waffensalbe in einen islamischen Kulturraum zu integrieren?

## II. Arabische und osmanisch-türkische Texte über die Waffensalbe und das sympathetische Pulver

Nach Sichtung aller Ibn Sallūm al-Ḥalabī zugeschriebenen Schriften und ihrer Übersetzungen ins Osmanische bzw. ins Arabische sowie der iatrochemischen Schriften der oben erwähnten osmanischen Ärzte konnten lediglich drei Textstellen zur Waffensalbe und ein kurzer Hinweis auf das sympathetische Pulver identifiziert werden. Die erste Rezeptur ist eine Übertragung von Crollius « Unguentum sympatheticum seu stellatum Paracelsi » aus der *Basilica Chymica*. Sie trägt in der arabischen Übersetzung die Bezeichnung *al-marham al-kawākibī min ṣan'at Barākilsūs wa-yusammā marham Ūmāriyā* (Die Planetensalbe nach der Kunst des Paracelsus die *Ūmāriyā*-Salbe genannt wird), wobei *Ūmāriyā* offenbar eine Verzerrung des Wortes *armarium* ist. Sie ist in *al-Kīmiyā' al-malakiyya*,<sup>28</sup> dem zweiten Teil von *aṭ-Ṭibb al-kīmiyā'ī al-ġadīd*, zu finden. Sie ist außerdem in den osmanischen Übersetzungen *Ġāyet ül-münā fī tedbīr il-marzā* von Ḥasan Efendi (*merhem-i kevākibī*)<sup>29</sup> und *Mürşid ül-elibbā fī tercemet ispaġiryā* von Gevrekzāde Ḥāfız Ḥasan (*merhem-i kevākib*)<sup>30</sup> in einer originalgetreuen, ja fast wörtlichen Übersetzung wiedergegeben worden.

Die zweite Erwähnung der Waffensalbe ist im enzyklopädischen Werk *Ġāyat al-itqān fī tadbīr badan al-insān* in der vierten Abhandlung über « die nicht organspezifischen Krankheiten » im Kapitel über Wunden zu finden. Unter der Bezeichnung *marham Armāriyā* (*Armāriyā*-Salbe) werden zwei Rezepturvarianten beschrieben.<sup>31</sup> Die lateinische Übersetzungsvorlage bildet das Kapitel *De Unguento*

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<sup>28</sup> Istanbul, Süleymaniye-Bibliothek, Ayasofya 3671, fol. 52r-52v (wird in diesem Artikel als AT abgekürzt); ŞALİH NAŞRULLĀH B. SALLŪM AL-ḤALABĪ. *al-Ṭibb al-ġadīd al-kīmiyā'ī liṭ-ṭabīb*, ed. KAMAL SHEHADEH, *manşūrāt ġāmī'at Ḥalab, ma'had at-turāt al-'ilmī al-'arabī*, Aleppo 1997, p. 273-274 (wird in diesem Artikel als ES abgekürzt).

<sup>29</sup> Istanbul, Süleymaniye-Bibliothek, Tahir Ağa 395, fol. 77v-78r.

<sup>30</sup> Istanbul, Bibliothek der Universität Istanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi TY 7085, fol. 108v-110r.

<sup>31</sup> Istanbul, Süleymaniye-Bibliothek, Ayasofya 3682, fol. 297r-297v.

Armario in Sennerts *Liber Quintus Practicae Medicinae*.<sup>32</sup> Der arabische Text wurde auch hier fast wörtlich ins Osmanisch-Türkische übersetzt.<sup>33</sup>

Die dritte Vorschrift kommt unter der gleichen Bezeichnung *marham kawākibī* (Planetensalbe) im enzyklopädischen Werk *Ġāyat al-itqān fī tadbīr badan al-insān* in der zweiten Abhandlung über zusammengesetzte Arzneien (*al-maqāla t-tāniya fī ‘amal al-murakkabāt*) im Kapitel über Salben (*faṣl fī l-marāhim*) vor.<sup>34</sup> Obwohl der Stoff dieser Abhandlung sonst auf dem *Antidotarium Speciale* Liber II und III des Johann Jacob Wecker beruht, stammt die Rezeptur nicht aus Weckers Werk,<sup>35</sup> sondern wurde ebenfalls aus Sennerts *De Unguento Armario* entnommen und dann in das Kapitel über Salben integriert, wie der Textvergleich zeigt (cf. *infra*). Sie ist auch wörtlich ins Osmanisch-Türkische übertragen worden.<sup>36</sup>

Das sympathetische Pulver erwähnt der Übersetzer anschließend an die Waffensalbenvorschrift im Kapitel über Wunden, wo er selbst zu Wort kommt und von einer vertrauenswürdigen Person folgendes berichtet:

Ein Vertrauter erzählte mir, dass er einen fränkischen Chirurgen gesehen habe, wie er ein Fleischstück von einem gemästeten speckreichen Schwein nimmt, mit einem Messer einschneidet, in den Schnitt Vitriol gibt, den Einschnitt verschließt und das Stück aufbewahrt. Wenn man ihm ein Tuch oder Holz bringt, das die Wunde oder das Geschwür berührt hat, nimmt er ein wenig von jenem Vitriol, sprüht es auf das Tuch, hebt das Tuch an einem sicheren Ort auf und wiederholt das Besprühen abends und morgens. Die Wunde oder das Geschwür des Patienten werden erfahrungsgemäß geheilt. Dies ist eine merkwürdige und wundersame Sache.<sup>37</sup>

Dieser Bericht bezeugt, dass europäische Ärzte in Istanbul das sympathetische Pulver anwendeten und dass Wissenstransfer durch direkten Kontakt zwischen Individuen stattfinden konnte.

<sup>32</sup> DANIEL SENNERT. *Liber Quintus Practicae Medicinae, De Tumoribus, Ulceribus, Cutaneis vitiis, Vulneribus, Fracturis, et Luxationibus*, Wittenberg 1634, p. 435–447.

<sup>33</sup> ŞĀLIH NAŞRULLĀH B. SALLŪM AL-ĤALABĪ. *Nūzhet ūl-ebdān fī tercemet Ġāyat al-itqān* (die osmanisch-türkische Übersetzung von *Ġāyat al-itqān fī tadbīr badan al-insān*), trans. EBŪ L-FEYẒ MUŞTAFĀ B. MEHMED B. AĤMED (bekannt als ḤAYĀTĪZĀDE ŞĀKIRDĪ), *Maṭba‘a-l-‘Osmāniye*, Istanbul 1303 H. [1885–1886], p. 567–568.

<sup>34</sup> Istanbul, Süleymaniye-Bibliothek, Ayasofya 3682, fol. 59r. Wird im Folgenden als ĠI abgekürzt.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. JOHANN JACOB WECKER. *Antidotarium generale et special*, Iacob Genath, Basel 1617; *Ibid.*, 1642.

<sup>36</sup> ŞĀLIH, *Nūzhet ūl-ebdān*, p. 99–100.

<sup>37</sup> ĠI, fol. 297v, l. 3–10: (Die Transkription der arabischen Texte erfolgt in diesem Artikel originaltreu ohne Anpassung an die heute gültigen Rechtschreibnormen.)

وقد اخبرنى من اتق به انه رأى طبيبيا جراحا من الافرنج يأخذ قطعة من لحم الخنزير السمين الكثير الدهن ويشقها بسكين ويضع فى الشق الزاج ويطبق الشق ويرفع تلك القطعة فى مكان فاذا أتى بخرقه او دفه مما الصق على الجرح او القرحة يأخذ من ذلك الزاج قليلا وينذر على الخرقه ويرفع الخرقه فى مكان محفوظ ويكرر الذرور كذلك مساء وصباحا فيحصل البرء لصاحب القرحة والجراحة عن تجربة وهو امر غريب عجيب

### III. Vergleich der Zutaten und Herstellungsmethode

Nun wenden wir uns den Ingredienzien der Waffensalbe zu. Da die osmanischen Übersetzungen mit den entsprechenden arabischen Texten fast wörtlich übereinstimmen, werden sie im Folgenden nicht explizit angesprochen. Die Übersetzung ins Osmanisch-Türkische erfolgte zudem ohne Rückgriff auf die lateinische Vorlage.

Beim Vergleich der Zutaten der Waffensalbe in der *Basilica Chymica* und *al-Kīmiya' al-malakiyya* ist festzustellen, dass alle Zutaten originaltreu übernommen wurden – bis auf die Usnea, das ist das Moos, das vom Schädel eines gewaltsam Verstorbenen gesammelt werden soll, wenn der Mond zunimmt und möglichst im Zeichen der Venus, nicht jedoch des Mars oder des Saturns steht.<sup>38</sup> Außerdem soll die Salbe zubereitet werden, wenn die Sonne in der Waage steht.<sup>39</sup> Die Rezeptur der Waffensalbe in *al-Kīmiya' al-malakiyya* lautet:

Die Beschreibung der Planetensalbe (*marham al-kawākibī*) nach der Kunst des Paracelsus. Man nennt sie auch *Ūmāriyā*-Salbe. Man nehme je acht Unzen Wildschweinfett (*šahm al-ḥinzīr al-barrī*) und Bärenfett (*šahm ad-dubb*), koche alles auf gelindem Feuer in Wein (*šarāb*) und gieße es zum Erstarren in kaltes Wasser. Man nehme dann zwei Pfund (*raṭl*) mit Wein oder Wasser gewaschene Regenwürmer (*ḥarāṭīn*), trockne sie auf einem Herd und zerreibe sie. Man nehme dann je eine Unze Wildschweinhirn (*dimāġ al-ḥinzīr al-barrī*), rotes Sandelholz (*šandal aḥmar*), Mumia (*mūmiyā*) und Blutstein (*ḥaġar ad-damm*) sowie Knochen von der menschlichen Hirnschale (*ʿazm qaḥf al-insān*) im Gewicht von zwei Mandelkernen, wenn der zunehmende Mond sich im Haus der Venus befindet; wenn auch die Sonne in der Waage steht, ist es besser. Man zerreibe, was zu zerreiben ist und verrühre es mit dem Rest, bis es gut vermischt und zu einer Salbe wird. Man bewahre es auf, bis es benötigt wird.<sup>40</sup>

Die Usnea wird im arabischen Text also durch Knochen der menschlichen Hirnschale (*ʿazm qaḥf al-insān*) ersetzt.<sup>41</sup> Die Todesumstände werden nicht erwähnt und die astrologischen Gegebenheiten während des Sammelns der

<sup>38</sup> CROLLIUS. *Basilica Chymica*, p. 278: « Demum accipe Usnea è Cranio Hominis violenta morte perempti, abrasae, Lunae crescente, & in bona domo existente, Veneris si fieri possit, non Martis aut Saturni. »

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 279: « paretur Unguentum Sole in Libra existente ».

<sup>40</sup> AT, fol. 52r, l. 18–24:

صفة مرهم الكواكبي من صنعة براكلسوس ويسمى مرهم اوماريا يوخذ شحم الخنزير البري وشحم الدب من كل واحد ثمان اواق يطبخ الجميع بالشراب علي نار لينه تم يفرغ في ما بارد يجمد تم يوخذ طرطير [على الهامش خراطين] مغسول بالشراب او بالما رطلان ويجفف على الطابق ويسحق تم يوخذ دماغ الخنزير البري وصندل احمر وموميا وحجر الدم من كل واحد اوقية عظم قحف الانسان وزن لوزتين ويكون القمر زايد النور في بيت الزهرة وان كانت الشمس في الميزان كان اجود ويسحق ما يقبل السحق ويخلط مع الباقي حتي يمتزج ويصير مرهما ويحفظ لوقت الحاجة

Cf. auch ES, p. 273.

<sup>41</sup> AT, fol. 52r, l. 18–24; ES, p. 273.

Usnea mit denen verwechselt, die nach der *Basilica Chymica* erst vorhanden sein müssen, wenn die Salbe zubereitet wird. So soll man nach der arabischen Vorschrift die Salbe zubereiten, wenn « der Mond zunimmt und im Zeichen der Venus steht. Wenn die Sonne in der Waage steht, ist es besser. »<sup>42</sup>

Die Auslassung der Usnea weist möglicherweise daraufhin, dass der Übersetzer die Wirkungsweise der Waffensalbe nicht verstanden hat. Wie Hartmann, der Kommentator der *Basilica Chymica*, erklärt, ist das Moos vom Schädel des Gehenkten die « Basis der Salbe », weil der Lebensgeist des Verstorbenen sich darin konzentrierte, sich mit dem Weltgeist vereine und in der Usnea niederschlage:

Sagen dannhero daß der Basis oder Satz dieser Waffensalben seye der Moos von eines erhängten Hirnschalen oder der coagulirte körperliche spiritus animalis, dann wann solche Malefitz Personen mit dem Strang erwürgt werden/so steigt die lebendig und natürliche Geister in das Haupt hinauff/und weiln sie wegen dicker Hirnschale nicht können hinauß kommen so werden sie mit dem animalischen zugleich under solchen Würgen eingesperret/verschlossen und gleichsam einem Gefängnuß so lang verwahrlich aufgehalten/biß sie mit der Zeit sich mit einander in ein Korpus vereinnigen und mit Gewalt herauß; dringen und die Hirnschal rings umb gleichsam überziehen. Wann alsdann der Mercurius oder der spiritus mundi von dem Neptuno durch den Regen/Thaw/Schnee/Reiff/ als eusserliche hierzu dienliche Mittel auff deß erhängten Hirnschalen außgegossen worden/so wächst darvon solcher Moos/welcher ist der Satz oder Basis dieser Arzney/welche alle drei Kräfte/als die animalische/vitalische und natürliche zugleich in sich begreiffet/welche er hernacher auch dieser Salben mittheilet.<sup>43</sup>

Diese Auslassung der Usnea oder deren Ersetzung durch die menschliche Hirnschale ist allerdings auf *al-Kīmiya' al-malakiyya* beschränkt. In *Ġāyat al-itqān fī tadbīr badan al-insān* bleibt die Usnea Bestandteil der Vorschriften. Im Kapitel ‚De Unguento Armario‘ bei Sennert folgen mehrere Rezepturen aufeinander: die Rezeptur der *Archidoxis Magica* des Pseudoparacelsus, die der *Magia naturalis* von Giovanni Battista Della Porta, die Version der *Basilica Chymica* von Oswaldus Crollius, zwei Rezepturen aus der *Practica Germanica* von Oswaldus Gabelchoverus<sup>44</sup> und zuletzt eine Rezeptur aus Johann Colers *Oeconomia*<sup>45, 46</sup>. Der

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., fol. 52r.

<sup>43</sup> OSWALDUS CROLLIUS. *Chymisch Kleynod: Hie bevor zwar außgangen Jetzo aber durch den Hochgelehrten Johan Hartmannum M.D. gemehrt, verbessert/ mit notwendigen Notis spagyricis zu Erläuterung der Artzneyen/ geziert/ vnd zum Ersten mal/ neben dem Hermetischen Wunderbaum/ in Truck außgangen/ allen Doctoren, Apotecken/ Laboranten, Balbierern vnd männlichen sehr dienlich vnd nützlich*, Frankfurt a. M. 1647, p. 384–385, fn. 6.

<sup>44</sup> Die beiden Rezepturen unterscheiden sich in der Verwendung von Wildschweinfett alleine oder Wildschwein- mit Bärenfett in Kombination. Es handelt sich wahrscheinlich um Johannes Gabelkover (1539–1616), den Arzt, Heraldiker und Historiker. Ein Werk mit dem Titel *Practica*

Übersetzer lässt die Rezepturen der *Archidoxis Magica* und die von Giovanni Battista Della Porta, die menschliches Blut und Fett enthalten, außer Acht.

Die Rezeptur von Crollius aus *De Unguento Armario* übersetzt Nīqūlawus zwar, allerdings nimmt er sie nicht in das Kapitel über Wunden auf, sondern integriert sie in das Kapitel über Salben in der zweiten Abhandlung von *Gāyat al-itqān*. Diese Rezeptur enthält kein menschliches Blut und Fett, aber Mumia. Die Zutaten stimmen folglich mit dem Text von Crollius überein, nicht aber mit dem Text in *al-Kīmiyā' al-malakiyya*. Die astrologischen Gegebenheiten während des Sammelns der Usnea sind hier genauer wiedergegeben. Die einzige Ungenauigkeit besteht darin, dass im arabischen Text nur von einem « getöteten Menschen » (*insān maqtūl*), im lateinischen Text dagegen von einem « gewaltsam verstorbenen Menschen » (*hominis violenta morte*) die Rede ist. Somit ist aus der Textvorlage bei Sennert, bei der es sich um ein direktes Zitat aus Crollius *Basilica Chymica* handelt, genauere Übersetzungsarbeit geleistet worden. Die Abweichungen in den arabischen Texten zur Waffensalbe in *al-Kīmiyā' al-malakiyya* und *Gāyat al-itqān* gehen also nicht auf Unterschiede im lateinischen Text zurück. Sie sind auch nicht auf einen frühen Abschreibfehler bei *al-Kīmiyā' al-malakiyya* zurückzuführen, der sich in späteren Abschriften etabliert hätte, denn die Textüberlieferung ist ziemlich einheitlich.<sup>47</sup> Man könnte daraus folgern, dass zwei Übersetzer am Werke gewesen sein müssen. Wenn man jedoch dem Vorwort des Ibn Sallūm zugeschriebenen Antidotariums (*Aqrabādīn*)<sup>48</sup> Glauben schenkt, war Nīqūlawus an der Übersetzung beider Werke beteiligt:

Dies ist das Buch des anerkannten und in dieser Zeit, im Jahr 1092 H. im gesegneten Monat Ramaḍān, verwendeten Antidotariums (*Aqrabādīn*). Wir begannen damit, dieses Buch auf Verlangen des vorzüglichsten der Hochgebildeten zu vervollständigen, nämlich des Obermedicus in diesem

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*germanica* von Gabelkover konnte ich nicht identifizieren. Gabelkover schrieb jedoch ein ‚Arzneibuch‘, welches im Jahr 1594 in zwei Teilen erschien. Siehe PAUL FRIEDRICH VON STÄLIN, « Gabelkover, Oswald », in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. VIII, Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig 1878, p. 290–291, <<https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd124602509.html> - adbcontent> (30. November 2018).

<sup>45</sup> Es handelt sich wahrscheinlich um *Oeconomia Ruralis et Domestica* des lutherischen Pfarrers Johann Colerus (gest. 1639), ein weitverbreitetes Werk mit zahlreichen Auflagen in Mainz, Wittenberg, Frankfurt a. M. und Leipzig. Siehe HEINZ HAUSHOFER, « Coler, Johann », in *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. III, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1957, p. 319, <<https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd10008723X.html#ndbcontent>> (30. November 2018).

<sup>46</sup> SENNERT, *Liber Quintus Practicae Medicinae*, p. 435–438.

<sup>47</sup> Alle von mir untersuchten Handschriften der *aṭ-Ṭibb al-Kīmiyā'ī* sowie die Edition von Schehadeh zeigen eine einheitliche Textüberlieferung, vor allem im Hinblick auf die Vorschrift der Waffensalbe (cf. BACHOUR, *Oswaldus Crollius*, p. 379–380; ES, p. 273–274).

<sup>48</sup> Das Wort *Aqrabādīn* wird hier durch ‚Antidotarium‘ und nicht etwa durch ‚Dispensatorium‘ oder ‚Handbuch für zusammengesetzte Arzneimittel‘ wiedergegeben, um die frühneuzeitlichen Ursprünge des Werks hervorzuheben (cf. BACHOUR, *Oswaldus Crollius*, p. 72–82).

erhabenem Reich, möge Gott ihn auf Ewigkeit erhöhen, ich meine Ṣāliḥ Efendī ibn Naṣrullāh al-Ḥalabī: ‚Ich wünschte mir sehr das Buch der fränkischen Ärzte‘. Wir übersetzten zuerst das Buch von *Sanarṭūs* dem Germanen, das für die Behandlung sämtlicher Krankheiten genügt. Danach übersetzten wir das Buch *aṭ-Ṭibb al-Kīmyāʿī* und fassten es zusammen; danach übersetzten und vervollständigten wir dieses Buch bis zur siebten Abhandlung. Dann ist er in die Ewigkeit eingegangen, Gott erbarme sich seiner und vergebe ihm.<sup>49</sup>

Allerdings erzeugt Nīqūlāwus' Verwendung der ersten Person Plural eine gewisse Unklarheit: Entweder ist es im Sinne eines Bescheidenheitspluralis zu verstehen, so dass Nīqūlāwus die Übersetzung allein anfertigt hätte, was wegen des Umfangs von Sennerts Werken nicht plausibel scheint, oder er übersetzte in Kooperation mit anderen Bearbeitern. Möglicherweise ist also Redaktionsarbeit (*iḥṭaṣarnā*, wörtl. wir fassten zusammen) an *aṭ-Ṭibb al-Kīmyāʿī* für Abweichungen in der Übersetzung verantwortlich. Es ist aber auch nicht auszuschließen, dass der Übersetzer in größerem zeitlichem Abstand zweimal denselben Text aus zwei lateinischen Vorlagen übersetzte. Auffällig ist auch der uneinheitliche Umgang mit Synonymen, wie die Verwendung von zwei unterschiedlichen Ausdrücken bei der Übersetzung der lateinischen Bezeichnung *haematit* in zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Rezepturen der Waffensalbe des *Ġāyat al-itqān*, nämlich als *ḥaḡar ad-damm*, der Lehnübersetzung des griechischen *αίματίτης* und ein paar Zeilen weiter als *šādanaḡ*, dem persischen Fremdwort.<sup>50</sup> Außerdem werden in der Version von *Ġāyat al-itqān* zusätzliche Details wiedergegeben, wie die Angabe zur Kochzeit und zum Alter der Tiere, von denen das Fett stammen sollte:

Die Planetensalbe (*marham kawākibī*): Man nehme je eine Unze Wildschwein- und Bärenfett, koche alles eine halbe Stunde in Rotwein, gieße es in kaltes Wasser und entnehme das im Wasser erstarrte Fett. Man nehme dann je eine Unze getrocknete geriebene Regenwürmer, Wildschweinhirn, rotes Sandelholz, Mumia und Blutstein sowie eine Drachme Moos vom Schädel eines getöteten Menschen (*ašinnat qaḥf ra's al-insān al-maqtūl*). Das Schweine- und das Bärenfett müssen beide von alten Tieren entnommen werden. Das Moos muss entnommen werden, wenn der zunehmende

<sup>49</sup> Istanbul, Süleymaniye-Bibliothek, Baḡdadlı Vehbi Nr. 1374, fol. 1v:

هذا كتاب الاقربادين المعتمدة المستعمله في هذا الزمان في سنة اثنين وتسعين والفي شهر رمضان المبارك وقد شرعنا في تكميل هذا الكتاب بالحاح بعض افاضل الحذاق وهو رئيس الأطباء بهذه الدولة العلية اعلاه الله سرمدنا اعني صالح افندي ابن نصر الله الحلبي قد رغبت غاية الرغبة في كتاب اطباء الافرنجي وترجمنا اولاً كتاب سنرطوس الجرمانى وهو كان في معالجات الامراض باسرها ثم ترجمنا واختصرنا الكتاب بطب الكمياوى ثم ترجمنا وكملنا هذا الكتاب إلى مقالة السابعة

Cf. BACHOUR, Oswaldus Crollius, p. 72–76.

<sup>50</sup> Zu Hämatit siehe: FABIAN KÄS, *Die Mineralien in der arabischen Pharmakognosie: eine Konkordanz zur mineralischen Materia medica der klassischen arabischen Heilmittelkunde nebst überlieferungsgeschichtlichen Studien*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2010, vol. I (Veröffentlichungen der orientalischen Kommission / Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur [Mainz], 54), p. 462.

Mond im Haus der Venus steht, auf gar keinen Fall aber im Haus von Saturn oder Mars, und die Sonne soll [im Haus] der Waage stehen.<sup>51</sup>

Zwei weitere Rezepturen, die keine Mumia und dadurch gar keine menschlichen Körpermaterialien enthalten, übernahm der Übersetzer im Kapitel über Wunden aus Sennerts *De Unguento Armario*, nämlich eine Rezeptur von Oswaldus Gabelchoverus und die Rezeptur von Johann Collier. Seine Wahl begründet der Übersetzer mit folgenden Worten:

Paracelsus, das Haupt der Iatrochemiker (*ra'īs al-aṭībā' al-kīmiyāwiyya*), erfand merkwürdige und wundersame Salben, die ohne Berührung der Wunden und Geschwüre wirken [...] Sie [die Iatrochemiker] mischten zu diesem Zweck Salben, deren Zubereitung schwierig ist, weil die meisten ihrer Bestandteile nicht leicht zu beschaffen sind. In diesem Buch führe ich diejenigen davon an, die man leicht besorgen kann.<sup>52</sup>

Anschließend werden die beiden Rezepturen aufgeführt:

Die Beschreibung einer Salbe, die Geschwüre und Wunden aus der Ferne (*al-qurūḥ wa-l-ḡurūḥ al-ḡā'iba*) heilt, indem man die Salbe auf einen Lappen oder ein Holzstück oder etwas anderes aufträgt, nachdem dies die Wunde des Patienten berührt hat. Man wiederholt das Vorgehen, bis der Kranke geheilt wird, selbst wenn er sich in einem anderen Land befindet. Man nennt diese Salben in der Sprache der Franken (*bi-l-ifranḡiyya*) 'Armāriyā'. Man nehme ein halbes Pfund Schweinefett (*šaḥm ḥinzīr*), je zwei Unzen getrocknete Regenwürmer (*ḥarātīn*) und Blutstein (*šādanaḡ*), je drei Unzen rotes Sandelholz (*šandal aḥmar*) und Beinwell (*sanfītīs*) sowie Menschen-Hirnschalen-Moos (*ašinnat qahf al-insān*) so viel eben vorhanden ist (*mā wuḡida minhā*). Daraus bereite man mit Rotwein eine Salbe.

Eine ähnliche Salbe: Man nehme ein Pfund mit Rotwein gewaschenes Schweinefett (*šaḥm ḥinzīr maḡsūl bi-š-šarāb*), eine Unze Blutstein (*ḥaḡar ad-dam*), sechs Drachmen rotes Sandelholz (*šandal aḥmar*), zwei Drachmen getrocknete Regenwürmer (*ḥarātīn*) und Menschen-Hirnschalen-Moos (*ašinnat qahf al-insān*), so viel man findet (*mā wuḡida min ḍalik*). Man mische daraus eine Salbe und verwende

<sup>51</sup> ḠI, fol. 59r, l. 16–22:

مرهم كواكبى يؤخذ شحم الخنزير البرى وشحم الدب من كل واحد اوقية يطبخ الجميع في الشراب الاحمر مقدار نصف ساعة ثم يقلب في الماء البارد ثم يؤخذ الشحم المنجمد في الماء ثم يؤخذ الخراطين المجفف المسحوق ودماع الخنزير البرى وصندل احمر وموميا وشاندنج من كل واحد اوقية اشنة قحف رأس الانسان المقتول درهم ويجب ان يكون شحم الخنزير وشحم الدب من خنزير ودب كبيزى السنّ ويجب ان تؤخذ الاشنة في زيادة نور القمر وليكن القمر في بيت الزهرة ويحذر من كونه في بيت زحل او بيت المريخ ولتكن الشمس في الميزان ويصنع من ذلك مرهما

Cf. SENNERT. *Liber Quintus Practicae Medicinae*, p. 436, col. I, sowie CROLIUS. *Basilica Chymica*, p. 278.

<sup>52</sup> ḠI, fol. 297r, l. 12–13, 19–20:

وقد اخترع براكلسوس رئيس الاطباء الكيمياوية مراهم غريبة عجيبة تفعل في الجراحة والقروح من غير مباشرة القرحة والجراحة [...] وقد ركبو لذلك مراهم عسرة التركيب لعدم تيسر اكثر اجزائها وقد اثبتنا في هذا الكتاب منها ما هو قريب تناول فمن ذلك

sie wie die erste. Man soll diese Arzneien zubereiten und mischen, wenn die Sonne [im Haus] der Waage, bevorzugt in ihrem zehnten oder elften Grad, steht.<sup>53</sup>

Im Vergleich zur Rezeptur von Crollius fehlen in beiden Rezepturen die Bestandteile Mumia, Bärenfett und Schweinehirn. Gemäß der Bemerkung des Übersetzers müssen diese Ingredienzien ebenso wie menschliches Blut und Fett schwierig zu beschaffen gewesen sein. Interessanterweise wurde die Bemerkung von Johannes Wittich (geb. 1537–1596)<sup>54</sup> ins Arabische übersetzt, der sogar das Moos als wirksamen Bestandteil anzweifelt:

Der Arzt Ġuwānis (Johannes) sagt, er habe dafür das Schweinfett mit jenen Arzneien getestet, ohne das Moos vom Schädel eines Menschen oder sein Blut oder irgendeinen [menschlichen] Bestandteil hineinzurühren: ‘Ich stellte jenen wundersamen Nutzen ohne Wirkungsabnahme fest’.<sup>55</sup>

Dies wirft die Frage auf, ob nicht gerade diese Notiz dazu führte, dass der Übersetzer dann in dem nach *Ġāyat al-itqān* entstandenen Werk *al-Kīmīyā al-malakiyya* in der Rezeptur der Waffensalbe absichtlich auf die *Usnea* verzichtete.

Nun wenden wir uns einer leichteren Frage zu, nämlich wie Mediziner im Osmanischen Reich des 17. Jahrhunderts überhaupt Menschen-Hirnschalen-Moos (*ašinnat qahf al-insān*) und weitere menschliche Körpermaterialien beschaffen konnten.

<sup>53</sup> ĠI, fol. 297r, l. 22–297v, l. 3:

صفة مرهم يلحم الفروح والجروح الغائبة بوضع المرهم على خرقة او دفة او شيء آخر الأصق على جراحة العليل ويكرر العمل حتى يبرأ العليل وان كان في بلد آخر ويقال لهذه المراهم بالافرنجية ارماريا يؤخذ شحم خنزير نصف رطل خراطين محقق وشادنج من كل واحد او قيتان صندل احمر وسنفيطس من كل واحد ثلاث اواق اشنه قحف الانسان الميت ما وجد منها يعمل مرهما بالشراب صفة مرهم آخر كالاول يؤخذ شحم خنزير مغسول بشراب احمر رطل حجر الدم اوقية صندل احمر ستة دراهم خراطين محقق درهمان اشنه قحف الانسان ما وجد من ذلك يعمل مرهما ويستعمل كالاول قلوا ويجب ان يكون عمل هذه الادوية وتركيبها والشمس في الميزان وخصوصا في الدرجة العاشرة والحادية عشر منه

Die erste Rezeptur stammt von Colerus und die Zweite von Gabelchoverus (cf. SENNERT. *Liber Quintus Practicae Medicinae*, p. 438, col. I). Das Wort *ġā'ib* hat zwei Bedeutungen: ‘abwesend, nicht da’ oder ‘verborgen, unsichtbar’. Die erste Bedeutung ist in diesem Kontext relevant. Allerdings wird *ġā'ib* als Synonym zum Ausdruck *min ġayr mubāšara* also ‘ohne Berührung’ oder ‘ohne Auftragen auf die Wunde’, i.e. ‘aus der Ferne’, eingesetzt.

<sup>54</sup> Johann Wittich studierte zu Jena und Wien Medizin, praktizierte dann als Stadtarzt in Eisleben und als Leibmedicus bei Graf Albrecht VII. von Schwarzburg in Arnstadt. Siehe [N. N.], « Wittich, Johannes », in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. XLIII, Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig 1898, p. 635, <<https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118880578.html#adbcontent>> (30. November 2018); FRIEDRICH/MÜLLER-JAHNCKE, *Geschichte der Pharmazie*, p. 132.

<sup>55</sup> ĠI, fol. 297v, l. 3–5:

وقال جوانس الطبيب قد جرب لذلك شحم الخنزير مع تلك الادوية من غير ضم اشنه قحف الانسان او دمه او شيء من اجزائه ورأيت تلك الفائدة الغريبة من غير نقصان في التأثير

Cf. SENNERT. *Liber Quintus Practicae Mediciae*, p. 438, col. I.

Das Menschen-Hirnschalen-Moos kann gezüchtet werden, indem man den Hirschädel eines gehängten Menschen eine Zeitlang dem Regen aussetzt.<sup>56</sup> Es wird sogar in pharmazeutischen Schriften vor gefälschtem, nicht in freier Luft gewachsenem Moos gewarnt, das manche « von den verstorbenen Köpfen in den Bein- und Totenhäusern abklauben und als Usnee verkaufen, welche doch billig von den aufgepfälhten, gehängten oder auf Rad gelegten Menschenköpfen herrühren sollte. »<sup>57</sup> Geiger identifizierte die Droge als die botanischen Arten Lichen saxatilis L. (Steinflechte) und Lichen omphalodes L. (Nabelflechte).<sup>58</sup> Man verwendete das Menschen-Hirnschalen-Moos gegen Blutflüsse und Epilepsie.<sup>59</sup> Gegen Blutungen sollte die Droge nicht nur innerlich, sondern auch äußerlich helfen, indem man sie in den Händen hielt.<sup>60</sup> Von einer positiven Wirkung berichtet Robert Boyle, der die Droge gegen eigene Nasenblutungen testete, indem er das Moos eine gewisse Zeit in der Hand hielt. Zur Überraschung aller Anwesenden wurde die Blutung schnell gestoppt.<sup>61</sup>

Das Menschen-Hirnschalen-Moos (*ašinnat qaḥf al-insān*) wurde in die arabische und osmanische medizinische Literatur erst durch Übersetzungen aus dem Lateinischen eingeführt.<sup>62</sup> Es ist zu bezweifeln, dass im Osmanischen Reich Usnea

<sup>56</sup> WOLFGANG SCHNEIDER, *Lexikon zur Arzneimittelgeschichte Sachwörterbuch zur Geschichte der pharmazeutischen Botanik, Chemie, Mineralogie, Pharmakologie, Zoologie*, vol. V/3: Pflanzliche Drogen P-Z, Govi-Verlag, Frankfurt a. M. 1974, p. 375.

<sup>57</sup> Zitat von Valentini aus dem Jahr 1714 nach SCHNEIDER, *Lexikon zur Arzneimittelgeschichte*, vol. V/3, p. 375.

<sup>58</sup> PHILIPP LORENZ GEIGER, *Handbuch der Pharmacie: zum Gebrauche bei Vorlesungen und zum Selbstunterrichte für Ärzte, Apotheker und Droguisten*, vol. III: Pharmazeutische Botanik, Erberhard Friedrich Wolters, Stuttgart 1830 (Zitat nach SCHNEIDER, *Lexikon zur Arzneimittelgeschichte*, vol. V/3, p. 376. Die Bezeichnung 'Moos' ist aus heutiger Sicht falsch, da diese beiden Arten zu den Flechten gehören. Moose sind Grünpflanzen, Flechten dagegen sind symbiotische Organismen, die aus Pilzen und Algen bestehen. Flechten können im Gegensatz zu Moosen auf sterilen Böden wie Steinen und Felsen wachsen (cf. HERMANN P. T. AMMON, *Hunnus: Pharmazeutisches Wörterbuch*, neu bearbeitet und erweitert von Arthur Burger und Helmut Wachter, de Gruyter, Berlin 1998<sup>3</sup>, p. 826, col. I und p. 241, col. I).

<sup>59</sup> SCHNEIDER, *Lexikon zur Arzneimittelgeschichte*, vol. V/3, p. 375–376; Siehe zur medizinischen Anwendung von *Usnea cranii humani*: MICHAEL E. MITCHELL, « Contentious Cures: The Rise and Decline of Lichens as European Materia Medica », *Pharmacy in History*, 57/3–4 (2015), p. 55–66; PAOLO MODENESI, « Skull Lichens. A Curious Chapter in the History of Phytotherapy », *Fitoterapia*, 80 (2009), p. 145–148.

<sup>60</sup> SCHNEIDER, *Lexikon zur Arzneimittelgeschichte*, vol. V/3, p. 375.

<sup>61</sup> Siehe direktes Zitat bei SUGG, *Mummies*, p. 60.

<sup>62</sup> Als Simplicium ist Moos in arabischen medizinischen Werken aus Mittelalter und Neuzeit unter der Bezeichnung *ašinna* oder *ašnān* zu finden, jedoch nicht das Menschen-Hirnschalen-Moos. Cf. etwa AL-ḤUSAYN ABŪ 'ALĪ IBN SĪNĀ. *al-Qānūn fi ṭ-ṭibb ta'lif al-Ḥusayn Abū 'Alī Ibn Sīnā*, ed. IDWĀR AL-QAŠŠ, intr. 'ALĪ ZĪ'ŪR, vol. I, Mu'assasat 'Izz ad-Dīn li-ṭ-ṭibā'a wa-n-našr, Beirut 1987, p. 645; DĀ'ŪD IBN 'UMAR AL-ANTAKĪ, *Taḍkirat ūlī l-albāb wa-l-ġāmi' li-l-'aġāb al-'uġāb*, ed. AḤMAD ŠAMS AD-DĪN, vol. I, Dār al-Kutub al-'ilmiyya, Bayrūt 1971, p. 49; 'ABDALLĀH IBN MUḤAMMAD AL-AZDĪ AŞ-ŠUḤĀRĪ. *Kitāb al-*

aus Menschen-Hirnschalen ohne Reibungen mit der Obrigkeit gewonnen wurde, denn dies hätte erfordert, Leichen auszugraben oder eine gewisse Zeit unter freiem Himmel, am besten bei Regengüssen, liegen zu lassen. In einem durch das islamische Recht dominierten Gebiet wären solche Praktiken zumindest illegal gewesen.<sup>63</sup> Das islamische Recht definiert das Bestatten als Pflicht einer hinreichenden Anzahl (*farḍ kifāya*) und schützt die Unversehrtheit des menschlichen Körpers (*hurma*), sowohl des lebendigen als auch des toten, jedoch lässt es ausnahmsweise einen gewissen Spielraum zu, der durch gerechtfertigtes Interesse der Lebendigen gegenüber den Toten oder durch das Gemeinwohl begründet werden muss: « Mutilation of the corpse (*muthla*) is strongly prohibited and any encroachment on the body – dead or alive – must be justified by necessity (*ḍarūra*) or public interest (*maṣlaḥa*) ». <sup>64</sup> Eine gewisse Diskrepanz zwischen den islamrechtlichen Regelungen und der Praxis kam allerdings vor, wie Savage-Smith anhand des Sezieren von Leichen und von körperlichen Verstümmelungen in ihrem Artikel « Attitudes Toward Dissection in Medieval Islam » aufzeigt.<sup>65</sup> Wir können aber trotzdem davon ausgehen, dass die Züchtung von Usnea islamrechtlich als illegal zu betrachten war – obwohl selbstverständlich ein Verstoß nicht ausgeschlossen werden kann – und daher eher der Handel als Möglichkeit zum Erwerb von Usnea in Frage käme.

Schädel mit darauf gewachsener Usnea war im siebzehnten Jahrhundert eine Ware im internationalen Handel. Dabei stellte Irland einerseits wegen häufiger

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*māʾ: awwal muʿjam tibbī luḡawī fī t-tārīḫ*, ed. HĀDĪ ḤASAN ḤAMMŪDĪ, vol. I, Wizārat at-Turāṭ al-Qawmī wa-t-ṭāqāfa, Oman 1996, p. 63–64.

<sup>63</sup> Zu islamischen Begräbnisritualen und entsprechenden Bestimmungen siehe: HOSSEIN MAHDAVI MANESH, NAJAM ABBAS, « Burial », in WILFERD MADELUNG, FARHAD DAFTARY (eds.), *Encyclopaedia Islamica*, Online edition <[http://dx.doi.org/ubproxy.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/10.1163/1875-9831\\_isla\\_SIM\\_05000042](http://dx.doi.org/ubproxy.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/10.1163/1875-9831_isla_SIM_05000042)> (4. März 2019); JUAN EDUARDO CAMPO, « Burial », in JANE DAMMEN MCAULIFFE (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān*, Georgetown University, Washington DC. Online edition <[http://dx.doi.org/ubproxy.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/10.1163/1875-3922\\_q3\\_EQSIM\\_00065](http://dx.doi.org/ubproxy.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/10.1163/1875-3922_q3_EQSIM_00065)> (4. März 2019). Auch wenn das Osmanische Reich als multiethnisches und multireligiöses Reich gilt, das christlichen und jüdischen Religionsgemeinschaften eine gewisse Autonomie gewährte, unterlagen diese Freiheiten gewissen Restriktionen (siehe dazu: MICHAEL URSINUS, « Millet », in PERI BEARMAN, THIERRY BIANQUIS, CLIFFORD EDMUND BOSWORTH, EMERI VAN DONZEL, WOLFHART PETER HEINRICHS (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Online edition 2012, <[http://dx.doi.org/ezproxy.uzh.ch/10.1163/1573-3912\\_islam\\_COM\\_0741](http://dx.doi.org/ezproxy.uzh.ch/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0741)> (4. März 2019); sowie AVIGDOR LEVY, « Millet », in NORMAN A. STILLMAN (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World*, Online edition 2010 <<https://referenceworks-brillonline-com.ezproxy.uzh.ch/entries/encyclopedia-of-jews-in-the-islamic-world/millet>> (4. März 2019).

<sup>64</sup> BIRGIT KRAWIETZ, « Body, in law », in KATE FLEET, GUDRUN KRÄMER, DENIS MATRINGE, JOHN NAWAS, EVERETT ROWSON (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three*, Online edition 2012, <[http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912\\_ei3\\_COM\\_23722](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_23722)> (04. Dezember 2018). Siehe auch EMILIE SAVAGE-SMITH, « Attitudes Toward Dissection in Medieval Islam », *The Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences*, 1/50 (1995), p. 67–110, hier p. 75–79.

<sup>65</sup> SAVAGE-SMITH, « Attitudes », p. 100–110.

Kriege und Massaker, andererseits aufgrund von geeigneten klimatischen Bedingungen einen wichtigen Lieferanten dar.<sup>66</sup> Der französische Apotheker Pierre Pomet (1658–1699) berichtet in seinem *Histoire générale des drogues* über den Handel mit moosbedeckten Schädeln aus Irland durch englische Drogisten:

The english Druggists, especially those of London, sell the Heads or Skulls of the Dead, upon which there is a little greenith Moss, which is call'd Usnea [...] The same Druggists send to foreign Countries, especially Germany, these Skulls cover'd with Moss, to put into the Composition of the sympathetick Ointment, which Crollius describes in his Royal Chymist.<sup>67</sup>

In Europa hergestellte Arzneien und Drogen wurden auch in Galata, im europäischen Teil Istanbuls, in Drogerien verkauft. So berichtet Ibn Sallūm in seinem auf Osmanisch-Türkisch verfassten medizinischen Werk *Gāyet ül-beyān fī tedbīr beden il-insān* (Die klarste Explikation der Behandlung des menschlichen Körpers) von Pessaren aus Wachs, mehreren chemiatrischen Präparaten und Heilpflanzen, die aus Westeuropa (*Frengistān*) stammten und in Galata feilgeboten wurden.<sup>68</sup> Daher ist es nicht auszuschließen, dass Usnea in Galata ebenfalls käuflich zu erwerben war.

Was die Mumia angeht, so wird in der Croll'schen Rezeptur die Bezeichnung *mūmiyā* ohne weitere Attribute angegeben, was bei osmanischen Ärzten eventuell für Missverständnisse sorgen konnte. In arabischen Schriften ab dem dreizehnten Jahrhundert wurden dagegen mehrere Sorten der Droge unterschieden.<sup>69</sup> Die wichtigsten sind die in Berghöhlen Persiens gesammelte Sorte, die sogenannte *mūmiyā ma'danī* (die mineralische Mumia), und die in Gräbern gefundene Mumia, die sogenannte *mūmiyā qubūrī* (Gräbermumie), womit die schwärzliche Harzsubstanz gemeint ist, die zur Balsamierung der Leichname verwendet wurde und aus Aloe, Myrrhe, Pech und weiteren aromatischen Stoffen bestand.<sup>70</sup> Durch Missverständnisse bei Übersetzungen aus dem Arabischen ins Lateinische wurde die Gräbermumie, mit der im arabischen Schrifttum die

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<sup>66</sup> SUGG, *Mummies*, p. 101–103. Im achtzehnten Jahrhundert erhob England eine Steuer auf den Handel mit Schädeln, und zwar pro importierten Schädel einen Schilling (Ibid., p. 237).

<sup>67</sup> PIERRE POMET, JOSEPH PITTON DE TOURNEFORT, NICOLAS LÉMERY. *A Compleat History of Druggs: written in French by Monsieur Pomet, chief druggist to the present French king; to which is added what is further observable on the same subject, from Messrs. Lemery and Tournefort, divided into 3 classes, vegetable, animal and mineral, with their use in physick, chymistry, pharmacy and several other arts; done into English from the originals*, Bonwicke, London 1737<sup>3</sup>, p. 229.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. BACHOUR, Oswaldus Crollius, p. 58–60.

<sup>69</sup> Zu *Mūmiyā*-Sorten siehe NATALIA BACHOUR, « *Mūmiyā* als Arznei im arabischen und osmanischen Schrifttum », in Susanne Kurz, Claudia Preckel, Stefan Reichmuth (eds.), *Muslim Bodies: Body, Sexuality and Medicine in Muslim Societies. Körper, Sexualität und Medizin in muslimischen Gesellschaften*, LIT, Berlin 2016, p. 407–465.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 426–429, 439–443.

Balsamierungssubstanz gemeint war, als der mumifizierte Körper verstanden und so kam es zur Verwendung der ägyptischen Mumie, i.e. des mumifizierten Fleisches, als Arznei in Europa.<sup>71</sup> Die ägyptische Mumie wurde in der frühen Neuzeit aus Ägypten importiert, jedoch in arabischsprachigen Regionen nicht medizinisch verwendet.<sup>72</sup> Allerdings scheint die menschliche Mumie in der Neuzeit auch im Osmanischen Reich verwendet worden zu sein. Ihre erste Erwähnung als Arznei ist nachweisbar in Dāwūd al-Anṭākī (gest. 1599) Werk *Tadhkirat ūlī l-albāb wa-l-jāmi' li-l-'ajab al-'ujāb* (Erinnerung an die Verständigen und Sammlung der bewundernswertesten [Dinge]). Er lehnt jedoch ihre Anwendung aus medizinischen Gründen ab: « Das aber, was von diesen Knochen [der menschlichen Mumien] verwendet wird, ist schädlich. Man soll es vermeiden, weil Menschenknochen den Körper verderben, indem sie zu Blindheit oder Sehschwäche führen. »<sup>73</sup>

Eine weitere Art der Mumia wurde in Europa durch Paracelsus in die Heilkunde eingeführt, nämlich die sympathetische Mumia oder *mumia hominis*, deren Zubereitung aus einem frisch verstorbenen jungen Mann in der *Basilica Chymica* erläutert wird.<sup>74</sup> Interessanterweise ließ der Übersetzer die Zubereitungsmethode von Crollius komplett außer Acht, jedoch übertrug er die Zubereitungsvorschrift des Specificums *Theriaca de mumia* unter der Überschrift

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 441–442.

<sup>72</sup> Gefälschte Mumien gelangten nach Europa, die in Ägypten durch Betrüger präpariert wurden. Davon berichtet der Mediziner Guy de la Fontaine, der eine Reise nach Ägypten unternahm, im Zusammenhang mit der Begegnung mit einem jüdischen Händler in Alexandria im Jahr 1564, welcher mit gefälschten Mumien Handel trieb. Dieser erklärte de la Fontaine seine Präparationsmethode der Leichen und « [He] added that he himself marvelled how the Christians, so dainty mouthed, could eat of the bodies of the dead. » Demnach war die Droge bei Muslimen oder Juden, wenn man das Wort im engeren Sinne versteht, oder unter den Einwohnern Ägyptens, wenn man unter 'Christians' die 'Europäer' versteht, nicht in Gebrauch (cf. THOMAS JOSEPH PETTIGREW, *A History of Egyptian Mummies: and an Account of the Worship and Embalming of the Sacred Animals by the Egyptians*, Longman et al., London 1834, p. 8). Pomet erwähnt den Bericht von Guy de la Fontaine in seiner *Histoire générale des drogues* (POMET, DE TOURNEFORT, LÉMERY. *History of drugs*, p. 228). Außerdem berichtet der ägyptische Chronist Ibn Iyās von zwei Betrugsfällen im Kairo des 15. und frühen 16. Jahrhunderts in seiner Chronik *Badā'i' al-zuhūr fī waqā'i' al-duhūr* (Die schönsten Blüten der epochalen Ereignisse). In beiden Fällen wurden die Kriminellen angezeigt, weil sie Gräber schändeten und das Fleisch der Tote an Franken verkauften, die Mumien daraus hergestellt hätten. (siehe MUḤAMMAD B. AḤMAD B. IYĀS AL-ḤANAFĪ. *Badā'i' al-zuhūr fī waqā'i' al-duhūr: Die Chronik des Ibn Ijās*, vol. IV, ed. MUḤAMMAD MUṢṬAFĀ, Franz Steiner, Kairo 1960<sup>2</sup>, p. 275, l. 7–19; die deutsche Übersetzung des Textes ist zu finden bei Bachour, 'Mūmiyā', p. 442–443). Johann Helffrich berichtete 1565, dass Mumien aus Ägypten nur exportiert wurden, woraus zu schließen ist, dass die menschliche Mumie keine übliche Droge für Einwohner Ägyptens war (siehe SUGG, *Mummies*, p. 74).

<sup>73</sup> DĀWUD B. 'UMAR AL-ANṬAKĪ, *Tadhkirat ūlī l-albāb wa-l-jāmi' li-l-'ajab al-'ujāb, wa-bi-hāmišhi al-Nuzha al-mubhiḡa fī tašhīḡ al-aḡḡhān wa-ta'dīl al-amziḡa li-l-mu'allif aydan*, vol. I/2, al-Maktaba al-thaqāfiyya, Bayrūt [s. a.], p. 325–326.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. CROLLIUS. *Basilica Chymica*, p. 257–258; BACHOUR, *Oswaldus Crollius*, p. 173–174.

*tiriyāq al-mūmiyā' al-insānī* (Theriak der menschlichen Mumie) ins Arabische. Dafür soll ein halbes Pfund getrocknete, geruchlose menschliche Mumie (*al-mūmiyā' al-insānī*) mit Weinspiritus extrahiert und zu den übrigen Zutaten hinzugefügt werden, die in Art und Menge im arabischen und lateinischen Text übereinstimmen.<sup>75</sup> Daraus kann geschlossen werden, dass die eigene Zubereitung der menschlichen Mumie seitens osmanischer Ärzte eher ausgeschlossen war, jedoch war es möglich, die fertig hergestellte Droge zu erwerben.

Damit wenden wir uns der Frage zu, ob die Verwendung der menschlichen Mumie als Arznei im Osmanischen Reich akzeptiert wurde. Der Rechtsgelehrte Ebüssü'ūd Efendi (gest. 1574) verfasste Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts zwei Fatwas zur menschlichen Mumie:<sup>76</sup> Im ersten verbietet er die medizinische Nutzung des Leichnams eines Menschen, der testamentarisch seinen Körper zur Verwendung als Mumie (*mūmiyā*) bestimmt hat, selbst wenn es den Muslimen nutzen würde;<sup>77</sup> im anderen untersagt er den Verkauf von *mūmiyā* aus menschlichem Fleisch.<sup>78</sup> Die religiösen und islamrechtlichen Restriktionen bezüglich der Zubereitung der menschlichen Mumie können auf die Bestimmungen zur Unversehrtheit des menschlichen Körpers (*ḥurma*)<sup>79</sup> oder auf die Vorstellungen von körperlicher Auferstehung (*ba't*)<sup>80</sup> zurückgeführt werden, allerdings gibt Ebüssü'ūd Efendi keine Begründungen für seine Beurteilung.

Jedoch beweisen mehrere Einkaufslisten der Palastverwaltung in Istanbul zum Erwerb von Zutaten für Arzneien, dass *mūmiyā ādamī* (menschliche Mumie) tatsächlich durch den Handel erhältlich war.<sup>81</sup> Außerdem wird in mehreren pharmazeutischen Schriften des siebzehnten und achtzehnten Jahrhunderts die Verwendung der Droge erwähnt.<sup>82</sup> Diese Texte waren allerdings von einem ablehnenden Ton durchzogen, der sich entweder auf jegliche medizinische Anwendung bezog oder aber nur auf die innerliche Applikation. Unter osmanischen Ärzten scheint sich aber ein Konsens herausgebildet zu haben, die

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<sup>75</sup> Cf. AṬ, fol. 50r–50v; ES, p. 265–266; CROLLIUS. *Basilica Chymica*, p. 257–258; BACHOUR, *Oswaldus Crollius*, p. 173–174.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. MEHMET ERTUĞRUL DÜZDAĞ (ed.), *Şeyhülislâm Ebussuud Efendi fetvaları ışığında 16. asır türk hayatı*, Enderun Kitabevi, İstanbul 1983<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>79</sup> Zur *ḥurma* (körperlichen Unversehrtheit) in Bezug auf den toten menschlichen Körper siehe BIRGIT KRAWIETZ, *Die Ḥurma: schariatrechtlicher Schutz vor Eingriffen in die körperliche Unversehrtheit nach arabischen Fatwas des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1991 (Schriften zur Rechtstheorie, 145), p. 116–147. Zwar bilden Fatwas aus dem 20. Jahrhundert den Gegenstand von Krawietz' Untersuchung, jedoch beziehen sich die darin aufgeführten Argumentationen und Präzedenzfälle z. T. auch auf ältere Rechtstexte.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. BACHOUR, « *Mūmiyā* », p. 453–454; SAVAGE-SMITH, « *Attitude* », p. 100–110.

<sup>81</sup> İstanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Cevdet Sıhhiye 1434 und Cevdet Saray 437.

<sup>82</sup> BACHOUR, « *Mūmiyā* », p. 451–454.

innerliche Anwendung zu unterlassen, doch die äußerliche zuzulassen.<sup>83</sup> Da die Waffensalbe, die Mumia enthält, nicht zur innerlichen Einnahme vorgesehen war, wäre sie also hinsichtlich der Zutaten von osmanischen Medizinern akzeptiert worden.

#### IV. Vergleich der Anwendungsbeschreibung

Die Anwendung der Waffensalbe erklärt Crollius im Abschnitt *Usus & Vires Unguenti huius Sympathetici* im Allgemeinen. Die Passage wurde gerafft ins Arabische übertragen, wobei der Übersetzer einige Details ausließ, wie unterschiedliche Anwendungsmöglichkeit bei Mann und Frau und die Kontraindikationen:

<i>Basilica Chymica</i> in deutscher Übersetzung nach Hartmann <sup>84</sup>	<i>al-Kīmiyā' al-malakiyya</i> in meiner deutschen Übersetzung <sup>85</sup>
Durch diese Salbe werden alle Wunden/Sie seyen gleich durch Pfeil, Kugeln/Stechen/Werffen/oder wie sie wöllen/verursacht/in Manus und Weibs Personen (jedoch also/daß keine Narven/Lufft Adern/oder eins auß den dreyen fürnembsten Gliedmassen des Leibs verletzt sey) geheylet/wann man nur die Waffen/damit der Schaden geschehen/haben kann/es sey der Patient selbst so weit von dannen/als er immer wölle. Und gleich wie sie von ihrer Natur zuheylet/vereytert und vernewert/also kopmt sie auch nach Gebühr gebraucht/allen bösen Zufällen vor.	Diese Salbe heilt alle Wunden, seien sie durch Schwert, Pfeil, Gewehr, Kanonkugel oder Stein verursacht, in welchem Körperteil sie auch immer sein mögen. Sie ist ein Wunder, denn sie heilt die Wunden ohne sie berühren zu müssen; vielmehr wird diese Salbe auf ein Holzstück oder auf ein Tuch aufgetragen, auf dem sich etwas Blut von dieser Wunde befindet.

Anschließend gibt Crollius im Abschnitt *Observationes* auf zweieinhalb Seiten ausführliche Anweisungen zur Anwendung der Salbe. Die meisten Abschnitte ließ der Übersetzer aus, etwa die Angaben zur Richtung beim Auftragen der Salbe auf die Waffe, zum Geschlechtsverkehr während der Behandlungszeit, oder zur

<sup>83</sup> BACHOUR, « Mūmiyā », p. 451–454.

<sup>84</sup> CROLLIUS, *Chymisch Kleynod*, p. 380; Cf. CROLLIUS, *Basilica Chymica*, p. 279.

<sup>85</sup> AT, fol. 52v, l. 1–3; ES, p. 273:

وهذا المرهم يبيري جميع الجراحات سوا كانت من السيف والنصل والتوفنك والطوب والحجر في اي عضو كانت وهو من العجايب فانه يبيري الجراحات من غير احتياج الي مماسها بان يوضع هذا المرهم علي حشيشه [ الصبح خشبية ] او خرقة عليها شي من دم تلك الجراحات

Empfehlung, Beinwell (*symphytum major*) oder Nieswurz (*helleborum niger*) der Salbe beizumischen, wenn die Verletzung mit Frakturen kombiniert ist. Außerdem wurden die Prognosemethoden ausgelassen, durch die der Arzt vorhersieht, ob der Patient sterben oder genesen wird und ob der Verwundete die diätetischen Anweisungen des Arztes befolgt. Zuletzt übergibt der Übersetzer Crollius' Hinweis, dass die Waffensalbe auch Pferde heilt, wenn ein Hufnagel in das Fleisch hineinsticht, indem man nach der gleichen Vorgehensweise verfährt und die Salbe auf den Nagel aufträgt.<sup>86</sup> Die Anweisungen, die der Übersetzer ins Arabische übertrug, wurden sowohl in *al-Kīmiyā' al-malakiyya* als auch in *Ġāyat al-itqān* zusammengefasst wiedergegeben, indem man wiederum auf Details verzichtete. So lauten die entsprechenden Passagen in *al-Kīmiyā' al-malakiyya*:

Diese Salbe wird auf das Schwert oder Messer oder die Speerspitze oder auf die aus der Wunde entfernte Kugel oder den herausgezogenen Pfeil aufgetragen, welcher die Wunde verursacht hat, und geschützt vor Kälte und Hitze an einen wohltemperierten Ort gelegt. So wird der Verwundete geheilt.

Wenn die Wunde oder das Geschwür trocken ist, wird es mit einer Rute, einem Holzstück oder einem Lappen zur Blutung gebracht, und darauf wird die Salbe aufgetragen.

