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INTRODUCTION TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN MEDIEVAL FRANCISCAN THOUGHT

The thirteenth century witnessed an explosion of interest in the powers of the soul, which became particularly evident in the Franciscan intellectual tradition. This tradition arose under the inspiration of Francis of Assisi, who founded his order in 1209, and yet it came to flourish in the context of the first universities, which were established in the early thirteenth century. In particular, Franciscans became leading figures at the University of Paris, which had gained its reputation as a leading centre for theological study already in the twelfth century. A number of factors converged to foster interest in the powers of the soul during this period.

One was the very existence of the universities, which created the right conditions for study and debate. Another major factor was the appearance of new translations of important philosophical works by Aristotle as well as his Islamic readers, such as Avicenna (980-1037) and later Averroes (1126-98), who handled questions concerning the powers of the soul at a level of sophistication that was relatively new to the Latin Western tradition. While Aristotle's *De anima* had been translated from Greek by James of Venice before 1160, Avicenna's own *De anima* became available together with large parts of his massive *Book of the Cure (Kitāb al-shifā')*, which was translated from Arabic into Latin between 1152-66 in Toledo.[1] Another important work was the *Fons Vitae* of the Jewish philosopher Avicebron (Ibn Gabirol), which was translated together with Avicenna; as we will see, both became extremely influential for Franciscans.

The Latin Averroes arrived somewhat later in Paris, around 1230/1, along with an Arabo-Latin translation of Aristotle that significantly improved the version of James of Venice, which had evidently been approached with caution previously. Alongside these important sources, Latin thinkers gained access to works by Greek theologians that dealt with the powers of the soul, including the *De fide orthodoxa* of John of Damascus (676-749) which was translated from Greek by Burgundio of Pisa, who was active in the mid-twelfth

[1] Much of the material presented in this introduction is elaborated at much greater length in my *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023) and in a forthcoming article on "The High Middle Ages", in *The Oxford Handbook of Theological Anthropology*; Avicenna, *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus*, 2 vols, edited by S. Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1972); Charles Burnett, "The Institutional Context of Arabic-Latin Translations of the Middle Ages: A Reassessment of the 'School of Toledo", in *Vocabulary of Teaching and Research Between Middle Ages and Renaissance*, edited by O. Weijers (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), 214-235.

century.[2] Such works benefited from a knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy that Latin thinkers had not hitherto enjoyed.

By the late twelfth and early thirteenth century, consequently, conditions were ripe for Latin thinkers to explore the powers of the soul. These powers included everything from the powers of the rational soul, namely: intellect and will; sensation and the imagination which provides mental images of sense objects to be abstracted by the mind; and the so-called 'irascible' and 'concupiscible' powers that generate what we might now describe as negative and positive emotions concerning sense objects. Some early scholastics even took to treating the 'bodily' powers, such as nutrition, growth, and reproduction, which had been discussed by the Greek physician Galen (d. 129 AD) and found their way into the work of various of his readers.

These included the fourth-century bishop, Nemesius of Emesa, who offered a summary of Galenic medical knowledge in his *The Nature of Man.* This work was translated in the late eleventh century (c. 1180) by bishop Alfanus of Salerno and again in 1155-65 by Burgundio of Pisa, who also produced numerous translations of Greek medical and patristic writings.[3] The newly acquired medical knowledge had already been incorporated by twelfth-century Latin thinkers, especially those like William of St Thierry working within the Cistercian order.[4] But the incorporation of the more philosophical material mentioned above waited for the most part until the second quarter of the thirteenth century, and particularly for members of the Franciscan order, for a variety of different reasons.[5]

Perhaps the most significant reason initially concerned the repeated condemnation in Paris of Aristotle's books of natural philosophy and any commentaries on those books, or at least public lecturing on them.[6] The first such ban was issued in 1210, in the wake of efforts by certain arts masters to utilize Aristotle to promote what were at the time considered heterodox views, i.e. pantheism and materialism, or the notion that the soul

[2] John of Damascus, *Saint John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, edited by E. M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Press, 1955).

[3] Nemesius of Emesa, *Nemesii Episcopi Premnon Physicon*, translated by A. of Salerno, edited by C. Burkhard (Tuebner: Leipzig, 1917).

[4] See *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology*, translated by B. Clark, edited by B. McGinn (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977). Pierre Michaud-Quantin, "La classification des puissances de l'âme au XIIe siècle", *Revue du Moyen Âge latin* 5 (1949): 20, in 15-34.

[5] John Blund is an exception to this rule, having written his work on the soul probably around 1210. *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*, edited by D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt, in Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 2 (London: British Academy, 1970).

