

**THE UNITY OF THE SOUL: METAPHYSICS, PSYCHOLOGY  
AND PROBLEMS IN THE FIRST JESUIT PARISIAN  
LECTURE ON THE SOUL (1564)\***

**LA UNIDAD DEL ALMA: METAFÍSICA, PSICOLOGÍA Y  
PROBLEMAS EN LA PRIMERA LECCIÓN JESUITA  
PARISINA SOBRE EL ALMA (1564)**

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**Abstract**

The paper reconstructs the conception of the soul by the Spanish Jesuit Juan Maldonado, one of the first Jesuits who lectured on the Aristotelian *De anima*, through the analysis of the synthesis of the lectures he gave in Paris. Maldonado maintains the definition of the soul as form of the body but also suggests that there are more forms in the human compound. The paper aims to solve this tension through the comparison with the later *De anima* by Francisco Suárez.

**Keywords**

Science of the Soul; Soul's Unity; Hylomorphism; Jesuit Philosophy; Renaissance Aristotelianism

**Resumen**

El artículo reconstruye la concepción del alma del jesuita español Juan Maldonado, uno de los primeros jesuitas que disertó sobre el aristotélico *De anima*, a través del análisis de la síntesis de las lecciones que impartió en París. Maldonado mantiene la definición del alma como forma del cuerpo,

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pero también sugiere que hay más formas en el compuesto humano. El trabajo pretende resolver esta tensión a través de la comparación con el posterior *De anima* de Francisco Suárez.

### Palabras clave

Ciencia del alma; unidad del alma; hilomorfismo; filosofía jesuita; aristotelismo renacentista

## 1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to present the conception of the soul elaborated by Juan Maldonado (1533–1583), a Jesuit belonging to one of the first generations of scholars of the Society of Jesus, in his compendium *On the Origin, the Nature and the Immortality of the Soul* (1564). In his text, we can identify some characteristic patterns of the Jesuit production of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, such as the independence of the intellect from the senses; the tendency to eliminate the traditional distinction between agent and passive intellect; a particular account of primary matter, considered as something actual and extended, as also the view that the soul needs, for entering (and leaving) the body, certain material dispositions (§2). These patterns are already present in Maldonado.<sup>1</sup> His text records what might be conceived of as the beginning of a Jesuit tradition that is a way of accounting for the soul's structure and powers, which will become typical of the Jesuit production of the following years. The examples of the relations between the soul and its powers (§2) or of the overstressed autonomy of the intellect from the senses (§3.1) are peculiar in this respect: from a general perspective, in that they show the anti-Thomistic vein of Maldonado. From a more historical, contextual perspective, it is the same fundamenetal thinking which will ground other Jesuits' works – such as Bento Perera's, Francisco de Toledo's, Girolamo Dandini's, Francisco Suárez's<sup>2</sup> –, although often giving rise to different developments in each

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<sup>1</sup> For a recent discussion of the common features of Jesuit psychology amongst first generations, see Daniel Heider, “Jesuit Psychology and the Theory of Knowledge”, in *Jesuit Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity*, edited by C. Casalini (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 115–134 and Anna Tropia, “Jesuit Psychology, Early Modern”, in *Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences. Living Edition*, edited by D. Jalobeanu and Ch. Wolfe (Cham: Springer, 2020: [http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20791-9\\_579-1](http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20791-9_579-1)).

<sup>2</sup> The fortune of these 16<sup>th</sup> century Jesuits is diverse. Bento Perera (Valencia 1536–Rome 1610) taught in Rome at the Roman College, where he was involved in controversies due to his alleged Averroism. His most influential work is the treatise *De communibus omnium rerum naturalium* (Rome, 1576). On his conception of primary matter, which has some points in common with the other Jesuits here mentioned, see Robert Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2015), 21–22 and 66–71. Francisco de Toledo (Cordoba 1534–Rome 1596) studied and taught in Salamanca before moving to the Roman College. In Rome, he started a brilliant diplomatic career.

author. Furthermore, analyzing the structure of the soul at the gates of modernity enables us to better understand old problems tied to the concept of the soul: as principle of life, as principle of activity, as organizing principle of the body and, at the same time, aporetically, as what survives the body. But this analysis also shines a light on new problems, received from anti-Thomistic scholastic traditions, which arose from the Lateran Council's agenda and from the dissemination of new physical accounts of the world and its structure.

Concerning the soul's structure, this paper will analyze some claims by Maldonado that are difficult to understand, owing to the form of the text which has come down to us on the one hand (§1), and to the general framework adopted by Maldonado himself on the other (§2). As the *De origine, natura et immortalitate animae* (=DONIA) is a synthesis of his courses, it does not transmit a complete exposition on the *scientia de anima* and some points are merely mentioned by Maldonado almost *en passant*. This is the case with the actuality of prime matter (§2), with the vital activities of the soul's powers, and with the intellect's activity (§3.1). Maldonado seems here to take an explicit stand against Aquinas, and in particular against his conception of the union of soul and body as an *unum per se*. His text is full of Franciscan echoes that bring us back inevitably to Aquinas' early opponents, such as Duns Scotus and Ockham. This seems hard to reconcile with the orthodox view of the soul as a (unique) *forma corporis* – which Maldonado himself defends. To clarify these claims, we shall compare Maldonado's text with the more famous *De anima* by Francisco Suárez.<sup>3</sup> This latter work tackles

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Among the Jesuits mentioned, he is “the best-sellers authors”: for, his courses on Aristotle were adopted to form a complete philosophical handbook in every Jesuit college, including those founded in the “new world”. See the complete anastatic reprint of them: Francisco de Toledo, *Opera omnia philosophica*, 2 vols. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1985) and Anna Tropia, “Francisco de Toledo. Setting a Standard for Jesuit Philosophy”, in *Jesuit Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity*, edited by C. Casalini (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 251-269. Girolamo Dandini (Cesena 1554-Forlì 1634) taught philosophy in Paris at the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. His *De corpore animato* (1610), a monumental commentary to the *De anima* of Aristotle, is the first printed “product” of the Parisian college. Among the Jesuits mentioned, Francisco Suárez (Granada 1548-Lisbon 1617) is today the most studied. Beside his *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597), that Schopenhauer called “a true compendium of scholastic metaphysics”, his scholarly production counts a commentary on the *Summa theologica* as well as on the *De anima*. For some of the views common to Toledo, Dandini, Maldonado and Suárez see Anna Tropia, “Three Jesuit Accounts of Cognition: Differences and Common Ground in the *De anima* Commentaries by Maldonado, Toledo and Dandini (1564-1610)”, in *Active Cognition. Challenges to an Aristotelian Tradition*, edited by V. Decaix and A.M. Mora-Márquez (Cham: Springer, 2020), 103-131.

<sup>3</sup> The same strategy, namely that of comparing a manuscript course with a printed text been adopted by Paula Oliveira e Silva and João Rebalde, “Doctrinal Divergences on the Nature of Human Composite in Two Commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* (Anonymous, Cod. 2399 BGUC and Francisco Suárez): New Material on the Jesuit School of Coimbra and the *Cursus Conimbricensis*”, in *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617): Jesuits and the Complexities of Modernity*, edited by R. A. Maryks and J. A. Senent de Frutos (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 378-410, and Anna Tropia, “The Transmission of Philosophy from Manuscript to Printed Text: the Case of Juan Maldonado's *De origine, natura et immortalitate animae* (1564)”, in *Praxis des Philosophen, Praktiken des Philosophiehistorikers. Perspektiven von der Spätantike bis zur Moderne*, edited by

extensively the whole *scientia de anima*. It also might offer a key – one of the possible keys – to Maldonado’s text.