Wenn die Wunde tief ist, wird dieser Vorgang wiederholt, und die Salbe wird auf dem Holzstück oder Lappen erneuert, so wie sie üblicherweise auf einer Wunde erneuert wird. Auf die Wunde werden keine Medikamente aufgetragen, sondern es wird nur ein sauberer Lappen oder ein mit dem Urin des Verwundeten getränkter Lappen auf die Wunde gelegt.<sup>87</sup>

Bei der Beschreibung der Anwendung ist der Text in *Ġāyat al-itqān* sogar noch knapper gefasst. So lautet die vollständige Vorschrift zur Anwendung der Waffensalbe, die den Abschnitten *Usus* und *Observationes* entsprechen, im Kapitel über Salben in *Ġāyat al-itqān*:

Man stelle daraus eine Salbe her, die alle Wunden heilen kann, wenn weder Arterie noch Nerv am Ort der Verletzung durchtrennt sind, nämlich indem sie bei großen Wunden zweimal täglich und bei kleinen Wunden einmal alle zwei Tage auf die Waffe aufgetragen wird, die die Wunde verursacht hat. Wenn die Waffe nicht vorhanden ist, entnehme man mittels eines Holzstückes Blut aus der Wunde und trage die Salbe wie bei der Wundbehandlung so oft auf, bis die Wunde heilt. Man

<sup>86</sup> CROLLIUS. *Chymisch Kleynod*, p. 380–382; Cf. CROLLIUS. *Basilica Chymica*, p. 280–282.

<sup>87</sup> AT, fol. 52v, l. 3–9; ES, p. 273:

وان وضع هذا المرهم على السيف الذي جرح به او السكين او النصل او الرصاصه المخروجه من الجرح او النشابيه المخرجه منه ووضع في مكان معتدل مصون عن الحر والبرد فان صاحب الجراحه يبيري وان كانت القرحة يابسه ادميت بعود او بخشيشه [هكذا والصح بخشبية] او بخرقه ثم يوضع المرهم على ايها كان وان كان عميقاً كرر وغير المرهم على تلك الخرقه او الخشيشه [هكذا والصح الخشبية] كما يغير على الجرح في العاده ولا يوضع على الجرح شي من الادويه غير خرقه نضيفه او تبل الخرقه ببول المجروح وتوضع على الجرح

umwickle die Waffe oder das Holzstück mit einem sauberen Tuch, schütze es vor Staub und lege sie an einen Ort von gemäßigter Temperatur.<sup>88</sup>

Im Kapitel über Wunden ist die Anwendungsvorschrift sogar knapper gehalten als man erwarten könnte, da gerade dieses Kapitel an Ärzte gerichtet ist. Sie lautet:

[...] man entnimmt mit einem Tuch, Holzstück, flachen Gegenstand oder Eisenstück ein wenig [Blut] des Verwundeten und trägt die Salbe auf diese [Gegenstände] wie auf eine Wunde auf. Man wechselt von Zeit zu Zeit [den Verband] wie man normalerweise Salben auf Geschwüren und Wunden von neuem aufträgt. Die Wunde und das Geschwür des Verwundeten werden geheilt, selbst wenn er sich in einem anderen, weit entfernten Land befindet.<sup>89</sup>

Demnach ist hier dasselbe zu beobachten wie bei der Übersetzung der Abschnitte zu den Ingredienzien. Der Übersetzer liefert bei der Übersetzung desselben Textes abweichende Translate, was vor allem durch Selektion, Auslassung und Zusammenfassung von Textinhalten zustande kommt. Auffällig bei der Übersetzungsweise aller Textversionen ist die Straffung des Textes durch die Beschränkung auf das Notwendige und Pragmatische.

#### V. Vergleich der Begründung der Wirkung

Die Waffensalbe und das sympathetische Pulver lösten in Europa eine heftige Debatte über ihre Wirkungsweise aus, genauer gesagt über die Frage, ob diese Wirkung durch *magia naturalis* oder *magia illicita* bzw. *magia daemoniaca* verursacht wird.<sup>90</sup> Die Wirkung durch Zauberei bestreitet Crollius in der *Basilica Chymica*: « Per Veneficia non perficitur hac cura ». <sup>91</sup> Auch der Eklektiker Sennert erläutert im Kapitel *De Unquento Armario* die Argumente gegen eine diabolische

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<sup>88</sup> GI, fol. 59r, l. 22-27:

ويصنع من ذلك مرهما فانه ينفع من جميع الجراح اذا لم ينقطع هناك شريان او عصب اذا وضع على الة القطع في اليوم مرتين ان كان الجرح كبيرا وفي كل يومين مرة ان كان الجرح صغيرا فان لم توجد الالة يؤخذ من دم الجرح على دفة ثم يوضع المرهم على تلك الدفة كما يوضع على الجراح حتى يبرأ الجرح ويجب ان تلف الالة او الدفة في خرقة نظيفة وتوقى من الغبار وتوضع في مكان معتدل في الحرارة والبرودة

<sup>89</sup> GI, fol. 297r, l. 12-16:

وقد اخترع براكلسوس رئيس الاطباء الكيماوية مراهم غريبة عجيبة تفعل في الجراحة والقروح من غير مباشرة القرحة والجراحة بان يؤخذ شيء من اثر العليل لخرقة الأصقث على جراحته او خشبة او دفة او قطعة من حديد ثم يلصق هذا المرهم على احدى هذه المذكورات كما يلصق على الجراحة ويغير كل وقت كما يغير المرهم على القرحة والجراحة في العادة فان جراحة العليل وقرحته تبرا ولو كان في بلد آخر له مسافة بعيدة

<sup>90</sup> Zur Waffensalbe siehe die zusammenfassende Darstellung bei Müller-Jahncke (MÜLLER-JAHNCKE, « Magische Medizin », p. 46-54); Zum sympathetischen Pulver siehe ZILLER-CAMENIETZKI, « Poudre », p. 290-304.

<sup>91</sup> CROLLIUS. *Basilica Chymica*, p. 279.

oder durch dämonische Vermittlung erzielte Wirkung und schreibt nach einem Zitat von Johann Coller: « Si veró adhibito isto medicamento, vulnus aliquod gravissimum sanetur, quod si naturae vires omnino superare videatur, vi ipsius daemonis ex pacto seu explicito seu implicito ad curationem hanc allecti id accidit. »<sup>92</sup> Die Textabschnitte, in denen der Verdacht auf Zauberei oder das Bestreiten einer Einwirkung diabolischer Kräfte thematisiert wird, beachtet der Übersetzer allerdings weder bei der Übersetzung aus Crollius' Werk noch aus dem Sennerts.

Crollius erklärt die Wirkung der Salbe durch drei Effekte: Erstens durch die *sympathia Naturae*.<sup>93</sup> Zweitens durch die Influenz der Himmelskörper,<sup>94</sup> indem die Kräfte der Gestirne in der materiellen Welt in bestimmten Stoffen, nämlich Usnea und Mumia, gebunden und durch Sympathie in die Wunde transferiert werden, drittens durch den Balsam, der mit dem *virtus* der Heilung versehen in jedem Menschen vorliegt,<sup>95</sup> so dass durch die Wirkung der Waffensalbe die eigene Selbstheilungskraft durch Stärkung des Lebensbalsams im Blut angeregt und dadurch die Wunde geheilt wird.

Der Übersetzer entstellt Crollius' Begründungen, indem er die Wirkung ausschließlich auf die *ḥawāss* (die okkulten Eigenschaften) durch Vermittlung der Weltseele (*rūḥ al-ālam*)<sup>96</sup> zurückführt. Die Erklärung durch Suggestion ist zudem

<sup>92</sup> SENNERT. *Liber Quintus Practicae Medicinae*, p. 447, col. I.

<sup>93</sup> CROLLIUS. *Basilica Chymica*, p. 279.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 279.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 279.

<sup>96</sup> Die Frage, was osmanische Gelehrte unter dem Begriff *rūḥ al-ālam* (Weltseele) im 17. Jahrhundert verstanden, geht über den Rahmen dieses Artikels hinaus, da die naturphilosophischen Schriften der Zeit größtenteils unerforscht sind. Ich begnüge mich daher mit einem Verweis auf das enzyklopädische Werk *Rasā'il ihwān as-ṣafā' wa-ḥillān al-wafā'* (die Episteln der lauterer Brüder und treuen Freunde) aus der 2. Hälfte des zehnten Jahrhunderts. Das Werk soll alle bekannten Wissenschaften der Zeit umfassen und ist von neuplatonischem und pythagoreischem Gedankengut geprägt. Das Werk war trotz seiner unorthodoxen Züge sowohl im Mittelalter als auch in der frühen Neuzeit stark verbreitet. Dies belegen die mehr als hundert immer noch erhaltenen Abschriften sowie die Übersetzung des Werks ins Persische in der frühen Neuzeit (GODEFROID DECALLATAÏ, « Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al-Ṣafā') », in KATE FLEET, GUDRUN KRÄMER, DENIS MATRINGE, JOHN NAWAS, EVERETT ROWSON (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three*, Online edition 2013, <[http://dx.doi.org/ubproxy.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/10.1163/1573-3912\\_ei3\\_COM\\_25372](http://dx.doi.org/ubproxy.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_25372)> (2. März 2019). In der zwanzigsten Epistel über das Wesen der Natur (*fi māhiyyat aṭ-ṭabī'a*) wird der Terminus *rūḥ al-ālam* (Weltseele) als 'die Universelle Seele' (*an-nafs al-kullīyya*) erklärt, die alle geschaffenen Dinge durchdringt, sie miteinander verbindet und lenkt: « Know, O my brother, may God help you and us through a spirit coming from him, that nature is one of the faculties of the Universal heavenly Soul, and that they are effused in all the bodies that are under the sphere of the moon, from the sphere of Ether to the extreme centre of the earth. [...] This faculty, namely, nature, is effused in all of them as light is effused in air. It puts each of them [the bodies that are under the sphere of the moon] on motion and in rest, and orders and brings each of them to completeness and perfection [...] And know, oh my brother, [...] that the Universal Soul is the spirit of the world and that nature is her act, that the

in der lateinischen Vorlage bei Crollius nicht zu finden. So lautet der Text in *al-Kīmiyā' al-malakiyya*:

Einige mögen diese Wirkung [der Waffensalbe] bestreiten und sagen, die Natur behandle und heile sie [die Wunde] vor allem, wenn ein Glaube (*i'tiqād*) an die Wundheilung durch diese merkwürdige und wundersame Salbe hinzukomme. Dadurch werde die Natur (*ṭabī'a*) wiederbelebt, sodass sie die Wunde kuriere und heile. Die Sache ist aber nicht so, wie sie behaupten. Die okkulten Eigenschaften (*ḥawāṣṣ*) der Dinge sind nämlich nicht zu leugnen, denn die Wirkung dieser Salbe entsteht aufgrund einer ihr innewohnenden okkulten Eigenschaft (*ḥāṣṣiyya*) durch die Vermittlung der Weltseele (*rūḥ al-'ālam*), ebenso wie bei der Wirkung des Eisens auf den Magneten.<sup>97</sup>

Im Kapitel *De Unguento Armario* stand dem Übersetzer eine Fülle von Wirkungserklärungen zur Auswahl, die der Eklektiker Sennert zusammengetragen hatte, jedoch entschied er sich für eine knappe, stichwortartige Darstellung. So lautet die Begründung der Wirkung in *Gāyat al-itqān*, die ausschließlich im Kapitel über Wunden angegeben ist:

Die Wirkung dieser Salben ist außergewöhnlich, als sei sie durch okkulte Eigenschaften [verursacht] (*ka'annahū min al-ḥawāṣṣ*). Crollius sagt: „Diese Salben wirken auf Wunden und Geschwüre aus der Ferne durch die Vermittlung der Weltseele (*rūḥ al-'ālam*) oder durch den Einfluss der Planeten (*ta'tīr al-kawākib*), während deren Konjunktionen (*ittiṣālāt*) die Salben hergestellt worden sind, oder durch die spezifische Form (*ṣūra naw'iyya*) mittels des Zusammenfügens (*inḍimām*) und der Mischung (*imtizāḡ*) jener Drogen. Es wird auch gesagt, dass diese Wirkung durch Sympathie (*muṣābaha*) [entstehe], da diese Salben aus dem menschlichen Körper stammende Bestandteile oder Zutaten enthalten, die zu Teilen des menschlichen Körpers eine Sympathie aufweisen.“<sup>98</sup>

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four elements are the matter subject to her, that the spheres and stars are like her tools, and that minerals are her products – all that by the Creator's will, high be His praise» (BRETHREN OF PURITY, *On the Natural Sciences: an Arabic Critical Edition and English Translation of Epistles 15–21*, ed. CARMELA BAFFIONI, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, p. 285).

<sup>97</sup> AṬ, fol. 52v, l. 9–13; ES, p. 273–274:

وقد ينكر هذا التأثير قوم يقولون ان الطبيعيه تدبره خصوصًا اذا انضم الى ذلك اعتقاد انه يبيري من هذا الجرح بهذا النوا الغريب العجيب فيحصل للطبيعه انتعاش فتصلح الجرح وتبريه وليس الامر كما زعموا فان خواص الاشيا لا تنكر فان فعل هذا المرهم بخاصية فيه بتوسط روح العالم كما يفعل الحديد في المغناطيس

<sup>98</sup> GĪ, fol. 297r, Z. 16–20:

وتأثير هذه المرهم امر خارق للعادة وكانه من الخواص وقال قروليوس وانما تؤثر تلك المرهم في القروح والجراح الغائبة بتوسط روح العالم او بتوسط تأثير الكواكب التي يصنع المرهم في وقت اتصالاتها او بتوسط الصورة النوعية الحاصلة من انضمام تلك الادوية بعضها الى بعض وامتزاجها وقيل ذلك التأثير بالمشابهة لما في هذه المرهم من اجزاء بدن الانسان او من المشابه اجزاء بدن الانسان

Zwar erwähnt der Übersetzer in *Ġāyat al-itqān* die Wirkungsinterpretation durch *forma specifica*<sup>99</sup> und durch den Einfluss der Planeten, jedoch ist die Darstellung so knapp, dass der Leser vermutlich die zugrunde liegenden Konzepte nicht durchschauen würde. Außerdem übergang er die auf der Korpuskulartheorie basierende Erklärung, welche die Wirkung durch unsichtbare Atome deutet, die sich mit der Luft vermischen und zur Wunde des Patienten gelangen, wo sie dann ihre Heilwirkung entfalten.<sup>100</sup>

In beiden Werken, *al-Kīmiyā' al-malakiyya* und *Ġāyat al-itqān*, fällt auf, dass Magie bei der Begründung der Wirkungsweise gar nicht zur Sprache kommt. Dafür werden die Sympathie oder die okkulten Eigenschaften (*ḥawāṣṣ*) in den Vordergrund gestellt. Um den Begriff der *ḥawāṣṣ* im Kontext der Zeit verstehen zu können, soll ein Zeitgenosse Ibn Sallūms zitiert werden, nämlich Ḥāğğī Ḥalīfa (1609–1657), der das umfangreiche wissenschaftskundliche und bibliographische Lexikon *Kaṣf az-zunūn 'an asāmī al-kutub wa-l-funūn* (die Beseitigung aller Unklarheiten über Buchtitel und Wissenschaftszweige) über alle ihm bekannten Wissensgebiete und Bücher verfasste.<sup>101</sup> Darin finden sich zwei Einträge zu *ḥawāṣṣ*:

1. « Die Lehre von den okkulten Eigenschaften der Medikamente und Simplicia. [Sie wirken] wie die Anziehung von Eisen und Magnet. [Taṣköprizāde] ordnet diese Lehre der Magie zu. Da die einfachen Leute die Ursachen davon nicht kennen können, zählt man sie zur Magie. Du aber weißt, dass ihre Unwissenheit kein Grund dafür ist, sie zur Magie zu rechnen. »<sup>102</sup>
2. « Es handelt sich um eine Wissenschaft, die die okkulten Eigenschaften der Gottesnamen, der Heiligen Bücher und der Gebete untersucht. Jeder dieser Namen und jedes der Gebete besitzt seine eigenen okkulten Eigenschaften. »<sup>103</sup> Außerdem finden die okkulten Eigenschaften der Zahlen, der Buchstaben, der Namen Gottes, der Koransuren, der Sternbilder und Planeten, der Metalle und Mineralien, der Pflanzen, der Tiere, der Klimate sowie von Land und Meer Erwähnung.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Darunter ist das spezifisch und verborgen Wirkende zu verstehen, das durch die aristotelische *Forma specifica* begründet wird. Zum Begriff von *ṣūra naw'iyya* siehe BACHOUR, *Oswalduns Crollius*, p. 341–344.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. SENNERT. *Liber Quintus Practicae medicinae*, p. 442.

<sup>101</sup> ḤĀĞĞĪ ḤALĪFA, *Kaṣf az-zunūn 'an asāmī āl-kutub wa-l-funūn = Lexicon bibliographicum et encyclopaedicum a Mustafa ben Abdalla Katib Jelebi dicto et nomine Haji Khalfa celebrato compositum: primum edidit latine vertit et commentario indicibusque instruxit Gustavus Fluegel*, ed. RICHARD BENTLEY, Bentley, London–Leipzig 1835–1858, p. 1835–1858.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, col. 79.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, col. 725.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, col. 725–726.

Ḥāḡḡī Ḥalīfa benutzte also den Begriff *ḥawāṣṣ* für ganz unterschiedliche Kontexte, sowohl naturwissenschaftliche als auch religiöse. Die Begründung der Wirkung der Waffensalbe durch die *ḥawāṣṣ* würde also plausibel und religiös akzeptabel erscheinen. Außerdem würde die Salbe nicht in den Verdacht der Zauberei (*siḥr*) geraten, die im religiösen Recht verboten (*muḥarram šar'an*) und die Ḥāḡḡī Ḥalīfa als « dasjenige, dessen Ursache verborgen und für die meisten durch Vernunft nicht zu erschließen ist », <sup>105</sup> definiert.

Außerdem war der Begriff *ḥāṣṣa* oder *ḥāṣṣiyya* (pl. *ḥawāṣṣ*) bereits im medizinischen Schrifttum der humoralpathologischen arabischen Medizin im Mittelalter etabliert und von Gelehrten wie 'Alī b. Sahl Rabban aṭ-Ṭabarī (gest. ca. 870), Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī (gest. 925), Ibn Sīnā (gest. 1037) oder Ibn Rušd (gest. 1198) im Sinne einer spezifischen Eigenschaft definiert worden, die man nicht durch rationale Schlüsse oder Anzeichen, sondern nur durch die Wahrnehmung ihrer Wirkung auf ein bestimmtes Objekt erkennen kann. <sup>106</sup>

Heilmittel und weitere Mittel mit einer eher technischen Anwendung wie Färben oder Fischfang, die durch ihre *ḥawāṣṣ* wirken, wurden sogar in gesonderten Handbüchern gesammelt, wie im *Kitāb al-ḥawāṣṣ* von Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī. <sup>107</sup> Ein weiterer Ausdruck kennzeichnete ebenfalls die ‚durch Erfahrung erprobten‘ Mittel, nämlich *muḡarrabāt*. <sup>108</sup> Unter dieser Bezeichnung entstand eine Literaturgattung, die eine Sammlung von ‚durch Erfahrung bestätigten Rezepten‘ umfassen sollte, nach dem Urteil von Ullmann war sie jedoch ein ‚Aushängeschild, das den betont superstitiösen und magischen Charakter der Rezepte kaschieren soll.‘ <sup>109</sup> Trotz der Obskurität einiger Anwendungen und Mittel scheinen die erprobten Mittel (*muḡarrabāt*) eine gewisse Wertschätzung unter Gelehrten in neuzeitlichem Istanbul genossen zu haben. Kein geringer als der Obermedicus des Osmanischen Reiches Ibn Sallūm al-Ḥalabī schließt sein dem Sultan Mehmed IV. gewidmetes Werk *Ġāyet ül-beyān fī tedbīr beden il-insān* (Die klarste Explikation der Behandlung des menschlichen Körpers) mit einem

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, vol. I, col. 980.

<sup>106</sup> Siehe LUCIA RAGGETTI, *ʿIsā ibn ʿAlī's Book on the Useful Properties of Animal Parts: Edition, Translation and Study of a Fluid Tradition*, de Gruyter, Berlin-Boston 2018 (Science, Technology, and Medicine in Ancient Cultures, 6), p. XIV-XVI; BACHOUR, *Oswaldus Crolius*, p. 330-334; sowie DIETLINDE GOLTZ, « Zu Begriffsgeschichte und Bedeutungswandel von *vis* und *virtus* im Paracelsistenstreit », *Medizinhistorisches Journal*, 5 (1970), p. 169-200.

<sup>107</sup> Siehe LUCIA RAGGETTI, « *The Science of Properties and its Transmission* », in JUSTIN CALE JOHNSON (ed.), *In the Wake of the Compendia: Infrastructural Contexts and the Licensing of Empiricism in Ancient and Medieval Mesopotamia*, de Gruyter, Berlin-Boston 2015 (Science, technology, and medicine in ancient cultures, 3), p. 159-176.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. MANFRED ULLMANN, *Die Medizin im Islam*, Brill, Leiden 1970 (Handbook der Orientalistik, 1. Abt., 6/1), p. 311-312. Siehe AḤMAD IBN-IBRĀHĪM IBN AL-ĠAZZĀR, *Die Risāla fī l-Ḥawāṣṣ des Ibn al-Ġazzār: die arabische Vorlage des Albertus Magnus zugeschriebenen Traktats De mirabilibus mundi*, ed. FABIAN KĀS, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2012 (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 79).

<sup>109</sup> ULLMANN, *Medizin im Islam*, p. 311.

Abschnitt ‚Über einige mit okkulten Eigenschaften versehene Mittel‘ (*baʿz-i ḥavāṣṣlar beyānindadur*). So schreibt er etwa:

Das Essen eines Hasenkopfes nützt durch seine okkulten Eigenschaften gegen Zittern von Hand und Fuß und gegen Paralyse. Das Essen eines Taubenküchens nützt durch seine okkulten Eigenschaften gegen Hirnschlag, Schwäche und Steifheit von Organen. Wenn man Nelken gründlich zerstoßt und auf das rasierte Haupt streut, wird man vor Katarrhen sicher sein.<sup>110</sup>

Zusammenfassend kann festgehalten werden, dass weder die neuen Konzepte noch die Debatten über die Wirkungsweise der Waffensalbe den Übersetzer zu interessieren schienen, sondern er auf das bestehende und anerkannte Interpretationsmuster der *ḥawāṣṣ* zurückgriff. Dies gilt auch für die erwähnte Verwendung des Vitriols durch den fränkischen Arzt. Dort werden die Stoffe und die Vorgehensweise erklärt, aber keine Interpretation der Wirkung gegeben, abgesehen davon, dass nicht beliebiges Vitriol für eine Fernwirkung verwendet wird, sondern nur das unter Sonnenlicht behandelte, damit es die Astralkräfte zu sich ziehe. Damit wird wiederum das pragmatische und praxisorientierte Moment in der Übersetzungsprozedur ersichtlich.<sup>111</sup>

## VI. Zusammenfassung

Im siebzehnten Jahrhundert ließ der osmanische Obermedicus Ibn Sallūm al-Ḥalabī medizinische Werke aus dem Lateinischen ins Arabische übersetzen. Dadurch gelangten mehrere Vorschriften der Waffensalbe unter der Bezeichnung *marham Ūmāriyā*, *marham Armāriyā* oder *al-marham al-kawākibī* (Planetensalbe) in die Werke *al-Kīmiyāʾ al-malakiyya* und *Ġāyat al-itqān fī tadbīr badan al-insān* sowie in ihre osmanischen Übersetzungen. Die Übersetzungsvorlagen waren das Kapitel « De Unguento Armario » in Daniel Sennerts *Liber Quantus Practicae Medicinae* und das Kapitel « Unguentum sympatheticum seu stellatum Paracelsi » in Oswaldus

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<sup>110</sup> Istanbul, Süleymaniye-Bibliothek, Köprülü 1/975, fol. 299r, l. 1–5:

طوشان باشنى بيمك خاصيتله الى وا ياغى دترينه و فلجه فائده ايلر كوكرجن ياوروسى بيمك خاصيتله سكته يه واعضا  
كوشكلكنه واعضا اويو شقلغنه نافعدر قرنغلى محكم دوکوب بعد الترائش باشنه اكسه لر نازله دن امين اوله

<sup>111</sup> Eine mögliche physiologische Wirkung der Waffensalbe entsprechend heutigen naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen, die gewiss mit dem historischen Verständnis in keinem Zusammenhang steht, wäre m. E. denkbar, wenn der Verwundete und der Gegenstand, auf dem die Salbe aufgetragen wird, sich im gleichen Raum befinden. Wie oben erwähnt sind Flechten symbiotische Organismen aus Pilzen und Algen, wobei sich der Pilz durch Sporen und die Alge durch Teilung vermehrt. Die Flechten enthalten antibiotisch wirkende Flechtensäuren wie die Usninsäure, die in den oben genannten Arten vorkommt (Cf. AMMON, *Hunnius*, p. 826, col. I; p. 1430, col. II). Denkbar wäre, dass die Sporen der Flechte im lauwarm gehaltenen Raum fliegen und sich auf die feucht gehaltene Wunde setzen, wo sie durch die Usninsäure eine antibiotische Wirkung entfalten könnten.

Crollius' *Basilica Chymica*. Das sympathetische Pulver wird in einem vom Übersetzer hinzugefügten Bericht über einen fränkischen Arzt erwähnt, der Vitriol (*az-zāğ*) zur Fernbehandlung von Wunden verwendete.

Der Übersetzer ging bei seiner Arbeit selektiv vor, indem er bestimmte Rezepturen oder Textstellen aussuchte und sie dann zusammenfassend ins Arabische übertrug. Bei der Rezeption stand die pragmatische Anwendungsorientiertheit im Vordergrund. Eine Adaptation an die Humoralpathologie ist festzustellen, indem der Begriff der *ḥawāṣṣ* zur Interpretation oder Legitimierung der Wirkung der Waffensalbe in den Vordergrund gestellt wurde. Eine Adaptation an die im Osmanischen Reich des 17. Jahrhunderts gegebenen rechtlichen und religiösen Bedingungen erfolgte durch die Auswahl derjenigen Rezeptversionen, die am wenigsten umstrittene Zutaten enthielten. Die magischen Konzepte, die die Wirkung der Waffensalbe begründeten, oder die Gelehrtendebatten über ihre Wirkungsweise waren für den Übersetzer am wenigsten interessant, was wiederum das pragmatische Moment bei der Rezeption hervorhebt.

Ob die Waffensalbe tatsächlich unter osmanischen Ärzten angewendet wurde, muss offen bleiben, da keine Fallberichte oder Einkaufslisten mit Menschen-Hirnschalen-Moos bekannt sind. In späteren Schriften, bei denen Autoren eine Auswahl von Rezepten aus den übersetzten arabischen oder osmanischen Werken traf, kam jedenfalls die Waffensalbe nicht vor. So erwähnt Ibn Sallūm die Waffensalbe nicht in seinem osmanischen Werk *Ġāyet ül-beyān fī tedbīr beden il-insān*, für dessen Abfassung er die für ihn angefertigten Übersetzungen aus dem Lateinischen nutzte. Auch die gekürzte osmanische Übersetzung *Mürşid ül-elibbā fī tercemet ispağiryā*, in die der Übersetzer eine Auswahl von Rezepten aus *al-Kīmiyā' al-malakiyya* aufnahm, enthält die Vorschrift der Waffensalbe nicht.

Ein ungewisser Aspekt im Zusammenhang mit dem Übersetzungsprozess der Ibn Sallūm zugeschriebenen Werke ist durch diese Untersuchung hervorgetreten. Der Vergleich der arabischen Translate mit der lateinischen Übersetzungsvorlage zeigt Abweichungen in der Übertragung derselben Textpassagen aus zwei unterschiedlichen lateinischen Werken, was die Frage aufwirft, ob mehrere Personen an der Übersetzung beteiligt waren. Die Beantwortung dieser Frage würde zum Verständnis der Übersetzungskultur im Osmanischen Reich des siebzehnten Jahrhundert beitragen, und vielleicht klären, ob Übersetzung stärker als individuelles oder als kollektives Werk anzusehen ist. Die Beantwortung dieser Frage bleibt ein dringendes Forschungsdesiderat.

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# ESTUDIO LINGÜÍSTICO DE *RISĀLAT AT-TAQRĪB WA-L-TASHĪL* DE IBN ĞANĀḤ DE CÓRDOBA\*

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## Resumen

Descripción lingüística del registro de la lengua árabe empleada por el filólogo hebreo Abū l-Walīd Marwān Ibn Ğanāḥ (Córdoba c. 975–Zaragoza d. 1035) en su obra *Risālat at-taqrīb wa-l-tashīl*.

## Palabras clave

Judeo-Árabe, Ibn Ğanāḥ, Dialectología árabe, Al-Andalus.

## Abstract

This article offers a description of the Arabic linguistic register used by the Hebrew linguist Abū l-Walīd Marwān Ibn Ğanāḥ (Cordoba c. 975–Zaragoza a. 1035) in his *Risālat at-taqrīb wa-l-tashīl*.

## Key Words

Judaeo-Arabic, Ibn Ğanāḥ, Arabic dialectology, Al-Andalus.



La reciente publicación de la edición diplomática y traducción de *Risālat at-taqrīb wa-l-tashīl* de Ibn Ğanāḥ<sup>1</sup> me sugiere completar ese volumen con un estudio

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\* Este trabajo se encuadra dentro del proyecto de investigación « Recuperación y estudio del legado lingüístico judeo-árabe de al-Andalus » (FFI2014-51818-P).

<sup>1</sup> AHMAD ALAHMAD ALKHALAF, JOSÉ MARTÍNEZ DELGADO, *Risālat at-taqrīb wa-l-tashīl de Abū l-Walīd Marwān ibn Ğanāḥ de Córdoba. Edición diplomática y traducción*, Sindéresis, Madrid 2018 (Colección Benito Arias Montano. Monografías, 4).

lingüístico del texto original que venga a sumarse a las iniciativas y aportaciones de otros especialistas dedicados al estudio del judeo-árabe empleado por este importante autor.<sup>2</sup> El siguiente estudio lingüístico actual se basará en la edición del manuscrito original de la obra (1453 de la biblioteca Bodleiana de Oxford), a través del cual intentaré abordar todos los casos reflejados en la *Risālah* que se apartan de la normativa clásica. No cabe duda alguna que Ibn Ġanāḥ tenía un nivel magnífico en lengua árabe, tal cual se refleja en la totalidad de sus obras, si bien esto no es excusa para suponer que las desviaciones del clásico que se reflejan en sus obras sean exclusivamente producto de los copistas, sino que pudieron ser cometidas por el propio autor.

La lectura de esta obra refleja que el autor o el copista intentaron ajustarse fielmente a la normativa del árabe clásico, y así, el nivel de árabe en esta obra es alto y por lo general coincide en su totalidad con la preceptiva clásica salvo en excepcionales ‘despistes’. El presente estudio, por tanto, está dedicado a todos esas desviaciones del autor o el copista y contrastarlas con su correspondiente forma normativa clásica. Dicho estudio seguirá la normativa fijada por la escuela de Jerusalén para el estudio de textos judeo-árabes medievales.<sup>3</sup> La mayoría de las características que esta escuela define como propias de un texto judeo-árabe se reflejan a la perfección en esta obra, desde el alfabeto utilizado a los préstamos léxicos, así como la presencia de pseudo-correcciones además un fiel reflejo del registro coloquial del árabe en determinadas formas. Sin embargo, mi intención en este estudio es, fundamentalmente, centrarme en los casos que se alejan del comportamiento del árabe clásico, descartando todos los casos que coinciden con el uso clásico.

## I. Ortografía y fonética

### I.1. Grafía

La grafía hebrea empleada en este texto es la denominada ‘arabizada’, predominante durante la época medieval para el judeo-árabe denominado ‘clásico’ y vigente entre los siglos X–XV.<sup>4</sup> Este tipo de sistema de escritura intenta con todas sus posibilidades adoptar todas las convenciones de la ortografía árabe clásica. A pesar de que la grafía arabizada intenta imitar la lengua árabe clásica en

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<sup>2</sup> Es el caso de MARÍA ÁNGELES GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval; Edición, traducción y estudio lingüístico del ‘Kitāb al-taswi’ā’ de Yonah ibn Ġanāḥ*, Peter Lang, Bern 2006 y JOSÉ MARTÍNEZ DELGADO, « *Risālat al-tanbīh* by Ibn Ġanāḥ. An Edition, Translation and Study », *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, 43 (2016), p. 309–355.

<sup>3</sup> JOSHUA BLAU, *A Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic* (en hebreo), The Magnes Press, Jerusalén 1995<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> A este respecto véase GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 18–24 y BLAU, *A Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 34–35.

su totalidad, se aprecia cierta influencia del sistema fonético que refleja la pronunciación.

## I.2. Vocalismo

### I.2.1. Vocales breves

Aparte del primer folio [116v],<sup>5</sup> donde su vocalización fue añadida por una mano posterior y tres casos más en otros folios a lo largo de la obra, nos encontramos ante un texto donde no hay reflejo alguno de estas vocales y, de haberla, es una vocalización bastante inestable. El autor de esta vocalización desconocía las reglas del árabe clásico. Son, en general, cambios /a/ < /u/ resultado de un desconocimiento de la flexión nominal y verbal:

Nominal: אלהים אלכרים [116v:6 *al-ḥalīma al-karīma* ‘longánimo magnánimo’] lo esperado en clásico es *al-ḥalīmu al-kārimu* con *ḍamma* según la norma del nombre que sucede el sustantivo *ayyuhā*.<sup>6</sup> Otro caso es גהלה [116v:18 ‘ignorancia’] y se esperaba *ḡahlu* por ser un predicado de la partícula *innaha*.<sup>7</sup>

Verbal: el prefijo del verbo imperfecto de la cuarta forma aparece vocalizado con *fath* יהזי [116v:8 *yaḥzī* ‘tener suerte con él’] y se esperaba יוזזי *yuhzī*, intuyo que se debe a la confusión entre la primera forma y la cuarta.<sup>8</sup> Igualmente se emplea la forma indicativo del imperfecto de la primera forma כשש [116v:9 *yaḥšā* ‘teme’] y se esperaba su forma pasiva שש [116v:9 *yuhšā* ‘se teme’].

a>i este caso refleja el desconocimiento del copista de la regla de la *hamza* en *innahu* y *annahu*: אנהא [116v:18 *annahā* ‘que’] con *fath* a pesar de suceder al verbo *fa-qāla* [‘y dijo’] cuando según la regla se esperaba *innahā*, con *kasr*.<sup>9</sup>

Finalmente, la vocalización aislada de וחקיליהם [119r:10 *wa-taqqīlahum* ‘el más importante’] reduplica inesperadamente la *qof* y además vocaliza con *fath* la *yod* que es una letra de alargamiento.

### I.2.2. Vocales largas

La grafía plena en general es conservadora y con un alto grado de fidelidad al árabe clásico, si bien encontramos casos donde el escriba emplea grafía plena donde no corresponde.

<sup>5</sup> Todas las referencias se corresponden con la foliación del manuscrito reflejada en la nueva edición de ALAHMAD ALKHALAF, MARTÍNEZ DELGADO, *Risālat at-taqrīb wa-l-tashīl*, p. 31–89.

<sup>6</sup> Véase YA’ĪŠ IBN YA’ĪŠ, *Šarḥ al-Mufaššal li-Zamaḥšarī*, vol. IV, Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmīya, Beirut 2001, p. 339.

<sup>7</sup> Así según Sībawayh y véase *Al-Kitāb, Kitāb Sībawayh Abī Bishr ‘Amr ibn ‘Uthmān ibn Qanbar*, ed. ‘Abd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, vol. III, Maktabat al-Ḥanḡī, El Cairo 1988, p. 120.

<sup>8</sup> BLAU, *A Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 74.

<sup>9</sup> *Kitāb Sībawayh*, vol. III, p. 142.

Destaca el pronombre demostrativo plural cercano האוּלִי [117r:20 *hā'ulā* 'aquellos'] < *ha'ul'a*. Esta es la forma utilizada en judeo-árabe para representar este pronombre<sup>10</sup> y así es también en los dialectos occidentales del árabe, mientras que los orientales imitan la grafía coránica.<sup>11</sup>

Lo mismo ocurre con el caso del verbo imperfecto yusivo de segunda radical débil ולם יקול [125v:3 *wa-lam yaqūl* 'no ha dicho'] < *wa-lam yaqul*. La conservación de la vocal larga en los verbos imperfectos yusivos se refleja con abundancia en los textos judeo-árabes.<sup>12</sup> Esto, sin duda alguna y como indica Gallego, se debe a su distanciamiento de la lengua árabe clásica, especialmente de sus modos y casos gramaticales.<sup>13</sup>

Lo mismo ocurre con el imperativo de verbos de tercera radical débil: ולם יכון [128r:7 'y no ha sido'] < *wa-lam yakun*; ולם יגיבה [136v:20 'no lo hizo lícito'] < *lam yuḡibhu*; ולם יקול [141r:15 'no ha dicho'] < *lam yaqūl*; y así también פאצגי [125v:19 'presta atención'] < *fa-iṣḡi*, donde el copista conserva la vocal larga en un verbo imperativo de tercera radical débil cuando según la norma del árabe clásico se debería suprimir.<sup>14</sup>

Los casos de yusivo donde se emplea la grafía plena pueden considerarse una hipercorrección, ya que el copista intentaría imitar la forma indicativa del verbo.

### 1.2.3. Grafía defectiva

Sólo he detectado dos casos de grafía defectiva. En el primer caso el copista recurrió a utilizar la escritura coránica para los nombres propios, sin que quede rastro de *alef*:<sup>15</sup> מרׁוּ marwan [116v:4 'Marwan'] < *marwān*.

El segundo caso es un verbo de tercera radical *hamza* que al conjugarlo en la tercera persona plural, debería estar escrito con dos *waw* aunque en este caso se refleja sólo una: חׁית שאׁוּא *ḥaytu šāū* [117v:3 'donde quisieron'] < *šā'ū*; la elisión puede ser de la *waw* de tercera persona del masculino plural o la de la *hamza* sobre *waw*, ya que no hay forma de discriminarlas ortográficamente.

### 1.2.4. *Alif maqṣūra*

Este fonema habitualmente se refleja en judeo-árabe por medio de *yod*, pero el escriba en este texto en seis casos la confunde con *alef mamdūda* debido a la

<sup>10</sup> MARÍA A. GALLEGO, « The *Kitāb al-Taswī'a* or *Book of Reprobation* by Jonah ibn Janāh. A Revision of J. and H. Derenbourg's Edition », *Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies*, 63/1 (2000), p. 94.

<sup>11</sup> ŠALAH AL-DĪN AL-MUNĠID, *Qawā'id Taḥqīq al-Maḥṭūṭāt*, Dār al-Kitāb al-Ġadīd, Beirut 1982, p. 20.

<sup>12</sup> JOSHUA BLAU, *A Grammar of Christian Arabic. Based Mainly on South Palestinian Texts from the First Millennium*, Secrétariat du Corpus, Louvain 1966, p. 185.

<sup>13</sup> GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 67.

<sup>14</sup> AHMAD B. MUHAMMAD AL-ḤAMLĀWĪ, *Šaḍā al-'Urf fī Fan Aṣ-Šarf*, Maṭba'at Dār al-Kutub al-Maṣryya, Caire 1927, p. 40.

<sup>15</sup> GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 62 y BLAU, *A Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 24–26.

coincidencia fonética de ambas. No es un fenómeno exclusivo de *alif maqṣūra*, ya que *alif mamdūda* también se intercambia con *alif maqṣūra*:<sup>16</sup> יֵשַׁהּ *yaḥšā* [116v:9 ‘teme’] < *yaḥšā*; אִתְּהָהּ *intahā* [120v:1 ‘ha terminado’] < *intahā*; יִחַשָׁהּ *yuhṣā* [121v:15 ‘se cuenta’] < *yuhṣā*; תַּחְפָּהּ *taḥfā* [124v:10 ‘oculta’] < *taḥfā*; וַיִּבְקַח *wa-yabqā* [132r:9 ‘queda’] < *wa-yabqā*; יִתְעַדָּהּ *yata‘adā* [142v:5 ‘ser transitivo’] < *yata‘adā*.

Viceversa, en dos casos *alif maqṣūra* sustituye a *alif mamdūda*: אֵלֵי תָרִי [132r:4 *alā tarā* ‘no ves’] < *alā tarā*;<sup>17</sup> הַכְדִּי [135r:20: *hākaḏā* ‘así’] < *hākaḏā*.

*Alif maqṣūra* sustituye a *hamza* sobre *waw* en אֶלְתַּוְאֻתִּי [123r:8 *al-tawāṭuā* ‘coincidencia’] < *al-tawāṭu‘ū*,<sup>18</sup> lo cual, sin duda alguna, se debe a la confusión con la forma del participio activo de la quinta forma (*al-mutawāṭiā*) que termina con *alif maqṣūra* cuando el infinitivo (*tawāṭ‘ū*) mantiene la terminación de *hamza* sobre *waw*.

### I.2.5. Consonantes

*Hamza*: La ausencia de *hamza fāṣila* es total en el manuscrito y su presencia es indicada por su soporte gráfico: *alef*, *yod* o *waw*.<sup>19</sup> A comienzo de palabra, *hamza* inicial se refleja sobre *alef* o debajo de ella, pero nunca sobre *yod* o *waw*:

*Hamza* inicial sobre *alef*: אָבִי [116v:3 *abī* ‘Abū’]; אֹהִיָּהּ [116v:6 *yayyuhā* ‘Oh’]; אֶפְצָלָ [116v:6 *aḫḏāla* ‘el más eminente’]; אֶרְפָּעָ [116v:7 *arfa‘a* ‘más elevada’]; אֶבְקָאָ [116v:9 *abqāka* ‘te guarde’]; אֶעֱנִי [116v:12 *a‘nī* ‘refiero’]; אֶגְאָזָ [117r:13 *aḡāza* ‘autorizó’]; אֶרְאָדָ [117v:19 *arāda* ‘quiere’]; אֶנְאָ [125v:18 *wa-anā* ‘yo’]; אֶבְדִּלָתָ [128v:5 *ubdilat* ‘se reemplazó’]. Los casos de *hamza* inicial son incontables, por lo que estos ejemplos son sólo muestras testimoniales.<sup>20</sup>

*Hamza* inicial bajo *alef*: אֵלֵיָהּ [116v:13 *ilayhi* ‘a él’]; אֵתֵיָאָן [116v:14 *ityān* ‘cumplir’]; אֵן [116v:10 *léase inna* ‘que’]; אֵנְהָהּ [116v:18 *léase innahā* ‘que ella’]; אֵוֹדָ [117r:10 *wa-idā* ‘sí’]; אֵלְהָמִי [116v:15 *ilhāmī* ‘inspirarme’]; אֵלְהָqִיחִי [122rv:13 *ilhāqihī* ‘anexionarle’]; אֵכְמָאֵלִי [126v:5 *ikmālī* ‘completarme’].<sup>21</sup> En estos casos, la ausencia de *hamza* crea la confusión de si debe ser reflejada gráficamente por encima o por

<sup>16</sup> GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 54–55.

<sup>17</sup> Véase además KARIMA A. EL-ARĀĪCHI AFIF, *El Libro de Homónimos, Kitāb al-Taḡnīs de Abū Zakariyya Yaḥyā Ibn Bil‘am, introducción, edición y traducción de los fragmentos árabes*, Tesis Doctoral, Universidad de Granada, 2012, p. 217.

<sup>18</sup> FEDERICO CORRIENTE, IGNACIO FERRANDO, *Diccionario Avanzado Árabe*, Herder, Barcelona 2005.

<sup>19</sup> JOSÉ MARTÍNEZ DELGADO, *Šelomo ben Mobarak ben Ša‘īr. Libro de la Facilitación. Kitāb at-taysīr (Diccionario judeoárabe de Hebreo Bíblico). Introducción, Edición, Traducción e Índices*, prólogo Federico Corriente, Editorial Universidad de Granada, Granada 2010, (Colección Textos: Lengua Hebrea, 8/1 y 8/2), vol. I, p. 37.

<sup>20</sup> ‘ABD AS-SALĀM MUḤAMMAD HĀRŪN, *Qawā‘id al-‘Imlā’*, Maktabat al-Anḡlū al-Maṣriyya, El Cairo 1993, p. 9–11.

<sup>21</sup> ŠAWQĪ DAYF, *Taḡdīd al-Naḥū*, Dār al-Ma‘ārif, El Cairo 1982, p. 55–56.

debajo de la letra, como en el caso de la partícula *anna* e *inna*. Los ejemplos de este tipo son muy numerosos.

Posición intermedia: en este caso se representa por medio del soporte gráfico, es decir, si es *alef* se escribe la *alef* sin que quede rastro gráfico alguno de la *hamza*, si es *waw* emplea *waw*, y si es *yā'* por medio de *yod*. En todo caso depende tanto de su vocalización como de la letra precedente, es decir, si está vocalizada con *fath*, se escribe sobre un *alef*.

Esto tipo de *hamza* puede interpretarse como una vocal larga debido a la ausencia de un signo que indique la presencia de *hamza*:

*Alef* 'a>ā: סאלתני [116v:8 *sāltanī* 'me has preguntado'] < *sa'altanī*; תאליף [116v:9 *tālīf* 'componer'] < *ta'līf*; ואסאל [116v:15 *wa-asālu* 'pido'] < *wa-as'alu*; מאכזה [118r:15 *māḥazihi* 'su significado'] < *ma'ḥazihi*; יאבהו [122r:18 *yābahū* 'hacen caso'] < *ya'bahū*. Estos ejemplos reflejan que *hamza*, cuando está vocalizada con *fath* después de *fath* o *sukun* o con *sukun* después de *fath*,<sup>22</sup> se escribe sobre *alef*; sin embargo, la ausencia del signo de *hamza* puede interpretarse como una vocal larga.

*Yod* i'i>iyi: cuando aparece precedida por *kasra* o *alef mamdūda*, se convierte en *yod*:<sup>23</sup> אלמבתדין [116v:2 *al-mubtadiyin* 'los principiantes'] < *al-mubtadi'in*; זואיד [117v:2 *zawāyid* 'suplementarios'] < *zawa'id*; היניד [117v:10 *hīnayīdin* 'entonces'] < *hīna'idin*; לילא [120v:5 *li'alā* 'para que no'] < *lay'alā*; אלקאיל [122r:13 *al-qayl*, 'el que habla'] < *qa'il*; אלגראיז [122v:5 *al-ġarāyiz* 'naturalezas, instintos'] < *al-ġarā'iz*; אלנהאיז [122v:5 *al-naḥāyiz* 'naturaleza'] < *al-naḥā'iz*.

*Waw* 'u<ū: si ella o la letra que la precede vocalizada con *ḍamma* entonces se escribe sobre *waw* por ejemplo: האולי [117r:20 *hāulī* 'aquellos'] < *hā'ulā'i*; שאוא [117v:3 *šāū* 'quieren'] < *šā'ū*; פאווה [117v:12 *fāwhu* 'su primera radical'] < *fā'ūhu*; יובה [120r:12 *yūbah* 'tener en cuenta'] < *yu'bah*; יודיהא [124v:11 *yūddihā* 'la reproduce'] < *yu'addihā*.

A final de palabra: la norma ortográfica para este tipo de *hamza* tiene su base en la vocalización de la letra precedente, es decir, si está precedida por *fath* se escribe sobre *alef*: מבהוא [120r:13 *mubtadā* 'inicial'] < *mubtada'a*. Así, si está precedida por *ḍamma* se escribe sobre *waw* como en אלתואטו [123r:8 *al-tawāṭū* 'coincidencia'] < *tawāṭ'u*; y si está precedida por *kasr* se escribe sobre una *yod* como אלמבתדי [116v:10 *al-mubtadī* 'principiante'] < *al-mubtadi'*.<sup>24</sup>

*Hamza* volada: No hay rastro alguno de la *hamza* volada en posición intermedia en este texto, ya que carece de un soporte gráfico que la refleje. En posición intermedia, sin soporte gráfico alguno, aparece en dos casos donde está vocalizada con *fath* y precedida por *alef* de alargamiento: פאא [117v:1 *fāāt* 'las

<sup>22</sup> BLAU, *A Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 27–34.

<sup>23</sup> GALLEGRO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 56–58.

<sup>24</sup> Véase además SA'ID AL-AFAGĀNĪ, *Al-mūġaz fī qawā'id al-luġa al-'arabiyya*, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, p. 419.

primeras radicales’] < *fā’āt* y קראה [122v:4 *qirāa* ‘leer, lectura’] < *qirā’a*. En posición final desaparece totalmente tras *alif mamdūda* sin que quede rastro alguno de la *hamza*: ורא [118v:11 *warā* ‘detrás’] < *warā*; אגזא [123r:17 *aǧzā* ‘partes, divisiones’] < *aǧzā*; ואלאסמא [125r:18 *wa-l-asmā* ‘nombres’] < *asmā*.

*Tā* (ت/ث/ت/ث): Se escribe con puntos en setenta casos, por ejemplo מראחב [116v:7 *marātib* ‘categorías’]; תמיז [134v:4 *tamyiz* ‘diferenciar’]; יהאג [137r:13 *yahtaǧ* ‘argumenta, discrepa’]. Además, aparece con un punto en cuatro casos, entre ellos: אלמתלין [116v:13 *ḏawāt* ‘que tienen’]. En la mayoría de los casos se refleja sin puntuación como ואסתעמלך [116v:8 *wa-ista’malaka* ‘sirva de ti’]; תאליף [117r:9 *ta’lif* ‘componer’] o תכתב [126r:19 *tuktabu* ‘se escribe’].

*Tā* (ث/ت/ث/ث): En tres casos aparece con tres puntos triangulares por encima: אלמתלין [116v:13 *al-miṭṭayn* ‘geminados’]; ואלמתאברה [120v:2 *wa-l-muṭābara* ‘perseverancia’]; כתר [126v:11 *kaṭura* ‘se proliferó’]. También aparece con dos puntos en un único ejemplo. תקיליהם [119r:10 *taqīluhum* ‘el más destacado’]. Este fenómeno común en judeo-árabe parece reflejar la evolución en neo-árabe, donde la *tā* evolucionó a *tā* especialmente en Levante, ya que la interdentales son sustituidas por dentales.<sup>25</sup> En los demás casos se escribe sin ninguna marca diferenciadora de la *tā* como en בעתני [118r:14 *ba’aṭanī* ‘me llevó’]; חית [117v:3 *ḥaytu* ‘donde’]. La ausencia de una marca discriminadora se debe a los dialectos árabes donde se produce el paso *tā* < *tā*.

*Ġīm* (ج/ג/ג): Esta letra se refleja sistemáticamente vocalizada con un punto encima, por ejemplo פגהלהם [117r:8 *fa-ǧahlihim* ‘y su desconocimiento’]; אלוגהין [134r:2 *al-waǧḥayni* ‘las dos posibilidades’]. Ahora bien, son excepcionales once ejemplos en los que no cuenta con ningún tipo de marca ortográfica que la diferencie de *ǧayn*. En estos casos se confunde con *ǧayn*, por ejemplo en געלה [142v:17 *ǧa’alahu* ‘lo hizo’]; תגתמי [122v:1 *taǧtami* ‘se junta’].

*Ġayn* (غ/ג/ג): Esta letra se encuentra en tres ejemplos puntuada con un punto encima confundiendo con *ǧīm*. Esta adaptación puede tener su origen en la ortografía árabe donde vocaliza con un punto encima, por ejemplo רגבה [116v:14 *raǧbat*<sup>an</sup> ‘desear’]; גירה [116v:16 *ǧayrihi* ‘otro’]; וגלטהם [116v:19 *wa-ǧalaṭahum* ‘su equivocación’]. En lo demás ejemplos del texto aparece sin ninguna marca ortográfica discriminatoria respecto a *ǧīm* y se presta a confusión con ella.

*Hā* (ח/כ/ח): Esta letra en la mitad de los ejemplos se refleja sin signo ortográfico auxiliar alguno. Se refleja en noventa ejemplos sin estar puntuada con ninguna marca, por ejemplo אלכפיפה [123v:2 *alhafifah* ‘ligera’]; אואכר [125v:5 *awāḥir* ‘los finales’]. Ahora bien, en el resto de ejemplos se refleja puntuada con un punto por encima, por ejemplo יכשא [116v:9 *yuhšā* ‘se teme’]; יכר [117v:6 *yahruǧ* ‘sale’].

<sup>25</sup> BLAU, A *Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 35.

*Dāl* (د/ד/ד): Se confunde en una ocasión con *dāl* y se escribe con punto diacrítico como en el caso de אִלְשָׁדִי [116v:11 *al-šādī* ‘principiante en el conocimiento’] < *al-šādī*.<sup>26</sup> La alteración entre *dāl* y *dāl* está presente tanto en árabe clásico<sup>27</sup> como en neo-árabe.<sup>28</sup>

*Dāl* (د/ד/ד): Se refleja en sesenta y siete ejemplos sin contar con un discriminador ortográfico que la diferencie de *dāl*, por ejemplo שד [125r:5 *šadda* ‘fue anómalo’]; אִלְמַהְדוּפָה [138r:7 *al-mahdūfa* ‘que le faltó un radical’]. Por otro lado aparece en gran parte de los casos con un punto por encima, por ejemplo לִלך [116v:15 *dālīka* ‘ese, aquel’]; ידכר [132v:19 *yadkuru* ‘menciona’]. Esta alteración entre *dāl* y *dāl* puede ser resultado bien de una hipercorrección, bien de un fenómeno común en el neo-árabe.<sup>29</sup>

*Dād* (د/ذ/ض): Se escribe con un punto por encima en todos los ejemplos del texto, con la excepción de tres casos: אִלְמַאֲצִי [130v:10 *al-mādī* ‘el pasado’]; אִלְפַאֲצִל [135v:3 *al-fādīl* ‘virtuoso’] y מִצְאֲדָדָא [140r:7 *muḏādīdan* ‘contrario’]. Normalmente *dād* en judeo-árabe se fusiona con *zā*<sup>30</sup> y esto se refleja en gran medida hoy en día en los dialectos árabes, pero además en nuestro caso esta letra se confunde con *dāl* en el siguiente ejemplo בעד [131r:2 *ba‘da* ‘después’] donde corresponde בעץ ‘algunos’ y esto o es un despiste del copista o fruto de la proximidad de los puntos de articulación de ambas letras.

*Za’* (ظ/ט/ז): Esta letra aparece marcada con un discriminador ortográfico en todos los casos, es decir, con un punto por encima, con la excepción de siete casos, por ejemplo אִלְלַפְט [118r:10 *al-lafz* ‘la pronunciación’], אִזְנ [122r:10 *aznu* ‘creo’]; יִזְהַר [133v:15 *yazharu* ‘aparece’], etc.

*Tā’ marbuṭa* (ة/י): Normalmente esta morfema se identifica con *hā’* cuando pierde los dos puntos que la caracterizan (ة y י). En el presente texto se escribe en once casos con dos puntos encima, para diferenciarla de *hā’*. Esta puntuación fue añadida por una mano tardía, por ejemplo רַגְבָּת [116v:14 *raḡbat<sup>an</sup>* ‘desear’] o por el copista, por ejemplo הַרְכָּה [119v:6 *ḥaraka* ‘vocal’]; בִּמְזוּלָה [141v:8 *bi-manzilāt* ‘es como, es semejante’].

<sup>26</sup> MARTÍNEZ DELGADO, Šelomo ben Mobarak ben Ša’ir *Kitāb at-taysīr*, vol. I, p. 38.

<sup>27</sup> SALMĀN SĀLIM B. RAJĀ’ AS-SAYMĪ, *Ibdāl al-Ḥurūf fī al-Lahḡāt al-‘Arabiyya*. Maktabat al-Ġurabā’ al-‘Aṭaryya, Al-Madina al-Nabawyya 1995, p. 465.

<sup>28</sup> BLAU, *A Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 14.

<sup>29</sup> GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 58.

<sup>30</sup> BLAU, *A Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 39.

### 1.2.6. Signos auxiliares de lectura

1.2.6.1. *Tašdīd* (geminación): se refleja en diecisiete ocasiones. Encontramos dos casos de falsa geminación<sup>31</sup> donde se usa *tašdīd* en un lugar donde no corresponde, como גִּנָּה [116v:4 *ġannāh* ‘ala, *ġanāh*] < *ġanāh*,<sup>32</sup> וְתִקְלָהֶם [119r:10 *wa-taqqīlahum* ‘el más destacado’] < *wa-taqīluhum*. Ahora bien, los demás casos son geminaciones donde corresponden y fueron añadidas por propio copista como en קָרְבָּה [116v:3 *qarrabahu* ‘lo divulgó’]; וְסַהְלָהוּ [116v:3 *wa-sahhalahu* ‘lo facilitó’]; וְפָקַךְ [116v:7 *wa-waffaqaka* ‘te guía’]; יִסְרֹךְ [116v:14 *yasurruka* ‘te complace’]; בְּמַנְהַ [116v:17 *bimannihi* ‘con su generosidad’]; בְּמַנְהַ [116v:17 *inna* ‘que’]; קָדַם [116v:17 *qaddama* ‘presentó’]; אֶלְעֵלָה [116v:18 *al-‘illa* ‘la razón’]; אִנְהָא [116v:18 *innahā* ‘que es’]; כְּאִנְהָ [118v:4 *ka’annah* ‘como’]; מְקַצְרָה [118v:14 *muqāṣṣira* ‘incapaz de alcanzar’]; וּבִינָהּ [118v:20 *wa-bayyanahā* ‘y la aclaró’]; וְחֻגְגָתוּ [122r:4 *wa-ḥuġġatu* ‘y el argumento’]; לִלְמַד [122r:8 *li-l-maddi* ‘de alargamiento’]; גִּזָּו [136v:9 *ġawwaza* ‘declaró lícito’]; תָּמַם [145r:7 *tamma* ‘concluyó’]. Asimismo, encontramos en el texto otro tipo de geminación donde se utilizan hábitos ortográficos rabínicos,<sup>33</sup> es decir, representar la geminación por medio de *waw* y *yod* en lugar de *šadda*, por ejemplo:<sup>34</sup> אֶלְגַּיִיד [118v:5 *al-ġayyid* ‘el bueno’] < אֶלְגִּיִיד [124r:13 *bayyana* ‘aclaró, explico’] < בִּיִן [141v:6 *ubayyin* ‘aclaro, explico’] < בִּיִן [134r:5 *sayyidi* ‘mi señor’] < אַבִּיִן [141v:6 *ubayyin* ‘aclaro, explico’] < אַבִּיִן. En este contexto, la palabra לַיְיִנָּה *layīna* ‘débil’ y su flexión (definido, indefinido, masculino y femenino) aparece en once casos en forma femenino indefinido, seis veces femenino definido y dos masculino definido con la representación fonética de la *šadda* como לַיְיִנָּה *‘layīna*’ [122r:8 ‘débil’] < לַיְיִנָּה; אֶלְלַיְיִנָּה *‘al-layīna*’ [123v:1 ‘la débil’] < אֶלְלַיְיִנָּה; אֶלְלַיְיִן *‘al-layīn*’ [134v:8 ‘el débil’] < אֶלְלַיְיִן.

