# THE TWO-WILLS THEORY IN THE FRANCISCAN TRADITION: QUESTIONING AN ANSELMIAN LEGACY

# LA TEORÍA DE LAS DOS VOLUNTADES EN LA TRADICIÓN FRANCISCANA: CUESTIONANDO EL LEGADO DE ANSELMO

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**Abstract**

The medieval Franciscan John Duns Scotus famously distinguished between two different wills, which are characterized by an affection for advantage or happiness and an affection for justice. He identified the source of his theory in the earlier medieval thinker, Anselm of Canterbury, who first articulated the distinction. This article will demonstrate, however, that there is significant disparity between Anselm and Scotus' understandings of the two wills. To this end, the article will explore the two wills theory articulated by Scotus' predecessors, Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, who together composed the so-called *Summa Halensis,* the founding text of the Franciscan intellectual tradition. These authors drew on John of Damascus' distinction between *thelesis* and *boulesis* to delineate the theory that Scotus attributed to Anselm. However, their theory was just as distant from the Damascene's original understanding as Scotus' was from Anselm. In demonstrating this, the article seeks to highlight the originality of the Franciscan theory while at the same time allowing its sources to be interpreted on their own terms.

**Keywords**

John Duns Scotus; *Summa Halensis*; Alexander of Hales; John of La Rochelle; Will; Justice; Affections; Happiness; Passions; Augustine, Anselm, John of Damascus

**Resumen**

El franciscano medieval Juan Duns Escoto distinguía entre dos voluntades diferentes, caracterizadas por una inclinación hacia el beneficio o la felicidad y una inclinación hacia la justicia. Identificó la fuente de su teoría en el pensador medieval predecesor, Anselmo de Canterbury, quien fue el primero en articular tal distinción. Sin embargo, este artículo demostrará que existe una disparidad significativa entre la comprensión de las dos voluntades en Anselmo y en Escoto. Con este

fin, el artículo explorará la teoría de las dos voluntades articulada por los predecesores de Escoto, Alejandro de Hales y Juan de La Rochelle, quienes compusieron la llamada *Summa Halensis*, el texto fundador de la tradición intelectual franciscana. Estos autores se basaron en la distinción de Juan de Damasco entre *thelesis* y *boulesis* para delinear la teoría que Escoto atribuyó a Anselmo. Sin embargo, su teoría estaba igualmente alejada del entendimiento original del Damasceno, al igual que la de Escoto lo estaba de Anselmo. Al demostrar esto, el artículo busca resaltar la originalidad de la teoría franciscana al mismo tiempo que permite que sus fuentes sean interpretadas en sus propios términos.

**Palabras clave**

Juan Duns Escoto; *Summa Halensis*; Alejandro de Hales; Juan de La Rochelle; voluntad; justicia; afectos; felicidad; pasiones; Agustín; Anselmo; Juan de Damasco

## 1. Introduction

In his *Ordinatio*, John Duns Scotus famously affirms that "every act of the will is elicited either from the affection for justice (*affectio iustitiae*) or from the affection for advantage (*affectio commodi*),"[1] which he describes in detail as follows:

> The first [affection] inclines the will supremely to advantage, while the second moderates it so that in eliciting an act, it does not have to follow its inclination. These two affections are nothing other than the same will insofar as it is intellective appetite and insofar as it is free; because, as was said, insofar as it is merely intellective appetite, it would be supremely inclined actually to the best intelligible (as in the case of the best visible and sight), but insofar as it is free, it can hold itself back in eliciting an act so that it does not follow the inclination – whether as to the substance of the act or as to the intensity of it – to which the power is naturally inclined.[2]

[1] *B. Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia, VIII: Ordinatio, Liber Secundus* (Vatican: Typis Vaticanis, 2001), d. 6, q. 2, ar. 1, 43: "Quia omnis actus voluntatis elicitus aut elicitur secundum affectionem iustitiae, aut commodi, secundum Anselmum." Thomas Williams gives a detailed account of the two affections in "The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus's Moral Philosophy", *The Thomist* 62 (1998): 193-215. See also Terence Irwin, "Scotus: Will, Freedom, and Reason", in *The Development of Ethics, vol. 1: From Socrates to the Reformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 654-678.

[2] Scotus, *Ordinatio,* d. 6, q. 2, ar. 1, 50: "Tamen distinguendo ex natura rei duas rationes primas istarum rationum, in quantum altera inclinat voluntatem summe ad commodum, altera autem quasi moderator eam, ne in eliciendo actum oporteat sequi inclinationem eius, nihil aliud sunt ista quam eadem voluntas, in quantum est appetitus intellectivus, et in quantum libera; quia, sicut dictum est, in quantum est appetitus mere intellectivus, summe inclinaretur actualiter ad optimum intelligibile (sicut est de optimo visibili et visu); in quantum tamen liber est, potest se refrenare in eliciendo actum, ne sequatur illam inclinationem, nec quantum ad substantiam actus, nec quantum ad intensionem, ad quam potentia naturaliter inclinatur".

As Scotus indicates here, the affection for advantage coincides with the natural human appetite for happiness or the fulfilment of human nature. Thus, it concerns what figures like Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas called the intellectual appetite or rational will. This affection is intrinsically bound to objects, whether sensory ones like wealth, health, and so on, or intelligible ones, like knowledge and success.[3] For this reason, it tends to prefer whatever may seem like the most advantageous of such objects at a given time. This poses a problem for Scotus in that what seems advantageous to a particular individual may not actually be compatible with justice, or more specifically, the will of God.

