STOICISM *A LA MODE*: SENECAN ETHICS IN ROGER BACON'S *MORALIS PHILOSOPHIA*

ESTOICISMO *A LA MODE*: LA ETICA DE SENECA EN LA *MORALIS PHILOSOPHIA* DE ROGER BACON

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Abstract

While recent scholarship accents early Franciscans' use of Greek and Greco-Arabic sources in their ethics, Roger Bacon's appeal to Stoic ethics via Seneca in his *Moralis philosophia*, the last book of his *Opus maius*, has not been given its due. Bacon's citation of Seneca's dialogues privileges *De ira* and works he associates with it. Placing Bacon's ethics in the context of classical and Christian traditions on anger, this paper argues that Bacon uses Seneca to undermine the arguments for righteous anger in both these traditions, specifically those validated by his Franciscan contemporary John of La Rochelle. Bacon's alternative addresses ethical and political concerns he shares with his dedicatee, Pope Clement IV, and with Franciscan confrères committed to popular preaching and the apostolate to non-Christians. As such, Bacon's Stoic ethics *à la mode* needs clearer recognition in the ongoing reinterpretation of thirteenth-century Franciscan thought.

Keywords

Anger; Ethics; Roger Bacon; Seneca; Stoicism

Resumen

Mientras la investigación reciente resalta el uso que los primeros franciscanos hicieron de fuentes griegas y greco-árabes en su ética, el recurso de Roger Bacon a la ética estoica a través de Séneca en su *Moralis philosophia*, el último libro de su *Opus maius*, no ha recibido el reconocimiento que merece. La referencia de Bacon a los diálogos de Séneca privilegia el *De ira* y las obras que él asocia con ésta. Situando la ética de Bacon en el contexto de las tradiciones clásicas y cristianas sobre la ira, este artículo argumenta que el autor utiliza a Séneca para socavar los argumentos a favor de la ira justa en ambas tradiciones, concretamente aquellos validados por su contemporáneo, el franciscano Juan de La Rochelle. La alternativa de Bacon aborda preocupaciones éticas y políticas

que comparte con su dedicatario, el papa Clemente IV, y con sus compañeros franciscanos comprometidos con la predicación popular y el apostolado con los no cristianos. Como tal, la ética estoica *à la mode* de Bacon merece un reconocimiento más explícito en la actual reinterpretación del pensamiento franciscano del siglo XIII.

Palabras clave

Ira; ética; Roger Bacon; Séneca; estoicismo

Whether as a neutral passion of the soul, a deplorable vice, or an occasional and situational virtue, anger has been discussed since antiquity. Medieval ethicists inherited the classical and biblical components of this legacy. Roger Bacon (c. 1214-92) devotes more attention to anger than any other medieval thinker. But this aspect of his *oeuvre* has not received its due. Contributors to the "history of emotions" ignore Bacon.[1] Some scholars mention the fact that his *Moralis philosophia*, the last book of his *Opus maius* (1266) draws heavily on Seneca's *De ira* and associated works, although accounts of thirteenth-century philosophy, ethics included, accent Aristotle and his Arabic commentators and not the Stoic ethics conveyed by Seneca. Educated at Oxford, where there was no ban on Aristotle in the early thirteenth century, Bacon was a recognized authority on Aristotelianism, among the first to teach it in the Arts faculty at the University of Paris. Yet, as an ethicist, Bacon turned to Seneca on anger, not to Aristotle. This paper considers Bacon's use of Seneca and his reasons for this preference, which also suggests that we should widen our assessment of Franciscan philosophy in Bacon's age to include Stoic ethics.

Classical views on anger are surveyed magisterially by William V. Harris. As he shows, some ancient authors validated anger – if not for women – and some factored humoral theory into their prescriptions for its cure. The leading positions on this theme were Aristotelianism and Stoicism as represented by Seneca. Both Harris' judgments and his presentation of these two positions enjoy a remarkable scholarly consensus, reflected in

[1] Contributors to this historiographical current focus on how medieval authors represent the external expression of anger by both historical and fictional personages, regardless of the feelings they may actually have, viewed through the lens of social anthropology, ritual, dispute-settlement understandings, and/or gender studies, and the terminology they use in so doing. For samples of this approach see Gerd Althoff, "*Ira regis*: A History of Royal Anger", in *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, edited by B. H. Rosenwein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 59-74; Albrecht Classen, "Anger and Anger Management in the Middle Ages: Mental-Historical Perspectives", *Mediaevistik* 19 (2006): 21-50. The latest survey of medieval authors on anger, Peter King, "Emotions in Medieval Thought", in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of the Emotions*, edited by P. Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 167-187, which considers emotions as psychological phenomena, joins the above-cited scholars in ignoring Bacon.

the summary which follows.[2]

Aristotle regards anger as a passion or disturbance of the soul, arising in its concupiscible or irascible faculty. Anger is our response to what we perceive to be an unfair attack. We naturally seek revenge. Aristotle does not require us to validate our perception or to consider any mitigating factors before reacting. Rather, our practical intellect should intervene and moderate the pay-back, avoiding the extremes of cruelty or cowardice. Like all passions of the soul, anger is neutral. The behavior it inspires may be virtuous or vicious. Insofar as it is virtuous, its vindication is appropriate; indeed, we stand dishonored if we do not avenge ourselves.

Seneca explicitly condemns Aristotle on anger. For him, anger is an unbidden emotion which, if it occurs, the sage first judges and then rejects as an irrational passion. Anger is intrinsically vicious, whatever occasions it. It cannot be moderated but must be excised from the soul. Vengeance is never acceptable. In judging anger, sages should consider the mindset and circumstances of those who provoke it. But, as with circumstances beyond our control, the bottom line is that no attack, however unwarranted, causes sages to lose their equanimity. While anger certainly harms others, Seneca accents the damage it does to the angry. He offers remedies combining aversion therapy with cognitive therapy. Aversion therapy confronts readers with examples of angry behavior so loathsome that they will be motivated to abhor and avoid it. Cognitive