[6] Luca Bianchi, "Les interdictions relatives à l'enseignement d'Aristote au XIIIe siècle", in *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle: Autour du Guide de l'étudiant du ms. Ripoll 109*, edited by C. Lafleur and J. Carrier (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 117-119 in 109-137.

is a bodily substance. This condemnation was reiterated in 1215 by Robert of Courçon, a former chancellor of the university who had since become the papal legate in Paris.[7]

In 1228, Pope Gregory IX reinforced the ban and ordered a full investigation of Aristotle's writings, which were certainly being privately studied by this point. For various reasons, this inquiry was never completed, and for all practical purposes, the ban was largely lifted by 1231. By this point in time, however, the first Latin works on the powers of the soul were already written. The first, *De anima et de potenciis eius*, was composed some time between 1224-28, according to its editor, René A. Gauthier, and makes extensive use of Avicenna's psychology.[8] This text influenced the author of a second anonymous work, the *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, which was likely written by a theologian between 1228-32. In turn the Franciscan theologian John of La Rochelle employed this text in his much lengthier *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, written between 1232/3, which undertook fuller incorporation of Avicenna's theory of knowledge, not to mention the aforementioned medical sources.[9] This tractate later became the basis for John's even lengthier *Summa de anima* which probably was written between 1235-6.[10]

This material was in turn employed by the redactor of a treatise on the rational soul in the *Summa Halensis*, a collaboratively authored, founding text of the Parisian Franciscan school, which was largely completed by John and Alexander of Hales among others between 1236-45. As recent scholarship has shown, the Franciscans were basically unique in the first half of the thirteenth century in providing such an extensive treatment of the soul and its powers, not to mention its relationship to the body.[11] As Louis-Jacques Bataillon has demonstrated, numerous other theologians of this era, including members of the Dominican order, exhibited a much more reserved attitude towards philosophical sources.[12]

For instance, Hugh of St Cher warned in a sermon delivered in 1242 that the study of philosophy can give rise to pride and prevent growth in wisdom. His teacher Roland of Cremona likewise stated that theologians should not delve into questions about the nature of the soul and its relationship with the body, which he regarded as the purview

[7] Stephen C. Ferruolo, "The Paris Statutes of 1215 Reconsidered", *History of Universities* 5 (1985): 1-14; Luca Bianchi, "Les interdictions relatives à l'enseignement d'Aristote au XIIIe siècle", 117.

[8] René A. Gauthier, "La traité *De anima et de potenciis eius* d'un maître des arts (vers 1225): Introduction et texte critique", *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982): 24, in 3-55.

[9] René A. Gauthier, "La traité *De anima et de potenciis eius*", 22.

[10] John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, edited by J. Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995).

[11] On the latter topic, see Magdalena Bieniak, *The Body-Soul Problem at Paris ca. 1200-1250* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010).

[12] Louis-Jacques Bataillon, "Problèmes philosophiques dans les œuvres théologiques", in *L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe-XVe siècles)*, edited by O. Weijers and L. Holtz (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 450 in 445-453.

of philosophers.[13] For him, as for many from the time of Lombard, it was enough to acknowledge that such a relationship did exist without delving into its technicalities. Why Franciscans were prepared to treat these topics so much earlier than the Dominican and so-called 'secular' masters (who were priests but not part of a religious order) can largely only be a matter for speculation. However, the trend is noteworthy and laid the foundation for the further development of a particularly strong tradition of reflection on the soul and its potencies amongst Franciscans.

The relationship between the first Franciscans and their later successors has not often been acknowledged, on account of a historiographical tendency to assume there was a major split in the school between Bonaventure and John Duns Scotus. While Bonaventure and his teachers, including Alexander of Hales, supposedly followed Augustine in the field of psychology, Scotus turned Franciscan attentions to the new works of Aristotle, although in a way that strongly contrasted with that of the Dominican Thomas Aquinas. This way of thinking has been challenged in recent scholarship, including my own, which has drawn attention to the particular way in which early Franciscans utilized Augustine.[14]

First of all, the initial Franciscans who developed their school's views in the realm of psychology rarely invoked Augustine's own writings on this subject and turned much more frequently to spurious works like the *De spiritu et anima*, which was written by a Cistercian before 1170, although it was widely attributed to Augustine in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.[15] Later generations of Franciscans would find 'proof texts' in actual works by Augustine to support their views, which has led many scholars to believe that they are somehow genuinely 'Augustinian'. However, there is little in their thinking, at least on the powers of the soul, that can seemingly be traced explicitly to the thinking of Augustine himself, when the context and contents of the Bishop's works are carefully considered.

[13] Daniel A. Callus, "The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul", in *Autour d'Aristote. Recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale affert à Monseigneur A. Mansion* (Louvain: Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1955), 471-495, 482; *Iohannes Blund Tractatus De Anima*, 13-15. On Roland, Dag Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima*, 38; Callus, "The Powers of the Soul", 157.

[14] Lydia Schumacher (ed.), *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021); Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

[15] Bernard McGinn, *The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella* (Washington: Cistercian Publications, 1972); Constant J. Mews, "Debating the Authority of Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima*", *Prezgląd Tomistyczny* 24 (2018): 321-348. Constant J. Mews, "The Early Diffusion of the *De spiritu et anima* and Cistercian Reflection on the Powers of the Soul", *Viator* 49/3 (2019): 297-330.

The same can be said of the extensive use of John of Damascus by early Franciscans and scholastics more generally.[16] The Franciscans engaged in significant distortions of his thinking, not least on psychology. In many cases, these distortions allowed for the adoption of positions found in Avicenna's *Book of the Cure*, which was much more popular and accessible than the translation of Aristotle's *De anima*, the quality of which was sometimes in doubt, during the first half of the thirteenth century.[17] Although it has sometimes been construed as such, the *Book of the Cure* was not a mere commentary on Aristotle but a highly original work that nonetheless followed a longstanding prior tradition of reconciling Aristotle with elements of Neo-Platonism.[18]

This aspect of Avicenna's work made it attractive to Latin thinkers who themselves possessed a Christianized version of Platonism in the works of their own authorities like Augustine, Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius, and others, and could therefore find in Avicenna a means to reconciling Christian Neo-Platonism with Aristotelianism, broadly construed. This is arguably what happened in the early Franciscan school.[19] Later on, as Aristotle came to the fore, following the production of revised translations of his works from the 1260s, and the full incorporation of Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle, the Augustinian attributions of Franciscans were in some cases jettisoned in favor of presenting a particular brand of Aristotelianism, which could be contrasted with that of Aquinas.