Thus, the affection for justice is required to orient the will towards God and thereby temper any inordinate desire for happiness that may conflict with the divine purposes. According to Scotus, the affection for justice can do this because it "is not bound in every way to will happiness (which the will would want if it were only intellectual appetite, without liberty). Rather, it is bound in eliciting an act to moderate the (intellectual) appetite, which is to moderate the affection for what is advantageous so that it will not will immoderately".[4] Insofar as the affection for justice liberates the will from desires for what is advantageous, Scotus concludes that it is the locus of free will.[5]

As Scotus notes, the distinction between the two affections, for the advantageous and for justice, derives originally from Anselm of Canterbury's work titled, *The Fall of the Devil*. For the most part, moreover, scholars have taken for granted that Scotus' two-wills theory represents a genuine and accurate interpretation of the Benedictine's thought.[6] In this article, however, I will contest that assumption by tracing the origins of Scotus' supposedly Anselmian two-wills theory to an earlier version of it that was advocated by his Franciscan predecessors at the University of Paris, namely, Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle.

These thinkers associated the theory in question with John of Damascus' distinction between *thelesis* and *boulesis*. After outlining the contours of their account, I will examine the theories of the will that were developed by the Damascene and Anselm, whose view builds upon the work of Augustine. This inquiry will highlight the considerable disparity between the Franciscan view and the authorities that were enlisted to bolster it. In

[3] Williams, "The Libertarian Foundations", 199*:* "Similar discussions can be found at *Ordinatio* 2, d. 25, nn. 22-23 (W 13:221-23), where intellective appetite is said to act *per modum naturae* and is identified with the *affectio commodi*; *Ordinatio* 2, d. 39, q. 2, n. 5 (W 13:415-16); and *Ordinatio* 3, d. 26, n. 17 (W 15 :340-41).

[4] Scotus, *Ordinatio,* d. 6, q. 2, ar. 1, 51: "Voluntas libera non tenetur omni modo velle beatitudinem (quae voluntas si esset tantum modo appetitus intellectivus sine libertate, vellet eam); sed tenetur in eliciendo actum moderari appetitum, unde appetitus intellectivus, quod est moderari affectionem commodi, ne scilicet immoderate velle".

[5] Irwin, "Scotus: Will, Freedom, and Reason", 45.

[6] Peter King, "Scotus's Rejection of Anselm: The Two-Wills Theory", in *John Duns Scotus 1308-2008,* edited by L. Honnefelder et al. (Munster: Aschendorff: 2010), 359 in 359-378. Other passages King mentions where Scotus discussions the two-wills theory include his *Lectura* II, d. 6, q. 2 (§ 3), *Reportatio II,* d. 6, q. 2 (§ 5).

undertaking this study, my aim is not merely to allow the sources of Franciscan thought to speak for themselves, but also to highlight the originality and ingenuity of the Franciscan theory of the will in relation to the sources with which it is often conflated.

## 2. Early Franciscans on the Two Wills

As noted above, Scotus' two-wills theory has long been presumed to offer a legitimate reading of Anselm, though it is also widely heralded for its innovativeness. However, the theory can be found in another form already in the *Summa de anima* of John of La Rochelle, which was written around 1236 and draws on John's earlier *Tractatus* on the powers of the soul which dates to around 1232. The *Summa de anima* eventually became the basis for the account of the will that was offered in the so-called *Summa Halensis.* This text was written between 1236-45, while Alexander of Hales, for whom it is named, was master of the Franciscan school in Paris. However, John of La Rochelle likely wrote volumes 1 and 3 of the work, while volume 2 was prepared by an unknown redactor who nevertheless drew heavily on the works of both John and Alexander.

In his *Summa de anima,* John associates a two-wills theory with John of Damascus that bears striking resemblance to the theory Scotus associated with Anselm. This attribution is not surprising, as the Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa* was a relatively newly translated and immensely popular theological source in John of La Rochelle's generation.[7] In this work, the Damascene distinguishes between the volitional categories of *thelesis* and *boulesis,* which John of La Rochelle defines in terms of the natural and rational will, respectively.[8] According to John, the natural will or *thelesis* is determined to the good in one of three ways.[9] First, it can be determined to the *bonum honestum* or the ultimate and unchanging good, that is, God, by means of *synderesis* or an innate appetite for the supreme good.

[7] On this see Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà: L'atto morale nelle dottrine di Filippo il Cancelliere e Ugo di Saint-Cher (1225-1235)* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2013).

[8] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, edited by E. M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1955), 2.22, 135-136. See also Richard Cross, "The Reception of John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis*", in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context,* edited by L. Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 71-90.

[9] Jean of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae: texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, edited by P. Michaud-Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964), 98: "Est enim bonum superius bonum rationale, quod dicitur honestum et bonum simpliciter, quod sua vi nos trahit et sua dignitate nos allicit. Et est bonum inferius bonum corporale delectabile carni, quod est bonum apparens siue secundum quid; iterum est bonum medium, quod est bonum naturale, sicut esse, viuere, intelligere et sentire". See also John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, edited by J. Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 287: "Est enim bonum superius bonum racionale, quod dicitur honestum, et bonum simplex, quod sua ui nos trahit et sua dignitate nos allicit; et est bonum inferius bonum corporale delectabile carni, quod est bonum apparens siue secundum quid; et est bonum medium quod est bonum naturale quemadmodum esse et uiuere, et intelligere, et sentire, et quecumque sunt substancialia nature".

Second, it can serve an inferior good or sensuality, which is linked to carnal desires for apparent, changeable goods. Thirdly, the natural will can pertain to any other good of human nature, which the Damascene described in terms of human activities like being, living, understanding, feeling.[10] By contrast to the natural power, the rational power, or *boulesis*, in the view of John of La Rochelle, is undetermined to any good other than God. For this reason, it can choose freely between temporal goods, in a process which John believes occurs in two phases. The first phase is referred to as right reason (*ratio recta*), which deliberates about the best option, and the second involves *boulesis* proper, or the act of the deliberative will to move towards a preferred option. According to John, these two faculties are the same in substance as free choice or *liberum arbitrium,* which presupposes a judgement of reason (*arbitrium*) and the free movement of the power to choose (*liberum*).[11]

According to John, free choice is exercised when the will chooses between two different options, such as A and B, after considering which is most conducive to the will of God.[12] By contrast, the *Summa Halensis* followed Alexander of Hales, who argued that the will chooses between opposites like A and not-A.[13] Paradoxically, Alexander ascribes his novel view to the same authority that John of La Rochelle had claimed for his, namely, John of Damascus.[14] Specifically, he cites the Damascene's claim that "everything that is generable is changeable (*vertibilis*)" to support the contention that free will entails the ability to choose between

[10] Alexander of Hales also treats the *thelesis/boulesis* distinction in, "De libero arbitrio", in *Magestri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae 'Antequam esset frater'*, vol. 1 (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1960), qu. 33, 590. John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus,* 119: "Voluntatem autem diuidit in thelisim et bulisim, id est in voluntatem naturalem et rationalem; thelisis siue voluntas naturalis est respectu bonorum naturalium, que non possumus non appetere, sicut sunt esse, viuere, intelligere; voluntas rationalis est respectu bonorum non naturalium, que possumus velle et non velle".