[2] William V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), passim and 56-60 on Aristotle; 61-66, 112-118, 220-228, 248-253, 324-326, 338-361, 377-382 on Seneca; 204-206, 212 on Cicero on both views. In accord with Harris are Christopher Gill, "The Emotions in Greco-Roman Philosophy", in *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature*, edited by S. Morton Braund and C. Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 5-15; Richard Sorabji, *Emotions and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 19, 56-57, 66-75, 93-94, 123, 164-166, 175, 191-192, 213-216, 223-224; Bernard Besnier, "Aristote et les passions", in *Les passions antiques et médiévales*, edited by B. Besnier, P.-F. Moreau, and L. Renault (Paris: PUF, 2003), 29-93; David Konstan, "Aristotle on the Emotions", in *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, edited by S. Braund and G. W. Most (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 99-120; A. W. Price, "Emotions in Plato and Aristotle", in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy*, edited by P. Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 121-143 at 132-139; Christopher Gill, "Stoicism and Epicureanism", in *Oxford Handbook*, 143-185 at 145-154; Gill, "Positive Emotions in Stoicism: Are They Enough"? in *Hope, Joy, and Affection in the Classical World*, edited by R. R. Caston and R. A. Kaster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 143-160 (with a useful reminder of the importance of *eupatheia* in Stoic ethics); Robert A. Kaster, introduction to his translation of Seneca, *De ira* in *Anger, Mercy, Revenge*, translated by R. A. Kaster and M. Nussbaum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 3-13. The most detailed and recent treatment of *De ira* is provided by Sharon Weisser, *Eradication ou modération des passions: Histoire de la controverse chez Cicéron, Sénèque et Philon d'Alexandrie* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2021), 183-264, 370-375. For a variant reading of Aristotle on emotions as hard-wired into human biology see Kostas Kalimtzis, *Taming Anger: The Hellenistic Approach to the Limitations of Reason* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012), 73-124; for a variant reading of Seneca in this light see Änne Bäumer, *Die Bestie Mensch: Senecas Aggressionstheorie, ihre philosophischen Vorstufen, und ihre literarischen Auswirkungen* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1982).

therapy promotes the attainment of an anger-free soul by citing inspiring examples of those who possess it and by stressing the advantages of *apatheia*, aided by the nightly examination of conscience. Given his express contrast between his own position on anger and Aristotle's, Seneca is a rich source for both views.

If ancient philosophy offered medieval Christians conflicting positions on anger, so did the New Testament.[3] The Gospels all portray Jesus as angry in ejecting the money-changers from the Temple (Matthew 21:12-13, Mark 11:15-17, Luke 19:45-46, John 2:14-17). Even within the same Epistle, St. Paul enjoins his flock to abandon anger (Ephesians 4:30) and also advises them, "Be angry and do not sin; let not the sun go down on your anger" (Ephesians 4:26). So, Holy Scripture suggests that anger does not always conflict with Christian virtue.

Some historians see Augustine as the chief vector to the Latin Middle Ages of the classical and biblical traditions on anger via his review and critique of philosophical ethics in the *City of God*. Equally if not more important are steps Augustine takes in earlier works where he redefines the cardinal virtues as modes of charity. Well-ordered love thus replaces reason as the norm of virtue. If Stoic *apatheia* is an arrogant fantasy, Stoic *eupatheia* does not go the distance. To the extent that Augustine classifies the passions of the soul, in Book 10 of the *Confessions* he models the temptations he faces on the lusts of the flesh, the lusts of the eyes, and the pride of life (1 John 2:16). Under the third heading, the closest he comes to anger is resentment when others fail to grant him the esteem he deserves.[4]

Medieval discussions of anger owe much more to John Cassian and Gregory the Great, each of whom offers a hierarchy of passions of the soul understood as mortal sins, with a parallel scheme of corrective virtues.[5] Cassian, his authority guaranteed by his status as

[3] The fullest catalogue of biblical citations is provided by Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 391-399. For Christian debates on the wrath of the Old Testament God in late antiquity, a sideline here, see Joseph M. Hallman, "The Emotions of God: Tertullian to Lactantius", *Theological Studies* 42 (1981): 373-393.

[4] Scholars focusing on the influence of the *City of God* alone include Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima: Teorie e usi degli affetti nella cultura medievale* (Florence: SISMEL Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2015), 19-41; King, "Emotions in Medieval Thought", 168-170. For Augustine's assessment of his own temptations see *Confessiones* 10.30-41, edited by L. Verheijen, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 27 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981). For Augustine's wider views, early and late, on the acceptability of Stoic ethics that go well beyond these texts see Marcia L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1990), II:207-225, 233-234, 237-238. For a somewhat different reading of this topic see James Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 45-85, 98-111, 116-126.

[5] On the schemata of these figures see Richard Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues in Latin and the Vernacular* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1993), 99-106, 108-110; Carole Straw, "Cassian and the Cardinal Vices", in *The Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages*, edited by R. Newhauser (Toronto: PIMS, 2005), 33-58; George E. Demacopoulos, *Gregory the Great: Ascetic, Pastor, and First Man of Rome* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015), 23-28, 32-33, 74-76, 113-124, 156; and above all the work of Silvana Vecchio and Carla Casagrande. See Vecchio, "*Ira mala/ira bona*:

recommended reading in the *Rule* of St. Benedict,[6] personifies his advice with examples of biblical worthies and Desert Fathers. Cassian draws on both Aristotelianism and Stoicism. He does not privilege Aristotle's intellectual faculty, above the fray, the arbiter of disturbances in the concupiscible and irascible faculties, since all three faculties are prone to their own distinctive vices.[7] Cassian's scheme moves from the gluttony, lust, avarice, avidity, and other perverse worldly desires of the concupiscible to the anger, impatience, sadness, sloth, cowardice, and cruelty of the irascible to the vainglory, pride, presumption, conflict, and heresy afflicting the rational faculty. Stoic *apatheia* enables us to master the emotions leading to these vices. Cassian's sequencing of the vices reflects his educational goals as a spiritual guide to ascetic monks. While anger occurs at the mid-point in his list, he regards it as the most serious vice, primarily because it destroys the tranquility of the angry and impedes their ability to pray.

By contrast, Gregory writes for a wider audience. His own scheme is etiological, not pedagogical.[8] Holding, with the Stoics, that vices as well as virtues are interconnected, he starts with pride, which engenders envy, which engenders wrath, which engenders sloth, which engenders avarice, which engenders gluttony, which engenders lust. Gregory reprises the Stoics' three-step process by which we succumb to these sins; his terms are *suggestio*, *delectatio*, and *consensus* rather than the *passio*, *propassio*, and *consensus* of most patristic and medieval writers. With Cassian, Gregory thinks we are at least mildly at fault if we dwell with pleasure on a sinful passion before rejecting it. But, departing from Seneca and Cassian alike, he regards anger as sometimes laudable. Anger as the zeal for holiness is virtuous. While Gregory agrees with Cassian that patience, humility, and self-denial are remedies for anger, he does not require an asceticism suited to monks alone and, with Seneca, advocates the regular examination of conscience of which all Christians are capable.