1.2.6.2. *Al-tanwīn*: sólo lo encontramos reflejado gráficamente en cuatro casos. Uno de estos aparece en caso genitivo: כְּתָאֵב [116v:9 *kitāb*<sup>in</sup> ‘libro’]. Los restantes casos en acusativo: מְסַרְעָא [116v:13 *musāri*<sup>an</sup> ‘con rapidez’]; חִרְצָא [116v:14 *ḥirṣ*<sup>an</sup> ‘pretendiendo’]; אִדָּא [141r:13 *id*<sup>an</sup> ‘entonces’]. Sin embargo, en el caso de los adverbios *al-tanwīn* se representa por medio de su soporte gráfico que es *alef* como en כְּתִירָא [118r:18 *katīr*<sup>an</sup> ‘mucho’] y סְפִלָּא [119v:2 *suf*<sup>an</sup> ‘para abajo’]. Este fenómeno es muy frecuente en este texto en el caso de los adverbios.

1.2.6.3. Artículo definido: el artículo definido no varía en el texto y se refleja con la unión de *alef* y *lamed* (א) en una misma letra trabada y que no reflejamos en nuestra edición. Esta unión no es constante en todos los casos, especialmente

<sup>31</sup> FEDERICO CORRIENTE, *A Grammatical Sketch of the Spanish Arabic Dialect Bundle*, Instituto Hispano Árabe de Cultura, Madrid 1977, p. 66 (3.2.2.).

<sup>32</sup> ID., *Léxico estándar y andalusí del Glosario de Leiden*, Dpto. de estudios árabes e islámicos de la UCM, Madrid 1991, p. 8.

<sup>33</sup> GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 60.

<sup>34</sup> BLAU, *A Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 32–34.

cuando el artículo se localiza a final de línea, y en dicho caso se repite el artículo definido:<sup>35</sup> אל אלמשרק *'al-mašriq'* [122v:4 'el oriente']. Se deduce del ejemplo anterior que el artículo cuando se separa de la palabra al final de línea, se repite.<sup>36</sup>

1.2.6.4 *alif waṣl* y *alif faṣl*: estos dos fonemas se someten en su totalidad a la norma del árabe clásico, a manera de ejemplo de un fenómeno muy frecuente en el texto:

*alif waṣl*: לאקתצארה [125r:12 *li-qtiṣārihi* 'por limitarse']; אסתעמאל [143r:3 *isti'māl* 'uso'].

*alif faṣl*: אלאבאנה [143r:1 *al-ibāna* 'aclaración']; אכמלת [142v:18 *akmaltu* 'he completado'].

## II. Morfología

### II.1. Pronombres

#### II.1.1. Pronombres personales

Destaca su fiabilidad a la lengua clásica con excepción de algunos casos, donde el pronombre masculino singular sustituye al femenino singular: וחרוף אללין פי לגתנא [129v:5–6 *wa-ḥurūf al-līn fi luḡatinā 'arba'a wa-hwa al-alef wa-al-waw wa-l-ya' wa-l-ha'* 'y las letras débiles en nuestra lengua son cuatro, que son *alef, waw, ya'* y *ha'*"] y viceversa הכדא הי אלסביל [144r:5–6 *hākāda hiya al-sabil* 'y así es la manera'] donde en general la forma más frecuente es la de masculino.

Entre los pronombres afijos pueden intercambiarse el de tercera persona masculina y femenina como en ירגע פעלא עינהא [117v:12 *yarḡi'u fi<sup>an</sup> 'aynuha* 'se vuelve un verbo cuya segunda radical']<sup>37</sup> donde se esperaba *'aynuhu* al referirse a un sustantivo masculino singular. Lo mismo en ומים משכו וואו וקרבו ולשכני [122r:6–7 *wa-mem mišku wa-waw u-qarab libbo wa-lam u-lē-šakenay mē'od wa-mā 'ašbahahu* 'y la *mem* de *mišku* y la *waw* de *u-qarab libbo* y la *lamed* de *u-lē-šakenay mē'od* y todo lo que parezca'] donde se esperaba *ašbahāhā* por preceder a un plural fracto. Encontramos ופי בעצהא אלתואטי עליה [123r:8 *wa-fi ba'dhā al-tawātu' 'alyhi* 'en otros por convención'] por *'alyhā* para referirse al plural fracto precedente que debe tratarse como si fuese un sustantivo femenino singular. למגאוהתה וואו אלמד אללין אלמצום מא קבלה [130v:13–14 *li-muḡāwaratihi waw al-madd al-layyin al-maḏmūm ma qablahu* 'por su proximidad a la *waw* de alargamiento débil que vocaliza con *ḍamma* lo que le precede'], se esperaba *qablahu* porque el pronombre se refiere a la *waw*.

<sup>35</sup> VÉASE GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 164–165

<sup>36</sup> BLAU, *A Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 38–39.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

### II.1.2. Pronombres demostrativos

II.1.2.1. De cercanía: en general el uso de esta categoría se ajusta a la norma del árabe clásico, por ejemplo *פי הדין אלמוצע* *fi hādā al-mauḏ'i* [133v:1 'en este sitio']; *פי הדין אלמעני* *fi hādā al-ma'nā* [135r:15 'con este sentido']; *פהדין אלאלפאט* *fa-hāḏihi al-alfāz* [135v:15 'y estas voces']. Sin embargo en tres ocasiones aparece *hādā* sustituyendo a *hāḏihi*, por ejemplo: *ליצעף הדין אלדעוי* [122r:11 *li-ḏa'f hādā al-da'wā* 'por la debilidad de esta afirmación']; *פהדין דוואַה אלהא* [128v:11-12 *fa-hādā dawāt al-ha'* 'y estos de tercera radical débil'];<sup>38</sup> *הדין אלמצאדר* [131v:1 *hādā al-maṣādir* 'y estos infinitivos'].<sup>39</sup> Asimismo, encontramos un único caso en el que *hādā* es sustituido por *hāḏihi*: *והדין קולה* [133r:1 *wa-hāḏihi qawluhu* 'y esta es su afirmación'].

Por su parte, el pronombre plural de cercanía *hā'ulā'i* se ajusta al uso clásico y así *האולי אלקום* [117r:20 *hā'ulā'i al-qawm* 'esas personas']; *האולא אלהרכאט* [120r:10 *hā'ulā al-ḥarakāt* 'esas vocales']. Nótese la doble grafía, una vez con *alef* y otra con *yod*, donde la forma más habitual en judeo-árabe es con *yod*.<sup>40</sup>

Además, encontramos tres formas de dual que se ajustan a la normativa clásica: un dual masculino en caso genitivo: *אן תוואלי פי כלמה מן הדין אלקבילין* [120r:14-15 *inna tawālī fi kalima min hādī al-qabīlyn taḥaṭa ḥarakāt* 'que se suceden tres vocales en estos dos tipos de palabras']; y dos formas de dual en femenino, una de ellas en caso acusativo: *וקד תחתמל האתאן אללפטתין* [139r:18-19 *wa-qad taḥtamilu hātayn al-lafzatayn* 'y que ambas palabras aceptan']<sup>41</sup> y la otra en nominativo, *ארי אן אביין לך התין אללפטתין* [141v:6 *arā 'an ubayyna laka hatayn al-lafzatayn* 'pretendo aclararte esas dos palabras'], el pronombre se emplea con escritura defectiva en este caso, ya que debía tener *alef* *האתתין*.

II.1.2.2. De lejanía: se someten a la norma del árabe clásico en su totalidad y en ningún momento se refleja discrepancia respecto al árabe clásico: *ותלך אללפטא* [118r:19 *wa-tilka al-lafza* 'y aquella palabra'] y *וקד ביין דלך* [124r:13-14 *wa-qad bayyna dālika* 'y aclaró eso']. No se emplea la forma plural de lejanía en el texto.

### II.1.3. Pronombre relativo

En el texto encontramos casos en los que el pronombre relativo masculino singular sustituye al pronombre femenino, y esto se debe a la influencia del neo-árabe,<sup>42</sup> donde se usa el pronombre masculino singular para referirse tanto al masculino como al femenino, por ejemplo *ואנקלאב ווא ראש אלדי הו אלף פי אלכט* [129v:1-2 *wa-inqilāb waw roš al-laḏī huwa alef fī al-ḥaṭ* 'y la transformación de la

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 106–108.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 61–63.

<sup>40</sup> GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 94.

<sup>41</sup> En este caso el sustantivo debía ser nominativo al igual que el pronombre, es decir, se esperaba *al-lafzatān* en vez de *al-lafzatayn* y véase DAYF, *Taḡdīd al-Nahū*, p. 116–117.

<sup>42</sup> BLAU, *A Grammar of Christian Arabic*, p. 67.

waw de ראש que es *alef* en la escritura’]; והי בין אלנון אלדי הי עין אלפעל ובין ואלהא אלתי [130v:11-12 *wa-hiya bayna al-nūn al-laḏī huwa ‘ayn al-fi’l wa-bayna al-ha’ al-latī hiya lām al-fi’l* ‘y está entre la *nun* que es la primera radical del verbo y la *ha’* que es la tercera radical’]; אן אליא כתבת מכאן אף אלדי הו לאם אלפעל [131r:9-10 *an al-yā’ kutibat makān alef al-laḏī huwa lām al-fi’l* ‘que la *yā’* se escribió en lugar de *alef* que es la tercera radical del verbo’];<sup>43</sup> פאליא פי הגיגי אלדי בין אלגיימין [139r:9 *fa-al-ya’ fi hagigi al-laḏī bayna al-ḡimayn* ‘que la *yod* en *hagigi* que hay entre las dos *gimel*’]; ובלגת אלגאיה אלדי רמית אליהא [142v:19-20 *wa-balaḡta al-ḡāya al-laḏī ramyta ilayhā* ‘!Dios te cumpla tus deseos!’. En todos estos casos se esperaba *al-latī*. Asimismo, encontramos un caso donde el pronombre femenino singular *al-latī* sustituye al masculino *al-laḏī*: אלשבא אלתי תחת אלואו [144r:10 *al-šəwa al-latī taḥta al-waw* ‘el *šəwa* que hay bajo *waw*’].

Por lo que respecta a los pronombres duales relativos, encontramos algunos casos que se apartan del uso clásico como ומתל אלשבין אלדי תחת בא וכאף וישא את קולו [119r:6-7 *wa-miṭla al-šəwīn al-laḏī taḥa yā’ wa-kāf way-yišša et qolo way-yebk* ‘y como los dos *šəwa* que están debajo la *ba’* y *kāf* de *way-yišša et qolo way-yebk*’] donde se esperaba el pronombre relativo dual masculino en vez del masculino singular; אמחתלו פיהמא אעני פי הומיה ובוכיה פעלהם פי עניה שביה אלדין וזנהמא פעילה [139v:8-9 *imtaṭalū fihuma an’ī fi homiyyah wa-boḥiyyah fi’lahum fi-‘aniyyah wa-šabiyyah al-laḏayn waznuhumā fa’ilah* ‘me refiero a que en *homiyyah* y *boḥiyyah*, hicieron lo mismo que en *‘aniyyah* y *šabiyyah*, cuya forma es *pa’ilah*’] en este caso está escrito con grafía defectiva con una *lām* en vez de dos, es decir, que se esperaba אללדין en vez de אלדין por estar en caso genitivo o acusativo;<sup>44</sup> y lo mismo en למהמא פעיל [139v:16-17 *kamā šana’ū fi ‘any naqy al-laḏayn waznuhumā fa’il* ‘como hicieron en *‘ani naqy* cuya forma es *pa’il*’] y en מע אלשבא [143v:7-8 *ma’ al-šəwa wa-l-pataḥ al-laḏayn ba’dahu* ‘con el *šəwa* y el *pataḥ* que le siguen’]. Además, este pronombre aparece en caso nominativo, por ejemplo המא מפעולאן [133r:2 *la-qāl al-laḏān humā maf’ulān* ‘habría dicho que ambos son participios pasivos’] si bien su grafía es defectiva, ya que se esperaba אללדאן en vez de אלדאן.

En cuanto al pronombre plural masculino, se emplea en un caso en uso regular, ואן אלדין ימדון אידיהם אלי כתאבה [131v:14 *wa-inna al-laḏīn yamuddūna aydiḥum ilā kitābihi* ‘y aquellos que manejan su libro’].

Los pronombres indeterminados relativos, vienen representados por *mā*, למהמא פיה: [126v:5-6 *ba’da ikmālī mā šara’nā fihi* ‘una vez haya completado esta sección que ya he comenzado’] y למהמא פיה: [120r:20-120v:1 *li-‘illa ḏarūryya ḥafiyya ‘an kul man taqadamanī* ‘por un motivo desconocido para todos los que me han precedido’].

<sup>43</sup> BLAU, A *Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 35-37.

<sup>44</sup> Véase Corán 41,29.

## II.2. El verbo

El número de los verbos utilizados en esta obra está limitado, ya que en la mayoría de casos los mismos verbos se repiten constantemente, y, en general, puede decirse que el autor fue fiel a su uso en árabe clásico. Sin embargo, encontramos algunos casos que pueden atribuirse a pseudo-correcciones, distracciones de copista (*lapus calami*) o al desconocimiento de la normativa clásica:

### II.2.1 El perfecto

El nivel de fidelidad al uso clásico es prácticamente total, con excepción de algunos casos donde la confusión ocurre entre el indicativo y el pasivo, o en la esfera del género. La alternancia entre las voces pasiva e indicativa de la primera forma se refleja en tres casos: *ואדא קאל אן אצל ותופהו מצות* [117r:10 *wa-idā qāla inna aṣla wa-tofehu maṣṣot* ‘y si dijo que la raíz de *wa-tofehu maṣṣot*’] donde se esperaba *qīl* afectando a la traducción ‘y si se dijo’; *פקד אגאז אן יקאל* [117r:13 *fa-qad aḡāza an yuqāla* ‘ya permitió decir’] por *uḡīza* pues su traducción es ‘se permite’; y en *ומא יסקט בה קול מן קיל אן אלוואת אלמכתובה* [131v:8–9 *wa-mā yasqutu bihi qawli man qīl inna al-wawat al-maktūba* ‘y anulando que alguien pueda decir que las *waw* escritas’] usó la forma pasiva donde corresponde la forma indicativa *qāla*, afectando también a la traducción.

Asimismo, aparece el verbo pasado en algunos casos en forma masculina donde correspondería la femenina: *וכאן אלהא ליינה איצא* [130v:12 *wa-kāna al-hā’ layyna ayḏ<sup>an</sup>* ‘siendo la *hā’* débil además’] y se esperaba *wa-kānat*; *ואליא פיה לאם* [131r:12–13 *wa-al-yā’ fihi lām al-fi’l inqalab yā’ li-muḡāwaratihi yā’ al-madd* ‘y su *yod* es la tercera radical transformada en *yod* por su proximidad a la *yod* de alargamiento’] por *inqalabat*; *וסקט יא אלמד מן אלכט* [131r:14 *wa-saqata yā’ al-madd min al-ḥaṭ* ‘y se suprime la *yod* de alargamiento gráficamente’] por *wa-saqatāt*; *וכאן יא אלמד אולי באלחדף* [131r:14 *wa-kāna yā’ al-madd awlā bi-l-ḥaḏif* ‘y se suprimiría la *yod* de alargamiento por ser un suplemento’] por *kānat*.

En dos casos aparece el verbo en perfecto donde se esperaba un imperfecto: *ומן יאצלי אלהא אן הדפוא אחרף אלאצלי* [131v:2–3 *wa-min al-muḡāl an ḥaḏafū al-ḥarf al-aṣli* ‘es imposible que supriman una radical’] y se esperaba *an yaḥḏifū*; *וכאן אלוגה פיה אן כאן* [140r:11 *wa-kāna al-waḡhu an kāna min hādā al-aṣli* ‘y lo esperado en este caso es que fuese de esta raíz’] y se esperaba *an yakūna* por la presencia de *an*. Todos estos lapsus parecer ser fruto de la distracción del copista.

En un caso aislado se confunde entre dos verbos de la forma VIII: *ואחתגנא בה* [137v:3 *wa-ḥtaḡnā bihi li-abī zakaryā* ‘y necesitamos a Abū Zakariyā’] donde se esperaba *wa-ḥtaḡāḡnā*, de manera que se tradujese ‘y apoyamos la

opinión de Abū Zakariyā”. En este caso la confusión se debe a una distracción del copista, porque en otros pasajes del texto se emplea este verbo de forma correcta. Hallamos un caso donde el verbo se escribe en grafía defectiva, faltándole algún fonema: זכריא אבי זכריא קרוא כתאב אנהם קום אמא אלה קום אצלחך אללה [133v:19-20 *fa-hāūlā'i aṣlahaka al-lāh qaṣm<sup>un</sup> immā innahum qarū' kitāb abī zakariyā* ‘y aquella gente –Dios te guíe– o leyeron el libro de Abū Zakariyā’] donde *qarū'* debería ser *qara'ū* con dos *waw*, una el pronombre sufijo plural masculino y la otra *hamza*.

### II.2.2. *El imperfecto*

Se ajusta al árabe clásico, con todas sus formas, tanto en singular, dual como plural, por ejemplo: לא יכון [lā yakūn 131v:16 ‘no existe’]; ולא יעהדון [wa-lā ya'taddūn 117r:1 ‘no cuentan’]; לא יקעאן [lā yaqa'ān 122v:11 ‘no vienen’]. Junto con estas encontramos ciertas desviaciones del árabe clásico que o bien son hipercorrecciones o confusión de género. En lo que se refiere a las formas de yusivo, tanto en los verbos cóncavos como en las formas plurales, detectamos abundancia de hipercorrecciones. Ya que el copista o el autor, en su intento de ajustarse a la norma del árabe clásico y apartarse del dialectal, cae en este tipo de erratas, por ejemplo: וּלֹם יְקוּל אֵן הָא אִלְכָה לִי [125v:3 *wa-lam yaqūl an hā' elḥal-lī* ‘y no dijo *elḥal-lī*’] donde se esperaba *yaqul* al ser un verbo cóncavo precedido por la partícula *lam*.<sup>45</sup> וּלֹם יְכוּן לִיקוּל פִּיה [128r:7 *wa-lam yakūn li-yaqūl fihi* ‘y no habría dicho en él’] donde se esperaba *yakun* al estar precedido por la partícula de yusivo *lam*. אִדּוּ לֹם יְקוּל יְדוּ בְכִסְרֵי אֵלִיא [141r:15 *id lam yaqūl yiddu bikasr al-yā'* ‘ya que no dijo *yiddu* con *kasra* en *yod'*], se esperaba *yaqul* al estar precedido por la partícula *lam*.

Encontramos un caso de un verbo plural masculino de tercera persona, precedido por la partícula *an*, donde en clásico corresponde suprimir la *nūn* de este verbo, pero el copista mantiene esta *nūn* a manera de hipercorrección: וּמִן עֲאָדָה אֵלְעִבְרָאֲנִיּוֹן אֵן יְקִלְבוֹן אִלְקִאֲמִצוֹת [138v:10-11 *wa-min ādat al-'ibrānīyūn an yaqlibūn al-qameṣot* ‘los hebreos tenían por costumbre transformar los *qameṣ*’] donde se esperaba *yaqlibū* por la partícula *an*.

En cuanto al género del verbo, hallamos casos donde se produce confusión entre el masculino y el femenino singular: אֵן יְקִאֵל מְנָה בְשִׁתִּי יְבוּשׁ פִּירְגֵעַ אִלְפָא עֵינָא [117v:19-20 *an yuqāl minhu baštī yabuš fa-yarḡī' al-fā' 'ayn<sup>an</sup>* ‘se dice *baštī yabuš* convirtiendo la segunda radical en la tercera’] y se esperaba *fa-tarḡī* y el mismo fenómeno ocurre en 117v:20 y 118r:8. Encontramos además un caso donde el femenino sustituye al masculino: פְּכִאֵן יִגְבּ אֵן תְּכוּן הִגָּה עֲלֵי זִנָּה הָרָה [141v:11-12 *fa-kāna yaḡīb 'an takūna haga 'alā zinat harah* ‘lo esperado que fuese *haga* con la forma de *harah*’] y se esperaba *yakūn*.

En un caso se ha producido confusión entre el verbo *aḡāba* ‘contestar’ y *aḡāza* ‘hacer lícito’ en forma IV: וּמִמָּא אִלּוּגָה אִלְדִּי אֲרִי אֲנָה לֹם יִגִּיב עֲנָדָה [136v:19-20 *wa-amma al-waḡhu al-laḏī arā anahu lam yaḡībh 'indahu* ‘mientras que esta opción creo que

<sup>45</sup> BLAU, *A Grammar of Christian Arabic*, p. 185.

resulta imposible según él’]. Este caso precisa dos apuntes: el primero es la confusión entre los dos verbos *yuḡīb* y *yuḡīz* y el segundo está en su grafía, ya que la *yā’* después de *ḡīm* debería ser suprimida al tratarse de un verbo cóncavo y precedido por la partícula *lam*.

Aparecen dos casos donde la grafía del verbo carece de uno de sus fonemas: *משדד יבתדון בהרף משדד* [124r:7 *wa-naḥnu naḡiduhum yabtadūn bi-ḥarf mušaddad* ‘y nosotros vemos que empiezan con una letra geminada’] donde se echa en falta una *yod* según *yabtadi’ūn*; *פאסל אללה יא סידי אעאדתך מן בלוואהם* [134r:4–5 *fa-āslu al-lāha yā sayyidī i’ādataka min balwāhum* ‘le pido a Dios, oh mi señor, te proteja de su desgracia’] donde se echa en falta *hamza* en posición intermedia, pues se esperaba *ās’ālu* en vez de *āslu*, no deja de ser un despiste del copista.

### II.2.3. El imperativo

Se ajusta en su totalidad al uso clásico salvo en una ocasión donde conserva la vocal larga de un verbo de tercera radical defeciva que debería ser suprimida, puede achacarse a la desaparición de los modos o a una hipercorrección:<sup>46</sup> *פאצגי סמעך אלי ואערני סמעך* [125v:19 *fa-aṣḡī ilayya wa-a’irnī sam’aka* ‘escuchame y prestame atención’] para *aṣḡi* por ser un verbo de tercera radical débil, por lo que según la norma del clásico se debe eliminar la *yā’*.<sup>47</sup>

## II.3. El nombre

### II.3.1. El genero

II.3.1.1. Nombre de letras: en este texto las letras en la mayoría de los casos se emplean en femenino, pero de vez en cuando, el autor las utiliza en masculino:<sup>48</sup> *אן יקאל מנה בשתי יבוש פירגע אלפא עינא* [117v:19–20 *an yuqāl minhu baštī yabuš fa-yarḡī’ al-fā’* ‘ayn<sup>an</sup> ‘se dice *baštī yabuš* convirtiendo la segunda radical en la tercera’] donde se esperaba *fa-tarḡī* y lo mismo en 118r:8. Así también *אלסין מהרך* [121v:8 *al-sīn muḥarrak* ‘la *sīn* vocalizada’] y no *muḥarraka*; *ואמא אלהא פאנה ללין* [125r:15–16 *wamma al-hā’ fa-innahu lil-līn* ‘mientras que la *hā’* es sólo débil’] y no *fa-innahā* a pesar de estar precedida por la letra *hā’*. *ואן כאן אלואו ראה הא פי אלכט* [141v:9 *wa-in kāna al-wāw ra’ah hā’ fi al-ḥaṭ* ‘aunque la *wāw* de *ra’ah* sea *hā’* en la grafía’] por *kānat*. *פאליא פי הגיגי אלדי בין אלגימין* [139r:9 *fa-al-yā’ fi hagigi al-laḏī bayna al-ḡīmayn* ‘la *yā’* en *hagigi* que se posiciona entre las dos *gimel*’] por *al-latī*.

<sup>46</sup> GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 66.

<sup>47</sup> AL-AFGĀNĪ, *Al-mūḡaz*, p.74.

<sup>48</sup> JOSHUA BLAU, *The Emergence and Linguistic Background of Judaeo-Arabic*, Ben Zvi Institute, Jerusalén 1981<sup>2</sup>, p. 106.

II.3.2. *El plural*

El sano, tanto masculino como femenino, se emplea en toda la obra y se ajusta al uso normativo del árabe clásico. Sin embargo, aparecen algunos casos donde el caso oblicuo suplanta al caso recto y viceversa, apartándose del comportamiento del árabe clásico:<sup>49</sup> אנהם למעדורין [124v:15 *innahum la-ma'dūrīn* 'que se les puede perdonar'] por *la-ma'dūrūn* al estar predicado por la partícula *inna* que funciona en una frase nominal compuesta de dos sustantivos y deja el primero en caso acusativo y el segundo en caso nominativo. Es decir, el copista sustituyó el caso recto por el oblicuo. ומן עאדה אלעבראניין [127v:8 y 138v:10–11 *wa-min 'ādat al-'ibrānīyūn* 'era costumbre de los hebreos'] por *al-'ibrānīyīn* al ser plural masculino sano en caso genitivo y así también en אלעלם אן אלעבראניין [143r:3 *i'lam anna al-'ibrānīyūn* 'has de saber que los hebreos'] por *al-'ibrānīyīn* al tratarse del sujeto de la partícula *anna*. También, en un caso, se usa el nombre de la vocal hebrea *pataḥ* con sentido de plural femenino sano: ולדלך כאלפת ואואתּ הדה אלפרשה פתוחות [144v:20–145r:1 *wa-li-dālīka ḥālafat wāwāt ḥāḏīhi al-paraša patuḥot* 'y por eso las *waw* de esta sección no se vocalizaron con *pataḥ*'].

II.3.3. *El dual*

Encontramos bastantes casos que se alejan del uso del árabe clásico al intentar seguir precisamente su normativa. Las desviaciones se reflejan en la sustitución del caso oblicuo por el caso recto y viceversa. Cuando el nombre de la vocal hebrea *qameṣ* se emplea con sentido de dual no sigue un uso clásico, sino que se produce un intercambio entre el caso oblicuo y el recto: ואלדאל עליהמא אלקמציין [124v:19 *wa-al-dāl 'alyhumā al-qamaṣyīn* 'que son confirmadas con *qameṣ*'] y se esperaba *al-qamaṣān* por ser predicado del sujeto *al-dāl*, pero en este caso, al estar el artículo con una voz en hebreo, el copista la pone a su gusto sin tener en cuenta el caso gramatical. ואעלם אן אלתהג באלאלף ואלהא אלליינתאן [127r:19 *wa-i'lam anna al-taḥaḡi bi-al-alef wa-al-hā' al-layyinātān* 'has de saber que la pronunciación de *alef* y *he'* débiles'] por *al-layyinātīn* ya que es adjetivo de los sustantivos precedentes que están en caso genitivo. וקד תחתמל האתאן אללפטתין וגהא אכר [139r:19 *wa-qad taḥtamīl ḥātān al-lafṭtayn waḡh<sup>an</sup> aḥar* 'ambas palabras aceptan otra explicación'] y no *al-lafṭtān* según la normativa clásica sobre el sustantivo definido que sucede al pronombre demostrativo y debe concordar en caso con éste. לאגתמאע סאכנאן לינאן פי אכר כל ואהד מנהמא [139v:4–5 *li-iḡtima' sākinān layyinān fī aḥir kul waḥid minhumā* 'porque se agrupan dos quiescentes débiles al final de cada una de ellas'] y se esperaba *sākinīn layyinīn* porque el primer sustantivo es parte de una anexión, por lo que rige genitivo y el caso genitivo en el dual tiene *yod* y *nun*, mientras que el segundo sustantivo es el adjetivo del primer sustantivo, y

<sup>49</sup> BLAU, A *Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 165.

como se sabe el adjetivo concuerda con el caso del nombre precedente. וְלוֹלָא מְכָאן [141r:3 *wa-lawlā makān al-ḥā' fihumā lakānā mušddadān* 'y si no fuese por la posición de sus *ḥet* estarían reduplicados'] y se espera *mušddadān* por ser un predicado del verbo *kāna* que funciona en una oración nominal compuesta por dos sustantivos, quedando el primero en caso nominativo y el segundo en acusativo. וְכָאן יִזְעַם אֵן יִידוּ בְתַחֲרִיךְ אֵלִיא יֵאָאן [141r:20 *wa-kāna yaz'um anna yidu bi-taḥrīk al-yā' yā'ān* 'pretendiendo que *yidu* con *yod* vocalizada tiene dos *yod*'] y se esperaba *yā'ayn*<sup>50</sup> pero ha sustituido el caso recto por el oblicuo.<sup>51</sup> פֶּאסְקָטוּרָא יֵאָ פֶּאסְקָטוּרָא יֵאָ [141v:1–2 *fa-'asqaṭū yā' al-istiqbāl istiḥfāfan wa-istiḡālan li-taḥrīk al-yā'ān* 'eliminaron la *yod* del imperfecto para facilitar y por la dificultad de vocalizar las dos *yod*'] y se esperaba *yā'ayn* por ser un dual en anexión, ya que el dual en caso genitivo termina con *yod* y *nun*.

#### II.3.4. Los numerales

Los números de uno a cuatro en la mayoría de los casos en esta obra aparecen en forma abreviada, por lo que, es imposible saber si lo utiliza según la norma del árabe clásico o no, por ejemplo, תּוֹאֵלֶת פִּיהָ דְּ הַרְכָּאָת [120v:19 *tawālat fihi d ḥarakāt* 'se suceden cuatro vocales']. Ahora bien, cuando se escriben, todos los números empleados, tanto ordinales como cardinales, se ajustan al uso clásico con una excepción, donde el número tres se desvía del uso clásico: חֲרוּף אֵלֵיךְ וְאֵלֵיךְ תֵּלַח [125r:9 *ḥurūf al-līn wa-al-mad ṭalaṭ* 'las letras débiles son tres'] por *ṭalaṭa*. Una característica, casi generalizada, es el uso de la grafía defectiva para el número tres, es decir sin *alef* siguiendo el ejemplo de la grafía coránica: וְלֹם יֵאָבְהוּא אֵלֵי [122r:18–19 *wa-lam yabahu ilā iḡtimā' ṭalaṭ ḥarakāt* 'hacen caso omiso a la agrupación de tres vocales'] y se esperaba una *alef*, תּלַתֵּת *ṭalāt*.

#### II.3.5. Partículas

No encontramos muchas desviaciones en la obra pudiendo afirmarse que su uso se ajusta al clásico y desempeñan su función según la normativa. Sin embargo, encontramos desviaciones en אֵלִימָא קֵד בִּינָה אֶפְאָצֶל אֶלְסוֹפְרִים [119r:10 *'alāmā qad bayyanahu afāḏil al-sofērim* 'según fue explicado por los más eminentes *sofērim*'] donde *mā* está sufijada a la preposición *'alā* y lo esperado es que estuviesen separadas *'alā mā* y lo mismo ocurre en 124v:5.<sup>52</sup>

Además, encontramos dos casos donde faltan las partículas *an* e *inna*: וְעֵסִי יְכוּן [137r:18–19 *wa-'asā yakūn abā zakaryya qad i'taqada fihā k kullihā hāḏā al-i'tiqād* 'quizás *Abū Zakariyā*' era consciente de todas estas posibilidades'] y *no'asā an* porque este verbo aparece tanto defectivo

<sup>50</sup> DAYF, *Taḡdīd al-Nahū*, p. 129–131.

<sup>51</sup> GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 70.

<sup>52</sup> MARTÍNEZ DELGADO, *Šelomo ben Mobarak ben Ṣa'ir Kitāb at-taysīr*, vol. I, p. 42.

como sano y cuando aparece sano tiene que estar precedido por la partícula *an* y un verbo imperfecto.<sup>53</sup> הגול והגוז והזול עלי זנה הכון לקראת [142r:7 *higgol higgöz hizzol* ‘alà zinat hikkon liqra’t ‘*higgol higgöz hizzol* siguen la forma *hikkon liqra’t*] donde la frase debería comenzar con la partícula *inna* junto a la *waw* copulativa, es decir, tiene que ser *wa-inna higgol...*, porque esta frase es la reanudación de una frase anterior y la partícula *inna* desempeña el papel de enfatizar dicha frase. Ahora bien, las partículas *inna* y *anna* se emplean en el texto como partículas introductorias y enfatizadoras para las frases nominales, prefijadas a veces con la preposición *lām* y otras con *fā’* y otras prefijadas con *lām* y *lā* a la vez: לאן אלפעל [117v:11 *li-anna al-fi’l al-laḏī fa’uhu ḥarfu līn yarḡi’ fi’l<sup>am</sup>* ‘aynuha aw lāmuhu ḥarfu līn ‘pués de esta manera un verbo que tiene por primera radical una letra débil se transforma en uno de segunda o tercera débil’] la partícula en este ejemplo se emplea como partícula introductoria y casualidad, ya que viene prefijada con la preposición *lām* siendo una de sus funciones la casualidad. פאן אלוואו מהרכה בפתח לעלה צרוריה [120r:20 *fa-inna al-wāw muḥarraka bi-pataḥ li-‘illatin darūryya* ‘ya que la *waw* está vocalizada con *pataḥ* por un motivo necesario’]. לילא ינקטע בנא נטאם אלכלאם [120v:5 *li-‘allā yanqatī’a binā nizām al-kalām* ‘para no interrumpir la cuestión principal’].

La partícula sustantivizadora *an* que precede al verbo imperfecto se ajusta al uso clásico en su totalidad, por ejemplo: אן יקאל מן אפה ותפהו [117r:13 *an yuqāl min afah wa-tofēhu* ‘que de *afah* se diga *wa-tēfēhu*’].

La partícula *ammā* se emplea como partícula de especificación y con sentido de condicional: ואמא אן תתואלי [120r:14 *wa-amma an tatawālā* ‘En cuanto a que se sucedan’] donde la partícula tiene el sentido de condicional.

### III. Sintaxis

#### III.1. Concordancia

Se dan muchas incongruencias de concordancia en este texto tanto en la esfera del verbo, como la de los pronombres y los sustantivos.

##### III.1.1 Sustantivos

III.1.1.1 Los sustantivos *abū*, *abī* y *abā*: es muy frecuente en judeo-árabe el uso del sustantivo *abū* para expresar todos los casos gramaticales de este mismo, tanto nominativo, acusativo como genitivo.<sup>54</sup> Sin embargo, el copista de este texto intenta abandonar esta costumbre y usar el sustantivo según la norma del clásico, sin tener fortuna en ello y cometiendo muchas incongruencias en la

<sup>53</sup> HĀRŪN, *Qawā'id al-'Imlā'*, vol. 3, p. 158.

<sup>54</sup> GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 82; BLAU, *A Grammar of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic*, p. 149.

concordancia en este punto. El copista en veinte casos sustituye *abī* por *abū* y en dos casos *abū* por *abī*, más en dos casos *abī* por *abā* y en un caso *abā* por *abū*. Todo esto quedará patente con los siguientes ejemplos:

*abī* por *abū*: קאל אבי זכריא ודא קאל אן אצל ותופהו [117r:10 *qāla abī zakariyā' wa-idā qāla inna 'aṣl 'dijo Abī Zakariyā'* y si se dice que la raíz de *wa-tofehu*] por *abū* y lo mismo en 121v:16, 122v:9, 124r:14, 124v:6, 124v:7, 129v:7, 130r:17, 134r:5, 135r:7, 135r:8, 135r:20, 137r:20, 137v:4, 137v:11, 138r:3, 138r:17, 138v:2, 140v:2, 140v:10.

*abū* por *abī*: en dos casos el sustantivo *abū* sustituye a *abī*, por ejemplo, וקיל א [130r:4 *wa-qila inna al-hā' laysat 'inda abū zakariyā'min 'aḥruf al-līn* 'se dijo que la *he*' según *Abū Zakariyā'* tampoco es una letra débil'] donde se espera *abī* por ser parte de una anexión y lo mismo en 134r:18.

*abī* por *abā*: aparece así en dos casos, por ejemplo פתאבע אבי זכריא אכתר אלנאטריין [135r:4 *fa-tāba'a 'aktaru al-nāzirīn fī-kitāb abī zakariyā'* 'la mayoría de los lectores de su libro siguieron a *Abū Zakariyā'*"] y se esperaba *abā* por ser el objeto directo del verbo y sujeto *tāba'a 'aktaru*. Lo mismo ocurre en 137r:2 por ser el sujeto de la partícula *inna*.

*abā* por *abū*: [137r:18 *wa-'asā yakūn abā zakariyā' qad i'taqada fihā k kullihā hādā al-i'tiqād* 'quizás *Abū Zakariyā'* era consciente de todas estas posibilidades']

III.1.1.2. El predicado (*ḥabar*): encontramos varios tipos de predicado.

El predicado del sujeto *mubtada'*: והי אנואעא [119v:10 *id al-ḍam lahā talāṭatuhā ka-al-ḡins wa-hiya anwā<sup>an</sup>* 'porque *ḍamm /u/* tiene las tres, como el género, y ellas son las especies'] y se esperaba *anwā<sup>an</sup>* por ser el predicado de *hiya*. אן יקלבוה אלהא יא מכסורה מא קבלהא [127v:9 *an yaqlibū al-hā' yā' sākina maksūrat<sup>an</sup> mā qablahā'* 'transformaban la *he*' en *yod* quiescente y vocalizaban con *kasra* lo que le precedía'] por *maksūr<sup>an</sup>* ya que este sustantivo no es el adjetivo de la palabra que le precede, sino un predicado adelantado de la partícula *mā* que le sucede. La partícula *mā* en este contexto tiene el sentido del pronombre relativo *al-laḍī*, por lo que el sustantivo *maksūr<sup>an</sup>* debería ser masculino. Así también encontramos עליהא דאכלא ואלאלף אצלא [128v:5-6 *fa-qad ḡa'ala al-hā' aṣl<sup>an</sup> wa-al-alef dāḥil<sup>an</sup>* 'alyhā 'la catalogó con *he*' radical y la *alef* se afija'] por *dāḥil<sup>an</sup>*, predicado del sustantivo *alef*. ואמא ואו אלמד פסאקט מן [130v:16 *wa-ammā wāw al-madd fa-sāqiṭ min al-ḥaṭ* 'en cuanto a la *waw* de alargamiento se elimina gráficamente'] y se esperaba *sāqiṭa* porque el sustantivo que precede (la letra *waw*) es femenino. El mismo caso es el de אלוואות אלמפתוהה [144r:17-20 *al-wāwāt al-maftūḥa al-latī ba'dahā alef bi- šēwa' wa-pataḥ al-latī kāna wāḡib<sup>an</sup> an takūn bi-šewa hiya fī al-kitāb kaṭīr<sup>an</sup> ḡidd<sup>an</sup>* 'estas *waw* vocalizadas con *pataḥ*

seguidas de *alef* con *šəwa'* y *pataḥ* que deberían estar vocalizadas con *šəwa'* son muy frecuentes en la Biblia'] donde se esperaba *kaṭīrat<sup>an</sup>*.

El predicado de *kāna*: והי עוץ מן אלסואכן אלגיר ליינה אלתי כאן ואגבא אן תכון מנדגמא פי [123v:7-9 *wa-hiya 'iwaḏ<sup>an</sup> min al-sawākin al-ḡayr layyna al-lati kāna wāḡib<sup>an</sup> an takūn mundaḡim<sup>an</sup> fī al-rā'at* 'se originaron en estas unas quiescentes débiles en compensación por las quiescentes no débiles que obligatoriamente deberían estar asimiladas en las *reš'*] y se esperaba *mundaḡima* por la presencia del plural fracto [127v:5 *idā kāna mā qablahumā muḥarrak bi-al-qameš* 'cuando lo que le preceda vocaliza con *qameš'*] y se esperaba *muḥarrak<sup>an</sup>* por ser el predicado de *kāna*.

El predicado de *anna* e *inna*: אן מכרḡה מתוסטא מן מכרḡ אלפתח ומכרḡ אלחרק [119v:16 *wa-dālīka anna maḥraḡahu mutawassiṭ<sup>an</sup> min maḥraḡ al-pataḥ wa- maḥraḡ al-hirīq* 'porque su realización es intermedia, entre la de *pataḥ* /a/ y la de *ḥireq* /i/'] y se espera el nominativo *mutawassiṭ<sup>an</sup>* por ser predicado de la partícula *anna*. וכאן יא [131r:14-15 *wa-kāna yā' al-mad 'awlā bi-al-ḥaḏif min lām al-fi' l li-'annahu zā'id* 'y se suprime antes la *yod* de alargamiento que la tercera radical porque es un suplemento'] por *li-'annahā zā'ida*. ואן דן אמרא מן [135r:14 *wa-anna dan amran min al-ḥafīf* 'y aunque *dan* es un imperativo ligero'] y se esperaba *amrun*. Igual en ואכלם ואמחצם קמץ לאנה מאצי [143v:17-19 *wa-aḱallem wa-emḥašem qameš li-'annahu māḏī* 'wa-aḱallem wa-emḥašem con *qameš* porque es un verbo perfecto'] y corresponde *māḏī<sup>in</sup>* al ser un participio activo de un verbo de tercera radical defectiva en caso nominativo y predicativo de *anna* por lo que debería perder su última radical. ולעמרי אנהם למעדורין פי דלך [124v:15-16 *wa-la'amrī innahum la-ma'durīn fī-dālīka* 'juro por mi vida que se les puede perdonar en esto'] se esperaba *ma'durūn* en forma de plural sano nominativo. En el siguiente caso el sujeto de la partícula *anna* no sigue la normativa del árabe clásico, y esto se debe a un despiste del copista: ואעלם אן [127r:19-20 *wa-i'lam anna al-tahaḡi bi-al-alef wa-al-hā' al-laynatān* 'has de saber que la pronunciación la *alef* y *he'* débiles'] y no el esperado *al-tahaḡī*, ya que el copista ha confundido el participio activo indefinido de un verbo de tercera radical defectiva con el infinitivo definido de la forma II del verbo de tercera radical defectiva *haḡḡā*.

III.1.1.3. Adjetivos: ואמא קולה ואמא כתאבתהא פי מוצע אלאף אללין [126v:9-10 *wa-ammā qawluhu wa-'ammā kitābatuhā fī mawḏi' al-alef al-layīn* 'mientras que cuando dice «mientras que su escritura en lugar de *alef* débil»'] por *al-layīna* en concordancia con *alef*. En וקד תחתמל האתאן אללפטתאן וגהא אכר [139r:18-19 *wa-qad taḥtamīlu hātān al-lafzatān waḡhan 'āḥar* 'ambas palabras aceptan otra explicación'] la concordancia exige *'āḥar<sup>an</sup>* por el precedente.

III.1.1.4. El participio activo: este sustantivo se desvía a veces la regla del árabe clásico por la que en la derivación del participio activo de un verbo de tercera

radical defectiva, en el caso nominativo y acusativo indefinido debe perder su tercera radical. Sin embargo, en el texto encontramos unos casos que no someten a esta regla: פרב שאד ען אלאטדאד גארי עלי אצלה: [140v:1 *fa-rubba šādin ‘an al-iṭṭirād ḡārī ‘alà ašlihi* ‘la mayoría de las anomalías de lo general se comportan según la forma original’] por *ḡār<sup>in</sup>*. Lo mismo en ולו אנה פעל מאצי להרך אלוואו באלקמץ [143v:10 *wa-law annahu fi<sup>lun</sup> maḏī laḥurrika al-wāw bi-al-qameš* ‘y si fuese perfecto vocalizaría la *waw* con *qameš*’] y se esperaba *maḏ<sup>in</sup>*. El copista emplea esta forma específica (143v:12 y 143v:19) para la mayoría de los casos de participio activo recogidas en el texto, lo cual nos indica que esta forma es invariable en el texto, aunque en algunos casos siga la norma clásica.<sup>55</sup>

III.1.1.5. El artículo definido: su uso se ajusta al uso del clásico. No obstante, encontramos cuatro casos que carecen de artículo, es decir, aparece un sustantivo indefinido donde se esperaba un definido, por ejemplo וסואכן אלהי פי וסומר דובר [125v:2 *wa-sawākin al-latī fi šamar wa-amar wa-dabar* ‘y quiescentes en *šamar* y *amar* y *dabar*’] por *al-sawākin*.

### III.1.2. Preposiciones

A pesar de la abundancia del uso de las preposiciones en esta obra, son muy pocos los casos en los que se produce confusión entre el campo funcional de una preposición y otra. Encontramos en el texto ocho casos donde a veces se produce confusión entre una preposición y otra, y ausencia o adición de una de ellas.

Uso de *min* en lugar de *fi*: se hallan dos casos donde *min* sustituye una vez a *fi* y otra al adverbio de lugar *bayna*. Esta confusión la puede cometer cualquiera, al ser un campo muy complejo: ומכרג אלפתח ומכרג אלהרק [119v:16 *wa-dālīka anna maḥraḡahu mutawassit<sup>an</sup> min maḥraḡ al-pataḥ wa-maḥraḡ al-ḥireq* ‘porque su realización es intermedia, entre la de *pataḥ* /a/ y la de *ḥireq* /i/’] y se esperaba *bayna* porque el verbo *tawassata* es transitivo cuando rige *bayna* o *fi* pero nunca con la preposición *min*. למגאורתה יא אלמד מן אלכט [131r:10 *li-muḡāwaratihi yā’ al-mad min al-ḥaṭ* ‘por su proximidad a la *yod* de alargamiento en la grafía’] y se espera *fi* porque el verbo *ḡāwar* rige la preposición *fi*, nunca *min*.

Uso de *fi* en lugar de *bi*: קאל אבו זכריא אן אלהרף אלמתחרך מא נטק פיה באחדי סבע [118v:16–18 *qāla abū zakariyyā inna al-ḥarf al-mutaḥarik mā nuṭīqa fihi bi-iḥdā sab’ ḥarakāt* ‘dijo Abū Zakariyyā: «la letra está vocalizada cuando se articula con una de las siete vocales»’] por *bihi*, necesario para que el verbo *naṭaq* sea transitivo y lo mismo ocurre en תם קאל ואלסאכן מא לא ינטק פיה באחדי הדה אלסבע [118v:19–20 *tumma qāla wa-al-sākin mā lā yunṭaqu fihi bi-iḥdā ḥādihi al-sab’ ḥarakāt* ‘luego dijo: «y está quiescente cuando no se articula con una de estas siete vocales»’].

<sup>55</sup> GALLEGO, *El judeo-árabe medieval*, p. 66.

Destaca en un caso la adición de una preposición en la frase, resultando redundante: *אבו זכריא בכלמאח וקד מתל פי דלך* [125r:20–125v:1 *wa-qad mattala fi dālika abū zakariyā bi-kalimāt* ‘que ejemplificó Abū Zakariyā’ con palabras’] donde *fi* es superflua porque el verbo ya es transitivo con la ayuda de *bi*, es decir, es suficiente con *mattala bi-kalimāt* ‘ejemplificó con’.

### III.1.3. Negación

Este tipo de partículas y su uso en la obra se ajusta al uso clásico. Según su frecuencia su orden es *lā*, *lam*, *laysa*, *mā*. En ningún momento el escriba usa la partícula *lan* sino que la sustituye por la partícula *laysa* que desempeña su papel.

La partícula *mā* se emplea en muy pocos casos como partícula de negación, porque en la mayoría de los casos se usa con el sentido del pronombre relativo *al-laḏī* como: *תקריב מא יכשא אן יבעד מאכדה עלי אלמבתדי* [117r:9–10 *taqrīb mā yuḥšā ‘an yab‘uda ma’ḥaḏuhu ‘alā al-mubtadi* ‘que divulgue lo que provoca duda al principiante’]

En un caso la partícula *lam* es sustituida por *lā*: *ואמא אנהם לא יקרוא ותעאטוא* [134r:1 *wa-immā annahum lam yaqra‘u wa-ta‘āṭū al-‘inkār ‘alihi* ‘aunque no lo hubiesen leído lo hubiesen criticado’] y se esperaba *lam* para transformar el sentido del verbo presente en pasado, mientras que *lā* se reserva para negar el pasado en presente, sin que transforme el sentido del presente en pasado. En esta frase el autor está hablando de un grupo de gente que leyeron el libro de Hayyuğ en el pasado, por lo que el contexto de la frase exige *lam* y no *lā*.

En otro caso se utiliza la partícula *lā* donde corresponde *mā*: *ולא גרי פי תצעיפהם* [139r:14 *wa-lā ġarā fi taḏ‘ifihim al-‘ayn qabla duḥūl al-lām* ‘y ni se le ha reduplicado la segunda antes de introducir la tercera’].

En el resto del texto el uso de las partículas de negación se ajusta a la normativa clásica. Sin embargo, encontramos dos casos que afectan a la partícula *lā*, en uno de ellos está de más y en el otro se echa en falta: *אד קאל ען חרוף אללין* [124v:10–11 *iḏ qāla ‘an ḥurūf al-līn innahā talīn ḥattā taḥfā fa-lā yakūn lahā fi al-lafzi wa-lā ḥiss<sup>um</sup>* ‘cuando dijo que las letras débiles se debilitan hasta desaparecer perdiéndose fonéticamente sin dejar rastro’] donde el uso de *lā* es superfluo porque la frase ya cuenta con esta partícula.

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# JACOPO DE' BARBARI'S *VIEW OF VENICE* (1500) 'IMAGE VEHICLES' AND 'PATHWAYS OF CULTURE' PAST AND PRESENT\*

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## *Abstract*

This essay focuses on an iconic and ground-breaking woodcut – Jacopo de' Barbari (c. 1460/70–1516) and Anton Kolb's *View of Venice* (1500) – and an interactive museum installation that I first developed for Duke University's Nasher Museum of Art. The exhibition uses the *View* as a point of departure for the development of multi-media displays about Early Modern Venice and the transfer of knowledge. Adopting Aby Warburg's illustrative terminology, the essay extends understandings of the woodcut, namely its function as an 'image vehicle' and its invention and realization as a product of cultural pathways. This concept, 'pathways of culture', also relates to the digital methods and visualized media used in the exhibition where their application advances a new methodology in art history, just as Aby Warburg did in the early twentieth century. And like Warburg who privileged visual imagery and traced its ideological transmission with his *Mnemosyne Atlas* (1924–1929), the curatorial team of the exhibition uses and systematizes original visualizations to drive the analyses of art, architectural and urban history in new and exciting ways.

## *Key Words*

Jacopo de' Barbari, *View of Venice*, Renaissance Venice, Graphic Arts, Art Historical Methods, Aby Warburg, Digital Humanities.

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\* This article and the exhibition project to which it refers have benefited from the generosity of many individuals and institutions. I would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of *Mediterranea* for their insightful suggestions. Jehangir Malegam, Kristen Neuschel, Clare Woods, Susanna Caviglia, and Mark DeLong read drafts of the article and offered helpful feedback. Hannah Jacobs generously coordinated the imagery and video, and I am grateful to my students Daphne Turan and Noah Michaud who assisted with details. The exhibition has a second life thanks to a partnership with the Fondazione Musei Civici di Venezia, and in particular, Andrea Bellieni and Valeria Cafà at the Museo Correr. For this installation, Ludovica Galeazzo continues to offer her immense expertise and her friendship. The project has benefitted from the institutional support of the Samuel H. Kress Foundation, the National Endowment of the Humanities, the Gladys Krieble Delmas Foundation, and the Wired! Lab at Duke University. This article is dedicated to Simon & Henri Lanzoni whose enduring support will always be cherished.



Jacopo de' Barbari (c. 1460/70–before 17 July 1516) and Anton Kolb's *View of Venice*, c. 1497–1500, visualized one of the most powerful Early Modern states in spectacular and unprecedented detail (fig. 1).<sup>1</sup> The monumental woodcut was a visual and technological marvel. It embodied geographic as well as metaphoric ideals of Venice and its place in the world at the turn of a new century and demi-millennium. Celebrating a powerful integration of knowledge – artistic and scientific – the bird's-eye view was a material expression of the city and its state. Indeed, its visual claims were echoed by written accounts that waxed poetic over its uniqueness.<sup>2</sup> Formed from six sheets of paper, each printed on its own exquisitely carved wooden block, the image's reproducibility held tremendous potential for the wide dissemination of its messages.<sup>3</sup> A manifesto of Renaissance thought – the *View* was an opportunity to celebrate Venice and amaze the world.

The composite impression reveals the city's elegantly curved form, rising from the Adriatic where people lived, navigated, and experienced urban life in a way that differed from any other place in the world.<sup>4</sup> Venice's dense urban form

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<sup>1</sup> For literature related to the *View*, see: JAY ALAN LEVENSON, *Jacopo de' Barbari and Northern Art of the Early Sixteenth Century*, Ph.D. Diss., New York University, 1978, p. 278–281; JÜRGEN SCHULZ, « Jacopo de' Barbari's *View of Venice*. Map Making, City Views, and Moralized Geography before the Year 1500 », *Art Bulletin*, 60 (1978), p. 425–475; DEBORAH HOWARD, « Venice as a Dolphin. Further Investigations into Jacopo de' Barbari's *View* », *Artibus et Historiae*, 18 (1997), p. 101–111; GISELLE LAMBERT, *Les premières gravures italiennes. Quattrocento du cinquecento. Inventaire de la collection du Département des Estampes et de la Photographie*, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris 1999, p. 331–333; GIANDOMENICO ROMANELLI, SUSANNA BIADENE, *A volo d'uccello: Jacopo de Barbari e le rappresentazioni di città nell'Europa del Rinascimento*, Arsenale, Venezia 1999; CORRADO BALISTRERI-TRINCANATO, DARIO ZANVERDIANI, *Jacopo de Barbari. Il racconto di una città*, 2 vols., Cetid, Venezia 2000; GERT JAN VAN DER SMAN, « De eeuw van Titiaan: Venetiaanse prenten uit de Renaissance », in ID., *Le siècle de Titien. Gravures vénitiennes de la Renaissance*, Waanders Uitgevers, Zwolle 2003, p. 40–41; SIMONE FERRARI, *Jacopo de' Barbari. Un protagonista del Rinascimento tra Venezia e Dürer*, B. Mondadori, Milano 2006, p. 150–154; BEATE BÖCKEM, *Jacopo de' Barbari. Künstlerschaft und Hofkultur im 1500*, Böhlau Verlag, Köln 2016 (*Studien zur Kunst*, 32), p. 32–33, 39–50, 428–429.

<sup>2</sup> In particular, see: BRONWEN WILSON, « Venice, Print, and the Early Modern Icon », *Urban History*, 33 (2006), p. 39–64, in which the author considers the complicity of printmakers in the promotion of Venice, especially within an emerging international market. Natives and foreigners alike wrote laudatory descriptions of the city around the time of the *View*'s publication. Among these were Marin Sanudo, Marc'Antonio Sabellico, Arnold von Harff, Pietro Casola, and Philippe de Commines.

<sup>3</sup> This is the subject of another paper in which I analyze the idea of viewing the *View* from both a theoretical perspective as an essay on spatial analysis, and from a practical one in its presentation strategies.

<sup>4</sup> Select contributions about art and architecture according to Venetian experience include: PATRICIA FORTINI BROWN, *Venetian Narrative Painting in the Age of Carpaccio*, Yale University Press,

gives way to the more than one hundred-twenty islands that come together to form a mosaic of interdependent spaces accessed via bridges and canals (fig. 2). Upon closer view, one can note the individual architectural structures that compose it: every building – private and public – from parish church to monastic complex, sites of government administration and palaces to open squares, some not yet paved, and gardens (fig. 3). The *View* shows the openness of Piazza San Marco, seat of Venice's government and power, flaunting the city's confidence in its ability to withstand threats from potential enemies (fig. 4).<sup>5</sup> Ships, commercial and military, remain moored near the Arsenal; hundreds of smaller boats appear throughout the interstices of the city.

The *View* captures the distinctiveness of a city built in the middle of a lagoon: men fishing in its channels; the many gondolas moving people and materials through winding canals and out into the lagoon; the celebratory regatta invoking festivals and choreographed events on its waterways. It also highlights Venice's unique architecture.<sup>6</sup> The church of San Marco, shrine to the city's patron saint, discloses longstanding associations with the East through its majestic domes and decorative details. Ornate palaces face out towards canals, while sculpted wellheads in each square mark the location of fresh water. Moving in closer, even greater detail emerges, including the careful articulation of windows, doors, sculptural details and frescoed façades that disclose an impressive range of artistic vocabulary – physical articulations of the city's multi-cultural and cosmopolitan nature (see VIDEO 1: <<https://duke.box.com/v/Video-1>>).<sup>7</sup>

Only one archival document has been connected to the *View of Venice*.<sup>8</sup> It records the request by Anton Kolb, a German merchant residing in the city and

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New Haven–London 1988; PAUL HILLS, *Venetian Colour. Marble, Mosaic, Painting and Glass*, Yale University Press, New Haven–London 1999; DANIEL SAVOY, *Venice from the Water. Architecture and Myth in an Early Modern City*, Yale University Press, New Haven–London 2012.

<sup>5</sup> Observers frequently note and question the absence of people in Piazza San Marco despite the fact that human industriousness is indicated elsewhere in the city. It is difficult to say whether there was a particular reason for this. It may simply be artistic license aimed at allowing clear legibility of the urban space and its messages as a site of power and learning (all the more notable for the inclusion of the recently constructed, yet highly sophisticated Clock Tower). Louis Marin suggests that the power of cities is more effectively conveyed in cityscapes that exclude people. See LOUIS MARIN, « La ville dans sa carte et son portrait », in *Id.*, *De la représentation*, Gallimard, Paris 1994 (Hautes études), p. 204–218.

<sup>6</sup> The visual record of the architectural monuments as they appeared was important. Careful comparison of the first and second state prints indicates a number of modifications, such as the Bell Tower in Piazza San Marco, and discloses the importance of their visual documentation. In addition, most labeling in the image is connected to location, particularly in the case of churches, the winds, and Venice itself.

<sup>7</sup> Please note that for optimal viewing of the video, it is important to change the quality from 'auto' to '1080' under settings.

<sup>8</sup> ASVe, Collegio Notatorio, reg. 15, fol. 28r. It should be noted that the Collegio's action is mentioned in the Diary of Marin Sanudo on 31 October 1500; see *I diarii di Marino Sanuto, 1496–*

likely financial sponsor of the project, to Doge Agostino Barbarigo (r. 1486–1501) and the Collegio. In it, Kolb seeks two permissions: first for a copyright on the invention of the image, and, second, for the exclusion of taxes on its sale in the provinces.<sup>9</sup> The state granted a *privilegio* for four years. While such courtesies had been extended to publishers of books, this is the first given to a published image, implying that the State was fully aware of the image's novelty. The document, a transcription of Kolb's appeal, reveals that the project took three years to complete. In it, Kolb also highlights the image's invention in terms of composition and scale, and notes that it was printed on customized paper, the largest sheets produced in Europe. We also learn that he must set the price at no less than three florins in order to recover the investment.<sup>10</sup> The use of florins instead of the Venetian ducat is curious and may point to an interest in an international market even if the ducat was a higher quality form of currency due to the purity and weight of its gold.<sup>11</sup> The six separate sheets would have facilitated sale thanks to their transportability, promoting circulation beyond Venice with the many foreigners passing through the city.