In one way or another, however, the historiographical categories of 'Augustinianism' and 'Aristotelianism' have masked not only the Arabic sources of Franciscan thought but also the originality of this tradition, which following its founding in works like the *Summa Halensis*, blossomed and developed in all kinds of ways that could be conceived from some of the same fundamental, often Avicennian, insights. Among others, these include the unity of the powers of the soul, the question of the identity of the soul with its powers, the plurality of forms – body and soul – in the human person, and the nature of their union, and the ultimate independence of intellectual from sense powers. From Avicebron, Franciscans gleaned further questions about whether the soul is itself comprised of form and 'spiritual matter' – a view known as universal hylomorphism – and whether the existence of the rational soul in humans implies the maximal composition of the body.

[16] Johannes Zachhuber, "John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis:* The Use of Greek Patristic Thought in the Treatment of the Incarnation", in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context*, edited by L. Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 91-116.

[17] See Amos Bertolacci, "On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization", in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, edited by D. Nikolaus Hasse and A. Bertolacci (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 197-223.

[18] See Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Averroes and Avicenna on Intellect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[19] This has already been acknowledged long ago by, e.g. Étienne Gilson, "Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant", *Archives dhistoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 4 (1929-30): 5-149. However, Gilson tended to see the use of Avicenna as a genuine expression of Augustinian views.

This latter topic is the focus of the contribution by **Dominic Dold**, who examines the text of the *Summa Halensis*, which offers two arguments according to which the human body is the most composite of all bodies. This doctrine, which draws its inspiration from Avicebron, is linked for the Summa to the notion that the rational nature of the human adds a dimension to its being beyond that of the sensitive and vegetative faculties found in animals and plants, respectively, but possessed by humans as well. As Dold explains, the rational soul of human beings facilitates more operations than are possible for other beings, and for the Summa, these operations require a more complex and thus maximally composite human body.

The chapter by **Lydia Schumacher** also deals with the *Summa Halensis* and the personal works of its editors, Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, on the question of the will. The Franciscan tradition is well known for its emphasis on the will's priority over the intellect. John Duns Scotus is the most famous formulator of the Franciscan theory of two wills, one of which follows the recommendations of the intellect, and one of which is characterized by an absolute freedom to choose or decline to follow these recommendations. As the article by John Marenbon later in this edition will explain, such a theory is often described in terms of 'synchronic contingencies' whereby the will remains able at the moment of willing to choose either A or not-A. The purpose of this article is to show that such a theory can already be found in the work the first-generation Franciscans. This has been masked by the fact that these thinkers attribute the theory to John of Damascus, while Scotus attributes his account to Anselm. By distinguishing the Franciscan theory from the ideas of both these authorities, this chapter highlights both the innovative nature of the Franciscan theory of the will and some broad continuities in the tradition.

The primacy of the will also comes to the forefront of the discussion in **Krijn Pansters'** chapter on the *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione*, by the thirteenth-century Franciscan spiritual master, David of Augsburg. Like his contemporary Bonaventure but before him – the *De exterioris* was written in the 1240s in Regensburg, while Bonaventure's famous *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* dates to 1259 – David employs Pseudo-Dionysius' paradigm of beginning, progress, and perfection to trace the steps of the spiritual life which ultimately culminates in an experience of God. In each of these stages, as in Bonaventure's work, the triad of will, understanding, and memory, originally found in Augustine's *De Trinitate*, but heavily reconfigured by Franciscans, played a significant role – although the will is crucial not only to initiating each stage but also to bringing it to completion, as the one that motivates the use of understanding and memory.

The contribution by **Marcia L. Colish** deals with a closely-related question about the passions, what we might call emotions, and, in particular, anger, in the work of Roger Bacon. The tradition of talking about the passions had long been dominated by Aristotle's view that all passions, including anger, are neutral, and their viciousness or virtuousness depends on how the will handles or responds to them. As Colish points out, the Stoic

thinker Seneca condemned this view, explaining why he sees anger as an irrational passion which will always be vicious. Bacon took his inspiration from Seneca and argued that anger and other emotions are always problematic. In this regard, he moves beyond his Franciscan predecessor John of La Rochelle, who held that passions are unavoidable and thus not strictly speaking sinful. Although they can be counted as venial sins insofar as they can be controlled by reason, they do not become mortally sinful unless approved by the will; as such, they have the potential to inspire virtue, in a way that Bacon totally rejected.[20]

The contribution of **José Filipe Silva and Tuomas Vaura** addresses one of the major questions debated amongst Franciscans and other scholastics as to whether the three powers of the human soul – vegetative, responsible for bodily functions like nutrition and growth, sensitive, responsible for capturing mental images of sense objects, and rational, which draws abstract conclusions based on sense experience – represent three distinct souls or one. The authors examine this question especially in the work of Peter of Trabibus, a student of Peter John Olivi. Like many Franciscans before him, Trabibus holds that the human being, like all beings, is comprised of a plurality of substantial forms, above all, that of the rational soul and the body. In this regard, however, Trabibus goes even further to contend that the powers of the soul, such as the intellect and will, themselves comprise substantial forms, insofar as they explain or govern certain actions, and only a form can perform such a function. By contrast, many other Franciscans, such as the authors of the *Summa Halensis*, would have argued that higher powers presuppose lower ones, which allows them to remain an ultimate unity, a view which had also been affirmed by Avicenna. Although Trabibus denies the simplicity of the soul's powers, he does not think he undermines its unity. To explain why, he follows Olivi in invoking the notion of the soul's spiritual matter, which serves as a kind of common substrate which all the different substantial forms of the soul inform and which establishes their unity.