Before, and alongside of, newly translated Greek and Greco-Arabic sources, all the above-mentioned authorities were available to thinkers in Bacon's day. The first to take a notably independent line on anger was William Peraldus, lector at the Dominican

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Storia di un vizio che qualche volta è una virtù", *Doctor Seraphicus* 45 (1998): 41-62 at 44-45; Silvana Vecchio, "Passions de l'âme et pechés capitaux: Les ambiguïtés de la culture médiévale", in *Laster im Mittelalter/Vices in the Middle Ages*, edited by C. Flüeler and M. Rohde (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 45-64; Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *I sette vizi capitali: Storia dei peccati nel medioevo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2000), 54-59; Casagrande and Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima*, 43-65. See also Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities: A History of Emotion in the Middle Ages*, translated by R. Shaw (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2018), 38-39.

[6] *The Rule of St. Benedict* 42.3, 42.5, 72.7, edited and translated by B. Venarde, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 6 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

[7] John Cassian, *Collationes XXIIII*, 24.15.3-4, edited by M. Petchenig, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiaticorum Latinorum 13 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wisssenschaften, 2004).

[8] Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job I-XXXV* 5.82, edited by M. Andriaen, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 143 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1979); *Cura pastoralis* 2.2.16, edited by F. Rommel, translated by C. Morel, introduction by B. Judic (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1992).

studium at Lyon.[9] His *Summa vitiorum* (before 1236) follows Cassian in starting with the corporal sins. Anger heads Peraldus' list as the worst of the spiritual sins. To that list he attaches sins of the tongue, not as an eighth mortal sin but as a means of expressing any of the seven. Peraldus shares Cassian's educational rationale for his chosen scheme, but in this case he writes for fellow-mendicants preparing lay people for confession.

While Peraldus enjoyed a wide medieval reception by Dominicans, Franciscans, and other clerics engaged in the pastoral ministry,[10] if he was known he was ignored by John of La Rochelle, the leading Franciscan ethicist prior to Bacon. Regent master in theology at the University of Paris (1238-44), John applied his own teachings to the ethics of the *Summa Halensis* (1236-55). He receives high marks from historians, for his appeal to Aristotelian faculty psychology, for his use of other Greek and Arabic sources, or for the changes he rings on both Aristotle and Gregory the Great. He occupies a key role in the historiographical revision of early Franciscan thought as the mere replay of Augustine.[11]

John's base-line is the passions of the soul in Gregory's scheme, which he refines. He agrees with Augustine that vices derive from disordered love and applies the Johannine

[9] On Peraldus, who work is still unedited, see Richard Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues*, 127-130; Newhauser, "The Capital Vices as Medieval Anthropology", in *Laster im Mittelalter/Vices in the Middle Ages*, edited by C. Flüeler and M. Rohde (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 119-123; see also Silvana Vecchio, "The Seven Deadly Sins between Pastoral Care and Scholastic Theology: The *Summa de vitiis* of John of Rupella", in *The Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle* Ages, edited by R. Newhauser (Toronto: PIMS, 2005), 104-127 at 107, 117; Marc B. Cels, "Interrogating Anger in the New Penitential Literature of the Thirteenth Century", *Viator* 45 (2014): 203-219 at 203.

[10] On the later influence of Peraldus see Siegfried Wenzel, "The Continuing Life of William Peraldus's *Summa vitiorum*", in *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers*, edited by M. D. Jordan and K. Emery Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 135-163; at 136 and at 156 nn. 6-7 Wenzel notes Franciscan users of this text.

[11] These accolades began with Pierre Michaud-Quantin, "Les puissances de l'âme chez Jean de La Rochelle", *Antonianum* 24 (1949): 489-565 and have been developed further by Vecchio, "*Ira mala/ira bona*", 57-59; Vecchio, "The Seven Deadly Sins", 104-127; Vecchio, "Passions de l'âme", 55-59 (with a detailed visual scheme of the sins at 57-58); Casagrande and Vecchio, *I sette vizi capitali*, 66-70; Casagrande and Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima*, 153-154, 157-158, 161, 175-181, 203-281; Boquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, 153-157; King, "Emotions", 173-175; for the current state of the art see Vecchio, "Passions and Sins: The *Summa Halensis* and John of La Rochelle", in *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*, edited by L. Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 211-225. These studies are rightly emphasized in the revisionist studies of Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 1, 8, 9-13, 17-19, 25, 29, 55-77; Schumacher, introduction to *The Summa Halensis* (as above), 1-7, Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 56-64, 112-124, 225-244, 248, 260-261, 285-307 (with my gratitude to Prof. Schumacher for sharing pre-publication material on John). By contrast, Simo Knuuttila, "Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul", in *Emotion and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, edited by H. Lagerlund and M. Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht: Kluver, 2002), 49-83 treats John of La Rochelle's ethics, at 64-69, as dependent on Avicenna, as ignoring Aristotelian faculty psychology, and as not constituting a turning point.

rubrics to Gregory's mortal sins, although John gives more scope than Augustine to our intellect and will in mastering them. On that model, the passions of the soul are all vicious. This presupposition sits uncomfortably with John's Aristotelian schemata, organized under the headings of our vegetative, sensitive, and rational faculties and our concupiscible, irascible, and rational faculties. While John gives intellect and will the job of judging and activating the passions arising in the infrarational faculties, with Cassian he assigns to the rational faculty its own specific passions. Anger is the only emotion John locates in the irascible faculty, giving it a distinctive look. Anger is a neutral passion which may inspire vice or virtue. Good anger fuels our zeal for righteousness. As such, anger is praiseworthy, as are the audacity, greatness of spirit (*magnitudo animi*) and rebelliousness (*insurrectio*) involved in its exercise, moving us to obey God's law come what may. Obedience to God's law is also John's remedy for anger badly used. Philosophical reasoning and our own free will empower us to make the correct assessments and choices, whichever of his taxonomies is involved.