In addition to visualizing the magnificence of the Venetian state and celebrating the skills and inventions of its makers, the *View* may also, albeit subtly, commemorate the Germans and their role in the transmission of knowledge – a knowledge that, combined with Venetian ambition, resulted in such a marvelous work. It bears noting that in the composition, the alignment of Mercury and Neptune is off center, slightly to the left, in order to delineate the two most important sites in the city, Piazza San Marco and the Rialto. But closer examination reveals that their placement does more than that. Mercury, in fact, appears above the Fondaco dei Tedeschi, the warehouse and residential quarters of the German community, along with their church of San Bartolomeo (fig. 5) for which Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528) painted the high altarpiece of the *Madonna of*

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1533: dall'autografo Marciano ital. cl. VII codd. CDXIX–CDLXXVII, ed. RINALDO FULIN, vol. III, Tip. Visentini, Venezia 1880, col. 1006. For a transcription of the document, see SCHULZ, « Jacopo de' Barbari's *View of Venice* », p. 473.

<sup>9</sup> CHRISTOPHER WITCOMBE, *Copyright in the Renaissance. Prints and the Privilegio in Sixteenth-Century Venice and Rome*, Brill, Leiden–Boston 2004 (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 100), p. 32–33. Witcombe asserts that the permission relates only to the tax exemption and not the image itself. However, this is impossible to determine since the document itself is a transcription of the original, and elides clauses in a way that prevents a correct understanding and/or translation. Given the amount of time that Kolb spent articulating the uniqueness of the image, it is difficult to believe that he did not seek a copyright for its invention.

<sup>10</sup> The price was not exactly low as the average skilled worker in Venice might expect to receive that amount over the course of a month.

<sup>11</sup> FREDERICK C. LANE, REINHOLD C. MUELLER, *Money and Banking in Medieval and Renaissance Venice*, vol. I: EAD., *Coins and Moneys of Account*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1985, and vol. II: REINHOLD MUELLER, *The Venetian Money Market: Banks, Panics and the Public Debt, 1200–1500*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1997.

*the Rose Garlands* in 1506. This is where Anton Kolb – de' Barbari's staunchest advocate as noted by Dürer in a letter to Willibald Pirckheimer dated to February of that same year – would have resided.<sup>12</sup>

The nod to German influence might come in an even more subtle way via the eight figurative winds, an allegorical compass rose surrounding the portrait of the city. One wind in particular appears different from the rest. This is the North wind that sweeps down across the Alps (fig. 6). The eyes of his putto-like face are gently covered with a blindfold secured with the most elegant of knots.<sup>13</sup> This may be due to his directional gaze south where the sun shines brightly, but it may also be because he looks towards the beauty of Piazza San Marco. The face recalls that of blindfolded cupids portrayed by fifteenth-century artists, such as Piero della Francesca (c. 1415–1492) and Andrea Mantegna (c. 1430/31–1506). In this case, perhaps it is the ineffable beauty of the beloved city that renders him blind.

An exchange occurs between the North and South winds – the only two with a star emerging from their lips, from which rays extend and blow across Venice. They are indicated by name (Septentrio and Auster), as well as by the letters T (Tramonta) and O (Ostro). Since their identities are labeled, the repetition of additional signifiers (letters and stars) seems a potential opportunity for de' Barbari to communicate secondary messages. «T-O» (or «O-T») is a cartographic trope for dividing the world – Orbis and Terrarum – ocean and land, Venice and the *terrafirma*. Even more interestingly, Neptune directs his gaze upwards to the Northwest wind, otherwise known as the Corus Circius or M for Maestro (fig. 7). This wind's disembodied face appears in three-quarter view with an eye directed towards Treviso and Seravalle, a nod to the Brenner Pass, the path to Nuremberg. This would have been the very route traveled by de' Barbari before the *View* was published in late 1500, the year in which he was called upon by the Holy Roman Emperor for his ingenuity and invention. Through the agency of artists as well as the movement of material objects, this north-south exchange relates to the theoretical construct and methodological model that Aby Warburg (1866–1929) developed throughout his career. By taking a Warburgian approach to the *View of Venice*, we can conceptualize the iconic image in a new way.

### I. *The 'Mnemosyne Atlas': an art historical methodology*

At the end of his career as an art historian, Warburg created the *Mnemosyne Atlas*, a visual itinerary of his interpretation and thematic understanding of the

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<sup>12</sup> For a transcription, see: BÖCKEM, *Jacopo de' Barbari*, p. 29.

<sup>13</sup> Knots made either out of hair or fabric are a regular feature in works by de' Barbari. Two that date to around the time of the *View* are the *Large Sacrifice to Priapus* and *Judith*.

Renaissance.<sup>14</sup> An innovative methodological model for the discipline at the time of its conception in 1924, Warburg's *Atlas* and its more than seventy image-filled panels succinctly presented concepts that he developed over the course of forty years. These included three separate, yet interrelated ideas: 'Bilderfahrzeuge' (image vehicles), 'Bilderwanderung' (the migration of images) and 'Wanderstraßen der Kultur' (pathways of culture).<sup>15</sup> The first two indicate the potential influence of material objects and their transmission of visual culture through travel to distant places and different societies. Figurative illustrations on Greek vases and their migration throughout the ancient world exemplify such image vehicles. The pathways refer to well-worn trade routes that facilitated the movement of people, their objects and culture, over time. According to Warburg, these phenomena embodied the transfer of ideas and artistic expression from classical antiquity into the Renaissance, or what he called « the after-life of antiquity ».<sup>16</sup> For the purposes of this essay, Warburg's use of these concepts are nuanced in order to underscore the ways in which the medium of print, introduced in the fifteenth century, expedited the transfer of sophisticated artistic and scientific knowledge during the Renaissance.

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<sup>14</sup> For recent surveys of the *Mnemosyne Atlas*, see: CHRISTOPHER D. JOHNSON, *Memory, Metaphor and Aby Warburg's Atlas of Images*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2012 (A Signale Book) and the companion website, <<https://live-warburglibrarycornelledu.pantheonsite.io/>>, curated by scholars, including Claudia Wedepohl, along with Cornell University Library and the Warburg Institute; ABY WARBURG, *Gesammelte Schriften: Studienausgabe*, vol. II.1: *Der Bilderatlas: Mnemosyne*, ed. MARTIN WARNE, CLAUDIA BRINK, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2008; ABY WARBURG, *Mnemosyne. L'Atlante delle immagini*, ed. MARTIN WARNE, CLAUDIA BRINK, trans. MAURIZIO GHELARDI, Nino Aragno, Torino 2002; ITALO SPINELLI, ROBERTO VENUTI (eds.), *Mnemosyne. L'Atlante della memoria di Aby Warburg*, Artemide, Roma 1999. 'The Keeper' exhibition at the New Museum in 2016 offered a contemporary recreation of the *Mnemosyne Atlas* (<<https://www.newmuseum.org/exhibitions/view/the-keeper>>).

<sup>15</sup> ERNST H. GOMBRICH, *Aby Warburg. An Intellectual Biography*, The Warburg Institute, London 1970 provides an extensive overview of Aby Warburg's intellectual career, including a chapter devoted to the *Atlas*. The notion of image vehicles and migration of images is connected to Dürer on whom Warburg gave a public lecture in October 1905; see: ABY WARBURG, « Dürer and Italian Antiquity (1905) », in ID., *The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity: Contributions to the Cultural History of the Renaissance*, ed. KURT W. FORSTER, trans. DAVID BRITT, Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, Los Angeles 1999 (Texts & Documents), p. 553–558. The idea of *Wanderstraßen* was part of a philosophical dialogue with Warburg's colleague Fritz Saxl; see: DOROTHEA MCEWAN, *Wanderstraßen der Kultur. Die Aby Warburg-Fritz Saxl Korrespondenz 1920 bis 1929*, Dölling-Galitz Verlag, München 2004 (Kleine Schriften des Warburg Institute London und des Warburg Archivs im Warburg Haus Hamburg, 2). On the concept of *Bilderfahrzeuge*, see: ANDREAS BAYER, HORST BREDERKAMP, UWE FELKNER, GERHARD WOLF, *Bilderfahrzeuge: Aby Warburg's Vermächtnis und die Zukunft der Ikkologie*, Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, Berlin 2018.

<sup>16</sup> GOMBRICH, *Aby Warburg*, p. 307. For an application of « the after-life of antiquity », see, GEORGES DIDI-HUBERMAN, *The Surviving Image: Phantoms of Time and Time of Phantoms: Aby Warburg's History of Time*, trans. HARVEY L. MENDELSON, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA 2017.

In 1929 Warburg presented a lecture with the *Atlas's* panels, each with a variety of arranged images, at the Biblioteca Hertziana in Rome, material that guided subsequent generations of art historians through the re-conceptualization of the field.<sup>17</sup> His visually driven narrative of pictorial forces offered a different model with which to explain the evolution of western art. The title, *Mnemosyne Atlas*, functioned as a précis of its purpose. It alluded to the Greek gods in a way that announced the humanistic, classical basis of Warburg's approach. The god Atlas is traditionally regarded as the progenitor of astronomers and geographers, and the first three panels, coded with the letters A, B, and C (subsequent panels are numbered), include pictorial reference to the cosmological and geographical underpinnings of Warburg's *Atlas*.<sup>18</sup> The title could also allude literally to an atlas as an illustrated itinerary. The memory goddess, Mnemosyne, could relate to collective memory as a formative influence as well as to the transformative nature of images – that is, their ability to shift our consciousness.<sup>19</sup> The *View of Venice* epitomizes such imagery by making an imprint on the viewer's mind. It mesmerizes in such a way that the transfixed image invites renewed engagement in an effort to make the viewer see and understand more of what is being revealed (and concealed) through general impressions as well as specific features.<sup>20</sup> It also presents a visually navigable topography.

The late fifteenth-century cultural context in which the *View* materialized demonstrates the applicability of Warburg's use of images, in particular the

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<sup>17</sup> Kenneth Clark (1903–1983), Erwin Panofsky (1892–1968), and Ernst Gombrich (1909–2001), three art historical titans directly inspired by Warburg, form part of the genealogy of the field. Clark, who was present for Warburg's lecture, noted that it was one of two moments in Rome that changed his life. See, KENNETH CLARK, « A Lecture that Changed my Life (1974) », in KLAUS BERGER, STEPHAN FÜSSEL (eds.), *Mnemosyne: Beiträge zum 50. Todestag von Aby M. Warburg*, Gratia Verlag, Göttingen 1979 (Gratia: Bamberger Schriften zur Renaissanceforschung, 7), p. 47–48. For an online resource with biographical information about art historians and their professional relationships, including the above-mentioned, see the *Dictionary of Art Historians*, curated by LEE SORENSEN and developed by HANNAH JACOBS at <<http://arthistorians.info/>>

<sup>18</sup> For the shaping of Warburg's thought on the cosmos through discussions with leading thinkers of his time, see: HORST BREDEKAMP, CLAUDIA WEDEPOHL, *Warburg, Cassirer und Einstein in Gespräch: Kepler als Schlüssel der Moderne*, Wagenbach, Berlin 2015 (Kleine Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek, 88).

<sup>19</sup> For a translation/transcription of Warburg's notebooks related to the philosophy of Mneme, see: GOMBRICH, *Aby Warburg*, 270. Bolzoni made a contribution to the notion of memory as a tradition that, while reaching back to antiquity, became a powerful force with the advent of the printed book: LINA BOLZONI, *La stanza della memoria: Modelli letterari e iconografici nell'età della stampa*, Einaudi, Torino 1995 (Saggi, 797).

<sup>20</sup> In this, Lefebvre's theoretical idea of Venice as the mutually reinforcing notion of the representation of space and representational space is clearly at play. See HENRI LEFEBVRE, *The Production of Space*, trans. DONALD NICHOLSON-SMITH, Blackwell, Oxford–Malden, MA 1991, in particular p. 73–74.

graphic arts, as image vehicles along pathways of culture. Select panels from the *Mnemosyne Atlas* showcase prints and drawings, such as those featuring ones by Mantegna and Dürer that disclose the transcultural exchange of ideas by visually quoting or paraphrasing each other's subjects and their arrangement. Artists acknowledged each other's creativity, as in the advancement of compositional formats and inventive subject matter, recording skilled intricacy and re-imagining general features in printed and drawn reinterpretations. This can be seen in Dürer's drawing of Mantegna's right-hand sheet of the *Battle of the Sea Gods* (c. 1485–1488), reproductions of which were pinned to Screen 49 of Warburg's penultimate version of the *Atlas* (fig. 8), or Screen 57 of his final one (fig. 9).<sup>21</sup> The monumental scale of the *View* (the six sheets together measure over 137 x 277 centimeters) and its intellectual scope signal the pioneering exploration of this relatively new reproducible medium. Its makers grasped the power of printed woodcuts in their ability to magnify and broadcast messages conveyed by the image. The *View* – in both its medium and pictorial content – is a quintessential image vehicle.

## II. *The exchange of knowledge in printed form*

In Warburg's day, Florence was considered the epicenter of Renaissance culture, while Venice was situated on the margins of study. This is confirmed by the limited number of Venetian works in Warburg's image-filled panels.<sup>22</sup> Given today's knowledge of late-fifteenth-century Venice, one might boldly assert that the addition of Venetian evidence would make his model more compelling.<sup>23</sup> In particular, due to the printmaking industry in Venice, the migration of images and their cultural pathways moved not only bi-directionally north and south, but also east and west due largely to the powerful expanse of the Venetian Republic,

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<sup>21</sup> Images by Andrea Mantegna and Dürer from Screens 49, 57 and 58, appeared together on one screen (49) in the penultimate version of the *Atlas* dating to 2 September 1928; this direct juxtaposition more readily revealed the inspired visual dialogue between the images. For the imagery that appeared on the final panels versus the penultimate version, see, SPINELLI, VENUTI (eds.), *Mnemosyne. L'Atlante della memoria*, p. 80, 87–88; and MARCUS ANDREW HURTTIG, *Antiquity Unleashed. Aby Warburg, Dürer and Mantegna*, Courtauld Gallery, London 2013, p. 12, 49.

<sup>22</sup> While a comprehensive list of the images remains to be compiled, my review of the final panels dating to 1929 has revealed that there are few Venetian works. Ones identified include: Jacopo Bellini's *Flagellation of Christ* and *Rape of Deianira*; Jacopo Sansovino's *Neptune on the Scala dei Giganti* in the Ducal Palace in Venice; Vittore Carpaccio's *Presentation of the Virgin*; Giovanni Bellini's *Christ the Redeemer*; Jacopo Tintoretto's *Muses*; and Titian or Giorgione's *Fête Champêtre*.

<sup>23</sup> For the past twenty years, there has been a remarkable shift in Renaissance studies. In a roundtable discussion devoted to Venetian art history at the Renaissance Society of America annual conference in NYC 2014, scholars publicly remarked that the number of sessions devoted to Venetian art and culture bore witness to the decentralization of Florence for Renaissance studies; margins have now become centers.

its territories, and its trading networks in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>24</sup> Of the conglomerate states in 1500 (a unified Italy did not exist until the mid-nineteenth century), only Venice reached beyond the actual peninsula to territories along the Dalmatian coast, and around to Greece and into the Mediterranean basin.<sup>25</sup>

The Republic's expanse, its position as one of the most powerful states in the Early Modern world, and its port of passage to and from the Holy Land, meant that the city regularly hosted, both short and long-term, people from many different places. It was a nexus of cultural pathways. Opportunity for encounter and dialogue accelerated growth. Such was the case with the Germans who set up some of the earliest workshops for printing and selling books in the final third of the fifteenth century.<sup>26</sup> Their time in Venice informed technical practice and allowed it to take root in the industry. In addition to looking at agents of change, it is important to consider processes of cultural exchange. Transfer also occurred with material objects, such as incunabula and prints, woodcut or engraved, which, due to their accelerated rate of reproduction, roamed across Europe, affecting taste and precipitating ideas at a faster pace than previously possible.<sup>27</sup>

The introduction of printing was an extraordinary phenomenon. Immediately after its germination in Mainz, twelve cities established large print-making industries all of which were notably situated along trading corridors.<sup>28</sup> While each of these urban centers made important contributions to book production, Venice quickly became the industry's capital due to its geographical location, long-established trading networks, and authority within the international

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<sup>24</sup> MONIQUE O'CONNELL, *Men of Empire: Power and Negotiation in Venice's Maritime State*, John's Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2009, presents recent scholarly consideration of Venice as empire; JOHN JEFFRIES MARTIN's essay, « Between Istanbul and Venice. Agency, Faith, and Empire in the Sixteenth Century », in *Mediterranea*, 3 (2018), p. 219–228, considers the ongoing connection between Venice and the East.

<sup>25</sup> WILLIAM SHEPHERD, *Historical Atlas*, Henry Holt and Company, New York 1911, p. 90–91, indicates the expanse of the Republic in 1495. This early atlas, produced by Shepherd during Warburg's career, anticipates the inherent potential of using color to visually convey important information, such as present-day colorization of historical imagery.

<sup>26</sup> HENRY SIMONSFELD, *Der Fondaco dei Tedeschi in Venedig und die deutsch-venezianischen Handelbeziehungen*, 2 vols., Scientia, Aachen 1968, reprint of Stuttgart 1887.

<sup>27</sup> BERND ROERK, « Venice and Germany: Commercial Contacts and Intellectual Inspirations », in BERNARD AIKEMA, BEVERLY LOUISE BROWN (eds.), *Renaissance Venice and the North*, Rizzoli, New York 1999, p. 45.

<sup>28</sup> Contributions to scholarly considerations of printmaking include: RUDOLF HIRSCH, *Printing, Selling and Reading, 1450–1550*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1967; SEAN ROBERTS, *Printing a Mediterranean World. Florence, Constantinople, and the Renaissance of Geography*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2013 (I Tatti Studies in Italian Renaissance History). For an open source, digitized database related to incunabula and fifteenth-century European printing, hosted by the British Museum with international institutional collaboration, see: <http://www.bl.uk/catalogues/istc/> In addition to Mainz, the twelve cities include: Leipzig, Cologne, Nuremberg, Augsburg, Strasbourg, Paris, Lyon, Basel, Venice, Milan, Florence, and Rome.

market.<sup>29</sup> By 1500, the year in which the *View* was published and its first copies sold, more than two hundred print shops were operating in the city and generating the largest output of books in Europe. Their subjects included philosophy, law, religion, classics, and science. Moreover, the city's resident foreign communities meant that classical texts were translated and printed in a variety of languages, including Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic. Printers not only developed new font types, such as Aldus Manutius's italics, but they also created typefaces for non-Latin alphabets.<sup>30</sup>

Images also increased the value, complexity, and innovative quality of printed texts. As the distribution of books made their way throughout the known world, textual and visual information was communicated at an unprecedented magnitude and rate.<sup>31</sup> Within books, printed text was soon aligned with woodcut imagery to communicate complex concepts in both the sciences and the humanities and to illustrate content in novel ways. It was the graphic excellence of books printed in Venice that informed taste.<sup>32</sup> Fantastic illustrations elucidated elaborate histories and fictions, such as the poetic allegory, *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili* (published in Venice by Aldo Manuzio, 1499).<sup>33</sup> From a formatting standpoint, the words appear in decorative alignment below the images (fig. 10); imagery and text work together with narrative purpose in an inspired and artistic arrangement that is useful to the fantastical story.

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<sup>29</sup> For further reading on printmaking in Venice, see: BRONWEN WILSON, *The World in Venice. Print, the City, and Early Modern Identity*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2005 (Studies in Book and Print Culture); and MARTIN LOWRY's contributions to this subject: *The World of Aldus Manutius. Business and Scholarship in Renaissance Venice*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 1979; and ID., *Nicolas Jenson e le origini dell'editoria veneziana nell'Europa del Rinascimento*, Il Veltro, Roma 2002. A 2018-exhibition and catalogue, *Printing Revolution, 1450-1500* (Marsilio), curated by CRISTINA DONDI for the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana and the Museo Correr in Venice, sought to highlight the importance of the city in the printmaking industry.

<sup>30</sup> In particular, see: MARTIN DAVIES, *Aldus Manutius. Printer and Publisher of Renaissance Venice*, J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles, CA 1995.

<sup>31</sup> It should be noted that it was not until the introduction of the World Wide Web in the late twentieth century, that mass dissemination of knowledge on a global scale occurred once again, a shift that took place over 500 years after the introduction of the printing press.

<sup>32</sup> ROERK, « Venice and Germany », p. 46, notes that this excellence attracted many printers, especially German ones, to Venice to learn the trade, and cites Erhart Ratdold of Augsburg, who ran a print shop in Venice as early as 1476 and then 'imported', upon his return home, an acquired technical knowledge of printing as well as its decorative elements, such as initials, Greek letters, and rounded antique characters.

<sup>33</sup> For the most recent consideration and relevant bibliography, see: HELENA K SZÉPE, « *L'Hypnerotomachia Poliphili*, l'avventura tra sogno ed erotismo stampata da Aldo Manuzio », in Beltrami, Guido, Davide Gasparotto (eds.), *Aldo Manuzio il rinascimento di Venezia*, Marsilio, Venezia 2016, p. 137-156. It is perhaps worth noting that Warburg used a woodcut from the *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili* to support an argument in his dissertation that Spring (Primavera) is the woman on the shore ready to receive Venus in Botticelli's painting on the subject. Cf. GOMBRICH, *Aby Warburg*, p. 61.

Representations of cities appear in the *Nuremberg Chronicle* (*Liber Chronicarum* or *Die Schedelsche Weltchronik*, 1493), introducing the notion of place in a systematic ordering of the world.<sup>34</sup> Hartmann Schedel, a humanist from Nuremberg who had trained as a physician in Padua, a Venetian annex that served as its university town, composed the text that organized the history of the world into seven ages. A masterpiece of early printing, it was the most extensively illustrated incunabula in its time, a project undertaken by Michael Wolgemut (c. 1434/37–1519) who oversaw the completion of over 1800 high-quality images. Dürer apprenticed with the senior artist, and was also the godson of Anton Koberger, the book's printer.<sup>35</sup> Shortly after its publication, Dürer made his first trip to Venice where he met distinguished practicing artists, among them possibly de' Barbari, and sketched novelties he had witnessed in the distinctive city, as can be seen in his comparative drawing of a lady from Venice and Nuremberg (fig. 11).<sup>36</sup> Anton Kolb, and quite possibly Dürer, disseminated copies of the *Weltchronik* in Venice.<sup>37</sup> Such moving interconnections with their north-south, south-north bi-directionality echo Warburg's *Wanderstraßen der Kultur*.

At this moment of international exchange, printed imagery grew in sophistication. The shift in the medium's scale and novelty facilitated the invention of the unprecedented *View of Venice*. As an epicenter of the print industry and a cosmopolitan magnet at the end of the fifteenth century, Venice sat at the intersection of rich philosophical and ideological exchanges. It was embedded in the study and translations of works by ancient and medieval scholars as well as the generation of new theoretical treatises. Such a climate fostered Jacopo de' Barbari's application of his study of proportion and geometry to his complex artistic representations.<sup>38</sup> A double-portrait attributed to the

<sup>34</sup> DAVID LANDAU, PETER PARSHALL, *The Renaissance Print*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1994, p. 38–40. The image of Venice in the *Nuremberg Chronicle* was based on that produced by Erhard Reurich for *Sanctae Peregrinatio* (Mainz, 1486). Both these views are linear, profile depictions of Venice, and demonstrate the advanced conception of the *View of Venice* shortly afterwards, in the late fifteenth century. Most of the woodcuts of the cities shown were repetitions based on patterns, the exception being views of Bavarian cities. For more on Reurich, see FREDERIKE TIMM, *Der Palästina-Pilgerbericht des Bernhard von Breidenbach und die Holzschnitte Erhard Reuwichs. Die Peregrinatio in terram sanctam (1486) als Propagandainstrument im Mantel der gelehrten Pilgerschrift*, Dr. Ernst Hauswedell & Co., Stuttgart 2006.

<sup>35</sup> GIULIA BARTUM, *Albrecht Dürer and His Legacy*, British Museum Press, London 2002.

<sup>36</sup> Dürer's c. 1496–1497 drawing can be found in the Städelsches Kunstinstitut, Frankfurt.

<sup>37</sup> For Dürer's possible role, see: RANGSOOK YOON, « Dürer's First Journey to Venice: Revisiting and Reframing the Old Question », in JOHN GARTON, DIANE WOLFTHAL (eds.), *New Studies on Old Masters: Essays in Renaissance Art in Honour of Colin Eisler*, Center for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, Toronto 2011 (Essays and studies, 26), p. 69–87.

<sup>38</sup> There is a written exchange between de' Barbari and the Emperor Frederick of Saxony in which the artist discloses the importance of geometry and proportion: « Prima nella geometria poi

artist features the mathematician Luca Pacioli (fig. 12), actively and scientifically working out Euclidian formulae.<sup>39</sup> In the painting Euclid's *Elements*, at Pacioli's fingertips, is open to Book XIII, while also on the table a dodacahedron, or Platonic solid, sits atop his *Summa* (published in Venice by Paganino Paganini, 1496).<sup>40</sup> Pacioli looks up towards a transparent rhombicuboctahedron, an Archimedean solid, and the multiple reflections of an architectural structure inside it. In this, de' Barbari seems to have been recording theoretical connections between geometry and the representation of architecture. The need for graphic exactitude and therefore the value and importance of illustrations in a variety of printed texts, is here visually promoted.<sup>41</sup> The dynamic mapping of ideas – a perspectival restitution dependent on the study of optics and the documentation of Euclidian principles as visualized in the painting – implies de' Barbari's own arcane understanding of complex geometry as well as cosmography, topography, and surveying.<sup>42</sup> These representational strategies are at play with the *View* – man in the cosmic circle – a Warburgian geographical and cosmological significance.

### III. Jacopo de' Barbari's artistic world & graphic invention

Renaissance Venice was ripe for rich and collaborative exchange – artistic, scientific, humanistic. Innovative artists, like de' Barbari, Dürer, the Bellini (Jacopo, Gentile and Giovanni) and Mantegna, fueled awareness and interest in

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arithmetica, lequal due necessita nell commensuracione de proportione, chè non poi essere proporcionne senza numero nè poi essere forme senza geometria ». Wiemar, Staatsarchiv, Reg. 0.156, fol. 209–210. In addition, Jacopo de' Barbari supposedly wrote a treatise on the subject, which was preserved in Mechelen while he was under the patronage of Margaret of Austria and resided in her palace.

<sup>39</sup> RENZO BALDASSO, « Portrait of Luca Pacioli and Disciple: A New, Mathematic Look », *Art Bulletin*, 92/1–2 (2010), p. 97, fn. 1, addresses the scholarly debate on the attribution of the painting to de' Barbari. Based on scientific and visual analysis, I concur with Baldasso's assertion.

<sup>40</sup> In the same year that Pacioli published his translation of Euclid's *Elements* in Venice, he also published *Divina Proportione* (1509). The latter included drawings by Leonardo da Vinci, illustrations of the polyhedra in the form of the first published skeletal solids and an open three-dimensional interpretation of the dodacahedron, such as that pictured in de' Barbari's painting of Luca Pacioli. A year prior, on 11 August 1508, over 500 people attended the church of San Bartolomeo to hear Pacioli's lecture on Book V of Euclid. At the end of his 1509 edition of Euclid's *Elements*, he listed the name of ninety-four people who had attended his lecture.

<sup>41</sup> BALDASSO, « Luca Pacioli », p. 89–91. Baldasso argues that Pacioli is in the act of making annotated revisions to previously published, inaccurate illustrations of Euclid's principles. As the author shows, two previous translations of Euclid, published in 1482 by Ratdolt in Venice & 1491 in Vicenza by Leonardo of Basel and Guglielmus of Pavia, had problematic images accompanying text.

<sup>42</sup> As noted by Baldasso, Book XIII indicates a higher level of geometry; a standard education typically reached only as far as Book V. Cf. BALDASSO, « Luca Pacioli », p. 92.

the graphic arts and their inherent potential for creative expression. Mantegna understood early on that prints, an affordable and reproducible medium, could publicize artistic invention. In addition to new subject matter, the medium liberated compositions from traditional constraints, allowing scenes to extend beyond the confines of a single sheet and imaginatively position figures in space, as in his groundbreaking *Battle of the Sea Gods* (fig. 13a and 13b). Jacopo Bellini (c. 1400–1470/71), father-in-law to Mantegna and head of a successful Venetian workshop paved the way for the consideration of drawings as prized works of art.<sup>43</sup> He created two volumes – imaginary views and renderings – one of which Gentile Bellini (c. 1429–1507) offered as a diplomatic gift to the Turkish sultan, the other acquired by the esteemed Venetian collector, Gabriele Vendramin.<sup>44</sup>

Inspired by such pioneers, de' Barbari set out to create his own unique subjects and compositions. His study of a dead partridge, masterful in its realism (fig. 14) and related to the painted *Still Life with Partridge and Gauntlets*, 1504, introduced a new genre. His engraved *Pegasus* (fig. 15), which turns and thus activates the space, is framed in a simple, yet masterful composition. The subject of *Dragons Chasing a Centaur* (fig. 16) represents his fertile imagination.<sup>45</sup> The caduceus in these graphic works marks the artist's invention; by the time of the *View's* conception, de' Barbari had adopted it as his signature.<sup>46</sup> A symbol of Mercury, the distinctive staff formed by two intertwined snakes, held a number of meanings in Early Modern Europe. In addition to eloquent communication and commerce, Mercury and his caduceus served as a symbol for artists, foreign dignitaries, and ambassadors in their role as interpreters. While the reason behind de' Barbari's adoption of the caduceus remains speculative, it appropriately aligns with his role as an artistic ambassador as well as the notion of knowledge as a treasured commodity. He continued to use this motif throughout his career, even in his late *Custodi Nos Dormientes* (*The Guardian Angel*),

<sup>43</sup> While the inventiveness of drawing was acknowledged as an art form in the fifteenth century, it was not codified until the first edition of Vasari's *Lives* in 1550.

<sup>44</sup> For more information on Jacopo Bellini's drawings, see in particular BERNHARD DEGENHART, ANNEGRI SCHMITT, *Corpus der italienischen Zeichnungen, 1300–1450*, Gebr. Mann, Berlin 1980. One of a handful of Venetian works on Warburg's panels (see fn. 22) is Jacopo Bellini's *Flagellation of Christ*, presently housed in the Louvre volume.

<sup>45</sup> There are known impressions of the *Pegasus* at the following institutions: Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum; Berlin, Kupferstichkabinett; Dresden, Kupferstich-Kabinett; London, British Museum; München, Staatliche Graphische Sammlung; Paris, Bibliothèque National; Saint Louis, Saint Louis Art Museum; Vienna, Albertina; There is only one known impression of the *Centaur* in London at the British Museum. See BEATE BÖCKEN, *Jacopo de' Barbari. Künstlerschaft und Hofkultur um 1500*, Böhlau Verlag, Köln 2016, p. 426–427 (Studien zur Kunst, 32).

<sup>46</sup> I believe the first use of de' Barbari's caduceus is in the *Triumph over the Satyrs*, a large, three-sheet woodcut dating c. 1497. I also believe that this woodcut set a visual precedent for de' Barbari's conception of a large-scale, multi-framed composition with sheets that function both as a composite whole as well as independent images.

where the watermark in the form of a hand, is cleverly positioned to hold Mercury's staff (fig. 17).<sup>47</sup>

*Victory Reclining Amid Trophies* (fig. 18), yet another print that highlights Mercury, bears analysis in its relationship to de' Barbari's artistic invention and the *View*.<sup>48</sup> At first glance, the figure appears to recline among a random assortment of spoils amassed from her victories. More specifically, scattered about are articles of warfare, including protective armor (cuirass, helmets and shields) and weapons (spears, swords, arrows, an axe and a battering ram). Their placement and positioning maintain compositional harmony; their artful arrangement suggests the artist's careful study of antique models. Closer examination discloses that select trophies in their particularities, signal Mercury. The winged helmet supported by a stick within the left third of the frame, the helmet with a profile view of Mercury on the ground directly before Victory, and the shield with the frontal face of Mercury supported on his caduceus on the right third of the composition, all highlight and celebrate the god. The caduceus is centered at the top of the page – an anomalous location for the artist's signature and a telling sign in its own way. Given that the piece is dated to shortly after the completion of the *View of Venice*, it is tempting to relate the *Victory* to the artist's recognition of his own notable accomplishments to date, a celebration expressed in laudatory visual language and an easily circulated format. As with the *Guardian Angel*, so here de' Barbari seems to have used his visual sobriquet to applaud himself.

Prior to the publication of the *View of Venice*, de' Barbari had already departed for the court of the Holy Roman Emperor in Nuremberg – the first Italian to receive this prestigious invitation and appointment. Venice, a cosmopolitan port city, and Nuremberg, the site of the Holy Roman Emperor's court, were two of the most vibrant artistic and scientific centers in the Western world at the time. The north-south land route across the Alps connected the two cities, facilitating

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<sup>47</sup> I happened to note the location of this watermark when studying the version of this engraving in the National Gallery of Art, Washington D.C. This is one example of at least twelve impressions of the subject. Rachel McGarry is currently conducting an extensive study of the paper and watermarks within the corpus of Jacopo de' Barbari's engravings, a study first unveiled at a scholarly symposium I hosted at Duke University in October 2017.

<sup>48</sup> Known impressions exist at the following institutions: Berlin, Kupferstichkabinett; Boston, Museum of Fine Arts; Cambridge, MA, Fogg Art Museum; Dresden, Kupferstich-Kabinett; London, British Museum; Hamburg, Kunsthalle; Minneapolis, Minneapolis Institute of Art; Nuremberg, Germanisches National Museum; NYC, Metropolitan Museum of Art; Oxford, Ashmolean Museum; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale; Paris, Musée du Louvre; Princeton, NJ, Princeton Art Museum; Vienna, Albertina; ETH, Washington D.C., National Gallery of Art; Weimar, Klassik Stiftung; Zürich. For further consideration, see: JAY LEVENSON, KONRAD OBERHUBER, JACQUELYN SHEEHAN (eds.), *Early Italian Engravings from the National Gallery of Art*, National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC 1973, p. 362–363; LEVENSON, *Jacopo de' Barbari and the Northern Art*, p. 238–241; FERRARI, *Jacopo de' Barbari*, p. 116–117.

commercial trade as well as the physical movement of artists, material objects and hence, ideas. In Nuremberg, de' Barbari and Dürer would have had opportunities to continue learning from one another; both excelled in the arts of painting, woodblock prints, and engraving and both devised theoretical formulae for determining proportions that set off intellectual waves throughout Europe.

Dürer has traditionally been considered the principal translator of Northern and Southern cultures and styles, though de' Barbari was most likely at the fore of the exchange in visual knowledge between the two artists.<sup>49</sup> While both drew inspiration from each other, their respective engravings of *Apollo and Diana* reveal Dürer's close study of de' Barbari's prints (fig. 19, fig. 20).<sup>50</sup> Both renditions feature Apollo, god of the sun who drives the diurnal movement of the terrestrial sphere, along with Diana, goddess of the moon who descends with dawn. De' Barbari, however, conceived a more sophisticated composition, one that visually narrates the gods' complementary mythological roles. In it, Apollo stands in contrapposto, poised to release his arrow, as rays of light emanate to indicate his function. Diana, is positioned lower and turned away as the celestial heavens rotate; her head overlaps the deer's antlers which seem to extend from it – a composite of her and her iconographical attribute. Both engravings demonstrate a scientific study of human proportions even if de' Barbari's print shows the figures in a more direct relationship with the world. As has often been noted, while working on his treatise, *Four Books on Human Proportion* of 1523, Dürer confessed that he would prefer to have de' Barbari's understanding of proportion over a kingdom.<sup>51</sup> De' Barbari never disclosed his trade secret, leaving any transfer of knowledge to Dürer and the rest of the world, visual and interpretive. What de' Barbari knew and had in his mind was a precious commodity that he only revealed in poetic, pictorial expression.

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<sup>49</sup> See ULRICH PFISTERER, « Jacopo de' Barbari zu Malerei, Dichtung und Kulturtransfer im Norden », and BEATE BÖCHEM, « Jacopo de' Barbari im Dienst Maximilians I », in MATTHIAS MÜLLER, KARL-HEINZ SPIER, UDO FRIEDRICH (eds.), *Kulturtransfer am Fürstenhof. Höfische Austauschprozesse und ihre Medien im Zeitalter Kaiser Maximilians I*, Lukas Verlag, Berlin 2013, p. 189–217 and 218–242, respectively.

<sup>50</sup> ERWIN PANOFSKY, *The Life and Art of Albrecht Dürer*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1955<sup>4</sup>, p. 86–87.

<sup>51</sup> Translation: « If I cannot find someone else who has described how to make human proportions, then there is always Jacopo [de' Barbari], a lovely painter, born in Venice. He showed me [figures of] a man and woman which he had made from measurements, and at that time I would have preferred to have had his judgment than a new kingdom, and if I had it, I would have put it into print in his honor for the general good ». German text in WILLIAM MARTIN CONWAY, *The Literary Remains of Albrecht Dürer*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1889, p. 253–254.

IV. *Art history and digital methods*

Just as Aby Warburg attempted to do with his *Mnemosyne Atlas* in the early twentieth century, so too scholars of art history have embarked on a new methodological approach in the early years of the twenty-first. Driven by scientific advancements in a variety of fields and industries, digital methods grounded in scholarly research questions have demonstrated great potential for the fields of art, architectural and urban history by opening new modes of analysis.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, the application of digital tools to generate visualizations of art historical research has allowed scholars to conduct deeper inquiries, expand understandings, and make inter-disciplinary discoveries and contributions. And, as in the case of de' Barbari and Kolb's *View of Venice*, technological advancements have enabled the dissemination of knowledge in privileged visual formats. As specifically related to this essay, innovations have presented additional opportunities for public-facing scholarship; assiduously curated interactive displays in museum exhibitions have resulted in new vehicles for transmitting scholarship to an expansive and varied public.<sup>53</sup> In short, Warburg's 'Wanderstraßen', or pathways of culture, are now wide open.

A 2017-exhibition that I curated at Duke University's Nasher Museum of Art, *A Portrait of Venice: Jacopo de' Barbari's View of 1500*, showcased not only the multifaceted image, but also modes by which digital technologies and visualizations could expand art historical understandings. Some of this exhibition content will form part of a permanent reinstallation of the de' Barbari *View* and the original wooden matrices at the Correr Museum at Piazza San Marco, Venice. Following and building on two previous *Visualizing Venice* exhibitions at the Ducal Palace in Venice that opened in 2015 and 2016 respectively, the 2017-exhibition at Duke was nonetheless the first of its kind as it focused on one standalone work of art, the *View*, which it used as a centerpiece for digital stories.<sup>54</sup> Capitalizing on

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<sup>52</sup> To name a few of the fields and their technologies that have recently been applied and subsequently led to new discoveries in art, architectural and urban history: Architecture/Historic Building Information Modeling; Meteorology/Lidar & 3D Laser Scanning; Earth Sciences/Ground Penetrating Radar; Cartography/Geographic Information Systems; Computer Science/Machine Learning.

<sup>53</sup> At present digital displays in museums serve different functions and purposes. At one extreme, some are intended for playful interaction and games, while at the other end of the spectrum, they communicate substantive art historical research. This article intends to make a distinction between gamification and new modes of research and its delivery.

<sup>54</sup> *Visualizing Venice* is an inter-institutional research initiative begun in 2010. For further information on it, see: KRISTIN HUFFMAN, ANDREA GIORDANO, CAROLINE BRUZELIUS (ed.), *Visualizing Venice. Mapping and Modeling Time and Change in a City*, Routledge, New York 2018 (Routledge Research in Digital Humanities). The previous *Visualizing Venice* exhibitions include *Acqua e Cibo: Storie della laguna e la città* and *Venice, the Jews, and Europe, 1516-2016*, both curated by DONATELLA CALABI; catalogues with commensurate titles and dates were published by Marsilio Press. For

the possibilities of technology and new media, it recounted multiple different socio-historical and cultural narratives about Early Modern Venice.<sup>55</sup> It combined art historical, humanities-based research with digital methods, allowing scholarly conundrums and undocumented mysteries to drive select visualizations. In this way, the exhibition and its digital narratives, presented within interactive displays, showcased contemporary advancements in the transfer of knowledge to a public that ranged from experts in the field (prominent in an art museum embedded within a university) to those with little familiarity with Renaissance art. Thus, the *View of Venice*, a *summa* of artistic skill, printed technology, and Venetian preeminence, became once again in the twenty-first century an image vehicle.

The complexity and innovation of the six-sheet print – a unique representation of an urban space at an historically significant moment – necessitated an equally original methodological approach.<sup>56</sup> The previously acknowledged richness of the *View* has resulted in numerous scholarly studies documenting and identifying a range of subjects from specific sites to people and their activities.<sup>57</sup> The print has also been the focus of cartographic, representational, and morphological analysis.<sup>58</sup> Yet, until this exhibition, it could not be fully investigated, analyzed, or visualized due to limitations for up-close study. On the most prominent wall in the two-room exhibition space, viewers could admire the print on loan from the Minneapolis Institute of Art, one of

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information on exhibitions that engage with the digital, see: MARK OLSON, « Interactive Exhibitions. New Interfaces for Engaging Visualizations », in HUFFMAN, GIORDANO, BRUZELIUS (ed.), *Visualizing Venice*, p. 92–99.

<sup>55</sup> I believe the exhibition is progressive in that it shows how one work of art, a portrait of a city, can serve as the centerpiece for the development of an otherwise difficult exhibition with respect to loans, coordination among institutions, and ultimately cost. This concept is replicable with any number of city views at particular moments in history.

<sup>56</sup> The *View of Venice* offers great visual complexity and sophistication (as Kolb suggested in his appeal to the Collegio); for this reason, it is important to ask 'how' to experience the image and its contents rather than to dwell on the newness of 'what' one sees; in this the *View* does indeed show a remarkable similarity to current ways of cartographic 'looking'. Cf. JURAJ KITTLER, DERYCK W HOLDSWORTH, « Digitizing a Complex Urban Panorama in the Renaissance: The 1500 Bird's Eye View of Venice by Jacopo de' Barbari », *New Media & Society*, 16/5 (2014), p. 770–788.

<sup>57</sup> Scholars have consistently used the *View* as a document for how the city and specific locations appeared in 1500. For a consideration of activities, see in particular: BALLISTRERI-TRICANATO, ZANVERDIANI, *Jacopo de' Barbari*.

<sup>58</sup> See: SCHULZ, « Jacopo de' Barbari's *View of Venice* »; HOWARD, « Venice as a Dolphin »; ROMANELLI, BIADENE, *A volo d'uccello*; VANNA BAGARODO, VLADIMIRO VALERIO, « Jacopo de' Barbari. Una nuova ipotesi indiziaria sulla genesi prospettiva della veduta Venetie MD », in VLADIMIRO VALERIO (ed.), *Cartografi veneti*, Editoriale Programma, Padova 2007, p. 119–135; GENEVIEVE CARLTON, *Worldly Consumers*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2015, p. 43–45 and 48–49.

twelve extant, first-state impressions.<sup>59</sup> Nearby, on an adjacent wall, a screen displayed a digital online version of the image that complemented the act of ‘looking’ at the original (<<https://repository.duke.edu/catalog/duke:448098>>). This unprecedented high-resolution, zoomable version magnifies details within the print that are otherwise difficult, if not impossible, to see without a lens (figs. 21a & 21b; VIDEO 2: <<https://duke.box.com/v/Video-2>>).<sup>60</sup> Museums today present the six separate sheets as a unified whole, making the detail in the upper sections difficult to distinguish, especially when the print is hung on a wall. Glass, a reflective intermediary, poses yet another challenge that the digital image circumvents. Indeed, by studying this exceptionally high-quality, high-resolution image, scholars have already made new contributions to our understanding of Venice, its life, and its art and architectural history, in addition to discoveries about this unique cultural artifact.<sup>61</sup>

Like the collaborative production of the woodcut, which brought together at least one surveyor, artist, wood carver, printer, and financier, the exhibition required a variety of expertise for its realization (art and architectural historians, architects, visual and media experts, information technology specialists, archivists/librarians, and museum staff). The exhibition had seven interactive displays – five touchscreens, a sensor-enabled (Arduino connected) 4K screen, an Augmented Reality – situated alongside the woodblock print from Minneapolis.<sup>62</sup> Embedded within each of the displays was a wealth of art historical content –

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<sup>59</sup> The known first-state prints are located in the following institutions: Berlin, Kupferstichkabinett; Boston, Museum of Fine Arts; Cleveland, Cleveland Museum of Art; Hamburg, Kunsthalle; London, British Museum; Minneapolis, Minneapolis Institute of Art; Nuremberg, Germanisches National Museum; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale; Venice, Fondazione Querini Stampalia; Venice, Museo Correr, which owns two; Venice, Museo Navale. The print at the MIA was acquired in 2010, and I remain grateful to Rachel McGarry not only for arranging the loan to the Nasher, but also for her support of my project.

<sup>60</sup> The image is approximately 34,000 x 16,000 pixels. I would like to acknowledge the dialogues that resulted in this digital image, and the individuals who worked with me. They include: Nevio Danelon, Edward Triplett, Ludovica Galeazzo, Hannah Jacobs, Sean Aery, and Will Sexton. I would also like to thank Duke Libraries for hosting the image, the first non-Duke owned object in its Digital Repository. DOI: <<https://dx.doi.org/10.7924/G8MK69TH>>.

<sup>61</sup> There is a forthcoming volume on de’ Barbari’s *View* with scholarly essays that directly benefited from the ability to see the image in greater detail than previously possible. Many of the scholars came to Duke for a symposium I hosted in October 2017, with a final keynote lecture delivered in December.

<sup>62</sup> For the purposes of this essay, four of the five touchscreens will be considered. It bears noting that the Augmented Reality showed a photographic travelogue (stitched together views, time lapse photography, and photomontages) that included locations exceptionally and rarely accessed in an effort to connect thematically to the notion of Venice past and present. My thanks to Hannah Jacobs for her great contributions to the development of this display.

visual and textual (archival, primary, secondary and theoretical).<sup>63</sup> The conceptualization of historical themes and their visualizations expanded on complementary and traditional studies and analyses. In Warburg's *Mnemosyne Atlas*, imagery and its ordered arrangement was intended to reveal visual thematic relationships. The exhibition's multi-media displays achieved the same end, but moved beyond the static limitations of the *Atlas* by expressing the complex intersections of themes in a highly dynamic and visual way. Content was presented in a manner that allowed visitors to discover layers of information that matched their interests. Whereas Warburg had arranged images on panels to present ideas in a sequence, the exhibition permitted visitors to pursue narratives in a non-linear fashion. This happened through the perusal of separate displays as well as through the independent, yet thematically related chapters within each one (as if reading essays in an edited volume). Users were in control of what topics they chose to explore (or not explore), with accessible portals of knowledge at their fingertips. While visually privileged due to the use of parallax, embedded video, or interactive features that vividly and graphically animated complex topics or narratives, chapters within screens also connected text with the visuals in a manner that permitted viewers to dive into content as deeply as they desired. The presented material could be shaped to accommodate the viewer's level of knowledge and curiosity as this new media offers malleable possibilities to the neophyte and cognoscente alike.

The exhibition transported visitors to Venice through an immersive and multi-sensory experience, visually engaging and audibly resonating with ambient sounds of lapping water, creaking ropes, ringing bells, singing birds, and blowing wind, which were layered over a classically inspired music composed for the show. The large-scale (79-inch) 4K screen with harmonious, corresponding sounds, visually explored the city via the *View*, foregrounding its unique features through animation and colorization. Placed in the middle of the room (fig. 22), the screen enticed people to contemplate the image, which was hung in direct alignment with it; the experiential, thematic narratives encouraged viewers to look more closely at the original woodblock print. Like the *View*, this particular display visually emphasized important philological material that supported the selection of animated content.

Chapters on mythology, urban form, and winds illustrated the inimitability of a city built on water and visualized the precision and detail of the woodblock print as it related to mapmaking. Chapters on focal points, churches and green

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<sup>63</sup> It bears noting that the development of this concept of an interactive touchscreen, with chapters organized thematically according to historical content, and text accompanied with visually engaging features, was the result of close collaboration and development with CamerAnebbia in Milan. This type of display represents an advancement for the communication of historical and art historical material.

spaces revealed how certain patterns emerged around Venice's centers and peripheries.<sup>64</sup> For example, gardens largely appear as a ring encircling the periphery of the city (VIDEO 3: <<https://duke.box.com/v/Video-3>>). Such discoveries support understandings of patterns in Venice's urban growth, namely the chosen location for monastic and conventual properties and their self-sustainable communities as well as early Renaissance palace-villa life on the Giudecca, a phenomenon that shifted to the mainland later in the sixteenth century. Colorizing the monochromatic image led to insights about garden typology, formal and informal, in addition to previously undetected details, such as roses in bloom with their climbing vines wrapping around trellis walls and arcades (fig. 3).

Two touchscreens, *Piazza San Marco and Rialto* and *Hidden Treasures*, provided access to Venetian urban experience, the function and meaning of certain places, and change over time. One display celebrated Piazza San Marco and Rialto as the two most important sites in the city.<sup>65</sup> Strategically for Venice, mythical and symbolic, political, socio-economic, as well as architectural and urban interests converged within these principal centers. Digital reconstructions and visualizations represented how they served as meeting places, vital areas of exchange and international negotiation, squares for permanent and occasional markets, and loci for government administration. The adjacent display, *Hidden Treasures*, showed that while at first glance the present-day urban contours of Venice appear to be remarkably similar to those in de' Barbari's *View*, closer examination reveals that change did occur over time.<sup>66</sup> Napoleon's occupation of the city in 1797 initiated many significant interventions that marked the urban fabric. This digital story explored Venice's hidden riches – lost, demolished, or moved – along with ephemeral urban phenomena. Mapping demolished churches highlighted the significant changes to Venice, such as the zone occupied by the present-day public gardens in the district of Castello, while 3D architectural models offered visitors an opportunity to explore these lost spaces. Digital reconstruction and re-contextualization enabled old, often forgotten stories about place to be told in new and accessible ways. Along with the display on *Hidden Treasures*, the one dedicated to *Piazza San Marco and Rialto* arranged content

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<sup>64</sup> Each of the details has been systematized in a manner that can be used to create a database of information, a next, future step of this project. For example, each of the churches has been isolated, identified, and colorized according to broad categories (i.e. monastic, parish, etc.) that will lead to the addition of data by a team of scholars.

<sup>65</sup> This display was carefully curated by the architectural historian, Ludovica Galeazzo, who continues to collaborate with me as Assistant Curator for the reinstallation at the Correr Museum in Venice.

<sup>66</sup> Iara Dundas, an architectural historian and long-time collaborator in the Wired! Lab at Duke University, curated this display.

in thematic chapters, easing movement to sections according to user interest. Museum visitors could read the extensive text, interact with animations or 3D models, watch videos of reconstructions and/or simply observe the layered imagery embedded within each chapter. The screens functioned as metaphorical *Wanderstraßen*, points of access and vehicular pathways that relayed complex themes and scholarly analyses of related imagery and text.

The final, and most apt display discussed here, *The Making of the View*, served as an introduction to the overarching thematic of the exhibition as well as to the woodcut itself – its conception, its historical and cultural value, and the many remaining mysteries surrounding its production. Unanswered questions on how de' Barbari and his team of woodcarvers conceptualized and made the six large blocks were presented alongside known information about cultural context and printmaking as an industry and art form. Animations on the original matrices illustrated simple yet difficult to grasp concepts, such as the wooden blocks as an inverse of the printed sheets and the reverse of its carved image. These were visualized alongside recently acquired data, such as point cloud models of the blocks and new information and understandings gained from their study, neglected in scholarly analysis until now.

The blocks were sculpted in pear wood, a hard wood excellent for carving as well as possessing a certain prestige. In both the woodblock and its prints, one can see that great care has been taken with the details: the entire block was carved with precision and skill, even though the topmost surface lines were the only printed impressions. This means that the negative space has little value, yet somehow, even in the sculpted passages of figures, such as Mercury and the winds, the deeper, carved-out spaces show remarkable care and finesse (fig. 23). This is one reason why the winds are presently serving as case studies for an evolving method that entails studying light laser scans in tandem with the wooden blocks and the print. This work is paving new roads. While conservators have used technologies for examining the state of objects, art historians engaging with such research methods for interpretative value is relatively new.

Like the organization of the exhibition itself, the ongoing investigation of the wooden blocks is collaborative due to its dependence on various expertise. In May 2017, an inter-institutional team of engineers, architects, and art historians conducted photogrammetry and light laser scans for each of the six blocks (fig. 24).<sup>67</sup> In an effort to interpret the data acquired by the structured light

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<sup>67</sup> I would like to thank in particular, Andrea Giordano, Agostino De Rosa, Emanuela Faresin, Cosimo Monteleone, and Isabella Friso. The photogrammetry, which involves taking photographs around the periphery of an object at multiple heights and then digitally processing them, was reasonably successful, given that a previous attempt in 1999 did not work due to the limitations of software at the time. The quality of the 2017-photogrammetry model, however, remains much lower than the light scanned version due to the dark nature of the

scanning system, a scholarly collaborative (an art historian, a scholar trained in scanning techniques used on cultural heritage objects, and a humanities expert trained in computational data proficiency) has come into being. Because the winds appear in each of the blocks and demonstrate imaginative or artistic tendencies, analysis has begun with them. The point cloud model generated by the light laser scans has been used to indicate depth of carving according to color scale. In tandem with this, the team has conducted measurements of various places within a selected section in order to determine the relationship between the highest surfaces of relief and the deeper carved out passages (fig. 25). What preliminary data and its comparative value in relationship to visual analysis of the extant woodcuts and their blocks has revealed, is that the slopes of the carved lines vary significantly, from gradual to steep. More than serving a structural purpose given the pressure applied during the printing process, this sort of variation points to two different approaches to carving and, therefore, to at least two different hands. Although the study of the wooden blocks is only beginning, a continuation of this approach will yield additional data that may help determine recognizable patterns in the carving techniques and clarify how many different woodblock carvers contributed to the execution of the matrices, hitherto a mystery.

Digital applications in art history have led to an epistemological shift in the field. Developing methodologies, especially when paired with traditional scholarly foundations have opened original lines of research and new modes of inquiry. Visualizations can reveal hidden patterns and address unanswered queries. They can also present material in a manner that potentially awakens an interested public beyond scholars in the field. De' Barbari's adoption of the caduceus as his signature – an allusion to Mercury as messenger, interpreter, interlocutor, and celebrated in the visual language of the *View* – could here be extended to the hermeneutics that digital, visually driven analyses and their modes of expression offer. Visualizations grounded in scholarly research and scientific analysis have the potential to reaffirm art history's place in humanistic discourse and to present complex material in a graphically privileged, yet relatable manner. This emerging art historical methodology breathes new life into Warburg's visual approach and holds the power to extend what he aspired to achieve with his magnum opus. The afterlife of antiquity in the Renaissance may also apply to the afterlife of Renaissance Venice, with the *View* as an image vehicle, past and present.

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blocks themselves. The 54–56 light scans of each block generated a dense point cloud model that can be used for study and analysis and offers the possibility of replicating the blocks with the capabilities of 3D printers and laser engravers. A small piece that features Mercury and the lettering VENETIE MD was, in fact, successfully printed for the exhibition.



Figure 1. Jacopo de' Barbari, *View of Venice*, c. 1497–1500. Woodblock print on six sheets, 137,7 x 277,5 cm. The John R. Van Derlip Fund (2010.88), Minneapolis Institute of Art. <<https://repository.duke.edu/catalog/duke:48098>>




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© The Warburg Institute.



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


Figure 10. Francesco Colonna, *Hypertomachia Poliphili*, published by Aldo Manuzio, Venice, 1499. Woodcuts attributed to Benedetto Bordone. 29,5 x 22 x 4cm. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of J. Pierpont Morgan, 1923. Image in the Public Domain. <<https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/365313>>



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


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


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


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


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


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


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Figure 25. 3D models of the light laser scans showing carving depths of the Northwest wind. Image by author.

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# IN MEMORIAM



# IN MEMORIAM MARC GEOFFROY (1965–2018)

JULES JANSSENS  
UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN



On 23 April Marc Geoffroy passed away at the age of only 52. I knew him personally very well. For almost twenty years we had intensively worked together on several projects in a spirit of profound mutual respect. But there was so much more than a common scientific interest and collaboration. We were not just colleagues, but friends in the real sense of the word. I therefore will not just remember him as a brilliant, erudite scholar, who helped me a lot in improving my own scientific research, but also as a warm human being who was generous in so many respects.

If one looks at Marc's scholarly works, one sees easily the scholar who embodies the ideal of what is one of the main purposes of the present journal. When one consults the website, one reads: « *Mediterranea* is an international journal focusing on various areas of knowledge *transfer* from Late Antiquity to the Early Modern period, covering the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, and paying special attention to philological, philosophical, scientific, cultural and religious fields of research ».

Looking at the last of these purposes, i.e. the fields of research specified, there is no doubt that Marc combined in his works at least two of them, and this in a unique way, namely philology and philosophy. This is evidenced in his translations of texts (mainly, although not exclusively, Arabic) as well as in the edition of Avicenna's commentary on book *Lambda*, 6–10, which he made together with Meryem Sebti and myself, and of fragments of an Arabic version (written in Hebrew characters) of Averroes's Great Commentary on the *De Anima* he made together with Colette Sirat which will be published at the beginning of this year, but of which a first preliminary study was already published in 2005.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> AVERROES, *Le livre du discours décisif*, trans. and annot. MARC GEOFFROY, introd. ALAIN DE LIBERA, Flammarion, Paris 1996; AVERROES, *L'Islam et la raison. Anthologie de textes juridiques, théologiques et*

Certainly, regarding the editions, there was a collaboration, but I am sure that both Sirat and Sebti will agree with me that Marc had an exceptional knowledge of the Arabic language – after all he possessed an *agrégation de langue arabe* –, as well as a broad philosophical culture. Besides Arabic, he possessed as well a more than basic knowledge of Hebrew and Latin, as shown by his French translation of two epistles of Averroes on the Intellect (lost in Arabic), based on the edition of their Hebrew translation in parallel with that of the Latin work *Tractatus Averrois De perfectione naturali secundum menti philosophi* (and, whenever relevant, with variant passages in the closely related, perhaps better known, *De beatitudine animae*).<sup>2</sup> He also had a solid knowledge of ancient Greek, as shown in his paper on the influence of the Arabic translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias's *De intellectu* on al-Fārābī's theory of the four intellects.<sup>3</sup> His translations, from whatever language they originate, reveal clearly an explicit will to arrive at a sensible translation, but always with the highest respect for the basic philological rules, an attitude that also prevails in the editorial works in which he participated actively.<sup>4</sup> So, philosophy and philology are both substantial parts of his research. But the religious issue plays an important part in his first research on Averroes. There he mainly deals with two 'religious' works of the great Andalusian scholar, i.e. *Decisive treatise* (*Faṣl al-maqāl*) and *Uncovering the methods of proofs with respect to the beliefs of the religious community* (*Kashf 'an manāhij al-adilla fi*

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*polémiques*, trad. MARC GEOFFROY, pref. ALAIN DE LIBERA, GF, Paris 2000; AVICENNA (IBN SĪNĀ), *Commentaire sur le Livre 'Lambda' de la 'Métaphysique' d'Aristote (chapitres 6–10)*, ed., trans. and annot. MARC GEOFFROY, JULES JANSSENS, MERYEM SEBTI, Vrin, Paris 2014 (Études musulmanes, 43); COLETTE SIRAT, MARC GEOFFROY, *L'original arabe du Grand Commentaire d'Averroès au 'De anima' d'Aristote. Prémisses de l'édition*, Vrin, Paris 2005 (in a recent mail Sirat informed me that the final edition will be available in February 2019).