In the first section of this paper, *DONIA* will be briefly presented (2); in the second part, we shall examine the problem of the unity of the soul with the body, as well as that of the relation between the soul and its powers (3). In the last part, the text will be compared with Suárez’s (4). I will then summarize my results in a short conclusion.

## 2. *DONIA*

The text by Maldonado has come down to us in two manuscript notebooks: Paris, BNF 6454A and St. Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 1119.<sup>4</sup> These two testimonies are the only ones, to my knowledge, recording Maldonado’s first teaching in Paris. The Jesuit, first appointed in Rome, was sent to the newborn “Collège de Clermont” to inaugurate the chair of philosophy. From contemporary evidence, we know that his first course was an exposition of Aristotle’s *De anima*.<sup>5</sup>

In the two notebooks, this text is referred to as “De origine, natura et immortalitate animae” (Paris BNF 6454A) and as “Annotationes seu compendium de animi immortalitate a magistro Maldonato dictate” (Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek 1119). The first title precisely catches its content, whereas we owe to Louis Richeome, a student of Maldonado, a piece of information on its genesis. In the introduction to his treatise on the immortality of the soul (1610), Richeome recalls that

[...] Father Juan Maldonado began his public philosophical teaching with the exposition of Aristotle’s work on the soul. He did it with great success and approval, not only by the students but also by the doctors and the professors who came to listen to him. He fought with the greatest strength against this heresy [that the soul is not immortal] and worthily defended the immortality of the soul according to true philosophy and catholic faith. He prepared a synthesis of his lectures on Aristotle, after completing his course.<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, *DONIA* is clearly not a commentary on Aristotle’s treatise, owing to its length (only 30 folios in the Parisian notebook, and a bit more than 40 pages in the Swiss one) and to the fact that it does not cover all the books of *De anima*, but has a specific

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M. Meliàdò and S. Negri (Freiburg: Karl Albert Verlag, 2018), 76-99.

<sup>4</sup> The edition of this text has been published by Anna Tropia, “Pédagogie et philosophie à l’âge de la Contre-Réforme: le *De origine, natura et immortalitate animae* (Paris, 1564) de Juan Maldonado S.J.”, *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 88/1 (2021): 209-282. There since we will refer to this edition as to *DONIA*, followed by reference paragraph and page of the published text (e.g. *DONIA*, §18, 246).

<sup>5</sup> See for instance Richeome, in the next note, but also the old (but rich of information) Jean-Marie Prat, *Maldonat et l’Université de Paris au XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Julien, Lanier et Cie, 1856).

<sup>6</sup> Louis Richeome, *L’immortalité de l’ame declaree avec raisons naturelles tesmoignages humains et divins pour la Foy Catholique contre les Athees et Libertins...* (Paris: Sebastien Cramoisy, 1621), 5-6.

focus on the question of immortality. According to contemporary witnesses, Maldonado's lectures enjoyed a certain success. We can attribute some credibility to this information, for it is transmitted not only by Jesuits like Richeome but also by their enemies, such as the lawyer of the Parliament of Paris, Étienne Pasquier.<sup>7</sup>

### 3. Counting the forms

The account of the soul offered by Maldonado is characterized by his criticism of Aquinas. Such a declaration might sound simplistic, but it is easy to observe that almost every chapter of the Jesuit's compendium begins with criticizing – and dismissing – Aquinas' view. Moreover, Maldonado's anti-Thomism proceeds point-by-point: as we will see, he literally re-elaborates Aquinas' text to modify it.<sup>8</sup> In contrast, he does not specify who are the authors he shares his view with.<sup>9</sup> Understanding how he parts ways from Aquinas is thus essential for grasping his own conception of the soul and its structure.

In the wake of Aristotle, Maldonado claims that the human soul, which he calls *mens*, or *anima rationalis*, is a substantial form, namely the form responsible for the ontological makeup of the human substance, that which makes of some matter a human living body.

That Aristotle thought that our soul is the form of the body, is evident from *Metaphysics* XII, c. 3; for he lists the mind among the forms. But it is even more evident from *On the Soul* II c. 1, when he first defines in general every soul as ἐντελέχεια, namely as the perfection of a body having life in potency. Right after, in chapter 2, he proves that definition again: whatever is the first principle of living, or of having sensation, or of thinking, is the form and the perfection of a natural body. Every soul is a principle of living, like the vegetative soul; or of sensation, like the sensitive soul; or of thinking, like the intellectual soul. Hence, every soul is the form of a natural body. Aristotle thought he proved that the others [souls] are substantial forms of the body (*alias esse formas*

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<sup>7</sup> See Étienne Pasquier in É. Du Boulay, *Historia Universitatis ...6 vols.*, (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966), VI, 647: "En Cette Compagnie y avoit lors plusieurs personnages doctes, entr'autres Frere Edmond Auger et Maldonat. Celuy-là grand Predicateur, et celuy-cy versé et nourry en toute sorte de Langues et de disciplines; grand Theologien et Philosophe. Ceux-cy envoyez par deçà pour annoncer leur doctrine, furent favorablement accueillis et attirerent une infinité d'Escoliers à Paris".

<sup>8</sup> See e.g. n. 29.

<sup>9</sup> An immediately evident characteristic of Maldonado's text is the abundance of the sources he quotes. He goes from the Pre-Socratics to Renaissance philosophers such as Marsilio Ficino or Agostino Steuco, aiming to support the thesis of the soul's immortality. Nevertheless, he often refers to his own view as standing alone against the "Latini" or "fere omnes theologorum et philosophorum".

*substantiales corporis*). He proved the same in the case of the mind; thus, he believed that the soul is the substantial form of the body, no less than the other souls.<sup>10</sup>

In his text, Maldonado embraces the definitions of soul given by Aristotle in *De anima*. In particular, he focuses on the second definition of soul as the first act of a natural body: his aim is to prove, in accordance with Catholic orthodoxy, that the rational soul is the form of the body despite its specificity, i.e. that is to not be embodied. Famously, Aristotle claims in *De anima* that the intellect does not make use of any organ to perform its own operation; in this respect, it differs from the vegetative and the sensitive soul.<sup>11</sup> This difference is always emphasized by Maldonado for, on its basis, it is possible to ground what his text aims to prove, namely the immortality of the soul.<sup>12</sup> The intrinsic, aporetic difficulty underlying this conception of the soul is that, such an unembodied soul, according to Maldonado (and to all the orthodox Christian philosophers and theologians of the Latin Western world, after the council of Vienne<sup>13</sup>), is also the form actualizing a material body. From this aporia originates the difficulty of understanding the so-called mind-body problem, among others, and that of accounting for the relation between the form “soul” and its capacities, or faculties, some of which are enmattered, and proper to plants, non-rational and rational animals – the “other substantial forms”, as Maldonado calls them. In *DONIA*, these difficulties are articulated in a synthetic way; we shall follow the order of his arguments. For sure, he claims, the proper activity (*actio propria*) of human beings, what distinguishes them essentially from the other living beings, is the capacity of thinking.<sup>14</sup>

Maldonado does not seem to challenge the unitarian view. In fact, according to him, the principal activity of the human compound is what essentially defines it and what gives identity and unity to it. Nevertheless, there are in *DONIA* a couple of passages that challenge the unicity of the form-soul: for, on the one hand, they hint to the presence of another form, partially responsible for the body alone and, on the other, to different forms which are responsible for the vital activities of the compounds. The first passage is paragraph 9, which follows the discussion on the generation of the soul as something

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<sup>10</sup> See *DONIA*, §10.