Bacon's hostility to John of La Rochelle's approach to ethics in general and to anger in particular has both disciplinary and personal grounds.[12] As an ethicist Bacon reflects his own expertise in the *artes*. His experience at the University of Paris soured him not only on academic politics but also on ethics as taught by scholastic theologians. He retained this outlook as a private scholar after leaving the university in the late 1240s and after joining the Franciscan order in the mid-1250s. Although the early Franciscans eagerly recruited educated men, by mid-century the order's growth led them to install elementary curricula in the *artes* for adolescent novices. The university-level *Sprachlogik* which Bacon had taught was too advanced for these students. So, he was never assigned a teaching position in any of the order's *studia*.[13]

[12] The best account of Bacon's life and works is Amanda Power, *Roger Bacon and the Defense of Christendom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 29, 32-83; Power, "*Per lumen sapientiae*: Roger Bacon and the Struggle for Hegemonic Rationality", in *'Outsiders' and 'Forerunners': Modern Reason and Historiographical Births in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by C. König-Pralong, M. Meliadò, and Z. Radeva (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018), 123-164. See also Jeremiah Hackett, "Roger Bacon: His Life, Career and Works", in *Roger Bacon and the Sciences: Commemorative Essay*, edited by J. Hackett (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 9-23.

[13] On these developments see Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education (c. 1217-1517)* (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Bert Roest, "The Franciscan School System: Reassessing the Early Evidence (ca. 1220-1260)", in *The Franciscan Organization in the Mendicant Context: Formal and Informal Structures of the Friars' Lives and Ministry in the Middle Ages*, edited by M. Robson and J. Röhrkasten (Berlin: LIT, 2011), 253-279 at 253-254; Neslihan Şenocak, *The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order, 1209-1310* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 57, 74-77, 210. Not relevant here is Alfonso Maierù, "Formazione culturale e techniche d'insegnamento nelle scuole degli ordini mendicanti", in *Studio e studia: Le scuole dell'ordini mendicanti fra XIII e XIV secolo*, Atti del XXIX convegno internazionale, Assisi, 11-13 ottobre 2001 (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 2002), 5-32, which confines itself to Dominicans. Power, *Roger Bacon*, 58-60 thinks that Bacon taught for the Franciscans but cites no evidence for this claim. On Bacon's *Sprachlogik* see

In an important and underappreciated study, Beryl Smalley observes that it is a category error to treat Bacon the ethicist as a scholastic theologian *manqué*. He was and remained an *artista*, whose ethics was grounded in the classical authors read in the school traditions of grammar and rhetoric.[14] Seneca was a favorite of his from childhood, and he was delighted to find the manuscript with Seneca's complete moral works that facilitated the writing of his *Moralis philosophia*. Here was philosophical wisdom, wisdom that refuted the Aristotelian and para-Aristotelian lucubrations of scholastics like John of La Rochelle, wisdom packaged in an elegant, eloquent, and persuasive Latin style. Scholars highlighting the appeal of rhetorical arguments in Bacon's ethics have accented his awareness of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* via al-Farabi. But Seneca had already shown the way, in practice.[15] Bacon was never ordained to the priesthood and never had a preaching mission. But he, and other mendicants concerned with the efficacy of preaching *ad populum*, found what they needed in Seneca. Realizing that their mode of intra-university preaching was too technical for this purpose, scholastics sought to reform it. But the resultant *sermo moderatus* style failed to fill the bill. For Bacon, as for other Franciscans such as John of Wales (fl. 1260-70), Thomas of York (fl. 1253-56), and John Russel (fl. 1243-1305), Seneca outpaced other authors in their quest for material suitable for the edification of the laity.[16] To Smalley's list we can now add Juan Gil Zamora, inspired by

Mark Amsler, *The Medieval Life of Language: Grammar and Pragmatics from Bacon to Kempe* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2021), 43-72.

[14] Beryl Smalley, "Moralists and Philosophers in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries", in *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung*, Vorträge des II. internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie, Köln, 31 August-6 September 1961, edited by P. Wilpert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963), 59-67. Without citing Smalley this point is also made by Power, *Roger Bacon*, 84-85,125. At 264, Power notes that Bacon's hope that this ethical project could be united with "the intellectual agendas of the universities" fell on deaf papal and academic ears.

[15] Scholars in this group include Jeremiah Hackett, "Moral Philosophy and Rhetoric in Roger Bacon", *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 20 (1987): 18-40; Irène Rosier-Catach, "Roger Bacon, al-Farabi, et Augustin: Rhétorique, logique, et philosophie morale", in *La Rhétorique d'Aristote: Traditions et commentaires de l'Antiquité au XVIe siècle*, edited by G. Dahan and I. Rosier-Catach (Paris: Vrin, 1998), 87-110; Aurélien Robert, "L'Idée de logique morale aux XIIIe siècle", *Médiévales* 63 (2012): 27-46 (at 36, 37-39 he alone in this group mentions Seneca); Vincent Gillespie, "The Senses in Literature: The Texture of Reception", in *A Cultural History of the Senses in the Middle Ages*, edited by R. Newhauser (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 153-173 at 160-162, 164-165; Casagrande and Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima*, 300-303, 393-398; Bouquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, 239. See the important point made by Nadia Bray, *La tradizione filosofica stoica nel medioevo: Un approcio dossografico* (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2018), 152, who notes that Bacon read and processed his Greco-Arabic sources via Seneca.

[16] On the would-be scholastic reform of homiletics and the perceived needs of the Franciscans see Roest, *Franciscan Education*, 282-283; Timothy J. Johnson, "Roger Bacon's Critique of Franciscan Preaching", in *Institution und Charisma: Festschrift für Gert Melville zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by F. J. Felten, A. Kehnel, and S. Weinfurter (Cologne: Böhlaus Verlag, 2009), 541-558; Timothy J. Johnson, "Preaching Precedes Theology: Roger Bacon on the Failure of Mendicant Education", *Franciscan Studies* 68 (2010): 83-95; Randall B. Smith, *Aquinas, Bonaventure, and the Scholastic Culture of Medieval Paris: Preaching, Prologues, and Biblical Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021),

Bacon to translate Seneca's *De ira* (1292-95) into Castilian for his king.[17] And it is Seneca himself they cite, Smalley notes, with no reference to the spurious Seneca/Paul correspondence exposed as a forgery in the Renaissance.[18]

That said, it is remarkable how little attention has been given to the specifics of Bacon's use of Seneca in the *Moralis philosophia* even by those scholars to whom we are most indebted for documenting his citations.[19] Aside from his philosophical and pastoral objections to John of La Rochelle's analysis of anger, political events when Bacon was writing this text help to contextualize his concern with anger and related themes. These events also concerned the prelate to whom he dedicated the *Opus maius* with which the *Moralis philosophia* concludes.