In a further contribution, **Matthew Wennemann** explores a related question concerning the soul's powers, namely, whether they are identical with the soul itself. This question was considered to be of Augustinian origin but is more accurately derived from the pseudo-Augustinian text *De spiritu et anima*.[21] Although scholars like Albert the Great raised doubts about the work's authenticity, the early Franciscan authors of the *Summa Halensis* continued to employ it liberally, because of its amenability to incorporation with

[20] See Lydia Schumacher, "The Affections", in *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance*, edited by L. Schumacher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), 228-248.

[21] About the debates concerning the work's authorship, see Constant J. Mews, "Debating the Authority of Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima*" and Constant J. Mews, "The Early Diffusion of the *De spiritu et anima* and Cistercian Reflection on the Powers of the Soul"; Bernard McGinn, "Introduction", in *Three Treatises on Man: A Study in Cistercian Anthropology* (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977), 65.

Avicennian ideas, such as the thesis concerning the soul's identity with its powers.[22] As Rega Wood and Zita Toth have recently shown, early Franciscans like Alexander of Hales devised a more subtle way to affirm this identity than many of their contemporaries, which avoided certain infelicities associated with the doctrine, such as the suggestion that the soul is always 'in act' by virtue of its identity with its powers.[23] This involved arguing that the soul's powers are identical with its substance, rather than with its essence.[24] While the essence of a thing is that which makes it what it is, the substance is that in which the powers inhere, without which a thing cannot exist. This innovative solution comes to fruition in the work of Duns Scotus, who invokes his famous formal distinction to explain the relationship between the soul and its powers. As Wennemann explains, the formal distinction is "less than real but more than conceptual"; it implies that "something is really the same as something else but does not include it in its definition". According to Scotus, this relationship "holds between the divine essence and the divine intellect and will, as well as between the human soul and its Powers" on account of their univocal status. Thus, there is a real identity of the soul and its powers, as there is between the divine powers and the divine essence, which nevertheless does not efface the difference between them. This univocal relationship between God and beings also establishes the absolute freedom of both the human and divine wills.

The contribution by **Nena Bobnovik** further explores the Franciscan debates about the soul's relationship to its powers, focussing especially on William of Ockham's rejection of a position initially advanced by Henry of Ghent, a secular master who nonetheless was strongly sympathetic with Franciscans and adopted some similar positions, which Duns Scotus however strongly criticized. As Bobnovik explains, Henry held the view that the powers of the soul are defined with respect to the activities or operations they perform, such as knowing or willing. Ockham however rejects this view that the powers are defined in terms of their relations to objects, on the grounds that the powers would exist and be capable of functioning even if there were no objects to which they would relate. To demonstrate this claim, Ockham invokes a version of Avicenna's famous flying man thought experiment, which other Franciscans like John of La Rochelle and the authors of the *Summa Halensis* had used to prove the existence of the soul and of God. In Avicenna's version of the argument, we are asked to envision a man suspended in mid-air who lacked any access to his senses. In Avicenna's opinion, such a man would still be able to reflect upon himself and thus know he exists as a rational soul, which cannot cause itself and must therefore be caused by God. This kind of quasi-ontological argument for God's existence, which proves the reality of God on the basis of an understanding of who he is, was characteristic of the Franciscan tradition and contrasted sharply with the approach

[22] Gabriel Théry, "L'authenticité du *De spiritu et anima* dans Saint Thomas et Albert le Grand", *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 10 (1921): 373-377.
[23] Rega Wood and Zita Toth, "*Nec idem nec aliud*: The Powers of the Soul and the Origins of the Formal Distinction", in *Early Thirteenth-Century English Franciscan Thought*, edited by L. Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 171-98.
[24] Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought*, 117-26.

of Dominicans like Aquinas who sought to prove God's existence on the basis of his effects in the natural world. According to Ockham's rendition of Avicenna's argument, the 'flying man' illustration confirms that God has the power to create a rational soul before he created anything else upon which the rational soul could exercise its faculties. Thus, the powers of the soul exist and must be defined independently of the question of what they are powers-for.

