

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM AND WALTER CHATTON ON SENSORY POWERS AND THE MATERIALITY OF SENSATION

GUILLERMO DE OCKHAM Y WALTER CHATTON SOBRE LOS PODERES SENSORIALES Y LA MATERIALIDAD DE LA SENSACIÓN

Jordan Lavender
Purdue University

Abstract

While many thirteenth-century scholastic philosophers thought that the human powers of sensation are distinct from the human intellect, this apparent consensus collapsed in the 1320s, '30s, and '40s. The proximate cause of this transformation was Walter Chatton's rejection of William of Ockham's arguments that the human powers of sensation are distinct from the human intellect. This article examines Chatton's implicit and explicit motivations for rejecting Ockham's arguments. I show that Ockham thinks that the senses are distinct from the intellect because he holds that sensing is material and embodied in a way that thinking is not. I show that Chatton, on the other hand, sees no need to posit such a difference between sensation and thought with respect to materiality or embodiment because he thinks that nothing about the character of sensory experience shows it to be material or embodied in a way that thinking is not.

Keywords

William of Ockham; Walter Chatton; Sensation; Medieval Cognition Theory; Powers of the Soul

Resumen

Muchos filósofos escolásticos del siglo XIII creían que los poderes sensoriales humanos son distintos del intelecto humano. Este aparente consenso colapsó en las décadas 1320, 1330 y 1340. La causa inmediata de este cambio fue el rechazo de Walter Chatton a los argumentos de Guillermo de Ockham de que los poderes sensoriales humanos son distintos del intelecto humano. Este artículo examina las motivaciones implícitas y explícitas de Chatton para rechazar los argumentos de Ockham. Por un lado, nuestro que, de acuerdo con Ockham, los sentidos son

distintos del intelecto porque sostiene que el acto de percibir es material y está ligado al cuerpo de una forma que el pensamiento no lo está. Por otro lado, señalo que Chatton no ve la necesidad de postular tal diferencia entre sensación y pensamiento en cuanto a materialidad o corporalidad, ya que considera que nada en la naturaleza de la experiencia sensorial manifiesta que esta sea material o corporal de una manera diferente a como lo es el pensamiento.

Palabras clave

Guillermo de Ockham; Walter Chatton; sensación; teoría medieval de la cognición; poderes del alma

1. Introduction

Imagine sitting in a garden in the spring.¹ You might see some yellow daffodils, hear a sparrow's song, or feel a warm breeze. You might also hope that an upcoming

¹ I will use the following abbreviations and citation conventions. (Note that, while Chatton's *Reportatio* and *Lectura* each occupy multiple volumes produced by the same editors, each volume was published as a self-standing work rather than as part of a single, multi-volume work. The citation conventions used here treat the volumes of each work as if they were part of a single, multi-volume edition by numbering them 1-4 and 1-3 respectively):

- Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super Sententias*, edited by J.C. Wey and G.J. Etzkorn, 4 vols., Studies and Texts 141-142, 148-149 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002-2005): *Rep.* book.distinction.question.article (volume.page,line). (Volume 4 is not divided into distinctions and so will be cited as book.question.article);
- Walter Chatton, *Lectura super Sententias*, edited by J.C. Wey and G.J. Etzkorn, 3 vols., Studies and Texts 156, 158, 164 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007-2009): *Lect.* distinction.question.article (volume.page,line).
- Walter Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus*, edited by J.C. Wey (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1989): *Pro.* question.article (page,line).
- William of Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum secundum[-quartum] Sententiarum (Reportatio)*, edited by G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, F.E. Kelley, and R. Wood, 3 vols., *Opera theologica V-VII* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1981-1984): *ORep.* book.question (OT volume page,line).
- William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, edited by J. C. Wey, *Opera theologica IX* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1980), *QS* quodlibet.question (page,line).

In all citations, I will omit line numbers when citing an entire unit of text, such as a question or article. For Chatton's quodlibetal questions, q. 5, I have relied on my own transcription of q. 5 in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15805, f. 55ra. All translations are my own except where otherwise noted.

frost will not damage the daffodils, wonder whether the sparrow is a song sparrow, or believe that the breeze is coming from the southwest. Seeing yellow daffodils, hearing a sparrow's song, and feeling a warm breeze are all instances of what medieval scholastic philosophers called *sensatio* ("sensation") or *sentire* ("sensing"). Hoping that an upcoming frost will not damage the daffodils, wondering whether the sparrow is a song sparrow, and believing that the breeze is coming from the southwest are all instances of what medieval scholastic philosophers called *intellectio* ("thought") or *intelligere* ("thinking").

It was typical for medieval scholastic philosophers to see both sensing and thinking as actualizations of *capacities* or *powers* (*potentiae*) to sense and to think, respectively. Medieval scholastic philosophers were also highly attuned to questions of power identity and distinction: They debated whether the agent intellect was distinct from the possible intellect, the precise number of distinct sensory powers, and even whether the intellect and will are distinct powers.² But it might seem that when it comes to the powers of sensation and thought, there was broad consensus that the powers of sensation *are* distinct from the power(s) of thought. For instance, despite their many differences, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham all agree that powers of sensation are distinct from powers of thought. Moreover, there seems to be a deep philosophical commitment underlying this consensus: Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham all think that sensing is radically different from thinking in such a way that a single power could not be responsible for both kinds of actualization. In particular, they seem to see sensing as *material* or *embodied* in a way that thinking is not.³

But this apparent consensus did not even last through the second quarter of the fourteenth century. Instead, it collapsed in the 1320s, '30s, and '40s. In a little-studied development, many of the most influential scholastic philosophers at the University of Oxford and (later) the University of Paris came to think that in human beings the power to sense is identical to the power to think.⁴ The writings of William of Ockham and his confrere Walter Chatton provide a window onto this transformation.⁵ Chatton may be

² See, for example, Dag Hasse, "The Soul's Faculties", in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, vol. 1, edited by R. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 305-319; Robert Pasnau, "The Mind-Soul Problem", in *Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima*, edited by P. J. J. M. Bakker and J. M. M. H. Thijssen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 3-21; Dominik Perler, "Faculties in Medieval Philosophy", in *The Faculties: A History*, edited by D. Perler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 97-139.

³ See Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, edited by C. Bazán et al., *Editio leonine*, t. 24, 1 (Rome-Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1996), 116,213-117,231 (q. 13); John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio, liber quartus: distinctiones 43-49*, edited by C. Balić et al., *Ioannis Duns Scoti opera omnia studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae*, vol. 14 (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 2013), d. 43, q. 2 (20,439-21,462) and d. 44, q. 1 (114,607-616). For Ockham's view, see sections 2 and 3 below.

⁴ See the beginning of Section 2, below.

⁵ On Chatton's biography and his interactions with Ockham, see William Courtenay, *Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His Life and Writings* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 66-75.

the earliest extant philosopher from the 1320s and '30s to hold that in human beings the power to sense is not distinct from the power to think. Moreover, Chatton defends the view against Ockham's arguments that the power to sense and the power to think must be distinct. Plausibly, it was Chatton's influence that directly or indirectly led later figures, such as Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini, to adopt the view that the powers of sensation and the power to think are identical.⁶ Thus, one way to understand the proximate causes of this transformation is by examining Chatton's reasons for rejecting Ockham's arguments for distinguishing sensory powers from the power to think.

This is precisely the project I undertake in this article. I examine Ockham's six main arguments that powers of sensation must be distinct from the power to think, and try to understand Chatton's reasons, in some cases implicit and in others explicit, for rejecting those arguments. As a result, this article is organized in the following way: Section 2 will briefly characterize Chatton and Ockham's shared assumptions and the nature of the disagreement between them about the distinction or lack thereof between the senses and the intellect in human beings. Sections 3-6 will examine Ockham's six main arguments that sensation must be material and embodied in some important way that thought is not (with two sets of two closely related arguments considered together in Section 3 and Section 5), and Chatton's grounds for rejecting those arguments.

From this close examination of Ockham's arguments and Chatton's grounds for rejecting them, a coherent picture will emerge. On the one hand, it will become clear that Ockham thinks that powers of sensation must be distinct from the power to think because the *kind of actualization* that is sensing is material and embodied in a way that the kind of actualization that is thinking is not. On Ockham's view, actualizations that differ in this crucial way must be actualizations of distinct powers. Chatton, on the other hand, finds Ockham's view that the actualization of sensing is material and embodied in this way unpersuasive. Since he sees no reason to posit a difference in the respective materiality or embodiment of sensation and thought that would require the two kinds of state to have distinct subjects, he also sees no need to hold that the capacity for sensation is distinct from the capacity for thought. It will also emerge from our examination of Ockham's arguments and Chatton's rejection of them that Chatton thinks that there is no need to posit such a difference between sensation and thought with respect to materiality or embodiment because he thinks that nothing about the nature of *sensory experience* indicates that sensation is material or embodied in a way that requires a distinct subject from the subject of thought.

⁶ In an article in progress, "The Immaterial Turn in Medieval Latin Theories of Sensation" I trace Chatton's influence on Wodeham and Rimini.