<sup>2</sup> AVERROES, *La béatitude de l'âme*, ed. and trad. MARC GEOFFROY, CARLOS STEEL, Vrin, Paris 2001. It is worthwhile to note that Marc, when dealing with the fragments of al-Fārābī's *Political Regime*, also known as *Principles of Being*, that are included near the end of the Latin work, compares the Latin not only with its Hebrew translation by Ibn Tibbon, on which the Latin was based, but also with the original Arabic text.

<sup>3</sup> MARC GEOFFROY, « La tradition arabe du *Περί νοῦ* d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise et les origines de la théorie farabienne des quatre degrés de l'intellect », in CRISTINA D'ANCONA, GIUSEPPE SERRA (eds.), *Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodizia nella tradizione araba*, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2002 (Subsidia Mediaevalia Patavina, 3), p. 191–231, esp. p. 206–222.

<sup>4</sup> Since I had the privilege to work with him (and Sebti) to the edition and French annotated translation of Avicenna's commentary on *Lambda* (see fn. 1), and to prepare (with Sebti and Michael Chase) a critical edition and annotated French translation of the same author's commentary on the *Theology* (a work in progress when he died, but, unfortunately, far from being finished), I was a privileged witness of the extraordinary way in which he tried to combine philosophical understanding and philological rigour. However, it was on the occasion of a last systematic revision of my edition of AVICENNA LATINUS. *Liber primus naturalium: Tractatus tertius; De his quae habent naturalia ex hoc quod habent quantitatem*, Académie royale de Belgique, Bruxelles 2017, that I particularly experienced how demanding he was in this respect (and at the same how justified he was in defending this ideal).

'*aqā'id al-milla*), the former of which he qualifies as 'juridical', insofar as it places itself on the level of the Islamic law, while he does not hesitate to identify the latter as a treatise of *kalām*, 'Islamic theology'.<sup>5</sup> In several papers, he insists on the impact of Ibn Tūmart's profession of faith on the *Kashf*, and how Averroes tries to provide the Almohad rulers with a theological alternative for the Ash'arite *kalām*.<sup>6</sup> Finally, a significant part of his research consisted in codicological description of manuscripts, as well as teaching codicology to colleagues and students.<sup>7</sup> Now, codicology is defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary as « the study of manuscripts as *cultural* (my emphasis) artefacts for historical purposes ». Hence, I think that it is not exaggerated to say that he busied himself with what one may label 'a cultural field of research'. In sum, his research encompassed extensively two of the four fields specified in the basic outline of the purposes of the journal, and, be it in a somewhat more limited way, even two additional ones.

But Marc's work was also highly in line with the second specification, i.e. « covering the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin ». In the framework of two ERC-projects – one directed by Cristina d'Ancona, « Greek into Arabic. Philosophical Concepts and Linguistic Bridges », and another by Maroun Aouad, « Philosophy in Context: Arabic and Syriac Manuscripts in the Mediterranean » –, he visited libraries and scientific institutions in many countries that are part of the concerned area, such as Turkey and Lebanon. His search for manuscripts even brought him to Timbuktu. As to the main authors on whom his studies focused, they cover a large part of that area. Averroes (Ibn Rušd), who occupies a major place in his research, was living in Muslim Andalusia, but Ibn Tūmart, indicated by Marc as one of his major sources of inspiration, was a Moroccan. Also Avempace (Ibn Bājja), who constitutes, as shown by Marc, a major source for Averroes's doctrine of intellect, was originally from Muslim Spain, but lived in his later life not only in Spain, but also in the Maghreb, more particularly in the cities of Oran and Fes (where he died).<sup>8</sup> Al-Fārābī, discussed in the framework of

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<sup>5</sup> See AVERROES, *L'Islam et la raison*, p. 79 and p. 96.

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. MARC GEOFFROY, « L'Almohadisme théologique d'Averroès (Ibn Rušd) », *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age*, 66 (1999), p. 9–47; ID., « Ibn Rušd et la théologie almohadiste: Une version inconnue du *Kitāb al-Kašf 'an manāhiğ al-adilla* dans deux manuscrits d'Istanbul », in *Medioevo*, 26 (2001), p. 329–356; ID., « A propos de l'almohadisme théologique d'Averroès: L'anthropomorphisme (*tağsīm*) dans la seconde version du *Kitāb al-Kašf 'an manāhiğ al-adilla* », in PATRICE CRESSIER, MARÍA ISABEL FIERRO, LUIS MOLINA (eds.), *Los Almohades: Problemas y perspectivas*, Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, Madrid 2005, vol. II, (Estudios árabes e islámicos. Monografías, 11), p. 853–894.

<sup>7</sup> See his contributions on the codicology of Arabic manuscripts in PAUL GÉHIN (ed.), *Lire le manuscrit médiéval: Observer et décrire*, Colin, Paris 2005. He was, moreover, giving seminars on codicology both in France and in Lebanon.

<sup>8</sup> See MARC GEOFFROY, « Ibn Bājja, Abū Bakr ibn al-Sā'ig (Avempace) », in HENRIK LAGERLUND (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy between 500 and 1500*, Springer, Dordrecht 2011, p. 483–486. Regarding his influence on Averroes's doctrine of the intellect (and Averroes's

his use of Alexander of Aphrodisias in his theory of intellect (as indicated previously), but also presented as an important source for thinkers like Avempace and al-Baṭalyūsī,<sup>9</sup> was probably born in Fārāb, Turkestan, then moved to Baghdad, and afterwards to Syria, i.e. Aleppo and Damascus (where he died, maybe after having been for a while in Egypt as well). Also related to Baghdad were the translations of Aristoteles into Arabic, and this in its three major moments: the circle of al-Kindī, the translation school whose prominent figures were Ḥunayn Ibn Ishāq and Ishāq Ibn Ḥunayn, and the Peripatetic school of Baghdad (mid tenth/eleventh century).<sup>10</sup> Quite naturally, besides Aristotle's name, those of other Greek thinkers, as e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, appear many times in his publications.<sup>11</sup> With them we find ourselves in Greece and Asia Minor, i.e. Paphlagonia and Constantinople (Themistius) and (perhaps) Cara, Anatolia (Alexander).

Finally, Marc's publications also offer a clear illustration of knowledge transfer from Late Antiquity to the Early Modern Period. As evidenced in what precedes, a first such transfer happened during the ninth till eleventh centuries, and went from Greece and Asia Minor to Baghdad, at that time the political and cultural capital of the Arabic-Islamic world; and a second covered the eleventh and twelfth centuries, passing from Baghdad to Muslim Andalusia. In an encyclopaedical article on the Latin translations of Ibn Rushd, Marc, however, mentions still another, third, transfer which was directed from Muslim Spain to the Christian Western world.<sup>12</sup> In his article he makes clear that the translations

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changing attitude toward Avempace), see e.g. ID., « L'Exposition de la Jonction de l'Intellect avec l'homme (*ittiṣāl al-'aql bi-l-insān*) d'Avempace dans le Compendium d'Averroès sur l'âme (*Gāwāmi' ou Muḥtaṣar al-naḥs*). Présentation et traduction annotée », in NICOLE KOULAYAN, MANSOUR SAYAH (eds.), *Synoptikos: Mélanges offerts à Dominique Urvoy*, Presses Universitaires du Mirail, Toulouse 2011, p. 129–153; and ID., « Sources et origines de la théorie de l'intellect d'Averroès (I) », *Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph*, 66 (2014–2015), p. 181–302.

<sup>9</sup> See *supra*, fn. 3 (on Alexander's influence); fn. 8 (on Avempace); and ID., « al-Baṭalyūsī, Abū Muḥammad ibn al-Sīd », in LAGERLUND (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 148–149. Regarding Avempace and al-Baṭalyūsī, one might also consult his « La formazione della cultura filosofica dell'Occidente musulmano », in CRISTINA D'ANCONA (ed.), *Storia della filosofia nell'Islam medievale*, vol. II, Einaudi, Torino 2005, p. 671–722.

<sup>10</sup> See ID., « Aristotle Arabic », in LAGERLUND (ed.), *Encyclopedia of medieval philosophy*, p. 105–116.

<sup>11</sup> Regarding Alexander, see especially his « Alexandre d'Aphrodise et la doctrine de l'intellect d'Averroès: Remarques générales », in ELISA CODA, CECILIA MARTINI BONADEO (eds.), *De l'Antiquité tardive au Moyen Age: Études de logique aristotélicienne et de philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine offertes à Henri Hugonnard-Roche*, Vrin, Paris 2014, p. 545–558 and ID., « La tradition arabe du Περὶ νοῦ » regarding Alexander and Themistius, see especially his « Sources et origines de la théorie de l'intellect ».

<sup>12</sup> See his « Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Latin Translations of », in LAGERLUND (ed.), *Encyclopedia of medieval philosophy*, p. 501–507. It is worthwhile to stress that Marc also points out, whenever relevant, the intermediary role played in this transfer process by Hebrew translations from Averroes's works.

from Averroes's works into Latin were done for most part in mainland Italy (Bologna, Naples, Padua, Venice, Milan, Rome), but also in Sicily and Christian Spain, and encompass no less than four centuries (i.e. thirteenth–sixteenth centuries). So, one discovers in his studies three major moments of knowledge transfer between three major cultures, succeeding each other and spanning together no less than eight centuries.

I believe that this brief survey largely suffices to show how brilliant and all-encompassing Marc's work was. His death is a tragic loss, not only for his family, for his friends (among whom I had the immense privilege to figure), but clearly for the scientific community at large.



## NOTES



THE *PSEUDOPYTHAGORICA*  
AND THEIR PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND  
A DISCUSSION OF  
ANGELA ULACCO, *PSEUDOPYTHAGORICA DORICA*

RICCARDO CHIARADONNA  
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I. *The 'Pseudopythagorica' and first-century BC philosophy*

Angela Ulacco (henceforth U.) has just published an Italian translation, with an introduction and extensive commentary, of four pseudo-Pythagorean treatises: pseudo-Archytas's *On principles*, *On opposites*, and *On intellect and sense perception*; and pseudo-Brotinus's *On intellect and discursive thought*.<sup>1</sup> These titles will probably say little, if anything, to those who are not familiar with certain relatively unexplored areas of ancient philosophy; these works are full of technicalities; even their language – a kind of literary version of the Doric dialect – is obscure and difficult to translate. And yet these pseudo-Pythagorean forgeries are interesting from many perspectives: they reflect an important phase in the development of ancient philosophy; their philosophical views are intriguing and difficult to reconstruct; their influence on later philosophy was significant. By focusing on these treatises, U. draws a most interesting picture of a crucial phase

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<sup>1</sup> ANGELA ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica. I trattati di argomento metafisico, logico ed epistemologico attribuiti ad Archita e a Brotino*, Introduzione, traduzione, commento, De Gruyter, Boston–Berlin 2017 (*Philosophie der Antike*, 41). This note was presented at the Philosophical Review Club (University of Leuven) on 13 December 2017. I would like to thank Andrea Robiglio for inviting me and the audience for many insightful questions and comments. Thanks are also due to David Sedley and Tiziano Dorandi for their invaluable suggestions on Plutarch's passage. All mistakes are, of course, my own.

in ancient philosophy, that is the period around the first century BC that marks the transition from Hellenistic to Imperial philosophy.<sup>2</sup>

The pseudo-Pythagorean forgeries are among the most enigmatic works in the ancient philosophical corpus. These treatises are transmitted under the names of some Pythagoreans, such as Archytas (4<sup>th</sup> cent. BC). Actually they are forgeries, which reflect a later philosophical content. Most of them are preserved *via* quotations in late sources such as Iamblichus, Simplicius, and Iohannes Stobaeus; yet a small number of pseudo-Pythagorean treatises have an individual manuscript tradition. For some reasons, then, at some time between the third century BC and the beginning of Neoplatonism someone composed forgeries which incorporated philosophical material mostly drawn from Plato and Aristotle, and attributed these forgeries to some Pythagorean philosophers. Why so? Is it possible to circumscribe the date of composition of these forgeries more precisely? Do they reflect a specific philosophical environment? As predictable, the answers to these questions vary. In her substantial introduction, U. gives an up-to-date *status quaestionis* of the scholarly debate and outlines a number of interesting hypotheses about these controversial issues. The research about the *Pseudopythagorica* includes some milestones. Among these are Eduard Zeller's discussion in his *Philosophie der Griechen* and works by such scholars as Paul Moraux, Wilhelm Burkert, Holger Thesleff, Matthias Baltes, and Thomas Alexander Szlezák. Recent literature includes the works of (among others) Mauro Bonazzi, Bruno Centrone, and Phillip Horky.<sup>3</sup>

Actually it was Eduard Zeller who first put forward a hypothesis about the genesis of the *Pseudopythagorica*, which still remains plausible, at least as regards some of these treatises. According to Zeller, we should situate the genesis of this corpus at Alexandria in the first century BC, for it was at that time at Alexandria that a renaissance of interest in ancient Pythagoreanism took place after the Hellenistic age.<sup>4</sup> As we shall see later on, the Platonist and Pythagorizing philosopher Eudorus of Alexandria (1<sup>st</sup> cent. BC) played an important role in this revival and it is a likely guess that at least some of the forgeries were composed in his circle.

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<sup>2</sup> For further discussion see the articles collected in MALCOLM SCHOFIELD (ed.), *Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC. New Directions for Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013.

<sup>3</sup> For details and references, see the *status quaestionis* in ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica*, p. 1–10. A valuable recent overview can be found in BRUNO CENTRONE, «The pseudo-Pythagorean Writings», in CARL A. HUFFMAN (ed.), *A History of Pythagoreanism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, p. 315–340.

<sup>4</sup> See EDUARD ZELLER, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, vol. III/2, Reisland, Leipzig 1923<sup>5</sup> (repr. 1963), p. 123.

U. is judiciously cautious. She remarks that the pseudo-Pythagorean forgeries did not emerge out of thin air at the beginning of the Roman Empire. And, independently of the existence of Pythagorean circles, it is far from implausible that some of these treatises were composed at a relatively early date.<sup>5</sup> That said, some features certainly point to a specific philosophical environment and this seems to confirm Zeller's intuition:

1: Some *Pseudopythagorica* contain substantial allusions to texts and theories from Aristotle's treatises. This fact suggests a date of composition around the first century BC (or later), that is roughly the same years in which the so-called 'Andronicus edition' of Aristotle's works came into being. This is an extremely controversial issue but – whatever the details – Aristotle's treatises certainly had limited circulation in the Hellenistic age and their circulation enjoyed a renaissance around the first century BC.<sup>6</sup> –

2: Many pseudo-Pythagorean forgeries reflect an agenda which is typical of first century BC philosophy. Very broadly speaking, their philosophical content is inspired by Plato and the Academy; in addition to this, they contain allusions to Hellenistic terms and theories; finally – as we have just seen – the *Pseudopythagorica* reflect some knowledge of Aristotle's school treatises.

3: Two important treatises from this corpus are paraphrases of, respectively, Plato's *Timaeus* and Aristotle's *Categories*: these are pseudo-Timaeus of Locri's *On the nature of the world and the soul* and pseudo-Archytas's *On universal logos*.<sup>7</sup> Actually Plato's *Timaeus* and Aristotle's *Categories* were, so to speak, the star texts in first-century BC philosophical debates and their interpretation was closely connected to the revival of Aristotelian and Platonist philosophies after the Hellenistic age.

4: Some pseudo-Pythagorean treatises point to issues in the interpretation of Plato and Aristotle which are distinctive of first-century BC exegesis: this holds especially for the treatise on the categories, whose connection to the early commentators on Aristotle has convincingly been shown by Thomas Alexander Szlezák.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica*, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> For an overview, see now ANDREA FALCON, « Aristotelianism in the First Century BC », in ID. (ed.), *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity*, Brill, Leiden–Boston 2016 (Brill's Companions to Classical Reception, 7), p. 101–119. A classic discussion is provided by MICHAEL FREDE, « Epilogue », in KEIMPE ALGRA et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, p. 771–797.

<sup>7</sup> See MATTHIAS BALTES, *Timaios Lokros über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele*, Brill, Leiden 1972 (*Philosophia antiqua*, 21); THOMAS ALEXANDER SZLEZÁK, *Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien. Texte zur griechischen Aristotelesexegese*, de Gruyter, Berlin–New York 1972 (*Peripatoi*, 4).

<sup>8</sup> See SZLEZÁK, *Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien*.

We will soon come back to these issues in more detail. For the time being, it is worth raising the question as to whether these treatises present homogeneous philosophical views or not. U.'s outline is clear and is soundly based on recent scholarship. Actually the Doric pseudo-Pythagorean writings display a homogeneous philosophical account of reality, mostly drawn from Plato and the Old Academy, which is based on the existence of two metaphysical principles: a principle of determination and one of indetermination. These principles are taken to provide a sort of explanatory model for all areas of philosophy, from physics to theology, from logic to ethics and politics.<sup>9</sup> And yet, as U. remarks, this is not the whole story. These Academic theories are supplemented (and sometimes amended) via Aristotle and Hellenistic philosophies.<sup>10</sup> For example, in a recent article, U. and Jan Opsomer have interestingly shown that the theory of elements in pseudo-Timaeus is indebted to Aristotle's theory of matter and form, whereas some distinctive aspects of Plato's account are omitted or modified.<sup>11</sup> So the philosophical background of these treatises is multifaceted: saying that they are indebted to Plato is certainly not enough. Rather, they reflect a distinctive reading of Plato against a Pythagorean background, with philosophical supplements drawn from Aristotle and from the Hellenistic philosophies.

These remarks lead us to two questions raised by U.:

1: What texts and what authorities lie behind the *Pseudopythagorica*?

2: What idea of the Pythagorean (and more generally philosophical) tradition emerges from these works?

U.'s assessment is predictably based on the previous debate, but she brings new material to the discussion *via* her detailed interpretation of the pseudo-Pythagorean treatises pertaining to logic, metaphysics and epistemology. As seen earlier, the canon of authorities in these works points to the first century BC and, more precisely, to a philosophical environment which displayed, among others, the following characteristics: 1) a dogmatic Platonist stance which emphasises the connection between Plato and the Pythagorean tradition; 2) an interest in Aristotle's treatises. Such features seem to point to Eudorus of Alexandria, an interesting example of a Pythagorizing Platonist who has sometimes been regarded as one of the archegetes of Imperial dogmatic Platonism (what scholars from Karl Praechter onward call 'Middle Platonism').<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> See ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica*, p. 8.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9–10.

<sup>11</sup> See ANGELA ULACCO, JAN OPSOMER, « Elements and Elemental Properties in Timaeus Locrus », *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, 157 (2014), p. 154–206.

<sup>12</sup> See ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica*, p. 6 and 12–13, with further references. On Eudorus, see *infra*, Section III.

These remarks help answer the second question. As a matter of fact, talking about Pythagoreanism in the Imperial age means talking about a certain form of Platonism.<sup>13</sup> Certainty cannot be attained, but it is likely that after the decline of the Hellenistic and Sceptical Academy those Platonist circles which aimed to revive a dogmatic reading of Plato's philosophy, centred on theology and metaphysics, chose to emphasise the Pythagorean legacy of the Platonist tradition; and, in addition to this, they also integrated at least parts of Aristotle's philosophy into their philosophical outlook (after all, Aristotle was a major source for Plato's Academy). So their Plato was as Pythagorizing Plato; and their Pythagoras was the archegete of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy.<sup>14</sup>

As U. remarks, in this general framework the usage of ancient sources and the reference to ancient authorities had no merely antiquarian significance; rather, it was part of a precise view of the philosophical tradition.<sup>15</sup> In a recent article, Marwan Rashed and Thomas Auffret have suggested that Eudorus of Alexandria prepared an edition of *Metaphysics* A which – according to these scholars – supplemented Aristotle's text with « un certain nombre d'ajouts à la tonalité pythagoricienne » (more on this below).<sup>16</sup> The genesis of at least some *Pseudopythagorica* can be interpreted as part of this 'return to the Ancients'. It was part of the wider project to establish a Pythagorean philosophical tradition, which integrated – at different levels – Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle. This enterprise was an exceedingly successful one. The *Pseudopythagorica* were regarded as being genuine Pythagorean writings by the subsequent tradition, which accepted and further developed their account of the philosophical tradition: this explains why the *Pseudopythagorica* have mostly been preserved through Neoplatonist writings. To mention just one famous example, Iamblichus regarded Archytas as being the source of Aristotle's *Categories*: this is the reason why Simplicius (who incorporated Iamblichus's now lost commentary into his

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<sup>13</sup> On this, see BRUNO CENTRONE, « Cosa significa essere pitagorico in età imperiale. Per una riconsiderazione della categoria storiografica del neopitagorismo », in ALDO BRANCACCI (ed.), *La filosofia in età imperiale. Le scuole e le tradizioni filosofiche*, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2000 (Elenchos, 31), p. 137–168.

<sup>14</sup> There is an extensive bibliography on this. Here I would only recall the seminal paper by PIERLUIGI DONINI, « Platone e Aristotele nella tradizione pitagorica secondo Plutarco », in AURELIO PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ et al. (eds.), *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles*, Ediciones Clásicas, Madrid 1999, p. 9–24 (repr. in PIERLUIGI DONINI, *Commentary and Tradition. Studies in Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Post-Hellenistic Philosophy*, de Gruyter, Berlin–New York 2011 [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina, 4], p. 359–373).

<sup>15</sup> ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica*, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> THOMAS AUFFRET, MARWAN RASHED, « Aristote, *Métaphysique* A 6, 988a 7–14, Eudore d'Alexandrie et l'histoire ancienne du texte de la *Métaphysique* », in CHRISTIAN BROCKMANN et al. (eds.), *Handschriften- und Textforschung heute: Zur Überlieferung der griechischen Literatur Festschrift für Dieter Harlfinger aus Anlass seines 70. Geburtstages*, Reichert, Wiesbaden 2014 (Serta Graeca, 30), p. 55–84, here p. 82.

commentary on Aristotle's treatise) preserves substantial passages from pseudo-Archytas's logical treatises (see Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 2.15–25).<sup>17</sup> As a matter of fact, the Pythagorean account of the philosophical tradition lasted well beyond Late Antiquity and, just to mention another famous example, it played an important role in early modern philosophy: authors such as Ficino and Kepler were supporters of the Pythagorean philosophy whose origin lies in these post-Hellenistic forgeries.

These remarks of course cannot be seen as some kind of *passé-partout* hypothesis and they have to be supplemented with a detailed exegesis of the texts. For example, parallels with the early interpretations of Aristotle around Andronicus bring crucial support to the dating of these treatises to the first century BC: from this perspective, Szlezák's commentary to Archytas's treatise on the categories remains a model for the scholarship in this area.<sup>18</sup> In U.'s volume each treatise is translated into Italian and the commentary explores in detail all the issues raised by these works: the status of the text, problems of translation, parallels with other ancient sources, philosophical content, etc.

## II. Pseudo-Archytas's 'On opposites' and the Peripatetic commentary tradition

As previously noted, parallels with the early commentators of Aristotle play an important role in the debate about the *Pseudopythagorica*. This is particularly important for the interpretation of the logical treatises, such as *On opposites* (Περὶ ἀντικειμένων) which is based on the second part of the *Categories* (the so-called *Postpraedicamenta*, which Andronicus regarded as inauthentic) and fragments of which are preserved in Simplicius's commentary. These hitherto neglected passages are extremely interesting and we are now lucky to have U.'s commentary. U. aptly describes the aim of this work:

Lo scopo dell'autore dell'apocrifo è stato probabilmente quello di ricostruire questa sezione delle *Categorie* [that is the *Postpraedicamenta*], rendendola adatta a un sistema pitagorico-platonico e così rivelare, indirettamente, la fonte e il modello pitagorico dello stesso Aristotele.<sup>19</sup>

Of course, Aristotle's *Categories* is the main source of *On opposites*, but U. interestingly detects echoes of other works such as *Metaphysics* Δ and the *Divisiones aristoteleae*. We are thus immediately placed, so to speak, in Eudorus's philosophical environment and U. offers a detailed reconstruction of all the

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<sup>17</sup> See SIMPLICIUS. In *Aristotelis Categoriae commentarium*, ed. KARL KALBFLEISCH, Typ. et impr. Reimer, Berolini 1907 (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 8).

<sup>18</sup> See *supra*, fn. 7.

<sup>19</sup> ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica*, p. 65.

issues related to the early exegesis of the *Categories*, which can shed light on the pseudo-Pythagorean work. So, for example, she connects pseudo-Archytas's care in ordering the various kinds of opposites (opposites are ordered according to their degree of proximity to substance: see Simplicius, *In Cat.*, 407.16–26 = [Archytas], p. 15.15–20) with the debates about the order of the categories around Eudorus.<sup>20</sup> She also remarks (rightly in my view) that pseudo-Archytas's emphasis on contraries could be connected to the metaphysical views expounded in the treatise *On principles*: there we find an opposition between two first principles and this opposition is seen as that between two contrary genera (more on this below). U.'s discussion is sound, learned and well argued. Yet in some cases it could be interesting to emphasise more the parallels with the early debates on Aristotle. I would only mention one example taken from the passage about affirmation and negation:

κατάφασις δὲ καὶ ἀπόφασις [καὶ] λόγου εἶδεα [καὶ μᾶλλον] ἐντι καὶ ἀλαθῆος καὶ ψευδέος μᾶλλον ἐντι σημαντικά. τὸ γὰρ ἦμεν ἄνθρωπον ἀληθῆς ἐστίν, ὅκκα ὑπάρχει, ψευδῆς δέ, ὅκκα μὴ ὑπάρχει. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀποφάσιος καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἀλαθῆς ἢ ψευδῆς παρὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ σημανόμενον ἀληθῆς μὲν, ὅκκα ὑπάρχει, ψευδῆς δέ, ὅκκα μὴ ὑπάρχει. (Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 408.10–14 = [Archytas], p. 16.6–11)<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> References are given according to Thesleff's pagination: see HOLGER THESLEFF, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period*, Åbo Akademi, Åbo 1965 (Acta Academiae Aboensis, Ser. A, Humaniora, 30.1). See ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica*, p. 13, 70–71. On pseudo-Archytas's ordering of opposites, see PAUL MORAUX, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisia*, vol. II: *Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr.*, de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1984, p. 623–628. On the debates around Eudorus, see RICCARDO CHIARADONNA, « Autour d'Eudore. Les débuts de l'exégèse des *Catégories* dans les Moyen Platonisme », in MAURO BONAZZI, JAN OPSOMER (eds.), *The Origin of the Platonic System. Platonisms of the Early Empire and their Philosophical Contexts*, Peeters, Louvain 2009 (Collection d'Études Classiques, 23), p. 89–111; MICHAEL GRIFFIN, *Aristotle's 'Categories' in the Early Roman Empire*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2015 (Oxford Classical Monographs), p. 78–99. The relevant sources are now collected and discussed in GEORGE BOYS-STONES, *Platonist Philosophy 80 BC to AD 250. An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2018 (Cambridge Source Books in Post-Hellenistic Philosophy), p. 418–436 (Texts 15A–Q).

<sup>21</sup> Text after Thesleff's edition (followed by U.). At [Archytas] 16.7 = SIMPLICIUS. *In Cat.*, p. 408.10 the text is dubious. MSS have *κατάφασις δὲ καὶ ἀπόφασις καὶ λόγος εἶδεα καὶ μᾶλλον ἐντι κτλ* Kalbleisch in *app.* suggests *λόγον εἶδεα [καὶ]*. Thesleff retains Kalbleisch's correction of *λόγος* with *λόγου* and, in addition, he omits the second *καὶ* and the *μᾶλλον* (see the text quoted above). In his translation of Simplicius, Richard Gaskin adopts Kalbleisch's text and his translation is: « Affirmation and negation are, rather, forms of sentence, and also are, rather, significative of true and false. For that a man is true, when it obtains, and false, when it does not obtain. And the same account holds of the negation too: for it too is true or false depending on the signified object – it is true when that obtains, and false when that does not obtain » (RICHARD GASKIN [ed.], *Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 9–15*, Duckworth, London 2000, p. 152). See the detailed discussion in ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica*, p. 77.

This is a difficult passage and I am (cautiously) inclined to agree with U. that there is no need to connect *σημαντικά* at p. 16.8 with *ἀλαθέος και ψευδέος* at the previous line. While syntactically very plausible, this connection would conflict with 16.10–11, where pseudo-Archytas identifies what is signified (*τὸ σημαινόμενον*) not with the true and the false, but with « the signified object » (*τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ σημαινόμενον*).<sup>22</sup> This is U.'s translation:

Affermazione e negazione sono poi specie del discorso sia del (discorso) vero sia del (discorso) falso e sono a maggior ragione significanti. Infatti, che 'un uomo è' è vero quando (la cosa) sussiste, e falso quando non sussiste. Lo stesso discorso vale anche per la negazione: infatti, anche quella è vera o falsa a seconda della cosa che è significata.<sup>23</sup>

In her commentary U. rightly remarks that pseudo-Archytas's vocabulary is not that of Aristotle's *Categories* (see *Cat.* 10.13a37–b36). Unlike Aristotle, Archytas connects terms related to semantics (*σημαντικά, τὸ σημαινόμενον*) to the discussion about affirmation and negation, truth and falsehood.<sup>24</sup> U. adduces some well-known parallels from *Metaphysics* (*Δ* 7.1017<sup>a</sup>31–35) and *De interpretatione* (2.16a16–18; 2.16a20; 4.16b27; 5.17a23, etc.) which can explain pseudo-Archytas's approach. So she remarks that:

Archita [...] sembra aver coniugato una teoria sull'affermazione e negazione che poteva ricavare dalle *Categorie* [...] con alcuni influssi derivanti del *De interpretatione*, non utilizzato nella sua teoria più complessa del giudizio.<sup>25</sup>

This is extremely plausible, but I wonder if we could go a little further in the interpretation of these lines. Actually pseudo-Archytas's vocabulary is the same as that which the commentators used to explain the subject of Aristotle's *Categories*. Simplicius informs us (*via* Porphyry) that the Peripatetic Boethus of Sidon (1<sup>st</sup> cent. BC) regarded the categories as utterances that signify beings: « according to the categories the division takes place in so far as expressions have a relation to beings, since they are significant of the latter » (Simplicius, *In*

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<sup>22</sup> As Gaskin remarks, here the « signified object » must be « must be a *complexe significabile*, i.e., something like a proposition (in the modern sense) or Meinongian objective, or possible state of affairs, if negative existential statements are to be accommodated. For in the case of the statement that a man does not exist the signified object obviously cannot be a man » (see GASKIN, *Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 9–15*, p. 231, fn. 846).

<sup>23</sup> ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica*, p. 62.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

*Cat.*, p. 11.26–27).<sup>26</sup> Indeed, Boethus regards the categories as simple signifying expressions, that is as words taken outside of any propositional statement. Archytas talks instead about statements and their meanings. But another passage from Simplicius informs us that Boethus focused on propositional statements too, suggesting that, unlike simple words, statements signify thoughts and not πράγματα. This is, according to Boethus, the view of the Ancients, that is of Aristotle: « Boethus says that, among the Ancients, the only things said or signified were intellections, for truth and falsehood are not in the realities, but in thoughts and the developments of the intellect » (Simplicius, *In Cat.*, 41.28–42.1).<sup>27</sup> Pseudo-Archytas seems to hold a different view: whereas Boethus argues that true and false statements merely signify thoughts, Archytas says that truth and falsehood depend on the signified *object*: καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἀλαθῆς ἢ ψευδῆς παρὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ σημαϊνόμενον. This vocabulary could indeed point to Stoic semantics (according to the Stoics, statements signify propositional objects, that is the so-called *lekta*). Or, rather, pseudo-Archytas could simply be adopting, in this section about propositional statements, the vocabulary used in discussions about the subject of the *Categories*. Be that as it may, it would be interesting in my view to further connect this and other passages from the treatise *On opposites* to the early debates about the *Categories*.

### III. Pseudo-Archytas's 'On principles' and the reception of Aristotle's theology

U.'s collection is opened by pseudo-Archytas's *On principles*, a short treatise which is preserved by Iohannes Stobaeus (1.41.2, p. 278 Wachsmuth = p. 19.5–20.17). As U. remarks in her Introduction, the author develops a dualist account of principles. These are regarded as both logical principles, through which we can explain all domains of being, and cosmological principles, that is as ultimate causes from which everything derives. The origins of this doctrine are clearly to be placed in the Pythagorean and Academic traditions: each reality can thus be traced back to the two supreme principles which governs two opposite series (*sustoichiai*) of entities.<sup>28</sup> This treatise, however, also contains some interesting

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<sup>26</sup> κατὰ δὲ τὰς κατηγορίας ἡ διαίρεσις γίνεται, καθὸ σχέσιν ἔχουσιν αἱ λέξεις πρὸς τὰ ὄντα, σημαντικαὶ τούτων οὔσαι. Trans. MICHAEL CHASE, *Simplicius: On Aristotle's 'Categories 1-4'*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2003, p. 27.

<sup>27</sup> ὁ δὲ Βόηθος μόνον λεγόμενα καὶ σημαϊνόμενα τὰς νοήσεις εἶναι φησι παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν διανοαῖσι καὶ ταῖς τοῦ νοῦ διεξόδοις κτλ. Trans. CHASE, *Simplicius: On Aristotle's 'Categories 1-4'*, p. 56. On this passage, see RICCARDO CHIARADONNA, « Les mots et les choses », in RICCARDO CHIARADONNA, MARWAN RASHED (eds.), *Boëthos de Sidon: Exégète d'Aristote et philosophe*, forthcoming.

<sup>28</sup> See ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica*, p. 10–11. Ulacco follows Thesleff and adds the excerpt in Stobaeus, 1.41.5, p. 282 Wachsmuth = p. 36.13–37.12 (Ἀρχύτου ἐκ τοῦ Περι ἀρχᾶς) to pseudo-Archytas's *On intellect and sense perception*. *Contra*, see JAAP MANSFELD, « 'Pythagoras' and

allusions to Aristotelian theories. So pseudo-Archytas regards the two principles as corresponding to matter and form (p. 19.17–20). This is a perfectly Aristotelian move, since Aristotle had already regarded the One and the indefinite Dyad, that is the Academic metaphysical principles, as corresponding to form and matter respectively (see *Metaph.* A 6.988a8–14). Yet the analogies with Aristotle do not stop at this. Pseudo-Archytas develops a hylomorphic reading of the Pythagorean principles, whereby he posits the existence of a level of them which is immanent in things: principles are thus seen as genuine constituents of things in the same way as form and matter. Most interestingly, pseudo-Archytas argues that a third principle is necessary beyond form and matter: this principle acts as a mover, or, to be more precise, as a prime mover (p. 20.10: τὸ πρῶτως κινεῖον), and makes it possible to explain movement which cannot be explained through matter and form alone. So our text ends with a theory of three principles: matter, form, and the prime mover which pseudo-Archytas regards as a God which is not only intellect, but even above intellect: οὐ νόον μόνον εἶμεν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νόω τι κρέσσον (p. 20.13–14).

Building on previous studies (in particular some important articles by Mauro Bonazzi),<sup>29</sup> U. persuasively connects this account of principles to three issues:

1: The reception of Aristotle. Pseudo-Archytas's outline of principles appears to be an Aristotelising version of the Pythagorean account, since pseudo-Archytas's tripartition is obviously close to Aristotle's distinction between material, formal, and moving cause. Archytas's argument that an external mover is necessary to produce movement so that form can determine matter recalls what Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* Λ 4.1070b22–24. And, of course, pseudo-Archytas's characterization of God as 'prime mover' has an obvious Aristotelian echo.

2: The metaphysics of Eudorus of Alexandria. Pseudo-Archytas's account of principles is interestingly similar to Eudorus's Pythagorean metaphysics as reported by Simplicius (*In Phys.*, p. 181.7–30 = 30 Boys-Stones). Eudorus makes the distinction between a supreme principle (ἀρχή), that is the first one which is the God above all, and a couple of subordinate principles or rather elements (στοιχεῖα), that is the One-Monad and the Dyad, which govern two opposite series of beings. Eudorus's tripartition *apud* Simplicius is indeed close to that of pseudo-Archytas, and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Λ lurks behind both texts. As shown by Bonazzi, Eudorus's distinction between principles and elements is probably

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ps.Archytas' *On Principles* », forthcoming, who argues persuasively that that passage belongs to the treatise *On Principles*.

<sup>29</sup> See MAURO BONAZZI, « Eudoro di Alessandria alle origini del platonismo imperiale », in MAURO BONAZZI, VINCENZA CELLUPRICA (eds.), *L'eredità platonica. Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo*, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2005 (Elenchos, 45), p. 115–160; and ID., « Pythagoreanising Aristotle: Eudorus and the Systematisation of Platonism », in SCHOFIELD (ed.), *Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism*, p. 160–186.

connected to Aristotle's distinction between intrinsic elements and the external moving principle in *Metaphysics*  $\Lambda$  4 (the same passage mentioned above in connection to pseudo-Archytas's account).

3: The Middle Platonist account of principles. Interestingly, U. sets pseudo-Archytas's account in parallel to the standard account of principles developed in pre-Plotinian Imperial Platonism. As a matter of fact, in several sources we find the distinction between three principles, that is God, matter, and form. This distinction (the so-called *Dreiprinzipienlehre*) was part of the interpretation of the *Timaeus* and has been regarded as a central thesis of Middle Platonist cosmology.<sup>30</sup> Pseudo-Archytas's tripartition incorporates the three principles account into the Pythagorean distinction of opposite series, thus giving an original version of this school doctrine.<sup>31</sup>

This is only a short survey of the issues raised by this treatise. In her commentary U. offers an in-depth discussion of these and other aspects of *On principles* and in what follows I would like to explore some issues related to the reception of Aristotle.<sup>32</sup> Certainly, pseudo-Archytas's *On principles* reveals an Aristotelian background and this background is likely to connect the treatise to Eudorus. It is very important, however, to distinguish between facts and plausible speculations. What we know about Eudorus for sure is that he raised a number of critical arguments about Aristotle's *Categories* (fragments in Simplicius, *In Cat.*).<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, Eudorus is connected to some textual work of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, since in a very obscure passage Alexander of Aphrodisias (*In Metaph.* 58.25–59.8) explains that Eudorus proposed a textual amendment to Aristotle's report on Plato's theory of principles at *Metaph.* A 6.988a10–11. It is tempting to connect Eudorus's amendment of Aristotle's text with his Platonist-Pythagorean philosophical project. Aristotle's reports on Plato and the Academy were in fact a crucial source for any account of the Old Academic theory of principles and Eudorus could very well have been engaged in a close interpretation of these

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<sup>30</sup> For some qualification, however, see now FEDERICO PETRUCCI, *Taurus of Beirut: The Other Side of Middle Platonism*, Routledge, London–New York 2018, p. 76–84 and 99–104.

<sup>31</sup> On this, see ULACCO, *Pseudopythagorica Dorica*, p. 12–13.

<sup>32</sup> What follows is based (with some changes and supplements) on RICCARDO CHIARADONNA, «Théologie et époptique aristotéliennes dans le médioplatonisme: La réception de *Métaphysique*  $\Lambda$  », in FABIENNE BAGHDASSARIAN, GWELTAZ GUYOMARC'H (eds.), *Réceptions de la théologie aristotélienne. D'Aristote à Michel d'Éphèse*, Peeters, Louvain 2017 (Aristote. Traductions et Études), p. 143–157. On Plutarch's passage, see SILVIA FAZZO, « The *Metaphysics* from Aristotle to Alexander of Aphrodisias », *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 55 (2012), p. 51–68. VALERIO NAPOLI, « Le denominazioni della *Metafisica* e della sua scienza nella filosofia tardoantica », *Peitho/Examina Antiqua*, 1 (2012), p. 51–82, esp. p. 60–62 offers a valuable survey.

<sup>33</sup> See *supra*, fn. 20.

texts. As noted earlier, Auffret and Rashed even suggest that Eudorus of Alexandria prepared a Pythagorizing edition of *Metaphysics A*.<sup>34</sup>

No ancient source, instead, overtly connects Eudorus with *Metaphysics A*. Mauro Bonazzi has suggested that Eudorus's distinction between the One-God and the couple Monad-Dyad is indebted to Aristotle's account of principles and elements in *Metaphysics A* 4. This is a most interesting suggestion and I am inclined to agree. Pseudo-Archytas's account of principles and his reference to the prime mover could point to the same Aristotelian source. That said, neither Eudorus nor pseudo-Archytas mention the most characteristic theories of *Metaphysics A*: the doctrine of *energeia*, the theory of God's self-reflexive thinking, and its causal role with respect to the heavens. Both Eudorus and pseudo-Archytas are completely silent about these issues. The most distinctive vocabulary of Aristotle's *Metaphysics A* is absent in their accounts. So the least one can say is that their reading of the *Metaphysics* was selective. They may well have relied on passages from Aristotle which were strictly related to the Platonist-Pythagorean theory of principles, while neglecting other passages which in fact contain Aristotle's most distinctive views about God and motion. From this point of view, the reception of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in Eudorus and pseudo-Archytas is completely different from what we find in later sources such as Alcinous's *Didaskalikos* and (of course) Plotinus.<sup>35</sup> There the presence of Aristotle's theology is unmistakable: Alcinous and Plotinus employ Aristotle's theories and vocabulary in their accounts of principles. It is only Alcinous and Plotinus who clearly integrate Aristotle's theory of the prime mover as activity and self-reflexive thinking into the Platonist account of God and Forms. Nothing of the sort exists in early Middle Platonism (unless indeed Alcinous is a contemporary of Eudorus, but this seems unlikely). So even if we grant that Aristotle's *Metaphysics* lies behind Eudorus and pseudo-Archytas, what we find are only generic references, which point to a very selective theological reading of Aristotle against the background of the Academic-Pythagorean account of principles. We must wait more than two centuries for a proper integration of Aristotle's theology into the corpus of Platonism.

#### IV. Plutarch, Eudorus and Aristotle's 'epoptics'

A famous passage from Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* can shed further light on these issues. When talking about the philosophical training of Alexander, Plutarch reports that he was not only well aware of Aristotle's ethical and political doctrines, but that he also « participated in those secret and more profound

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<sup>34</sup> See *supra*, fn. 16.

<sup>35</sup> See ALCINOUS, *Didaskalikos* 10, p. 164.7–166.14. For further details, see CHIARADONNA, « Théologie et époptique aristotéliennes dans le médioplatonisme ».

teachings which Great Men,<sup>36</sup> by designating them through the special terms ‘acroamatic’ and ‘epoptic’, used not to impart to many » (*Alex.* 7 5.668 A–B).<sup>37</sup> We will soon come back to this passage. For the time being, it is enough to note that Plutarch presents Aristotle’s acroamatic teaching much like some secret Platonist-Pythagorean teaching for initiates. The term ‘epoptic’ is a clear sign of this fact, as it seems to be an unmistakable allusion to the language of mysteries adopted in Plato’s *Symposium* (210a). In Imperial philosophy the term ‘epoptic’ denotes theology, i.e. the knowledge of principles which is the highest part of philosophy.<sup>38</sup> Hence, according to Plutarch, Alexander’s acquaintance with Aristotle’s acroamatic teaching entails that Alexander was a kind of initiate into the profound mysteries of Aristotle’s secret and epoptic teaching. Plutarch reports that when Alexander learned that certain treatises on these matters had been published in books by Aristotle, he wrote a letter to his master complaining about it: ‘for in what shall I surpass other men if those doctrines wherein I have been trained are to be all men’s common property?’ (*Alex.* 7 7.668B).<sup>39</sup> Aristotle replies to this letter and reassures his ambitious student by saying that his *logoi* are in fact both published and unpublished: for in truth the treatise *Metaphysics* is written for those already trained therein (i.e. in Aristotle’s philosophy), whereas it is useless for teaching and learning (*Alex.* 7 9.668C).

What I have just offered is a loose paraphrase, since the Greek text is somewhat unclear. Before going into details, it is worth noting that these letters are also preserved by Aulus Gellius (*Noctes Atticae* XX V.1–13), whose testimony, however, differs from that of Plutarch in certain respects. Gellius actually provides details that are missing in Plutarch. First, he specifies that he took this information from the « book of the philosopher Andronicus [ex Andronici philosophi libro] » (XX V.10).<sup>40</sup> Secondly, Gellius provides a full quotation of Aristotle’s letter, whereas Plutarch provides what looks like a paraphrase of it, which condenses the first sentence of the letter.

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<sup>36</sup> See *infra*, p. 236.

<sup>37</sup> ἔοικε δ’ Ἀλέξανδρος οὐ μόνον τὸν ἠθικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν παραλαβεῖν λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀπορρήτων καὶ βαθυτέρων διδασκαλιῶν, ἃς οἱ ἄνδρες ἰδίως ἀκροατικὰς καὶ ἐποπτικὰς προσαγορεύοντες οὐκ ἐξέφερον εἰς πολλούς, μετασχεῖν. English translation (with slight alterations) by BERNADOTTE PERRIN in *Plutarch’s Lives VII: Demosthenes and Cicero – Alexander and Caesar*, Harvard University Press–Heinemann, Cambridge, MA–London 1967 (Loeb Classical Library), p. 241. A detailed discussion of these lines can be found in FAZZO, « The *Metaphysics* from Aristotle to Alexander of Aphrodisias », p. 56–60.

<sup>38</sup> For further details and references, see again CHIARADONNA, « Théologie et époptique aristotéliciennes dans le médioplatonisme », p. 150–151.

<sup>39</sup> τίνι γὰρ δὴ διοίσωμεν ἡμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ καθ’ οὓς ἐπαιδευθήμεν λόγους, οὗτοι πάντων ἔσονται κοινοί;

<sup>40</sup> On Andronicus’s work see now MYRTO HATZIMICHALI, « The Texts of Plato and Aristotle in the First Century BC », in SCHOFIELD (ed.), *Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism*, p. 1–27, here p. 19: « This work contained Aristotle’s biography, his will, probably some spurious letters, and a catalogue of Aristotle’s works, the Pinakes referred to by Plutarch ».

Gellius

Ἔγραψάς μοι περὶ τῶν ἀκροατικῶν λόγων οἰόμενος δεῖν αὐτοὺς φυλάττειν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις. Ἴσθι οὖν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκδεδομένους καὶ μὴ ἐκδεδομένους· ξυνετοὶ γάρ εἰσιν μόνοις τοῖς ἡμῶν ἀκούσασιν. (XX V.12)

Plutarch

[...] Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπολογεῖται περὶ τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων, ὡς καὶ ἐκδεδομένων καὶ μὴ ἐκδεδομένων ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἢ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματεία, πρὸς διδασκαλίαν καὶ μάθησιν οὐδὲν ἔχουσα χρήσιμον, ὑπόδειγμα τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γέγραπται. (7 9.668C)

Gellius's reference to Andronicus has obviously attracted the attention of scholars and it is indeed plausible that Andronicus's book (whatever it might have been) was the ultimate source for both Plutarch and Gellius. Yet their narrations contain interesting differences. It is not only the case that Gellius provides a fuller account of the same source used by Plutarch. First, Gellius describes Aristotle's acroamatic teaching in a very different way from Plutarch. Whereas Plutarch conveys the ideas that Aristotle's acroamatic teaching was a secret epoptic teaching for initiates, Gellius offers a much more sober version (which indeed might well be that of Andronicus):

ἀκροατικά autem vocabantur, in quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur quaeque ad naturae contemplationes disceptationesve dialecticas pertinebant' (XX V.3).<sup>41</sup>

Secondly, Gellius' quotation of Aristotle's reply contains no allusion to the *Metaphysics*.

ξυνετοὶ γάρ εἰσιν μόνοις τοῖς ἡμῶν ἀκούσασιν.

Here Plutarch's text is considerably expanded:

ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἢ Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματεία πρὸς διδασκαλίαν καὶ μάθησιν οὐδὲν ἔχουσα χρήσιμον ὑπόδειγμα τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γέγραπται.

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<sup>41</sup> See, on these lines, MATTHIAS PERKAMS, « Die Ursprünge des spätantiken philosophischen Curriculumums im kaiserzeitlichen Aristotelismus », *Elenchos*, 36 (2015), p. 149–164, here p. 152, who thinks that 'dialectic' has a Platonic sense in this passage. This could be possible, but a more neutral meaning ('logic', as is usually the case in Hellenistic and Imperial philosophical terminology) seems more likely to me.

Unfortunately these lines are far from clear.<sup>42</sup> Suffice it to say that there is no reason to correct the text against the consensus of the manuscripts, as proposed by Ziegler (ἡ περὶ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματεία). The reference to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is actually confirmed beyond any reasonable doubt by Simplicius: Πλούταρχος [...] ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρου βίῳ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐκδόσει τῆς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ ταῦτα γέγραπθαι φησὶν (Simplicius, *In Phys.*, 8.30). Furthermore, whatever the meaning of ὑπόδειγμα (Perrin's translation as 'memorandum' is probably wrong), the overall meaning of the final sentence is relatively clear. Either (by translating ὑπόδειγμα as 'example', by joining χρήσιμον to ὑπόδειγμα and by putting a comma after this word, as recently suggested by Jonathan Barnes).<sup>43</sup>

[...] the treatise *Metaphysics*, lacking any useful example for teaching or learning, has been written for those already trained therein.<sup>44</sup>

Or (by following the usual reading that joins ὑπόδειγμα to τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις, by putting a comma after χρήσιμον, and by translating ὑπόδειγμα as *specimen*, illustration):

[...] the treatise *Metaphysics* is of no use for teaching or learning, but has been written as a *specimen* for those already trained therein.

In both cases, this sketchy description of the *Metaphysics* appears to be problematic if we start from our current reading and understanding of this work. But things are of course very different if the *Metaphysics* is seen as an outline of Aristotle's secret epoptic views about first principles (which is what Plutarch takes it to be). Starting from this perspective, one could well read some theological sections of Aristotle's work (esp. those in books A and Λ) as a cryptic and summary discussion that can only be useful for those already trained in the field. I certainly do not intend to deny that Andronicus was Plutarch's ultimate source about these letters, but the way in which Plutarch reports the whole story seems to point to a different philosophical background, i.e. that of the Platonist-Pythagorizing reading of Aristotle. This is further confirmed by a passage in Clement of Alexandria (*Stromateis*, 1 28.176.1–3), who, probably relying on the same tradition, identifies Aristotle's metaphysics with the epoptic part of philosophy. These conclusions are further suggested by a second passage from Plutarch's *On Isis and Osiris* (382 DE), where Plutarch takes the term 'epoptic' to designate the highest part of philosophy, i.e. that which leads to what is first, simple and immaterial. Plutarch ascribes this view not only to Plato, but also to

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<sup>42</sup> For a fuller account I would refer again to the articles mentioned *supra*, fn. 32.

<sup>43</sup> See FAZZO, « The *Metaphysics* from Aristotle to Alexander of Aphrodisias », p. 57, fn. 23.

<sup>44</sup> On these lines, see the in-depth discussion in *Ibid.*, p. 57.

Aristotle, and this makes the parallel with the *Life of Alexander* extremely interesting. Therefore, in both works Plutarch presents Aristotle's philosophy as culminating with epoptics, i.e. something like a Platonist-Pythagorean account of theology.

In some seminal contributions, Pierluigi Donini and Jaap Mansfeld suggested that Eudorus's Pythagorizing reading of *Metaphysics* A was the source of Plutarch's account of metaphysical principles and dualist philosophers in *On Isis and Osiris*.<sup>45</sup> Certainty is impossible to attain, but Eudorus is a good candidate for explaining Plutarch's allusions to Aristotle's epoptics too, both in *On Isis and Osiris* and in the *Life of Alexander*. There Plutarch claims to be reporting the view of some 'Great Men' (οἱ ἄνδρες: see *Alex.* 7 5.668B) about Aristotle's epoptic and secret teaching. David Sedley has investigated Philodemus's use of the words οἱ ἄνδρες to designate the founding members of the Garden, who were traditionally accorded canonical status: Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaeus.<sup>46</sup> Plutarch's passage offers a valuable (and to my knowledge overlooked) parallel. It would of course be interesting to know more about the identity of Plutarch's 'Great Men'. In view of the imperfect tense used by Plutarch (οὐκ ἐξέφερον, 'used not to impart to many'), we may suppose it could even be that οἱ ἄνδρες here, just as among the Epicureans, refers specifically to the school's authoritative founding members.<sup>47</sup> If this were the case, Plutarch would be ascribing the epoptic reading of Aristotle's metaphysics to the ancient masters of fourth-century philosophy, i.e. the philosophers of the Academy and of the Lyceum before the Hellenistic schools (the 'Ancients' according to the typical vocabulary of first-century BC philosophers). Such a view would of course again point to Eudorus's qualified integration of Aristotle into the Platonist and Pythagorean tradition.

It is in fact unlikely that Plutarch is making any direct allusion to the *Metaphysics*. Nothing really suggests that he was familiar with this work: for example, he does not mention the *Metaphysics* in the list of works dealing with Plato's Ideas in his *Against Colotes* (1114F–1115C).<sup>48</sup> Plutarch may have borrowed the reference to the *Metaphysics* from Andronicus, but I would be cautious on this issue. Firstly, the treatise is not mentioned in Gellius, and secondly, Plutarch's

<sup>45</sup> JAAP MANSFELD, *Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus' 'Elenchos' as a Source for Greek Philosophy*, Brill, Leiden–New York–Köln 1992 (*Philosophia antiqua*, 56), p. 274–296; PIERLUIGI DONINI, « Testi e commenti, manuali e insegnamento: la forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età postellenistica », in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, II.36.7, de Gruyter, Berlin–New York 1994, p. 5027–5100 (repr. in DONINI, *Commentary and Tradition*, p. 211–281, here p. 266).

<sup>46</sup> DAVID SEDLEY, « Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World », in JONATHAN BARNES, MIRIAM GRIFFIN (eds.), *Philosophia togata I*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989, p. 97–119, here p. 106.

<sup>47</sup> I owe this remark to David Sedley, *per litt.*

<sup>48</sup> For details, I would refer again to CHIARADONNA, « Théologie et époptique aristotéliciennes dans le médioplatonisme », p. 155.

mention of the *Metaphysics* appears to be part of his overall Pythagorizing account of Aristotle's epoptic acroamatic teaching. So if Plutarch did not insert this reference to the *Metaphysics* himself, I would suggest that he was relying not only on Andronicus, but on another source too that interpreted Aristotle's acroamatic teaching as dealing with epoptics and regarded Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as the highest part of this esoteric teaching. In addition to this, Plutarch's source referred this Platonist-Pythagorizing reading to the Ancients, the old masters of philosophy of the Academy and the Lyceum (Plutarch's 'Great Men'). As noted above, Eudorus would be a natural candidate for this role and I would suggest that his reading lies behind Plutarch.

So it seems plausible that Eudorus and his circle read the *Metaphysics* in a way that was both selective (since they only focused on sections dealing with first principles and theology) and ideologically opinionated, since they took the *Metaphysics* to be a cryptic outline for those already trained in Aristotle's secret and epoptic teaching. This is certainly bizarre, but it is after all no more implausible than what we know about the Pythagorizing reading of the *Categories* made by Eudorus and his circle. In his treatise *On universal logos*, pseudo-Archytas says that Aristotle's first category includes the Ideas ([Archytas], *Cat.*, p. 30.23–31.1); Philo outlines Aristotle's ten categories when describing the virtues of the Decad (*De Decalogo* 29–31). Something like this must hold for Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. So I would propose to regard Plutarch's passage as evidence of the fact that Eudorus and his followers took some sections of the *Metaphysics* to be a sketchy outline of Aristotle's epoptics and I would also suggest that this was part of their overall Platonist-Pythagorizing reading of Aristotle. And it seems to me that the Aristotelian background in pseudo-Archytas's *On principles* fits very well with this general framework, which is of course *toto caelo* different from that of later philosophers such as Plotinus.

This review has mostly dealt with the Aristotelian background of the *Pseudopythagorica*. This is of course a partial account. Among other things, U. spends much effort and ingenuity to outline the Platonist and Hellenistic background of the *Pseudopythagorica*. I would only recall her discussion about Stoic epistemology and Plato's line analogy in pseudo-Archytas *On intellect and sense perception* and pseudo-Brotinus's *On intellect and discursive thought*. These treatises actually provide very interesting evidence about post-Hellenistic debates about the criterion of truth. U.'s detailed interpretation supplements a number of recent studies devoted to these issues.<sup>49</sup> The *Pseudopythagorica* are still rather neglected works. U.'s book is a most welcome contribution to the recent

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<sup>49</sup> See, in particular, MAURO BONAZZI, *À la recherche des idées. Platonisme et philosophie hellénistique d'Antiochus à Plotin*, Vrin, Paris 2015 (Histoire des doctrines de l'Antiquité classique 46). A recent discussion can be found in GIULIA DE CESARIS, PHILLIP SIDNEY HORKY, « Hellenistic Pythagorean Epistemology », *Lexicon Philosophicum*, 6 (2018), p. 221–262.

trend of scholarship that counters this attitude, an attitude which certainly does not do justice to the historical and philosophical significance of these treatises. Indeed, all those who investigate this part of the ancient philosophical tradition will refer, from now on, to U.'s fine monograph.

# WHY WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE IS NOT THE AUTHOR OF ‘HIS’ *GEOMANTIA* (AND WHY THAT DOES NOT MAKE THE TEXT LESS INTERESTING)

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Arguably the most intriguing item in William of Moerbeke’s bibliography is a work entitled *Geomantia*.<sup>1</sup> Among the plethora of translated ancient Greek philosophical and scientific texts, the treatise stands out as the only one for which William allegedly was the original author. It deals with a particular technique of divination that was rather popular in the later Middle Ages.<sup>2</sup> The system allowed the practitioner to predict the future or interpret the past from randomly drawn points and lines on the ground.