That dedicatee, Gui de Foulques, had been sent in 1264 as cardinal-legate by Pope Urban IV (1261-65) to an England fractured by the rebellion led by Simon de Montfort

45-46, 230, 342-343, 416-426. On these other Franciscan figures see Smalley, "Moralists and Philosophers", 63; Smalley, "John Russel OFM", in Beryl Smalley, *Studies in Medieval Thought and Learning from Abelard to Wyclif* (London: Hambeldon Press, 1981), 205-248; Jenny Swanson, *John of Wales: A Study of the Ideas of a Thirteenth-Century Friar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Thomas Ricklin, "Seneca der Minderbruder: Die Réécriture einer moralischen Herausforderung durch Roger Bacon und Johannes von Wales und ihr frühhumanistischer Epilog", in *Ethik:Wissenschaft oder Lebeskunst? Modelle der Normenbegründung von der Antike bis zur frühen Neuzeit*, edited by S. Ebbermeyer and E. Kessler (Berlin: LIT, 2007), 51-74 at 52, 59-67; Fiorella Retucci, "The *Sapientale* of Thomas of York OFM: The Fortunes and Misfortunes of a Critical Edition", *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 52 (2010): 133-159; Power, *Roger Bacon*, 61-62; Bray, *La tradizione filosofica stoica*, 123-147, 159, 162, 181-182; Bray, "Anaxagoras in the Late Middle Ages: A Doxographical Study of Thomas of York's *Sapientale*", in *Past and Future: Medieval Studies Today*, edited by M. J. F. M. Hoenen and K. Engel (Basel: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2021), 317-336 at 320-328, 331-333, who, although accenting metaphysics not ethics here, sees a particular openness to Stoicism in Oxford thinkers.

[17] Juan Héctor Fuentes, "Roger Bacon, el diálogo *De ira* de Séneca y el *Libro contra la ira e saña*", *Revista de poética medieval* 32 (2018): 151-171. Roest, *History of Franciscan Education*, 142, states that Bacon's ethics had a later impact in the Franciscan lectorate program in theology but cites no specifics.

[18] Smalley, "Moralists and Philosophers", 60. For this forgery and its medieval acceptance elsewhere see *Epistolario apocrifo di Seneca e San Paolo,* edited by L. Bocciolini Papagi (Florence: Nardini, 1985).

[19] See in particular the foundational work of Eugenio Massa, *Ruggero Bacone: Etica e poetica nella storia dell'Opus maius* (Rome: Herder, 1955) and Bray, *La tradizione filosofica stoica*, 149-158, 182. See also Rickin, "Seneca als Minderbruder", 53-59; John Sellars, "The Reception of Stoic Ethics in the Middle Ages", in *Barlaam of Seminara on Stoic Ethics*, edited by C. M. Hogg, Jr. and J. Sellars (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2022), 191-206 at199-200. The only scholar thus far to consider why Bacon is so concerned with anger is Power, *Roger Bacon*, 86-90, 160; she relates it to what she calls the "rhetoric of outrage" in contemporary preaching against heretics, to Bacon's hostility to the factional disputes at the university of Paris, or to a self-therapy undertaken for his own personality problems. Power does not consider the Aristotelian and patristic justifications of good anger and its recent vindication by John of La Rochelle as an issue that Bacon addresses.

since 1258 against King Henry III.[20] Desirable as was peace in England, the popes had additional skin in the game. Since 1254 they had been at war in Italy with the last male descendants of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, who claimed title to Sicily and the Regno. The popes needed and thought they had found in Edmund, Henry's younger son, a rich, friendly, available, and non-German anti-Hohenstaufen champion. Henry backed this venture enthusiastically; Parliament's repeated refusal to fund it triggered Simon's takeover of the royal government.[21] In 1264, after much to and fro between rebels and royalists, Simon and Henry both agreed to submit their case to the judgment of King Louis IX of France. Both swore to accept it. Louis, wisely declining to comment on the nuts and bolts of English institutions, ruled that royal authority had been usurped by Simon. It must be restored to Henry forthwith. Breaking his oath, Simon unleashed a full-bore civil war, reaching the apex of his cause at the battle of Lewes later in 1264. This event aborted Gui's legatine mission, since he was refused entry into Simon's England. The tide turned in 1265. Henry defeated the rebels at the battle of Evesham, at which Simon lost his life and his cause. 1265 also saw Gui's election as Pope Clement IV (1265-68). His own cardinal-legate to England, Ottobuono, is credited by some historians with mediating the post-war settlement embodied in the Dictum of Kenilworth (1266) and confirmed by the Statute of Marlborough (1267).[22]

[20] Excellent background on the career of Gui, recognizing the concern he shared with Bacon on the English rebellion but omitting its connection with the popes' investment in the Sicilian venture is supplied by Power, *Roger Bacon*, 62-69, 74; Amanda Power, "Seeking Remedies for Great Dangers: Contemporary Appraisals of Roger Bacon's Expertise", in *Knowledge, Discipline and Power in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of David Luscombe*, edited by J. Canning, E. King, and M. Staats (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 63-78 at 69-71; William Chester Jordan, *Men at the Center: Redemptive Governance under Louis IX* (Budapest: Central European University, 2012), 8-9, 69; Justine Firnhager-Baker, *Violence and the State in Languedoc, 1250-1400* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 28, 31, 33, 38, 55 58, 61, 65, 90. These authors relate Guy's early career as a lawyer, royal councilor, enquêteur, and peacekeeper in Languedoc and then, following a mid-life call to the priesthood, as bishop of Le Puy and archbishop of Narbonne before his elevation to the cardinalate by Urban IV. See also Maurice Powicke, *The Thirteenth Century*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 180, 199.

[21] While these events are agreed on, historians differ on their meaning and on Simon's motives. For a quick fix on these debates see David Carpenter, "What Happened in 1258"? and "Simon de Montfort, First Leader of a Political Movement in English History", both in David Carpenter, *The Reign of Henry III* (London: Hambledon Press, 1996), 183-197 and 219-239. See now the *magnum opus* of David Carpenter, *Henry III: Reform, Rebellion, Civil War, Settlement, 1258-1272* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023), especially 1-2, 73-74, 179-181, 237-238, 455 for Henry's obsession with the Sicilian venture. For other recent assessments see Adrian Jobson, *The First English Revolution* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012); Stephen Church, *Henry III: A Simple and God-Fearing King* (London: Allen Lane, 2017); and Darren Baker, *The Great King England Never Knew* (Stroud, UK, The History Press, 2017).