[11] John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 120: "Sufficientia predicte diuisionis patet sic: vis motiua rationalis aut est determinata ad bonum, sicut est thelesis siue voluntas naturalis, aut indeterminata ad bonum, et hec triplex est: aut enim discernit bonum, sicut est ratio; aut bonum cognitum appetit, sicut est voluntas rationalis siue deliberatiua vel bulisis; aut bonum cognitum et appetitum eligit, sicut liberum arbitrium".

[12] John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 121.

[13] Alexander also took an equally radical view at the time – also distinct from John of La Rochelle's – that free choice consists primarily in the will, which executes the decisions of reason, rather than in the collaboration of reason and will. This is another respect in which he anticipated Scotus and his voluntarism. See Lydia Schumacher, "Free Choice", in *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), 249-75.

[14] Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* 33, 566. John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 121: "Nota quod liberum arbitrium non dicitur liberum, quia flexibile sit ad bonum et ad malum, sed quia potest facere et non facere, quod consulit et instigat synderesis, vel suggerit sensualitas, et decernit ratio, et voluntas appetit naturalis". "Free choice is not called *liberum* because it is flexible between good and evil, but because it is able to do or not to do something, as it consults and is instigated by s*ynderesis*, or as it is suggested by sensuality".

opposites of good and evil.[15] The difference between John and Alexander concerning how to understand John of Damascus therefore brings us to the latter's theory of the will and the question of how it should be interpreted on its own terms.

### 3. John of Damascus on *thelesis/boulesis*

According to the Damascene's own account, the changeability of human nature is the source of an ability to do or not to do any given thing (*facere et non facere*). As Michael Frede therefore writes, Damascus "does not construe choice as inherently a choice between two [opposing] options, the good and the evil".[16] Although John of La Rochelle did not go as far as Alexander in affirming this, he nevertheless distorted the Damascene's views on the nature of *thelesis* and *boulesis*. The origins of the latter term can be found in Aristotle, for whom *boulesis* is a rational or intellectual appetite that oversees the lower sensory appetites and thus directs us towards our proper ends.[17]

By contrast to *boulesis*, the term *thelesis* has no precedent in the Aristotelian tradition, whether in Aristotle himself, or in his commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias or John Philoponus.[18] Rather, the term seems to derive mainly from Maximus Confessor, who used the distinction between *thelesis* and *boulesis*, which was subsequently copied by Damascene, to differentiate between Christ's human and divine wills. This was part of his strategy for opposing the heresy of monotheletism, according to which Christ possesses only one will.[19] The meaning of *thelesis* in the Greek tradition and the Damascene particularly is fairly clear: it involves the will to obtain all that is good for human nature. As the Damascene writes:

> There is implanted in the soul by nature a faculty of desiring that which is in harmony with its nature, and of maintaining in close union all that belongs essentially to its nature: and this power is called will or θέλησις. For the essence both of existence and of living yearns after activity both as regards mind and sense, and in this it merely longs to realise its own natural and perfect being. And so, this definition also is given of this natural will: will is an appetite, both rational and vital, depending only on what is natural. So that will is nothing else than the natural and vital and rational appetite of all things that go to constitute nature,

[15] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* (ed. Buytaert), 2.22, 152: "Omne enim generabile et vertibile est". See 152-154 more generally on free choice.
[16] Michael Frede, "John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom", in *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources*, edited by K. Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 63-95.
[17] Frederick J. Adelman, "The Theory of Will in St John Damascene", in *The Quest for the Absolute*, edited by F. J. Adelman (Chestnut Hill: Boston College, 1966), 33.
[18] Adelman, "The Theory of Will", 22-37. See also a more extensive discussion of this material in Lydia Schumacher, "The Affections", in *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), 228-248.
[19] Adelman, "The Theory of Will", 37. R.A. Gauthier, "Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 21 (1954), 53.

> that is, just the simple faculty. For the appetite of creatures without reason, since it is irrational, is not called will.[20]

This passage makes unmistakably clear that the natural will for the Damascene is the same as the rational will, which is unique to human beings and governs their lower impulses. These are called passions, which result from the experience of sensory objects as either pleasurable or painful. As Damascus writes: a "passion is a sensible activity of the appetitive faculty, depending on the presentation to the mind of something good or bad. Or in other words, passion is an irrational activity of the soul, resulting from the notion of something good or bad".[21] According to the Damascene, these passions are not good or bad in themselves but only become so depending on how they are managed by the rational will, which must seek to find pleasure and pain in the right things.