2. Framing the Debate: Ockham's Arguments that the Subject of Thoughts is Distinct from the Subject of Sensations

Chatton's adoption of the view that in human beings powers of sensation are not distinct from the power to think heralds a significant and largely unexamined shift in late medieval thought. When he began to defend it, it is not clear that Chatton's view was held by anyone else in his milieu in England whose works are extant. Over the next four decades, it was endorsed by many of the most influential philosophers at Oxford and Paris, including Adam Wodeham (who was closely familiar with Chatton's work), William Crathorn, John Buridan, and Gregory of Rimini (who inherited the view from Wodeham).⁷ Nor was this view a passing fourteenth-century fad. The influence of Chatton, Wodeham, and Rimini is visible in later scholars who endorse the view that the powers of sensation are not distinct from the immaterial human soul, including Gervasius Waim (sixteenth century, who receives the view from Gregory of Rimini) and Rodrigo de Arriaga (seventeenth century).⁸ Surprisingly little scholarly attention has been devoted to examining this significant development in the history of philosophy. Indeed, there is no published work devoted to Chatton's views on the topic, even though he was apparently the proximate source for this fourteenth-century development.⁹ This is a surprising development: The view that sensations are embodied and material in a way that thought is not is often seen as a cornerstone of medieval Aristotelianism.¹⁰ Knowing that this view is abandoned by influential fourteenth-

⁷ Adam Wodeham, *Lectura secunda*, edited by R. Wood and G. Gál, 3 vols. (St. Bonaventure: St. Bonaventure University, 1990), vol. 1, Prologue, q. 1 (10,28-11,55); William Crathorn, *In primum librum Sententiarum*, edited by F. Hoffman, *Quæstionen zum ersten Sentenzenbuch* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1988), q. 7 (349,28-32); Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*, edited by A. D. Trapp, V. Marcolino, and M. Santos-Noya, 7 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979-1987), vol. 5, l. 2, d. 16-17, q. 3 (354,11-373,15). On Buridan's account of the powers of the soul, see Can Laurens Löwe, "Aristotle and John Buridan on the Individuation of Causal Powers", *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy* 6/1 (2018): 189-222.

⁸ Gervasius Waim, *Tractatus noticiarum* (Paris: 1519), "An potentia animae distinguatur ab anima", 41-42. Rodrigo de Arriaga, *Cursus philosophicus* (Antwerp: 1632), *De anima*, disp. 2, sec. 2, subsec. 2, 660b; disp. 3, sec. 3, subsec. 4, 669a.

⁹ An exception is the recently published Marilyn McCord Adams, *Housing the Powers: Medieval Debates about Dependence on God* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 69-82. Adams focuses on the relationship between Ockham and Wodeham, whereas I will focus on Chatton's responses to Ockham. And unlike Adams, I am primarily concerned with the reasons fourteenth-century philosophers had for thinking that sensation must be material and embodied, and why Chatton found those reasons unpersuasive. Another exception is Sandra W. De Boer, who notes in an introductory article that Wodeham thinks that sensations are non-extended spiritual forms and that Wodeham thinks that disembodied sensation is metaphysically possible. Sander W. de Boer, "Dualism and the Mind-Body Problem", in *Philosophy of Mind in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance*, edited by S. Schmid (New York: Routledge, 2019), 63-82. De Boer notes that "this shift is as yet underexplored in the scholarly literature". "Dualism", 215.

¹⁰ See, for example, Robert Pasnau, "Mind and Hylomorphism", in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 496; Peter King, "Why Isn't the Mind-Body

century figures reshapes our picture of the development of late-medieval cognition theory.¹¹

Ockham and Chatton share crucial metaphysical commitments about the nature of sensations and sensory powers. This article will not attempt to motivate these commitments or explain them in detail. However, to understand the disagreement between Ockham and Chatton we do need to know what these commitments were. Ockham and Chatton agree that sensations are items in the Aristotelian category of quality. In particular, sensations are qualitative features of humans and animals that qualify them as sensing.¹² Ockham and Chatton also think that when qualities such as sensations inhere in a substance, they do so by inhering in one of the metaphysical parts of that substance. That is, a feature qualifies a whole substance only mediately or secondarily, in virtue of immediately or primarily qualifying one of its metaphysical parts. Ockham and Chatton call the metaphysical part in which a quality immediately inheres its “immediate subject” or “primary subject”.¹³ In what follows, I will sometimes refer to the immediate or primary subject of sensation simply as “the subject of sensation”. On the other hand, when I refer to the proximate or mediate subject of

Problem Medieval?”, in *Forming the Mind*, vol. 5, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 187-205; Dominik Perler, “Seeing and Judging: Ockham and Wodeham on Sensory Cognition”, in *Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by S. Knuuttila and P. Kärkkäinen, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2008), 151-169.

¹¹ My article in progress “The Immaterial Turn in Medieval Latin Theories of Sensation” discusses just how this shift reshapes our understanding of late-medieval cognition theory.

¹² Chatton and Ockham think that all occurrent human *cognitiones*, both thoughts and sensations, are qualities. See William of Ockham, *Summula philosophiae naturalis*, edited by S. Brown, *Opera philosophica* VI (St. Bonaventure N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1984), 135-394, l. 3, c. 14, 293, 13-17; l. 3, c. 20, 309, 18-23; *Lect* 3.1.2 (2.50, 27-19); *Lect* 3.3.1 (2.119, 33-120, 5). Chatton and Ockham’s shared view of the metaphysics of sensation seems to originate with Scotus. See Giorgio Pini, “Two Models of Thinking”, in *Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by G. Klima (New York: Fordam University Press), 81-103.

¹³ On Ockham’s view that the immediate subject of a substance’s qualities is a metaphysical part of that substance, see William of Ockham, *Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis: Libri IV-VIII*, edited by R. Wood et al., *Opera philosophica* V (St. Bonaventure N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1984), l. 6, c. 1, 455, 110-456, 116. See also Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 661-664; and Richard Cross, “Ockham on Part and Whole”, *Vivarium* 37/2 (1999): 143-167, 160-166. For Chatton’s endorsement of the view that a composite cannot be the immediate subject of an accident, see *Ord.* 3.3.2.1 (3.41, 20-25). Note that while Cross suggests that for Ockham there are some “accidents” that have more than one part of a substance for their immediate subject, Cross’s use of the term “accident” includes predicates that do not, according to Ockham, refer to qualities (such as “being generated”). As Cross shows in detail, Ockham argues that any quality with “parts of the same nature” can have only one immediate subject. But according to Ockham all qualities have parts of the same nature. See William of Ockham, *Brevis summa libri Physicorum*, edited by S. Brown, *Opera philosophica* VI (St. Bonaventure N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1984), 1-394, l. 3, c. 1, 40, 31-41, 35. Thus, Ockham must deny that any quality has more than one immediate subject.

sensation I will make it explicitly clear that I am doing so. For Ockham and Chatton, the basic metaphysical parts of a composite substance are substantial form, prime matter, and accidents. Both Chatton and Ockham think that the immediate subjects of human sensations are substantial forms.

Ockham and Chatton are both pluralists about substantial forms: they think that one substance can have more than one substantial form. And in particular, they are pluralists about the substantial forms of human beings. Ockham thinks that each human being has three substantial forms: the form of the human being's body, a sensory soul (responsible for sensation and sensory desires), and a rational soul (responsible for thought and volition).¹⁴ Chatton thinks that a human being has two substantial forms: the form of the human being's body and her rational soul (the latter of which is responsible for both sensory and intellectual states).¹⁵ Thus, Chatton is a pluralist about substantial forms but not a pluralist about souls.

Ockham and Chatton both take an immediate subject's power to be characterized by a quality to be in no way distinct from the immediate subject itself.¹⁶ They disagree, however, over whether the immediate subject of human sensations is or is not the

¹⁴ QS 1.10 (62-65); QS 1.12 (68-71); QS 2.10 (156-161); QS 2.11 (162-164). When I use the term "substantial form of a human being", I mean to refer to a form that inheres at every location at which the human being of which it is the substantial form exists. The issue of whether the *integral parts* of the human body have their own substantial forms is not relevant here.

¹⁵ For Chatton's view that the intellectual soul is a substantial form of the human body, see *Rep.* 2.16-17.1 (3.309,17-18). For his view that there is a form of the body that is not a soul, namely the "form of corporeity", see *Rep.* 4.5.4 (4.293,6-8). In *Pro.* 2.4, Chatton is cautious not to directly assert the view that there is just one soul in human beings. However, in the *Reportatio*, *Lectura*, and *Quodlibeta* he directly asserts the view. See, e.g., *Quodlibeta*, q. 5, f. 55ra: "Et dico quod anima intellectiva [is the subject of sensory passions] quia illa non distinguitur a sensitiva"; *Rep.* 2.15.1.1 (3.300,6-10); *Rep.* 4.7.1 (4.300,9-11).