[22] For the text of the Dictum of Kenilworth see B. Wilkinson, *Constitutional History of Medieval England, 1216-1399 with Selected Documents*, 3 vols. (London: Longmans, 1963), I:184-186. For the controversies resulting from these settlements see Carpenter, *Henry III*, 455-522, 580-588. On Ottobuono's commission from Clement, his role in the settlement, and the fact that it did not

If this outcome took England off the table for Clement, who granted the crown of Sicily to Charles of Anjou, youngest brother of Louis IX, it left if squarely there for Bacon.[23] The head of his family, his eldest brother, was an ardent royalist. Twice captured in battle and twice ransomed by Simon, he was then exiled along with his widowed mother and brothers in England. The Bacon family fortune was ruined. It was this fortune that had enabled Roger to operate as a private scholar, both before and during his career as a Franciscan. While cooling his heels in Boulogne hoping to get into England, Gui learned of Bacon's work. Once he became pope, he ordered Bacon to send him a fair copy of the *Opus maius* at once. Bacon faced difficulties in meeting this demand. The Franciscan order had ruled at its General Chapter in Narbonne in 1260 that its members could not publish works without prior approval of their superiors. Clement was aware of this rule and told Bacon to violate it. Bacon had to scramble for the funds, and the scribes, he needed. In 1266 he resided at the Franciscan convent in Paris where Bonaventure, head of the order, also lived. Bonaventure was scarcely unaware of Bacon's activities. His attitude was that of the Franciscan order in general, which neither hindered nor helped Bacon's work.

These moral and practical difficulties were joined by Bacon's political and family concerns. He never located his exiled relatives. And, given the Dictum's complex provisions for the redemption of property expropriated or destroyed by both sides during the recent conflict, and its equally complex provisions for the punishment of the non-compliance it clearly expected, Bacon's homeland could look forward to a period marked by acrimony, backbiting, favoritism, chicanery, and vindictiveness. These issues gave a contemporary and heartfelt edge to his philosophical and disciplinary interest in the themes of anger, clemency, and the compatibility, or not, of *insurrectio* and *magnitudo animi* with these emotions.

The *Moralis philosophia* has six parts, of which Part 3, based on Seneca, is the longest and was the most frequently copied. Brief comment is needed on the parts that surround it. Ethics involves our duties to God, to others, and to ourselves.[24] In Parts 1 and 4 Bacon proposes to prove, by extremely loose rhetorical argumentation, that the main tenets of Christianity starting with the doctrine of God are reasonable, for the benefit of shaky

provide for the recall of exiles and prioritized the restitution of lands deemed important for national defense, see Powicke, *Thirteenth Century*, 199, 205-207 and Carpenter, *Henry III*, 492-522, 541.

[23] Power, *Roger Bacon*, 31-33, 33 nn. 8-15, 47-48, 72, establishes what we can know about Bacon's family and its fortunes before and after 1264. A possible relative or ancestor, Richard Bacon, a landholder in Essex and Hertfordshire, is flagged by Stephen Bennett, *Elite Participation in the Third Crusade* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2021), 323, with sources that document him.

[24] Roger Bacon, *Moralis philosophia*, edited by E. Massa (Turin: Thesaurus Mundi, 1963), Part 3, general proemium 6-8; Part 4, proemium and passim. As Massa notes in his Introduction at ix-xviii, Part 3 was the primarily the section copied and annotated. This work will be cited below as *MP*.

Christians and the conversion of infidels.[25] These tenets ground our duties to God. Part 5 explains why a rhetorical strategy is appropriate to ethics, a practical science needing attractive garb, with Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, and Seneca as its named proponents, contrasted with the "naked science" anatomized by speculative ethics.[26] Part 6, a brief appendix to part 5, adds nothing to it. Part 2 purports to explain our duties to others in a sketchy essay on political theory, on which we will comment below. Part 3, treating our duties to ourselves, explains and justifies Bacon's reliance on Seneca in aid of his own agenda.[27]

Bacon opens Part 3 by countering Aristotle's list of virtues and vices with those of Seneca and Gregory, adding his own assessment.[28] The emotions leading to sins are not neutral but vicious; they are to be uprooted from the soul not moderated. For Bacon,

[25] *MP*, Part 1.1-5; Part 4 passim for the doctrines involved. The general proemium 14-15 gives Bacon's criteria for proof at 6-7: "Horum autem principiorum quedam sunt mere principia et solum methaphisice nata sunt declarari. Alia, licet sint principia respectu sequentium, tamen vel sunt prime conclusiones huius scientie, vel, licet aliquo principii gaudeant privilegio, tamen, propter eorum maximam difficultatem et quia eis nimis contradicitur, atque propter excellentem utilitatem respectu sequentium, debent sufficienter stabiliri." Bacon here appears to be invoking the norm of rhetorical argumentation of Cicero's *Topica* as reprised by Boethius, *In Ciceronis Topica* 1.2.7-1-2.8, edited by J. Caspar Orelli and J. Georg Baiter (Zurich: Fuessli, 1833), 276-277: "argumentum autem rationem quae ratio rei dubiae faciat fidem." At 4.2.1 Bacon argues, against Gregory the Great, and by extension some of his current supporters, that holding doctrines by reason does not deprive faith of its merit. At 4.2.4-13 he stresses that arguments with non-believers should not appeal to miracles or to authorities they do not accept, diverging from that policy only with respect to the Eucharist at 4.5.1-4.6.4.

[26] *MP* 5.1.1-6.1-2 for the overall defense of rhetoric with Seneca ending the list of practitioners; on opposition to naked science, 5.2.4 at 251: "Sed tamen necessarium est quod flectamur ad bonum et longe magis quam ad speculationem nude veritatis, quia virtus et felicitas sunt magis necessaria et meliora quam sciencia nuda." On this term and theme see also *MP* 3.1.8, 5.1.9 at 49, 249.

[27] *MP* proemium to 3.5.1-4 at 132-33; quotation at 132: "Ampliavi iam hanc partem terciam Moralis philosophie ultra id quod a principio estimavi. Set delectat sencentiarum moraliam pulchritudo, et precipue quia magna racionis vivacitate eruuntur per philosophorum industriam. Et tanto avidius recipiende sunt, quanto nos philosophantes christiani nescimus de tanta morum sapiencia cogitare nec tam eleganter persuadere. Utinam operibus comprobaremus ea, que ipsi philosophi nobis sapienter proponent!" Bacon's justification of his long quotations from Seneca was actually coals to Newcastle for Clement since Senecan MSS. were then more widely available in Italy than France, on which see Leighton Durham Reynolds, "The Medieval Tradition of Seneca's *Dialogues*", *Classical Quarterly* 18 (1968): 353-373; *Texts and Transmission: A Study of the Latin Classics*, edited by L. D. Reynolds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 359-375; Leighton Durham Reynolds and Nigel Guy Wilson, *Scribes and Scholars: A Guide to the Transmission of Greek and Latin Literature*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 84-87, 104, 106, 111-118.

