

THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN LATE FRANCISCAN THOUGHT: THE CASE OF PETER OF TRABIBUS

LAS POTENCIAS DEL ALMA EN EL PENSAMIENTO FRANCISCANO TARDÍO: EL CASO DE PEDRO DE TRABIBUS

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Abstract

In the late medieval period, the issue of the composed nature of human beings and its relation to medieval faculty psychology became central. There is ample scholarship on this topic, focusing primarily on authors such as the Dominicans Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, and the Franciscans Alexander of Hales, Hugh of St. Cher, John of La Rochelle, and Peter John Olivi. In this paper, we want to examine the view of one of Olivi's disciples, the Franciscan theologian Peter of Trabibus (fl. 1290s), on the unity of the human soul and the nature of its powers, especially the powers of the intellect and the will. We are particularly interested in his application of the principle of plurality of substantial forms to explain the nature of the relation between the powers of the soul and its essence.

Keywords

Plurality of Forms; Powers of the Soul; Franciscan Thought; Will; Essence

Resumen

En el período medieval tardío, el asunto de la naturaleza compuesta de los seres humanos y su relación con la psicología de las facultades se volvió central. Existen muchos estudios sobre este tema, que se enfocan principalmente en autores como los dominicos Alberto Magno y Tomás de Aquino, y en los franciscanos Alejandro de Hales, Hugo de San Víctor, Juan de La Rochelle y Pedro Juan Olivi. En este artículo, queremos examinar la opinión de uno de los discípulos de Olivi, el teólogo franciscano Pedro de Trabibus (fl. 1290-1300), sobre la unidad del alma humana y la naturaleza de sus potencias, especialmente las potencias del intelecto y la voluntad. Estamos particularmente interesados en su aplicación del principio de pluralidad de formas sustanciales para explicar la naturaleza de la relación entre las potencias del alma y su esencia.

Palabras clave

Pluralidad de formas; potencias del alma; pensamiento franciscano; voluntad; esencia

1. Introduction: Powers

There are various ways to characterize the relationship between the powers of the soul and the soul itself.¹ One way of doing so is by considering the individual powers of the soul, like those of the imagination and the memory, by themselves, focusing on the nature of their operations and objects. Another is by considering the ontological status of clusters of powers, like the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective parts of the soul. We can also consider how these clusters relate to one another (e.g., the sensitive to the vegetative) and how the powers within each cluster relate to one another (e.g., within the sensitive, the relationship between sight and hearing), and how each of these powers relates to a power of other clusters (e.g., how the sensitive power of the imagination relates to the intellective power). Finally, we can also consider how these clusters and powers relate to the essence of the soul considered as a whole.

There is a great variety of ways in which these relations were understood by medieval thinkers, a diversity which has been explored in a significant number of studies on the topic.² Within that framework, existing scholarship tends to examine the relationship between the powers on the one hand and between the powers and the essence of the soul on the other, without framing it in the context of the position a given author holds about the unicity or plurality of substantial forms – that is, without considering the ontological status of the clusters of powers: are these parts of the soul, souls, or substantial forms? Yet there seems to be quite a substantial difference between explaining the relation of the power of sight and the power of the intellect from an ontological perspective in one author who holds that these powers belong to two different substantial forms and another author who takes them to belong to one and the same substantial form. The reason why this issue matters is that the whole to which

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² See e.g., Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris ca. 1200-1250*, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1, 42 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013); Sander W. de Boer, *The Science of the Soul: The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's De anima, c. 1260-c.1360*, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013); and Lydia Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

the power relates is necessarily different, and thus the relation between power and the whole needs to be accounted for in a specific way: that something forms a unit does not sufficiently explain the internal structure or even the nature of its constitutive elements. Whether this matters in any significant way as concerns the way in which the soul works is a different matter.³

Finally, in addition to the distinctions involved in the compositional nature of the human soul, i.e., as being constituted by vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual parts or clusters (in turn divided into different powers), one must also point out the fact that powers are defined by their operations. Some of these operations take place by means of the mediation of bodily parts, for instance, the sense organs for the five sense modalities of the external senses, whereas others, like the powers of the intellective part of the soul, namely the intellect and the will, perform their operations without the use of any bodily organ. This distinction has implications for the nature of the operations, their objects, but also for the nature of the powers themselves.

Among the authors who tried to make sense of the distinctions presented above is the Franciscan theologian Peter of Trabibus. In what follows, we examine how Peter of Trabibus' position on the plurality of substantial forms affected his philosophical psychology, namely, how this plurality influenced his account of the powers of the soul and in particular the *rational* powers. We show that due to their superior rational nature, these powers cannot be conceived of as accidents, and that the freedom of the will requires a special ontological status for this power – and by consequence the intellect. This leads Trabibus to conceive of these rational powers as substantial forms in themselves. It has been recently argued⁴ that this is Peter John Olivi's own view and thus, although not completely original, Trabibus' conception of the powers of the soul brings new insight concerning how the unicity versus the plurality of forms debate developed

³ This qualification seems necessary because it is unclear whether there are global consequences for the way in which a given author positions himself in this constellation of possibilities. Some commentators consider that the consequences are not very great. See e.g., Sander de Boer, who goes through pluralist and unitarian models of the soul in order to see whether they answer differently the challenge of the thought experiment of “the eye in the foot”, which concerns the bodily location of “mental powers”. He concludes: “the thought experiment can be formulated and answered irrespective of whether the distinction [Ockham's] between the two souls is accepted or not. [...] The difference between them seems to stem from a disagreement on how we should analyze the soul in terms of its powers, not from how we should analyze the soul in terms of its substantial unity” (de Boer, *The Science of the Soul*, 227). We are less certain whether this is the case, but this is not the place to elaborate on the reasons for our doubts.

⁴ See Can Laurens Löwe and Dominik Perler, “Complexity and Unity: Peter of John Olivi and Henry of Ghent on the Composition of the Soul”, *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 89/2 (2022): 335-392, especially 352. The authors elegantly describe Olivi's position as based on “a mereological relation among single-track powers” (355). Although their reading is compelling, there are significant differences between Olivi and Trabibus in terms of the terminology and arguments they employ.

in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, especially among Franciscan authors.⁵

2. Peter of Trabibus

Not much is known about Peter of Trabibus beyond the fact that he was a Franciscan theologian teaching in the Franciscan *studium generale* of Santa Croce at Florence during the 1290s.⁶ We also know that Peter was a student of Peter John Olivi and that, like most Franciscans, his thought was also influenced by Bonaventure and the post-Bonaventure Franciscan tradition. Among the preserved works of Peter are his *Quodlibetical disputations* (*Quodlibeta*) and two commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. These exist in two redactions, one in the form of an *Ordinatio* and another as a *Lectura*, probably based on his teaching in Florence.⁷ In this paper, we will focus on the *Lectura*, which exist mostly in manuscript form (Ms Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppressi, D.6.359),⁸ but also refer to the text of the *Ordinatio*, which has been edited by Hildebert Huning.⁹

There has been a scholarly debate whether Peter of Trabibus was the author of *Lectura*. However, recent studies have demonstrated that *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* have many similarities that justify their attribution to the same author, Peter of Trabibus.¹⁰ The

⁵ We remain neutral about the existence of a ‘school of Peter John Olivi’, as has been suggested by Hildebert Alois Huning, “The Plurality of Forms according to Petrus de Trabibus O.F.M.”, *Franciscan Studies* 28 (1968): 137-196, esp. 137.

⁶ A good introduction to Peter of Trabibus, including the literature on the authorship of the *Lectura*, can be found in Tuomas Vaura, “Peter of Trabibus on Creation and the Trinity”, *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 89/1 (2022): 145-195. See also the excellent recent study by Paola Bernardini, “Nuove ricerche sul fondo di Santa Croce: un frammento del ‘Commento alle Sentenze’ di Pietro delle Travi (BML, Plut. 4 sin. 3, ff. 211ra-224rb)”, *Codex Studies* 6 (2022): 23-51. Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this bibliographical reference.