As noted already, this rational will is simply *thelesis*. For the Damascene, consequently, *boulesis* or "wish" as he calls it is not a separate kind of will as John of La Rochelle supposed but only concerns the end or object of the will, which may be possible or impossible to achieve.[22] As the Damascene writes: "will (θέλησις) and wish (βούλησις) are two different things...For will is just the simple faculty of willing, whereas wish is will directed to some definite object. Again, the object of will is the matter underlying the will, that is to say, the thing that we will: for instance, when appetite is roused for food. The appetite pure and simple, however, is a rational will".[23]

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[20] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 135-36; translated by E.W. Watson and L. Pullan, *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series*, vol. 9, edited by P. Schaff and H. Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1899), 629: "Oportet scire quoniam animae inserta est naturaliter virtus, 'appetitiva eius quod secundum naturam est, et omnium quae substantialiter naturae adsunt contentiva,' quae vocatur voluntas. Nam 'substantia quidem esse et vivere et moveri secundum intellectum et sensum appetit, propriam concupiscens naturalem et plenam essentiam.' 'Ideoque' et sic determinant hanc naturalem voluntatem: 'thelima (id est voluntas) est appetitus rationalis et vitalis, ex solis dependens naturalibus.' 'Ouare thelisis (id est voluntas) quidem est ipse' naturaliset 'vitalis et rationalis appetitus' omnium naturae constitutivorum, 'simplex virtus,' Qui aliorum enim appetitus, non existens rationalis, non dicitur thelisis (id est voluntas)".

[21] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 132; trans. Schaff/Wace, 628; "Animalium autem passionum terminus est hic: passio est motus appetitivae virtutis, sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter: passio est motus irrationalis animae, per suspicionem boni vel mali".

[22] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 132; trans. Schaff/Wace, 629: "Dicitur bulisis (id est voluntas) et in hiis quae sunt in nobis, et in hiis quae non in nobis sunt, hoc est et in possibilibus so et in impossibilibus". "Wish, however, is used both in connection with what is within our power, and in connection with what is outside our power, that is, both with regard to the possible and the impossible".

[23] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 140-41, trans. Schaff/Wace, 631: "Nam thelisis quidem (id est voluntas) est ipsa simplex virtus volendi. Bulisis vero (id est voluntas) est quae circa quid thelisis. Theliton (id est voluntabile) autem est quae supposita est thelisi res, scilicet quod volumus, puta movetur appetitus ad cibum, qui simpliciter quidem appetitus, qui rationalis thelisis (id est voluntas) est; appetitus autem qui ad cibum, bulisis (id est voluntas) est, ipse autem cibus theliton (id est voluntabile) est".

As the Damascene elaborates:

> The wish, then, has reference to the end alone, and not to the means by which the end is attained. The end is the object of our wish, for instance, to be a king or to enjoy good health: but the means by which the end is attained, that is to say, the manner in which we ought to enjoy good health, or reach the rank of king, are the objects of deliberation.[24]

Although the Damascene clearly states here that *boulesis* exclusively concerns the ends of the will, many scholastic thinkers from Philip the Chancellor through Thomas Aquinas believed it involved willing means as well as or instead of merely ends.[25] In this regard, they seem to overlook the fact that *boulesis* for the Damascene, following Aristotle, is distinct from *bouleuton*, which is the deliberative process concerning the best means to achieving an end. John of La Rochelle was among the scholastics who understood free choice to encompass deliberation about both ends and means to ends.[26] However, he exacerbated this confused reading of the Damascene further in defining *boulesis* as a rational will over and above the natural will – which is in fact rational – when in fact it is only one of a number of different elements that factors into any given act of willing by *thelesis.*

This view may have resulted from the misinterpretation of a passage from Damascene's discussion of *boulesis* which states: "βούλησις or wish is a sort of natural will, that is to say, a natural and rational appetite for some definite thing. For there is seated in the soul of man a faculty of rational desire. When, then, this rational desire directs itself naturally to some definite object, it is called wish. For wish is rational desire and longing for some definite thing".[27] Alternatively, the misreading could simply be an example of the way that scholastics manipulated authoritative sources to support their own positions, in this case, the two-wills theory that was unique to early Franciscans themselves.

[24] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 137, trans. Schaff/Wace, 629-30: "Est autem bulisis (id est voluntas) finis, non eonim es quae sunt ad finem. Igitur finis quidem est voluntabile, ut regem esse, ut sanum esse; ad finem autem est quod consiliabile est, scilicet modus per quern debemus sani esse, vel regnare; deinde, post bulisim (id est voluntatem), inquisitio et scrutatio".

[25] See Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, 6 vols, vol. 1 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1948-1960), 401: Philip the Chancellor misunderstands *boulesis* and makes it about means rather than ends, when, for Damascus, it only concerns ends. This is an error he passes on to Rochelle and later Aquinas. As Riccardo Saccenti points out in *Conservare la retta volontà,* 95, however, this misunderstanding may come from Burgundio of Pisa, the translator of the Damascene and Aristotle's *Ethics*, or from a gloss included in some manuscripts of the *De fide orthodoxa.*

[26] John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 212. Irene Zavattero also points this out in "*Voluntas est duplex*: La dottrina della voluntà dell'anonimo commentario di Parigi sull'ethica *Nova* e *Vetus* (1235–40)", *Medioevo* 40 (2015): 74.

[27] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 136; trans. Schaff/Wace, 629: "Bulisis (id est voluntas) autem est qualitativa naturalis thelisis (id est voluntas), scilicet naturalis et rationalis appetitus alicuius rei. Nam iniacet quidem hominis animae virtus rationaliter appetendi. Cum igitur naturaliter motus fuerit ipse rationalis appetitus ad aliquam rem, dicitur bulisis (id est voluntas). Bulisis (id est voluntas) enim est appetitus et desiderium cuiusdam rei rationalis".

As noted already, this position bears striking similarities to the view that Scotus popularized and associated with Anselm. Both Scotus and John of La Rochelle envisage the existence of a natural will, which is linked necessarily with objects which are perceived to bring happiness or advantage. For both thinkers, this natural will must be moderated by a higher will, which is not linked to any such object other than God and can therefore discriminate freely amongst objects to prefer what is just. Thus, Scotus was not himself the originator of the Franciscan two-wills theory but only of the tendency to link it to Anselm. As the sections below will demonstrate, however, the Anselmian link is just as tenuous as the one early Franciscans forged with the Damascene, particularly when Anselm's thought on the will is interpreted in its Augustinian context, as I will do below. This does not denigrate the value of Scotus' account of the will, let alone that of early Franciscans, but allows for appreciating its novelty, and for interpreting Anselm on his own terms.