The treatise is preserved in fifteen manuscripts, listed by Elisa Rubino who is preparing the critical edition.<sup>3</sup> In the majority of these witnesses it is explicitly ascribed to William of Moerbeke. Thérèse Charmasson, who gave a survey of the entire genre, established the authorship of the Dominican translator on the basis of the virtual unanimity in the manuscripts’ subscriptions. Recent publications do not challenge her initial judgement. Agostino Paravicini Bagliani seems to summarize what has become a *communis opinio*:

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<sup>1</sup> The point of reference is WILLY VANHAMEL, « Biobibliographie de Guillaume de Moerbeke », in JOZEF BRAMS, WILLY VANHAMEL (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d’études à l’occasion du 700<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de sa mort (1286)*, Leuven University Press, Leuven 1989 (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre. Series 1, 7), p. 301–383; *Geomantia* on p. 376–383.

<sup>2</sup> THÉRÈSE CHARMASSON, *Recherches sur une technique divinatoire: la géomancie dans l’occident médiéval*, Droz–Champion, Geneva–Paris 1980 (Centre de Recherches d’histoire et de philologie de la IV<sup>e</sup> section de l’École Pratique des Hautes Études, V: Hautes Études Médiévales et Modernes, 44); William’s *Geomantia* is treated in chapter 6, p. 157–167.

<sup>3</sup> ELISA RUBINO, « Per una edizione della *Geomantia* di Guglielmo di Moerbeke: il testo del proemio e della prima distinzione della prima parte », in ALESSANDRO PALAZZO, IRENE ZAVATTERO (eds.), *Geomancy and Other Forms of Divination*, SISMEL–Edizioni del Galluzzo, Firenze 2017 (Micrologus Library, 87), p. 93–134.

La tradition manuscrite ne signale aucun autre nom d'auteur et aucun indice codicologique ou textuel faisant obstacle à la paternité de Guillaume de Moerbeke, ce qui induit aujourd'hui à pencher pour l'authenticité de cette attribution.<sup>4</sup>

The purpose of this note is to critically reassess the available data concerning the origin of the treatise. Arguments will follow the order of quotation above. They will cast serious doubts over the traditional attribution, yet also open up new lines of inquiry that seem to have been neglected so far.

While the information about the author's name is mostly accepted at face value, the colophons contain another element that should raise some degree of suspicion regarding their overall reliability. Three manuscripts give the year 1288 as the date for the completion of the text. Since William died two years earlier, there cannot be any doubt about the inaccuracy of this chronology.<sup>5</sup> It is noteworthy to observe how several scholars have accepted Moerbeke's authorship as stated in the colophons, while at the same time proposing various solutions to ignore or correct the inconvenient date from those sources.<sup>6</sup>

When we turn to the manuscript tradition, several elements appear to deviate from the standard way in which William's translations were spread. All copies of the *Geomantia* except one are preserved in libraries from German-speaking areas. The tradition starts relatively late in the fourteenth century, which leaves the treatise with a geographically and chronologically more restricted dissemination than other works by William of Moerbeke. Admittedly, the value of this observation is somewhat outbalanced by the presence of three different French translations and one in Italian. They form a strong indication that the treatise was already known at an early stage in regions outside Central Europe.<sup>7</sup>

Another striking characteristic of the manuscript tradition of the *Geomantia* is that the variation among the fifteen extant copies is so important, that Rubino all but excludes the possibility to document the text in the form of a traditional critical edition. If she did, the critical apparatus would become 'elephantine'. Apparently, copyists attached a far lesser degree of authority to the *Geomantia* than to Latin versions of ancient masters. While William's translations were mostly copied with great care and few errors, the absence of a university

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<sup>4</sup> AGOSTINO PARAVICINI BAGLIANI, « Le pénitencier pontifical Guillaume de Moerbeke. Deux nouveaux documents (1268, 1278) », in FRANCISCO J. HERNÁNDEZ, ROCÍO SÁNCHEZ AMEJEIRAS, EMMA FALQUE (eds.), *Medieval Studies in Honour of Peter Linehan*, SISMEL-Edizioni del Galluzzo, Firenze 2018, p. 209–223; see p. 221–222. I am extremely grateful to Steven Spileers, librarian of the KU Leuven Institute of Philosophy, who expertly got this article on my desk within hours after my request.

<sup>5</sup> VANHAMEL, « Biobibliographie », p. 317–318.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 382. I did not find the title of *sacre theologie professor* in MS Kassel, Landesbibliothek, Astron. Qu. 16, as reported by PARAVICINI BAGLIANI, « Le pénitencier pontifical », p. 222.

<sup>7</sup> CHARMASSON, *Recherches sur une technique divinatoire*, p. 166–167.

tradition – where the academic authorities would control the quality of the exemplars – leads to important discrepancies among the manuscripts of this text, Rubino acknowledges. Moreover, the more practically orientated character of the *Geomantia*'s content may equally account for the significant discrepancies between the extant copies. Concrete needs might have shifted the focus on specific information required by the user for whom the copy was made.

While these elements point to a rather atypical transmission history, they do not form undeniable arguments against the attribution of the *Geomantia* to William of Moerbeke. Alessandra Beccarisi therefore falls back on circumstantial evidence to underscore her claim to authenticity.<sup>8</sup> Although she admits that there is no firm proof to ascribe the work with certainty to the Dominican translator, she implicitly aims to draw his intellectual background in such a way that his authorship would become acceptable.<sup>9</sup> William's concern for the influence of the heavenly spheres on the human life is proven by his translation of Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*. Witelo's description of William's scientific interests in the dedication of his *Perspectiva* confirms the latter's concern with higher powers and their effect on the fortune of living beings, with Neoplatonic philosophy, and with astrology. Another member of William's intellectual circle, Henry Bate of Mechelen, dedicated his work explaining the use of the astrolabe he had construed to his Dominican friend, leaving no doubt that the friar would have been fascinated by an instrument to observe celestial movements. In this line of thought, geomancy is to be considered as a less complicated form of astrology with similar objectives to interpret hidden signs of nature.

As a last argument in favour of authenticity, Beccarisi surveys Thomas Aquinas's treatment of divination in his treatise *De sortibus*, where he expertly describes the method of geomancy and discusses its possible value in the light of divine omnipotence. She plays down the possibility that Thomas's objections could have prevented William from writing a *Geomantia*.

William admittedly did not shy away on principle from every possibly sensitive subject regarding the prediction of the future, even if it may have led to frictions with a theological obstacle in the form of God's free will. A case in point is found in his translation of Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*, which surprisingly closes with an astrological table that allows readers to calculate their moment of death.<sup>10</sup> It

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<sup>8</sup> ALESSANDRA BECCARISI, « Natürliche Prognostik und Manipulation: Wilhelm von Moerbeke *De arte et scientia geomantiae* », in LORIS STURLESE (ed.), *Mantik, Schicksal und Freiheit im Mittelalter*, Böhlau, Köln–Weimar–Wien 2011 (Beihefte zum Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, 70), p. 109–127.

<sup>9</sup> One could somewhat harshly speak of Beccarisi's methodology as flawed, since she consistently calls the text William's treatise, even in the section where her purpose specifically is to establish the authorship.

<sup>10</sup> GUDRUN VUILLEMIN-DIEM, CARLOS STEEL, PIETER DE LEEMANS, *Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos in the Translation of William of Moerbeke. Claudii Ptolemaei Liber Iudicialium*, Leuven University Press, Leuven 2015 (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre. Series 1, 19), p. 131–133.

will remain ambiguous whether this material would have been deemed acceptable if the table had found a wider circulation than the unique manuscript in which it was preserved.

Although Beccarisi admits that no complete certainty about the authorship of William's *Geomantia* can be reached, she inexplicably leaves the linguistic approach totally unexplored. In this light, it is even more puzzling that Paravicini Bagliani explicitly claims that there is no codicological or textual objection to genuineness. Yet, Jozef Brams already suggested that features from the language used in the treatise strongly argue against the attribution.<sup>11</sup> He singled out two characteristics in particular: first, the treatise contains several words that rather belong to vulgar Latin, typical of popular works and absent from William's translations; on the other hand, Brams spotted some phrasings that betray an Arabic background for the treatise. That may imply that the *Geomantia* was compiled from other material translated from an oriental original.<sup>12</sup>

As for the second argument, the same sources that bore testimony to William's interest in astrological science make it very unlikely that he would have used material supplied from Arabic. The editors of his translation of Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos* describe how he declined to adopt the customary translation (*h*)*yleg*, a loan word from Arabic, for the Greek *ἀφεικός*, although it had become an accepted technical term in Latin astrology. William's choice for the Latin *dimissorius* made his version virtually incomprehensible for experts versed in the traditional vocabulary. Significantly, one of the rare users of the manuscript in which it was preserved added the more common term as an annotation to the neologism.<sup>13</sup>

The work of his friend Henry Bate confirms the general tendency to prefer pieces directly from the Greek to others with an Arabic background. Many instances can be found where he compares an identical passage in translations from different languages, invariably concluding that *translatio que de Greco melius habet*.<sup>14</sup> In a similar vein, Witelo in his dedication of the *Perspectiva* ascribes a feeling of *taedium verborum Arabicarum* to William. The reference is usually

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<sup>11</sup> JOZEF BRAMS, « Mensch und Natur in der Übersetzungsarbeit Wilhelms von Moerbeke », in ALBERT ZIMMERMANN, ANDREAS SPEER (eds.), *Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter*, vol. II, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 21/2), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin–New York 1991, p. 537–561, in particular p. 559–560.

<sup>12</sup> I cannot see how the acceptance of William's authorship can be reconciled with Charmasson's discovery that another treatise on geomancy is almost literally incorporated into the *Geomantia* ascribed to Moerbeke, see CHARMASSON, *Recherches sur une technique divinatoire*, p. 122. The problem is not mentioned by Beccarisi or Rubino.

<sup>13</sup> VUILLEMIN-DIEM, STEEL, DE LEEMANS, *Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos*, p. 31; the user was Simon Bredon, who incidentally also owned a copy of a *Geomantia*, see CHARMASSON, *Recherches sur une technique divinatoire*, p. 229.

<sup>14</sup> VUILLEMIN-DIEM, STEEL, DE LEEMANS, *Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos*, p. 39–44.

interpreted as a warning against the lack of reliability of texts that had reached the Latin West through Arabic intermediaries.<sup>15</sup> If William did not stick to this same attitude in his capacity of author and compiler of the *Geomantia*, it would have formed a complete denial of his customary stance and that of his intellectual peers.

When we turn to Brams's remark about the Latin vocabulary, it clearly needs to be applied with due reserve. It is conceivable that Moerbeke as a translator prefers a different linguistic register from that of William as an original author. However, the vocabulary from the short extract published in Rubino's article already offers a few unexpected lexical choices to supplement the terms that Brams judged to be suspect. One would expect Moerbeke not to use *hesitatio* and *dilucide* rather than *dubitatio* and *palam* or *manifestum*.<sup>16</sup> Among the words for which the preference depends on habit and automatization the four instances of *atque* in the published passage look significant. This copula is virtually absent from Moerbeke's works, and when it does appear, it usually occurs in his revisions of prior translations.<sup>17</sup> Similar relevance may be granted to the use of the passive perfect *incepta est*, which Moerbeke never introduces on his own strength. In his translations of Aristotelian texts, it appears just once in his revision of the *Physica vetus*, where he leaves the words of James of Venice unchanged.<sup>18</sup>

Obviously, these observations are open to interpretation and criticism. Only if Latin renderings of Greek text can be compared to each other, irrefutable conclusions become possible. Surprisingly, the published sample from the *Geomantia* contains a useful instance where the author explains the etymology of the term *geomantia*: *dicitur a geos quod est terra et mantia divinatio*.<sup>19</sup> For the second part of the compound, *divinatio* is the translation of *μαντεία* that one may expect from William's quill. However, knowledge of Greek is no absolute requirement to make the connection, since everyone could learn from Isidore of Seville's *Etymologiae* VIII.9.11: *μαντεία divinatio nuncupatur*. As for the explanation for the first part, where *geos* is proposed to render the Greek for *terra*, every beginner will notice that this is not a suitable transcription of *γῆ*. William may have made divergent lexical choices as an author, but he cannot suddenly have lost his Greek. At that point, a variant reading can come to the rescue: MS Wien,

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<sup>15</sup> CLEMENS BAEUMKER, *Witelo, ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrhunderts*, Aschendorff, Münster 1908 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 3/2), p. 128, l. 28–29.

<sup>16</sup> RUBINO, *Per una edizione*, p. 106 and 114.

<sup>17</sup> I retrieved two occurrences of *atque* in the *Physica* and five in the *Parva Naturalia* (treatises on sleep) from the Aristoteles Latinus database (via <www.brepolis.net>, accessed December 2018).

<sup>18</sup> RUBINO, *Per una edizione*, p. 107; *Physica*, 236b36.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 116.

Nationalbibliothek, 3059, has *dicitur a ge grece, quod est terra*.<sup>20</sup> However, this choice would turn the editorial process into a chance game, where variants are preferred according to the editor's convenience, because in what follows the Wien MS twice reads *mantos* instead of *mantia*. Moreover, the combination *geos quod est terra* seems firmly rooted in the Latin tradition. It is found in Thomas Aquinas's *In II Sententiarum* 8.1.6, with other similar occurrences in extremely popular texts as the *Historia scholastica* and the *Legenda aurea*.

As a final argument against William's paternity, it seems highly improbable that a society in which the wife, *uxor*, and the mistress, *amasia*, are mentioned on the same level was compatible with the views of William of Moerbeke, papal penitentiary.<sup>21</sup>

None of the previous aspects is in itself decisive to deny William of Moerbeke the authorship of the *Geomantia*. Some of the analysed readings may even be due to accidents in the transmission of the text, which would make them lose their critical value. Their sum, however, is too important to be brushed away without further investigation.

Moreover, would a negative judgement regarding the authenticity necessarily deprive the treatise of its inherent value? On the contrary, a careful assessment of the manuscripts' attribution may open up new perspectives for additional research. William's name was one among many used to attribute credibility to typical works from a genre for which the appropriateness was not beyond questioning.<sup>22</sup> It would be interesting to explore the geographical and cultural context where a reference to his name and function at the papal court carried enough weight to counterbalance a content of dubious acceptability.

<sup>20</sup> Pace Rubino, the manuscript reads *grece* in both parts that contain the text (fol. 93v and 136v), as opposed to her reading *geomante* (Rubino's sigla W1 and W2; MS checked on microfilm and via <[http://digital.onb.ac.at/RepViewer/viewer.faces?doc=DTL\\_5957055&order=1&view=SINGLE](http://digital.onb.ac.at/RepViewer/viewer.faces?doc=DTL_5957055&order=1&view=SINGLE)>, accessed December 2018; see also CHARMASSON, *Recherches sur une technique divinatoire*, p. 13.

<sup>21</sup> BECCARISI, *Natürliche Prognostik und Manipulation*, p. 126: « De amasia vel uxore, si [...] habeat amatorem. Si uxor vel amasia recuperabitur amissa re ». For what the comparison is worth, William in his capacity of penitentiary uses the word *concubina*, which obviously may have a different connotation than *amasia*, see PARAVICINI BAGLIANI, *Le pénitencier pontifical*, p. 213.

<sup>22</sup> CHARMASSON, *Recherches sur une technique divinatoire*, p. 227 cites Hugo of Santalla, Gerard of Cremona, Plato of Tivoli, Michael Scot, Salio of Padua, and William of Moerbeke as translators to whom treatises on geomancy were attributed. She adds: « Le fait que les œuvres de Michel Scot, de Jean de Murs et de Pierre de Padoue soient vraisemblablement apocryphes, n'a que peu d'importance; l'attribution de géomancies à des personnalités de ce type montre qu'elles étaient susceptibles, aux yeux des contemporains, de les avoir écrites ». Andrea Robiglio kindly pointed out to me that there is a similar problem of authenticity with (in particular several alchemical) works attributed to Thomas Aquinas, see the list of 56 *unechte Schriften* compiled by RUEDIMBACH in ALEXANDER BRUNGS, VILEM MUDROCH, PETER SCHULTHESS (eds.), *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Begründet von Friedrich Überweg, völlig neu bearbeitete Ausgabe. Die Philosophie des Mittelalters*, vol. IV: 13. Jahrhundert. Schwabe, Basel 2017, p. 332–336.

# BYZANTIUM AND THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES\*

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Byzantinists have a great advantage over their counterparts in other historical fields; they know exactly the moment when their subject terminated: 29 May 1453. But the end of Byzantium was not the end of the Greek Middle Ages, let alone the end of the Middle Ages *tout court*. I myself have been arguing now for years that the Renaissance was not the beginning of modern times but the final and, if you wish, culminating phase of the Middle Ages.<sup>1</sup> The Reformation was the third and, in effect, the final medieval reformation.<sup>2</sup> Conversely, the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, not the Renaissance, should be labeled early modern, with the transition from medieval to early modern starting about the mid-seventeenth century and the term ‘modern’ without qualification being appropriate really only from about the turn of the nineteenth century forward. The historiography of Byzantine studies is a nice test case of these propositions.

Obviously Greeks and non-Greeks on the day after the *Halosis*, 30 May 1453, were as medieval in their world view, historical perspective, technological conditions, and so forth as they had been the day before. So the question becomes: when, at least as far as Byzantine studies are concerned, did Byzantine studies, as such studies are understood today, begin. The traditional answer has been the mid-seventeenth century, with the appearance of the first volumes of

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\* This essay was originally delivered as a paper at Harvard University on 27 October 2017 as part of a conference on Byzantine historiography.

<sup>1</sup> JOHN MONFASANI, « The Renaissance as the Concluding Phase of the Middle Ages », *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo*, 108 (2006), p. 165–185; reprinted as Essay I in *Id.*, *Renaissance Humanism, from the Middle Ages to Modern Times*, Ashgate–Variorum, Farnham–Surrey 2015 (Variorum Collected Studies Series, 1057).

<sup>2</sup> The first was the Monastic Reformation of eleventh century; the second was the Mendicant Reformation of the thirteenth century; see *Ibid.*, p. 179–180.

the Parisian corpus of Byzantine historians, with Du Cange's *Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae Graecitatis* and his *Historia Byzantina duplici commentario illustrata*, with Leone Allacci's voluminous books on Byzantine theology, liturgy, popular religion, and religious architecture, with Jacques Goar's *Euchologion sive Rituale Graecorum*, and with publications by such luminaries as Philippe Labbe, Denis Petau, and François Combefis,<sup>3</sup> to name just some of the greats of the age.

Agostino Pertusi has already taught us that the sixteenth-century humanist literature on Byzantium was really an extension of medieval interests and approaches, including the most notable product of that literature, Hieronymus Wolf's *Byzantinae Historiae Corpus*, produced with the help of Wilhelm Holtzmann (a.k.a. Xylander) and the patronage of Anton Fugger.<sup>4</sup> Wolf's *Byzantinae Historiae Corpus*, just like other sixteenth-century editions of Byzantine works put out by Protestant scholars, and just like Catholic editions published by Jesuits and other Catholic scholars, emanated from religious interests in the conversion of the Orthodox to Protestantism or Roman Catholicism, or from a desire to provide object lessons for the Christian West of how internal divisions would invariably lead to conquest by the fearsome and ever threatening Turkish Sultanate.<sup>5</sup> In other words, interests in Byzantine history and texts very much reflected internal Latin religious imperatives and political fears, just as was true in the medieval West up to the sixteenth century. The famous 1584 *Turcograecia* of the long time professor in Protestant Tübingen, Martin Crusius, fits perfectly into this mold since, as its subtitle and preface state, the work aims to reveal the miserable condition of the Christian Greeks now that they have fallen under the yoke of the Infidel Turk.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, the back story of Renaissance editions of

<sup>3</sup> For Du Cange, see JÜRGEN LEONHARDT, « DuCange, Charles du Fresne », in PETER KUHLMANN, HELMUTH SCHNEIDER (eds.), *History of Classical Scholarship: a Biographical Dictionary*, trans. and ed. DUNCAN SMART, CHAD M. SCHROEDER, Brill, Leiden 2014, p. 166–167. There is no synthetic study of Labbe, but see HENRI OMONT, « La collections byzantine de Labbe et le projet de J.-M. Suarès », *Revue des études grecques*, 17 (1980), p. 18–32; on Petau, see MICHAEL HOFMANN, *Theologie, Dogma und Dogmenentwicklung im theologischen Werk Denis Petau's. Mit einem biographischen und einem bibliographischen Anhang*, Peter Lang, Bern 1976 (Regensburger Studien zur Theologie, 1); on Combefis, see RAYMOND DARRICAU, « A Hellenist of the Grand Siècle: The Dominican François Combefis (1605–1679) », *Res Publica Litteraria*, 1 (1978), p. 21–41.

<sup>4</sup> AGOSTINO PERTUSI, *Storiografia umanistica e mondo bizantino*, Bruno Lavagnini, Palermo 1962, (Istituto siciliano di studi bizantini e neoellenici. Quaderni, 3), p. 45–66.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40–45 and 67–93.

<sup>6</sup> MARTIN CRUSIUS. *Turcograeciae libri octo quibus Graecorum status sub imperio Turcico in Politia et Ecclesia, Oeconomia et Scholis, iam inde ab amissa Constantinopoli ad haec usque tempora luculenter describitur*, per Leonardum Ostenium, Sebastiani Henricpetri impensa, Basileae 1584. See sign. \*2v of the preface: « Inscriptionem eis [sc. libris] feci TURCOGRAECIAE propterea quod res Graecorum, iam inde ab Imperii Graeci amissione sub Turcico dominatu factas et fieri solitas continent Ἑλλάς ibi ἐκτουρκωθεῖσα est, Graecia servituti Turcicae subiecta: insuperque multis in Religione erroribus et superstitionibus (quod initio nos latebat) obnoxia: ideoque merito infelicitas eius deploranda ».

Byzantine texts accords very nicely with the notion that the Renaissance should be viewed as the final phase of the Middle Ages.

But what about the seventeenth-century explosion of brilliant scholarship on Byzantium? As I acknowledged earlier, the move from medieval to modern began somewhere in the seventeenth century. So by logical necessity, I would have to acknowledge that seventeenth-century scholarship on Byzantium was in some sense modern. But in what sense and why? The Parisian Corpus of Byzantine historians and Du Cange's *Historia Byzantina* and *Glossarium* established Byzantium as a distinct field of study and laid the foundation of scholarship that still serves the field today. It was not purely coincidental that prolific seventeenth-century textbook writer, Christopher Cellarius, published in 1688 a *Historia Medii Aevi*, canonizing a long developing view that historicized the Middle Ages and set it off from what he and contemporaries viewed as antiquity on one side and modernity on the other.<sup>7</sup> What one may view as extraordinary about Cellarius's definition of the Middle Ages is that in chronological terms he essentially defined it as equivalent to the rise and fall of Byzantium. The full title of his textbook runs: *Historia Medii Aevi a temporibus Constantini Magni ad Constantinopolim a Turcis captam deducta*. Fittingly, he ended his narrative by explaining how Byzantine scholars such as Cardinal Bessarion, Theodore Gaza, and George of Trebizond came to Italy and joined forces with scholars such as Lorenzo Valla and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola to combat the medieval barbarism of the West,<sup>8</sup> thus setting up the background for his next volume, the *Historia Nova, hoc est XVI et XVII saeculorum*.<sup>9</sup>

But if Byzantium as a field of study took its start in one sense in the seventeenth century, in another it remained an appendage to other fields and interests. The titles of Du Cange's two epoch-making *Glossaria* are very clear in their general classicist perspective, explaining that they are dictionaries of *media et infima Latinitas* and *Graecitas*.<sup>10</sup> In the introduction to his Latin dictionary, Du Cange spent most of his time expostulating on the various forms of Late Latin barbarisms, offering in their defense chapters explaining that books written in a *rudior stylus* should not be viewed with contempt (*contemnendi*) if they offer something useful (*siquid utilitatis*), and arguing that not everything produced by the *scriptores mediae aetatis* was *inutilia*.<sup>11</sup> But it was especially in the introduction

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<sup>7</sup> WALLACE K. FERGUSON, *The Renaissance in Historical Thought: Five Centuries of Interpretation*, Houghton Mifflin, Cambridge, MA 1948, p. 73–77.

<sup>8</sup> CHRISTOPHORUS CELLARIUS, *Historia Medii Aevi a temporibus Constantini Magni ad Constantinopolim a Turcis captam deducta*, I. Bielkii, Jena 1688, p. 213–214.

<sup>9</sup> Jena, 1696.

<sup>10</sup> *Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis*, G. Martini, Paris 1678; *Glossarium ad Scriptores Mediae et Infimae Graecitatis*, apud Anissonius, J. Postel, C. Rigaud, Lyon 1688.

<sup>11</sup> After tracing the history of the Latin language and discussing the various dictionaries he used, he offer a chapter (LXI) with the title « Rudiori stylo scripti libri non contemnendi si quid utilitatis habeant aliunde »; and another (LXII) with the title « Non omnia sunt apud scriptores

to his Greek dictionary that Du Cange gave full vent to his classicist prejudice, endorsing the view of the sixteenth-century Greek scholar Theodosius Zygomalas that among the myriad contemporary Greek dialects none is worse or more corrupt (*deterior ac corruptior*) than the Athenian, which is scarcely understood by other Greeks. The unstated premise undergirding Du Cange's and Zygomalas's opinion was that every declension from classical Greek is one more step towards decadence and corruption.<sup>12</sup> The central fact about the great seventeenth-century Byzantinists is that they were at heart classicists or patristic scholars or antiquarians or ardent proponents of some cause, be that cause French glory (not for nothing did Du Cange write a *Histoire de l'empire de Constantinople sous les empereurs français*)<sup>13</sup> or, be the cause, as was the case with Leone Allacci, the union between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. As Karen Hartnup comments in respect to Allacci's treatise on Greek folk practices, « for Allatios the unbroken Orthodox tradition was alive and well in his own time ». She concludes that Allacci effectively did not recognize « a 'Byzantine history', separated from the classical and Ottoman periods ».<sup>14</sup> Allacci's long Greek poem *Hellas* to the French crown fits perfectly within the long tradition since the fifteenth century of Greek émigrés issuing appeals for a crusade to rescue Greece from the oppressive rule of the Turks.<sup>15</sup> In his insightful *Storiografia umanistica e mondo bizantino*, Agostino Pertusi stressed as the chief cause of seventeenth-century Byzantine scholarship what he call the « vasto movimento intellettuale e scientifico » of the age.<sup>16</sup>

But granting all of this, I think another factor should be added, namely, the contemporary political threat of the Ottoman Empire. With more scholarly tools and a larger educated audience than ever before, the seventeenth century could indulge to an extraordinary extent its interest in the collapse of the Byzantine Empire and the rise of the Ottoman. A telling indicator of these external influences is the well known eighteenth-century flip, indeed, revolution, in Byzantine studies, when the great advances in the field, with some exceptions,<sup>17</sup> simply stopped. The reason for this transformation is usually attributed to the

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mediae aetatis inutilia ». I used the edition of Paris 1840–1850, I, p. 39–41.

<sup>12</sup> Preface to the 1688 edition, I, p. viii.

<sup>13</sup> On the nationalistic French orientation of Du Cange's projects, see JEAN-MICHEL SPIESER, « Du Cange and Byzantium », in ROBIN CORMACK, ELIZABETH JEFFREYS (eds.), *Through the Looking Glass: Byzantium through British Eyes. Papers from the Twenty-eight Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, London, March 1995*, Ashgate, Aldershot 2000 (Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies. Publications, 7), p. 199–200.

<sup>14</sup> KAREN HARTNUP, *'On the Beliefs of the Greeks': Leo Allatius and Popular Orthodoxy*, Brill, Leiden 2004 (The Medieval Mediterranean. Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1500, 54), p. 323.

<sup>15</sup> See VINCENZO RUTOLO, *Il carme 'Hellas' di Leone Allacci*, Bruno Lavagnini, Palermo 1966 (Istituto siciliano di studi bizantini e neellenici. Quaderni, 3).

<sup>16</sup> PERTUSI, *Storiografia umanistica e mondo bizantino*, p. 90.

<sup>17</sup> One thinks of the 22 tomes of CHARLES LE BEAU'S (1701–1778) *Histoire du Bas-Empire en commençant à Constantin le Grand*, chez Desaint et Saillant, Paris 1756–1779.

Enlightenment's disdain for all things medieval. But I suggest we should consider the effect of the Battle of Zenta in 1697 and the subsequent Peace of Karolwitz in 1699. The battle did not end the Ottoman threat, but its subsequent peace pretty much ended a thousand years of Moslem expansion against the Christian West and marked the beginning of the reverse process all the way into the twentieth century. In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire ceased to be a threat and became itself a target for piecemeal conquest, in short, an object of benign consideration. Some years ago Bernard Lewis noted that

the eighteenth-century Enlightenment had two ideal prototypes, the noble savage and the wise and urban Oriental [...] For a while the Chinese held up as a model of virtue [...] Then disillusionment set in [...] shaped by [...] experience. By the time Gibbon began to write, there was a vacancy for an Oriental myth. Islam was in many ways suitable. While it was ceasing to impress, Islam no longer terrified.<sup>18</sup>

Consequently, one finds Edward Gibbon in chapter 50 of the *Rise and Fall* praising Mohammed as 'sagacious' and 'discerning' and speaking of his 'liberality'. As Lewis goes on to say,

[Islam] served as an admirable vehicle for anti-religious and anti-Christian polemic. Gibbon occasionally accomplishes this purpose by attacking Islam while meaning Christianity, more frequently by praising Islam as an oblique criticism of Christian usage, beliefs, and practice.<sup>19</sup>

Conversely – and most famously – Gibbon buried Byzantium in opprobrium, declaring at the start of his chapter 48:

At every step as we sink deeper into the decline and fall of the Eastern empire, the annals of each succeeding reign would impose a more ungrateful and melancholy task. These annals must continue to repeat a tedious and uniform tale of weakness and misery.<sup>20</sup>

And in chapter 53 he lamented that « [t]he minds of the Greeks were bound in the fetters of a base and imperious superstition ». <sup>21</sup> Steven Runciman, having judged chapter 48 on Byzantium of the *Decline and Fall* « the weakest section of the whole work », <sup>22</sup> decided that « [t]he splendor of [Gibbon's] style and wit of his satire

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<sup>18</sup> BERNARD LEWIS, « Gibbon on Muhammed », *Daedalus*, 105/3 (1976), p. 89–101, at p. 98.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> EDWARD GIBBON, *The History of the Decline of the Fall of the Roman Empire*, J.O. Robinson, London 1830, p. 845.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1012.

<sup>22</sup> STEVEN RUNCIMAN, « Gibbon and Byzantium », *Daedalus*, 105/3 (1976), p. 103–110, at p. 103.

killed Byzantine studies for nearly a century ».<sup>23</sup> Consequently, if part of the transformation of Byzantine studies in the eighteenth century reflects the effect of the political and military revolution launched by the Battle of Zenta in 1697, then Prince Eugene of Savoy, the victor of Zenta, needs to be considered a decisive figure in the history of Byzantine studies.

Other factors intervened as well. The great competition between Protestants and Catholics to win Greek Orthodoxy to their side culminated in the seventeenth-century, but thereafter petered out.<sup>24</sup> Already in the sixteenth century Lutherans had sought to entice the Greek Church to join in a union. These efforts failed, though the correspondence between Martin Crusius and the Patriarchate did result in him receiving the text of the two sixteenth-century Greek chronicles that formed the core of his already mentioned *Turcograecia* of 1584. The conversion of the Patriarch Cyril Lucaris (1570–1638) to Calvinism brought the competition to a frenzy.<sup>25</sup> His murder, however, in 1638 effectively ended the Calvinist phase of the competition. Rome remained active throughout the period, but its greatest victory was in Slavic lands, with the Union of Brest in 1596,<sup>26</sup> rather than in Greece. Finally, in the later seventeenth century the Anglican Church made a go of it. But despite its greater communality with

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 109. See ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO, « After Gibbon's *Decline and Fall* », in KURT WEITZMANN (ed.), *Age of Spirituality: A Symposium*, The Metropolitan Museum, New York 1980, p. 7–16, who points out that Gibbon's disparagement of Christianity would not have created anywhere the furor that it did if it had appeared not in the first installment of his history in 1776, but as part of the whole work when the third installment came out in 1788.

<sup>24</sup> In general see STEVEN RUNCIMAN, *The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1968, p. 238–319; and GUNNAR HERING, *Ökumenisches Patriarchat und Europäische Politik, 1620–1638*, F. Steiner, Wiesbaden 1968.

<sup>25</sup> See KLAUS-PETER TODT, « Kyrillos Lukaris », in CARMELO G. CONTICELLO, VASSA CONTICELLO (eds.), *La théologie byzantine et sa tradition*, vol. II, Brepols, Turnholt 2002, p. 617–658. GEORG HOFMANN, *Griechische Patriarchen und römische Päpste. Untersuchungen und Texte*, vol. II.1: *Patriarch Kyrillos Lukaris und die römische Kirche*, (*Orientalia Christiana*, 15/1), Pont. institutum orientalium studiorum, Rome 1929; CASIMIR EMERAU, « Lucar, Cyrille », *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, 9 (1926), col. 1003–1019; and GEORGE A. CHATZÉANTONIOU (HADJANTONIOU), *Protestant Patriarch: The Life of Cyril Lucaris, 1572–1638, Patriarch of Constantinople*, John Knox Press, Richmond, VA 1961.

<sup>26</sup> See BERT GROEN, WIL VAN DEN BERCKEN (eds.), *Four Hundred Years: Union of Brest (1596–1996). A Critical Re-evaluation. Acta of the congress held at Hernen Castle, the Netherlands, in March 1996*, Peeters, Louvain 1998. For subsequent unions up to 1698, see MICHAEL LACKO, « Unionsbewegungen im slavischen Raum und in Rumänien », in WILHELM NYSSSEN, HANS JOACHIM SCHULZ, PAUL WIERTZ (eds.), *Handbuch der Ostkirchenkunde*, vol. I, Patmos Verlag, Düsseldorf 1984, p. 269–286. For activity in Rome, see INGO HERKLOTZ, *Die Academia Basiliana: griechische Philologie, Kirchengeschichte und Unionsbemühungen im Rom der Barberini*, Herder, Rome 2008; and HOFMANN, *Griechische Patriarchen*, cited in the previous note. For theological developments see GERHARD PODSKALSKY, *Griechische Theologie in der Zeit der Türkenherrschaft (1453–1821)*, C. K. Beck, Munich 1988, p. 117–329.

Orthodoxy when compared to Lutheranism and Calvinism, its attempt came to naught as well.<sup>27</sup>

Then there was the brute fact that by 1700 European horizons had radically expanded beyond Europe and the Middle East. The treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt in 1713 and 1714 ended the War of Spanish Succession only to set the stage for the great eighteenth-century duel for empire from the Americas to Asia between England and France. Not only the interests of the reading public, but also the producers of literature on travel and geography changed. As Febvre and Martin point, until the mid-sixteenth century French readers seemed almost obsessed with books about the Turks, but in the later part of the century this changed,<sup>28</sup> and by the seventeenth century books on the New World were flooding the market, soon matched by the literature of Catholic missionaries and various travelers and adventurers in Asia.<sup>29</sup> The Turks and the Greeks had become only a niche in the geographic, religious, and ethnographic interests of the eighteenth-century European educated world.

In the nineteenth century, nationalism and Romanticism brought about a new and intense appreciation of the Middle Ages. Byzantine studies followed, pulled along in the wake of this momentous enthusiasm for all things medieval, but decidedly late. Although one can easily identify important publications in Byzantine studies in the course of the nineteenth century,<sup>30</sup> Charles Diehl long ago and, separately and more recently, John W. Barker and Peter Schreiner have dated the beginning of the modern professional study of Byzantine philology to the publication of Karl Krumbacher's *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur* in 1891 and the appearance of the first number of *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* the next year and then in 1894 of *Vizantijskiy Vremennik*.<sup>31</sup> So it was not until the 1890s that modern Byzantine studies really took off. Only then did university chairs specifically dedicated to Byzantium begin to be created.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>27</sup> See RUNCIMAN, *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 289–319.

<sup>28</sup> See LUCIEN FEBVRE, HENRI-JEAN MARTIN, *Coming of the Book: The Impact of printing 1450-1800*, trans. DAVID GERARD, Verso, London 1976, p. 280–282.

<sup>29</sup> One can get a sense of this ever-expanding literature from DONALD F. LACH, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, vol. III, Book 1: *A Century of Advance. Trade, Missions, Literature* (with EDWIN J. VAN KLEY), University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1993, p. 301–597 (« The Printed Word »).

<sup>30</sup> See, for instance, the works discussed by CHARLES DIEHL, « Les études byzantines en France au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle », in his *Études Byzantines*, A. Picard et fils, Paris 1905, p. 21–37

<sup>31</sup> ID., « Les études d'histoire byzantine en 1905 » in his *Études Byzantines*, p. 38–106, at 39–40; PETER SCHREINER, « Filologia Bizantina », in MARCO BUONCORE, AMBROGIO M. PIAZZONI (eds.), *La Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, luogo di ricerca al servizio degli studi: Atti del convegno, Roma, 11–13 novembre 2010*, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 2011 (Studi e testi, 468), p. 49–67, at 50; JOHN W. BARKER (ed.), *Pioneers of Byzantine Studies in America = Byzantinische Forschungen 27*, Adolf M. Hakkert, Amsterdam 2002, p. XI.

<sup>32</sup> On the progress of Byzantine studies from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, I found insightful and informative: PETER CHARANIS, « Some Observations on the Evolution of Byzantine

To sum up, since the Middle Ages did not end with the Byzantine Empire in 1453, Byzantium as an historiographical construct became inextricably bound with the fate of the Middle Ages in the West. Hence, Byzantium as a recognized distinct area of study did not emerge until the Middle Ages themselves ended in the seventeenth century and educated European society divided the past neatly into ancient, middle, and modern. But even if Byzantine studies, qua Byzantine, can date their origin from the seventeenth century forward, their distinctiveness from other fields of studies often remained fuzzy. For instance, Johann Fabricius's great *Bibliotheca Graeca*, the last volume of which appeared in 1736, treated Byzantine literature as an extension of classical Greek literature.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, one of the greatest of the seventeenth-century Byzantinists, the aforementioned Leone Allacci, approached Byzantium not as a subject in itself but as a part of the history of Greek Christianity from the Church Fathers to the religious debates of the seventeenth century. One needs to appreciate the significance of the intense competition between Protestants and Catholics over the Orthodox Church for the historical outlook of Europeans well into the seventeenth century. So, in some important respects the medieval world did not end until the end of the seventeenth century. Not completely facetiously therefore have I suggested that Prince Eugene of Savoy and his victory at the Battle of Zenta in 1697 should be commemorated in the historiography of Byzantine studies. The geopolitical revolution in Eastern Europe at the end of the seventeenth century changed how the West viewed not only the Ottomans but also the medieval Greeks.<sup>34</sup> Edward Gibbon was not the creator, but the most effective popularizer of the subsequent scorn for Byzantium in the Enlightenment, so much so that it was rather late in

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Studies since the 1930s », in CYRIL MANGO, OMEJAN PRITSAK, ULIANA M. PASICZNYK (eds), *Okeanos: Essays Presented to Ihor Ševčenko on His Sixtieth Birthday by His Colleagues and Students = Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 7 (1983), p. 95–99; FIONA K. HAARER, « Writing Histories of Byzantium: the Historiography of Byzantine History », in LIZ JAMES (ed.), *A Companion to Byzantium*, Wiley–Blackwell, Oxford 2010, p. 9–21.

<sup>33</sup> *Bibliotheca Graeca: sive notitia scriptorum veterum graecorum quorumcunque monumenta integra, aut fragmenta edita exstant, tum plerorumque è MSS. ac deperditis*, 14 vols, sumptu Christiani Liebezeit, typis Stromerianis–sumtu [sic] viduae Felgineriae, Hamburgi 1708–1728. Starting with vol. 10, Fabricius dealt, as his subtitle put it, « maxime vero de scriptoribus mediae et infimae Graeciae ».

<sup>34</sup> And this is not to speak of its eventual effect in the Balkans because it would in time allow states freed of Ottoman domination to study their national histories and Byzantine background. In this regard, see three articles in PAUL STEPHENSON (ed.), *The Byzantine World*, Routledge, London 2010: DESPINA CHRISTODOULOU, « Byzantium in Nineteenth-Century Greek Historiography », p. 445–461; PAUL STEPHENSON, « Pioneers of Popular Byzantine History: Freeman, Gregorovius, Schlumberger », p. 462–480; and SRDAN PIRIVATRIĆ, « A Case Study in the Emergence of Byzantine Studies: Serbia in the Nineteenth Centuries », p. 481–490.

the nineteenth century that the modern enthusiasm for all things medieval eventually brought in its wake the establishment of professionally institutionalized Byzantine studies.



CROSSING LINES  
BETWEEN THE MEDITERRANEAN,  
THE *ECCLESIA SPECULARIS*, AND THE SELF  
NOTES ON A RECENT BOOK ON  
OPICINO DE CANISTRIS\*

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Me voici, l'Europe, qui confesse mes délits, non pas aux oreilles mais aux yeux de tous les présents, selon les propriétés des membres à mon service. Mon bras de Provence, que l'Afrique m'a enlevé quand les barbares ont envahi la Provence, se réjouit pour rien de la paix sur terre; mon bras d'Allemagne souffre de l'absence d'empire temporel; mon pied de Calabre a l'espoir absurde de traverser la mer pour obtenir la victoire en Terre Sainte; mon pied de Béotie a la vaine crainte de devoir se défendre d'une servitude misérable. Le Seigneur, par sa miséricorde, en me ramenant à la lumière, a transpercé mes chairs de clous par sa crainte, comme vous pouvez le voir clairement. [...] Désormais toutes mes affections sont transformées de vices en vertus. Je me réjouis de la joie spirituelle de mon prochain, je m'afflige de la méchanceté des pervers, j'espère la conversion du plus grand nombre et je crains les périls de ceux qui vont chuter, et cela envers mon prochain. Quant à moi, je me réjouis de l'adversité, je m'afflige de la prospérité temporelle, j'espère être sauvé par la miséricorde divine et je crains les jugements secrets de Dieu. Derrière mon pied gauche, dans mon dos, coule le grand fleuve Danube, de 'Dan' qui veut dire jugement, et 'dubium', comme tous les jugements dont je doute.<sup>1</sup>

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\* SYLVAIN PIRON, *Dialectique du monstre. Enquête sur Opicino de Canistris*, Éditions Zones Sensibles, Bruxelles 2015. These notes benefited from a meeting with the author at the Philosophical Review Club (University of Leuven, 23 November 2016).

<sup>1</sup> OPICINO DE CANISTRIS, « De la disposition spirituelle de l'Europe comparée à celle de l'homme », trans. in PIRON, *Dialectique du monstre*, p. 125–126. For the original Latin, see MURIEL LAHARIE (ed.), *Le journal singulier d'Opicinus de Canistris (1337-vers 1341): Vaticanus latinus 6435*, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 2008, vol. II (Studi e testi, 448), p. 460–462.

The Pavian priest Opicino de Canistris (1296–c. 1353) wrote these lines in his daybook on 13 September 1337, putting into words a glimpse of his most personal version of the microcosm/macrocosm topos which he had been illustrating for three years in a series of complex and mesmerizing drawings. In these words, hereabove reported in the French translation provided by Sylvain Piron in his *Dialectique du monstre*, one can indeed find the breadth of the visionary cosmography which Opicino displayed in his graphic creations, in which the body of the œcumene is represented as intersected with the body of the human creature – with its passions, guilts, doubts, anguishes, and hopes –, with the body of Christ, and with that of His Church.

Brought back to light beginning in the 1920s after centuries of neglect, the textual and graphic works of Opicino have since fascinated many art historians, historians of ideas, and psychiatrists, who have tried in their differing ways to describe it, understand its meaning, and explain the causes of its singularity.<sup>2</sup> Born in Lomello, near Pavia, into a family of merchants and notaries involved in the Guelf party during the factional strife afflicting Lombardy, Opicino spent the first part of his troubled life moving between his homeland and other cities of northern Italy, resorting to different jobs to help support his family. Initiated early into an ecclesiastic career, he studied the liberal arts, theology, canon law, and was trained as manuscript illuminator; he probably learnt how to copy maps in Genoa, where he lived in exile for a short period after Stefano Visconti had taken Pavia. After his ordination, Opicino became rector of the Pavian parish of Santa Maria Capella, which he left in 1328. Settled in Avignon, at that time site of the Holy See, he gained, after a period spent in poverty, the favor of Pope John XXII, and became *scriptor* at the Apostolic Penitentiary. He probably remained in Avignon until his death, afflicted by inner turmoil, in a long-lasting exile.

The composition of those pieces of work by which he caught the attention of twentieth-century scholars followed a distressing episode in his life. During the

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<sup>2</sup> For a richer account of literature on Opicino and his intellectual context to supplement the list of titles I will mention in this review-article, I refer to Piron's book; see also the bibliography provided in LAHARIE (ed.), *Le journal singulier*, p. LXIII–LXXXVI. Among the scholarship published at the same time or right after Piron's monograph, one should mention MARIA TERESA FUMAGALLI BEONIO-BROCCHIERI, ROBERTO LIMONTA, *Volando sul mondo. Opicino de Canistris (1296-1352)*, Archinto, Milano 2016; as well as SYLVAIN PIRON, « Les exils d'Opicino de Canistris », in ELISA BRILLI, LAURA FENELLI, GERHARD WOLF (eds.), *Images and Words in Exile. Avignon and Italy during the First Half of the 14th Century (1310-1352)*, SISMEI, Firenze 2015 (Millennio medievale, 107; Strumenti e studi, n.s., 40), p. 193–207; and ID., « L'Europe d'Opicino », in JOËL BLANCHARD, RENATE BLUMENFELD-KOSINSKI (eds.), *Philippe de Mézières et l'Europe médiévale: nouvelle histoire, nouveaux espaces, nouveaux langages*, Droz, Geneva 2017 (Cahiers d'humanisme et Renaissance, 140), p. 191–202. Sarah Griffin (University of Oxford) has recently completed a Ph.D. dissertation on the calendrical components in Opicino's work in relation to contemporary calendars and the understanding of time and temporality in the Middle-Ages (« Diagram and Dimension: The Visualisation of Time in the Drawings of Opicinus de Canistris [1296–c. 1352] »).

Holy week of 1334, Opicino was hit by a sudden *infirmetas* which brought him to a state of half-death, leaving him mute, partially paralyzed in the right arm, deprived of his *memoria litteralis*, but strengthened in his *scientia spiritualis*. After this event, which has been read by many as a mental breakdown accompanied by hallucinatory visions, he started drawing complex diagrams – often including maps or geographical references – interwoven with texts and inhabited by geometrical, human, animal, angelic and diabolic figures. Particularly impressive are his anthropomorphic portolan charts – or « body-worlds », according to the fitting expression employed by Karl Whittington in his recent monograph.<sup>3</sup> Herein, the sea-lines of Europe, North Africa and Asia Minor transform into profiles of male or female figures in dialogue with one another, while the waters of the Mediterranean and of the Atlantic Ocean take the shape of monstrous or disturbing characters. What remains of the outcome of this creative activity is preserved at the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana: a collection of 27 sheets of large format parchment, mostly containing diagrams and drawings on both the recto and the verso (MS Palatinus latinus 1993, henceforth P);<sup>4</sup> a codex in paper of 87 folios of texts and pictures (MS Vaticanus latinus 6435, henceforth V);<sup>5</sup> and a fragment of parchment contained in the codex Barberinianus Latinus 2999.<sup>6</sup> Of the many writings in prose and poetry that Opicino reported to have composed before his illness in 1334, only two works are known to have survived. The first is a description of the city of Pavia, entitled *Liber de laudibus civitatis Ticinensis*, which was long ascribed to an ‘Anonymus Ticiniensis’.<sup>7</sup> The second, the *De preeminentia spiritualis imperii*, is a treatise on the relationship between the papal and imperial power, composed in support of John XXII during his conflict with Ludwig of Bavaria.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> KARL WHITTINGTON, *Body-Worlds. Opicinus de Canistris and the Medieval Cartographic Imagination*, PIMS, Toronto 2014 (PIMS Studies and Texts, 186; Text Image Context: Studies in Medieval Manuscript Illumination, 1).

<sup>4</sup> Partially edited in RICHARD G. SALOMON, *Opicinus de Canistris. Weltbild und Bekenntnisse eines Avignonnesischen Klerikers des 14. Jahrhunderts*, The Warburg Institute, London 1936 (Studies of the Warburg Institute, 1); the plates are available at <[http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/bav\\_pal\\_lat\\_1993](http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/bav_pal_lat_1993)>.

<sup>5</sup> Edited and translated in French by LAHARIE (*Le journal singulier*, see fn. 1). The manuscript is available at <[http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS\\_Vat.lat.6435](http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.lat.6435)>.

<sup>6</sup> SIMONETTA NICCOLINI, MICHELE FEO, « Una scoperta di Augusto Campana: il frammento inedito di Opizzino de Canistris », in CINO PEDRELLI (ed.), *Omaggio ad Augusto Campana*, Società di studi Romagnoli, Cesena 2003 (Saggi e repertori, 31), p. 205–348.

<sup>7</sup> OPICINUS DE CANISTRIS [ANONYMUS TICINENSIS]. *Liber de laudibus civitatis Ticinensis*, ed. RODOLFO MAIOCCHI, FERRUCCIO QUINTAVALLE, Lapi, Città di Castello 1903 (Rerum italicarum scriptores, 11).

<sup>8</sup> Partially edited in RICHARD SCHOLZ, *Unbekannte Kirchenpolitische Streitschriften aus der Zeit Ludwig des Bayern (1327-1354)*, Loescher, Rom 1911–1914, (Bibliothek des Kgl. Preußischen Historischen Instituts in Rom, 9–10), vol. I, p. 37–43, and vol. II, p. 89–104.

From the first rediscovery of Opicino's œuvre – thanks to the interest of the Vatican librarians and the circle of scholars gathered around Aby Warburg – until the present day, one line of scholarship has tended to follow a biographical approach to the study of this material, taking an interest more in what the work could say about the man and his mind, rather than its intrinsic value and its possible connection with the imagery and theological debates of that time. More specifically, many have considered Opicino's drawings as the symptom of a psychiatric disorder, suitable for use as a case study for the history of the relationship between art and madness. The pivotal reference in this regard is a 1952 study by Ernst Kris, who defined Opicino as a « a psychotic artist of the Middle Ages » and diagnosed him with schizophrenia.<sup>9</sup> This line of research – which Carl Gustav Jung had encouraged during his Eranos seminar in 1943 –<sup>10</sup> has been developed since the 1990s by Muriel Laharie and Guy Roux, who identified Opicino's condition as a form of fantastic paraphrenia or « délire chronique fantastique », finding in his texts and drawings signs of megalomaniac delirium together with attempts at dissimulation.<sup>11</sup>

On the other hand, a number of scholars rejected or payed only minor attention to the possible diagnosis of mental illness, trying instead to understand Opicino's work in relation to the fourteenth-century visual, spiritual and intellectual culture. A particularly harsh reaction against a purely clinical reading, considered unproductive as much as dishonest, is that of Michele Feo.<sup>12</sup> One could mention also the studies of Eugenio Randi<sup>13</sup> and, more recently, of

<sup>9</sup> ERNST KRIS, *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art*, International Universities Press, New York 1952, p. 118–127.

<sup>10</sup> RICCARDO BERNARDINI, GIAN PIERO QUAGLINO, AUGUSTO ROMANO (eds.), « Opicinus de Canistris: Concluding Lecture by C. G. Jung, Eranos, Ascona, 1943. Notes Taken [Probably] by Rivkah Schärf Kluger », *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 58/2 (2013), p. 163–183, here p. 175: « Unfortunately, [Richard Salomon] had too little psychological and psychopathological knowledge. It would surely have given this investigation a great advantage if these pictures had been looked at through the eyes of a modern psychologist ». See also EAD., « Further Studies on Jung's Eranos Seminar on Opicinus de Canistris », *The Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 58/2 (2013), p. 184–199.

<sup>11</sup> Among the many studies published by the authors, together or individually, one should at the very least mention GUY ROUX, MURIEL LAHARIE, *Art et Folie au Moyen Âge. Aventures et Énigmes d'Opicinus de Canistris (1296–1351?)*, Le Léopard d'Or, Paris 1997.

<sup>12</sup> MICHELE FEO, « La vita come vaso. L'autobiografia figurale di Opizzino de Canistris », in FRANCESCO BRUNI (ed.), *In quella parte del libro de la mia memoria. Verità e finzioni dell'io autobiografico*, Marsilio, Venezia 2003 (Saggi Marsilio. Presente storico, 26), p. 69–101, esp. in §2 « L'impostura dell'artista pazzo », in which Kris's work is defined as « uno sciagurato capolavoro di ciarlataneria scientifica esposta con le migliori arti del lenocinio verbale ».

<sup>13</sup> EUGENIO RANDI, « La vergine e il papa: *potentia absoluta* e *plenitudo potestatis* papale nel XIV secolo », *History of Political Thought*, 5 (1984), p. 425–445, esp. 437; ID., « La tartaruga e il Leviatano », *Leggere*, 2/11 (May 1989), p. 54–63.

Agostino Paravicini Bagliani,<sup>14</sup> in which considerations of Opicino's (in)sanity are very limited, focusing rather on his place within the contemporary politico-ecclesiological discussions and iconography. In Anglophone scholarship, this historical perspective has been pursued by Victoria Morse<sup>15</sup> and Catherine Harding,<sup>16</sup> who both dismissed the hypothesis of the mad artist, understanding the shift following the episode of 1334, respectively, as a conversion to a higher degree of religiosity, or as a case to be studied in comparison with the experiences of the great visionaries of Christian mysticism.<sup>17</sup> Among the most recent and relevant contributions, the above-mentioned work by Whittington explicitly follows the way paved by Morse and Harding. Putting aside the *vexata quaestio* of Opicino's mental disease, Whittington instead provides a formal analysis of the anthropomorphic maps: he analyses those cartographic models which Opicino might have referred to, and studies the graphic techniques and modalities of composition which Opicino devised in order to pursue his 'experimentations'. From this perspective, these diagrams are indeed seen as intentional and progressively improving attempts to give visible form to (and understand the meaning of) the « images of the earth and the sea » that inhabited his vision.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup> AGOSTINO PARAVICINI BAGLIANI, « Opicinus de Canistris et la symbolique pontificale », in JEAN MARIE MARTIN, BERNADETTE MARTIN-HISARD, AGOSTINO PARAVICINI BAGLIANI (eds.), *Vaticana et medievalia. Études offertes à Louis Duval-Arnould*, SISMEL, Firenze 2008 (Millennio medievale, 71; Strumenti e studi, n.s., 16), p. 427–435, repr. in Id., *Il potere del papa. Corporeità, autorappresentazione, simboli*, SISMEL, Firenze 2009 (Millennio medievale, 78; Strumenti e studi, n.s., 21), p. 227–236.

<sup>15</sup> VICTORIA MORSE, *A Complex Terrain: Church, Society, and the Individual in the Works of Opicino de Canistris (1296-ca. 1354)*, Ph.D. Diss. University of California, 1996. See also EAD., « The Vita mediocris: The Secular Priesthood in the Thought of Opicino de Canistris », in COSIMO DAMIANO FONSECA (ed.), *Preti nel medioevo*, Cierre, Verona 1997 (Quaderni di storia religiosa, 4), p. 257–282; EAD., « Seeing and believing. The problem of idolatry in the thought of Opicino de Canistris », in SUSANNA ELM, ÉRIC REBILLARD, ANTONELLA ROMANO (eds.), *Orthodoxie, Christianisme, Histoire*, École française de Rome, Rome 2000 (Collection de l'École française de Rome, 270), p. 163–176; EAD., « The Role of Maps in Later Medieval Society: Twelfth to Fourteenth Century », *The History of Cartography*, 2 (2007), p. 23–52.

<sup>16</sup> CATHERINE HARDING, « Opening to God: the Cosmographical Diagrams of Opicinus de Canistris », *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte*, 61/1 (1998), p. 18–39; EAD., « Madness, Reason, Vision and the Cosmos: Evaluating the Drawings of Opicinus de Canistris (1296–c. 1351) », in GABRIELE NEHER, RUPERT SHEPHERD (eds.), *Revaluing Renaissance Art*, Ashgate, Aldershot 2000, p. 201–210.

<sup>17</sup> A comparison between Opicino's visionary cosmography and the visions of Hildegard of Bingen has been recently proposed by MARIA TERESA FUMAGALLI BEONIO-BROCCHIERI, « Il mondo di Opicino », in FUMAGALLI BEONIO-BROCCHIERI, LIMONTA, *Volando sul mondo*, p. 46.

<sup>18</sup> WHITTINGTON, *Body-Worlds*. See also Id., « Experimenting with Opicinus de Canistris (1296–c. 1354) », *Gesta*, 51 (2012), p. 147–174. For the entire passage on Opicino's opening of his inner eyes to the *ymagines terre et maris*, see PIRON, *Dialectique du monstre*, p. 75–76 (Latin in LAHARIE [ed.], *Le journal singulier*, vol. II, p. 522–524).

Published in 2015 by Zone Sensibles, Sylvain Piron's *Dialectique du monstre* is a new chapter of this *enquête* – as the subtitle says – on Opicino and his world. It is the outcome of a fruitful collaboration with the editor Alexandre Laumonier, graphic designer and anthropologist, who in the final acknowledgments is defined « au sens les plus fort, le co-auteur » of the book (p. 202). Throughout the volume, Piron's study is intertwined with color illustrations of Opicino's diagrams (several on fold-out inserts, plus one additional plate of 60 × 40 cm used as book jacket), schemas explaining their basic structure, marginal notes (which become more and more dense towards the end of the book), and *excerpta* from Opicino's writings in French translation, usually placed at the end of each chapter and often announcing the theme of the one that follows.<sup>19</sup> The result is a rich but compact volume, which can be read and handled as a paperback novel without compromising the quality of the images.