The article by **Oleg Bychkov** takes the study of the Arabic sources of Franciscan thought further, showing how both of these traditions independently developed similar arguments about the reliability of sense perception which exceed anything that can be found in the Greek philosophical tradition stemming from Aristotle. As Bychkov shows, medieval Franciscans were at the forefront of a revived interest in the question whether and how the mind can grasp external reality. This debate itself created the potential for scepticism concerning the possibility of knowledge, which did not arise to the same extent from the tradition of, say, Thomas Aquinas. While the latter invested considerable confidence in the senses as a basis for rational knowledge, the Franciscans pioneered an account which foregrounded the active role played by the mind in informing our perception of reality, as José Filipe Silva has also recently shown in numerous works.[25]

As Bychkov illustrates, this 'active' account of cognition introduced the possibility of distorting perceptions of reality and thus gave rise to concerns about the reliability of the senses, which preoccupied the fourteenth-century Franciscans Bychkov discusses, including Peter Aureol (d. 1322), William of Ockham (d. 1347), Walter Chatton (d. 1343), and Adam of Wodeham (d. 1358). Fascinatingly, these Franciscans mentioned a number of examples of mistaken sense perception, such as hallucinations, dreams, and optical illusions, which can also be found in the works of many Islamic authors, who influenced the Franciscans, above all, Avicenna and later Averroes. In light of these examples, Bychkov shows how both subsequent Islamic thinkers as well as his fourteenth-century Franciscan theologians developed two different approaches to thinking about the reliability of the senses, the direct realist or the anti-realist. The former denies that there is any intermediary, such as an intelligible species, between the external thing and the mind. On this account, consequently, the mind makes direct contact with reality, at least in cases where there is no deception of the senses, such as in hallucinations or optical illusions. What Bychkov calls the relationist view is a version of this account, which "claims that sensory perception is simply the process itself of relating to or interacting with an external object". By contrast, the anti-realist position holds that "our entire phenomenal picture is a mental construct" and does not have to correlate with "things out there", and is held by the early Ockham and Aureol. The later Ockham, as well as

[25] José Filipe Silva, "Medieval Theories of Active Perception: An Overview", in *Active Perception in the History of Philosophy: From Plato to Modern Philosophy*, edited by J. F. Silva and M. Yrjönsuuri (New York: Springer, 2014), 117-146; José Filipe Silva, "The Chameleonic Mind: The Activity versus the Actuality of Perception", in *Medieval Perceptual Puzzles: Theories of Sense Perception in the 13th and 14th Centuries*, edited by E. Baltuta (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 38-72.

Chatton and Wodeham, however, hold the view that while human perception may not perfectly 'map on' to external reality, it gives us a more or less accurate insight into the nature of the world around us.

Jordan Lavender's contribution further explores the nature of the sensory powers in William of Ockham and Walter Chatton, in particular, their 'materiality'. As Lavender shows, Ockham posits that sensation and cognition differ in that the former is "material and embodied" while the latter is not. This tended to be a common opinion until Ockham's time, namely, that the subject of sensation—the faculty or power that senses—is material, whereas the subject of thought, that is, the power that thinks, is not. However, Chatton rejected the notion that sensory cognition is distinguished from intellection by virtue of its materiality, in what became an increasingly common view, starting in the second quarter of the fourteenth century. One significant reason Chatton gives in support of his view is that, as Lavender puts it, "nothing about the nature of *sensory experience* indicates that it is material or embodied in a way that requires a distinct subject from the subject of thought". This argument is consistent with what Silva has described as an 'active' account of perception, typical of Franciscan thinkers and their later medieval confrères, in which sensory perception nevertheless involves a kind of active cognitive grasp of a sense object.[26]

John Marenbon examines the Franciscan doctrine of free will, as it is treated by Scotus, Peter John Olivi and Robert Grosseteste, who argue in different ways that the will has the power to choose between opposites at one and the same moment. In other words, the will is not simply capable of preferring A over B, or A at one time and not-A at another, as many previous authors had affirmed, but instead discriminates simultaneously between A and not-A. As Marenbon notes, "this position has often been used to support, and is interpreted in the light of, the view that Scotus was a great modal innovator, who introduced the idea of synchronic possibilities, thereby opening the way to contemporary theories of possible worlds". However, Marenbon contests the notion that the Scotist doctrine of the will should be interpreted as an attempt to articulate a new modal theory. On his account, the goal of positing the possibility of "synchronic contingencies" was mainly to assert the absolute freedom of the will, not only in human beings but also in God. In the work of Scotus, for instance, such freedom requires that the will retains the power to will opposites in the same instance, for otherwise, it would be necessitated to one decision over the other. Likewise, for Scotus, God's will must remain contingent, or undetermined to one option over another at the moment of willing, otherwise his will would pre-determine human choices. On this basis, Marenbon draws the conclusion that the typically Franciscan tendency to describe the will as capable of willing simultaneous opposites is primarily concerned with preserving freedom, as Franciscans understood it.

The final article by **Zita Toth** deals with the powers of angels. This topic was very relevant to the study of the human soul and its powers, at least in the view of Franciscans,

[26] Silva, "Medieval Theories of Active Perception: An Overview".

for whom angels are more like than unlike humans, though they lack human limitations. The question Toth explores specifically concerns the materiality of angels. This might seem surprising, since angels are generally regarded as purely spiritual or immaterial beings. In the Franciscan tradition, however, the tendency quickly developed to adopt Avicebron's universal hylomorphism, according to which all substances other than God – including spiritual substances like angels and the rational soul – must be comprised of matter of some kind, namely, a spiritual or intelligible matter, in order to be regarded as substances in the full sense of the term. Among the other reasons Toth highlights why Franciscans regarded angels as subject to material composition is that they have qualities that belong to material beings, in particular, the ability to change, not only in the sense that they are created by God and thus move from non-being into being but also insofar as change occurs in the angelic intellect when it receives influence from another angel or God. The view that change implies matter was already found in Franciscans like Bonaventure and Peter John Olivi, who set the terms for the debate of the early fourteenth-century Franciscans Toth discusses, including Gonsalvo of Spain, Duns Scotus (or at least work attributed to him), Peter of Trabibus, who, as we have seen, was heavily influenced by Olivi, and Peter Auriol. As Toth explains, these thinkers agree not only that angels possess some material component, but they also present four similar arguments as to why this is the case. The first argument from passibility entails that angels undergo change, which implies materiality; the second argument is that all beings are comprised of act and potency which entails form and matter, respectively; the third, that matter necessarily underlies all further accidents, including mental acts and volitions; and fourthly, that the individuation of angels within a species requires matter. Nevertheless, fourteenth-century Franciscans disagreed as to whether the matter in angels is the same as the matter in corporeal beings, insofar as it shares some of the same characteristics, such as being perfected by form and entailing potency.