## 4. Anselm on the Two Wills

To this end, I begin by offering some background to Anselm's thought on the will and especially how it becomes susceptible to sin, which can be found in his *De conceptu virginali.* Here, Anselm draws a distinction "between the sin that each man contracts with his nature at his origin, and the sin that he does not contract with his own nature but commits after he has become a person distinct from other persons".[28] The former is original sin, which is the proclivity or potential to sin that is inherited through Adam, and the latter concerns the ways that individual persons actualize that potential, for which they alone are responsible.[29] Anselm's definition of sin in either case is derived from his definition of justice, which involves the "rectitude of the will preserved for its own sake".[30]

On his account, the rectitude of the will does not depend upon the objects of the will as such, which are not good or evil in themselves, but only pertains to the nature or extent of the desires we have for objects under given circumstances.[31] For instance, the desire for success is not in itself evil; it only becomes so when it is given greater priority over the desire to do what is right for the self and other people. In that sense, preserving justice is a matter of prioritizing greater over lesser goods. By the same token, evil involves the failure to desire the good that ought to be prioritized in any given instance.[32]

As a result of this failure, Anselm elaborates, human beings become slaves to their desires, which is why injustice for him is ultimately incompatible with human happiness

[28] Anselm of Canterbury, *On the Virgin Conception and Original Sin (VC)*, in *The Major Works,* edited by G.R. Evans and B. Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 359. For the Latin edition, see *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, 2 vols, edited by F. Salesius Schmitt (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1968-84).
[29] Anselm, *VC* 23, 26.
[30] Anselm, *VC* 3, 362.
[31] Anselm, *VC* 3.
[32] Anselm, *VC* 5, 365.

and flourishing.[33] While Anselm thus acknowledges that evil has negative effects on human life, and that it warrants punishment, he insists that evil is ultimately "nothing" precisely because it involves turning away from the good that should be preferred towards something inferior, which entails a privation or absence of the good.[34] To illustrate this point, Anselm invokes the example of blindness, which is not strictly speaking something present in the eye but entails the absence of the power of sight.[35]

In *De causu diaboli,* Anselm explains how humans come by the ability to will the good and avoid evil, citing a crucial passage in 1 Corinthians 4:7, *"What do you that you have not received?"*[36] According to Anslem's interpretation of this passage, God created all beings, including angels, with the ability to preserve the good or righteous nature they originally received from him.[37] Those that do not persevere in the good do not therefore do so because they did not receive the requisite ability but because they choose not to employ it.[38] The resulting loss of what Anselm calls "original justice" entails not only that the creature in question cannot persevere in the good but also that they cannot regain the ability to choose the good.[39] For Anselm, this raises the question how it was possible that a creature created good could turn to something other than the good, which is in fact evil.[40]

In answering this question, Anselm introduces his famous distinction between the "will for happiness" and the "will for justice". On his account, all beings, including angels, have an innate desire to be happy.[41] This will cannot be fulfilled, however, unless the angel wills what is just or good.[42] As mentioned above, happiness depends upon the harmonization of the two wills, because willing happiness without willing justice results in slavery to the objects of desire. Anselm acknowledges that the fallen angels at least both can and have failed to will the good and that this might seem to suggest that God, as the source of the will, is the cause of their ability to will evil.[43] However, he contests this

[33] Anselm, *VC* 12.
[34] Anselm, *VC* 5.
[35] Anselm, *VC* 5; see Anselm of Canterbury, *On the Fall of the Devil (FD)*, in *The Major Works,* edited by G.R. Evans and B. Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 26.
[36] Anselm, *FD* 1.
[37] Anselm, *FD* 1, 195: "No creature has anything of itself. How can something that does not have being of itself, have anything of itself? In short, if there is only one who creates and whatever is created is from that one, it is clear that he who creates and what he has created is all there is [...] He alone has of himself all that he has, while other things have nothing of themselves. And other things, having nothing of themselves, have their only reality from him".
[38] Anselm, *FD* 3.
[39] Anselm, *FD* 17.
[40] Anselm, *FD* 7, 205: "The will is a thing and is good when it turns to that which it ought to will and is called an evil will when it turns to what it should not".
[41] Anselm, *FD* 13.
[42] Anselm, *FD* 14.
[43] Anselm, *FD* 20.

notion on the grounds that God is only the source of the ability to do good, which can be abandoned in ways he did not intend and for which he is not therefore responsible.

As Anselm observes in his *De Concordia,* God foreknows the decisions human beings will freely take for good or evil.[44] This does not mean he himself necessitates those decisions but only that he is able to see what decisions they will take as a result of his eternal knowledge of all things past, present, and future, as present.[45] For Anselm, God's will is simply that we employ our own free choice, which as noted can only properly be used to will the good, since willing evil entails slavery to an object of desire rather than genuine freedom. As Anselm reiterates, "the freedom also under discussion is the power to preserve uprightness of will for the sake of that very same uprightness".[46]

Although human beings always maintain this freedom, Anselm notes again that "the state of justice is not present by nature but has proved to be separable from the beginning both in the case of the angels in heaven and of human beings in Paradise".[47] When they exhibit justice, it is because they have chosen to use their God-given ability to will the good. Thus, Anselm reiterates 1 Corinthians 4:7, "what do you have that you have not received?" and John 15:5, "without me you can do nothing".[48] Still, humans can abandon that ability of their own accord and turn to something other than what is good.

In this regard, Anselm returns to his discussion of the will and its two affections, which he broadly defines as follows: "The will's tool is that power of the soul we use for willing, just as reason is the tool for reasoning we use when we reason, and sight is the tool we use for seeing. The affectivity of this tool is that by which the tool itself is so swayed toward willing some object".[49] Anselm further details the nature of the two affectivities that sway the will as follows: "when disposed to will their own advantage, people always will their gratification and a state of happiness. Whereas when disposed to will uprightness, they will their uprightness and a state of uprightness or justness".[50] As Anselm elaborates, "all human merit, whether good or evil, comes from the two dispositions termed "wills".