<sup>11</sup> See *De anima*, III, 4, 429a18-30.

<sup>12</sup> See *DONIA*, §3.1.

<sup>13</sup> See *DONIA*, §13, 243: “Fides etiam docet animum nostrum non tantum qua parte est vegetans et sentiens, sed etiam qua parte est intelligens esse formam corporis. Sic fuit definitum in concilio Viennensi et in Clementina, de summa trinitate et fide catholica cap. ultimo sumpta illius. Quod concilium tametsi non fuit generale, fuit tamen confirmatum in concilio Lateranensi, sectione 6”. On the definition of the orthodox conception of the soul, see the rich dossier of sources exposed by Alain de Libera, “Formes assistantes et formes inhérentes. Sur l’union de l’âme et du corps, du Moyen Âge à l’Âge classique”, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 81 (2014): 197-248. As for the pluralists’ view, see William Duba, “The souls after Vienne: Franciscans Theologians’ Views on the Plurality of the Forms and the Plurality of the Souls, c. 1315-1330”, in *Psychology and the Other Disciplines. A Case of Cross-disciplinary Interactions (1250-1270)*, edited by P. Bakker, S. de Boer and C. Leijenhorst (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 171-212.

<sup>14</sup> *DONIA*, §11, 248.

divine – something, which “comes from outside” (*extrinsecus advenit*). There Maldonado recalls that the generation of the soul also happens in matter. Talking about how the soul enters (and leaves) the body, Maldonado claims that this happens by means of intermediate, material dispositions – like heat. When such a certain amount of heat is not present in the body, the soul parts from it and the conditions for life are not met anymore. If it were not so, that is to say, if the soul were the only form actualizing the material body, after its separation from the body there would be no organized matter at all, but purely unformed matter. For instance, the same accidents – like a scar, a color – present in the live body would not be observable in the dead body any longer, once its (only) form parted from it. This is, unmistakably, Aquinas’ view:

In the *Summa contra Gentiles* II c. 71 and in the *First Part* q. 76, Saint Thomas says that accidents are not in matter alone, but in the compound [only]. He says that the soul is joined to the body by means of no intermediate dispositions, which is exactly what almost all the philosophers and theologians teach. But, to begin with, it is false that the accidents are not in matter alone. That, in fact, it is not the same color which is in the corpse, and which was, a little before, in the living body, is something that goes against common sense.<sup>15</sup>

Maldonado contests Aquinas’ conception of matter as pure potentiality. According to Aquinas, matter always requires a form to be actualized – to become something.<sup>16</sup> As others before him,<sup>17</sup> Maldonado ascribes a certain actuality to matter, inferior to the one of the form-soul but enough to warrant the persistence in (some) time of some of

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<sup>15</sup> DONIA §9, 239-240. Unfortunately, no more elements on Maldonado’s theory of matter are available in the text. On Aquinas’ position, see also *Sentencia libri de anima*, II, 2 (Rome-Paris: ed. Leonina, 1984) XLV/1, 75.

<sup>16</sup> As Pasnau has pointed out, this is a real tenet of Thomistic metaphysics, in contrast to those claiming that prime matter has some actuality. Such a thesis was generally accepted by all the modern philosophers – where, for “modern”, he refers to a large group of thinkers, going from Thomas’ early opponents (e.g. Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham) – to 16<sup>th</sup> century scholars, including Jesuits like Bento Pereira. See Pasnau, *Metaphysical themes*, 37ff.

<sup>17</sup> The example of the corpse was currently used by other authors, earlier or contemporary to Aquinas, like Kildwardby and Middleton; yet, in this paper I refer mainly to Duns Scotus and Ockham, for they are more frequently referred to by the Jesuits here studied. Nevertheless, no explicit quotations is made by Maldonado. See, e.g., William of Ockham, *Quodl.* II, q. 11, in *Opera theologica*, edited by G. Gál *et alii*s (St. Bonaventure (NY): The Franciscan Institute, 1967-1988), IX, 162: “[...] mortuo homine sive bruto animali, remanent eadem accidentia numero quae prius; igitur habent idem subiecto numero. Consequentia patet, quia accidens naturaliter non migrat a subiecto in subiectum; sed illum subiectum non est materia prima, quia tunc materia prima immediate recipere accidentia absoluta, quod non videtur verum; igitur remanet aliqua forma praecedens, et non sensitiva; igitur corporeitas”. For Middleton and Kildwardby, see Roberto Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des forms* (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1951) and Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1995, for instance, 150 and ff.). On Kildwardby, see José Felipe Silva, *Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul: Plurality of Form and Censorship in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

the compound's features, like the scar and the color of the example. It is interesting to notice that

1) this stand against Aquinas is taken within the context of the discussion on how human generation takes place; this chapter fits well with the previous one, where the divine generation of the soul is dealt with.

2) No further discussion, nor view concerning matter follows in the text. In paragraph 9, Maldonado treats human generation as a material process that enables the body to welcome the immaterial soul as principle of life:

Furthermore, the soul leaves the body by means of contrary dispositions; thus, the same (soul) is united (to the body) by means of dispositions convenient to its nature. Also, when it is in the body, the soul is conserved by means of dispositions; but the cause of producing and conserving is the same. When it is in the body, the soul is conserved by means of dispositions; thus, it enters the body by means of the same ones. Also, if it were not united to the body by means of bodily dispositions, a human being could not generate another human being, as it generates only by disposing matter: more precisely, disposing matter when the soul enters matter; and such a process corresponds to the generation. Thus, if a human being does not dispose matter, it does not generate. Thus, the soul enters the body by means of dispositions.<sup>18</sup>

At this point it is legitimate to raise a question concerning the meaning of Maldonado's "flirting" with Aquinas' early opponents. If we consider Ockham, for instance, he attributed three distinct forms to a single human being: the form of "bodiliness" (*forma corporeitatis*), the sensitive soul (which is in matter and perishable) and the intellective soul. Three forms for a human being; the first constitutes a human being's "basis", but is not a principle of life, whereas the other two account for the material and the immaterial aspects of the soul. How do these three forms constitute a unity? Ockham did not provide any explicit answer apart from what can be summarized in the claim that these three forms constitute a unity out of the order they are united with.<sup>19</sup> Also, their union is contingent and not necessary: for both rational and sensitive forms depend on the other, according to Ockham, although their union only concerns this state and not the afterlife.

What about Maldonado's own view? Before analyzing the second text of our dossier, it is worthwhile to notice that a similar treatment is reserved to the union of the soul and the body by another Jesuit, Nicola Baldelli (1573-1655), in his compendium on the rational soul.<sup>20</sup> In this text, dictated at the Roman College, a long time after

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<sup>18</sup> *DONIA* §9, 239-240.