As the foregoing summary of the articles in this issue confirms, a number of common threads run through medieval Franciscan debates about the powers of the soul, which center on the unity-and-difference of the powers in relation to one another, the question of the soul's matter-form composition, as well as that of angels, the relationship between the body and the soul, and the priority of the will over the intellect. These signature ideas of the Franciscan intellectual tradition stood in stark contrast to the priorities of Dominicans, above all, Thomas Aquinas, whose ideas have been well-studied elsewhere. Thus, the current special issue seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of the distinctive aspects of the Franciscan tradition while at the same time showcasing the diversity of approaches to its development

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Acknowledgements and Dedication

This special edition arose from a workshop on 'The Powers of the Soul in Medieval Franciscan Thought' which I hosted at King's College London in June 2022. The conference was funded through a grant I received from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No. 714427) and offered an opportunity for scholars working across a range of disciplines – including history, philosophy, and theology – to coordinate and share expertise on this important area of Franciscan thinking. Shortly after the event, I was pleasantly surprised and delighted to receive an invitation from Alexander Fidora and Nicola Polloni to publish the papers as a special edition of the *Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval*. This has proven the perfect opportunity and context for bringing the papers together and identifying some common threads that run through the medieval Franciscan intellectual tradition. I am extremely grateful to the journal's executive editor, Maria Cabré Duran, who has coordinated the whole process of production and brought the project to completion.

This special edition is dedicated to the memory of our colleague and friend, Marcia L. Colish, who participated in the June 2022 workshop as well as several others I organized in conjunction with my ERC project between 2017-2021. Marcia was a hugely important contributor to the project, providing expert advice to the team members and generally serving as a support and mentor to many younger scholars. Over the decade or so I had the chance to get to know her, Marcia became one of my most steadfast advisers, and the news of her passing in April 2024 has been a great source of sadness. We will deeply miss Marcia, her sharp intellect and wit, and her faithful presence in our scholarly lives. May she rest in peace.

Marcia L. Colish in memoriam
1937-2024

ARTÍCULOS | ARTICLES

THE *SUMMA HALENSIS* ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE HUMAN BODY

LA *SUMMA HALENSIS* SOBRE LA COMPOSICIÓN DEL CUERPO HUMANO

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Abstract

The author of the *Summa Halensis* claims that the human body is maximally composite and argues for this using a proof strategy that intends to deduce the body's composition from the human soul's immateriality. This study examines that claim and argument, which is given both in a shorter and a longer form. The core of the article consists in a careful reconstruction of both forms, along with an enquiry into its Jewish Neoplatonic sources (first and foremost the *Fons vitae*) and its appearance in zoological commentaries contemporary to the *Summa* written by Peter of Spain and Albert the Great. It emerges that the argument brings into play various features of the Summist's hylomorphic theory, especially a pluralism about substantial forms.

Keywords

Early Franciscans; Hylomorphism; Rational Soul; Human Body; *Fons vitae*

Resumen

El autor de la *Summa Halensis* afirma que el cuerpo humano es máximamente compuesto y lo argumenta utilizando una estrategia probatoria que pretende deducir la composición del cuerpo a partir de la inmaterialidad del alma humana. Este estudio examina esta afirmación y su argumento, que se presenta tanto en una forma corta como en una forma más larga. El núcleo del artículo consiste en una reconstrucción metódica de ambas formas, junto con una indagación sobre sus fuentes neoplatónicas judías (principalmente el *Fons vitae*) y su aparición en comentarios zoológicos contemporáneos a la *Summa* escritos por Pedro Hispano y Alberto Magno. Se desprende que el

argumento pone en juego varios aspectos de la teoría hilemórfica del Sumista, especialmente un pluralismo con respecto a las formas sustanciales.

Palabras clave

Primeros franciscanos; hilemorfismo; alma racional; cuerpo humano; *Fons vitae*

1. Introduction

Recent scholarship has led to an increased appreciation of the Franciscan *Summa Halensis* as not only historically significant, but also philosophically rich and fascinating.[1] While it has already emerged that the *Summa*'s doctrines of the human soul and the soul's relation to the body are of particular interest,[2] its teaching on the *composition* of the human body has not received sufficient attention. In this article, I examine this doctrine through an argument the Summist gives in two versions (a shorter and a longer form) to support the claim that the human body is maximally composite. The main objective of my study is a clarification of the hylomorphic principles employed in the *Summa*.[3] More specifically, I argue that what is operative in the argument for the body's maximal composition is the concept of an *isomorphism* (i.e., a *structural* correspondence) between (1) the complexity of the human soul with respect to its powers, (2) the form of the body in relation to the forms comprised by it, and (3) the matter of the body as divided by various quantitative parts.