⁷ See Sylvain Piron, “Franciscan *Quodlibeta* in Southern *Studia* and at Paris, 1280-1300”, in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century*, edited by C. Schabel (Boston: Brill, 2006), 403-438, esp. 409-410. See also Sylvain Piron, “Le poète et le théologien. Une rencontre dans le *studium* de Santa Croce”, *Picenum Seraphicum. Rivista di studi storici e francescani* 19 (2000): 87-134.

⁸ Some of the questions have been transcribed and can be found freely available in the *Rationality in Perception* website project: <https://blogs.helsinki.fi/rationality-in-perception/texts/>.

⁹ Huning, “The Plurality of Forms”.

¹⁰ Against the attribution of authorship of the *Lectura* to Peter of Trabibus are P. Ephrem Longpré, “Nuovi Documenti”, *Studi francescani* (1923): 314-328; and Valens Heynck, “Zur Datierung der *Sentenzkommentar* des Petrus Johannis Olivi und des Petrus de Trabibus”, *Franziskanische Studien* 38 (1956): 371-398. In favour of the thesis that Peter is the author of *Lectura* we find Victorin Doucet, *Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au repertoire de M. F. Stegmüller* (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1954), 88-170, esp. 94; Hildebert Alois Huning, “Die Stellung des Petrus de Trabibus zur Philosophie”, *Franziskanische Studien* 46 (1964): 213-223; Sylvain Piron, “Le poète et le théologien”, 8-10; and Russell L. Friedman, *The Sentences Commentary*

Ordinatio is explicitly attributed to Trabibus in the manuscripts. Also, when *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3 - a highly relevant text for the subject of this study - is compared to *Ordinatio*, we find several similarities between these two texts that demonstrate that *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* are by the same author. Some of the similarities are listed in the appendix.

As we noted above, the issue of the composed nature of human beings and its relation to medieval faculty psychology became central in the late medieval period. The 1277 and 1284 Oxford Prohibitions and Condemnations, which targeted certain views concerning the plurality of forms in the human composite, are the expression (and perhaps the result) of ongoing acrimonious debates, often between Franciscan and Dominicans, which continued long after these Prohibitions were issued.¹¹ Among the main figures in these debates was Peter John Olivi, who denied that the human (intellective) soul is the form of the body. In 1311, the Council of Vienne declared that whoever defends the view that “the rational or intellectual soul is not the form of the human body of itself and essentially is to be considered a heretic”, and thus that the unicity of the substantial form is consistent with Christian doctrine.¹² While Olivi’s position on this matter has received a fair amount of attention in recent scholarship, the same is not true of Olivi’s disciples. In this paper, we want to show that, like Olivi,¹³ Peter of Trabibus argued that human beings consist of a plurality of substantial forms, which he took to be compatible with the claim that a human being has only one soul. What is interesting for us here is the way that Trabibus extends this formal plurality to his analysis of the ontological status of the powers of the soul.

To understand Peter’s view, we must start with his view on substances, which he takes to be a composite of form and matter. Like many Franciscans of his time, Peter of Trabibus was a defender of universal hylomorphism, the view that hylomorphic (matter-form) composition was not limited to material substances and extended to all substances, including spiritual ones. Angels are therefore a composite of matter and form.¹⁴ Although universal hylomorphism was very popular in the mid-thirteenth century, it also had its

of Peter of Trabibus. With Question Lists and Text Editions on Matter, Form, Body, and Soul (forthcoming).

¹¹ The literature on this debate is extensive and cannot be considered here in any detail. As introductions to this issue, the reader should consult (for the 1277 Prohibitions) José Filipe Silva, *Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul. Plurality of Forms and Censorship in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); and (for the 1284 Condemnations) spearheaded by John Peckham, Andrew E. Larsen, *The School of Heretics: Academic Condemnation at the University of Oxford, 1277-1409* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 42-63.

¹² H. Denzinger, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, edited by N. P. Tanner (London and New York: Sheed & Ward, 1990), 361; see *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Generaliumque Decreta*, vol. II/1 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 405-407: “[...] quod quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpsetit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tanquam haereticus sit censendus.” It is important to point out that this statement remains compatible with the plurality of substantial forms in composite substances.

¹³ On this topic, see Efrem Bettoni, *Le dottrine filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi* (Milan: Pubblicazioni dell’Università cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1959).

¹⁴ “Dicendum est quod angelus habet materiam”, Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 3, q. 2, f. 6rb.

detractors. Thomas Aquinas, for example, explicitly denied universal hylomorphism and its application to angels;¹⁵ one consequence of his view was that he lacked the conceptual resources to deal with the individuation of angelic intelligences and thus had to admit that each angel constituted its own species.

In a hylomorphic composite, matter plays the role of the indeterminate element, the substrate that underlies all change and all form. Form, on the other hand, plays the role of the determining element, but it plays this role in one of two ways: either as that which determines the already constituted thing in a qualified way (*secundum quid*), i.e., as an accident; or as that which determines the thing in an essential way (*dat esse simpliciter*), i.e. as a substantial form. In the former case, form comes to be in what already exists as one thing or another, whereas in the latter, it comes as a determination, partial or complete – or, better said, dispositional or completive. An important consideration is that Peter does not think that any *one single* substantial form is *the* determination of any individual thing.

Unlike Aquinas,¹⁶ but like Olivi,¹⁷ Peter of Trabibus argues that any given composite is constituted by a plurality of substantial forms. Trabibus especially criticizes Aquinas' view of the unicity of substantial forms, even though he does not mention the Dominican by name. Instead, he says:

¹⁵ “Relinquitur ergo quod anima intellectiva, et omnis intellectualis substantia cognoscens formas absolute, caret compositione formae et materiae”, Thomas Aquinas, *Pars prima Summae theologiae*, qq. 50–119 (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1889) (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P. M. edita 5), q. 75, a. 5 co.

¹⁶ “There is an extensive literature on the topic; see e.g., John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000). In several places, Aquinas clearly states his view, e.g. *Summa theologiae* I^a q. 76 a. 4 co.: “Sed si anima intellectiva unitur corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut supra iam diximus, impossibile est quod aliqua alia forma substantialis praeter eam inveniatur in homine. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt quia forma accidentalis non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale, sicut calor facit suum subiectum non simpliciter esse, sed esse calidum. [...] Forma autem substantialis dat esse simpliciter, [...] Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; [...] Et similiter est dicendum de anima sensitiva in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectioribus respectu imperfectiorum.”

¹⁷ “[...] idcirco simpliciter teneo in corpore humano praeter animam esse alias formas realiter differentes ab ipsa et etiam credo omnes gradus formales qui in eo sunt concurrere ad unam perfectam formam constituendam, quarum principalior et omnium quodam modo forma et radix est illa quae ultimo advenit”, Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, edited by B. Jansen (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922–26), q. 50, vol. II, 35. See Robert Pasnau, “Olivi on the Metaphysics of the Soul”, *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 6 (1997): 109–132.

Some hold that in one matter there is but one form; for they maintain that the substantial form that exists in matter perfects it with respect to every formal act that is in it, and that the last form contains by power and force all preceding forms and every one of their acts in the aforesaid mode; as for example the rational soul makes a human being to be a human being and to be an animal and [to be] a body and a substance.¹⁸

Trabibus takes such a view to be contrary to both faith and reason.¹⁹ Appealing to a pluralist stock example, he claimed that living things like human beings are constituted of bones and blood, and that bones and blood are compounds of substantial form and matter, and thus are substances in their own right. According to Peter, one and the same substantial form cannot explain why a being is ‘human’, i.e., belongs to the human species and is made of bone and blood because each of them – bone and blood – are composites that belong to their own substantial genus.²⁰ In addition, as Aristotle claims that a soul is the act of the physical body which can be alive,²¹ a body must exist and thus have a form before the soul is united with it, determining its species. Trabibus also argues that as a spiritual substance lacking quantity, the soul cannot explain the material being of the human body.²² Therefore, a body must have a form that is distinct from the soul and that explains why it is a body.²³

¹⁸ “Quidam enim ponunt quod in materia una non est nisi forma una; ponunt enim quod forma substantialis existens in materia perficit eam quantum ad omnem actum formalem qui est in ea, ita quod forma ultima continet virtute et potestate omnes formas praecedentes et omnem actum earum modo praedicto; ut, verbi gratia, anima rationalis facit hominem esse hominem et esse animal et corpus et substantiam”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, edited by H. A. Huning, 147. All translations are ours unless otherwise indicated.