<sup>19</sup> On this point, see Dominik Perler, "Ockham on Emotions in the Divided Soul", in *Partitioning the Soul: Debates from Plato to Leibniz*, edited by D. Perler and K. Corcilius (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 179-198; see p. 187ff. Perler attempts to reconstruct Ockham's argument, for no systematic and detailed discussion is provided by the philosopher himself in his texts.

<sup>20</sup> See Nicola Baldelli, *Disputatio de anima rationali secundum substantiam des Nicolauis Baldelli S. J.*



Maldonado's, Baldelli claims as well that some material dispositions are responsible for the preservation of the soul within the body. Such a claim aims to point out to the dependency of the soul on the body. Nevertheless, such dependency is not absolute, for it does not stem, in its own right (*secundum se simpliciter*), from the soul's nature. It only describes the state of affair of the soul as far as it is united to the body (*secundum esse unitum*): in other words, as far as it is the form of the compound.<sup>21</sup> Baldelli's text does not help answering the question concerning the number of the forms; for, in this case too, the question is not tackled, nor does Baldelli ever pronounce himself explicitly – like Maldonado – in favor of pluralism. How does such a conception of matter fit into a picture according to which the soul is the (unique) form of the body? Are both Maldonado and Baldelli suggesting that two forms (or even three, if we count the form of the bodiliness, like Ockham), – the one being perishable and dependent on the body, the other, separable and independent from the body – are responsible for the essential properties and activities of human beings? Or are they only talking about some parts – some capacities – of the soul, some of which are inseparable from the body, whereas another part is separable? The first option would lead us to put Maldonado next to those admitting the existence of a plurality of forms in the human being; the second one, next to those according to whom there is only one form for each human being. Maldonado claims to belong to the second group, in line with what he held in the abovementioned text:

The opinion of Aristotle was that there is only one soul for each human being. He always held the following principle: every substance must be one in itself, since it is a being in itself (*Metaph.* VII, c. 1). For this reason, he always interrogated himself about the reason why a corporeal substance, although made by two parts, is nonetheless one. In *Metaphysics* VII c. 2 and VIII c. 6 he answers: (there is unity) because one part is pure potency and the other, pure act, namely a substantial form. And it is not extraordinary that one being in itself derives from potency and act. From which derives the common axiom: everything that happens to an actual being produces an accidental being only. Every soul, as it has been proven, is a substantial form; hence, it must be one in one human being only. If souls were many, they would produce a pile of natures, not a single nature. To this must be added that, in *On the soul* I c. 5, Aristotle criticizes Plato, and

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nach dem Pariser codex B.N. lat. 16627, edited by H. Wels (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: B. R. Grüner, 1999), 12-22.

<sup>21</sup> See Baldelli, *Disputatio*, q. 2, 81: “[...] animam conservari in corpore dependenter a dispositionibus, non quia illae attingant ipsum esse animae, sed quia sine illis non conservaretur in corpore; sicut enim essentia et natura totius, quae per animam constituitur, cum sit quid materiale et corruptibile, dependet a dispositionibus, ita etiam ab his dependet anima secundum esse unitum, etiamsi non dependeat secundum esse simpliciter, quod idem etiam accidit in materia, quae, cum sit ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis et habeat propriam existentiam independenter a forma, non potest dependere a dispositionibus secundum esse simpliciter, etiamsi ab illis dependeat secundum esse unitum cum forma et secundum constitutionem compositi”.

those who claimed that there are many souls in the same human being: through which bond would they be united together?<sup>22</sup>

This text seems to contradict *DONIA* §9, for no mention is made of matter as something already possessing some degree of actualization; thus, the body is presented as purely in potency with respect to the form-soul. In the immediately preceding chapter (§14), Maldonado rejects Averroes' monopsychism. In the wake of Aristotle's texts, the connection of the soul with the body it is the form of – as a *forma informans*, and not only *assists*<sup>23</sup> – is, thus, emphasized once more by him, as well as its uniqueness. Every suspicion of pluralism of the forms is therefore rejected in the name of substantial unity. The criticism of Plato, which closes the text quoted above, could not be more explicit in this respect: if there were more than one soul for each human being, how would these forms be united? This question is of crucial importance, for, the inner unity of the soul depends on it. If, in fact, Maldonado holds everywhere the uniqueness and the unity of the form-soul, then the question is how such a form is structured, namely how its parts are related to it and constitute a unit. The text concerning the material dispositions responsible for the union of the soul to the body makes a stand-alone statement. Maldonado's answer concerning the unity of the soul appears, thus, not fully developed in *DONIA*.

That the soul has different parts, enacting different activities, is the common Aristotelian view. Like Baldelli – like every Aristotelian philosopher –, Maldonado claims that some “faculties or souls or parts of the soul” (*facultates seu animas aut animae partes*) perform their activities in the bodily organs, as if they were their own laboratory (*veluti officinam*)<sup>24</sup>; whereas the mind acts independently from the body. So far, so good; but the composition of the soul, namely the relation between the unique soul and these different faculties, or souls, or forms; its unicity; its unity; these remain in the background, never constituting the subject-matter of a chapter in Maldonado's treatise. In the dense §15, though, he says something more on the relation between the soul and its faculties. Again, he begins by rejecting Aquinas' view.

According to Aquinas, the faculties of the soul are accidents related to one substance, the soul's essence.<sup>25</sup> They are distinguished from the soul insofar as they

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<sup>22</sup> *DONIA* §15, 244.

<sup>23</sup> On this distinction, see De Libera, “Formes assistantes et formes inhérentes”, *passim*; Jean-Baptiste Brenet, *Les possibilités de jonction. Averroès-Thomas Wylton* (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2013), 226ff.

<sup>24</sup> See *DONIA* §11, 242: “Non enim est quaestio Aristotelis, an animae partes possent a corpore separari, sed an in ipso corpore loco separentur, ut Plato dicebat. Et, quia in ea corporis parte omnes putabant esse animam, in qua exercebat sua munera, reliquae autem animae suas actiones exercent aliquo corporis instrumento, et certo quodam loco ubi habent veluti officinam, ut vis videndi in oculis tantum (facultates Aristoteles vocat animas aut animae partes), mens autem nullo instrumento utitur neque habet certam sedem in corpore, idcirco dicit reliquas quidem animi facultates non posse a certis partibus corporis separari, quia sunt proprii illarum partium actus”.