These two "wills" also differ in that willing one's own advantage is unavoidable while willing what is right is avoidable.[51] While human beings always will their own happiness, in other words, they do not always realise that their happiness depends on "the

[44] Anselm of Canterbury, *De Concordia (DC)*, in *The Major Works,* edited by G.R. Evans and B. Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 439: "Therefore, when we say that what God foreknows is going to happen is necessarily going to happen, we are not asserting always that it is going to happen by necessity but simply that it is necessary that what is going to happen is going to happen".
[45] Anselm, *DC* 1.5.
[46] Anselm, *DC* 1.6, 445.
[47] Anselm, *DC* 1.6, 445.
[48] Anselm, *DC* 3.1.
[49] Anselm, *DC* 3.11, 467.
[50] Anselm, *DC* 3.11, 469.
[51] Anselm, *DC* 3.12, 470.

preservation of justice for its own sake". This oversight is the result of the fall into sin, which disrupted the harmony between the two wills or affections that God had initially given both angels and human beings.[52] The consequence of this fall for humans as for angels was that they not only lost the ability to preserve justice but also the ability to regain the ability to preserve justice, which can only be restored by the Incarnation of the Son of God. Without him, human beings only possess the will to happiness without the will to justice that is the key to happiness.

## 5. The Augustinian Background

Although Anselm famously advanced his arguments without references to authorities, his indebtedness to the tradition of Augustine is widely recognized. As a matter of fact, Augustine is the only source outside Scripture that Anselm ever mentions explicitly in his oeuvre as one of his major sources of inspiration.[53] Thus it is no surprise that Anselm's recurring notion of "preserving justice for its own sake" has clear resonances with Augustine's famous distinction between objects that should be loved or enjoyed for their own sake (*propter se*), or loved for the sake of another (*propter alia*) and thus merely 'used' as means to an end.[54] According to Augustine, God alone should be loved for his own sake, because he is the source of all beings and therefore transcends them in terms of his significance. All other beings should therefore only be loved for his sake.[55]

Augustine parses the precise meaning and implications of his somewhat enigmatic use/enjoy (*uti/frui*) distinction in many places throughout his works. In book 8 of *De Trinitate,* for instance, he observes that human beings often confuse "this good and that good" with *the* Good. In other words, they ascribe absolute significance to temporal objects which they can see and encounter, which is only rightly attributable to the invisible God.[56] The problem with doing this is that temporal objects and experiences are both finite and fleeting in their nature. In short, they are not God, and God, conversely, is not a temporal being.[57] To stake hopes for happiness on them therefore enslaves human beings to desires that cannot ultimately be fulfilled, setting them up for disappointment.

In this context, belief in God is important, because the knowledge of him as the supreme good, that is, the only being to be loved for his own sake, regulates desires for

[52] Anselm, *DC* 3.13.
[53] Anselm of Canterbury, *Monologion*, Prologue, in *The Major Works,* edited by G.R. Evans and B. Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
[54] Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana* (*DDC*), 1.4, translated by J. J. Gavigan, in *The Fathers of the Church* (Washington: D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002), 29-30.
[55] Augustine, *DDC* 1.5; 1.20; see Augustine, *De Trinitate (DT),* 8.8.12, translated by S. McKenna, in *The Fathers of the Church* (Washington: D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, repr; 2002), 262-65.
[56] Augustine, *DT* 1.2.3.
[57] Augustine, *DT* 8.4.6.

other objects and ensures that they do not become disproportional – or subject to what Augustine describes as *concupiscence.* This is the sense in which Augustine suggests that we can love the God we cannot know, namely, by bringing our belief in him to bear on the way we think about and deal with the things that we can know.[58] A key way Augustine tries to impress the need to do this upon his readers – and thus help them avoid projecting their own wishes and ideas onto God – involves asking them to reflect the human mind itself, which is not a direct object of knowledge even though it directs and guides everything that humans do.[59]

As Augustine acknowledges, we can easily forget that the mind, as God's image, is immaterial like God, and thus we become inclined to conflate who we are with our own immediate or temporal needs and desires. In this way, as noted, we become slaves to our desires and live at the mercy of whether they are fulfilled, which is not always possible.[60] According to Augustine, this outcome is a function of the fact that we have turned away from God towards the self as ultimate end and source of happiness.[61] The first step to overcoming this situation is therefore to remember that we do not consist in material things alone and that we possess an immaterial nature and source, namely, God, belief in whom is the key to rightly conceptualizing not only ourselves but also all other objects of our experience.[62]

In his efforts to explain how we do this in the *De Trinitate*, Augustine employs phraseology which clearly anticipates the notion of "preserving righteousness for its own sake" found in Anselm. As he states, the human mind or image of God "lost righteousness and true holiness by sinning, through which that image became defaced and tarnished".[63] The image therefore "cannot give itself the righteousness it has lost, and so has not. For this it received when man was created, and assuredly lost it by sinning".[64] Thus, righteousness can only be restored and the image of God renewed by grace, that is, by God's revelation of himself through his Son as the supreme Good.[65] This illumination not only reinstates the resources we need for upholding righteousness or using and enjoying what we ought but also gives us a perfect model in Christ for doing so.

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[58] Augustine, *DT* 8.5.7; cf. 10.1.1.
[59] Augustine, *DT* 10.5.7.
[60] Augustine, *City of God, Books VIII-XVI* (*DCD*) 14.11, translated by G. G. Walsh and G. Monahan, in *The Fathers of the Church* (Washington: D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1952), 376: The will's "choice is truly free only when it is not a slave to sin and vice".
[61] Augustine, *DCD* 14.13, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 380: "Now, exaltation is inordinate when the soul cuts itself off from the very Source to which it should keep close and somehow makes itself and becomes an end to itself. This takes place when the soul becomes inordinately pleased with itself, and such self-pleasing occurs when the soul falls away from the unchangeable Good which ought to please the soul far more than the soul can please itself".
[62] Augustine, *DT* 10.12.19.
[63] Augustine, *DT* 14.16.22.
[64] Augustine, *DT* 14.15.21.
[65] Augustine, *DCD* 1.11-14.