¹⁹ “Repugnat enim veritati sanctae scripturae, veritati fidei catholicae, veritati rationis recte, autoritati philosophiae”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, 147.

²⁰ “Sed contra istam positionem sunt plures rationes, quarum una sit haec. Quia quicquid est in genere, per se participat principio illius generis. Sed ossa et caro et nervi vere sunt in genere substantiae, ergo sunt composita ex materia et forma illius generis. Probatio consequentiae, quia secundum Boethium genus, quod est praedicamentum substantiae, est compositum. Sed si non esset in homine nisi una forma, tunc non esset os et huius in genere nisi per reductionem”, Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, f. 17ra-b. See also Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, 140.

²¹ Aristotle, *De anima* II.1, 412a, 27-28.

²² “Item, impossibile est quod unum oppositorum det esse formaliter reliquo. Sed anima rationalis est quid spirituale et non quantum. Ergo impossibile est quod det corpori esse quantum formaliter.” Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, f. 17ra; see also *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, 150: “[...] ergo cum forma spiritualis sit actus spiritualis, impossibile est quod forma spiritualis daret materiae actum corporalem [...] constat ergo quod impossibile est quod anima faciat hominem vel quodcumque animal esse corpus.”

²³ “Item, Philosophus dicit, quod anima est actus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis. Ergo praesupponit ante suam coniunctionem illa existere, vel tempore vel natura, alioquin coniungeretur materiae nudae et non organicae”, Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, f. 17rb.

This argument was particularly important for theological reasons and was applied to explain the status of the dead body of Christ during the time his corpse lay in the tomb (the so-called *triduum*). For most pluralists, the unicity of form doctrine was unable to explain the relationship that holds between Christ's corpse and his living body, except by claiming that there is a substantial change from one to the other, meaning that one substance (the living body) is replaced by another (the corpse or dead body), with only formless prime matter persisting throughout the change. But prime matter, as pure potentiality, could not "hang on the cross" or "lie in the tomb" because it did not have any properties such as location.²⁴ For those who defend the plurality of substantial forms, the question of the identity of the living and the dead body is easier to solve because there is a form, which is not the rational soul, that accounts for the constitution of a body when the soul is not present. This principle applies to any essential substantial part of the human composite and thus, Trabibus concludes, for philosophical as well as for theological reasons, that human beings are necessarily constituted by a plurality of substantial forms. Trabibus' statement of this view could not be clearer:

And it must be said according to a saner doctrine that there are or can be many substantial forms in one composite, except in simple things [e.g., elements]. And this agrees with the truth of the Sacred Scripture, at the beginning of *Genesis*. It is also in agreement with the truth of the Catholic faith in what concerns the conception of Christ, His death, and His being in the Sacrament [i.e., the Eucharist]. It also agrees with the truth of right reason, because the more a form is noble, the more actuality it has and the more remote it is from possibility [i.e., potentiality], but the rational soul etc. [is the most actual and the most remote from potentiality]. It agrees also with the authority of philosophy, as it results from argument.²⁵

As numerous scholars have shown, pluralism of substantial forms does not entail that the human composite lacks unity.²⁶ What pluralists offer us is an account of the principle of unification, not of simplicity. In Trabibus we find precisely the claim that human beings have only one soul despite being composite because unity does not entail simplicity.

²⁴ "Item, si anima Christi dabat esse corpus et omnia alia, tunc cum per mortem fuerit fuerit separata, non remansit nisi materia pura, cui non competit iacere in sepulcro, et per consequens nec in cruce pendere, quia illa non habet situm de se", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, f. 17ra. See also Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. 1, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, 149: "Item, materia nudata forma substantiali non potest dici corpus, sicut prius est ostensum; ergo anima a corpore separata, si non sit in homine nisi forma una, non remanet nisi materia sola, et ita non remanet corpus. Falsum est ergo quod dicitur et creditur corpus Christi iacuisse in sepulcro et quod ab ipso iam mortuo emanavit sanguis et aqua."

²⁵ "Et ideo dicendum secundum saniolem doctrinam, quod in uno composito sunt plures formae substantiales, vel possunt esse, nisi in simplicibus. Et hoc est consonum veritati Sacrae Scripturae [...] Est etiam consona veritati fidei catholicae [...] Est etiam consona veritati rectae rationis, quia quanto forma nobilior tanto actualior et a possibilitate remotior, sed anima rationalis, etc. Est etiam consona auctoritati philosophiae, ut patuit in arguendo", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, f. 17rb.

²⁶ See e.g., Silva, *Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul*, Part One, for analysis and references.

Among the arguments that Trabibus presents for the unity of the soul is one in which he appeals to Avicenna. According to Trabibus, Avicenna explains that when one power of the soul has an intense act, the acts of the other powers become weaker. Avicenna's idea can be illustrated by the example of trying to think strategically when angry. When one is very angry, it is difficult to think clearly. Trabibus takes this example as evidence that the powers of the soul are connected by one common factor, namely, the essence of the soul, so that the intensity of the act of one power which is rooted in that common subject results in the weakening of the others.²⁷ Importantly, however, even then the intensity of the operation of one power, say the intellect, does not completely prevent the operation of another power, say the will, which can still be carried out. He takes this as evidence of the fact that each of these powers is a form on its own and thus operates in relative independence of the others.²⁸ What is interesting in this view is that the simultaneity of operations is often used as an argument for the need to postulate the existence of more than one substantial form, for instance, when we have contrary desires, one rational and one sensory. However, Trabibus uses the simultaneity argument to show that even within the same level of operation, which is rational in this case, two powers can operate despite influencing each other. This he takes as evidence not of the need to separate them ontologically but as two distinct powers operating within the same total entity, the human soul. If the operation of one of these powers does not affect, to some degree, the other, they could be conceived of as separate entities, not connected in any significant sense – without a joint purpose of action, as it were. But that is precisely what he wants to deny because he takes plurality to be compatible with unity (but not simplicity).

Now, the challenges facing a pluralist such as Trabibus concern the unity of the human soul and the unity of the human being. To start, he must explain how these forms come together to constitute one soul. Trabibus answers that what grounds that plurality internal to the human soul is the existence of spiritual matter. He uses the notion of the spiritual matter of the human soul to argue that the substantial forms of the soul inform this spiritual matter directly, and it is this common substrate that gives unity to the composite the soul. Hence, according to Peter, a human being has one soul, which is

²⁷ “Item, dicit Avicenna, *VI Naturalium*, potentiae animae humanae habent unum vinculum commune et unam radicem communem in qua radicanur. Et probat per hoc, quia una non remitteretur propter alterius actum, si ita non esset. Ergo ex quo remittitur sunt una essentia”, Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 17, q. 2, f. 22rb.

²⁸ “[...] si intellectus et voluntas essent forma una, quando intelligere et amaret, divideretur eius intentio et virtus; sed omnis virtus finita et determinata dispersa facit operationes imperfectas et viles, sicut etiam dicit Commentator, scilicet 18 propositione de causis: quanto magis, inquit, virtus patitur et dividitur, minoratur et debilitatur et efficit operationes viles. Ergo si intellectus et voluntas essent forma una et eadem, quando intelligeret, non posset complete amare, immo cum numquam possit amare, nisi quod intelligit, numquam exiret in actu amoris, nisi per imperfectum, vilem et diminutum, quod constat esse falsum. Relinquitur ergo primum, scilicet quod intellectus et voluntas sint formae essentialiter differentes”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. 1, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 179.

constituted by many substantial forms that are rooted in spiritual matter.²⁹ Trabibus is not original in giving this reply, as his view of the hylomorphic structure of the soul follows Olivi's teaching. Olivi believes that a human soul is one substantial form that has three constitutive formal parts: the intellectual part, the sensitive part, and the vegetative part. What binds these parts together in the constitution of one soul is that they inform an intellectual or spiritual matter.³⁰ The result is a model of the human soul as a composite substance constituted by a plurality of substantial forms. But this characterization of the human soul as a spiritual composite substance represents a challenge to a traditional hylomorphic definition of the human being, i.e., of a conception of the soul as the form of the body. An explanation is owed as to the nature of the relation between the soul thus constituted (of matter and forms) and the human body.