<sup>25</sup> See *ST* Ia, q. 77 a. 1, ad. 5. On Aquinas' position, see Dominik Perler, “How Many Souls Do I

“flow” from its essence; they are rooted in it and connected one with another.<sup>26</sup> In such a model, the soul is the principle and the ground of the faculties, which are accidents able to perform some activities. Maldonado’s criticism concerns how, according to Aquinas, such faculties inhabit the human soul. For, Aquinas claimed that such faculties are owned by the human soul potentially only (*tantum virtute*) and accordingly to a hierarchy, in which the highest capacity includes the lowest ones:<sup>27</sup> at the beginning of life, the human soul has only the vegetative capacity; with the development of the soul, the latter is replaced by a superior form of soul, the sensitive soul, successively replaced by the highest kind of soul, the rational. According to such a scheme, the lowest sensitive and vegetative forms are “potentially” comprehended in the human soul and *eminenter*, namely in the way proper to a superior being. Maldonado argues against this view, which he dismisses as “non-philosophical”, by remarking that each power, each “soul” must be truly, actually present in the human being (*proprie*), insofar as it plays the role of a formal cause (*formaliter*), when it generates a vital action. For, Maldonado states, vital activities – such as seeing, breathing, or thinking – cannot be enacted but “in presence of a soul” (*ubi est anima aliqua*):

In *Summa contra gentiles* II c. 58 and *Opusc.* III c. 90, Saint Thomas claims that certain souls are in human beings only virtually (*tantum virtute*), not properly and formally (*proprie et formaliter*). That is exactly what theologians and almost everybody teaches, for, superior forms always encompass the lower, as they say, in an eminent way (*eminenter*) in a more perfect being. But this is not philosophical at all. First: for there is a difference between the activities of life and all the others, that can follow not only from their proper form but also from a superior form, like heat is produced not only by fire, but also by the sun – which is not itself hot. But the activities of life originate only when there is a soul.<sup>28</sup>

Maldonado strongly emphasizes that each faculty is actually, truly operating within the soul. How? As (1) a principle of a vital activity, (2) as something distinguished from the other powers and (3) as sole formal cause of its own activity. The lowest faculties, that are enmattered, and have “their laboratory” within the bodily organs, produce different vital activities, of which they are the only internal formal cause. This is what distinguishes a vital activity from the others: the vital activities are produced by a cause, which is, at the same time, their trigger and also their “final” repository. Vital activities are immanent.<sup>29</sup> For instance, if I look at the apple on the table, the

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Have? Late Aristotelian Debates on the Pluralities of the Faculties”, in *Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle’s De anima*, edited by R. Friedman and J-M Counet (Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 277-296.

<sup>26</sup> See *ST Ia q. 77*.

<sup>27</sup> See for instance *ST Ia q. 77 a. 7* and *Summa contra gentiles*, II, 89. Another text is the *Compendium theologiae* by Thomas, which Maldonado refers to in his chapter as to the *Opusculum tertium*, according to its place in the 15<sup>th</sup> century editions. Besides c. 90, quoted by Maldonado, see also c. 92, which resumes all the points targeted by Maldonado, in the edition by Paolo Barbo (Milan, 1488, pages not numbered).

<sup>28</sup> *DONIA* §16, 245.

<sup>29</sup> See that vital activities must be produced by an intrinsic principle, is a view shared by Peter

image of the apple will affect my sight—“department”, namely my sight and eyes, not my stomach. My sight will be the formal cause of its activity – that of seeing – and will be, at the end, the “repository” of such an image. This is not the case of heat, which can be also propagated by forms, external and ontologically superior to what they affect: in the example by Maldonado, the sun, as a superior cold form, generates heat in inferior bodies.

To stress further the tight relation between a vital power and its activity, Maldonado brings up the example of God’s extraordinary power. If God wanted to replace a vital power, like sight, by means of secondary causes, the activity of seeing would follow indeed, but it would not be a vital one anymore.<sup>30</sup> It is precisely in this sense that each faculty is in the soul: a distinct principle, able to generate its own vital activity.

In human beings, there are all the activities (*actiones*): vegetative and sensitive activities of the soul; thus, these souls are proper to the human being and are not in it in an eminent way (*eminenter*) only. Likewise, a human being is an animal not only potentially but properly (*proprie*), and living; thus, it possesses a sensitive and a vegetative soul properly, differently than the sun, which, although it is able to heat, is not defined as hot, because it does not have heat in itself. So, even if it perceives, a human being would nevertheless not be called “animal”, without having formally the sensitive soul.<sup>31</sup>

The way “the other souls” are in human beings is such that they are not potentially included, as Aquinas wanted, in the rational soul, but they are there “properly” (*proprie*), as something in the soul, distinguished from it and actually existent.

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John Olivi and Duns Scotus: see Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in Secundum librum sententiarum...*, edited by B. Jansen (Ad Claras Aquas: ex Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1922, q. 71), II, 644 and q. 72, III, 24-5; Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 2, n. 509, in *Opera Omnia* (Civitas Vaticana: typis Vaticanis, 1950–), III, 301, but also by Thomas: see *ST Ia*, q. 18, a. 3. About the vital activities, see Simo Knuuttila, “The Connexion between the Vital Acts in Suárez’s Cognitive Psychology”, in *Suárez’s Metaphysics in Historical and Systematic Context*, edited by L. Novák (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 259-274. On the distinction between immanent and transitive activities, see Dennis Des Chene, *Life’s form. Late Aristotelian conceptions of the soul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 58ff and José Felipe Silva, “Intentionality in Medieval Augustinianism”, *Phänomenologische Forschungen* 2 (2018): 25-44.

<sup>30</sup> See *DONIA* §16, 245: “In primis, quod hoc interest inter actiones vitae et omnes alias, quod aliae possunt proficisci non tantum ex propria forma sed ex superiore, ut calefactio non tantum ab igne sed etiam a sole, qui calidus non est. Actiones autem vitae nunquam proficiscuntur nisi inde ubi est anima aliqua. Quapropter Deus dicitur per se ipsum posse efficere quicquid potest per causas secundas; tamen vicem causae formalis et vitalis actionis non potest supplere, ita ut non potest facere candidum sine candore, neque videre sine visu, quia actio vitae est”. Besides the example of God “substituting” sight, Maldonado makes the example of the impossibility, for God, of making white without whiteness. Such an example is not entirely clear to me, in this context, since, first, producing the quality of white is not a vital activity. Claiming that the formal cause of white, whiteness, is required in any case (even that of divine omnipotence), when something happens to be white, seems to be too strong a limitation of God’s absolute power.

<sup>31</sup> *DONIA* §16.

Maldonado never employs the lexicon of the pluralists: the powers are never said to be “*formaliter et per se distinctae*”; they generate different activities but are treated as homogeneous parts of the soul. Thus, the accent is more on the relation they have to the rational soul.

Maldonado completes his short treatment of the faculties in the following chapter (§17), on the location of the soul in the body. As most dualists, he holds the holenmeric position, according to which the whole of the soul is present in the whole body.<sup>32</sup> As the soul is immaterial, it is not divisible and thus, present in the whole body. Concerning its parts, the different forms that are in the same substance, he adds that “they do not have a different form than the form of the whole”.<sup>33</sup> They thus depend on it and are only “where there is the substance [of the soul]”. This does not differ from Aquinas’ view, according to whom the faculties are related to the essence of the soul as accidental qualities, they ontologically depend on it and are able to generate different activities. So, how to understand Maldonado’s criticism?

In *DONIA*, Maldonado does not go back anymore to this topic. It is thus difficult to deduce, from these dense but short texts, how he conceives of the relation between the soul and its powers. What makes them a unity for instance and why does he stress the vital aspect intrinsic to each activity? Maldonado seems to part ways from Aquinas, for he ascribes to each power a certain role, and its own distinctive identity; is he rejoining a sort of pluralistic view of the soul? If we confine ourselves to the extant text, what we obtain is the following description of the soul:

- 1) The soul is the (unique) form of the body (§§10-12)
- 2) The human soul is immortal, for, at least one of its powers, the intellect, performs an activity independently from the body (*passim*)
- 3) The rational soul is the form of the body (§12), but not the only one (§9)

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<sup>32</sup> For this “standard view”, see for example Aquinas, *ST Ia*, q. 76 a. 8. Nominalists like Ockham and Buridan specified that it is only the rational soul, which exists in the whole body and in each part of it: see John Buridan, *Quaestiones in Aristotelis de anima (prima lectura)* edited by B. Patar (Louvain-la-Neuve and Longueil: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Éditions du Prémabule, 1991), 284-285. A broad discussion on the diverse forms of holenmerism from Aquinas to the 17<sup>th</sup> century is provided by Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, chap. 16.

