

cómo la noción de pecado afecta al carácter de las personas, tanto en su dimensión moral como psicológica, de igual modo que la noción de gracia afecta a la responsabilidad moral

Para concluir, una reflexión crítica: evidentemente, las cuestiones éticas no tienen en la historiografía medieval el peso que merecen, constituyendo una asignatura pendiente que se hace necesario subsanar. Sin embargo, a las propuestas que ahora se formulan cabe hacerles una objeción. ¿Hasta qué punto las cuestiones éticas están condicionadas por una previa interpretación histórica de la noción de progreso, que ahora se sobreentiende, pero no se termina de justificar? Por ejemplo, cuando se sitúa a Agustín y Boecio en una primera fase de la filosofía medieval, en razón del estilo literario personal de su pensamiento, mientras que la filosofía escolástica del siglo XIII y XIV ya sería una filosofía académica mejor formalizada, que no necesitaría recurrir a este tipo de estrategias literarias. Realmente, ¿una recuperación de las cuestiones éticas por parte de la historiografía medieval debe comenzar relegando a un periodo todavía no consolidado las grandes aportaciones de Agustín de Hipona?

RICHARD CAMPBELL, *Rethinking Anselm's Arguments: A Vindication of his Proof of the Existence of God*, Leiden and Boston, Brill, 2018, 535 pp., ISBN: 9789004363663

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Since Anselm first published his *Proslogion* in in the late 1070s, two things have generally been assumed: first, that his argument for the existence of God is a form of what later became known as an ontological argument; and, second, that this argument resided in Chapter 2 of a 26-chapter work. Campbell's latest book challenges both of these, demonstrating with convincing force that the latter is false and the former unlikely. Consequent to this challenging of the status quo, as the book's subtitle suggests, Campbell provides a persuasive vindication of Anselm's arguments, to the point of declaring them a valid proof for the existence of God.

Of course, at least part of this argument is not new. Over forty years ago Campbell himself published *From Belief to Understanding*, which articulates the theory that Anselm's argument is not to be found in chapter 2 (I will refer from now on to Anselm's chapters as P2, P3, etc.) alone – and in this he was not entirely alone.¹ We should not make the mistake, however, of thinking that the present book is either a re-statement of the argument of *From Belief*, nor is it a sequel, so to speak, that builds upon the first. It is, instead, better

¹ La Croix, for instance, suggests that not only is the work not contained within the second chapter, but that it is found within the entire work. Cf. R. La Croix, *Proslogion II and III: A Third Interpretation of Anselm's Argument*, Leiden, Brill, 1972.

thought of as a completely new enterprise in its own right, though not without reference to the former.

The book begins with a complete translation of *P2-4*, a nice point of reference for the discussion that follows. This is particularly useful given the density and length of argument and analysis throughout the majority of the book, providing a frame of reference to which both author and audience can connect at each point.

Having given the text of *P2-4*, Campbell then embarks on a step-by-step analysis of each line of Anselm's original argument, expounding and examining each in great detail, in search of the argument as intended. Along the way he is careful to refer to alternative views, translations, and interpretations given by other commentators, and does not shy away from addressing head on the differences of interpretation. Chapter 3 outlines the structure of Anselm's argument as a three-stage argument: stage one (found in *P2*) argues that something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought exists in reality; stage two (first half of *P3*) concludes that this same thing exists so truly it can not be thought *not* to exist; and stage three (second half of *P3*) identifies this thing with God. This structure is then elucidated and analysed in the remaining chapters 4 and 5 given to the first stage, 6 and 7 to the second, and chapter 8 to the third. Campbell then turns to Anselm's critics, addressing Gaunilo's famed 'lost island' critique (Ch. 9), before considering the validity of the slightly different argument Anselm gives in his reply to Gaunilo (Ch. 10). If we take these last two endeavours as building on the first – and I think we are justified in doing so – we can see that the task of fully two thirds of the book is given over to a demonstration of the validity of Anselm's argument. An herculean task, which Campbell accomplishes admirably.

Campbell's argument so far is plausible, and so one is necessarily drawn to consider whether Anselm's premises are themselves reasonable. This is the natural next step for Campbell, since he has been at some pains to show the validity of Anselm's argument, and so the question of the plausibility of the premises must be considered if Campbell's proposed vindication is to be successful. Having argued for their plausibility in chapter 11, the last two chapters respectively consider the character of Anselm's argument and give an overview of the remainder of the *Proslogion*.

This discussion is inevitably wide-ranging, touching upon such corners of philosophy as Keith Donnellan's critique of Russell's theory of definite descriptions (Ch. 4) and W. O. Quine's critique of second-order logic (Ch. 11), but at no point does the reader feel the argument has strayed from the point, an impressive feat in any circumstance. Given this breadth of discussion, however, it is impossible to give a summary of all the ins and outs of Campbell's arguments, and so I restrict myself here to three aspects of the book which I think worthy of note.

Crucial to Campbell's argument is his claim that the argument for the existence of God is to be found not in *P2*, but in the subsequent chapter as well. In order to argue this, Campbell gives a commendable consideration to Anselm's position as a monk, and to his work as being formally structured as a prayer to God. This allows Campbell to notice that

when, at the end of *P2*, Anselm shifts from talking in the third person to the first, that this does not precipitate an end of argument. But neither does Campbell fail to notice that there is also a subtle shift of perspective as Anselm moves from speaking of what is in the Fool's mind to what is in his. Highlighting this shift, Campbell shows that, far from being a form of argumentative sleight of hand, it is both valid and plausible, since the Fool's statement is the beginning of an argument made by Anselm himself, a point crucial to Anselm's line of thought.