¹⁶ I take it as basically clear that this is the correct interpretation of Ockham and Chatton, though neither ever gives a fully general statement of the view. In *ORep* 2.20 (*OT* V, 425-447) and *ORep* 3.4 (*OT* VI, 130-139), Ockham argues that the power to think and the power to sense are in no way distinct from the immediate subjects of thoughts and sensations, respectively. Note that in *ORep* 3.4 Ockham distinguishes a use of the term "sensory power" according to which anything that is a partial causal of a sensation is a sensory power (*OT* VI, 135,2-6). In this usage, sensory powers include the dispositions in sense organs that allow them to produce sensations. *ORep* 3.4 (135,7-136,15). However, in this article I am interested in sensory powers in the more narrow usage according to which something is a "sensory power" if and only if it is a power to sense; it seems that on Ockham's view, dispositions in organs are only powers to *produce sensations*. While Chatton frequently claims that the human rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, he never bothers to explicitly state the view that human sensory powers are not distinct from the rational soul. I take this to be because he took the latter view to be an obvious consequence of the former given his other commitments. And indeed it is: In *Lectura* 3.8.1, Chatton argues that the powers of intellect, memory and will are not distinct from the rational soul on grounds general enough to show that any power for any occurrent psychological state is not distinct from the soul that has that power (2.266,34-267,9).

human rational soul. Chatton thinks that the rational soul is the immediate subject of human sensations (and, of course, denies that there is a separate sensory soul in human beings).¹⁷ Ockham thinks that the sensory soul is the immediate subject of sensations.¹⁸

In fact, in two of the three places in which Ockham argues that the subject of sensations is distinct from the subject of thoughts (*Reportatio* 4.9 and *Quodlibeta* 2.10), he does so in order to show that there must be a *sensory soul* distinct from the intellectual soul. In the third location (*Quodlibeta* 1.15), Ockham argues for this conclusion in order to support his claim that *if* there is no substantial form other than the intellectual soul in human beings, then that soul *still* cannot be the subject of sensations. In all, Ockham gives six direct arguments that the subject of sensations is distinct from the subject of thoughts. These arguments are represented in the following table:

Argument Number	Argument	Location(s)	Section in which the Argument is Discussed
1	Argument from the Materiality of Sensation	<i>Rep.</i> 4.9 (162,12-18)	§3
2	Argument from the Sameness in Kind of Human and Non-Human Sensation	<i>Rep.</i> 4.9 (162,19-22)	§6
3	Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing	QS 1.15 (84,21-23); QS 2.10 (158,49-53)	§5
4	Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing	QS 1.15 (84,23-26)	§5
5	Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought	QS 2.10 (158,48-49)	§3
6	Argument from the Extended Subject Requirement	QS 2.10 (159,62-65)	§4

Ockham also gives three arguments that the subject of sensory *desires* must be distinct from the subject of rational desires.¹⁹ Since these arguments do not directly show that the subject of sensations (rather than sensory desires) is distinct from the subject of thoughts, I will not examine these three arguments in this article.²⁰

¹⁷ *Pro.* 2.4 (108,88-93); *Rep.* 1.3.5.1 (1.299,19-21); *Rep.* 2.15.1.1 (3.300,7-9); *Lect.* 3.6.2 (2.235,8-12).

¹⁸ QS 2.10 (158,42-159,60).

¹⁹ See QS 2.10 (157,11-19; 158,32-40); *ORep* 3.9 (161,8-162,3).

²⁰ Some of these arguments, along with some of Ockham's arguments (1)-(6) are discussed in Adams, *Housing*, 71-75 (including Ockham's arguments (3) and (5)); Dominik Perler, "Ockham über die Seele und ihre Teile", *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 77/2 (2010): 315-350, 323-329 (including Ockham's arguments (3) and (6)); and Adam Wood, "The Faculties of the Soul and

Arguments (1) and (5) are connected in a way that makes it natural to discuss them together, so I discuss both of them in Section 3. Likewise, arguments (3) and (4) are connected in a way that makes it natural to discuss them together, so I discuss both of them in Section 5. As Section 4 will note, my reading of argument (6) as an argument from a feature of sensation is not obviously correct, though there is evidence to support it.

Chatton develops either explicit or implicit responses to each of Ockham's arguments (1)-(6) in his *Reportatio*, *Lectura*, and *Quodlibet*. In fact, in the *Reportatio* and *Lectura*, Chatton endorses no philosophical arguments that sensory powers are not distinct from the human rational soul.²¹ Instead, he apparently takes the philosophical plausibility of the view to rest on his having established that there is no need to posit a distinction between the human rational soul and a sensory soul (in other words, Chatton implicitly argues from parsimony). Thus, Chatton's rejection of these six arguments plays a central role in his endorsement of the view that the powers of sensation are not distinct from the power of thought. However, Chatton does not respond *explicitly* to all of these arguments, and at points it is not clear whether he has one of Ockham's arguments in mind or not. In this article, I will focus on those texts from Chatton's *corpus* that show why he was unmoved by each of Ockham's six arguments, whether or not Chatton wrote those passages with Ockham in mind. Since Chatton's rejection of Ockham's arguments (1) and (5) is in some ways the most useful or understanding the disagreement between him and Ockham, I will begin with those arguments.

3. The Organ-Dependent Nature of Sensing: The Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought (5) and the Argument from the Materiality of Sensation (1)

Ockham states the Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought in QS 2.10 as an argument for the minor premise of an argument that there is a sensory soul distinct from the intellectual soul:

Sensations are in the sensory soul as a subject either mediately or immediately, and they are not in the rational soul as a subject. Therefore, [these two kinds of soul] are distinguished. The major is clear, because nothing else can be a subject of sensations

Some Medieval Mind-Body Problems", *The Thomist* 75/4 (2011): 585-636, 611-612 (including Ockham's argument (6). Adams, Perler, and Wood do not discuss Chatton's responses to these arguments.

²¹ He does give two arguments from authority and one theological argument in *Pro*. 2.4 (107,55-108,81). Ockham briefly dismisses these arguments in QS 2.10 (160,87-161,19). In his *Quodlibet*, q. 5 Chatton does offer at least one philosophical argument for the view that the sensory soul is not distinct from the rational soul. That argument and its role in the fourteenth century is the subject of my paper "The Immaterial Turn in Medieval Latin Theories of Sensation".

except a sensory soul or a sensory power. And if a power is an accident of a soul, it will be in the sensory soul as a subject. *The minor is proven, because otherwise every apprehension of the sensory soul would be a thought, because it would be in the intellectual soul as a subject.*²²

Ockham argues as follows:

- (i) If the rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, then every apprehension of the sensory soul is a thought.
- (ii) Not every apprehension of the sensory soul is a thought.
- (iii) The rational soul is not the immediate subject of sensations.

The phrase “apprehension of the sensory soul” should be read as referring, *de re*, to those sensory states that Ockham’s theory takes to be in the sensory soul, but which Chatton’s theory takes to be in the rational soul. These apprehensions are what Chatton and Ockham both call *sensationes* (“sensations”). On the plausible assumption that the distinction between sensation and thought is exclusive, (ii) is true.

However, it is not at all clear why Ockham thinks (i) is true. A natural first thought is that he takes different kinds of actualizations to require distinct immediate subjects. Thus, (i) would be supported by the principle: *If two actualizations have the same immediate subject, they must belong to the same basic kind* (e.g., if sensations belong to the rational soul as their subject, they must be the same type of actualization as thoughts). But it is clear that Ockham thinks this principle is not true in general. For instance, he thinks that the human rational soul can be the primary subject of both thoughts and volitions, two radically different kinds of state.²³

A more promising conjecture is that Ockham takes (i) to be true because he thinks that no quality that inheres in a rational soul could have the feature or features *in virtute of which a quality is a sensation and not a thought*. That conjecture is reinforced by the Argument from the Materiality of Sensation:

[If the sensory soul and the rational soul are not distinct], then bodily seeing and the other operations of sensory powers are just as immaterial and spiritual as thought and intellectual seeing, because they are received in the rational soul just like the operation of the intellect is.²⁴

Ockham argues as follows:

²² QS 2.10 (158,42-49): “Sensationes sunt subiective in anima sensitiva mediate vel immediate; et non sunt subiective in anima intellectiva; igitur distinguuntur. Maior patet, quia nihil aliud potest assignari subiectum sensationum nisi anima sensitiva vel potentia; et si potentia sit accidens animae, erit subiective in anima sensitiva. Minor probatur, quia aliter omnis apprehensio animae sensitivae esset intellectio, quia esset subiective in anima intellectiva”. Emphasis mine.

²³ ORep. 2.20 (OT 5 435,4-443,23).

²⁴ ORep. 4.9 (OT 7 162,12-15): “Item, si sic, tunc visio corporalis et aliae operationes potentiarum sensitivarum sunt ita immateriales et spirituales sicut intellectio et visio intellectualis, quia recipiuntur in anima intellectiva sicut operatio intellectus”.

- (iv) If the subject of sensations is not distinct from the rational soul, then sensing is just as immaterial and spiritual as thought.
- (v) Sensing is not as immaterial and spiritual as thought.
- (vi) Therefore, the subject of sensations is distinct from the rational soul.

It is not surprising that Ockham would endorse (iv), which follows from the seemingly plausible assumption that a quality is just as immaterial and spiritual as the subject in which it inheres. But (v) tells us something important: Ockham thinks that sensation is material in a way that thought is not. And Ockham thinks that nothing that is material in this way inheres in a rational soul.

Our conjecture about why Ockham thinks (i) is true was that he thinks that no quality that inheres in a rational soul could have the feature or features in virtue of which a quality is a sensation and not a thought. If an apprehension's being material in the way that Ockham refers to in (v) is what makes it a sensation rather than a thought, this fits well with the conjecture. After all, it is clear from (iv) that Ockham thinks that any quality that inheres in a rational soul lacks this sort of materiality. Thus, if it is this kind of materiality that makes an apprehension a sensation rather than a thought, this explains why any apprehension that inheres in a rational soul is a thought, as (i) claims.

Some additional support for this reading of Ockham comes from the fact that he does not seem ever to offer *any other* way of drawing the distinction between thought and sensation. As we will see, Chatton will develop another way of distinguishing sensation from thought.²⁵ But it is not clear that Ockham has any other way of drawing the distinction.

For instance, it seems that for Ockham the difference between sensation and thought is not a difference in *content*. For, as we will see below, Ockham thinks that for any human sensory apprehension with a given content, there can be an intellectual apprehension (i.e., a thought), with the same content.²⁶ Given two apprehensions with the same content, what makes the quality in the sensory soul a sensation whereas the quality in the rational soul is a thought? The only obvious candidate is the *materiality* of the first quality.