Piron's inquiry cannot but start with an evaluation of the previous scholarship and with a methodological premise. In Chapter 1 (« Travaux d'approche ») the author reconstructs the historiographical tendencies of the last century, distancing himself from the research method followed by Laharie and Roux. Firstly, he questions the suitability of applying modern nosographic classifications to a fourteenth-century man, since psychoses are « maladies culturelles » and cannot be identified outside their particular historical context (p. 27). Secondly, he contests the validity, in historical research, of a hermeneutical approach which attributes to an author, with no hard evidence, attempts at dissimulation or bad faith, and overinterprets his works in the light of that undemonstrated presupposition. A historian should instead approach the object of his research applying, *prima facie*, a sort of willing suspension of disbelief: he should look at the documents with « bienveillance », taking them seriously, reading them for what they are and what they say, or would want to say, and this, on the basis of correct editions and translations.<sup>20</sup> In our specific case, a 'benevolent' reading of Opicino would involve looking at the Vaticanus and Palatinus codices under the assumption that they sincerely express the intention of their author, are somewhat in continuity with his earlier treatises, and give voice to Opicino's efforts at elaborating a (more or less) coherent

<sup>19</sup> More specifically, one can find reproductions of P, fol. 3v, 4r, 4v, 16r, 17r, 17v, 11r, 11v, 13r, 15v, 18v, 20r, 22v, 23r, 24r, and 27v; and V, fol. 52r, 52v, 53v, 61r, 61v, 78r, and 84v. Piron provides a first French translation of Opicino's autobiography (P, fol. 11v), and a new translation of the following passages from his journal: *Comment cette œuvre a été composée; De la conservation du trésor cache jusqu'au temps voulu; Des nombreuses tentations par lesquelles je suis passé, et le perplexités qu'elles m'ont causées; Comparaison du corps personnel au corps de l'Europe; De la disposition spirituelle de l'Europe comparée à celle de l'homme; Les propriétés du cœur de la mer, de la poitrine et du ventre de l'Europe; Du savoir naturel.*

<sup>20</sup> Piron remarks the presence of some inaccuracies in Laharie's translation of the journal (p. 24); see also his review in *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 3 (2010), p. 400–403.

theological and spiritual discourse, which was in conversation with the cultural and historical context of his time. To a certain extent, Piron therefore endorses the project of the first Opicino scholar, Richard Salomon, who, starting from the principle that « le tâche de l'historien [...] n'est pas de formuler des jugements mais d'exposer et de comprendre des documents », expressed the (unachieved) wish of analyzing Opicino's works not only as a « produit pathologique » but as a « symptôme des mutations spirituelles du XIV siècle » (p. 22). Indeed, in order to understand Opicino's work, the issue of his personal suffering and psychological condition cannot be ignored; however, that issue cannot be addressed with anachronism nor constitute the starting point and the main benchmark of a historical research.<sup>21</sup>

In *Dialectique du monstre*, the attempt to define Opicino's suffering from a clinical point of view is delegated to the psychiatrist Philippe Nuss, who authored the postscript of the volume (« Esquisse de cartographie psychique des œuvres d'Opicino de Canistris », p. 175–180). Reserving all judgments on the specific nature of the « changement d'activité cérébrale » that might have occurred to Opicino in 1334, Nuss describes the priest as a man affected by anguish more than by psychosis, obsessed by the idea of sin and a victim of his inner struggle. Opicino's work is not the expression of a pathological deviance, the product of a disordered mind, but rather a therapeutic « travail de reconstruction, d'élaboration, d'élucidation » (p. 180) aimed at reconstituting a unity out of a fragmented reality: « une représentation du monde au sein duquel son débat intérieur, les dogmes de l'Église catholique et la topographie du monde ne font plus qu'un » (p. 178).

Approaching Opicino's works from a different perspective, Piron's own analysis comes to similar conclusions. He utilizes Aby Warburg's idea of *Dialektik des Monstrums* to describe Opicino's drawings as the battlefield on which he fought his own demons, as well as the place where one can see emerging the *Seelendrama* of a culture as a whole.<sup>22</sup> A second reference explicitly used by Piron is Gregory Bateson, and more specifically his concept of the double bind. According to this paradigm, Opicino's trouble is to find himself trapped between contradictory instances, these being identified as the intrinsic paradoxes of the

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<sup>21</sup> Similar remarks on the historical interest of Opicino's creations can be found, although with a different perspective (i.e. in the framework of a study of the individuality and personality during the Middle Ages) in AARON GOUREVITCH, « L'individualité au Moyen Âge. Le cas d'Opicinus de Canistris », *Annales: Économies, sociétés, civilisations*, 48/5 (1993), p. 1263–1280, e.g. p. 1268: « Opicinus mérite l'intérêt de l'historien, non parce que c'est un malade mental, mais parce qu'il incarne un phénomène de son époque », and p. 1278: « ce n'est pas la maladie psychique elle-même, mais son expression culturelle qui présente quelque intérêt pour l'historien ».

<sup>22</sup> The Warburghian perspective is further addressed in Chapter 7 (« Dialectique du Monstre »). For a study of this concept see, for instance, GEORGES DIDI-HUBERMAN, « *Dialektik des Monstrums*: Aby Warburg and the Symptom Paradigm », *Art History*, 24/5 (2001), p. 621–645.

Avignon papacy, of the Roman Church, and maybe of Christianity itself: his being a sinner while simultaneously a professional worker at the Penitentiary; the validity of the sacraments being based on the pure formal execution of the rite, independently from the moral worth of the minister who celebrates it; the relationship between spiritual and temporal power of the Church and secular rulers (and the consequent political situation in northern Italy at the time); the « conflit non résolu entre différents niveaux de normativité » (p. 109) within the ecclesiastical institution, which professes humility and poverty as virtues, but is rich, hierarchically structured, and governed by individuals driven by ambition. Opicino therefore superimposed different levels of reality on a single sheet of paper or parchment as a way for him to find a unitarian, although multifaceted, sense of his life, and to delineate penitential and salvific paths.

From this perspective, understanding the context is essential in order to correctly (although not fully) understand the personal sufferance of Opicino and his works; at the same time, however, his individual case becomes the gateway for a discourse on that very historical context and its contradictions. Moreover, it can serve as a privileged witness to how the spiritual, cultural, and political transformation of the time might have been perceived by simple priests or mid-level functionaries working out of the spotlight.<sup>23</sup>

The scope of Piron's book is to provide reading keys for approaching Opicino's œuvre, both as an artist and as a writer, understanding, first of all, its « conditions de production et de fonctionnement ». He tries to fulfill this aim, on the one hand, through a description of the material and formal aspects of the manuscripts, and, on the other hand, by taking into consideration Opicino's specific historical context and analyzing the contradictions he found in the Christian Church.

As for the material and formal aspects of his drawings, Piron notes how in Opicino's autographs one can find several similarities with the visual codes of his time: he made use, for example, of the techniques of contemporary cartography, of the fourteenth-century Italian style of drawing portraits, and of graphical norms linked to the notarial practices. What is unique is the way in which he used these tools and how he put them together in order to express his inner-world. As for his writings, « son originalité est d'avoir pratiqué, à une échelle inhabituelle à cette date, l'écriture de soi », which goes beyond the medieval genre of confessions, since it lacks the public dimension, instead carrying on « le projet d'une écriture rigoureusement intime, vouée à l'analyse de soi-même » (p. 14).

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<sup>23</sup> In this regards, Roberto Limonta recognize the value of the case-Opicino as a perfect subject for a microhistorical study, comparable to Carlo Ginzburg's Menocchio (« Il cartografo di Dio », in FUMAGALLI BEONIO-BROCCIERI, LIMONTA, *Volando sul mondo*, p. 67 and 92, fn. 10).

The most explicit example of this « écriture de soi » is his autobiography (P, fol. 11v), of which Piron provides a French translation at the end of Chapter 1 (p. 37–47), and an analysis in Chapter 2 (« Dans le labyrinthe »).<sup>24</sup> This consists of a diagram containing concentric circles representing the inner sections of a vase or basket, and therefore referring to the very meaning of Opicino's surname. Opicino annotated each ring of this basket, divided according to months and days, with the events defining his years of life, giving form to a graphic confession of his sins, a « histoire de mes sacrements » (p. 51), or « un documento d'anima », as defined by Faustino Gianani.<sup>25</sup> Piron uses the autobiography, together with the *De pre eminentia spiritualis imperii* and the *Liber de laudibus civitatis Ticiniensis*, as a basis for reconstructing Opicino's biography and historical framework. These texts are indeed read in the light of the political conflict between Guelf and Ghibellines in northern Italy, the conflict between the Pope and Pavia (put under interdict since 1316), the institutional environment of the Avignon Papacy (« un Eldorado de bénéfiques ecclésiastiques pour intellectuels ambitieux » [p. 64]), as well as the intellectual background of the disputes over the poverty of Christ and over the relationship between papal and imperial power, which pitted the Papal curia against the Franciscan refugees at the court of Ludwig of Bavaria. Addressing Opicino's radical hierocratic position in the *De pre eminentia*, Piron shows the presence of themes and references used by Marsilius of Padua amongst the arguments rejected by the priest, which might signal the circulation of Marsilian-inspired texts in Pavia among the Ghibelline allies of Ludwig of Bavaria. To date, there exists no critical edition of the *De pre eminentia*, which is only partially edited by Scholz and rather understudied.<sup>26</sup> Piron's book has the merit, among other things, of making recurring use of this text in his analysis.

Chapter 3 (« La confession infinie ») presents the formal features of the « écriture de soi » that Opicino displays in V and P. In this regard, the author focuses on their material aspect and tries to reconstruct their modalities of composition, recalling the principles of the *nouvelle école* of Latin paleography promoted by Jean Mallon and later by Armando Petrucci (« une histoire des

<sup>24</sup> An Italian translation of the autobiography has been made available in FUMAGALLI BEONIO-BROCCHIERI, LIMONTA, *Volando sul mondo*, p. 13–25.

<sup>25</sup> OPICINUS DE CANISTRIS. *L'Anonimo Ticinese (Cod. Vaticano Palatino latino 1993)*, ed. FAUSTINO GIANANI, Fusi, Pavia 1927 (repr. 1996), p. 19.

<sup>26</sup> For the edition, see *infra*, fn. 8. Among the scarce literature discussing this work, one should mention MICHAEL WILKS, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: the Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1963 (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, n.s., 9), *passim*; RANDI, « La vergine e il papa », p. 437; and THOMAS TURLEY, « The Impact of Marsilius: Papalist Responses to the Defensor Pacis », in GERSON MOREÑO-RIANO (ed.), *The World of Marsilius of Padua*, Brepols, Turnhout 2006 (Disputatio, 5), p. 59–60.

pratiques de l'écrit » [p. 79]). In *V*, a journal (or « manuscrit d'auteur » [p. 79]) in which Opicino gathers his theological thoughts, Piron observes the differing predominance of text over images (and vice versa) throughout the codex, and he notices the emergence of an ordered system of paratexts, recalling the notarial indexing techniques with which Opicino might have become familiarized while working at the Penitentiary. The first approach to the study of the illustrations gathered in *P* is instead that of providing a formal categorization of the diagrams according to their basic structure, together with an attempt to establish the chronological sequence of their composition.

In Chapter 4 (« Combat contre soi-même »), Piron describes how Opicino's works can be read as both a witness (*testimonium*) and a trial (*iudicium*) against himself. It may also be read as the site of a threefold fight which he describes in a page of his journal in 1337: a fight against himself and his attachment to the world; against the temptation to judge others; and against the pride resulting from having defeated the first two. In this chapter, Piron addresses the feeling of intimate dissociation expressed by Opicino between his *homo exterior* and *interior*, his being a priest and his being a Christian, especially with regard to anxieties connected to the nature and functioning of the sacraments, which could cause a paralyzing « panique sacramentelle ». If the validity of the sacraments does not depend on the morality of the minister, but rather on the efficacy of his gestures and words – his « parole efficace », using the title of a study by Rosier-Catach<sup>27</sup>, then any formal mistake in the execution of the rite has tragic consequences for the soul of the one who receives it.

Chapter 5 (« Les mondes superposés ») deals directly with Opicino's cartography and the logic and analogies that can be found underlying his way of projecting different spatial realities one above the other, according to a « rêverie géographique qui donne un accès imaginaire au monde en ouvrant les territoires décrits à toutes les trajectoires et projections possibles », a « rêverie méthodique et fondée sur des plans rigoureusement tracés » (p. 128). Particularly interesting here is the analysis of *P*, fol. 4v, in which Opicino represented the basin of the river Po as superimposed on a portolan chart of Europe (« Le salut de la Lombardie », p. 133–134, fig. 16), and of *V*, fol. 84v, where the plan of Pavia is projected over the *œcumene* (p. 135–137, fig. 17).

Finally Chapter 6 (« Dans un miroir ») is dedicated to Opicino's ecclesiological imagery. After analyzing how he introduced into his diagrams representations of concepts such as militant/triumphant Church, « dignité générale des pères qui ne mourra jamais »/« dignité personnelle, transmise par succession canonique », and *Ecclesia corticalis/spiritualis* or *specularis*, (p. 151–160), Piron suggests an interesting link between Opicino's works and the debate on beatific vision which

<sup>27</sup> IRENE ROSIER-CATACH, *La parole efficace. Signe, rituel, sacré*, Seuil, Paris 2008.

distressed the Avignon papacy in the early 1330s.<sup>28</sup> The controversy was triggered by a series of sermons delivered by Pope John XXII, in which the Pope suggested that the souls of the blessed would not see the divine essence face-to-face immediately after death, but that they would simply rest in the contemplation of the humanity of Christ, waiting to be rejoined to their body at the Final Judgment, when they could contemplate his divinity. As a member of the Penitentiary, Opicino was possibly asked to copy the papal sermons to enable their circulation. After three years of discussion, on his death-bed, John XXII revoked his position, and his successor, Benedict XII, dogmatically stated that the souls of the blessed can have, immediately after their death, an intuitive and face-to-face vision of the divine essence, asking that any further debate on this matter be suspended. According to Piron, « Opicino transforme cette mesure disciplinaire en un principe épistémologique », renouncing any investigation (or representation) of the after-life while *in via*, as a vain and impossible task:

Si je cherchais à rendre raison de la patrie éternelle, ce serait le signe que je cherche la gloire du paradis en ce monde [...]. Seule doit être proclamée la présente Église miroir, et pas une autre, reflétée en énigme dans les raisons visibles (p. 162).

The *Ecclesia* is conceived by Opicino as a mirror which reflects the divine, and the only accessible vision of God in this life is, *per speculum et in aenigmate*, through the contemplation of his Church. Opicino's mysticism is therefore « une mystique de l'Église, qui atteint une connaissance supérieure par la pure contemplation de l'institution » (p. 162). And it is probably in this ecclesiological imagery – in which the body of the *Ecclesia specularis* intersects with the body of the Mediterranean basin, of his hometown Pavia, of the individual himself – that Opicino tries to find that unity necessary to overcome the contradictions which afflicted his soul:

la cartographie stratifiée d'Opicino lui fournit comme un escabeau spirituel. En lui permettant de superposer et d'intégrer dans un schéma unique des plans de représentation hétérogènes, cette technique graphique se révèle comme un moyen particulièrement efficace d'élévation du monde visible vers l'invisible (p. 164).

*Dialectique du monstre* is a work that has much to say to both specialists of Opicino and those who approach this figure for the first time. It is not the definitive

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<sup>28</sup> Among the classical studies on the debate, one can mention at least MARC DYKMANS, *Les sermons de Jean XXII sur la vision béatifique*, Presse de l'Université Grégorienne, Rome 1973 (Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae, 34); and CHRISTIAN TROTTMANN, *La vision béatifique. Des disputes scolastiques à sa définition par Benoît XII*, École Française de Rome, Rome 1995 (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 289).

monograph on Opicino, nor does it claim to be so. It does not have the pretension of giving an exhaustive description and interpretation of his texts and drawings – these are indeed marked by a certain opacity that probably could never be fully overcome. It rather indicates gateways to approach the study of this author, of his world, and of his reception by his twentieth-century readers. It is a piece of work grounded on a conscious meditation on the purpose and modality of historical research which gives rise to a respectful dialogue between past and present, where scientific rigor coexists with the acknowledgment of the fascination and echoes that Opicino's works can raise in the eyes of a post-modern reader.

One of the strengths of this volume is that it presents a fair balance between these elements, constituting a meeting point of different voices. The first, of course, is that of Opicino, as an artist and as a writer, made directly available thanks to the illustrations and the long translations. In counterpoint, one can find the voices of the Warburg scholars; of Antonin Artaud and his *Cahiers de Rodez*; and, above all, the first-hand voice of the author, who, besides putting on paper the results of his study and providing methodological insights concerning the rules of historical research, catches himself in the act of pursuing his enquiry, describing the moment when, flying over northern Italy and looking out the window, he recognized the course of the Ticino river and the lands of Pavia that Opicino portrayed in his drawings (p. 148). The last voice – or, at least, potential voice – is that of the reader, who, carrying on Piron's *enquête*, might let his gaze linger on the extraordinary imagery created by the Pavian priest that is displayed in the volume, and find in it new evidences that might reveal different sides of this story.

# REVIEWS



CARLA CASAGRANDE, GIANFRANCO FIORAVANTI (EDS.), *LA FILOSOFIA IN ITALIA AL TEMPO DI DANTE*, CASA EDITRICE IL MULINO, BOLOGNA 2016, (LE VIE DELLA CIVILTÀ), XXI + 291 PP., ISBN 97888256166

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Scrivere di un libro è spesso piacevole, altre volte non è un bell'esercizio; ma fare la *recensio* di un libro quando si conoscano i curatori e molti degli autori dei contributi da parecchio tempo è una situazione che carica la faccenda di tutt'altra dimensione. Perché chi leggesse queste note potrebbe pensare che il recensore sia troppo coinvolto per essere nella condizione di esprimere un giudizio senza condizionamenti. Si dà però anche il caso che non pochi anni di *conversatio* con i vari autori possano comunque portare a una valutazione *sine ira et studio*. E questo può accadere soprattutto quando i singoli contributori siano stati cooptati per la loro competenza, in quanto specialisti dell'argomento loro assegnato; condizione questa che non è affatto frequente rilevare nelle scelte degli autori dei contributi nella ormai incessante proliferazione dei *Companion to XY*. Del resto, il cultore di faccende della non molto nota tradizione filosofica medievale 'universitaria' della penisola italiana e del suo contesto istituzionale aveva incontrato in una raccolta di saggi pubblicata ormai un quarto di secolo fa buona parte degli studiosi che ritrova in quest'altro volume.<sup>1</sup> Quella raccolta costituiva il primo tentativo di una indagine in qualche misura sistematica della produzione dei titolari dei corsi filosofici a Bologna, ed è partendo dal quadro ricostruito allora che Carla Casagrande e Gianfranco Fioravanti hanno progettato di offrire uno spaccato del contesto istituzionale e dottrinale dello studio della 'filosofia' a Bologna. Il contesto delle istituzioni universitarie bolognesi è ora più che delineato dopo la pubblicazione degli atti del convegno sulla Facoltà di teologia istituita

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<sup>1</sup> DINO BUZZETTI, MAURIZIO FERRIANI, ANDREA TABARRONI (eds.), *L'insegnamento della logica a Bologna nel XIV secolo*, presso l'Istituto per la storia dell'Università, Bologna 1992 (Studi e memorie per la Storia dell'Università di Bologna, n.s., 8). Fra i promotori del seminario di studi ebbe un ruolo particolare Alfonso Maierù, del quale sono noti gli studi e le indagini sulle istituzioni scolastiche della penisola, e non solo di questa. Simbolicamente, la raccolta dei contributi fu dedicata « Alla memoria di Sofia Vanni Rovighi », che aveva dedicato lavori a Taddeo da Parma e all'averroismo dei maestri bolognesi. Non occorre menzionare che anche Martin Grabmann e Anneliese Maier si erano occupati delle dottrine degli averroisti bolognesi, poi indagati a fondo da Zdzisław Kuksewicz.

all'Università di Bologna nel 1360, curati da Roberto Lambertini, uno degli autori della raccolta che stiamo illustrando.<sup>2</sup>

Raggrupperei le mie impressioni di lettore interessato in due momenti. Dopo aver toccato la questione del punto di vista storiografico, intenderei dare uno sguardo alle sezioni e ai capitoli di questa storia della filosofia, accennando qua e là ad annotazioni di lettura e ad alcune considerazioni di merito.

Quanto all'impianto storiografico, occorre rilevare che già nel titolo, e poi subito nella prefazione, i curatori bloccano sul nascere la prevedibile reazione del lettore che tende ad andare immediatamente con il pensiero alle tentate storie di un pensiero 'regionalizzato' o caratterizzato per aree geografiche. Avvisano, infatti, che non hanno inteso ricostruire una storia della filosofia 'italiana', bensì le vicende e l'insegnamento di alcuni professori di filosofia in un'area delimitata e in un momento circoscritto, e – soprattutto – in riferimento a Dante, al cui emergerà come protagonista principe della storia letteraria e anche civile di quel periodo storico. Eugenio Garin non aveva potuto evitare di connotare come 'italiana' la sua storia della filosofia e giustificava l'uso di quell'aggettivo nell'ampia introduzione con una serrata disamina storiografica, non nel quadro europeo, ma all'interno della problematica sviluppatasi in Italia a partire dal Risorgimento.<sup>3</sup> E a questo proposito vien da pensare al punto di vista, alla proposta formulata da Carlo Dionisotti in un saggio dell'inizio degli anni '50 e ripresa nella raccolta *Geografia e storia della letteratura italiana*;<sup>4</sup> e a ben vedere l'analogia potrebbe avere un fondamento anche per la filosofia 'italiana' se la si considera nel suo fiorire nelle vicende dei centri di studio prima dei comuni, e poi delle signorie e dei principati della penisola italica, almeno a partire dalla fine del secolo XIII, come del resto è stato fatto nel libro che stiamo considerando. Ma non è il momento di entrare nel merito di questo problema, e passiamo invece a rilevare che, in effetti, l'Italia considerata è delimitata dai curatori a Bologna e alle sue Scuole. Non solo, il punto di vista che è all'origine della prospettiva che domina questa storia della filosofia è l'individuazione del 'ritorno' dei filosofi in Italia negli inizi più o meno ufficiali dei corsi di 'logica' e di 'filosofia naturale' nell'Università di Bologna. E i curatori ne individuano la persona in Gentile da Cingoli, che inizia l'insegnamento nel 1295, ben consci ovviamente della strumentalità di una simile proposta, come sono strumentali le periodizzazioni

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<sup>2</sup> ROBERTO LAMBERTINI (ed.), *Università, teologia e 'Studium' domenicano dal 1360 alla fine del Medioevo. Atti del Convegno di studi, Bologna, 21-23 ottobre 2011*, Nerbini, Firenze 2014, stampa 2015 = *Memorie Domenicane*, 131, n.s. 45 (2014).

<sup>3</sup> EUGENIO GARIN, *Storia della filosofia italiana*, Einaudi, Torino 1966, vol. I (Piccola biblioteca Einaudi, 80), p. 3-28.

<sup>4</sup> CARLO DIONISOTTI, *Geografia e storia della letteratura italiana*, (Piccola biblioteca Einaudi, n.s., 18), Einaudi, Torino 1999, p. 25-54.

della storia, che assurgono a categorie storiografiche, e che riconosciamo come convenzionali.

Per articolare e anche giustificare la proposta, nella prefazione Casagrande e Fioravanti percorrono rapidamente le fasi della storia narrata nel volume, la cui seconda parte ha la funzione di collocare nel contesto socio-culturale – direi – le vicende del ‘ritorno dei filosofi’ nella prima metà del secolo XIV, ritorno coincidente almeno in parte con ‘il tempo di Dante’. Ci si rivolge, cioè, a protagonisti della cultura, non solo letteraria, non legati direttamente alle università, a protagonisti della vita civile, volgarizzatori di testi direttamente o indirettamente in relazione con la filosofia professata nelle scuole. Il quadro si completa con le figure di Dante e Petrarca. Da quanto finora detto, si potrebbe essere portati a pensare che il titolo dato al volume prospetti al potenziale lettore ben altro rispetto al suo effettivo contenuto. E in effetti, per certi aspetti è così, e – aggiungerei – non poteva essere altrimenti. Infatti, i curatori riconoscono – perché ben lo sanno – che dalle prime decadi del secolo XIII è stata istituita da Federico II l’università a Napoli, che in Roma o, comunque, presso la curia papale è istituito lo *Studium Curie*, e che presso i principali conventi degli Ordini Mendicanti sono attivi gli *Studia*. Tuttavia, è noto che nelle università di Padova e di Bologna non fu istituita una Facoltà di teologia sino alla seconda metà del secolo XIV. Tenendo presente, dunque, questa realtà istituzionale, è in qualche modo fondato e giustificato individuare nel momento in cui un docente, Gentile da Cingoli, viene stipendiato per tenere corsi di logica e filosofia naturale come l’atto col quale, in una università già plurisecolare, come quella di Bologna, vengono istituiti ‘corsi di filosofia’ destinati principalmente, anche se non esclusivamente, agli studenti di medicina. Vista l’importanza, seppur simbolica, attribuita a questo evento, anche il lettore si domanda, come fanno Casagrande e Fioravanti a p. XIX della prefazione: « Detto tutto ciò resta una domanda finale: quale impatto può aver avuto l’ingresso della filosofia sulla vita della società italiana della prima metà del XIV secolo? ». I dati in nostro possesso non sembrerebbero portare a granché. E si potrebbe anche invertire la domanda: quale impatto ha avuto o quale scambio c’è stato fra il mondo ‘cittadino’ circostante, che ha ‘voluto’ i filosofi, e la filosofia da questi professata? Dalla lettura del volume credo si debba concludere che emerga reciproco disinteresse, soprattutto disinteresse da parte dei ceti che costituivano la vita cittadina per le *disputationes*, che pure ai nostri occhi appaiono fine a se stesse; inoltre, marginale sarà anche la presenza dei ‘filosofi’ nel contesto cittadino, almeno fino agli inizi del secolo XV.

Quanto all’impianto storiografico, viene da fare anche una seconda considerazione. A mio parere è da apprezzare l’aver volutamente, scientemente – credo – evitato qualsiasi riferimento all’approccio storiografico che potremmo definire ‘conflittualistico’, con relativa ricaduta in un titolo ‘sensazionalistico’,

approccio che ha caratterizzato alcune prese di posizione recenti e non. Quello cioè che fa ricorso alla contrapposizione ‘chierici’/‘laici’, o piuttosto, ‘ecclesiastici al potere’/‘laici’ che mirano a emanciparsi, cliché che ha percorso in diversa misura tutta la storiografia filosofica, e non solo: la ragione che per secoli – quelli ‘medievali’ in particolare – si sforza di emanciparsi dalla religione (non dico fede, ma religione come potere che si incarna, come se ci fossero forme di potere che non tendessero a esercitare un controllo, visto che proprio all’origine del filosofare occidentale ci si imbatte in una esecuzione capitale comminata per ‘tentato sovvertimento del comune sentire dei cittadini di una polis’). Chiuderei queste prime osservazioni con un grazie anche per averci risparmiato la ormai *vexata quaestio*: se sia esistita una filosofia dei ‘laici’ nel Medioevo. Domanda che, in particolare a partire dagli anni ‘80 del secolo scorso – o forse prima – aveva preso il posto di quella ben più radicale – ma per altri fini – degli anni ‘20 e ‘30, che chiedeva: è possibile una filosofia cristiana?

Vorrei, infine, attirare l’attenzione su di una componente della prospettiva storiografica adottata che potrebbe essere letta come fondata oppure pretestuosa. Relativamente al periodo considerato, mettere in relazione – come emerge in alcuni contributi – Bologna con Parigi appare immediatamente come *parva componere magnis*, e per di più, come far ricorso a una analogia fortemente sproporzionata dal punto di vista del peso ‘culturale’ e dottrinale. Tuttavia, se il lettore si lascia guidare coglie il motivo di tale analogia. Da una parte, infatti, i curatori legano gli inizi del fare filosofia a Bologna con maestri, non solo con un maestro in particolare, che si sono formati a Parigi; dall’altra, l’analogia ha poi la funzione di dare la ‘misura’ dei contenuti e della qualità dell’insegnamento dei maestri bolognesi di quel periodo, insegnamento che, se raffrontato con alcuni grandi e noti maestri parigini, viene eclissato, ma se parametrato su figure in qualche misura minori del secolo XIV – e sempre ‘parigine’ – acquista una dignitosa, anche se provinciale, consistenza.

Va comunque detto che nel volume si nota, si rileva con una certa frequenza l’avvertimento, seppur non sempre esplicito, che si riassume nella cautela ‘*mutatis mutandis*’, perché il contesto bolognese e – in generale – quello della penisola è radicalmente diverso rispetto a quanto avvenuto nelle università del resto d’Europa, almeno fino al secolo XV, durante il quale – poi – prese forma quel modo di pensare che chiamiamo Umanesimo, ma non proprio nelle università.

In questi tratti che ci è parso di rilevare sta la peculiarità e la novità di questa storia della filosofia. Venendo alla narrazione, mi sembra di poter dire che – in generale – si avverte la compresenza di due ‘registri’ di scrittura che soddisfano due livelli di lettura, cosa questa non frequente. Accanto, infatti, al procedere dell’esposizione delle dottrine e dei problemi usando il lessico appropriato, è costantemente rilevabile l’intento ‘didattico’, che definirei come una *manuductio*,

che si manifesta mediante brevi incisi esplicativi del lessico e mediante capoversi che segnalano e orientano il passaggio da un tema all'altro. La trattazione è articolata in due parti. Nella prima (« Il ritorno dei filosofi in Italia: Bologna 1295 », p. 11-161) è affrontato quello che potremmo propriamente chiamare il quadro istituzionale della struttura universitaria nel contesto sociale-organizzativo della città di Bologna. Nel primo dei sette capitoli che costituiscono questa parte Gianfranco Fioravanti si è assunto il compito di giustificare la prospettiva storiografica adottata e di individuare i tratti dello 'status' che ritenevano proprio del 'filosofo' i maestri bolognesi (« Morte e nascita della filosofia. Da Parigi a Bologna », p. 11-24). In queste pagine, Fioravanti mette a frutto con estrema sintesi notizie e dati relativi alla tradizione scolastica grammaticale e logica a Bologna nell'arco del Duecento, per arrivare a porre in qualche modo a confronto l'"autocoscienza" del 'fare filosofia' dei maestri di logica a Bologna che riflette quell'autocoscienza professionale che raggiunsero, dichiararono e difesero i maestri parigini attorno alla metà del Duecento, quel passaggio – per dir così – dal fare filosofia come *subiectum* e come metodo al fare filosofia come 'status' identitario di coloro che fanno il 'mestiere di pensare'. E Fioravanti si chiede: « Il punto centrale del nostro discorso è che questo nuovo modello di pensare transitò da Parigi in Italia: quando e come? » (p. 15). Quando, lo abbiamo già visto, a illustrare come concorrono i capitoli successivi: « A questo punto, dunque, occorre ripercorrere in sintesi le tappe di uno sviluppo dello Studio bolognese nel Duecento, per seguire da un lato come l'insegnamento medico sia riuscito progressivamente ad acquisire un riconoscimento ufficiale al livello degli ordinamenti, e registrare, dall'altro, come quello filosofico, inizialmente legato alla medicina, abbia finito per acquisire una sua autonomia anche istituzionale » (p. 19). Quindi, nel capitolo II (« La nascita dello Studio di Medicina e Arti a Bologna », p. 25-36) Andrea Tabarroni traccia con un procedere agile, ma chiaramente, la dinamica storica del progressivo riconoscimento e della definitiva costituzione giuridica dello Studio di medicina, che ingloba i maestri di logica e astrologia e poi anche di filosofia naturale (senza la quale non si fa astrologia): dunque, non autonomia della 'filosofia', ma più che subordinazione curricolare (e in qualche forma o misura giuridica) della filosofia alla medicina: Bologna è l'unica università europea a subordinare insegnamenti filosofici al curriculum di medicina, senza una specifica Facoltà delle Arti.

Dato questo contesto istituzionale, è lecito porre la questione: quale delle scienze – medicina e filosofia naturale – subordina, subalterna l'altra? Troviamo anche la risposta a questa domanda, non secondaria dal punto di vista teorico-metodologico, nel capitolo III (« Medici e filosofia », p. 37-64), nel quale Chiara Crisciani, in questo ambito di studi maestra, richiama lo statuto epistemologico della *scientia/ars* medica e ne delinea le articolazioni. Abbiamo, invece, nel capitolo successivo le risposte alla domanda per quanto concerne l'aspetto di una

qualche forma di ricaduta istituzionale o di 'immagine' sociale, scritto da Fioravanti (« I filosofi e la medicina: una progressiva autonomia », p. 65-90). A proposito del processo di 'filosofizzazione' della medicina italiana, e di quella insegnata a Bologna in particolare, « utilizzando il linguaggio della filosofia naturale di Aristotele », al di là della reale, effettiva portata filosofica delle questioni discusse e della loro ricaduta sulla 'teorizzazione' di fenomeni subordinati alle facoltà regolatrici della vita vegetativa e sensitiva, vien tuttavia da pensare che i maestri siano sollecitati a porle o tendano a porle sul tappeto per far vedere, per dimostrare agli uditori quanto possa effettivamente contribuire l'analisi di problematiche 'vegetative' alla luce delle categorie della filosofia naturale aristotelica, anzi della filosofia naturale tout-court. Quanto all'autonomia istituzionale, non è ancora netta e lo diventerà solo nella seconda metà del Trecento. In ogni caso, niente Medicina senza Arti, e, soprattutto, niente Arti senza Medicina. Se andiamo poi a vedere quale 'consapevolezza di sé', del proprio ruolo avessero medici e filosofi, e ci rivolgessimo ai *principia*, ci troviamo di fronte alla continuo elogio della 'vita filosofica' da parte dei maestri, nello sforzo di rivendicare a loro volta una figura istituzionale, quale i medici già avevano come gruppo, come corporazione elitaria (cap. V: « I filosofi e i medici come gruppo: autorappresentazione e autopromozione », p. 77-90, scritto a quattro mani da Crisciani e Fioravanti). Nei capitoli sesto e settimo che chiudono la prima parte (cap. VI: « I filosofi e gli altri », p. 91-122; cap. VII: « Fare filosofia », p. 123-161), Fioravanti recupera e traccia le linee del confronto, della coesistenza, della concorrenza fra gli accademici 'professionisti' – teologi, giuristi, medici – nell'università parigina, per prospettare poi analogie e differenze della corrispondente situazione in Bologna, seppur di qualche generazione successiva. L'eco delle teorizzazioni parigine della vita filosofica risuona a Bologna, ma in ben altro contesto istituzionale e dottrinale: il confronto con i teologi non può esserci, le condanne dottrinali non hanno portata alcuna a Bologna, giuristi e medici sono ben presenti nel tessuto della comunità cittadina, ai 'filosofi' non resta che attaccare i giuristi quasi come forma di *captatio* nei confronti dei medici, dalla cui Facoltà dipendevano. Belle pagine e ben argomentate quelle di Fioravanti sul confronto fra 'averroismo bolognese' con dottrine esplicitamente dichiarate e insegnate e scritte, e l'ambiente parigino. Significativa, poi, la portata dell'annotazione relativa alla presenza/passaggio di teologi negli *Studia* degli Ordini Mendicanti bolognesi, ma del loro 'disinteresse' per quanto andavano insegnando i 'filosofi'.

I capitoli VI e VII sono di piana, piacevole, godibile lettura, ricchi, informati e altrettanto ben documentati: insomma, capitoli pregevoli, in cui si sente che l'autore mette a frutto interessi che – seppur con intervalli – l'hanno accompagnato per decine di anni. Inoltre, in generale, nei giudizi Fioravanti mostra prudenza – intesa come *phronesis* – e condivisibile cautela. Dalla

narrazione che egli fa delle tematiche e delle problematiche dibattute sembra in effetti di dover concludere che l'insegnamento dei maestri bolognesi avesse come esito una dichiarazione non tanto di 'indecidibilità', quanto piuttosto di una quasi programmatica, metodologica 'indifferenza', non solo 'dottrinale', ma pure, in generale, di una 'indifferenza' teoretica delle posizioni possibili in un vasto ambito del sapere filosofico, quello naturale (ivi compresa quindi l'anima e le sue facoltà). Se così è – e a me sembra che così sia – come vanno interpretate le esaltazioni del sapere filosofico che abbiamo sentito proclamate dagli stessi maestri? Ancora: se insegnare filosofia sembra essere la palestra dove i futuri medici si esercitano nella disputa (cf. p. 129), e per di più un esercizio fine a se stesso, dal momento che alla fine il maestro dichiara in qualche misura 'equivalenti' le molteplici, contrastanti posizioni prese in considerazione, e che anche la sua non deve essere presa troppo sul serio, non mi pare che tutto questo lo si possa leggere come un *understatement* estremo: e allora, come lo si può leggere? Un puro esercizio *disputationis gratia*? Se così fosse, possiamo ben capire allora perché il fronte dei teologi non abbia ritenuto di perder tempo nella sisifica impresa di confutare chi non 'teneva una posizione'. Esemplare, infine, a mio giudizio, il paragrafo 2 del capitolo VII (« Temi centrali del dibattito filosofico », p. 130–161). Esemplare sotto tutti i punti di vista. Anzitutto, unica nel suo genere la ricostruzione nel suo insieme delle problematiche oggetto di indagine da parte dei maestri bolognesi che sia finalmente 'entrata' in un manuale. Esemplare dal punto di vista della storia del pensiero e pure dal punto di vista storiografico il raffronto Parigi/Bologna, dal quale il lettore, non solo *incipiens*, apprende quali fossero i 'contenuti', il 'metodo', e anche i 'presupposti' dei differenti maestri e la loro *forma mentis*.

La seconda parte (« Contesti, temi, figure », p. 163–280) non ha più come epicentro Bologna e le vicende dell'università, ma la circolazione delle dottrine, delle idee filosofiche e non nel contesto geografico, politico e sociale da Firenze alle Alpi nel secolo XIV. Questa apertura su dottrine e personaggi come Dante, Marsilio e altri protagonisti, fino a chiudere con il cammeo su Petrarca, mira – credo – a orientare lo sguardo del lettore verso l'orizzonte della nascente nuova visione dell'uomo, che inizia a prendere forma nei primi decenni del Trecento. Tanto che, alla luce di tali protagonisti, pure al lettore sembrano 'fuori tempo' le dissertazioni filosofiche dei maestri bolognesi, come lo sembravano a loro. Ma questa è una storia che è ben nota. Qui, invece, è un piacevole compito segnalare al lettore la funzione, oltre alla loro qualità, dei capitoli 8-11, che costituiscono questa seconda parte. A Roberto Lambertini spetta offrire uno spaccato della nuova sensibilità 'politica' che matura in Italia, ma non solo, nella prima metà del Trecento (cap. VIII: « Aristotele e la riflessione politica in Italia nel primo Trecento », p. 165–190). Lambertini è uno studioso ben noto come specialista della storia del pensiero politico medievale, e nel suo contributo prende le mosse

dalla ormai diffusa visione della *polis* secondo Aristotele e delle sue preferenze riguardo al suo governo, e in questa innesta la concezione dei poteri secondo Dante e poi secondo Marsilio, nel contesto della lacerante disputa circa la relazione e la preminenza fra i due poteri. In un contesto politico assai poco stabile nell'Italia del tempo, Sonia Gentili apre la prospettiva sull'ormai lungo percorso fatto dalle iniziative volte ad aprire l'accesso al 'mondo filosofico' anche a quanti non lo frequentavano come professionisti, rendendolo accessibile anche a chi non praticava il latino, la lingua ritenuta idonea a formulare e a comunicare i contenuti di un tale sapere (cap. IX: « La filosofia dal latino al volgare », p. 191–224). Oltre alle pregevoli annotazioni sulla teoria del tradurre e sulla finalità e sulla funzione del voler 'volgarizzare', va segnalato quanto l'Autrice evidenzia a proposito del volgarizzamento dell'*Etica* e dell'impatto dei volgarizzamenti di testi 'moralì', il cui studio ha ormai una lunga tradizione. Sul processo di diffusione e di 'volgarizzamento' del sapere filosofico – o meglio, di aspetti, di ambiti del sapere filosofico – che va costituendosi come filone che incontra le esigenze di un pubblico, si colloca il *Convivio* di Dante, di cui trattano le pagine di Paolo Falzone (cap. X: « Il 'Convivio' di Dante », p. 225–264). Opera, come è noto, non portata a termine da Dante, il *Convivio* è per noi reperto di un progetto di Dante assai ambizioso, ma abortito. Il contributo di Falzone tocca tutti gli aspetti problematici del progetto dantesco, e al contempo conduce il lettore ad accostarsi ad esso con strumenti adeguati perché possa da un lato collocarlo nel contesto del mondo dantesco, e dall'altro leggerlo all'interno delle iniziative ormai diffuse che miravano alla disseminazione, alla traduzione di prospettive filosofiche attraverso il 'volgarizzamento', la 'riduzione' al lessico delle nuove lingue, il cui uso non era circoscritto a una categoria di individui.

Il volume si chiude con Petrarca (cap. XI: « Petrarca e la filosofia », p. 265–280). Petrarca non sembra voler entrare a far parte del quadro che i curatori hanno inteso dipingere. Chi ne abbia frequentato un poco gli scritti, infatti, trova stridente la sua presenza. E in effetti, egli esce dal quadro e costituisce un ritratto a sé, perché è su un altro pianeta rispetto ai maestri bolognesi, ma è pure 'estraneo' rispetto al mondo di Dante. Il compito di Sonia Gentili è arduo, e non può se non prendere atto che, in qualunque modo si possa intendere la filosofia, Petrarca è sempre 'altrove'. Sistematico in nessuno dei suoi scritti – neppure nel *De suis ipsius et multorum ignorantia* –, è per lo più con Cicerone o con Agostino e i Padri, e, loro tramite, con Platone, mai con Aristotele. Del resto, scelse Agostino come interlocutore-mentore delle sue 'segrete cure'.

Vorrei terminare queste note di lettura de *La filosofia in Italia al tempo di Dante* rilevando come, per un verso, il volume sia il riconoscimento e il frutto dei risultati di ricerche condotte per decenni dai medievisti non solo italiani, ma che, d'altra parte, è a italiani che dobbiamo la sintesi che stiamo leggendo, a studiosi che, per la gran parte pur con formazione fondamentalmente storico-filosofica, si

sono occupati anche delle vicende costitutive e statutarie di campi del sapere considerati non marginali, ma ‘al margine’ della filosofia, quelli concernenti appunto l’area biologica di cui si occupa la medicina. Oltre a far questo, (sulle tracce, è vero, di alcuni maestri), essi hanno invaso il terreno dei letterati, e hanno letto con altri occhi testi e temi della letteratura delle origini, ma non con l’approccio cosiddetto ‘multidisciplinare’, che spesso porta a risultati per accumulo di parti, bensì cercando di leggere, di cogliere l’insieme del fenomeno, la sua interezza/completezza.

Chiudo citando quanto Leonardo Bruni mette in bocca a Coluccio Salutati, che ricorda quando – *puer adhuc* – si trovava studente proprio a Bologna:

Equidem memini, cum puer adhuc Bononiae essem ibique grammaticis operam darem, me solitum quotidie, vel aequales lacessendo vel magistros rogando, nullum tempus vacuum disputationis transisse. Neque id <quod> in pueritia feci, postea vero, annis crescentibus, dereliqui; sed in omni aetate atque vita nihil mihi gratius fuit, nihil quod aequae expeterem quam doctos homines, si modo potestas data sit, convenire, et quae legerim et quae agitaverim et de quibus ambigerem illis exponere, eorumque in his rebus percontari iudicium.<sup>5</sup>

Inquieta un poco pensare al giovanissimo Salutati – quasi novello Socrate, *si licet* – *lacessere* i compagni di studio e *rogare* i maestri a Bologna!

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. LEONARDO BRUNI. *Dialogi ad Petrum Paulum Istrum*, ed. STEFANO UGO BALDASSARRI, Leo S. Olschki, Firenze 1994, p. 239, l. 10.



FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI, *DIÁLOGO SOBRE EL GOBIERNO DE FLORENCIA*. ESTUDIO PRELIMINAR, TRADUCCIÓN Y NOTAS DE ANTONIO HERMOSA ANDÚJAR, AKAL, MADRID 2017 (BÁSICA DE BOLSILLO. SERIE CLÁSICOS DEL PENSAMIENTO POLÍTICO, 340), 269 PP., ISBN 9788446044659.

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El interés del que ha gozado la obra de Maquiavelo, aunque fuera para criticarla con ardor, como ocurrió durante siglos en el mundo hispano, ha contribuido a eclipsar a otros autores contemporáneos del diplomático florentino cuyos textos tal vez no posean la originalidad, fuerza y universalidad de los suyos, pero mantienen ideas muy atractivas que – sin duda – no merecen pasar desapercibidas. Uno de los casos más claros de relegación es el de Francesco Guicciardini, aunque en su caso él mismo contribuyera a oscurecer sus aportaciones al impedir su publicación en vida. Fuera para evitarse problemas personales o para no tener que cambiar algunas de sus afirmaciones y análisis, lo cierto es que esa decisión permitía que expresara sus ideas sin ninguna cortapisa pero, a cambio, alejaba cualquier influencia ideológica sobre la época que le tocó vivir.

Guicciardini es conocido sobre todo por su *Historia de Italia*, publicada póstumamente. Existen hasta cinco traducciones de esta obra al castellano de las que da noticia la tesis doctoral de Montserrat Moragues Coscolla (*La influencia de la historiografía renacentista italiana en las monarquías occidentales. El caso de Francesco Guicciardini [1483-1540]*, 2016). Una primera traducción parcial de la obra por Antonio Florez de Benavides, se edita en Baeza en 1581. De las restantes versiones manuscritas castellanas, todas del siglo XVII y una de ellas desaparecida, la del rey Felipe IV fue editada finalmente en 1889. Esta publicación había sido precedida de un compendio (« reducida à Epitome por Don Oton Edilo Nato de Betissana ») que se editó en 1683. Más tiempo habría de tardar en editarse su *Historia de Florencia 1378-1509* (FCE, 1990), que conoce una nueva reedición en 2006. Las aportaciones de Guicciardini como historiador le han otorgado gran fama, pero también muestran su penetrante capacidad para el análisis político, faceta en la que sus tratados políticos resultan insustituibles. No se puede decir que la publicación de estos en nuestro idioma haya sido escasa, aunque desde la aparición en 1879 de la traducción de la *Relación de España* en la recopilación de *Viajes por España* de Antonio María Fabié, hay que esperar más de medio siglo para

que se editen la antología *De la vida política y civil* (Espasa-Calpe Argentina, 1947), y su *Viaje a España* (Castalia, 1952). En una etapa más próxima se publican los *Aforismos políticos y civiles* (UNAM, 1985), a los que siguen sus *Recuerdos* (CEPC, 1988), editados y traducidos por Antonio Hermosa Andújar, que ahora nos regala este más que interesante *Diálogo sobre el gobierno de Florencia*. A la vez que esta última edición se han publicado su « Diario del Viaje a España », el « Discurso de Logroño », el « Informe sobre España » y otros dos escritos sobre el Gran Capitán, bajo el título *Un embajador florentino en la España de los Reyes Católicos* (Tecnos), con estudio preliminar de M<sup>a</sup> Teresa Navarro Salazar y Montserrat Casas Nadal, y traducción de la primera.

El *Diálogo sobre el gobierno de Florencia* fue una de las obras de Guicciardini condenada a ser conocida más de tres siglos después de ser escrita. En su breve Proemio, Guicciardini la presenta en forma de un diálogo dividido en dos libros, escrito para su placer y sin intención de publicarla (p. 64). A pesar de inscribir su obra claramente en la tradición del humanismo cívico, que aspira a exaltar el patriotismo y dirigirlo por la senda de la mejora de la vida de los ciudadanos mediante la participación política, el autor renuncia aparentemente a la dimensión práctica de su escrito, a que sea útil en la determinación del destino de Florencia, al no publicarlo. Tal vez por la conciencia de la imposibilidad de poner de acuerdo a los Médici y a los partidarios de la república, que poco después de finalizado el *Diálogo* iban a obtener su última y efímera victoria (1527-1531), Guicciardini prefirió optar por el silencio, pero su obra se esfuerza por establecer un régimen que recogiera lo mejor de cada uno: « un modo de convivencia basado en una libertad honesta, bien equilibrada y ordenada » (p. 65). Es, por tanto, con esa cierta desesperanza del que cree tener soluciones para los problemas existentes, pero sabe que no serán tenidas en cuenta por la propia afasia de las partes implicadas, con la que se abordan las propuestas políticas del texto.

La discusión transcurre en las afueras de Florencia, en 1494, pocas semanas después de expulsar a los Médici e instaurarse un régimen bajo la dirección del dominico Girolamo Savonarola. En ella participan Piero Capponi, Pagolantonio Soderini (hermano de Piero, confaloniero vitalicio de Florencia desde 1502 e inicial protector de Maquiavelo), Piero Guicciardini (padre de Francesco), todos ellos comprometidos en mayor o menor medida con el nuevo régimen republicano, y Bernardo del Nero, que representa a los defenestrados partidarios de los Médici, incapaces por convicción o falta de habilidad – a diferencia de sus compañeros de diálogo – de congraciarse con las nuevas autoridades. Aunque en la exquisitez de las formas utilizadas por todos ellos se aprecia la amistad, la cortesía y, sobre todo, el civismo que les caracteriza, las diferencias políticas fluyen a lo largo de la obra, mostrando desacuerdos ideológicos importantes que no son sino la expresión de las profundas discrepancias existentes entre los bandos con los que se identifican.

Gracias al reconocimiento del que goza entre sus amigos, el peso de la disputa lo lleva Bernardo, el de mayor edad de todos ellos y de quien se alaba su experiencia política. Bernardo, que interviene como *alter ego* de Francesco Guicciardini, se aferra a esa experiencia no exenta de razón (p. 86), en cualquier caso práctica y no libresca (p. 156), pero que no renuncia a sacar enseñanzas de la historia (p. 79), aunque reconozca que su acercamiento a esta ha sido a través de la literatura vernácula y no de la latina (p. 217). Esa experiencia práctica es sugestivamente recalcada por Antonio Hermosa, en su Estudio preliminar (p. 8 y ss.) y citada en la nota correspondiente del texto (p. 70). De ella quiere extraer Bernardo su justificación de la acción política y del mejor régimen de gobierno, lo que a la postre no es sino el reconocimiento de la autonomía de la política respecto de cualquier otro ámbito, sea moral o religioso. El predominio de los discursos de Bernardo hace que el diálogo, lleno de realismo tanto por los personajes que lo protagonizan, además de los que se nombran, como por las soluciones aportadas, adopte la forma ciceroniana, donde se produce la transmisión de conocimientos de un interlocutor privilegiado al resto, alejándose de la búsqueda de la verdad entre todos los participantes, habitual en los diálogos platónicos.

Desde estas premisas, no nos puede sorprender que Bernardo utilice el libro primero del *Diálogo* para realizar una defensa del régimen principesco de los Médici, frente a la profesión de fe republicana de sus amigos, mostrando que las dificultades de la acción de gobierno se sortean mucho mejor desde el primero que por los partidarios del segundo. El libro segundo, en una especie de síntesis superadora de la oposición de los anteriores, estará dedicado a la búsqueda del mejor gobierno, lo que – dado el realismo que exhibe en todo momento el texto – descarta el fantasma de la utopía inalcanzable en beneficio del más adecuado régimen político posible.

De manera coherente con lo ya indicado, en el libro primero Bernardo no enuncia una teoría general que pretenda elevarse por encima de las circunstancias y ser válida para cualquier tiempo o lugar. Sus propuestas se remiten a la situación florentina del momento y a las dos formas de gobierno concretas que han entrado en conflicto. La bandera que Bernardo enarbola frente a los partidarios de la república no es tanto ideológica como empírica: la ya citada experiencia frente a la ignorancia e impericia que reprocha a los partidarios de la república. Esto, sin embargo, no quiere decir que no se recurra a conocimientos librescos o de autores que se identifican con estos. En concreto, el *Diálogo* menciona a personajes de reconocido prestigio en la época, como Marsilio Ficino, para, en la mejor tradición platónica, reconocer que el mejor gobierno es el de uno, el mediano el de pocos y el peor el de muchos (p. 73). La discusión va a centrarse en las ventajas e inconvenientes que presentan la señoría y la

democracia (p. 89), dejando para el segundo libro, como ya se ha dicho, las excelencias del régimen mixto con fundamento aristocrático.

Consciente de la imposibilidad de justificar como legítima la adquisición del poder por parte de los Médici (« un gobierno usurpado a través de una facción y mediante la fuerza », p. 89), Bernardo va a dejar de lado el origen de los gobiernos para centrarse en el desempeño de sus funciones. En su opinión, son los efectos de los gobiernos los que se deben tener en cuenta para medir su validez y no un origen (violento, reglado, etc.), que no siempre sirve para juzgar la trayectoria posterior de quienes ejercen el poder. Atendiendo a su práctica del poder, Bernardo no ve cómo puede considerarse válido el nuevo régimen florentino, al que achaca numerosos errores, a la vez que muestra las contradicciones que envuelven su origen: una revuelta popular, apoyada por los *ottimati* con la finalidad de establecer un régimen aristocrático, que deviene en un gobierno de muchos controlado por Savonarola (p. 81–83). Es así como Bernardo se esfuerza por dejar de lado los mitos que una y otra vez le ponen sus interlocutores para defender el nuevo régimen popular: no lo es, por cuanto está dominado por uno o por unos pocos; la libertad que se le atribuye no existe, pues el deseo universal de dominio que acompaña a la naturaleza humana, y que se manifiesta especialmente en los grandes de Florencia, hace imposible su auténtico disfrute; incluso los que dijeron actuar en nombre de la libertad para oponerse a la tiranía, si tuvieron éxito, demostraron estar más interesados en sustituir al tirano que en conseguir aquella.

Sin embargo, asumida la más que posible maldad del gobernante principesco cuando debe nombrar cargos o decidir lo que se debe hacer, la raíz de los males que Bernardo atribuye al régimen popular resulta mucho más peligrosa que lo que revela la existencia de esos mitos: reside en la ignorancia a la hora de actuar, lo que viene a significar no solo cometer errores sino, sobre todo y de manera más imperdonable para quien piensa que las amenazas internas y externas siempre están esperando su oportunidad, ofrecerse como un objetivo débil. Si la maldad de los Médici tiene como descargo en la mayor parte de las ocasiones la necesidad, la ignorancia de los populares carece de límites y tiende a repetir sus errores (p. 116), a la vez que también se siente afectada por intereses, reproduciendo la maldad de sus rivales (p. 120).

Tal vez sea este aprecio por el gobierno señorial de los Médici, que su propio defensor no tiene reparo en considerar en ocasiones una tiranía, aunque dulcificada en las formas por instituciones republicanas (p. 151) o – siempre que fuera posible – por la ausencia de violencia (p. 152), lo que hace que se utilice en varias ocasiones la metáfora organicista por parte de Guicciardini (p. 143, 144, 234, 244), siempre exaltando la cohesión entre los miembros del cuerpo social y, por tanto, la dependencia con respecto a la cabeza, más que la democrática utilidad de todos ellos para sacar adelante la tarea común. Sin embargo, donde de

verdad se muestran las simpatías señoriales del italiano es en el uso de la metáfora médica: lo que en tiempos posteriores algunos llamarán un « cirujano de hierro », aparece en el *Diálogo* bajo la forma de un médico sanador de todo posible mal social, aunque para ello se vea obligado a medir muy bien el remedio que demanda cada necesidad y el bienestar general (p. 145, 156, 178, 180, 181). Al autor italiano, como a otros partidarios que la cirugía permanente parece atraer en todas las épocas, se le escapa que las metáforas dicen tanto como ocultan: la apelación al médico es un recurso excepcional que se requiere en una situación que se sale de lo habitual; justificar el primado de un médico para una sociedad en condiciones de vida saludable no parece necesario.

El segundo libro del *Diálogo* quiere ser una solución conciliadora a la situación creada en Florencia. Guicciardini, a través de Bernardo, ha mostrado que el régimen popular no es capaz de lograr un gobierno de la república que ofrezca las garantías suficientes de estabilidad y progreso; pero, al mismo tiempo, ha reconocido la imposibilidad de solucionar los males con un retorno al gobierno de los Médici (p. 257). Por eso se impone ir más allá del régimen popular y del monárquico, con una alternativa que no puede ser otra que el gobierno de los pocos. Sin embargo, ese gobierno no puede ser un constructo de la razón, sino que debe encontrar su fundamento en la propia experiencia. De manera que para reformar en sentido aristocrático la república de Florencia, Venecia se ofrece como un modelo de organización política. El mito veneciano ejerce sobre Guicciardini su fascinación, como entre tantos otros de sus contemporáneos de dentro y fuera de Italia durante el siglo XVI, pero también Roma e incluso las más famosas ciudades griegas de la Antigüedad son utilizadas una y otra vez por Bernardo para mostrar que sus soluciones para el gobierno de Florencia están justificadas.

Las propuestas concretas de Guicciardini no renuncian a ampararse en supuestos de carácter universal, que hacen recordar a su paisano Maquiavelo, aunque su preocupación por la situación específica a la que se dirigen sus remedios, reduzcan el número de aquellos. Ya se ha visto a propósito de la utopía, que tan rechazada es por Maquiavelo como por el autor del *Diálogo*. Es así como aparece también su convicción, amparada igualmente en Polibio, de que « la mutación permanente de las cosas del mundo, que no pueden durar a perpetuidad, da lugar a tales variaciones y corrupción » (p. 249; 116, 234), lo que equivale a reconocer que ningún régimen político, por perfecto que se quiera suponer, está destinado a perdurar durante un largo período de tiempo con las mismas formas. También su visión de la Iglesia como una institución demasiado grande y poderosa pero capaz de renovarse periódicamente (p. 253) y, por tanto, destinada a permanecer en el tiempo, recuerda la valoración de Maquiavelo en los *Discursos sobre la primera década de Tito Livio*. Asimismo, ambos pensadores comparten un dualismo, republicano en el caso de Maquiavelo y aristocrático en

el de Guicciardini (p. 252), según el cual los valores de la constitución florentina que defienden solo rigen para sus ciudadanos, mientras creen lícito el imperio, incluso despótico (p. 256) sobre sus vecinos. En la misma medida, su percepción del origen violento de los Estados y la carencia de legitimidad de las potestades (p. 257) hace recordar la astucia y la fuerza como instrumentos de cualquier poder que aspire a seguir siéndolo.

Pero estas coincidencias no pueden impedir que Guicciardini guarde las distancias con su vecino y mantenga algunos presupuestos claramente opuestos a las ideas de Maquiavelo. Así ocurre con su desconfianza en el pueblo, mucho más radical que el circunstancial distanciamiento del autor de *El príncipe*: « no confío en el juicio del pueblo y nunca celebraré que sea él el primero en deliberar sobre cualquier asunto de importancia » (p. 250). La oposición afecta también al concepto de conflicto de clases, que para Maquiavelo no puede ser negado porque constituye el origen de la libertad, mientras que para Guicciardini no es sino una fuente de problemas de la que conviene huir si no se quiere poner en peligro la independencia de la república (p. 245).

El *Diálogo sobre el gobierno de Florencia* viene precedido por un amplio Estudio preliminar de su traductor y anotador, Antonio Hemosa Andújar. Ya he recordado su familiaridad con Guicciardini y su obra, que viene de lejos, como lejana y notoria es también su dedicación a otros autores del Renacimiento italiano (Maquiavelo, Giannotti), cuyas obras ha editado y estudiado con competencia reconocida. Su introducción desgrana el pensamiento de Guicciardini para mostrar que su búsqueda de la libertad y de la igualdad de Florencia supone el reconocimiento de la necesidad de encauzarla a través de instituciones donde los mejores puedan actuar por el bien de todos, lo que no deja de ser una forma de reconocer una cierta desigualdad.