[28] *MP* 3.1.1-3.1.13. For the tradition on avarice see Richard Newhauser, *The Early History of Greed: The Sin of Avarice in Early Medieval Thought and Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Lester K. Little, "Pride Goes before Avarice: Social Change and the Vices in Latin Christendom", *American Historical Review* 76 (1972): 16-49 charts the increasing interest in this sin in Bacon's day but does not mention him.

avarice is the primordial sin. The sequence that follows is neither etiological nor pedagogical. According to Bacon, passions of the soul, whether corporal or spiritual, are motivated by pleasure. They spring from false judgments on what is profitable. Anger is unique. Anger alone neglects what is profitable. Anger, says Bacon, is devoid of any profit. It struggles with adversity and is ultimately defeated by it.

Aside from that motive for avoiding anger, anger sins against truth; it blasphemes God; it lowers the angry to a sub-human state; it destroys their other virtues and their peace of mind. Further, anger is incompatible with clemency and with *magnitudo animi*. Bacon agrees with Seneca, against Aristotle, that *magnitudo animi* is not a monopoly of men in public life who preserve their honor by avenging affronts to it. Vengeance is always wrong. People in private life, women included, can possess greatness of soul. Wielding Seneca against the tradition informing John of La Rochelle, anger is never righteous, for Bacon.[29] He agrees with Seneca: anger has harmful effects wider than those inflicted on individuals. For it is also a political evil, leading to mob violence, organized rebellion, civil war, and devastation. In one of the few passages of Part 3 that is not a quotation from Seneca, Bacon observes, "What kingdom exists in which overthrow and ruin do not lie in wait?"[30]

Another Senecan theme which Bacon takes very seriously and puts his own spin on is wealth. While Seneca frequently maintains that virtue is the sage's only true possession, he dedicates his *De beata vita* to countering critics who charged him with hypocrisy. To some contemporary and later Latin writers, the vast riches Seneca accumulated in public service made a mockery of his philosophical claims; he failed to practice the detachment from worldly goods he preached. True, as Seneca states repeatedly, poverty and wealth

[29]*MP* proemium to Part 3, 3.2.2, 3.3.1. The best study of Bacon on greatness of soul is Jeremiah Hackett, "Roger Bacon on Magnanimity and Virtue", in *Les philosophes morales et politiques au moyen âge*, edited by C. Bazán, E. Andújar, and L. G. Sbrocchi, 3 vols. (New York: LEGAS, 1995), I:367-377. For the classical background on this theme and its reworkings by patristic authors see René-Antoine Gauthier, *Magnanimité: L'idee de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne* (Paris: Vrin, 1951), who dismisses Bacon as incoherent at 242. Gauthier is rightly criticized by J. Warren Smith, *Ambrose, Augustine, and the Pursuit of Greatness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), whose chosen authors reject *magnitudo animi* as self-aggrandizement in favor of charity and forgiveness of enemies. For the philosophical positions on this topic available to medieval thinkers see Terence Irwin, "Magnanimity as Generosity", (accenting Cicero not Seneca as the source of Stoicism) and John Marenbon, "Magnanimity, Christian Ethics, and Paganism in the Latin Middle Ages", (accenting Aristotle and omitting Bacon), both in *The Measure of Greatness: Philosophers on Magnanimity*, edited by S. Vasalou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), at 221-248 and 249-271 respectively. For Seneca on *magnitudo animi* see his *De tranquillitate animi* 3.2; *Consolatio ad Marciam* 19.4-7; *Consolatio ad Helviam matrem* 1.5. Seneca's works here and below are cited in the edition of L. D. Reynolds, *Dialogi libri duodecim* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). Good discussion in Erik Gunderson, *The Sublime Seneca: Ethics, Literature, Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 74-87, 102-103.

[30] *MP* 3.5.15 at 177: "Quod regnum est, cui non sit parata ruina et proculcatio?" My translation. See Seneca, *De ira* 1.2.

are matters of indifference to the Stoic sage. But, along with excusing himself by admitting that, while perfect Stoic virtue is his goal, he has not yet attained it, he stresses that the sage to whom Fortune grants riches need not spurn them. What counts is that he is not a slave to them and treats them as opportunities to benefit others. Poverty is not an entrance requirement for the philosopher.[31] With his own past and current financial situations in mind, Bacon warmly seconds this conclusion. In his citations from *De beata vita* he presents Seneca as having successfully refuted his critics, none of whose attacks in Latin classical or post-classical literature he chooses to mention.[32]

Along with such add-ons and emphases, Bacon's agenda informs aspects of Seneca's argumentation which he omits altogether. Two examples will have to suffice. Seneca's *De clementia*, dedicated to Nero, with whose weaknesses of character he was all too familiar, confines itself to the prudential reasons for adopting this policy. Clemency wins friends and neutralizes enemies. Seneca cites Julius Caesar's adept manipulation of this strategy as Nero's chief role model. Law-enforcement should be as calculating as it is dispassionate. Mitigating its severity should not be confused with pity for malefactors. Feeling their pain involves taking on pain oneself, an irrational vice to be shunned, as are cruelty, arbitrariness, anger, and vindictiveness. For his part, Bacon ignores political prudence as a motive for clemency and omits Seneca's critique of pity.[33] Bacon cites Seneca's *De ira* examples of worthies who mastered anger when victimized by the malicious or powerful, accenting those who suffer the loss of loved ones or property. But he omits Seneca's examples of the wrath of tyrants, of whom Caligula is a favorite. While Seneca supports the Senate's application of *damnatio memoriae* to Caligula after his assassination in 41 CE, the memory of his atrocities remained fresh in Seneca's mind and those of his first-century readers.[34] These *exempla* lack the same valency for Bacon and his own would-be audience. Indeed, Bacon omits this aspect of Seneca's aversion therapy altogether. An absolute and arbitrary autocrat whose subjects are entirely at his mercy, innocent or guilty, is simply not in his *imaginaire*.