Chatton will disagree with Ockham's way of drawing the distinction between thought and sensation. This allows him to reject both the Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought and the Argument from the Materiality of Sensation. To see the precise nature of the disagreement, we need to see *exactly what sense* Ockham thinks sensation is more material or spiritual than thought. There are two ways not shared by qualities inhering in a rational soul in which a quality that inheres in the sensory soul is material and non-spiritual. First, such a quality essentially depends on a form that itself essentially depends on prime matter. Second, such a quality has integral parts that are

²⁵ See below in this section.

²⁶ See below in this section.

distinct in location from one another. Let us say that a quality Q is *material* if it has the first property and *extended* if it has the second property:²⁷

An accidental form Q is *material* if and only if either Q essentially inheres in prime matter or Q essentially inheres in a form that by nature depends for its existence on prime matter.²⁸

An accidental form Q is *extended* if and only if Q has potentially or actually distinct integral parts that by nature exist in distinct locations.²⁹

Chatton and Ockham apparently think that a quality is extended if and only if it is material.³⁰ I also assume that Ockham thinks no material and extended quality could inhere in a form such as the rational soul.³¹ In what follows, I will refer to a quality that is material and extended as a “physical quality” and to a quality that is neither material nor extended an “immaterial quality”.³²

Ockham holds that sensations, since they inhere in a material and extended form (see Section 2), are physical qualities. Thoughts are immaterial qualities. This is the

²⁷ While I do think that I am using the terms “material” and “extended” in the way that Ockham uses the terms *materialis* and *extensa*, respectively, I do not take my usage of the terms to be justified by its match with Ockham’s usage. (See, for instance, *ORep.* 3.2 (*OT* 6 57,2-4); *QS* 4.19 (396,10-11); *Expositio* l. 4, c. 17, 182,120.) Instead, I simply use them to pick out the concepts defined here.

²⁸ On fourteenth-century uses of the term *materialis*, see footnote 32 below.

²⁹ The idea that Ockham or Chatton think that any quality is extended in the sense here defined may seem implausible: qualities do not have integral parts! But the texts are unambiguous: Ockham and Chatton think that material forms, both accidental and substantial, are extended and have integral parts. See *Brevis summa*, l. 4, c. 1, 52,77-84; *Expositio*, l. 4, c. 6, 56,9-16; *QS* 4.19 (396,33-38). That Chatton shares Ockham’s view on this issue is clear from, for instance, *Rep.* 4.4.1-2 (4.274,15-276,12).

³⁰ It is less clear whether Ockham and Chatton think that necessarily, every extended quality is also material. To my knowledge, neither considers the possibility of God making an extended form that does not essentially depend, directly or indirectly, on prime matter (though both think that God could supernaturally keep in existence a form that essentially depends on prime matter without the existence of that matter).

³¹ Ockham apparently takes for granted that a material and extended quality must have a material and extended immediate subject. This principle is not obvious. And once Chatton rejected the principle that every quality of an immaterial subject must characterize it at every place at which it exists (see Section 4 below), there was no obvious reason to hold it. See Rodrigo de Arriaga’s extensive defense of the view that sensations are material and extended qualities that immediately inhere in the immaterial human soul in *Cursus, De anima*, disp. 3, sec. 2, subsec. 1 (659a-660b).

³² It might seem unfitting to use the term “immaterial” to refer to a quality that both does not depend on matter and is not extended. After all, wouldn’t *immaterialis* mean just “not dependent on matter” for medieval philosophers? In fact, both John Duns Scotus and William Crathorn list being “indivisible” (Crathorn) or “in no way extended” as one of the senses in which a quality can be immaterial. William Crathorn, *In primum librum*, q. 1, 120,8-16. John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* 43-49, d. 43, q. 2 (21,478-22,492).

precise sense in which Ockham thinks sensation is more immaterial and spiritual than thought (and thus the precise sense in which he thinks (v) is true). I have also suggested that Ockham thinks that being physical is the *differentia* of sensation – given an apprehension of, say, a cat, the apprehension is a sensation if it is a physical quality, but a thought if it is an immaterial quality. Since Ockham thinks any quality that inheres in a rational soul is an immaterial quality, we can see why he takes (i) to be true.

Chatton rejects both (i) and (v). That is, Chatton thinks both that the feature that distinguishes sensations from thoughts can be possessed by a quality that inheres in the rational soul and that sensations are no less material and spiritual than thoughts. Chatton considers the Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought in his *Reportatio* and *Lectura*, as well as in his *Quodlibeta*.³³ In all three locations, Chatton's response is the same. He offers his *own account* of what makes something a sensation rather than a thought. On this account, the sensation-making feature is compatible with the qualities that are sensations inhering in a rational soul. Since on Chatton's account the feature in virtue of which a quality a sensation rather than a thought is compatible with that quality's having a rational soul as its immediate subject, Chatton is able to reject (v) as well – on Chatton's view, sensations are just as immaterial as thoughts.

So, to understand Chatton's response to Ockham, we need to understand Chatton's account of the feature that distinguishes sensations from thoughts. In the following passage from the *Reportatio*, Chatton responds to the view (which he does not attribute to any particular author) that sensations simply are thoughts because they inhere in the rational soul:

These people do not make a substantive point, but only disagree about the signification of a word. For I ask, what do they call thought? Either every actualization received in the soul, or only that which the soul has in its power. If the latter, then my claim follows. If the former, then they only equivocate, and we agree about the facts. For then they concede that there is one [kind of] actualization that we experience in the pupil of the eye in response to a change in an organ, and other actualizations which are in our power. If, as they want to do, they call both thoughts, then the difficulty is merely verbal.³⁴

This passage shows us exactly how Chatton would respond to (i): by noting that the feature that distinguishes sensations from thoughts can be possessed by a quality that

³³ *Rep.* 1.3.6 (1.335,15-337,3); 1.; *Lect.* 3.8.2 (2.270,11-16; 2.275,14-276,34); *Quodlibeta* q. 5. Chatton considers the view under the guise not of Ockham's argument, but rather of a view (which he does not attribute to any particular individual) that sensations simply *are* thoughts because they have the same subject as thoughts.

³⁴ *Rep.* 1.3.6 (1.336,14-22): "Item, isti nihil reale dicunt, sed solum variant in significato vocabuli. Quaero enim quid vocant intellectionem. Aut omnem actum receptum in anima; aut solem quem habet anima in potestate sua, et si hoc, propositum. Si primo modo, tunc tantum aequivocant, et in re concordamus. Nam tunc concedunt unum actum quem experimur in pupilla oculi ad transmutationem organi, et alios actus qui sunt in potestate nostra. Si vocant, sicut volunt, ambas intellectiones, difficultas tantum est vocalis".

inheres in a rational soul. Unlike Ockham, Chatton does not think that this feature consists in being a physical quality. Instead, Chatton characterizes this feature as an apprehension's being such as to occur naturally in response to a change in organ. Chatton describes this feature again in a passage in his *Lectura*:

Sensations are the kind of actualizations which necessarily are caused when their objects are present and there is no impediment which is suited to impede their natural action, and consequently we experience the sort of actualizations that are caused just as necessarily in us through a change in [our] organs as they are in non-rational animals.³⁵

According to Chatton, any apprehension that occurs (a) unavoidably (given the absence of impediments) and (b) in response to a change in an organ is a sensation. Consider, for instance, a case where one sees a straight stick half in and half out of the water as bent. The visual awareness of the stick seems to fulfill these criteria: (a) given that one's visual system is in good condition and one looks at the stick in good lighting, one will be unable to avoid seeing the stick; (b) one's seeing the stick occurs in response to reflected light entering one's eyes. Thoughts, Chatton thinks, are in our power and we do not experience them as occurring in response to changes in bodily organs.

If this is what Chatton thinks the distinction between sensation and thought amounts to, then we would expect him to reject (v). That is, we would expect him to think that an immaterial quality can fulfill conditions (a)-(c) just as well as a material quality can. And indeed he does. Chatton writes that "sensation is no more extended or quantified than thought."³⁶ According to Chatton, sensations are just as immaterial as thoughts.

Thus, Chatton rejects Ockham's Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought (5) and his Argument from the Materiality of Sensation (1) because he disagrees with Ockham about what distinguishes sensing from thinking. Ockham thinks it is the materiality of sensation that differentiates it from thinking. Chatton thinks sensation's not being under a subject's direct control and its occurring in response to a change in an organ differentiates it from thinking.

I propose that this disagreement between Ockham and Chatton signals an important difference in the way they approach theorizing about sensation. Chatton takes the distinction between thought and sensation to be an *introspectable difference between kinds of experiences*. Notice that in the two passages previously quoted, Chatton states that "there is one [kind of] actualization that we *experience* in the pupil of the eye

³⁵ *Lect.* 3.8.2 (2.276,3-8): "[...] sensationes sunt tales actus qui necessario causantur, obiectis praesentibus, circumscripto impedimento quod natum esset impedire actionem naturalem, et per consequens tales actus experimur qui aequo necessario causantur in nobis per transmutationem organorum sicut in brutis". Chatton repeatedly offers the same account of the difference between thought and sensation. See, for instance, *Lect.* 3.8.2 (2.275,17-20); *Pro.* 2.4 (109,127-131); *Rep.* 1.3.5.1 (1.295,14-17).