<sup>33</sup> See *DONIA* §17, 246: “Quamvis enim animi substantia in toto sit corpore, facultates, quia sunt proxima principia actionum, et actiones diversae requirunt diversa instrumenta, non sunt nisi in certis locis. Quod autem animus sit in toto corpore hinc constat: unaquaeque pars corporis habet formam aliquam substantialem non aliam a forma totius, quia essent plures formae in eadem re; ergo eandem. Anima est forma substantialis; ergo est in omnibus partibus. Praeterea, facultates non sunt nisi ubique est substantia. Facultates autem animae sunt dispersae per corpus universum, omnes enim partes augentur; ergo ipsa anima substantia est in omnibus partibus. Hoc tantum de iis intelligendum est quae sunt partes propriae animalis – de quibus Aristoteles, lib. 1 de partibus animalium, c. 1-, idest quae nos vocamus me<bra> ; et Aristoteles, 2 libro De historia, cap. 1”.

- 4) The “other souls” are not potentially included in the rational soul, but each of them is the only and unique internal formal cause of its own activity (§16)
- 5) The other souls, namely the faculties, depend on the essence of the soul (§17)

The major tension in this account is that provided by points 1-3: the suggestion that the prime matter has already a certain actuality before being informed by the soul remains like a stain on a white tablecloth. A detailed account of the relation between the soul and its powers is not provided in the text, so it is not easy to spell out Maldonado’s view. Furthermore, his compendium does not examine the whole *scientia de anima* but confines itself to mention – and to use – parts of it as building blocks to prove the immortality (and the separability) of the soul.

#### 4. Seeking an answer: what gives the powers unity?

How does Maldonado conceive of the human soul? An answer can be provided in a twofold way. The first, is to focus on the relation between the intellect and the senses as a sort of short case-study, as it is sketched by Maldonado in his compendium. The second, is to attempt a comparison with the more systematic *De anima* by Francisco Suárez (1572); for this latter presents many important convergence points with Maldonado.

##### 4.1 “Animadvertite hoc interesse inter intellectum et sensum”

This turn of phrase, which invites the reader to consider the obvious difference between the intellect and the senses is repeated three times in Maldonado’s compendium. Such a difference is obvious, for, at the time, every scholastic would have acknowledged it. What marks a change are the consequences the Jesuit draws from it. Maldonado understands this distinction in a quite sharp way, thereby inaugurating a tendency proper to all the Jesuits’ commentaries and works to follow: that of highlighting the superiority and the independence of the intellect from the body. Maldonado breaks every parallelism between the functioning of the intellect and the senses, in the name of a major tenet: what is material cannot interact with, nor can it act upon, what is immaterial and superior to it.<sup>34</sup> Also, such different “domains”, material and immaterial, function differently: the intellect, owing to its immateriality,

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<sup>34</sup> This argument rejects, in one single move, 1) the necessity of an agent intellect, distinct from the passive one, and whose task would be that of abstracting spiritual species from material objects 2) the species theory. See *DONIA* §26, 252: “Materiale per se non potest movere spiritale”; or, about the species doctrine: “Sumit enim tanquam principium quod species materiales fiant spirituales, quod est alienissimum ab omni philosophia. Res enim spiritalis secundum philosophiam numquam fit ex corporea”. On the species doctrine and its decline at the dawn of Modern Age (with a close up on many medieval and early modern philosophers), see Leen Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1994-5), II.

is described by Maldonado as free to know what it prefers, thus obeying different rules from the senses.<sup>35</sup> Unlike the senses, in fact, the intellect does not receive passively information from the external world, nor is it indissolubly tied to it: it abstracts its object “freely” (*libere*).<sup>36</sup> The senses, instead, receive passively the impression from the external world and always depend on it. Also, the intellect is described by Maldonado as an entirely active power, able to grasp directly, without any sensory mediation, its cognitive objects as singulars, but also as universals.<sup>37</sup> In Maldonado’s account, this corresponds to the intellect’s direct capacity of grasping knowledge and to the rejection of the species as medium in every cognitive process. Such rejection, as well as the claim that singulars are known directly by the intellect, is of course another critical point with respect to Aquinas. At the time, this view was largely shared by every scholastic, and the Jesuit professor does not make an exception. Yet, in the actual state the human mind is partially limited by its role as form of the body.<sup>38</sup> Midway between God and the angels, the human intellect knows first the material substances and the surrounding world.<sup>39</sup> This provides the intellect with a touchstone, through which it can form concepts of the immaterial substances, such as God, the angels, itself.<sup>40</sup> How to depict such limitation – or, in other words, dependency – in a system in which 1) the intellect acts independently from the senses<sup>41</sup> and 2) grasps its cognitive objects without

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<sup>35</sup> See *DONIA* §29, 254-255: “Multis autem rebus differt sensus ab intellectu. Primo, quia nunquam abstrahit a proprio obiecto sed ab alieno, ut aspectus non abstrahit a colore, sed ab odore; intellectus, qui habet obiectum proprie infinitum, non potest abstrahere ab alieno, sed a proprio. Secundo, sensus necessitate quadam abstrahit, quia nulla potentia percipit alienum obiectum; intellectus non necessitate, ut quando non potest multa simul comprehendere, separat, aliquando libere, quia vult unum et non alterum contemplari. Praeterea sensus non abstrahi nisi formam a forma, ut colorem a sono, quam metaphisici vocant formalem abstractione; intellectus enim non tantum unam formam ab alia, sed etiam universam a singulis”.

<sup>36</sup> See previous note. About the capacity of the intellect “to know one thing, freely, and not another”, Maldonado does not add more unfortunately; nor is an account of cognitive attention provided by him.

<sup>37</sup> In §26, Maldonado proposes the following interpretation of Aristotle’s *De anima* III, 5: by “agent intellect”, Aristotle would refer exclusively to the intellect; by “passive intellect”, exclusively to the senses. The intellect has thus, in his view, a fully active nature. On this point, see Tropaia, “The transmission of philosophy”, 84-94.

<sup>38</sup> Describing the present state, Maldonado does not avoid using Platonic-flavored expressions: see *DONIA* §35, 258-259: “Intellectus, quia natura habet expertem corporis, percipit non tantum res corporeas sed etiam spiritalia. Sed quia in corpore est et ad cognoscendum semper excitatur a rebus corporeis, res quidem spiritalia non intelligit nisi specie aliqua et similitudine corporum [...] homo, quia mentem habet non tantum finitam, sed etiam sepultam in corpore, et se et cetera omnia intelligit per formas corporeas”.