Trabibus tries to solve this inherent tension concerning the union of the body and the soul by discussing separately the lower parts of the soul – vegetative and sensitive – and the higher parts of the soul, the intellect and the will. This brings a certain hierarchy to the substantial forms of the soul, so that the vegetative and the sensitive are those formal parts of the soul that are the act of the body, whereas the intellective powers of the will and intellect are not. Peter argues that “the soul” is united to the body by means of something from itself (*per aliquid sui*), and what he means by this is that the vegetative and the sensitive powers are those formal parts of the soul that communicate their actuality to the body, whereas the intellective and volitional powers do not. However, insofar as the lower parts operate via the body, only they bear a close connection to the body, such that the vegetative and sensitive substantial forms inform spiritual matter, and this composite completes and perfects – as a form in this qualified sense – the body, constituted by matter (physical matter) and a plurality of forms. Another way to understand this is to say that the soul is united with the body as the form of the body through its formal parts.³¹

²⁹ “Et non sunt in [uno] homine per consequens nisi una, habens plures partes formales, quarum aliquae sunt eius partes formales communicantes eius actum et aliquae non, ut intellectiva et volitiva”, Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 17, q. 2, f. 22rb-23va; see also Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 172-173: “[...] anima enim humana est quoddam suppositum in genere spiritualis substantiae constans ex spirituali materia et ex spirituali forma, ad cuius suppositi constitutionem plures formae conveniunt in una materia radicatae, ex quibus quaedam collocant et ordinant ad constituendum compositum ex ipsa et corpore, ut hominem, in esse generis ut vegetativa et sensitiva, quaedam vero in esse suo specifico et completo, ut intelligentia et voluntas.”

³⁰ “Sufficit enim ad hoc quod omnes formales partes animae informent eandem materiam spiritualem, ita quod ex omnibus fiat una totalis forma eius”, Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 51, vol. II, 184.

³¹ “Item, ratione potest probari, quia anima unitur corpori ut forma, aut ergo est forma se tota, aut per aliquid sui. Sed non potest dici se tota, quia tunc potentia intellectiva esset forma corporis sicut sensitiva, quod est contra Philosophum, *II De anima*, dicente, nullius corporis est actus. Et etiam omnis forma corporis est ligata taliter, quod non potest se reflectere supra se, quod falsum est de intellectiva, quia potest se reflectere. Et omnis talis forma communicat corpori actum suum

Trabibus is again very close to the view we find in Olivi, who also argues that it is (intellectual) matter that explains the unity of the intellectual part of the soul and the sensitive part: both forms (sensitive and intellective) inform that same matter and thus are part of one and the same whole.³² The unity of these parts informing the same intellectual matter can account for several psychological phenomena, for example, why the intellective part can move the sensitive part freely, for instance in turning one's gaze to a given object, or why the intellective part is so intimately connected with the sensitive part that one can even say that the acts of the sensitive part are its own acts.³³

We come now to the key question of the status of the powers of the soul. Trabibus states at the outset that “powers are distinguished by their acts, acts are distinguished by their habits, and habits by their objects”.³⁴ But there are different ways of conceiving of the ontological status of powers and their relation to the essence of the soul. It has become traditional in the literature to distinguish between three main theories about this relation, namely the ‘identity theory’ of thinkers like Philip the Chancellor; the ‘distinction theory’ of thinkers like Thomas Aquinas; and more recently, the ‘middle theory’ common among Franciscan authors, such as Bonaventure.³⁵ We cannot go into this debate here, but it suffices to say that Trabibus follows his Franciscan predecessors and especially contests the distinction theory.

primum et cuilibet eius parti, et tunc oportet, quod quaelibet pars hominis intelligeret, sicut quaelibet pars sentit et quaelibet pars vivit, quod falsum est apud omnem, scilicet, quod quaelibet pars hominis intelligat. Ergo relinquitur, quod anima uniatu corpori per aliquid sui. Sed hoc non potest esse suum materiale. Ergo aliqua pars formalis, scilicet, sensitiva et vegetativa. Est igitur dicendum, quod tota anima corpori coniungitur, sed non est tota eius perfectio, sed aliqua eius partes formales. Et non sunt in [uno] homine per consequens nisi una, habens plures partes formales, quarum aliquae sunt eius partes formales communicantes eius actum et aliquae non, ut intellectiva et volitiva”, Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 17, q. 2, f. 22rb-23va.

³² “[...] supposito quod sensitiva sit unita cum parte intellectiva in una spirituali materia seu saltem in uno, ut ita dicam, supposito rationalis animae. [...] pars autem intellectiva et sensitiva sint unitae tanquam duae naturae formales in una materia seu in uno supposito et in una substantia animae et ita invicem sibi consubstantiales tanquam partes substantiales unius formae substantialis animae”, Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 59, vol. II, 539.

³³ “Et cum manifeste sentiamus quod superior movet et tenet libere inferiorem: oportet quod inferior sit radicatus in materia superioris et non e contrario”, Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 51, vol. II, 124. See also q. 51, vol. II, 122: “Primum etiam est contra experimentum intimum et certissimum quo intra nos sentimus sensitivam teneri et regi et dirigi a parte superiori tanquam aliquid in sua materia intime plantatum; in tantum que sentitur esse plantata in radice superioris partis nostrae quod radix nostrae subsistentiae, ipsa scilicet pars superior, sentit intime et dicit actus sensitivae esse suos.”

³⁴ “Item, potentiae distinguuntur per actum, et actus per habitus, et habitus per obiecta”, Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 24, q. 2, f. 29va.

³⁵ See Dominik Perler, “Faculties in Medieval Philosophy”, in *The Faculties: A History*, edited by D. Perler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 97-139; and Can Laurens Löwe, “Bonaventure on the Soul and Its Powers”, *Vivarium* 59 (2021): 10-32.

In fact, Trabibus takes issue with the traditional view that powers are accidents of the soul. He takes this theory to be grounded in two theses:

(1) nothing that is in act by its own essence is ordered to an ultimate act; but the soul is, by its own essence, in act; therefore, its essence is not ordered to an ultimate act; thus, if the essence of the soul were the immediate principle of its operations, the soul would always be operative, in the same way as [every being that has a soul] is always alive.³⁶

(2) the diversity of acts according to nature and species is from the diversity of principles; but to be and to operate are acts of different species; therefore, [they] are from different principles; but to be is from form and to operate is from power; thus, power is something essentially different from form.³⁷

According to this view, the powers of the soul are “certain natural properties” (*quaedam naturales proprietates*) by means of which the soul performs its operations, which flow from the soul’s essence, and that are better said to be accidents of the second species of quality.³⁸ But, Peter concludes, this view cannot seem rational for any inquisitive person who loves the truth and does not have a stubborn mind.³⁹

The problem Peter sees in this view is that it makes essential features of the type of being in question, for instance, what is essential to being human, to be accidental. If this traditional view was correct, then the power of the intellect, which is responsible for determining a human being in its proper species (*in esse specifico*), would be accidental to the soul.⁴⁰ Importantly for a Franciscan author and a disciple of Olivi, the same would be true of the will, meaning that if powers are accidental to the soul, the power of the will would be an accident of the soul. “Not only is this false, it is heretical” (*non solum falsum*,

³⁶ “Item, nihil quod est actus per suam essentiam est ordinatum ad ulteriorem actum; sed animam per suam essentiam est actus; ergo essentia eius non est ordinata ad ulteriorem actum; ergo si essentia animae esset immediatum principium operationis, semper habens animam semper haberet opera animae, sicut semper est animatum”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 166.