³⁶ *Lect.* 3.6 (2.235,8-9): "[...] sensatio non magis extenditur nec est quanta quam intellectio".

in response to a change in an organ” and that “consequently we *experience* the sort of actualizations that are caused just as necessarily in us through changes in [our] organs as they are in non-rational animals” (emphasis mine). In addition, Chatton sometimes introduces his account of the distinction between sensation and thought by asking *how we become aware* of the difference between these two kinds of states. For instance, in the *Prologus* he asks (rhetorically) “I ask, in what way is the distinction between sensation and thought made known to us?”³⁷ Chatton responds to this rhetorical question by arguing that

[...] the distinction between thought and sensation is disclosed because every actualizations that is caused in response to a change in an organ is a sensation, no matter what it is received in.³⁸

In other words, we introspectively distinguish sensations from thoughts *not* by noticing that we have one type of state (sensation) that is more material than or in a different subject than another type of state (thought), but by noticing that we have one type of state that occurs in response to bodily changes in a way outside of our control (which we call sensation) and another state that seems unnecessitated to bodily changes and under our direct control (which we call thought). Chatton even apparently thinks that the only reason we draw a distinction between thought and sensation at all is because we notice that some of our mental states come about in response to changes in organs and others apparently do not:

Through *this alone* is it made known to us that some actualization is volitional [i.e., involves rational desire], or even that it is rational: that it is not necessarily caused in response to a change in an organ.³⁹

In short, Chatton thinks that the distinction between sensations and thoughts is given in introspection and that, but for these introspectable differences, we would have no reason to distinguish sensations from thoughts at all.

Ockham, on the other hand, does not obviously think of the difference between thought and sensation as an introspectively given difference. In QS 1.15, which directly responds to some of the arguments in Chatton’s *Prologus* 2.4, Ockham considers Chatton’s question “In what way is the distinction between sensation and thought made known to us?”. Ockham answers:

I say that the difference between sensory seeing and rational seeing is made known to us partly through reason and partly through experience. Through experience, because a

³⁷ “Quaero per quem modum innotescit nobis differentia inter sensationem et intellectionem?” *Pro.* 2.4 (109,112-113).

³⁸ *Pro.* 2.4 (109,127-129): “[...] arguatur distinctio inter intellectionem et sensationem, quia omnis actus qui causatur ad transmutationem organi est sensatio, in quocumque recipiatur”.

³⁹ *Rep.* 3.33.1.6 (3.207,24-26): “Nam per hoc solum innotescit nobis quod actus est volitivus, vel intellectivus etiam, quia non causatur necessario ad transmutationem organi”. Emphasis mine.

child sees sensorily but not rationally. Through reason, because a separated soul is able to have intellectual seeing, but not sensory seeing.⁴⁰

Ockham claims that we become aware of the distinction between sensing and thinking through both experience and reason. This is already a difference from Chatton, who takes the distinction to be given by experience alone. More importantly, however, notice that Ockham's appeal to experience is not an appeal to introspection at all: Instead, Ockham points to the third-personally observable (rather than first-personally introspectable) fact that children have one type of cognition but lack another type.

I suggest, then, that Ockham and Chatton fundamentally disagree about the nature of the distinction between thought and sensation: Chatton thinks that it is an introspectively given distinction. Ockham rejects this view. This becomes especially clear when Chatton rejects one of Ockham's most distinctive views about the nature of sensation. According to Ockham, for every sensation with a given content in the sensory soul, there can be a thought *with that same content* in the intellectual soul. That is, Ockham posits *duplicates* of our simple sensory apprehensions in the rational soul: For each sensory seeing, there is an intellectual seeing in the rational soul.⁴¹ For instance, when you hear a song sparrow in the garden, there are *two distinct qualities*, one in your sensory soul and one in your intellectual soul, both of which are simple (i.e. non-propositional) apprehensions of the song sparrow's song, one in your sensory soul and one in your rational soul.

Chatton objects that this view leaves us with no way to distinguish sensation from thought:

[If this view were true], then the way of discovering the difference between sensation and thought would be destroyed, because it is not clear what way [of discovering this difference] there would be unless it is posited that every actualization which occurs with natural necessity in response to (*causatur ad*) a change in an organ whenever impediments are absent, and even after deliberation, is a sensation. But a thought is that actualization which is able to be caused or not to be caused, even after deliberation, when every sensory impediment is absent.⁴²

⁴⁰ QS 1.15 (84,37-85,41): "Dico quod differentia inter visionem sensitivam et intellectivam innotescit nobis partim per rationem partim per experientiam: per experientiam, quia puer videt sensibiliter et non intellectualiter; per rationem etiam, quia anima separata potest habere visionem intellectivam, non sensitivam".

⁴¹ William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio*, edited by S. Brown et al., *Opera theologica 1* (St. Bonaventure: St. Bonaventure University, 1967), l. 1, Pro., q. 1 (25.15-26.10).

⁴² *Lect.* 3.6.1 (2.219,19-220, 6): "[...] tunc periret via investigandi differentiam inter intellectionem et sensationem, quia non apparet quae sit via nisi ponendo quod omnis ille actus sit sensatio quae causatur ad transmutationem organi necessitate naturali, amotis impedimentis, etiam post

On Chatton's reading of Ockham's view, both the qualities in the sensory soul that Ockham calls sensations *and* the duplicate states in the rational soul that Ockham calls thoughts are introspectively experienced as occurring necessarily in response to changes in bodily organs. But on such a view, Chatton argues, there would be no introspectable difference between sensation and thought.

This difference between Ockham and Chatton is crucial to understanding Chatton's view that powers of sensation are not distinct from powers of thought. As we saw from our analysis of Ockham's arguments (1) and (5), Ockham thinks that the subject of sensations must be distinct from the subject of thoughts precisely because he thinks that sensations are material and embodied in a way that requires a subject that is material or embodied. However, given Chatton's way of drawing the distinction between thought and sensation through introspectively experienced differences between thought and sensation, it seems likely that he will only accept Ockham's view that human sensations require such a subject if some feature of *sensory experience* seems to require a material and embodied subject. And it is not at all obvious why the kind of state that occurs outside of a subject's control and in response to a change in an organ would have to occur *in a material subject*. It seemed to Chatton that this kind of state could also occur in a rational soul. However, as we will see in the following section, there *is* one aspect of the experience of sensing that Chatton thinks requires explanation on the view that sensation occurs in an immaterial soul.

4. The Embodied Experience of Sensation: The Argument from the Extended Subject Requirement (6)

In QS 2.10, Ockham argues that the immediate subject of sensations is distinct from the immediate subject of thoughts:

Numerically the same form is not extended and non-extended, material and immaterial. But the sensory soul in a human being is extended and material, whereas the rational soul is not, because the rational soul is whole in whole and whole in every part. Therefore, [the sensory soul is distinct from the rational soul].⁴³

For a given sensory and rational soul in a given human being, Ockham's Argument from the Extended Subject Requirement runs as follows:

- (vii) The sensory soul is extended and material.
- (viii) The rational soul is not extended and not material.
- (ix) No soul is both extended and not extended or both material and not material.

deliberationem; sed intellectio est ille actus qui potest causari vel non causari, etiam post deliberationem, amoto omni impedimento sensitivo".

⁴³ QS 2.10 (159,62-65): "Eadem forma numero non est extensa et non extensa, materialis et immaterialis; sed anima sensitiva in homine est extensa et materialis, anima intellectiva non, quia est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte; igitur etc".

- (x) Therefore, the sensory soul is distinct from the rational soul.

Since Ockham holds that the sensory soul is the subject of sensations and the rational soul is the subject of thoughts, it follows that the subject of sensations must be distinct from the subject of thoughts.

We know that Ockham is committed to (viii), and (ix) is plausible. However, it is hard to see what Ockham's motivation for (vii) could be. In QS 2.10, Ockham gives this argument as a proof that there exists a sensory soul distinct from the rational soul. Of course, if there is such a soul *and it is distinct from the rational soul*, it is plausible that (vii) is true of it. But in the context of this argument Ockham cannot assume that the sensory soul is distinct from the rational soul, since that is the conclusion of the argument.

So what evidence does Ockham take himself to have for (vii)? Before he has shown that the sensory soul is distinct from the rational soul, Ockham can still distinguish it *functionally* from the rational soul. For instance, we know that the sensory soul is that soul (whichever one it is, perhaps even the rational soul) that is the subject of sensations and sensory desires. Likewise, we know that the sensory soul is that soul, whichever one it is, in virtue of which a human being is a living animal. Perhaps, then, Ockham can defend (vii) by arguing that one of the functions performed by the sensory soul could only be performed by a form that is extended (i.e., having distinct parts in distinct spatial locations) and material (i.e., depending essentially on prime matter for its existence).

What might these functions be? In QS 2.10, Ockham does not say. However, a look at his *Reportatio* 3.4 brings to light a possibility. There, Ockham carefully develops an account of the way in which sensory powers are distinct from another. The view that the sensory soul is an extended form is essential to this account. Ockham argues that the sensory powers are in some sense distinct from one another because the sensory soul is extended and divisible.⁴⁴ Ockham suggests that a particular sensory power is that *part* of the sensory soul which informs the organ corresponding to that power. Thus, for instance, when we speak of "Jill's power of sight" or "Jill's capacity to see" we refer to the part of Jill's sensory soul that informs her organs of sight, but not the part of Jill's sensory soul that informs, say, her left elbow.⁴⁵ In short, Ockham's view that the sensory soul is extended allows him to assign unique bodily locations to sensory powers.