There are other sources roughly contemporary with the *Summa* that also deal with the question of the body's organisation, among them the zoological question

[1] See, for example, the three volumes Lydia Schumacher (ed.), *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020); Lydia Schumacher (ed.), *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020); Lydia Schumacher (ed.), *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021).

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[2] Recent discussions can be found in monographs by Schumacher and Bieniak; see Lydia Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023); Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, Ca. 1200–1250*, translated by R. Roncarati (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010).

[3] Bieniak has initiated the study of the hylomorphic theory espoused in the *Summa* through the lens of the union of soul and body; see Magdalena Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis," in *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought*, edited by L. Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 37-48.

commentaries by Peter of Spain and Albert the Great.[4] These authors argue that every animal is necessarily composed of a certain type of body parts (specifically, of organs), and as shown in a recent publication of mine, these zoological arguments share their *form* with the shorter version of the argument for the maximal composition of the human being in the *Summa*.[5] The present study will, however, highlight that the metaphysical principles driving the Summist's argument are very different to the ones endorsed by the zoological commentators and contrast especially with Albert's philosophical commitments. In particular, the aforementioned isomorphism relies on a pluralist view about substantial forms that a formal unitarian like Albert cannot accept. I shall indicate why Albert's unitarianism renders this argumentative strategy less effective for him.

This article has a three-part structure. First, I review the basic tenets of the *Summa*'s doctrine of soul and body on the basis of the secondary literature, showing that the precise logical relation between the multitude of operations of the human soul and the compositional complexity of the human body has not been sufficiently elaborated. Second, I turn to the shorter version of the argument for the maximal composition of humans in the *Summa*, and provide an analysis of its sources, its structure, and its parallels in the zoological commentaries written by Peter and Albert. Third, I give a detailed reconstruction of the longer argument presented later in the *Summa*. I shall suggest that the longer form alone – rather than the shorter one with its parallels in the zoological commentaries – captures the fundamental metaphysical (in particular, hylomorphic) commitments of the *Summa*.

2. *Status quaestionis*

As I do not assume any familiarity with the *Summa*'s teaching on the human soul and body – as well as other doctrines it is entangled with – I shall introduce this background cursorily, focussing on issues of hylomorphism in particular while also referring the reader to the thorough historical and systematic monographs by Lydia Schumacher and

[4] See Dominic Dold, "Why Do Animals Have Parts? Organs and Organisation in 13th- and 14th-Century Latin Commentaries on Aristotle's *De Animalibus*", in *Fragmented Nature: Medieval Latinate Reasoning on the Natural World and Its Order*, edited by M. Cipriani and N. Polloni (New York: Routledge, 2022); also Theodor W. Köhler, *Homo animal nobilissimum: Konturen des spezifisch Menschlichen in der naturphilosophischen Aristoteleskommentierung des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts. Teilband 2* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 6-9. The composition of *animals* (not just humans) is also discussed through the same argument by Bonaventure; see Ian P. Wei, *Thinking about Animals in Thirteenth-Century Paris: Theologians on the Boundary Between Humans and Animals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 140; also Raymond Macken, "Le statut philosophique de la matière selon Bonaventure", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 47 (1980): 188-230, 221.

[5] See Dold, "Why Do Animals Have Parts?", 140-143.

Magdalena Bieniak for further details.[6] Importantly, the Summist[7] espouses a non-Aristotelian hylomorphic theory, as pointed out recently by Bieniak. With respect to matter, a distinction is drawn between that which makes matter what it is and actualises it – form properly speaking – and that which is the mover of that matter. [8] Postponing discussion of the former for now, the latter is, in the case of the human being, the rational soul, defined as a substance that is non-bodily, partaking of reason, and fit to rule the body.[9] The soul is simple, yet it fails to be absolutely simple on account of its composition out of form and intellectual matter.[10] This claim in the *Summa* is in fact due to the influence of Avicebron's (Ibn Gabirol's) *Fons vitae*, which was the source for thirteenth-century Latin philosophers and theologians when it comes to the doctrine of so-called universal hylomorphism. This is the theory according to which *all* beings, with the exception of God, are composed of form and matter.[11] In addition, the human soul is divided into three powers: it is one "in [its] three powers, [that is to say,] the vegetative, sensitive, and rational".[12] The unity here is a unity in substance.[13] While the substance of

[6] In the following I rely heavily on the works by Schumacher and Bieniak; see Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought*; Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*.

[7] The *Summa Halensis* is the result of a collaborative project among Franciscan friars at Paris. Books I to III were compiled by at least two editors before 1245 – mainly on the basis of the writings by John of La Rochelle (d. 1245) and Alexander of Hales (d. 1245) – although some parts were added later to the first three books, and so was the fourth book. Despite of this, I shall speak of the *Summa* as written by "the author of the *Summa*" or "the Summist", as a shorthand that is customary in the secondary literature. See Riccardo Saccenti, "The Reception of the Summa Halensis in the Manuscript Tradition Until 1450", in *The Reception of the Summa Halensis in the Manuscript Tradition Until 1450* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 353-372, 361; Victorin Doucet, "Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II Summae Fratris Alexandri", in *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica*, vol. IV, 4 vols. (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1948), CCCVI/CCCXXXII-CCCXXXIV.

[8] See Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 39-41; 48.