³⁷ “Item, diversitas actuum secundum naturam et speciem est a diversitate principiorum; sed esse et operari sunt actus secundum speciem diversi; ergo sunt a principiis diversis; sed esse est a forma, operari a potentia; ergo potentia est aliud essentialiter a forma”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 166.

³⁸ “Quidam enim dicunt quod potentiae animae sunt quaedam naturales eius proprietates quibus anima est facilis ad operandum, fluentes ab eius essentia in essentiae diversitate; unde sunt in secunda specie qualitates, anima in genere substantiae existente”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 167-168. Both Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas argued that powers flow from the essence of the soul; for Aquinas, see *Summa theologiae* I, q. 77, 6: “[...] omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut principio.”

³⁹ “Sed ista positio homini veritatem amanti et eam mente non obstinata inquirenti minime rationabilis apparet”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 168.

⁴⁰ “[...] nullum accidens potest constituere rem in specie sua; sed rationale in homine designat et exprimit specificam eius formam, unde ponitur in eius definitione ut specifica differentia eius, et constat quod accipitur ab intellectu primo et immediate; ergo impossibile est quod intellectus sit accidentis animae rationalis”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 168.

sed haereticum apparet: 169), Trabibus pointedly remarks. So, what makes a human being human would only be accidental to the human being, because human being would lack the features of rationality and freedom of choice which we take to be inherently essential to it.⁴¹ According to this view, these powers could be removed from the human rational soul by God. Trabibus strongly argues against this view and reasons that as rationality and free choice of the will are essential for human beings, these powers must therefore be essential parts of the human soul.⁴²

For Trabibus, consequently, these powers are clearly essential to the human soul, but the question now remains what kind of being these powers have. What is clear is that:

it cannot be said that these are accidents, because Augustine proved in the *De trinitate* Chapter 4 that these cannot be accidents, and also because it would follow that a human being could understand without having an intellect or will, if these were accidents. Moreover, a human being would be placed in its species by his accidents, which is completely impossible and absurd.⁴³

This passage makes it clear that what is essential to a being cannot be accidental to that being, such as is the case with the powers of the intellect and the will. Otherwise, we would have to say that understanding is not essential to being human, and on the other hand, that it would be possible for a being to understand without having an intellect. Thus, powers cannot be accidents.⁴⁴ Instead, he claims:

⁴¹ “Et etiam quia sequeretur, quod homo posset intelligi non habens intellectum et voluntatem, si essent accidentia. Item, homo iam reponeretur in sua specie per sua accidentia, quae omnia sunt impossibilia et absurda. Ergo, si iste potentiae non sunt accidentia, nec etiam sunt materia, relinquatur per locum a divisione quod sint formae”, Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 24, circa 2, q. 2, f. 29vb. See also *Ordinatio* lib. 1, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4: “[...] nam homo in quantum homo est rationalis, intelligens, liber arbitrio; sed si potentiae istae sint homini accidentia, cum dicant in se aliquam essentiam absolutam, non enim dicunt purum respectum animae, possunt per intellectum ab anima, ab esse, et ita ab homine separari per potentiam divinam; sed illis circumscriptis vel separatis non erit homo rationalis nec intelligens nec arbitrio liber, cum haec insit homini per rationem et voluntatem; ergo poterit intelligi et esse quod non sit rationalis nec intelligens nec arbitrio liber; sed nihil tale est homo; ergo homo non erit homo.”

⁴² “[...] rationale in homine designat et exprimit specificam eius formam”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. 1, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 168. An anonymous referee made the point that also Aquinas would deny this possibility because as *propria* the powers of the soul are had necessarily by the soul and cannot (in principle) be separated from the soul even by divine intervention (see e.g., *Quaestiones de anima* 12, 7, edited by Marietti, 327: “Potentiae vero animae sunt accidentia sicut proprietates. Unde licet sine illis intelligatur quid est anima, non autem animam sine eis esse est possibile neque intelligibile”).

⁴³ “Sed non potest dici, quod sint accidens, quia Augustinus probat, *IX De trinitate* capitulum 4, quod non possunt esse accidens. Et etiam quia sequeretur, quod homo posset intelligi non habens intellectum et voluntatem, si essent accidentia. Item, homo iam reponeretur in sua specie per sua accidentia, quae omnia sunt impossibilia et absurda. Ergo, si iste potentiae non sunt accidentia, nec etiam sunt materia, relinquatur per locum a divisione quod sint formae”, Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 24, q. 2, f. 29vb.

⁴⁴ “Item, tota dignitas animae rationalis et naturalis excellentia ad alias creaturas consistit in

these powers are active and not passive, as the nobility of the soul consists in them; if these were passive, they would not be free and reflective of themselves. Thus, if these are active powers, [they] are forms because everything that acts is formal. Therefore, it is necessary that these forms are either substantial or accidental, but it has been proved that these are not accidents; therefore, [they] are substantial forms.⁴⁵

The conclusion that the powers of the intellective soul, the intellect and the will, are substantial forms appears to be the inevitable conclusion of an argument to the exclusion of parts: powers cannot be “accidental to the soul”,⁴⁶ and yet they must be forms because they are active, and to act is a property of forms. As there are only two types of forms, accidental and substantial, if these powers are not the former, for the reasons indicated above, they *must* be the latter. Thus, the powers of the soul must be substantial forms.

Peter also considers another traditional theory of powers and their relationship with the essence of the soul, which claims that powers are co-substantial with the soul but are not the same as its essence. Peter addresses this common early Franciscan theory by saying that if these powers are of the same substance (but are not essentially the same),⁴⁷ this means that they are caused or produced by the substance of the soul; but if that is the case, then they are essentially different from the substance of the soul.⁴⁸ However, he claims in particular that he does not understand how the substance and essence of human beings are really distinct. The essence of a human being (*homo*) is constituted by the body and the rational soul, both having a mutual inclination to be connected and united. In that case, the essence of a human being is the same as its substance, and thus:

that which is the essence of a human being is his substance and vice versa, and the same [is true] of body and soul and any other thing; therefore, that which is the same as another according to substance is necessarily the same according to essence.⁴⁹

potentiis istis; sed impossibile est quod naturalis nobilitas rei et perfectio et excellentia ad res alias consistat in accidentibus eius, cum nobilitas accidentium dependeat a dignitate et perfectione formae substantialis rei, et non e contrario; ergo impossibile est quod potentiae praedictae sint accidentales”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 169.

⁴⁵ “Item, istae potentiae sunt active et non passive, cum in eis consistat tota nobilitas animae, quia si de se essent passive, non essent libere et reflexibiles supra se. Igitur, si sunt potentiae activae sunt formae, quia omne agens est formale. Ergo oportet quod ista forma sit vel substantialis vel accidentalis, sed probatum est quod non sunt accidentia, ergo sunt formae substantiales”, Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 24, q. 2, f. 29vb.

⁴⁶ “[...] ergo impossibile est potentias istas esse animae accidentales”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 168.

⁴⁷ A view which we find, among others, in John of la Rochelle and Alexander of Hales: the powers and the soul are the same *secundum substantiam* but not the same *secundum essentiam*. On this, see Schumacher, *Human Nature*, ch. 5.

⁴⁸ Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 171.

⁴⁹ “[...] unde illud ipsum quod est hominis essentia est eius substantia et e converso, et similiter est de corpore et anima et qualibet re alia; ergo quod est idem cum alio secundum substantiam est necessario idem secundum essentiam”, Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 172.

The only correct view is that which holds that powers are as it were parts of the whole that is the soul. As an active principle intrinsic to the soul, powers are the formal parts of the soul and can only be substantial forms – rather than accidental. This is primarily the case with the powers of the rational soul, but nothing seems to prevent us from concluding that that is the case with all powers of the soul.