La llamada ‘desigualdad de los desiguales’ expresada a través de instituciones a las que se reforma en su base constitutiva, en el número de sus miembros o en sus poderes, no es sino el precio a pagar para que esas mismas instituciones funcionen, la libertad sea posible y cierta medida de igualdad sea buscada. El resultado debería ser un buen gobierno y la estabilidad de la república, pero el precio a pagar es limitar la participación y la capacidad de decisión de los ciudadanos llanos. La república popular, por tanto, solo puede mantenerse como tal si es capaz de ser menos ‘popular’ en sus instituciones y consigue, a la vez, hacer creer a sus ciudadanos que todos participan de la misma en igualdad de condiciones. Antonio Hermosa muestra también que esos contradictorios valores rigen asimismo la acción exterior de la república: la mayoría de los ciudadanos pueden tener sus derechos en la medida posible, pero para las ciudades dependientes no cabe ni el disimulo. La república dominadora no respetará ni su libertad ni su igualdad porque su debilidad lo hace posible. Un panorama sombrío

en el que a pesar de todo, como reconoce Antonio Hermosa, « la república es la única isla de legitimidad en el océano político constituido por todos los regímenes habidos hasta aquí » (p. 53).



MONTSE LEYRA CURIÁ, *IN HEBREO: THE VICTORINE EXEGESIS OF THE BIBLE IN THE LIGHT OF ITS NORTHERN FRENCH JEWISH SOURCES*, BREPOLS, TURNHOUT 2017 (BIBLIOTHECA VICTORINA, 26), 408 PP., ISBN 9782503575421\*

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Since the days of the great historian Salo Baron, scholars have argued about his phrase « the lachrymose tradition of Jewish historiography ». When describing day-to-day life, should historians describe the Jewish experience in medieval Christendom as precarious and often dangerous, a tragic series of expulsions, acts of discrimination, and false accusations (blood libels and claims of host desecration)? Or should they emphasize that the Jews were generally the only tolerated non-Christian minority, and that they were often granted a surprisingly large measure of self-governance? The same dispute surrounds Jewish intellectual life. Should historians emphasize the restrictions, the burning of the Talmud, the often-rigged public disputations where Jews were required to defend Judaism but told that saying anything that Christians might consider blasphemy was not allowed? Should Jewish-Christian polemics, which were often vituperative, be emphasized? Or should scholars search out the stories of intellectual cooperation between Jews and Christians in the medieval world?

These tensions are particularly strong in the field of the academic study of medieval Bible commentaries, both Jewish and Christian. Some medieval commentaries polemicize, at times explicitly, against the other religion. When the polemical motives are not made explicit, scholars often disagree about whether to impute hidden ones to them. David Berger sums up the problem: « in matters of exegetical detail, polemical motives are occasionally obvious, occasionally likely, and occasionally asserted implausibly ».<sup>1</sup> All too often, modern scholars impute implausible polemical motivations to individual comments of a medieval exegete.

Yet in the past century, scholars have also taken a different approach to the relationship between Jewish and Christian Bible commentaries, often paying special attention to the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a productive time for commentators from both religions. The works of the Jewish commentators Rashi

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\* A shorter version of this review appeared in the *Canadian Jewish News* of 11 October 2018.

<sup>1</sup> DAVID BERGER, *Persecution, Polemic and Dialogue: Essays in Jewish-Christian Relations*, Academic Studies Press, Boston 2010 (Judaism and Jewish Life), p. 46.

(1040–1105), his student, Rabbi Joseph Qara (1065–1135), Rashi's grandson Rabbi Samuel ben Meir (Rashbam, c. 1080–c. 1160), and Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra (1089–1167) are classics still studied by Jews all over the world. Rashi is in a category by himself in Jewish consciousness, unrivalled by any commentator before or since.

The Christian world also produced crucial and innovative Bible commentaries in the very same years and in the very same country, France. (Rashi, Qara, and Rashbam were born and lived in France; ibn Ezra moved there later in life, writing many Bible commentaries there.) Christians affiliated with the Abbey of St. Victor, a kind of monastery-university on the outskirts of Paris, produced path-breaking Bible commentaries. The most famous of these commentators were Hugh of St. Victor (c. 1096–1141) and Andrew of St. Victor (d. 1175).

Beryl Smalley, in the middle of the twentieth century, was the first scholar to pay attention to the similarities between the Hebrew Bible commentaries of Rashi, Qara, Rashbam and ibn Ezra, on the one hand, and the Latin Bible commentaries of the Victorines, on the other. All took an approach that was new for the time – the plain, contextual meaning of the biblical text, what the Jews called *peshat*. At times such interpretations even went against commentaries written by their venerated predecessors. Many explanations, none totally satisfying, have been offered for this expression of the spirit of what has been called the Twelfth-Century Renaissance.

In a carefully researched scholarly book, *In Hebreo: The Victorine Exegesis of the Bible in the Light of its Northern French Jewish Sources*, Montse Leyra Curiá has advanced our understanding of the relationship between these Jewish and Christian works. Leyra Curiá is an accomplished scholar of Latin texts who spent many years in Israel mastering the Hebrew language and studying Jewish Bible commentators. This has enabled her to make meticulous comparisons between the Latin commentaries of the Victorines and the Hebrew commentaries of Rashi and others.

Although Hugh and Andrew never mention any living Jewish writer by name in their Bible commentaries, they do frequently refer to what the *Iudei* (Jews) or the *Hebrei* (Hebrews) say about a biblical verse. At times, they reject or correct common Christian interpretations based on these Jewish sources.

Leyra Curiá considers how this information came to Hugh and Andrew. She concentrates her analysis on Victorine interpretations introduced by the expressions *in hebreo* (when they offer their own translation of the biblical text into Latin, and feel that it reflects a better understanding of the original Hebrew than the Vulgate) or *secundum hebreos/hebrei* (when they actually introduce Jewish interpretations of the text). She does not believe that the Victorines' Hebrew was good enough either for them to have their own independent understanding of the biblical Hebrew text, or for them to read and understand the Jewish Bible commentaries of their time. When Hugh and Andrew do

occasionally make original comments about Hebrew words, Leyra Curiá states that they frequently betray ignorance or inaccurate knowledge of the Hebrew text.

Did they learn what Jews said about the Bible by reading the works of other Christians? Sometimes. She states, for example, that the *Glossa Ordinaria* on Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus and the First and Second Book of Samuel was a direct Latin source for some of Andrew of St Victor's *in hebreo* or *secundum hebreos/hebrei* translations and interpretations on those biblical Books. To prove this, she compares Hugh and Andrew's comments with the parallel passages in the Gloss in Rusch's 1480/1481 edition and in a number of manuscripts of the Gloss dating to the twelfth century. She also finds that the Victorines made use of the writings of Jerome and others to determine what the Hebrew of the Hebrew Bible really means. In other words, part of what the Victorines knew about the Hebrew text and about how the Jews interpreted that text was from the Victorines' study of Christian sources.

Interesting, though, are the many references to Jewish interpretations that first appear in Jewish works in the eleventh or twelfth centuries and appear also in the commentaries of the Victorines. Leyra Curiá concludes that Christians like Hugh and Andrew talked about the meaning of biblical verses with living Jews in Northern France. She considers it likely that the Victorines learned between a quarter and a third of their *in hebreo* or *secundum hebreos* interpretations from actual conversations with contemporary Jewish exegetes (or with these exegetes' disciples). Andrew and Hugh do not just cite Jewish interpretations; sometimes they correct earlier Latin commentaries based on a more accurate understanding of the Hebrew syntax (e.g., commentaries to Gen 2:5 and 1 Sam 13:1). She concludes that, if they were arriving at better understandings of the syntax of the Hebrew original, their meetings with Jews probably included some teaching and learning.

Which Jews were they studying with? Leyra Curiá carefully reviews the similarities between 'Jewish' interpretations that Hugh and Andrew quote on the one hand and the actual writings of their Jewish contemporaries on the other. She finds that Hugh and Andrew cite interpretations found in Rashbam's Torah commentary more often than any other Jewish Bible commentary. She concludes: « there is a high probability that Rashbam himself taught [...] interpretations to Hugh or to both Victorines » (p. 367). From his own writings, she adds, we know that Rashbam spent time in Paris. He also occasionally refers to conversations he had with Christians who, he claims, 'admitted' that what he said made sense. Interestingly, Rashbam used this same term when describing the conversations about Bible interpretation that he had with his grandfather, Rashi. According to Rashbam, Rashi 'admitted' to Rashbam that if he only had time, he would have

rewritten his Bible commentary, taking into account new insights into the meaning of the Bible (Rashbam's commentary to Gen 37:2).

In 400 pages of meticulous scholarship, Leyra Curiá builds a strong case that Rashbam, one of the leading rabbis of the twelfth century, met with Christian clergy to discuss the Bible in a non-polemical setting. Presumably he was not the only Jew to do so. We now know that even in the twelfth century, just after the horrible devastation inflicted by the First Crusade on Franco-German Jewry, some Jews and Christians were still able to meet and discuss the meaning of biblical verses, not in a disputation, but in a cooperative attempt to better understand God's words.

MARÍA JESÚS SOTO-BRUNA (ED.), *CAUSALITY AND RESEMBLANCE. MEDIEVAL APPROACHES TO THE EXPLANATION OF NATURE*, GEORG OLMS VERLAG, HILDESHEIM–ZÜRICH–NEW YORK 2018 (EUROPAEA MEMORIA, REIHE I: STUDIEN, 127), 182 PP., ISBN 9783487156866.

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*Causality and Resemblance: Medieval Approaches to the Explanation of Nature* acts as a short history of topics related to the ‘unity’ and ‘multiplicity’ of the Logos in nature by compiling a collection of English and Spanish entries. In her introduction, María Jesús Soto-Bruna notes that the collection focuses primarily on Neoplatonic approaches to the subject, which see the plurality of creation as, one way or another, coming from an undivided Logos and which typically also emphasize the importance of ‘returning’ to God as the source of creation. Limited to late classical and medieval authors, the edition arranges the thinkers chronologically, starting with early church Father Gregory of Nyssa and ending with St. Thomas Aquinas. The collection aims to bring a ‘new perspective’ to the subject by focusing on thinkers of less renown, as well as lesser known aspects of more familiar figures, like Aquinas.

Establishing the historical context, Miguel Brugarolas opens the volume with « Teología del Logos: unidad y distinción en la exégesis de Gregorio de Nisa sobre Jn 10,30 », a piece which focuses on the relationship between both the ‘one’ and the ‘many’ in the Triune God, as well as nature qua created *ex nihilo*. Brugarolas argues that Gregory of Nyssa’s new approach to Trinitarian theology established the understanding of causality after the Patristics. To navigate the dilemma between affirming the unity of God at the expense of affirming the plurality of the divine persons (and vice versa), Gregory correlated the creator-creature distinction with the philosophical intelligible-perceptible distinction. Words thus have a diverse sense when referring to human versus divine realities. In the created human sense, ‘*Ingénito*’, ‘*Padre*’, and ‘*Hijo*’ imply generation, change, and composition, but in reference to God the terms only refer to the relationship within the Trinity: « la paternidad y filiación se encuentran en Dio de una manera propia » (p. 23). However, in the divine intelligible sense, the Son is not after, but completes the Father, such that there is « mutua inhesión de las personas divinas » (p. 23). Thus, the anthropomorphic language of Scripture is not figurative (resulting in apophaticism), but allegorical, such that the human meaning is ascribable to God only in a metaphorical or virtual way. Brugarolas

provides strong evidence that philosophical distinctions affecting causality and divine predication may be traced back to or through Gregory of Nyssa.

The second chapter seeks a fresh look at the famous Neoplatonic notion of 'return' in « Hermeneutics of Logos: Interpretation of Mystical Experience in Augustine's *Confessions* » by Agnieszka Kijewska. Combatting the stigma commonly associated with obtaining knowledge from religious experience, Kijewska analyzes Augustine's *Confessions* through the lens of William Alston's 1991 *Perceiving God. The Epistemology of Religious Experience* to highlight the 'epistemic side' of religious experience and its role in Augustine's biography. After arguing that Augustine's life aptly fits Alston's project, Kijewska shows how Augustine's recorded experiences fit five of Alston's essential features of mystical perception as: A) experiential or a kind of perception; B) immediate awareness of the mystical object, whether i. unmediated, ii. mediated (direct perception), or iii. mediated perception through another perceived object; C) object-oriented; D) an experience of God as the object; and E) an experience which « brings the subject into a relationship with another person » (p. 37). Using Alston's five features, Augustine's changing understanding of and relationship with the Divine is then mapped through his analogous, not literal, perception of the Divine through the *libri platoniorum*, Milan garden, and vision of Ostia. Kijewska concludes by positing that Augustine's purpose for recounting his experiences in the *Confessions* was to create a new medium through which his readers, perchance, may similarly experience God. While contemporary analyses always run the risk of anachronistic assessments, Kijewska provides a fresh perspective on Augustine's *Confessions* while reopening the discussion on the 'epistemic' value of religious experience.

Following in the third chapter is Francisco O'Reilly's « Causality, Flux, and Procession. An Unexpected Encounter Among Proclus, and Avicenna ». The 'unexpected encounter' refers to the *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, a short Latin work, of which seventy percent is comprised of paraphrases from Eriugena, Avicenna, and the *Liber de causis*, plus Augustine, Boethius, Aristotle, and al-Farabi, which seeks to explain the origin of multiplicity in the simplicity of God. O'Reilly aims to confirm Marie-Therese D'Alverny's view that the anonymous author found a relationship between three distinct Neoplatonic systems and, thus, integrated choice texts from each. As such, the *Liber de causis primis et secundis* is not just a 'copy and paste' job but serves as an illustration of how Arabic translations were integrated by Latin thinkers into the framework of existing authorities, creating new variants of the Neoplatonic tradition in the process. The key takeaway is reiterating D'Alverny's claim that neither the *Liber de causis primis et secundis* nor Arabic influence should be overlooked as mere translation efforts.

María Jesús Soto-Bruna's own « Harmony in the Conception of the Universe. Unity and Plurality in Eriugena » appears fourth. She explains how the integrating motif of Eriugena's universe – the notion of 'harmony' – emerges from the key term *processio* which « implies a relationship between the first principle, which is the unity of simplicity, and the different realities which proceed from it » (p. 58). Citing Eriugena's classic text *Periphyseon*, Soto-Bruna shows that harmony is a basic principle of being and knowledge for Eriugena, rooted in the Logos, which can resolve *ab un non nisi unum* issues when linked with his former discourse on proportionality and relation (p. 59–60). Since Eriugena's universal cause is a unity it « confers unity on its effects » establishing a basis for the extension of harmony from the eternal to the temporal world (p. 61). However, Eriugena's primordial cause is not a Parmenidean unity because it eternally contains plurality harmoniously (understood proportionally or as a relationship). Eriugena's *processio* is a 'correspondence' between the first cause (which includes the Logos) and the diverse realities it effects. Thus, the world results from the Logos expressing itself in the form of unity making the world a kind of theophany or divine apparition before it returns to its origin. This explains the harmony and intelligibility of nature in relation to the First and other created things. Soto-Bruna downplays Eriugena's pantheistic stigma to reconsider his model of causal unity (the relationship of harmony) which grounds multiplicity in creation as a theophany (Eriugena's third division of nature). Eriugena's solution to the one-many problem may be appealing insofar as creation's *telos* is the Neoplatonic return to unity, as Soto-Bruna claims, and not the disconcerting notion of the divine making an effable expression to understand its ineffable self.

In the fifth chapter, Nicola Polloni's « Nature, Souls, and Numbers: Remarks on a Medieval Gloss on Gundissalinus's *De Processione Mundi* » shows Gundissalinus's numerological take on creation which synchronizes al-Farabi's metaphysical procedure with Avicbron's universal hylomorphism and Avicenna's modal ontology through two demonstrations. Polloni shows how each proof is grounded in the 'reason of numbers', (i.e., if 'two', then 'one' must have preceded, but the converse is not necessarily true), such that if there is form and matter, 'two', then a single principle – God – must have preceded. Thus, the procession starts with 'one' as God, then 'two' as matter and form, then 'three' as genera of beings performing secondary causality (angels, spheres, and elements), and 'four' as sensible things which are generated and corrupted. Thus, the first demonstration shows « the completeness of the ontological order of the universe » (p. 86). The second, in which numbers one to four now refer to « very peculiar substances », is perplexing since it is a direct quote of Avicbron's *Fons vitae*, which contains a cosmology Gundissalinus rejected. One solution is to interpret the series as *psychological* and not *hypostatical*, but 'four' in this series

relates to 'nature' which is difficult to render as a *psychological* reading. This problem was recognized in the thirteenth century, resulting in a gloss which is deleted from critical editions. However, Polloni shows that the glossarist understood the passage well; it helpfully points to Gundissalinus's *De anima* which links the vegetative soul to the four powers of nature, thereby confirming the psychological interpretation. Thus, the gloss is crucial in seeing the second demonstration as « the completeness of the *gnoseological* faculties through which the universe is animated and discovered » (p. 86–87).

The sixth chapter is « Hermann de Carintia (Siglo XII): Una encrucijada en la explicación de la causalidad » by Elisabeth Reinhardt. Her goal is to 'revisit' Hermann de Carintia and advance the understanding of his specialized *De essentiis*. After a brief biography of Hermann and his relation to his teacher Thierry, Reinhardt gives an overview of the peculiar *De essentiis*. Using the precise definitions of *idem* and *diversum*, Herman provides a natural science demonstration for the primordial cause.<sup>1</sup> However, Hermann is a man of faith. Thus, he allows humans to obtain knowledge beyond human capacity through revelation from the Creator, « dándole acceso a realidades inalcanzables con el solo esfuerzo intelectual » (p. 95). The Trinitarian God is shown to be the transcendent cause of the universe through creation and generation, revealing Hermann's mixed usage of theology and natural science. By highlighting the similarities and differences between Hermann and his philosophical predecessors, while noting Hermann's terminological innovation, Reinhardt lays out the status of Hermann scholarship. After a quick overview of other authors citing Hermann, Reinhardt concludes that Hermann is not a theologian like his teacher Thierry, but « es un científico creyente que desarrolla razones naturales sin eclipsar el horizonte de la fe » (p. 102). To this end, she advances the conversation in recommending both thematic and historical future studies, e.g., a study on the harmony between faith/theology and reason/natural science and a study on what Hermann worked on after *De essentiis* and why Thierry never replied, respectively.

The seventh entry is Laura Corso de Estrada's « The Ciceronian Tradition of *Ius Naturae* in the Diffusion of the *Bonum*. The Lecture of Philip the Chancellor ». She shows how Philip the Chancellor developed a speculative notion of *natura* – combining unity and plurality – where the *natura* of man is both « part of the world and, the same time, emerging from it » (p. 105). For Philip, the unity of the world follows from two senses of *bonum*: first, a Neoplatonic sense where *esse* and *bonum* are the same and predicable of the divine essence; and second, a sense of

<sup>1</sup> The two pillars of his thought are precise meanings of *idem* and *diversum*, where *idem* includes *essentia* as the 'matter' of the rational soul and the immutable part of the universe and *diversum* includes *substantia* as the matter which designates the substrate of accidents and the changeable part of the universe (while *essentiae* refers to five immutable principles).

*bonum* as communicating being to all other things. Thus, the same *bonum* can be said of both God (directly) and created beings (indirectly). The question Philip wishes to answer is how creaturely participation in the divine *bonum* applies to human moral acts. Corso de Estrada analyzes the definition of virtue Philip attributes to Cicero as « the habit of the soul in harmony with the order of nature and reason » (p. 110). Philip's main issue is determining what *natura* and *ratio* say and how they find conformity in each other. Corso de Estrada argues that one of the primary medieval sources for the stoic thesis grounding morality in 'conformity with nature' is thus Cicero. Following the idea that *ius naturae* serves as a universal governing Logos, Philip claims that « reason is itself natural » or that « the ratio itself is like a certain nature » (p. 114). This explains how *bonum* is diffused through all created being and Cicero's virtue: « reason insofar as it is nature, is a certain principle » which disposes humans to perfect themselves (p. 114). Corso de Estrada gives a strong case for the primacy of Ciceronian influence on medieval natural law, and it would be interesting to see whether this fact can impact contemporary ethical discussions where reason is unhitched from nature.

Isabel María León-Sanz's chapter « La mediación creadora del Verbo, origen de las bellezas expresivas de las criaturas en S. Buenaventura » touches upon many of the themes prevalent in the following chapters. León-Sanz uses the notion of the Word as 'mediator' between God and creation – particularly creation as art and the Word's relation to creation's beauty – as an opportunity to better appreciate the scope of Bonaventure's doctrine. León-Sanz claims that the idea of creation as art in early Platonism took full root in later biblical contexts since 'la operación artística' allows creation to be intelligent, free, and distinct while related to the creator without anthropomorphizing God. She continues arguing that 'art' for Bonaventure can be « trasladar analógicamente a Dios » in two dimensions: first, as an operation from the Trinitarian character and second, a dispositive habit, namely the Word as the art of the Father. Thus, creating art – the creation – is an expression of the Trinity, while, within the Trinity, the Word proceeds from the Father's self-understanding as the image or art of himself. In linking the Word with the *ratio* of beauty, Buenaventura roots the beauty of creation in the three transcendentals – form, light, and truth – through the beauty of the Word. Consequently, it is through the dimension of art that creation is linked to God and fits the *exitus-reditus* theme: the Word is the art of God by whom God first created and redeemed the world and conversely through whom his creatures know and are renewed by God. In showing Platonic idea in Bonaventure, León-Sanz's article has a wide potential audience ranging from aesthetics to theology.

Juan José Herrera, in chapter nine, addresses Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of divine causality in artistic terms in « The Exemplarity of God: Between Nature and Intellect ». Citing *In Sententiarum*'s explanation that the form of a horse and

the form of life exist in God according to different modes, Herrera notes two major interpretations of God's exemplarity of created beings: the first maintains two distinct types of divine exemplarity in which the divine nature is the cause of *esse*, goodness, and life, while divine ideas are the cause of specific forms like 'horseness'; the second emphasizes the divine ideas which determine the exemplarity of the divine essence to guide the creative act. Herrera argues for a third integrated approach uniting God's essence and ideas by making the essence or the divine nature of God the *exemplar primum* and thus the ultimate source of exemplarity of divine ideas. God thus creates with his essence through the intellect and divine ideas: « God communicates the perfections of his nature according to certain measures that correspond to the created beings in his singularity. Life and truth are contained in the idea of the horse and the colour in terms of the similarity and differences they bear to the divine essence » (p. 144). Herrera sees this approach avoiding an unnamed Avicennian necessitarianism, preserving the freedom of God to create creatures that participate in his attributes while maintaining God's simplicity and perfection. Herrera's new approach solves the problems of others but will likely need to be defended from objections of anthropomorphizing God.

Alice Ramos provides the second entry on Thomas Aquinas, « The Human Person as *Imago Dei* and the Perfection of the Universe » to investigate the *exitus-reditus* theme (p. 146). The essay explores the different ways God's presence appears in all things and how God's likeness appears in his effects. Ramos explains Aquinas's account of God's immanence in creation, the *imago dei* in human souls, and angels as imitating aspects of the Trinity. However, the image within the human needs to be perfected to become like God (p. 151) leading to a discussion about the perfection of creation. Building upon the idea that higher bodies must contain lower bodies (e.g. the bodies of animals must contain the bodies of the elements), God contains all creatures *qua* simple before they are produced as corporeal creatures. Since creation is a diffusion of the divine goodness, the universe requires intellectual creatures (humans) to fully reflect God and his intellect. Still, all things imperfectly reflect their divine source and are only perfected upon returning to God. Ramos relates this to her investigation into the relationship between two instances of 'all in all': Apostle Paul's eschatological claim that after all things are subjected to Christ, then « God will be all in all »; and Aquinas's (Aristotelian) claim that after a spiritual substance cognitively comprehends all things (insofar as it is able) it will be 'all in all'. Intellectual souls' capacity to cognize all that exists is likened to God's knowledge of all things, which makes intellectual creatures more perfect especially as souls mirror the perfection of the universe in its return to God through their knowing « since they tie things together that are diverse and multiple into a unity (*colligatio*) » (p. 156). However, the human intellect will remain imperfect until its

complete return and 'seeing' or possessing of God who is 'all in all'. Ramos's account of the complete actualization of human intellectual potentiality conjures up thoughts about Islamic conceptions of separated souls and the continuation of personal identity which would be beneficial to see in dialogue.

Mirela Oliva concludes the volume by introducing the importance of the subject to contemporary discourse in the eleventh and final entry « Beauty and Meaning: From Aquinas to Gadamer and Nancy ». She challenges any separation between cognitive and aesthetic experiences by claiming that beauty is necessary in experiencing meaning. Her goal is to show that the « medieval paradigm of beauty » continues in Gadamer and Nancy through the actuality of being and the reflective nature of light. She begins by expounding Hans-Georg Gadamer's claim in *Truth and Method* that art « lost its cognitive and metaphysical value » under the scientific method (p. 160). Quoting Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*, Gadamer sees good, truth, and beauty as identical, since they are diffused by the Trinity, but differ insofar as goodness is desired by the appetite and beauty is assessed by the cognitive faculty. Oliva shows how Gadamer connects this medieval paradigm to Christ the *verbum* in the Neoplatonic tradition of light reproducing the *exitus-reditus*: « light originates in one source, but spreads itself on everything and comes back, as it were, from everything, as its reflection shines back from everything » (p. 163). Beauty is said to have the same 'reflective' nature as light, « beauty is visible only by making something else visible, namely the beautiful thing » (p. 164), which depicts the interior *verbum* traced back to God's mind. The result is language and meaning which depend upon the phenomenon of beauty. In the second section, Oliva shows how Jean-Luc Nancy also draws on Aristotle and Aquinas to link beauty and meaning in his concepts of *sens* and *signification* (a distinction, Oliva warns, English obscures).<sup>2</sup> Nancy also claims we have lost the 'sense of the world' since secularization has disconnected the world from its source of signification. The process of not seeing the world as 'having sense' reveals that the world is 'being sense'; thus sense precedes, succeeds, and exceeds signification because « sense is the opening of being, the manifestation of existence itself » (p. 167). In short, sense cannot be reduced to signification, as best illustrated through music, which differs from other art forms since it suppresses signification and reveals the 'circularity' of beauty and sense (meaning). Oliva concludes that meaning is not merely intellectual content (signification), but a process which makes signification possible through the manifestation of beauty. While Oliva's account should cause the reader to desire more aesthetics in their life, the article also shows how medieval ideas are more than historical peculiarities and can challenge contemporary discourse.

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<sup>2</sup> *Sens* covers the range from the five senses to a disposition and ultimately meaning, while *signification* covers the notion of indicating, being a sign, and also meaning.

In addition to a name index (p. 173–177) and author biographies (p. 179–182), *Causality and Resemblance: Medieval Approaches to the Explanation of Nature* offers a wide breadth of topics and interests that should provide something of interest to any scholar in medieval philosophy and theology, especially those with Neoplatonic interests. The collection does not pretend to serve as a comprehensive guide to the Neoplatonic one-many tradition, so readers should not expect to see a smooth, chronological evolution of Neoplatonic thought sweeping through the successive chapters. But the book provides punctuated accounts of the status and usage of Neoplatonic thought from various traditions at various stages prior to the Renaissance. Due to the breadth of thinkers covered, scholars may feel that attention to certain influential thinkers and works is lacking (e.g. Arabic thinkers or the *Liber De Causis*). The volume succeeds in its stated goal of sketching ‘major routes’ which address the unity and multiplicity of the Logos in creation and, as such, the authors are to be congratulated for contributing to this grand collection.

VANESSA BIGOT JULOUX, AMY REBECCA GANSELL, ALESSANDRO DI LUDOVICO (EDS.), *CYBERRESEARCH ON THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST AND NEIGHBORING REGIONS. CASE STUDIES ON ARCHAEOLOGICAL DATA, OBJECTS, TEXTS AND DIGITAL ARCHIVING*, LEIDEN–BOSTON, BRILL 2018 (DIGITAL BIBLICAL STUDIES, 2), XVIII + 458 PP., ISBN 9789004346741 (PBK) – 9789004375086 (EBK)

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In the wake of the first issue by Claire Clivaz, Paul Dilley and David Hamidović, in which the coeditors of the *Digital Biblical Studies* series took part, this second volume is dedicated to cyber-research applied to the investigation of ancient Near Eastern and surrounding areas from the Chalcolithic to Iron Age within the context of humanities. In a very uniform tone, most of the projects presented were first introduced in the annual meetings of the American Oriental Society (AOS), the American Society for Oriental Research (ASOR), and Computer Applications and Quantitative Methods in Archaeology (CAA).

In the introduction, the editors Vanessa Bigot Juloux, Amy Rebecca Gansell and Alessandro Di Ludovico replicate the previous issue's approach by pointing out the unquestionable aspects of DH research as well as the concepts that are still unstable or epistemologically difficult to settle in a certain domain. As regards the clear premises, digital research has two main purposes as in this volume: firstly, to shed light on information that has been omitted or discarded by the human eye for many years; and secondly, to supply data that can support old and new hypotheses made by experts from all branches of the humanities (archaeology, anthropology, art history, history, philology and literary studies) and to make it possible to interpret them from a interdisciplinary viewpoint.

As Clivaz, Dilley and Hamidović have already suggested, the use of a wide variety of new technologies is still very limited, which could lead to an academic gap between digital and non-digital researchers. That is why this whole series aims to prevent and remove the pernicious effects caused by such a split by providing very descriptive information to clarify concepts and terminological confusion. Therefore, each and every one of the eleven chapters that make up this issue starts with theoretical sections in which the basic concepts are defined for novices, the method is given in profuse detail and complex aspects are illustrated with examples. Moreover, several supplementary annexes are incorporated: Maps, Glossaries (CyberResearch/General), Index of Authors and

Researchers, Index of CyberResearch, and General Index (including terms associated with archaeology, history, geography, literature, philology and their methods).

Another goal set by Juloux, Gansell and Di Ludovico is to promote interdisciplinarity, blurring the Manichaean dividing line between sciences and the arts: « we hope that a computer scientist would be able to appreciate archaeological discussions and issues, an archaeologist would be able to follow philological analyses, and a humanities student would understand the logic and mechanisms of computer science techniques » (p. 2).

Among the hazy subjects to be illustrated in this issue, the editors underline the concept of DH itself: Aurélien Berra posed the question about its nature; Christine Borgman considered it to be the application of a set of technologies to deal with certain problems in humanities; Frederic Darbellay saw it as a junction between new information technologies and humanities disciplines; Matthew Krischenbaum together with Eileen Gardiner and Ronald Musto conceived digital humanities as a method but humanities computing as a field; while David Berry defined digital humanities as technical support for the work of the « 'real' humanities scholars » (p. 8).

Although the epistemological limits are still to be laid down, by selecting a more specific sub-matter to deal with, the authors have been able to establish a common thread and define the concept of cyber-research as the « investigations that rely on programming languages and/or mathematical formulas to relay data and instructions to a computer ». In humanities, the computer generates results that can be used to reassert or refute a hypothesis or illuminate new research topics.

From the macrostructural viewpoint, this volume is very well organized, which helps data retrieval in a very specific subject. It consists of four large sections: « Archaeology », « Objects », « Texts », and « Online Publishing, Digital Archiving and Preservation ». The strict division into sub-sections of content is also noteworthy (mainly theoretical framework, method, analysis and results that are graphically shown), enabling quick access to a sub-topic.

The first section, « Archaeology », deals with data coming from fieldwork activities, entire sites and landscape archaeology. It has two chapters: the first one is by Sveta Matskevich and Ilan Sharon with the title « Conceptual Framework for Archaeological Data Encoding » and the second by Marco Ramazzotti, Paolo Massimo Buscema and Giulia Massini, who present « Landscape Archaeology and Artificial Intelligence: the Neural Hypersurface of the Mesopotamian Urban Revolution ».

The first chapter focuses on the excavation records from Tel Dor, Israel, and reflects upon the conceptual basis of archaeological data recording. The study aims to obtain better digitalization, longer preservation and interoperability

through graph databases. For that purpose, the authors re-treat pen-and-paper data, sketch plans, detail drawings, ancient photographs and the first rudimentary site grid taken during the 1920s by great scholars in the field such as John Garstang, Joseph Leibowitz, Claudine Dauphin, Avner Raban, Ephraim Stern and others. Their project was launched in 2003 to bring together, register and broaden the available information with the « Southern Phoenicia Initiative » ontologies or thesauruses to be constructed. Both authors consider that the challenges they faced in the DOR PROJECT can be extrapolated to DH as a whole:

How can digital data be curated for the long term? Can meta-databases (for archaeology as well as for other disciplines and interdisciplinary projects) be constructed on a national or transnational scale? [...] What, if any, are the common denominators of all excavation-recording systems, or at least those of roughly compatible complexes, such as Near Eastern tell excavations? What should be the logical structure of a database that might accommodate all the permutations of such systems? (p. 29).

Taking into account that a post-processual field manual is still a chimera, the authors propose a meta-model that supports an 'agnostic' approach to field recording, starting by 'stripping' archaeological recording systems down to their basics and examining their elementary components.

In the second paper, Ramazzotti, in collaboration with Buscema and Massini, proposes using Artificial Adaptive Systems (AAS) on the Mesopotamian Urban Revolution Landscape (MURL) to create new analytical hypersurfaces that can reveal complex or unseen interrelations between settlement distributions and cultural, technological and economic variables between the Ubaid and Uruk periods of Babylonia, while exploring the possible connections between the high spatial variability of settlement organization and human mobility as well as inferences from settlement morphologies, distributions and dynamics. The authors point to a combination of Biological Modeling of the MURL (graph-algorithms were applied on a matrix generated by ANNs to predict the possible spatial localization of the Ebla Royal Mausoleums) and topological modeling (through a new data-mining procedure of the spatial semantics of the settlement distributions in the region between Ur and Uruk). The paper incorporates two very useful appendices: one for experimental and simulation procedures and another for topological weighted centroid basic definitions.

The second main section of this monograph, « Objects », shows a corpus of material culture. Like the first one, it is also made up of two parts: a contrastive one on the description of cylinder seal imagery and another that describes a productive synergy between programmers and archaeologists to determine the common attributes of figurines and ceramics from Turkey.

With respect to the potential of cylinder seals, the author of the third chapter, di Ludovico, « advocates for the contextualized interpretation of materials, since the lives and possible meanings of ancient artifacts are very dynamic, and their interpretation is equally dynamic and complex » (p. 86). He chooses cylinder seals as the axis of his research because these artifacts have a social and cultural purpose as testimonies to important administrative documents and events, and they establish a close relation to the user's body. After presenting former related projects, the *Repertoire analytique des cylindres orientaux* (Gardin, 1955) and the Cuneiform Digital Library Initiative (CDLI), the author offers a 425 specimen corpus of Mesopotamian cylinder seals dating from the Akkadian to the Ur III periods. The study's entire method is delicately described: from the imagery splitting into units with ANNs to the current use of statistical algorithms. Di Ludovico's « analysis of correspondence » surpasses the iconographic vision and incorporates the specific function for which the seal was designed, an approach that represents a turning point in the study of these artifacts and other material findings in general.

Later, in the fourth work, Shannon Martino and Matthew Martino apply a quantitative method to create typologies of qualitatively described objects. This standpoint is also found in other chapters of this volume (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Taking nothing for granted, these two authors justify their study by proving that cultural differences deducted from typologies come from a subjective previous taxonomy. To do so, they compare Late Chalcolithic and Early Bronze Age clay anthropomorphic figurines from Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey by creating a FileMaker database, and ceramic data from the Early Bronze Age. In terms of method, they avoid previous impositions and develop a series of independent attributes. For this purpose, they use a hierarchical clustering algorithm that guarantees accuracy and a more realistic treatment by each scholar that can measure the significance of both the unique and universal aspects of any piece. At the end of the chapter, a list of attributes is generously shared and explained.

The third section of the book, « Texts », is dedicated to Ugaritic, Sumerian and Akkadian as primary sources for information discovery. This is the longest one, spanning four chapters.

In Chapter 5, Juloux makes the case for the tremendous relevance of DH applied to the study of Ugaritic literature. To prove this, she selects the narrative stories in alphabetic cuneiform from the thirteenth century BCE where 50% of the text is missing in order to study the role of each character, examine how this hermeneutics of action works and insert empirical testimonies (annals and chronicles) into the study. From a very pragmatic viewpoint, her « actantial event » becomes very relevant as she considers that an analysis cannot be carried out by a text-oriented approach alone. She uses three analytical taxonomies to examine an actantial event (primary events, objective variables, and subjective

variables) and formulates them with TEI (Text Encoding Initiative) and data mining. In this paper, the author introduces an explanation of TEI-XML for novices, which gives the article a didactic application in spite of the complexity of using so many categories in this analysis: objective levels of study such as context, result, sphere, role and biological sex, and subjective ones such as consequence, emotion and its strength, and the degree of desire and voluntary intentionality with its degree of motivation.

In the next chapter, Émilie Pagé-Perron extrapolates network analysis, a method well established in life and social sciences, to her study of a large number of unannotated cuneiform texts in order to detect and visually represent patterns that could not be easily perceived using old methods. This proposal can be applied to teaching and disseminating information about Mesopotamian social history as the whole process (transcription, standardization, tokenization, lemmatization and information extraction) is explained to identify individuals of interest and group cores, then quantitatively isolate meaningful groups. According to Pagé-Perron, the main advantage of using quantitative analyses in Assyriological studies is the multiplicity of approaches and inquiries, the reproducibility and the strong evidence with which to provide the researcher to support an argument.

In Chapter 7, Saana Svärd, Heidi Jauhainen, Aleks Sahala and Krister Lindén examine two possible language technology methods for analyzing the semantic field in Akkadian. To do so, they use the Oracc (Annotated Cuneiform Corpus). These authors coincide with Martino and Martino and Pagé-Perron in encouraging a quantitative perspective for studying Ancient Near Eastern History, as they consider it broadens the possibilities for semantic and linguistic research. They propose a genuine 'emic' approach; that is, a native vision very close to Lakoff's 'experimental realism' (1987) that suggests that cognitive categories are embodied and have a strong link to a particular context. They used two types of software: Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI), a statistical method with which collocations can be identified and that is used to suggest syntagmatic semantic fields, and Word2vec, Natural Language Processing (NLP) software to align lexical units with numeric vectors to establish paradigmatic groups of words. By combining both, the interpretation of archaeological data is more reliable. This study is especially relevant as it opens the door to obtaining conclusive evidence of the existence of standardized contextual semantic frames for all languages.

Chapter 8, « Using Quantitative Methods for Measuring Inter-Textual Relations in Cuneiform » by M. Willis Monroe, shares with the former papers the importance of quantitative methods applied to digital humanities to « test intuition and assumptions about a body of textual material quickly and efficiently » (p. 257). The case study of this paper consists of a smaller cuneiform

corpus from Late Babylonia of astrological material from which the author aims to link ingredients used in medical treatment and the signs of zodiac. As it is damaged and incomplete, the quantitative method allows for a better understanding and depiction of the organization of the text. Much of the theory behind the methods employed in this chapter and in the field of digital humanities was first concretely laid out by Franco Moretti (2007), who advocated a form of « distant reading ».

This is the most informative paper of the volume as it includes a lot of explanations on techniques and the method of processing and textual analysis (everything from text objects, philological work, digital coding and analysis up to the final visualization) and a data subset that serves as an illustration. The variety of software used in the experiment is huge and the patterns discoverable here are applicable to other corpora: Language Python, Pandas and NumPy libraries for data processing, Matplotlib and Seaborn libraries, CountVectorizer, Gephi, SciPy library and the Unweighted Pair Group Method with arithmetic Mean (UPGMA).

The final touch to a very meticulous volume is the miscellaneous section entitled « Online Publishing. Digital Archiving and Preservation », in which the authors consider the possibility of making cyber-research data, methods and results freely accessible online.

Chapter 9, for instance, focuses on the problems of the « Epigraphic Interoperability of Digitized Texts of the Mediterranean and Near Eastern Regions for the First Millennium BCE ». The author, Doğu Kaan Eraslan, points out that although great efforts have been made with ancient texts, there have been very few initiatives to make them interact. For him, it is essential to understand the history of international relations in the ancient Mediterranean region from a holistic viewpoint that takes into account multilingualism in the area and the problem of multilingualism in data encoding (p. 283–284). Thus, he proposes a radical shift in the encoding schemes but taking what is seen as the encoding unit instead of what is read. This new premise can facilitate the compatibility of 2D forms. Eraslan also presents tools for digital epigraphers to solve the lack of multilingual interoperability. The author also recommends SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) as an XML-based language for describing 2D graphics and having experts in OCR technologies in DH projects. From his viewpoint, the perfect combination would be: EpiDoc, SVGs, Unicode, relative encoding schemes, and LD technologies.

In Chapter 10, Miller C. Prosser seeks to integrate archaeological data from the excavations by using the Online Cultural and Historical Research Environment (OCHRE), which allows the linear transcription to be broken down into individual signs or letters and to use analytical wizards to find words in project dictionaries, add grammatical properties to the words and identify people and places in the

texts. Another advantage it offers is that it leads researchers all around the world to access data in real time to recompose, import and analyze texts. Prosser wants RSTI to become a digital publication platform for all text editions (including information about the location where the tablets containing texts were found, their dimensions and other physical characteristics; text transliteration; a translation; specific epigraphic commentary; commentary on structure and interpretation; and bibliographic references). He recommends using a semi-structured item-based data model to make it possible for each individual unit to have a universally unique key. In this way, the data are more broken down, organized and described, so they can be accessed and recombined quite easily. In fact, Prosser's paper is a « model of modeling » texts in a database for the researcher and the interested general public.

In the final chapter, Terhi Nurmikko-Fuller examines the adequacy of three ontologies to represent and capture data from the Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature (ETCSL). The ones studied in this chapter are: CIDOC CRM (cultural heritage), FRBROO (bibliographic information) and ONtoMedia (OM) (narrative in multi-media). Assyriologists face terrible problems in accessing heritage. Apart from the armed conflict itself, not all of the interesting data are stored online. That is why the author suggests that the Internet publication of object metadata and high-resolution images with translations and transliterations can contribute to amalgamating partial information silos and surmounting the difficulties of distance. These new technologies shed light on patterns and unnoticed details of the ancient Sumerian literary compositions (p. 361).

As a conclusion, the new applications of all the technologies discussed in this volume are very promising since long-term storage of information, re-use and the discovery of new patterns are guaranteed. Of course there is still a need for better coordination and standardization of encoding processes to permit interoperability. Nevertheless, enriching interdisciplinarity and new didactic possibilities for general audiences could be possible by recycling the results coming from the « slow orthodox method » of humanities that will be put together in more democratic platforms for the transfer of knowledge thanks to works such as those presented in Digital Biblical Studies.



ANTOINE CALVET, *L'ALCHIMIE AU MOYEN ÂGE: XII<sup>E</sup>–XV<sup>E</sup> SIÈCLES*, VRIN, PARIS 2018 (ÉTUDES DE PHILOSOPHIE MÉDIÉVALE, 107), 282 PP., ISBN 9782711628384.

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*L'alchimie au Moyen Âge* is a scholarly book written in French aiming at providing a solid introduction to the discipline of medieval alchemy (12<sup>th</sup>–15<sup>th</sup> cent.). Yet, the word 'introduction' should not mislead any prospective reader, since the book contains a profound richness of knowledge which could also satisfy an expert of the field. Antoine Calvet, being a well-known and experienced scholar on medieval alchemy, vouches for the undisputable quality of his book, which is comprised of six chapters – introduction and conclusion included.

In the introduction, Calvet provides us with the appropriate background for entering the world of medieval alchemy. At the very beginning, he states the objective of his book, which concerns the history of the practitioners and the theorists of medieval alchemy. Subsequently, Calvet describes basic concepts and theories pertinent to the alchemy of that period, such as the theories of sulphur-mercury and of the two natures of metals, which are necessary for understanding alchemical procedures. In the last part of the introduction, Calvet deals with the techniques of translation acquired during the twelfth century, the pre-alchemical texts, the connection between alchemy and social and historical factors, and the manuscript tradition of alchemical texts.

The first chapter is dedicated to the reception of Arabic alchemy in the Western World during the twelfth century. Therefore, the main protagonists of this chapter are *Morienus* and the texts of Hermes Trismegistus. The author offers a rich and up-to-date account of *Morienus*, adducing a detailed description of its content and its impact on other works, as well as trying to draw connections between this text and the *Responsiones Aros philosophi ad Nephes regem*. Then, he considers the texts of Hermes Trismegistus by laying a focus on the *Tabula Smaragdina*, the *Septem tractatus*, and the *Liber Hermetis*. Finally, he presents the *Secretum secretorum* – a text which had a great impact on medieval alchemical literature – through the lens of Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon, and Hortulanus.

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The second chapter brings to the foreground the Arabic authors who were translated into Latin. The chapter is divided in two sub-chapters – the first entitled « practical alchemy », and the second « mytho-poetical alchemy ». In the first context, Calvet places the Latin Geber, Rhazes, and Avicenna, whereas in the second one finds the *Turba philosophorum*, *Tabula chemica*, *Liber quartorum Platonis*, and the texts of Artefius. In the first set of texts, Calvet rightly distinguishes between the genuine and the pseudo-texts of Rhazes and Avicenna.

The third chapter is the heart of the book, since it focuses on the most important period of medieval alchemy – that is, the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The chapter is comprised of three sub-chapters: the first dealing with the alchemy of the thirteenth century, the second with that of the fourteenth, and the last one with what Calvet calls « diversified » alchemy.

In the first sub-chapter, Calvet exposes his material through the lens of scholasticism. At the beginning he shows the relation between alchemy and medieval universities and scholars; then, he deals with individual alchemical authors of the thirteenth century. In particular, he presents the cases of Michael Scot, Albert the Great and pseudo-Albert, Vincent de Beauvais, Thomas Aquinas and pseudo-Thomas, Constantinus of Pisa, Roger Bacon and pseudo-Bacon, and lastly pseudo-Geber with his *Summa perfectionis*.

Next, the author considers the alchemy of the fourteenth century. He provides an introduction to Franciscan alchemy, arguing that Franciscans favoured and fostered medieval alchemy. Then, he analyzes the cases of (pseudo-) Arnald of Villanova, (pseudo-)Raymond Lull, John Dastin, Johannes de Rupescissa, and Petrus Bonus. Afterwards, he offers an insight into the adversaries of alchemy by presenting individual authors (Pietro d'Abano, Gilles of Rome), religious bans, and the position of the Canonists.

The chapter ends with what Calvet has named « diversified » alchemy, in which he includes alchemists whose work was of an experimental character and diverged from traditional sources like those of pseudo-Arnald and pseudo-Lull. Following this line of thought, he discusses the cases of Walter of Odington, Philippe Èlèphant, and Guillaume Sadacer.

In the fourth chapter, Calvet takes into account the last period of the Middle Ages, treating the alchemy of the fifteenth century. He starts his *exposé* with the subject of iconography and how it evolved in alchemical manuscripts from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. Subsequently, he touches upon the matter of alchemical translations into the vernacular, explaining how alchemy was diffused and portrayed through Italian, French, and English literature. In this respect, he analyses the cases of George Ripley and Thomas Norton. At the end of the chapter, he introduces us to liturgical alchemy through the text of Melchior de Sibiu, in which alchemy is associated with the sacraments.

Finally, in the conclusion, Calvet draws connections among the aforementioned chapters and highlights the main points of each chapter.

When it comes to the evaluation of the book, one cannot but praise it, due to the richness of its virtues. First of all, this work does not belong to a certain historiographical tradition – that is, it is not coloured by a historiographical approach like that of history of science or of psychoanalysis – and therefore Calvet has indeed succeeded in presenting an unbiased historical account. In order to preserve the historical character of the book, the author offers detailed descriptions of the content of the works, a very up-to-date account of the state of the art, and lastly he provides much information on the manuscript tradition of the texts he takes into consideration. All this makes the volume suitable to be read not only by students but also by advanced scholars. In the same strand, it helps that the author provides many footnotes with the aim of either defining or clarifying alchemical concepts and ideas – whereas, on the other hand, he adduces Latin excerpts of many alchemical texts for those who want to immerse themselves into a deeper level of the study of the sources. As far as the bibliography is concerned, the author is perfectly informed and makes good use of all the European and American research that has been conducted thus far on this topic.

Before I close this review, I would like to stress three points of this book which are of great value. Firstly, Calvet makes a sharp distinction between the genuine and the pseudo-texts – which is extremely important in the cases of Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon, Arnald of Villanova, and Raymond Lull. In this way, a reader who has no prior experience in medieval alchemy does not fall into fallacies or misconceptions when it comes to the actual opinion and alchemical approach of each medieval writer.

Secondly, I find it very interesting that Calvet implicitly distinguishes between Dominican and Franciscan attitudes towards alchemy. Of course, he does not speak of two different ‘schools’ of alchemy, but he makes it clear enough that the two mendicant orders had a different approach and ‘use’ of alchemy.

Finally, I would like to stress the way through which Calvet presents the state of the art of each alchemical author or case. Calvet does not try to settle cases which are ambivalent when it comes to matters of authenticity or interpretation. This attitude adds more value to the book, since the reader is not influenced by Calvet’s position and is allowed to create his/her own’s opinion.

To sum up, I find Calvet’s volume an excellent read and a fundamental introductory work to medieval alchemy studies. Calvet presents his material in a historical way and this makes his book suitable for scholars of all different kinds of disciplines. The only problem with this work could be that it is only available in French: an English translation would result in its reaching a larger audience and therefore receiving greater credit.



JULES L. JANSSENS, *AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON IBN SĪNĀ. SECOND SUPPLEMENT (1995-2009)*, ARIZONA CENTER FOR MEDIEVAL STUDIES, TEMPLE AZ 2017 (MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE TEXTS AND STUDIES, 439), XVI + 736 PP., ISBN 9780866984874

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In the East and the West the work of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) has been highly valued for centuries and scholarship has been productive, especially in recent years. Adequate tools are required to process the large amount of information and bibliographies are the most common instrument for this. But very often, bibliographies do not advise the researcher about the contents and possible value of the publication, and so there is great need for bibliographies containing notes on each edition or study, and on the import of the publication.

Jules Janssens first published an annotated bibliography on Avicenna in 1991 with Leuven University Press (358 p.), scrutinizing the period 1970–1989. In 1999, the same publisher printed the first supplement comprising the years 1990–1994 (218 p.). In only five years, scholarly activity had grown so much that a supplement was already needed.

The reviewed book has 736 pages and 1970 entries to cover another fifteen years of Avicennian editions and studies. Janssens has organized it in seventeen chapters and complemented it with the necessary indexes.

Chapter I deals with editions and translations of Avicenna's works, which are the essential tools for any research.

Section I. (« Works, Editions and Translations »), A. (« Major Philosophical Works »), 2. (« *al-Shifā'* ») concerns the *Shifā'*, i.e. Avicenna's encyclopedia of the sciences as they are needed for the health of the soul, which, together with the *Qānūn*, for the health of the body, constitutes his main work. The *Shifā'* was first printed in Tehran in 1303–1305/1886–1887, in two volumes, and the edition has been reprinted; at times, the edition was retyped, and the publisher incorrectly presented it as a brand-new edition. Muḥammad 'Uthmān, for instance, claimed to have prepared a new edition of the logical parts of the *Shifā'* (Cairo 2008) on a manuscript basis, but he actually reproduced the Tehran text, which had been reprinted again in Tehran in 1405/1984, as Janssens shows (p. 4). The *Metaphysics of the Shifā'* has drawn most attention, and here again Janssens helps us to distinguish between real and fake editions. For instance, 'Abd al-Raḥīm al-

Sā'ih published the *Ilāhiyāt* (Cairo 2009), claiming that it was a new edition and that he had used unnamed Iranian manuscripts. Janssens proves that this is a copy of an Iranian edition by Ḥasanzādeh al-Āmolī (Qom 1375H/1417HQ/1997), who indeed relied on manuscripts, although his work does not abide by academic standards (Janssens, p. 5).

Section I.A.2.D. deals with Avicenna Latinus. For medieval and Renaissance scholars, the Latin translations of Avicenna are the gateway to the reception of his philosophy and medicine. In this respect, Janssens records the publication of the *Liber primus naturalium. Tractatus secundus. De motu et de consimilibus* (Brussels 2006), the latest volume of the project *Avicenna Latinus* (p. 36). The Belgian project aims at the critical edition of the Latin versions of the *Shifā'*. It was initiated by Simone van Riet who edited the first eight volumes, in addition to a ninth volume contributed by Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, dedicated to the manuscript tradition. Simon van Riet passed away when she was working on the tenth volume and Janssens is now carrying the main responsibility for it, taking care of the edition of the treatise on motion (and place and time), corresponding to the second part of Avicenna's division of the *Naturalia* ('Natural Matters'). Of course, the section on Latin translations comprises many other entries, some of them related to the Belgian project.

Section I.A.3. considers other major philosophical writings. Janssens has been able to describe editions, many of them in Iran, whose existence is difficult to discover or to check. The section includes translations – in this respect, I would like to point to the references the author makes to the Syriac tradition of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt* ('Indications and Admonitions') (p. 61).

*Al-Nukat wa-l-Fawā'id* ('Notes and Observations') is a recapitulation of Avicenna's philosophical doctrines. Janssens deals with the issue of its authorship and concludes that it is an apocryphal work – a view that is not shared by all scholars. The information given (p. 69–70) focuses on all the aspects of the *al-Nukat*, a lesser-known work that deserves more attention.

Section I.B. is dedicated to Avicenna's major medical writings. Avicenna's medicine was influential on the East and the West for centuries. We find details about editions and translations of his *Canon* and other works; I would like to point out those related to the Hebrew tradition, such as the research done by L. Ferre Cano and Chaim Rabin (p. 77–78).

Section I.C. treats Avicenna's minor works. Avicenna's philosophy seems to be unrelated to Islamic issues, but the impression is wrong since he had a concern for the Qur'an and its interpretation that resulted in various writings. Janssens has done research on Avicenna's Qur'anic commentaries and the reader will find information on sources and scholarship at p. 124–128. Here, Janssens has included a chapter of *Varia*. The reader will find there the *Mi'rāj Nāme-ye Abū 'Alī*

*Sīnā* ('The Book of Ascent') ascribed to Avicenna and the scholarly debate on its authorship (p. 138–140).

The bulk of the bibliography is dedicated to published research on Avicenna, his disciples, and his aftermath. Because of the global interest in Avicenna, the massive amount of secondary literature makes its examination very difficult and time-consuming. Janssens's bibliography helps the scholar to focus on the articles and books relevant to research because he has gathered almost everything written on Avicenna, including bibliographies. Each item in the catalogue is followed by an abstract and a critical comment.

Chapters II–V comprise general studies. The inclusion of Avicenna in general studies of many philosophical topics and in various languages confirms the outstanding position he holds in the history of philosophy (see, in particular, Chapter V, p. 159–186).

Chapter VI deals with logic, noetics, and philosophy of science. Although Avicenna's metaphysics has been the main subject of interest for a long time, also other branches of knowledge attract the researchers. Concerning logic and the division of the sciences, I would like to refer to the discussion on intuitive knowledge and on abstraction analyzed in several contributions (e.g. Peter Adamson, Syamsuddin Arif, Dimitri Gutas, Dag N. Hasse, Gabriel Lahood, Jon McGinnis, Parviz Morewedge, Rahmat Allāh Rezāyī, et al.).

Chapter VIII focuses on psychology, pedagogy, and anthropology. The Avicennian doctrine of the soul has had great significance. Mehdi Aminrazavi, Attie Filho, Devorah Black, Sayyid M.A. Dībajī, Carla DiMartino, Robert E. Hall, Alfred Ivry, Jari Kaukua, Michael Marmura, Meryem Sebtī, among others, have written on the matter and Janssens gives an accurate account of their contributions. A few other scholars have written on the political philosophy of Avicenna. These include Miklos Mároth, Abu l-Fazl Shakūrī and Olga Lizzini, and the reader is properly informed.

No doubt metaphysics (Chapter X) is the philosophical discipline in which Avicenna far outstrips his predecessors, to the point of being considered the founder of 'ontology' (Gerard Verbeke). Articles by Allan Bäck, Amos Bertolacci, M. Cruz Hernández, Tiana Koutzarova, Michael Marmura, Parviz Morewedge, J. Puerta Vílchez, Giuseppe Roccaro, Robert Wisnovsky, et al. focus on this subject and there could be even more, so important has been Avicenna's position.

Avicenna's mysticism (Chapter XI) is an issue that has been discussed for a long time and Janssens lists the various contributions to the discussion (p. 351–376). I would like to point to Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal and his interpretation of the contemplative vision in the *Ishārāt*, the well-known criticism of Dimitri Gutas, and the synthetical article of Rafael Ramón on Avicenna as the link between East and West.

Chapters XII-XIV of Janssens's bibliography extend to the sources of Avicenna, his relationship to other Arab thinkers, and to his influence on the West. We learn about the research of Amos Bertolacci, Marienza Benedetto and Cristina D'Ancona concerning the reception of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Abraham D. Stone elucidates the influence of Simplicius as does Robert Wisnovsky with the Neoplatonists.

Chapter XIII deals with Avicenna and other Arab philosophers. I would like to mention Ahmed H. al-Rahim's contribution on Avicenna's disciples, that by Alnoor Dhanani on the relationship between Avicenna and 'Abd al-Jabbār, Gerhard Endress's study on the chains of transmission, and several others on Avicenna's influence upon other Islamic thinkers. A relevant point is the controversial relationship with al-Ghazzālī, on which we find articles by Frank Griffel, Jules Janssens, and others.

In Chapter XIV, the author expounds the influences of Avicenna upon the West (Medieval, Modern, and Contemporary), upon Jewish thought, and Syriac and Byzantine philosophers. As expected, the section devoted to Avicenna's impact on the Latin philosophers of the Middle Ages is the largest (p. 489-572). Most of the studies are dedicated to Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, but one finds also contributions on Meister Eckhart, William of Auvergne, Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent, Dominicus Gundissalinus, Dietrich von Freiberg, Henry Bate, and Roger Bacon. Among the many scholars, Dag N. Hasse should be mentioned for his meticulous studies on the influence of Arabic and Islamic philosophy on the Latin West, and that of Avicenna in particular.

Chapter XV focuses on natural sciences and Chapter XVI on medicine. Many oriental authors have recently contributed to the study of these aspects and Janssens gives us an account of their publications, many of which in Persian or Turkish. The bibliography covering publications in Oriental languages is a major strength of Janssens's project and one wishes it could be larger.

The publication is available in hard-copy, although it would be much more useful in an electronic form. The reader may not necessarily agree with all the judgments, but the bibliographical data are correct and the summaries fully reliable, making the book a required instrument for research not only on Avicenna but also on Islamic philosophy.