In this connection, Augustine cites 1 Corinthians 4:7, a favourite and frequently quoted passage of his, "For what have you that you did not receive", a habit clearly emulated by Anselm. Augustine's account starts to anticipate Anselm's even more clearly when he speaks in *De Trinitate* about the desire for happiness which all people possess, even though they have different ideas of what it entails.[66] For example, some people think happiness consists in the pleasures of the body, or in knowledge. Given all people desire happiness, Augustine raises the question why they do not all know that in which happiness consists. This is a question he had already addressed in his earlier work, *Confessions,* where he states explicitly that the desire for happiness is in fact a desire for God.

As he observes here, however, human beings have forgotten that God is the source of happiness as a result of sin, which erased the knowledge of him as the supreme good.[67] By contrast to the Franciscans, consequently, Augustine did not believe human beings have a natural or innate desire to love God. As noted above, the knowledge of God that enables us to love him is exactly what Augustine thinks Christ restored at his Incarnation, at least in principle. Even in the wake of this event, however, the love of God must still be restored in practice in individual human beings as they re-learn the habit of thinking about all aspects of their experience in light of the fact that these are not God and cannot therefore make or break human happiness.

This, I contend, is what it means for Augustine to reinstate or renew the image of God, namely, for the human mind gradually to regain the ability to think of all things as God does in the light of God's supreme and unqualified significance. For Augustine, this process involves re-training the "lower" powers of our being to answer to the higher ones rather than the other way around. The lower powers include what he like Damascus calls the passions, which are the immediate reactions human beings have to objects of sense experience which register those objects as pleasurable or painful, that is, as sources of happiness or unhappiness.[68] As for Anselm and the Damascene, so for Augustine, neither these passions, nor their objects, nor any aspect of bodily life more generally, is intrinsically good or evil.[69]

Although some early Christian writers held these "first movements" of the soul to be sinful in themselves, Augustine stresses that the reactions we have to our experiences are

[66] Augustine, *DT* 13.4.7.

[67] Augustine, *Confessions*, 10.20.29, translated by H. Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[68] Richard Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Templtation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[69] Augustine, *DCD* 14.5, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 356: "We ought not, therefore, to blame our sins and defects on the nature of the flesh, for this is to disparage the Creator. The flesh, in its own kind and order, is good. But what is not good is to abandon the Goodness of the Creator in pursuit of some created good, whether by living deliberately according to the flesh, or according to the soul, or according to the entire man, which is made up of soul and flesh and which is the reason why either 'soul' alone or 'flesh' alone can mean a man".

involuntary and thus unavoidable.[70] Thus, they are not culpable: "For I am not aware that any right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering, or with fear, lest one in danger be destroyed".[71] Since good and bad people alike possess passions, what makes them good or bad for Augustine only concerns whether and how we consent to the passions – approve or curb them – at the level of the rational will.[72] As Augustine writes:

> There are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they [the Stoics] call *phantasiæ*, and it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid.[73]

To illustrate his point above, Augustine cites the famous example of the Stoic sage who suddenly grows pale and trembles when the ship on which he is sailing encounters a turbulent storm. While the wise person controls the passions that thus arise at the prospect of losing his life, the fool succumbs to them.[74] On this basis, Augustine affirms that all the passions named by the Stoics–fear, desire, sorrow, and joy[75] – which respectively pertain to past and future pains and pleasures – can either be passions which are experienced but not yet consented to, or affections which are products of the rational

[70] Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 173. As Knuttila explains, the view that the passions themselves are venial sins which has often been attributed to Augustine actually derives from Gregory the Great whose view was associated with Augustine by Lombard.

[71] Augustine, *DCD* 9.5.

[72] Augustine, *DCD* 9.9; *DCD* 14.7, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 360: "The affection of the upright will, then, is good love and that of a perverse will is evil love".

[73] Augustine, *DCD* 9.4; *DCD* 9.5, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 85: "The Stoics admit that passions of this kind affect the soul even of the wise man who, as they hold, must be above all evil. We must, therefore, conclude, first, that Stoics do not, in fact, consider emotions vices, since the wise man meets them in such a way that they can do nothing to change his mind or mar his virtue".

[74] Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, 50: "For Augustine passions and affections, like the flesh, were not evil in themselves, but only when they failed to be controlled – when they failed to take their proper place in the order of things. Specifically, reason was the human principle that was properly in command of the passions. In the well-ordered soul, reason was the guiding principle".

[75] Augustine, *DCD* 14.5-6; Augustine, *Confessions*, 10.14.22.

will and its consent. Augustine was quite insistent that his view, which he claimed aligned with those of both Platonists and Aristotelians, was also compatible with the Stoic view.[76]

A number of scholars including Knuuttila and Sorabji have contested his claim, on the grounds that the Stoics did not actually believe that the "first movement of the will", which Augustine described in terms of the passions, involved any quasi-emotional reaction at all, other than a completely involuntary physiological reaction like trembling.[77] The sage who underwent these symptoms did not in other words experience actual fear in the way Augustine assumed. To deny that human beings do thus suffer the emotional effect of first movements, in Augustine's view, would involve an artificial suppression of such emotions and a concomitant denial of our humanity.[78] In that sense, Augustine seems to have been intent on giving a more-charitable-than-realistic reading of the Stoics.