Peter's view about the substantial forms of the soul is quite radical. Usually, philosophers who defended the plurality of substantial forms explained that the substantial forms or formal parts of the human soul were something like the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual parts of the soul, but not the powers included in these parts. For Peter, however, the intellect and the will, which are two powers of the soul, are also substantial forms. Trabibus reasons that insofar as these inform the spiritual matter of the soul, they are called substantial forms, and insofar as they are directed to certain kinds of objects, these are called powers. So, the same entity is both a power and a substantial form: power with respect to an object and form with respect to inhering in a substrate.⁵⁰ There is, hence, a distinction between what powers are from the point of view of how they relate to the essence of the soul, and as such, they are not distinct from that essence but are one with it;⁵¹ and from the point of view of being powers and as such each adds something to the soul, namely, its being directed to a certain kind of operation. Thus, the same essence is given different names in accordance with the diversity of operations. However, one should not read this – Trabibus warns us – as meaning that the soul is a simple essence; rather, powers do carve out something for themselves in the ontological structure of the soul. It is this 'ontological carving' that justifies the distinguishability of the powers and essence of the soul. Finally, it is important not to understand the diversity of operations principle as implying that powers simply "flow from the essence of the soul", as effects from a prior cause, as we find in Thomas Aquinas (and his master, Albert the Great). Instead, Peter argues, the human soul is created all at once (*simul*) with all its

⁵⁰ "Dicendum igitur quod potentiae istae sunt formae quaedam animae non accidentales, sed substantiales ponentes ipsam in esse intellectuali sive rationali; anima enim humana est quoddam suppositum in genere spiritualis substantiae constans ex spirituali materia et ex spirituali forma, ad cuius suppositi constitutionem plures formae conveniunt in una materia radicatae, ex quibus quaedam collocant et ordinant ad constituendum compositum ex ipsa et corpore, ut hominem, in esse generis ut vegetativa et sensitiva, quaedam vero in esse suo specifico et completo, ut intelligentia et voluntas; esse enim specificum hominis non est unum unitate simplicitatis et indistinctionis, sed unitate compositionis et integritatis, quia cum sit perfectissimus et multiplicis actionis, necesse est quod anima ipsuim constituens secundum quod ipsum contituit habet plures formas in sua spirituali materia radicatae, quae, licet ordinem secundum naturam, nam intellectus et affectus, et agunt circa obiecta propria, habeant enim duplicem comparisonem, scilicet ad materiam cui innituntur et in qua radicanantur, et sic sunt et dicuntur formae, et ad obiecta circa quae operantur, et sic dicuntur potentiae", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 172-73.

⁵¹ "[...] potentiae istae non sunt essentialiter diversae ab essentia animae rationalis", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 169.

powers,⁵² which means that powers are not accidental features added to the essence of the soul, but basic, primary constituents of it.

3. Conclusion

In this paper we focused on Peter of Trabibus' account of the human soul and its powers. We hope to have shown that for Trabibus, human beings consist of a plurality of substantial forms, which he takes to be compatible with the claim that they are unitary substances. We have also shown that the originality of Trabibus' view consists of his claim that whereas some forms or powers, like the senses, are united with a body, others, like the intellect and the will, are not so and that makes them special kinds of powers, characterized by their independence of operation. He goes as far as to call them "substantial forms" and takes this plurality as compatible with the claim that human beings have only one soul. The main argument for the special status of these powers is based on their dignified nature, meaning that they cannot be mere accidents being, as they are essential to the definition of a human being. On the other hand, they cannot have their freedom of operation compromised by being dependent on the body. This is particularly the case with the power of the will, the operation of which explains human freedom in action and theological merit, i.e., to be saved or damned. One aspect that is brought to the fore by this view is the reconsideration of the role of substantial form as the unification principle of substance: each power bears the powers of organizing the substance according to the operation it is able to produce or carry out. Only the whole soul is a substance, capable of independent existence, while the powers or capacities that constitute that substance are substantial forms in that they bring about a specific (set of) operation.

Finally, the focus on Peter of Trabibus allows us to show that the debate on the unicity versus plurality of forms in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was not held exclusively at the Universities of Paris and Oxford but rather it spilled over to the system of mendicant *studia* throughout Europe. Certainly, a sign that it was not thought of as vague theological speculation, but that it cut across the philosophical landscape as different ways of thinking about life, human nature, the relation between the body and the soul, the relation between powers within one and the same soul, and the basic structure of reality.

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⁵² "[...] ergo istae potentiae immediate concreantur a Deo sicut essentia ipsa [...] omne fluens ab alio est naturaliter posterius illo sicut effectus sua causa; sed illae potentiae naturaliter sunt et intelliguntur simul cum essentia animae rationalis (...) ergo non potest intelligi quod fluant ab ipsa", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 169.

APPENDIX

What follows is a comparison between selected passages of the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio*, with textual similarities underlined. The similarity of views strongly argues in favour of Peter of Trabibus as the author of the two texts.

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 139.
[...] <u>quia differentia est inter formam substantialem et accidentalem</u> , quia una <u>dat esse simpliciter per</u> cuius <u>acquisitionem fit generatio simpliciter</u> , et <u>per</u> cuius ablationem fit <u>simpliciter corruptio</u> . <u>Accidentalis</u> autem <u>dat esse secundum quid</u> , et sua <u>praesentia vel absentia non facit generationem</u> nec <u>corruptionem</u> , <u>sed solum alterationem</u> , sed prima substantialis. Ergo omnis post ea adveniens est accidentalis.	<u>Quia differentia est inter formam substantialem et accidentalem</u> , nam forma substantialis <u>dat esse simpliciter</u> , unde <u>per</u> eius <u>acquisitionem fit generatio simpliciter et per</u> eius abscissum <u>corruptio simpliciter</u> . Forma vero <u>accidentalis</u> non <u>dat esse nisi secundum quid</u> ; et ideo <u>praesentia et absentia non facit generationem</u> vel <u>corruptionem</u> substantiae, <u>sed solum alterationem</u> . Sed prima forma existens in materia est forma substantialis; ergo prima forma quam habet materia dat sibi esse simpliciter; ergo post illam vel supra illam non potest alia forma, nisi accidentalis, et sic in una re non potest esse nisi forma substantialis.
<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 139.
[...] <u>si per aliam formam panis est corpus et per aliam</u> panis, poterit substantia panis converti et remanebit corpus subiectus illis accidentibus, quod videtur esse contra fidem, quae dicit quod accidentia sunt sine subiecto.	[...] <u>si panis per aliam formam est panis et per aliam</u> substantia, quando convertitur panis in corpus Christi non remanebit forma panis, poterit tamen remanere forma substantiae; ergo conversio illa non esset transsubstantiatio; quod est contra commune dictum sanctorum.

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 142.
[...] <u>vivere viventibus est esse</u> , ergo <u>mori morientibus est corrumpi</u> . Sed si <u>per aliam formam</u> Christus habuit <u>esse et per aliam vivere</u> , ergo <u>separata anima</u> , adhuc <u>corpus eius</u> habebat <u>esse substantiale</u> , et sic non perdidit esse, quod est contra veritatem suae mortis.	[...] <u>vivere viventibus est esse</u> , et <u>mori est corrumpi</u> sive non esse. Sed si sint plures formae, <u>per aliam formam</u> habet corpus <u>esse et per aliam vivere</u> ; ergo <u>separata anima</u> habebit <u>corpus esse suum substantiale</u> ; ergo non erit mortuum.

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 143.
Item, cum in Christo fuerint os et caro et nervi et sanguis, aut haec omnia habent esse per unam formam, scilicet corpoream, aut per plures. Si per plures, cum panis non convertatur nisi in substantiam corporis Christi, tunc vi sacramenti non erit ibi vera caro et sanguis, cuius contrarium dicit veritas, qui manducat etc., et caro mea vere est cibum et sanguis vere est potus.	In corpore enim Christi fuerunt carnes, ossa, et nervi; aut ergo corpus caro et corpus os et corpus nervus dicunt aliquid aliud quam corpus, aut non; si non, cum forma corporis sit universalior quam forma carnis, non different realiter forma magis universalis et minus universalis. Similiter per eandem rationem non differret corpus homo et corpus ignis et sic de aliis. Si corpus caro dicat aliqua duo ita quod caro dicat formam superadditam formae corporis, tunc sequitur quod panis convertatur in solam substantiam carnis et non in formam carnis; sed cum sancti velint quod panis substantia convertitur in solam substantiam corporis ex vi sacramenti, non erit ibi forma carnis; quod est contra illud: nisi manducaveritis carnem filii hominis, et illud: caro mea vere est cibus.