<sup>39</sup> See *DONIA* §31, 256: “[...] mens, quia secundum naturam suam expers est corporis, res spiritalia potest intelligere. Quia secundum statum est in corpore, non potest excitari nisi ab obiecto hausto per sensum; unde fit ut primum, ut vocant, obiectum intellectus non sit ens, quod late patet, sed ens concretum in corpore”.

<sup>40</sup> See *DONIA* §35, 258.

<sup>41</sup> See *DONIA* §40, 263.

species? How can it know without being like what it knows? In the last section of this paper, we will try to reply to these questions through the comparison of Maldonado's text with Suárez's commentary on *De anima*. The two texts are indeed diverse: the latter was conceived for publication, whereas the other was never meant for this. Nevertheless, they both spring from the two Jesuits' teaching activity and, more importantly, they share many things in common.

#### 4.2 A fast-forward comparison: Suárez's *De anima*

Suárez's account of the soul has always attracted great attention:<sup>42</sup> compared to Maldonado's, it is a "discovered land". Thanks to its more systematic approach, it helps to better understand his predecessor's synthesis, insofar as the Grenadian philosopher seems to fill in the spaces left blank by Maldonado. Just like him, Suárez endorses a unitarist conception of the soul; the soul is the unique form of the body and is the principle of life and unity in human beings. But, like Maldonado, both in *De anima* and in the famous *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1596), the philosopher attributes to primary matter the capacity of housing and preserving material accidents. In *De anima*, Suárez does not bring up the example of the corpse but, like Baldelli, confines himself to talk about some material, preparatory dispositions that allow the union between the soul and the body.<sup>43</sup> It is in the *Disputationes* that he takes on the traditional example of the

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<sup>42</sup> In particular, his account of cognition. See for instance the old but still useful PhD thesis by Josef Ludwig, *Das akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suárez* (München: Karl Ludwig, 1929); Salvador Castellote, *Die Anthropologie des Suárez: Beiträge zur spanischen Anthropologie des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts* (Freiburg: Karl Albert Verlag, 1962); Knuuttila, "The Connexions"; James B. South, "Suárez and the Problem of External Perception", *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 10 (2001): 217-240; James B. South, "Suárez on imagination", *Vivarium* 39 (2001): 119-158; T. Aho, "Suárez and Cognitive Intentions", in *Mind, Cognition and Representation. The Commentary Tradition of Aristotle's De anima*, edited by P. Bakker and J. Thijssen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 179-203; Cees Leijenhorst, "Cajetan and Suárez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought", in *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment*, edited by H. Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 237-262; Cees Leijenhorst, "Suárez on Self-Awareness", in *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez*, edited by B. Hill and H. Lagerlund (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 137-153; Sebastian Lalla, "Die Interpretation von *De anima* bei Francisco Suárez", in *Der Aristotelismus an den europäischen Universitäten der Frühen Neuen Zeit*, edited by R. Darge (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2010), 235-248; Marleen Rozemond, "Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez's Soul", in *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez*, 152-172; Christopher Shields, "The Unity of the Soul in Francisco Suárez", in *Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's De anima*, 359-38; Heider, "Jesuit Psychology and the Theory of Knowledge"; Dominik Perler, "Francisco Suárez, The Soul's Powers", in *Encyclopedia Conimbricensis.org*, edited by M. S. de Carvalho and S. Guidi: Online edition: doi="10.5281/zenodo.2325500", URL="http://www.conimbricensis.org/encyclopedia/suarez-francisco-souls-powers/" (latest revision: 14th February 2019). This bibliography has no pretension to be exhaustive; its sole purpose is to show how Suárez's studies have proliferated and attracted scholars' attention until today.

<sup>43</sup> Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*. 3 vols, edited



*forma cadaveris* and attempts at finding a middle way between the Thomist position, which accords no actuality to matter, and the Ockhamist position.<sup>44</sup> There, he acknowledges that the accidents present in the dead body are numerically identical with those present before death, when the soul was there vivifying the compound soul-body. Suárez does not reject Aquinas' thesis as strongly as Maldonado does, but acknowledges that there is a distinction between the union of quantity and matter, and that of the soul with the body: the first union – that of matter and quantity – precedes that of soul and body, and is autonomous from it.<sup>45</sup> The interesting point is that Suárez never gives up the unitarist account of the soul: like Maldonado, he claims that the soul is the form of the body and is apt to inform it.<sup>46</sup> As Des Chene has observed, this way of accounting for the substantial union does not avoid bringing into the picture the same tensions we find in Maldonado: for, seeing that matter has a certain autonomy from the form-soul, it becomes harder to understand how soul and body make up an *unum per se*.<sup>47</sup>

Suárez's *De anima* offers valuable help in figuring out how Maldonado conceives of the relation between the soul and its powers. Unlike Aquinas, and also, unlike pluralists such as Ockham, Suárez claims that the soul is the efficient cause of its powers that it generates all at once.<sup>48</sup> This claim is important, for it makes explicit the relation of intrinsic dependency that the faculties entertain with the soul. They are accidental forms, generated by the soul, which are distinguished one from another and which

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by S. Castellote (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1978-1991); (since now on) *De anima*, (vol.) I, disp. I, q. 3, n. 6-8, 94-98. For a visual representation of how Suárez conceives of the human compound, see Dennis Des Chene's scheme n. 6 in *Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 150.

<sup>44</sup> See Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, q. 14, §3, 19-20, in *Opera Omnia*, 28 vols., edited by D. M. André (Paris: Vivès, 1856-1878), XXV, 477: "Et quamvis dici possit quantitas mediate pendere ab anima, quatenus materia pendent ab illa, haec tamen dependentia sufficienter suppletur per subsequentem formam, quae informando, et suo proprio esse actuando eandem numero materiam, sufficienter terminat dependentiam ejus a forma; ergo nulla causa est ob quam, recedente anima, recedat quantitas humani corporis. Quae ratio eodem modo probat de omnibus accidentibus quae sunt insunt corpori, media quantitate, et ab anima effective non pendent. A posteriori vero idem probari potest; nam experimur in cadavere hominis statim post mortem ejus manere eadem accidentia corporalia quae errant in homine vivo, exceptis illis facultatibus quae sunt propriae viventium, ac propterea effective ab anima pendent. Etc". On this point, see the detailed analysis by Des Chene, *Physiologia*, 138-157.

<sup>45</sup> See Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, q. 14, §3, 19-20, 476ff.

<sup>46</sup> De Boer compares Suárez, on this point, to John Buridanus, for neither did he give up the unitarian thesis all the while acknowledging a certain actuality to primary matter. See Sander de Boer, *The Science of the Soul. The Commentary Tradition to Aristotle's De anima. 1260-1360* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013), 195.

<sup>47</sup> See Des Chene, *Physiologia*, 149-150.