The upshot of his discussion, however, is that the passions can – though need not – cause us to take pleasure in what is easiest or most immediately satisfying and thus to sacrifice what is most important, because of the pain and waiting involved in delayed gratification. As such, the passions are the mechanisms by which we confuse the true source of our happiness with temporal things. The key to avoiding this outcome is to train the will to approve only those passions that are consistent with belief in God as the ultimate source of happiness and to curb those that counteract this belief. Thus, Augustine writes that the mind must be subjected to God, "that he may rule and aid it, and the passions, again, [subjected] to the mind, to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses".[79]

In sum: the key to being sad, fearful, desirous, or joyful about the right things – and not about the wrong things – for Augustine, is belief in God, which helps the will to regulate the passions in the appropriate way. As we learn to do this, what Anselm called the "will for happiness" is gradually harmonized, as it should be, with the "will for righteousness" or justice. At the same time, the righteousness of the will gives rise to happiness, which is incompatible with concupiscence or inordinate preoccupations with temporal things which bind the will to matters outside our control and thus hamper its freedom. As Augustine sums up: "no one lives as he wishes but the blessed (happy), and no one is blessed but the righteous".[80] For him, moreover, the righteous are those who have tapped into the source of happiness which consists in God.

[76] Augustine, *DCD* 9.4, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 81: "In the question whether the wise man is subject to passions or entirely free from them, the controversy, so it seems to me, is one rather of words than of meaning. In so far as the point at issue is the sense and not just the sound of words, in my opinion, the Stoics are at one with the Platonists and Peripatetics".
[77] Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, 372-384; Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy,* 155.
[78] Augustine, *DCD* 14.9, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 370: "Yet, so long as we are clothed with the infirmities of this life, we are not living a proper human life if we are entirely devoid of these emotions".
[79] Augustine, *DCD* 9.5.
[80] Augustine, *DCD* 14.25.

## 6. John of La Rochelle versus his Sources on the Affections

At this point, we can clearly grasp how Augustine's thinking provided the basis for Anselm's distinction between the affection for advantage or happiness and the affection for righteousness. These were two aspects of one will that must be harmonized if human beings are to flourish. As we have seen, the harmonization process turns, as Augustine said, on learning to love God alone for his own sake or as an unqualified good while using other things as means to loving God – thus recognizing that they are qualified goods that cannot make us happy at all times and in every way. To will freely is not to have a will totally unhinged from all goods – whether qualified or unqualified – as the Franciscans argued, but to be able to prioritize the greater over the lesser good in any instance.

The difference between Franciscans and their authoritative sources on this matter has much to do with their novel understanding of the relation between the "lower" and "higher" powers of the will. The Middle Ages inherited a long tradition of distinguishing between the irascible and concupiscible powers, which are the "lower" powers of the soul that produce passions of aversion or desire for objects of sensory experience.[81] This distinction is found in the Damascene as well as Anselm and Augustine.[82] As we have seen, these thinkers held that the passions – and the irascible and concupisicible powers that produce them – must ultimately be checked by the rational will, which decides which passions to uphold or reject and thus transforms passions into more deliberate "affections".

Following the prior tradition, John of La Rochelle states that all our inclinations towards or away from different objects spring from these two appetitive powers: irascible and concupiscible.[83] Whereas Augustine and the Damascene had understood these inclinations – or passions – as matters of the lower "irrational" appetite, however, John insists that they are ordered towards reason in human beings and thus are quasi-rational. This may be one reason why John uses the term 'affection' and never mentions passions at all, namely, because he sees human "emotions" not as a matter of reacting to passively received sense-data but as an active and thus rational processing of sense material.

While John does presuppose a passive phase in which the human being encounters a sense object, the actual tendency to register the object as good or evil is already for him the work of *thelesis,* which in his view coincides with the irascible and concupisicible powers.[84] Thus, John defines an affection as an "interior motion following on the [sensory] apprehension of good or evil",[85] which thereby encourages the pursuit or avoidance of an object by the natural will. As noted previously, the key shortcoming of *thelesis* for John is that it is determined to specific objects and specifically the natural desire for human

[81] John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 118.
[82] *De spiritu et anima* (PL 40), translated by B. McGinn in *Three Treatises on Man: Cistercian Anthropology* (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publishers, 1977).
[83] John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 126.
[84] John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima,* 253.
[85] John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 79: "Affectio vero est motus interior consequens secundum boni uel mali apprehensionem". *Summa de anima*, 254-255; see 263, 266.

happiness. As such, it can interfere with the affection to achieve what is just or good, in much the same way that earlier thinkers thought the passions could do so.

That is why free choice as John of La Rochelle understands it, namely, as undetermined to any good, is crucial, namely, because only such a faculty can overcome erroneous natural desires and prioritise greater over lesser goods. In positing this will, John creates a "second level" of the will over and above the rational will posited by Augustine and Anselm. This move was itself a partial consequence of having elevated the work that these thinkers would have assigned to the passions, and the related irascible and concupiscible powers, to the level of the natural will and its affections. Here, it is also worth noting that John's theory of the affections anticipates the account later developed by Scotus, for whom the passions are part passive and sensory and part rational and voluntary.[86] Like Scotus, but before him, John connects the motive powers normally associated only with the senses also to the higher power of the will, or at least the natural will for the goods of human nature, thus re-orienting the prior tradition of thinking about these matters in a way that was consistent with his broader commitments about the relative roles of *thelesis* and *boulesis* in the exercise of free choice.

## 7. Conclusion

Although the Franciscan views described above are highly original, I have sought to demonstrate in this article that they differ significantly from those found in the sources the Franciscans employed to support their positions, above all, Augustine, Anselm, and John of Damascus. In studying these positions, most scholars have simply assumed that these authorities held the opinions the Franciscans assigned to them. Thus, they have not always fully appreciated precisely how and why Franciscans and scholastics more generally manipulated authorities as part of a tactic for devising and defending their own positions. This article has shown just how far the views of authorities could be and were distorted to achieve scholastic purposes. In this case, the specific purpose of the Franciscans was to posit the radical freedom of the will, which is capable of withholding desire for objects that can bring happiness for the sake of fulfilling the just purposes of God.

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[86] On this, see Ian Drummond, "John Duns Scotus on the Passions of the Will", in *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by M. Pickavé and L. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 53-74.