Ockham does not explain *why* he wants to assign unique bodily locations to sensory powers in this way. However, it is clear that Chatton thinks that a feature of *sensory experience* should incline us to assign unique bodily locations to sensations. As we will see below, he thinks that introspection presents sensations as occurring at unique

⁴⁴ *ORep* 3.7 (OT 6 136,22-137,11).

⁴⁵ *ORep* 3.7 (OT 6 139,4-7). Ockham is quick to point out that it is not as if the part of Jill's sensory soul in her eyes is somehow intrinsically better suited to seeing from the part in her left elbow – the former part is just better placed to take advantage of the causal activity of Jill's eyes. *ORep* 3.7 (OT 6 138,6-17).

bodily locations. Seeing seems to occur in the neighborhood of the eyes, some tactile sensations seem to occur in one's fingers and toes, and so on. In short, sensations seem to have unique bodily locations. This gives Chatton a reason to accept (vii). As Ockham's account in his *Reportatio* 3.4 suggests, an account on which the subject of sensations is extended and material can easily explain why sensations seem to have unique bodily locations: For instance, a sensation in my thumb seems to be located where my thumb is located and not where my eye is located because it is a quality that informs the part of my sensory soul that is in my thumb, but not the part that is in my eye.

Chatton, who thinks that the primary subject of sensations is the rational soul, cannot opt for this explanation. Chatton *does* think that the human rational soul is in every part of the body. But he must deny that the human rational soul has spatially distinct parts such that none of these parts is the whole soul. If it did have such extended parts, it would be a material form rather than an immaterial form. According to Chatton, the subject of human sensations is *holenmerically located* in every place in which the body exists. A holenmerically located entity exists in multiple locations at once, but in such a way that all of it exists in every location at which it exists.⁴⁶ It is, to use the medieval terminology that Ockham uses in his statement of the argument “whole in whole and whole in every part”, rather than existing in such a way that it has “parts outside of parts”. Now, it seems natural to think that every *feature* that characterizes a holenmerically located entity characterizes it in every place that it exists. It seems that if, for instance, my touch sensation of my keyboard that I seem to feel in my thumb characterizes an immaterial soul that exists wholly in every part of my body, then my sensation of the keyboard will be in every part of my body. But then I would not have the touch sensation in my thumb rather than in my toes! So it seems that Ockham's account of the immediate subject of sensation explains the fact that sensations seem to have unique bodily locations. Chatton's account leaves this fact unexplained.

Chatton gives significant attention to explaining how the human soul can experience some of its qualities as located in some proper part of the body in which it is holenmerically located.⁴⁷ In these passages, Chatton points out that we experience *thoughts* as having unique bodily locations *as well as sensations*, stating, for instance, that “we experience ourselves to think in our head and not in our feet”.⁴⁸ But thoughts, Chatton and Ockham agree, immediately inhere in the human rational soul, which is

⁴⁶ See Robert Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 16. For Chatton's endorsement of this standard account of the metaphysics of the human rational soul, see, e.g., *Rep.* 2.16-17.2 (3.310,6-13). However, note that in this location Chatton is pointing out that the fact that thoughts and volitions seem to have unique bodily locations is a reason to think that the human soul is not present in every part of the body (albeit a reason that Chatton thinks must be rejected as inconclusive, since it contradicts a view Chatton thinks is required by theological authorities).

⁴⁷ The crucial texts are *Rep.* 1.3.6.1 (328,21-329,20) and *Lect.* 3.8.1 (2.267,23-268,7).

⁴⁸ *Rep.* 2.16-17 (3.310,11-13): “[...] experiamur nos intelligere in capite et non in pede”.

holenmerically located in the whole body. Thus, a cognition's being immediately received in an immaterial soul must be compatible with its being experienced as having a determinate bodily location.

These statements suggest that Chatton has a strong, albeit implicit, response to Ockham's Argument from the Extended Subject Requirement: Ockham must grant that the datum on which the argument seems to be based (the experience of sensations as having unique bodily locations) is not enough to show that the subject of sensations is extended and material, because Ockham himself must admit that there are some qualities of our immaterial soul which we experience as having unique bodily locations. As Chatton points out, even though the principle that a feature that characterizes a holenmerically located entity characterizes it everywhere that it is located seems powerful, our experience of thought shows that it must be false (on the assumption that thoughts are immaterial qualities of an immaterial soul, which both he and Ockham accept):

This [that thoughts do not have unique bodily locations because they are in a subject that is holenmerically located in the whole body] is a very weighty argument against me, but nevertheless it need not move me, because, given the fact that we so evidently and certainly experience ourselves to think more in one part than in another, and that it does not appear to us that this argument proves the opposite as evidently [i.e., as evidently as that experience shows that the conclusion of the argument is false], is to be followed more here.⁴⁹

Chatton thinks he has a reason to reject the introspective data in support of (vii): We experience thoughts as having unique bodily locations. But this experience is not incompatible with thoughts inhering in the rational soul. Thus, there is no reason to suppose it is incompatible with sensations inhering in the rational soul either.

Chatton may have raised his view that sensations and thoughts are both experienced as occurring at unique bodily locations while he and Ockham were at the Franciscan convent in London, as Ockham responds to it in his *Quodlibeta* 1.12.⁵⁰ Ockham responds that we do not experience thoughts as having bodily locations, but only as being *caused* by qualities with bodily locations:

I say that we do not experience ourselves to think in our head any more than in our foot. But we often experience that we are more aided in thinking or impeded from thinking

⁴⁹ *Rep.* 1.3.6.1 (1.329,1-5) "Istud est gravius argumentum contra me, sed tamen non debet me movere, quia ex quo ita evidenter et ita certitudinaliter experimur nos intelligere plus in una parte quam in alia, nec apparet nobis quod istud argumentum ita evidenter concludat oppositum, magis adhibendum est hic experientia".

⁵⁰ *QS* 1.12 (69,26-27; 71,54-63). On the evidence that Ockham's quodlibets sometimes represent *viva voce* debate between Ockham and Chatton, likely at the Franciscan convent in London, see Rondo Keele, "Oxford *Quodlibeta* from Ockham to Holcot", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, edited by C. Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 651-692, 666-678.

through a disposition of our head than of our foot, just as we experience that often we are more aided by a disposition of our eye than of our hand.⁵¹

Ockham simply denies that we experience thoughts as occurring at unique bodily locations. Instead, we experience our thoughts as being aided or impeded by states that themselves have unique bodily locations. This may be a plausible response: It seems plausible that that having a unique bodily location is part of the phenomenology of sensation. On the other hand, it is less clear that thoughts have their own phenomenology at all.⁵² And even if they do, it is not obvious that this phenomenology includes an experienced, unique bodily location.

On the other hand, Ockham's response to Chatton's claim that thoughts are experienced as having unique bodily locations highlights one way in which Chatton might *explain away* the apparent unique bodily locations of sensations. Just as Ockham suggests that thoughts do not have unique bodily locations but are rather aided or impeded by states with unique bodily locations, so Chatton might explain away the apparent unique bodily location of sensations by proposing that what we do not experience sensations as possessing unique bodily locations, but only as being aided or impeded by states with unique bodily locations.

In fact, this is one of two strategies that Chatton offers for explaining the apparent bodily location of sensations. Chatton refers to the feature in virtue of which occurrent mental states such as thoughts and sensations seem to have unique bodily locations as their being "mediately received" in an organ.⁵³ In the *Lectura* and the *Reportatio*, Chatton considers two possible accounts of what it is for an occurrent mental state to be medially received in an organ: According to the first, (1) it is not the case that necessarily, every feature of a holo-merically located entity characterizes that entity at every place in which it exists.⁵⁴ Instead, a sensation can characterize the rational soul at only some but not all of the places at which it exists. As Adams shows, Wodeham will later adopt this response.⁵⁵ Chatton states that this is his less preferred response. He claims to prefer the view that (2) what we experience is not the occurrence of sensation in a unique bodily location, but its "essential dependence" on that location alone, a view that sounds much like Ockham's account of the supposed apparent location of thoughts.⁵⁶

⁵¹ QS 1.12 (71,54-58): "[...] dico quod non plus experimur nos intelligere in capite quam in pede. Sed experimur frequenter quod plus iuvamur et impedimur ad intelligendum per dispositionem capitis quam pedis, sicut experimur quod frequenter plus adiuvamur per dispositionem oculi quam manus".

⁵² For an introduction to the debate over the existence of "cognitive phenomenology", see Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague, "Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction", in *Cognitive Phenomenology*, edited by T. Bayne and M. Montague (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), viii-34.

⁵³ *Pro.* 2.4 (109,123-126). Note that Chatton thinks that both thoughts and sensations are medially received in organs.

⁵⁴ *Rep.* 1.3.6.1 (1.329,16-20). *Lect.* 1.3.8.1 (267,28-32).

⁵⁵ See Adams, *Housing*, 80.

⁵⁶ *Rep.* 1.3.6.1 (1.329,6-15); *Lect.* 1.3.8.1 (267,32-268,2).

Despite claiming that (1) is his less preferred view, Chatton defends the view that there is no contradiction in a quality characterizing a holonmerically located entity at only some of the places at which it exists in much greater detail in his discussions of the eucharist in *Reportatio* 4.4.⁵⁷

By Chatton's lights, the fact that sensations seem, upon introspection, to have unique bodily locations is some reason to accept the first premise of Ockham's Argument from the Extended Subject Requirement. But Chatton thinks that the force of this consideration is limited for several reasons. First, he thinks that considerations of this sort apply to thoughts as well, but he is committed to the view that thoughts do not inhere in an extended subject. Second, it is not obviously true that a quality that modifies a holonmerically located subject must modify it at every place at which it exists. Third, it is not clear that the phenomenology of sensation shows that sensations really do have unique bodily locations rather than uniquely depending on unique bodily locations.