<sup>48</sup> See Suárez, *De anima*, II, d. 3, q. 3, n. 7, 124-126. See n. 7 (2-3): "Potentiae vere producuntur ab anima [...] anima effective non concurrat ad productionem sui, et tamen concurrat effective ad productionem potentiarum; ergo est distincta productio animae et potentiarum; ergo distincta actio".

inhere in the soul as to their own generating matrix.<sup>49</sup> They thus depend on it essentially and inhabit it as special entities, able to generate different activities. Also, like Maldonado, Suárez claims that every vital activity must be generated by its corresponding vital power: better, by its intrinsic formal principle, which is the faculty concerned with a specific activity and domain.<sup>50</sup> To highlight this, Suárez resorts as well to the case of God's almightiness as unable to replace a vital power as such: for a vital activity produced by an agent, different from its intrinsic principle is not vital.<sup>51</sup> Such a view seems to be intimately related to how the philosopher conceives of the soul and its relation to its powers as well; for, having established that vital powers are immanent, he also describes how each faculty operates in a sort of "isolation" from all the others, being the alpha and the omega of the activity, i.e. of the process that it generates.<sup>52</sup> Like with Maldonado, each power – say, the intellect – is described by Suárez as having its own proper domain, upon which it acts as sole efficient cause. In the case of the agent intellect, as is well known,<sup>53</sup> Suárez states that no other interaction between the intellective and the sensitive faculty is needed for abstraction to take place, but only their being rooted (*radicatae*) in the same soul.

Between phantasm and agent intellect, there is no other union one can think of, but that they are rooted in the same soul and in the same ground, [and they act] as its instruments.<sup>54</sup>

Such way of thinking might be applied, for instance, to Maldonado's attempt at sharply separating the intellect from the sensitive faculty. In his roughly sketched

<sup>49</sup> See Suárez, *De anima*, I d. 3, q. 1, nn. 4-7, 60-64.

<sup>50</sup> See Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, 18, 5, 2 (XXV, 628): "[...] nam intime hae actiones vitales tam intimo modo fiunt, ut ab ipso primo principio vitae, quod est anima, actualiter procedure videantur; unde fit ut, licet oculus praesentem habeat imaginem, et ab illa recipiat speciem, si anima non attendat, non videat".

<sup>51</sup> See Suárez, *De anima*, I, d. 4, n. 16, 497: "Concedo Deum de absoluta potentia posse paulatim augere arborem, verbi gratia, cum eadem successione, conversione, et unione, ac distributione alimentis: quia in hoc nulla apparet repugnantia [...] unde concedo non repugnare, eadem rem, quae per actionem vitalem fit, posse fieri ab altero agente absque vitali actione, si diverso modo fiat. Nam fortasse etiam ipsas entitates, seu qualitates actuum vitalium rigorose permanentium potest Deus facere sine concursu potentiae, et tunc actiones non essent vitales, licet res, seu qualitates productae essent eadem".

<sup>52</sup> South talked in this respect of a principle of non-communication among the soul's powers: see James B. South, "Singular and Universal in Suárez's Account of Cognition", *The Review of Metaphysics* 55/4 (2002): 785-823, see in particular, 805-807.

<sup>53</sup> This point is the core of Ludwig, *Das akausale Zusammenwirken*.

<sup>54</sup> See Suárez, *De anima*, III, d. 9, q. 2, n. 8, 90. In this text, we can spot another echo of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, for the connection among the soul's powers (the *colligantia virtutum*) is, for instance, a solution and a mechanism often employed by Peter John Olivi and John Duns Scotus. For the comparison between Suárez and Olivi, see Spruit, *Species Intelligibiles*, II, 300 and 350. See also Anna Tropia, "Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy: the Necessity of the *connectio potentiarum* in the Present State", in *Suárez's Metaphysics in Historical and Systematic Context*, edited by L. Novák (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 275-292.

account of cognition, Maldonado actually claims that the intellect performs its own activity alone, without causally depending on sensory data. Nevertheless, he also claims that in the state of union with the body the intellect must always rely on sensory data.<sup>55</sup> Such dependency is the mark of humankind; but, as we have seen, Maldonado does not explain how this state of affairs matches with claims, such as that the intellect grasps directly its cognitive objects independently from sensory data and sensible species.<sup>56</sup> Suárez's way of accounting for the relation between the soul's faculties offers, in this respect, a solution and a completion to the same issue brought up by Maldonado: for in his account of cognition, each faculty is the only efficient cause of its own activity, without depending on the others. Their common root – the soul – is sufficient, according to Suárez, to guarantee the communication between its powers and to keep each of them “informed” about what happens to the others; but their activity takes place independently and in isolation from all the others. Thus, the intellect, in Suárez's picture, is the sole cause of its activity and depends on the sensitive faculty only insofar they are both rooted in the same soul.

## 5. Conclusions

How does the soul constitute a unity, according to Maldonado? This question was the starting point of our incursion into this early Jesuit compendium. After a brief parallel exposition – on the one hand, the obscure text by Maldonado and, on the other, the much better known *De anima* by Suárez – , the answer is in accordance with “Catholic orthodoxy and true philosophy”, as Maldonado himself would have put it: the soul itself, as the form of the body, confers unity, identity and life, as a superior form (as the Scotist *forma vivificativa*), to the material body. The internal richness of the soul is depicted by both Jesuits without resorting to the pluralists' views: both philosophers hold that there is a unique form, the soul, to which all the vital powers are bound. Both stress the distinction between these powers and the soul itself; in contrast to Aquinas, they highlight that the vital powers are distinguished by the soul, and not only potentially contained in it. This peculiar view is functional to defend a conception of the soul in which the intellect performs its own activity – thinking, abstracting, judging – in full separation from the enmattered powers. In Maldonado, the discussion of this “intellectualistic” aspect is mostly functional to pave the way to his defense of the soul's immortality; in Suárez, the cognitive account reflects the concern of highlighting the superiority of the intellective faculty with respect to the others.

What can we draw from these parallel readings? One of our initial aims was to clarify some positions, which seem only to be sketched out by Maldonado and are not fully

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<sup>55</sup> See *DONIA* §35, 258: “Res autem corporeae quasi media sunt, quibus cognoscimus et intelligimus divinas res; idcirco numquam nisi sub aliqua corporis imagine eas intelligimus et cognoscimus”.

<sup>56</sup> See *DONIA* §§28-29.

understandable in *DONIA*. Interestingly, Maldonado's text possesses *in nuce* many of the features that it is possible to find out in later Jesuit productions; I limited myself to quote Suárez and, briefly, Baldelli. A more thorough investigation would be required to bring to full light all these common "*loci*": the adherence to a sort of midway position between the pluralists and Aquinas, if we consider the treatment of the *forma cadaveris* and, more broadly, of prime matter; a certain view of the soul's powers, from a functional perspective, aimed at sharpening the distinction between intellect and senses; the consideration of the vitality of the soul's powers. Besides these, there are naturally other investigations that need to be carried out, to have a clearer picture of the psychology described in early Jesuit commentaries, incorporating readings from yet unpublished manuscripts. Another point is worth considering to rethink old historical labels such as eclecticism, often used for Suárez and his midway positions, or the even stronger tag of anti-Thomism. For indeed, from these texts read side by side, what emerges is a composite picture in which, within an officially Thomist framework (the orthodox framework of the councils' agenda), other positions, closer to the Franciscans of the 13<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> centuries, get expressed naturally and – at least in the case of Maldonado – almost without discussion. Much has been written on the Jesuits' effective adhesion to Aquinas; but what is striking in texts like the ones we analyzed, is how a more naturalistic view – a more philosophical view, in Maldonado's terms – replaces the Thomist one. Perhaps what we perceive today as an almost surprising anti-Thomism, in these texts, was nothing more than the mirror effect of a wide scholastic framework, transmitted *via* lectures, such as Maldonado's, which, therefore, need to be more widely known.

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