<p><i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.</p>	<p><i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 146.</p>
<p>[...] <u>V Metaphysicae</u>, dicitur, quod <u>unum</u> dicitur quatuor modis, scilicet <u>numero</u>, <u>forma</u>, <u>genere</u>, <u>et proportione</u>. Et habent se per ordinem, quia quod <u>non</u> est <u>unum genere</u>, <u>non</u> est <u>unum specie</u>, et sic de aliis. Et constat, quod si unum numero esset vivum et mortuum, ergo oportet quod sit specie et genere, quod absurdum dicere, et idem specie essent ignis et aqua.</p>	<p>[...] <u>V Metaphysicae</u> quod <u>unum</u> est quadrupliciter: unum <u>numero</u>, unum <u>forma</u>, unum <u>genere</u>, unum <u>proportione</u>. Et ibidem dicitur quod haec se habent secundum proportionem et ordinem, quia quae non sunt unum proportione non sunt unum genere, et quae <u>non</u> sunt <u>unum genere</u> <u>non</u> sunt <u>unum specie</u>, et quae non sunt unum specie non sunt unum numero; sed secundum ponentes plures formas idem corpus erit nunc aqua, nunc ignis, ut si ex aqua generaretur ignis; ergo est unum numero quod non est unum specie; quod est absurdum.</p>
<p><i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.</p>	<p><i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 149.</p>
<p>[...] si in composito non est nisi una forma, ergo ea separata non remanet aliqua nisi materia nuda. Sed nulli tali rei debetur reverentia, nec sepultura etc., quod est contra fidem.</p>	<p>[...] materia nudata forma substantiali non potest dici corpus, sicut prius est ostensum; ergo anima a corpore separata, si non homine nisi forma una, non remanet nisi materia sola, et ita non remanet corpus. Falsum est ergo quod dicitur et creditur corpus Christi in sepulcro et quod ab ipso iam mortuo emanavit.</p>

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 147.
<p>Respondeo, dicendum, quod <u>circa quaestionem istam est duplex positio</u> valde solempnis. <u>Quidam enim</u> dicunt, quod in composito non est nisi <u>una forma</u> substantialis, quae <u>continet in virtute omnis praecedentes</u>, ut <u>anima rationalis</u>, quae dat esse corporeum, vivum, animal et hominem. Et <u>ratio eorum est tacta in opponendo</u>.</p>	<p><u>Circa quaestionem istam duplex est positio</u>. <u>Quidam enim</u> ponunt quod in materia una non est nisi <u>forma una</u>; ponunt enim quod forma substantialis existens in materia perficit eam quantum ad omnem actum formalem qui est in ea, ita quod forma ultima <u>continet virtute</u> et potestate <u>omnes formas praecedentes</u> et omnem actum earum modo praedicto; ut, verbi gratia, <u>anima rationalis</u> facit hominem esse hominem et esse anima et corpus et substantiam; <u>ratio autem earum est ratio prima tacta in opponendo</u>.</p>

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 148.
<p>Quia quicquid est in genere, per se participat principio illius generis. Sed ossa et caro et nervi vere sunt in genere substantiae, ergo sunt composita ex materia et forma illius generis. Probatio consequentiae, quia secundum Boethium genus, quod est praedicamentum substantiae, est compositum. Sed si non esset in homine nisi una forma, tunc non esset os et huius in genere nisi per reductionem.</p>	<p>[...] corpus, sanguis, caro, os etc. huiusmodi non dicunt solam materiam, sed dicunt necessario aliquid compositum ex materia et substantiali forma, tum quia quodlibet istorum directe et per se et essentialiter recipit praedicationem substantiae et est in genere substantiae; substantia autem ut genus et praedicamentum dicit quid compositum ex materia et forma, uti vult Boethius Super praedicamenta, ubi distinguens substantiam in materiam, formam, et compositum dicit quod relictis extremis Aristoteles de medio agit, et hoc etiam patet, quoniam materia et forma non sunt per se in genere, sed per reductionem sicut principium; tum quia corpus non praedicatur de materia vel forma, nisi solum denominative; non enim bene dicitur: materia est corpus, vel: forma est corpus, sed quod est corporea.</p>

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 150.
Item, impossibile est quod unum oppositorum det esse formaliter reliquo. Sed anima rationalis est quid spirituale et non quantum. Ergo impossibile est quod det corpori esse quantum formaliter.	[...] forma informat materiam et non efficiendo vel causando alium actum a se ipsa, sed se ipsam communicando et actum suum qui est formatio ipsa materiae participando; est enim forma essentialiter actus; ergo cum forma spiritualis sit actus spiritualis, impossibile est quod forma spiritualis daret materiae actum corporalem, quia tunc sequeretur ipsam esse corporalem; sed actus corporeitatis est corporalis; constat ergo quod impossibile est quod anima faciat hominem vel quodcumque animal esse corpus.

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 149.
[...] si anima Christi dabat esse corpus et omnia alia, tunc cum per mortem fuerit separata, non remansit nisi materia pura, cui non competit iacere in sepulcro, et per consequens nec in cruce pendere, quia illa non habet situm de se.	[...] ergo anima a corpore separata, si non homine nisi forma una, non remanet nisi materia sola, et ita non remanet corpus. Falsum est ergo quod dicitur et creditur corpus Christi in sepulcro et quod ab ipso iam mortuo emanavit.

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 150.
[...] Philosophus dicit, quod <u>anima est actus corporis physici</u> organici potentia vitam habentis. Ergo praesupponit ante suam coniunctionem illa existere, vel tempore vel natura, alioquin coniungeretur materiae nudae et non organicae.	[...] dicitur II De anima quod <u>anima est actus corporis physici</u> ; si autem in eadem materia non sit nisi forma una, anima non erit actus corporis et multo minus corporis physici, si coniungeretur materiae immediate.

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 150.
[...] <u>Commentator dicit</u> , II Physicorum, <u>quod omnia, quae sunt inter materiam primam et formam ultimam, sunt formae compositae.</u>	[...] <u>Commentator II Physicorum dicit quod omnia quae sunt inter materiam primam et formam ultimam sunt materiae et formae compositae</u> ; quod dici non posset, si non essent formae.

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 151.
Sed auctoritates huius positionis haec advertentes nituntur se defendere per quandam distinctionem, quae est talis, quia materia potest accipi dupliciter, <u>scilicet indeterminata</u> , ut <u>secundum se ab omnibus formis absoluta</u> , et sic dicunt quod <u>materia habet aliquo modo esse, non tamen potest dici corpus nec totum</u> . Secundo modo accipitur <u>materia determinata</u> et per qualitatem affectam <u>et alia accidentia physica</u> , quibus <u>mediantibus recipit diversitatem in partibus</u> , et facit os et nervos et carnes.	Radix autem et summa modorum sustinendi secundum ipsos est duplex distinctio. Prima est quod est accipere materiam duplicem, <u>scilicet indeterminatam</u> , ut <u>secundum se sumptam et ab omnibus formis absolutam</u> , et sic <u>materia habet esse</u> quodammodo simplex et <u>non potest dici corpus neque totum</u> ; alia est <u>materia determinata</u> , determinatur enim per formam signatam per quantitatem, afficitur per quantitatem et <u>alia accidentia physica</u> , quibus et varie affecta <u>recipit in partibus diversitatem</u> , ut dicatur caro quantum ad partem affectam mollitiae, os quantum ad partem affectam duritiae, et sic de aliis; unde talis materia potest dici corpus et totum et potest esse organica.