To my knowledge, Chatton does not consider any other introspectable features of sensation that would indicate that it is material or embodied in a way that thought need not be (thus requiring a distinct subject from thought). However, we can gather from Chatton's *Reportatio* and *Lectura* how he did or would have responded to Ockham's three additional arguments that the subject of sensations must be distinct from the subject of thoughts. All three arguments seek to show that sensation must be material or embodied in a way that thought is not. And in each case, I will suggest, Chatton is unconvinced because he sees nothing about the nature of sensory experience that requires it to be material or embodied in a way than merely would require a subject distinct from the subject of thought.

5. Sensing Without a Body: The Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing (3) and the Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing (4)

Ockham's Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing and his Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing are closely related. Ockham recognized that identifying the power to sense with the power to think (and thus the subject of sensations with the subject of thoughts) would challenge a foundational commitment of medieval Aristotelian psychology: Sensing is possible only for an *embodied* cognizer. Angels do not touch or see or taste, and neither do human souls when separated from the human body. In fact, touching and tasting may even be *deficient* ways of grasping the objects of touch and taste – ways that a more perfect cognizer would not be capable of simply on account of being more perfect.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ *Rep.* 4.4.2 (277,5-12; 278,2-9). See also *Rep.* 4.3.2 (4.266,16-20) where Chatton explicitly asserts that he adopts solution (1) in the context of a discussion of whether Jesus's body can be multilocated.

⁵⁸ For a discussion of precisely what this deficiency might amount to, see Therese Scarpelli Cory, "Embodied vs. Non-Embodied Modes of Knowing in Aquinas: Different Universals, Different Intelligible Species, Different Intellects", *Faith and Philosophy* 35/4 (2018): 417-446, 439-442.

Ockham highlights this problem with both the Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing and the Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing in QS 1.15:

For if [sensory seeing] were received in the rational soul, then a separated soul would be able to have in itself every sensation of the five senses, at least through divine power, which seems untrue. For, if this were the case, an angel would always lack some natural perfection. For, it seems that it would be able to have such forms [i.e., sensations] even naturally, because corporeal things would be merely efficient causes of those forms.⁵⁹

Ockham's Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing runs as follows:

- (xi) If the rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, then it is metaphysically possible for a disembodied rational soul to undergo sensations.
- (xii) But it is not metaphysically possible for a disembodied rational soul to undergo sensations.
- (xiii) Therefore, the rational soul is not the immediate subject of sensations.

Ockham's Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing has a similar structure:

- (xiv) If the rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, then it is naturally possible for angels to have sensations.
- (xv) If it is naturally possible for angels to have sensations, then sensations are a perfection for angels.
- (xvi) Angels never have sensations.
- (xvii) Thus, if the rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, angels always lack a state that is a perfection for angels.
- (xviii) But there is no state that is a perfection for angels that is such that angels always lack that state.
- (xix) Thus, the rational soul is not the immediate subject of sensations.

Both arguments highlight Ockham's Aristotelian view that sensing is the sort of activity that can only be accomplished by embodied creatures. Angels and human souls after death are not embodied, so they cannot sense.

Chatton rejects this Aristotelian commitment. In response to the Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing, Chatton simply rejects (xii):

⁵⁹ QS 1.15 (84,21-26): "Si enim reciperetur in anima intellectiva, anima separata, per potentiam Dei saltem, posset habere in se omnem sensationem quinque sensuum; quod non videtur verum. Quia si sic, angelus semper careret aliqua perfectione naturali, quia videtur quod naturaliter etiam posset tales formas habere, quia corporalia non essent nisi causae efficientes illarum formarum". Ockham repeats a similar argument at QS 2.10, where instead of trying to show that there is an implausible implication of sensation being possible for a separated soul, he simply claims that the implication is absurd. QS 2.10 (158,49-53): "[...] tunc anima separata posset sentire, quia ex quo sensatio est subiective in anima intellectiva et Deus potest conservare omne accidens in suo subiecto sine quocumque alio, per consequens posset conservare sensationem in anima separata; quod est absurdum".

I do not see why the actualization of touching [i.e., the touch sensation] now immediately received in a soul would not be able to remain in that soul while it is separated from the body, if God wanted it to.⁶⁰

In fact, it is unclear whether Chatton's position is at a significant disadvantage to Ockham's in this respect even by Ockham's own lights: As Gregory of Rimini would later point out, it seems that Ockham must grant that God could supernaturally separate a *sensory* soul from its body while preserving its sensations in it.⁶¹

To see how Chatton would respond to the Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing, we can look to two of Chatton's discussions of angelic mental states, one in his *Lectura* and one in his *Reportatio*. In the *Lectura*, Chatton suggests the view that disembodied spirits have apprehensions that are phenomenally and intentionally like sensations, while leaving it open that those apprehensions differ in kind from sensations in some other way. Chatton states:

If some actualizations like the sensations of souls with bodies were to be posited in disembodied spirits, then it should consequently be posited that in those spirits intellectual pleasure and sadness are distinguished from those pleasures and sadnesses that are like sensory pleasure and sadness.⁶²

He promises to discuss the issue of whether this it is in fact true that disembodied spirits have sensations "elsewhere".⁶³

That reference may be to Chatton's *Reportatio* 4.11, where he considers as a philosophical thought experiment the question (motivated by scholastic theological commitments) of how both separated human souls and fallen angels could suffer from physical fire after death. The issue here is directly related to the issue of whether disembodied spirits can sense: If disembodied spirits cannot have touch sensations, then how could fire cause them pain or sadness? After setting out two possible views, Chatton gives what he identifies as his preferred view. According to this view, separated souls and fallen angels have apprehensions that are just like our touch sensations:

[On Chatton's preferred view] that fire would have some quality which could cause an actualization in a spirit or separated soul that is like the actualization of touching (*talem actum qualis est actus tangendi*) now immediately received in our soul (because, just as I have frequently said, all our vital actualizations are immediately received in the soul

⁶⁰ *Rep* 4.11.1 (4.351,3-5): "Non video quin actus tangendi modo receptus in anima immediate posset manere in ipsa si placeret Deo, ipsa separata corpore".

⁶¹ Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura*, l. 2, d. 16-17, q. 2 (344,29-33). I take Chatton's denial in *Pro*. 2.4 that a separated soul "potest in actus sentiendi" to be the denial that a separated soul would be *naturally* able to sense because sensations are naturally caused by changes in sense organs (115,295-299).

⁶² *Lect*. 1.2.2, (1.68,20-23): "[...] si in spiritibus separatis ponantur aliqui actus similes sensationibus animarum coniunctarum, tunc consequenter esset ponendum quod in illis delectatio et tristitia intellectualis distinguerentur a delectationibus et tristitiis illis quasi sensitivis".

⁶³ *Lect*. 1.2.2, (1.68,24-27).

itself) upon which an actualization that is similar to our actualization of touching would follow that distressing pain.⁶⁴

A disembodied soul's cognition of a singular material quality is phenomenologically and intentionally like sensory awareness of that same quality. Angels feel heat just like embodied humans feel heat. And a bit later in the same passage, Chatton points to a natural and plausible justification for this view: "for otherwise it would not be explained how a spirit would have evident awareness of the qualities that are sensed by touch (*tangibilium*)".⁶⁵ Chatton thinks that, if disembodied spirits could not have states phenomenally and intentionally like our sensations, it is unclear how they could be aware of sensible qualities at all.

These passages hint at how Chatton would respond to the Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing. It seems he would reject either (xiv) or (xvi):

- (xiv) If the rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, then it is naturally possible for angels to have sensations.
- (xvi) Angels never have sensations.

How we answer the question of which premise he would reject turns on how we interpret Chatton's talk of states that are "like" sensory states in angels and of an "actualization that is similar to our actualization of touching." If these qualities *are of the same kind* as human sensations, then it seems that Chatton would reject (xvi). On the other hand, if they are only like, but not of the same kind as human sensations, then presumably Chatton would reject (xiv) – just because a certain kind of quality can inhere in a human soul, it does not follow that it can inhere in an angel.

Either way, when Chatton states that the qualities in angels are like sensations, it seems plausible that he *at least* holds that they are phenomenally and intentionally similar to human sensations. But if this is the case and they are not of the same kind, then in what way would they differ from human sensations? Perhaps by not requiring changes in a bodily organ as efficient causes? Chatton doesn't say.

Once again, I suggest that we can understand the disagreement between Chatton and Ockham here if we remember that Chatton is thinking of sensations as *sensory experiences*. Chatton sees no reason to deny that a disembodied soul or an angel could have a sensory experience such as feeling heat. He finds it easy to conceive of sensory intentionality and phenomenology as belonging to a disembodied subject. On Ockham's view, on the other hand, there is more that is essential to a quality's being a sensation

⁶⁴ *Rep.* 4.11.1 (4.349,3-8): "[...] ille ignis haberet aliquam talem qualitatem quae posset causare in anima separata vel in spiritu talem actum qualis est actus tangendi recepta immediate modo in anima nostra, quia sicut frequenter dixi, omnis actus noster vitalis immediate recipitur in ipsa anima, ad quem quidem actum similem actui nostro tangendi sequeretur dolor ille afflictivus".