Following on from this, Campbell argues that, for Anselm, it matters that the propositions considered are *in fact* thought and/or believed. This is important because it grounds Anselm's argument in reality by taking as its foundation actual beliefs and thoughts. This means that when, in the penultimate chapter, Campbell turns to the suggestion that Anselm's argument is not an ontological argument, but in fact a *cosmological* argument, the stage is already set. Campbell's argument is essentially that certain premises of Anselm's argument hinge on whether they are actually being thought. Thus a proposition to the effect that *x* can not be thought to exist is empirically verifiable or falsifiable. So too is the claim that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought cannot be thought not to exist' (p. 441). Campbell then demonstrates that Anselm's claim that whatever is other than God can be thought not to exist is both crucial to his argument, and *a posteriori*. He then shows, on pages 439-445, that this renders the entire argument a unique form of the cosmological argument, repudiating nearly a thousand years of interpretation of Anselm's argument as ontological. This is perhaps the most fascinating point in Campbell's work, but it is also inextricable from the rest of the work, relying as it does on the assumption that Campbell is correct in saying Anselm's original argument continues from *P2* through to *P4*.

The book should also be praised for its appendix, which brings together Anselm's inferences in their entirety, providing both a handy and necessary reference point for an argument spread out across five or so chapters. There is little to be unhappy with in this book, though the typographical errors are frequent enough to be irritating. I have only two minor quibbles, neither significant. The first is that, given Campbell's frequent recourse to Anselm's original Latin – and given the translations are usually either his or his variation on another's translation – it would have been beneficial to provide the full Latin text of *P2-4* alongside the full English, for reference and comparison by the reader. The second quibble is that, at times, the argument becomes so far-ranging it could be plausibly suggested that Campbell's vindication of Anselm is a vindication by means of Campbell's own argument, not an elucidation of Anselm's own thought. This is, I believe, not the case, since Campbell takes great pains to link his own argument to Anselm's actual thinking, and at any rate this is the danger for any and all commentators, so too much should not be placed on this comment.

On the whole the book is impressively thorough for a topic so large and a book just topping five hundred pages. Reading the introduction one finds that the book originated in an attempt to write a journal article reflecting on the state of Anselm studies forty years after his original book on the subject, and is immediately reminded of Locke's intention

to put a few thoughts together and ending up with his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. It is conceivable that the present work will share with Locke's 'few thoughts' not just the circumstances under which it was begun, but the popularity and influence within its discipline – no less is deserved.

Rabí JOSEPH B. SOLOVEICHIK, *Maimónides, entre la filosofía y la Halajá*, traducción de Javier Guerrero, Barcelona, Alpha Decay, 2018, 347 pp., ISBN: 9788494821028

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La obra tiene un doble interés: conocer una etapa hasta ahora desconocida del rabino Soloveichik (1903-1933) y aproximarse desde un punto de vista fenomenológico a la vivencia personal de lo divino (la halajá) en Maimónides (1135-1204). Por su parte Gerard Homnick recopiló en un cuaderno de 375 páginas las anotaciones tomadas durante el curso sobre la *Guía de perplejos* impartido por Soloveichik en la Revel School, mientras que Lawrence J. Kaplan habría ordenado y presentado la primera parte de dichas anotaciones en el marco evolutivo del pensamiento de Soloveichik. Especialmente se resalta su tránsito desde considerarse un experto en la Torah y el Talmud, hasta su interés por la filosofía de la religión en clave fenomenológica a partir de Kant y el idealismo cognitivo, como fue el caso de Solomon Mainon o Hermann Cohen. Todo ello justifica el interés mostrado en el curso 1950-1951 por el considerado mejor representante del pensamiento judío, que habría sabido distanciarse de los planteamientos convencionales de otras religiones relativos a las relaciones entre la fe y la razón, anteponiendo la propia autenticidad personal. Después, en los años 60, pasaría a interesarse casi exclusivamente por el pensamiento existencial de Kierkegaard y de Heidegger.

Según Soloveichik, la vivencia espiritual de la halajá se sitúa por encima de los criterios meramente culturales del saber estrictamente científico, filosófico o incluso religioso. De este modo al final es posible postular una superación por elevación de las aparentes contradicciones que puedan surgir entre las verdades religiosas y las científicas, sin necesidad tampoco de tener que defender una teoría de la doble verdad o de la eternidad del mundo. Especialmente cuando se comprueba que la vivencia espiritual de la halajá pertenecería a un ámbito de creencias personales con un valor fenomenológico muy superior, mientras que la religión, la filosofía o la ciencia serían productos culturales con un valor muy relativo. De ahí que Maimónides o el propio Soloveichik, pudieran ser enormemente críticos respecto de todo este tipo de saberes, sin por ello tener que cuestionar los principios básicos desde los que la halajá interpreta la Torah y el Talmud.

Soloveichik nos presenta así a un doble Maimónides: Por un lado, el practicante de la Torah y del Talmud desde la vivencia espiritual personal de la halajá; y, por otra, el científico y filósofo aristotélico enormemente crítico con sus propias propuestas, pero