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 151.
[...] <u>ut genus et sic praedicatur de animali, et est compositum ex forma et materia. Et potest accipi ut pars, et sic non praedicatur, quia pars non praedicatur de toto, nec est compositum ex materia et forma, nec dicit materiam et formam, sed materiam signatam quantitate, affectam qualitate. Et per istam distinctionem</u> defendunt se sicut possunt, sed in veritate non possunt.	[...] <u>ut genus et sic praedicatur de animali et homine et est compositum ex materia et forma; vel potest accipi ut est altera pars compositi, et sic non praedicatur, quia pars non praedicatur de toto, nec est compositum ex materia et forma, nec dicit materiam et formam, sed materiam signatam quantitate, affectam qualitate, organicam, partium quadam diversitate. - Et per hanc duplicem distinctionem</u> in summa nituntur declarare obiecta; sed cuiuslibet horum quae ab ipsis divinantur potest falsitas esse patens tribus conclusionibus ostensis et probatis.

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 151.
Suppono enim ad praesens, quod <u>in rebus extra animam non</u> sit dare naturaliter <u>materiam sine forma</u> . Hoc enim dicit Augustinus, <u>De libero arbitrio</u> , expresse in pluribus locis.	Prima est quod <u>in rebus extra animam non</u> est ponere <u>materiam sine forma</u> ac per hoc nec materiam simpliciter et indeterminatam vel aliam communitatem habentem. [...] Primum patet primo per auctoritates Augustini. Dicit enim sic II <u>De libero arbitrio</u> :

<p><i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.</p>	<p><i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 152-153.</p>
<p><u>Item, Philosophus, IV Physicorum, dicit, quod materia non est separabilis a forma, sive ab altero contrariorum, licet ratione sit diversa.</u></p> <p><u>Item, I De generatione, quod non est possibile materiam esse sine morphea, id est, substantiali forma.</u></p> <p><u>Item, Commentator, Super IV Physicorum, hoc idem dicit. Et sic unum membrum destruitur distinctionis eorum.</u></p>	<p><u>Item, Philosophus IV Physicorum dicit quod materia non est separabilis a forma sive ab altero contrariorum, licet ratione sit diversa.</u></p> <p><u>Item, I De generatione, quod non est possibile materiam esse sine passione et morphea, id est substantiali forma.</u></p> <p><u>Item, Commentator Super IV Physicorum:</u> materia numquam denudatur a forma, nam cum separatur ab una, induit aliam, quoniam si denudaretur ab omnibus aliis formis, tunc quod non est in actu esset in actu. [...] primum membrum illius distinctionis ad propositum nihil valet.</p>
<p><i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.</p>	<p><i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 151. (see also 153-154)</p>
<p>Alterum etiam membrum est contra Philosophum, magistrum eorum, VII Metaphysicae, qui dicit, quod accidentia sunt posteriora tempore dicta et cognitione. Et ipsi volunt, quod materia illa possit affici accidentibus sine forma substantiali.</p>	<p>Secunda est quod in materia non potest esse aliquod accidens aliud ab ipsa nec aliqua diversitas generis vel speciei, nisi praesupposita forma substantiali.</p>
<p><i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.</p>	<p><i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 151; 154-155.</p>
<p>Secunda etiam distinctio non valet per ea, quae iam dicta sunt. Et etiam quia omne corpus est in praedicamento substantiae, et de eo substantia praedicatur, quae est composita ex materia et forma, ut dicit Boethius.</p>	<p>Tertia est quod necesse est omne corpus reale compositum esse ex materia et forma. [...] Tertium principaliter et primo patet ex prius probatis. [...] Item, hoc patet ex comparatione corporis ad suum genus [...] Principia autem generis substantiae sunt materia et forma. Quod patet, tum quia dicit Boethius Super praedicamenta quod cum substantia dicatur de materia et forma et composito.</p>

<p><i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.</p>	<p><i>Ordinatio</i> lib. 1, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 147-149.</p>
<p>Et ideo dicendum secundum sanio-rem doctrinam, quod in uno composito sunt plures formae substantiales, vel possunt esse, nisi in simplicibus. Et hoc est consonum veritati Sacrae Scripturae, in principio Genesis. Est etiam consona veritati fidei catholicae, et hoc quantum ad Christi conceptionem, et quantum ad eius mortem, et in quantum habet esse sub sacramento. Est etiam consona veritati rectae rationis, quia quanto forma nobilior tanto actualior et a possibilitate remotior, sed anima rationalis, etc. Est etiam consona auctoritati philosophiae, ut patuit in arguendo.</p>	<p>Sed si positio ista oculo veritatis consideretur, repugnare multipliciter enim veritati sanctae scripturae, rationis rectae, auctoritati philosophiae. Veritati scripturae repugnat, quoniam, sicut patet in I Genesis. [...] Repugnat etiam positio dicta veritati fidei catholicae. [...] Hoc viso patet quod praedicta positio repugnat conceptioni et formationi corporis Christi, [...] Repugnat etiam corpori Christi existenti sub sacramento, [...] Repugnat etiam positio dicta morti Christi. [...] Repugnat etiam positio praedicta veritati rationis rectae, quoniam manifestum est quod anima rationalis est inter omnes formas nobilior; quanto autem forma nobilior tanto actualior et a possibilitate materiae remotior,</p>
<p><i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.</p>	<p><i>Ordinatio</i> lib. 1, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 156.</p>
<p>[...] <u>forma substantialis dat esse simpliciter, quia in genere substantiae</u>, quod distinguitur contra accidens, et tunc est vera illa propositio. Si autem dicas, quod det esse perfectum et quietum, non est uerus nisi secundum gradum.</p>	<p>[...] <u>forma substantialis dare esse simpliciter: aut quia dat esse in genere substantiae</u>, quod est esse simpliciter, et hoc totum dicitur respectu artificis, et sic verum est quod forma substantialis dat esse simpliciter, sed ex hoc non potest propositum concludi; alio modo potest hoc intelligi, quia dat esse totaliter et universaliter perficiens rem secundum omnem gradum perfectionis debitum sibi, et hoc modo non habet veritatem illud respectu formae unius et eiusdem; unde manifestum est quod esse simplex aequivocatur.</p>

<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 157.
Ad secundum, dicendum, quod quando panis convertitur <u>in corpus Christi</u> , fertur virtus conversiva non ad formam panis solum, sed ad totum compositum.	Ad tertium dicendum quod in conversione panis <u>in corpus Christi</u> totum illud quod convertitur in principio prolationis verborum est suppositum panis cum omnibus partibus essentiae suae, hoc est materia cum omnibus substantialibus formis quae sunt in ea, et ideo vere dicitur et est transsubstantiatio, quia nihil remanet de substantia panis.
<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17v.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 160.
[...] <u>vivere est esse viventibus</u> non <u>simpliciter</u> , sed secundum genus determinatum, puta <u>esse vivum</u> . Et illud bene volo, quod destruat. Et sic in Christo vere fuit destructum esse vivium per mortem suam. Et quod iste sit intellectus Philosophi in ista propositione, patet ibidem per suum Commentator, qui ita exponit.	[...] <u>vivere viventibus est esse</u> ; quod non intelligitur de esse <u>simpliciter</u> et universaliter, sed de esse generis derterminati, <u>esse vivum</u> ; et quod iste sit intellectus patet per Commentatorem sic exponentem:
<i>Lectura</i> lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17v.	<i>Ordinatio</i> lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 161.
[...] <u>unum numero</u> dicitur <u>de uno singulari</u> , sed <u>unum specie</u> vel genere non dicitur <u>nisi de pluribus</u> , <u>ut dicit Commentator</u> . Unde dicit, quod istud, <u>quod est unum numero est unum specie, cum eo a quo differt numero</u> .	[...] <u>unum numero</u> non potest dici nisi <u>de uno singulari</u> , <u>unum</u> autem <u>specie</u> non potest dici <u>nisi de duobus vel pluribus</u> , <u>ut etiam dicit Commentator</u> ; dicit enim quod illud <u>quod est unum numero est unum specie cum eo a quo differt numero</u> ;