⁶⁵ *Rep.* 4.11.1 (4.349,21-22): "[...] aliter enim non salvaretur quomodo spiritus haberet cognitiones evidentes tangibilium".

than that it be a sensory experience – or even a sensory experience with the right kinds of causes. After all, as we have seen, he thinks that for every sensory cognition in the sensory soul, there is a duplicate experience with the same content in the rational soul – but the latter kind of experience is not a sensation.⁶⁶ Thus, for Chatton, a quality's being a sensory experience in a human being is *sufficient* for it to be a sensation, whereas Ockham rejects this view. And this difference explains why Chatton sees no difficulty in the metaphysical possibility of disembodied sensations (since, after all, there is no obvious problem with disembodied subjects having sensory experiences).

6. The Sensory Powers of Non-Human Animals: The Argument from the Sameness in Kind of Human and Non-Human Sensation (2)

Like other medieval scholastic philosophers, Ockham and Chatton would deny that non-human animals have immaterial souls. This commitment is the basis for Ockham's Argument from the Sameness in Kind of Human and Non-Human Sensation:

A human being and a non-human animal's actualizations of seeing the same object are of the same nature. Therefore, they have subjects of the same nature. But in the non-human animal, the sensory soul insofar as it is something distinct from an intellectual soul is the subject of the seeing. Therefore, the same is the case for the human being.⁶⁷

Ockham argues as follows:

- (xx) A human being's actualization A and a non-human animal's actualization B of seeing the same object are of the same nature.
- (xxi) Actualizations of the same nature have subjects of the same nature.
- (xxii) An extended, material sensory soul is the subject of B.
- (xxiii) Thus, an extended, material sensory soul is the subject of A.

While Chatton never directly responds to this argument, it seems that he could respond by rejecting either (xx) or (xxi).

First, consider (xx). It seems that there are two ways in which human and animal sensations might be of the same nature. On the one hand, they might be of the same nature with respect to their metaphysical structure, as it were – e.g., they could both be extended and material qualities. On the other hand, they might both be of the same nature “from the inside” – with respect to the kind of experience that a subject undergoes in virtue of being qualified by these qualities. I assume that Chatton thinks that human and non-human animal sensations are of the same nature in the latter sense – they are the same kind of experience. But it is less clear that he feels any

⁶⁶ See Section 3.

⁶⁷ *ORep.* 4.9 (*OT* 7 162,19-22): “Visio hominis et bruti respectu eiusdem obiecti sunt eiusdem rationis, igitur habent subiecta eiusdem rationis. Sed in bruto sensitiva est subiectum visionis ut distinguitur ab intellectiva, igitur eodem modo in homine”.

pressure to maintain that they are of the same nature with respect to their metaphysical structure.

Perhaps more surprisingly, it is not clear that Chatton needs to accept (xxi). For Chatton and Ockham, physical qualities and immaterial qualities are very much *alike* in nature. Ockham and Chatton both think that physical qualities are (a) extended, (b) directly or indirectly dependent on prime matter, and (c) spatially located. Immaterial qualities on the other hand can be spatially located, but they are not extended and do not depend directly or indirectly on prime matter.⁶⁸ Now, the fact that physical qualities have (b) but immaterial qualities lack it does not obviously provide a reason for Chatton to posit a difference in kind, because Chatton denies that qualities are individuated by the kinds of subjects they have.⁶⁹ So the basis for a radical difference between physical and immaterial qualities comes down to the difference between being extended and being non-extended. Here, however, the difference turns out to be surprisingly thin. Ockham and Chatton both think that physical qualities such as color, heat, and sensations (assuming Chatton thinks there are physical sensations – see below) have integral parts.⁷⁰ And, crucially, these integral parts are *of the same kind* as the quality itself. An integral part of heat is itself a bit of heat; an integral part of a sensation is *itself a sensation*.⁷¹ Now, Chatton thinks that continua are composed of indivisibles, and thus holds that extended qualities have *indivisible, non-extended* integral parts.⁷² Thus, sensations that are physical qualities, if there are such qualities, are composed of non-extended parts that are *themselves sensations*. It is not clear, then whether there is any irreducible difference in kind between human and animal sensations, or whether animal sensations are just composites that are composed of the kinds of qualities that are human sensations. In fact, Chatton's Dominican contemporary William Crathorn adopted a view very much like this: According to Crathorn, physical and immaterial qualities do not differ in kind. Even colors, Crathorn claims, can inhere in immaterial subjects, such as angels.⁷³

In fact, however, the only indication Chatton ever gives of how he would respond to this argument suggests that he would adopt an even more radical response: Chatton thinks it is philosophically plausible to reject (xx)'s implication that non-human

⁶⁸ I take the view that immaterial qualities can have locations to follow from Chatton and Ockham's shared view that the immaterial human soul is located where the human body is located. Chatton even thinks that a material, extended form can be wholly present in multiple distinct locations. See *Rep.* 4.3.2 (4.266,6-20).

⁶⁹ *Rep.* 4.10 (4.345,19-29).

⁷⁰ See footnote 29 above.

⁷¹ See *ORep.* 2.7 (OT V 126,11-127,4).

⁷² *Rep.* 2.2.3.4 (3.134,20-22). Chatton thinks that it is possible for God to make these indivisibles exist apart from the wholes they compose: *Rep.* 2.2.3.4 (3.123,16-27). That indivisibles are not extended is clear from Chatton's response at *Rep.* 2.2.3.4 (3.136,1-4) to Ockham's argument found at 2.2.3.1 (3.116,1-8).

⁷³ William Crathorn, *In primum librum*, q. 1 (120,17-29).

animals sense. That is, Chatton thinks that it is reasonable to hold that animals *do not have sensations at all*. In his *Reportatio*, Chatton explains that the term “sensory soul” can refer to one of two things: a substantial form that is the immediate subject of sensations or the “vital spirits” that are immediately responsible for the motion of the parts of animal bodies.⁷⁴ Chatton then makes a startling proposal. “Anyone who dares”, Chatton suggests, could say that there is no sensory soul in the former sense in animals, but only vital spirits that move the body:

Anyone who dares could respond in another way, that in a given part of a non-human animal there is only one substantial form. For instance, in one part there is only the form of blood, in another only the form of bone, but in another only the form of vital spirit. And this person could say that just as blood is distributed throughout the whole body, so also the vital humors and spirits are distributed throughout the whole body, and the non-human lives through those spirits.⁷⁵

In short, Chatton thinks it would be philosophically plausible (though perhaps socially perilous, since he says it is a view one must “dare” to hold) to hold that *there is no sensory soul* in animals. But Chatton thinks that only a soul in the former, proper, sense, which he often calls a “living form” (*forma viva*) could be the immediate subject of a thought or a sensation.⁷⁶ Thus, if there are only animal spirits in animals, animals do not have sensations. This becomes clear when Chatton responds to an objection which claims that, on the view Chatton has described, “that vital humor in a non-human animal receives sensations”.⁷⁷ Chatton responds by denying that the vital spirits would receive sensations: “I say that this is not the case”.⁷⁸

On Chatton’s view, we lack compelling philosophical grounds to think that animals have sensory experiences. And, given Chatton’s close identification of sensations with

⁷⁴ *Rep.* 2.15.1.1 (300,7-10).

⁷⁵ *Rep.* 2.15.1.1 (299,20-25): “Aliter posset dicere – qui auderet – quod in eadem parte bruti tantum est unica forma substantialis, puta in una parte tantum forma sanguinis, in alia tantum forma ossis, sed in alia tantum forma spiritus vitalis. Et ille diceret quod sicut sanguis diffunditur per totum corpus, ita et spiritus et humores vitales diffunduntur per totum corpus, et per istos spiritus vivit brutum”.

⁷⁶ See *Lect.* 3.6.1.1 (2.222,24-26); *Lect.* 3.6.1.2 (2.235,8-10); and, most significantly, *Pro.* 2.4 (108,90-93). This is a crucial difference between Chatton and Ockham, the latter of whom suggests in *QS* 1.15 (83,17-84,20). that anyone who holds that there is just one soul in human beings could plausibly hold that sensations are received in the body rather than in the soul. It seems there is a difference between Ockham and Chatton’s conception of sensation such that Ockham can imagine a sensation in a body but Chatton can only see a sensation as occurring in a soul. It seems plausible that this difference is that Chatton think that a subject of sensation always experiences her sensation just in virtue of having it, whereas Ockham rejects this view. See Susan Brower-Toland, “Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton”, *Philosopher’s Imprint* 12 (2012): 1-29.

⁷⁷ “[...] ille humor vitalis in bruto recipit sensationes”. *Rep.* 2.15.1.1 (3.300,11).

⁷⁸ “Dico quod non”. *Rep.* 2.15.1.1 (3.300,13).

sensory experiences, we therefore lack compelling philosophical grounds to hold that animals have sensations. On this view, the Argument from the Sameness in Kind of Human and Non-Human Sensation fails to get off the ground.

7. Conclusion

In this article, I have shown that Ockham held that powers of sensation are distinct from the power to think because he thinks that the immediate subject of sensations must be distinct from the immediate subject of thoughts. And he held that the immediate subject of sensations must be distinct from the immediate subject of thoughts because he thought that sensations are by nature embodied or material in a way that thoughts are not. We have also seen that Chatton rejected Ockham's view that human sensations are material or embodied in a way that requires them to have an immediate subject distinct from the subject of thoughts. I have argued that Chatton rejected this view precisely because he sees nothing about the introspectable character of sensory experience that requires it to be material or embodied in a way that would require an immediate subject distinct from the immediate subject of thought.

Jordan Lavender
rlavende@nd.edu

Date of submission: 16/04/2023

Date of acceptance: 31/05/2023