Here, a word on the polity in Bacon's Part 2 is pertinent, leaving aside its egregious

[31] Seneca, *De beata vita* 3.3-4, 20.3-23.5. On the criticism of Seneca as a hypocrite from antiquity to the present see Madeleine Jones, "Seneca's Letters to Lucilius: Hypocrisy as a Way of Life", in *Seneca Philosophus*, edited by J. Wildberger and M. L. Colish (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 393-424.
[32] *MP* 3.14-30.
[33] *MP* 3.2.3-25. On pity see Seneca, *De clementia* 2.4.4-2.7.3; an excellent summary of this work is provided by Robert A. Kaster, introduction to his translation of *De clementia* in *Anger, Mercy, Revenge*, translated by R. A. Kaster and M. Nussbaum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 133-144.
[34] *MP* proemium to Part 3, 3.6.2-3.7.10. On Caligula as Seneca's favorite example of the wrath of tyrants see Amanda Wilcox, "Nature's Monster: Caligula as *exemplum* in Seneca's *Dialogues*", in *KAKOS: Badness and Anti-Value in Classical Antiquity*, edited by R. M. Rosen and I. Sluiter (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 441-475. For Seneca's most potent anti-Caligula zingers see *Consolatio ad Helviam* 10.4 and *Consolatio ad Polybium* 17.3.

constitutional inadequacies.[35] The ruler's chief role is enforcing the laws, especially property and inheritance rights. If he has been installed legitimately, there is no excuse for rebellion. Goaded by greed or lust for power, rebels deny God. All citizens rightfully take up arms against rebels and can kill them with no stain of blood-guilt. The only reason for replacing a ruler is his failure to put down a rebellion. For all its unworkability, Part 2 of the *Moralis philosophia* reads as Bacon's judgment on Simon de Montfort's rebellion and its outcome, even as Part 3 is the Senecan weapon of choice he wields against the ethics of John of La Rochelle.

How should Bacon's *Moralis philosophia* be placed in the context of thirteenth-century Franciscan thought? Amanda Power performs a signal service in demolishing the myths attached to Bacon as a joker in the Franciscan deck, suspected, condemned, and even imprisoned by his confrères.[36] Bacon the ethicist has been criticized as a would-be scholastic punching above his weight vis-à-vis Thomas Aquinas or Duns Scotus,[37] or as an incipient Renaissance humanist given his reliance on classical philosophy and literature.[38] It is true that Bacon did not engage in some issues convulsing Franciscans in his day, such as the theology of Joachim of Fiore, the stand-off with university seculars, Latin Averroism, or the *usus pauper* debate. The effort to integrate him into the Franciscan mainstream by paralleling his *Opus maius* with Bonaventure's *Reductio artium in theologiam* is, however, a bridge too far, given that Bonaventure was no supporter of natural ethics.[39]

But there are more fruitful ways of situating Bacon's ethics within the Franciscan calling. His emphasis on ethics as a practical science is integrally related to the mendicant preaching mission. Given Bacon's conviction that Christians best spread the faith not just

[35] *MP* 2.1.2-2.2.3.

[36] Power, *Roger Bacon*, 1-28, 33, 92-94.

[37] See, most recently, Astrid Schilling, *Ethik im Kontext ehrfahrungsbezogener Wissenschaft: Die Moralphilosophie des Roger Bacon (ca. 1214-1292) vor dem Hintergrund der scholastischen Theologie sowie der Einflüsse der griechischen und arabischen Philosophie* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2016).

[38] Massa, *Ruggero Bacone*, 92; Antonio Poppi, "La metodologia umanistica della *Moralis philosophia* di Ruggero Bacone", in Poppi, *Studi sull'etica della prima scuola franciscana* (Padua: Centro di Studi Antoniani, 1996), 41-57; Ricklin, "Seneca als Minderbruder," 66-74.

[39] Bacon's detachment from these concerns is noted by Jeremiah Hackett, "Practical Wisdom and Happiness in the Moral Philosophy of Roger Bacon", *Medioevo* 12 (1986): 55-109 at 57-61; Hackett, "Roger Bacon and the Reception of Aristotle", in *Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter von Richardus Rufus bis zu Franciscus de Mayronis*, edited by L. Honnefelder et al. (Münster: Aschendorff, 2005), 219-247; his preference for Avicenna over Averroes is also noted by Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, 58. On the effort to compare the *Opus maius* with Bonaventure's *Reductio* see Camille Bérubé, *De la philosophie à la sagesse chez Saint Bonaventure et Roger Bacon* (Rome: Istituto Storico dei Cappuccini, 1976), 87-96; Hackett, "Epilogue", in *Roger Bacon and the Sciences*, 405-409; Hackett, "Moral Philosophy and Rhetoric", 34; Hackett, "Practical Wisdom and Happiness", 61-63; Hackett, "Philosophy and Theology in Roger Bacon's *Opus maius*", in *The God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl OP*, edited by R. James Long (Toronto: PIMS, 1991), 55-69 at 59. For Bonaventure's rejection of natural ethics see his *In II Sententiarum.* d. 41. a. 1. ad 1-2, in *Opera omnia*, edited by Collegium S. Bonaventurae (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1885), II:942-946.

by persuasive arguments and eloquent preaching but also by the force of their moral example, ethics is central as well to the Franciscans' evangelical vocation.[40] Side by side with confrères who applied philosophy to ethics in other ways, Bacon and those who, like him, found Senecan Stoicism *à la mode* deserve more recognition in the ongoing revision of our understanding of the creative uses of philosophy in thirteenth-century Franciscan thought.

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[40] Power, *Roger Bacon* has appropriately made this point a key theme of her book, noting, at 50, 62, 93-94, 214-216, 222-223, 253-256, 258, 259, Bacon's use of the information on non-Christians in the missions to Asia of William of Rubruck OFM at *MP* 3.1.1.6, 3.1.3.5-6, 3.5.9 and of John of Plano Carpini OFM at *MP* 3.1.1.7. She also notes, at 223, 238-239, 310-311, his critique, at *MP* 4.1.21-22, of crusaders, especially the Teutonic Knights in the Baltic, for spreading the Christian faith by the sword – which also gives the mendicants a pass in that connection which they did not deserve; see, on that point, Christoph T. Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); David S. Bachrach, "The Friars Go to War: Mendicant Military Chaplains, 1216-c. 1300", *Catholic Historical Review* 90 (2004): 617-633; Paolo Evangelisti, *Dopo Francesco, oltre il mito: I frati Minori fra Terra Santa ed Europa (XIII-XV secolo)* (Rome: Viella, 2020), 67-136, 159-170.