[9] Alexander de Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (SH)*, vol. II, 4 vols. (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1928-1948), In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 321), Respondeo, 385b: "In hoc ergo quod dicitur 'substantia', differt ab accidente; in hoc autem quod 'incorporea' dicitur, ab essentia corporis quod habet trinam dimensionem; in hoc autem quod est 'rationis particeps', differt ab irrationali; in hoc autem quod est 'regendo corpori accommodata' differt ab angelo, qui dicitur substantia incorporea, rationis particeps, sed non regendo corpori accommodatur." See also Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought*, 67-71.

[10] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q2, Ti2, C1 (n. 328), Solutio, 399a: "[...] anima humana dicitur composita ex forma et materia intellectuali." See also Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought*, 77.

[11] See James A. Weisheipl, "Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron", *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 10/3 (1979): 239-260, 250; Dom Odon Lottin, "La composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles: Les débuts de la controverse", *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* 34 (1932): 21-41.

[12] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti1, C2 (n. 332), 403a (my translation): "Secundo quaeritur utrum anima sit una vel plures in tribus potentiis, vegetabili, sensibili et rationali."

[13] See Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought*, 114.

the soul does, therefore, not differ from the substance of the three powers, the Summist maintains that the soul and the three powers differ in essence.[14]

According to the *Summa*, the soul is an independent substance that can survive the death of the body, yet in this life, it is part of the essence or substance of the soul to be united to its body.[15] It is on this basis that the Summist characterises the soul's relation to the body as essential and calls the soul a "perfection", which is Avicenna's expression that is also found in the Latin translation of the *De anima* from the Arabic.[16] In comparison to Aristotle's own definition in *De anima* II.1 412a27–28, "perfection" here replaces the term "first act",[17] or "form", for the Summist insofar as there is only a similarity between the relation of the human soul to its body and a form to its matter.[18] As Bieniak elaborates, this position has its roots in an element of the *Summa*'s non-Aristotelian hylomorphic theory: for Aristotle, a first act is a certain potency to a second act – which in the case of the soul, means that the body's first act is also the root of the operations of the living body – and the form of the body is thus also responsible for the various activities of the human being, be they related to thinking, sensing, locomotion, or living. The Summist disagrees,[19] stressing that a "form has no act outside of matter" and hence cannot be a mover.[20] This can be illustrated by an example: the form of fire does not move "the matter whose act it is, but [rather] the matter of air".[21] The same happens in any living body "because the vital motion is contrary to the motion of nature". In a plant, heavy things might be pulled up and light ones pushed down; and in an animal, there are not only the natural movements of "up", "down", and "circular", but also movements to the left and

[14] See Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought*, 125.
[15] See Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 12-13.
[16] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, A1 (n. 344), [arg.] 418b: "Item, ex ratione quam ponit Philosophus arguitur: Anima est perfectio corporis physici, organici etc." See also Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought*, 90; Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris*, 13-15.
[17] *De anima* II.1 412a27-28: "διὸ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος."
[18] See Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar4 (n. 347), Solutio, 422a-b.
[19] Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 39.
[20] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 321), 386a (my translation): "Forma nullum habet actum nisi in materia; et movens aliquem habet actum praeter id quod movetur; ergo non est tantum forma materiae."
[21] Alexander de Hales, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 321), 386a (my translation): "Et hoc patet per exemplum: igneitas enim non movet materiam cuius est actus, sed materiam aeris, ut extrahat in actu quod fuit in potentia; eodem modo ponderosum quod movetur, a removente prohibens movetur et perducente ad suum locum."

right, back and forth.[22] Hence, every type of soul – even the vegetative soul – must be a separate "proper substance giving life to its body".[23]

Another fundamental tenet of the hylomorphic theory espoused in the *Summa* is the commitment to a pluralism about substantial forms:[24] there are multiple *types* of substantial forms, and a complex body such as the human body – the human body is in fact the most complex, as we shall see in detail below – contains several such forms. These types are classified through their respective relations to matter. A "first form [...] perfects both the whole matter and any of its parts in a similar way: the whole fire is fire, and any of its parts is fire." Every form of an element is a first form, and in a similar way, so are certain "natural forms", the forms of mixtures.[25] Recalling Bieniak's distinction between forms making matter what it is and actualising it and forms moving matter, first forms belong to the former kind and are "forms in the first and most proper sense of the word".[26] Second, some natural forms have a different relation to matter. The sensitive soul or the vegetative soul "perfect the whole and [each] part, but not in a similar way". Such a form is thus "more distant from matter because it has some individuation apart

[22] Alexander de Hales, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 321), 386b-387a (my translation): "[...] in hoc discernitur vitam habens a non vivente, quia motus vitalis est in contrarium motui naturae. Videmus enim quod secundum motum naturae grave fertur deorsum et leve sursum, secundum motum vero nutrimenti grave fertur sursum, sicut apparet in plantis, et quod igneum est, ut cholera, fertur deorsum in animalibus, cum nutritur simile simili. Item, motu naturali fertur aliquid sursum vel deorsum vel orbiculariter; sed motu animali fertur in ante vel retro vel dextrorsum vel sinistrorsum, sicut in animalibus; ergo discernitur motus vitalis a naturali." See Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 39-40.

[23] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 321), 387a (my translation): "Item, secundum intellectum fit abstractio speciei a materia vel subiecto, secundum naturam vero non; ergo differentia est inter esse vitale et naturale, et ideo dicitur 'propria substantia sui corporis vivificatrix'." See Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 40.

[24] See, for example, Avicebron, *Fons vitae*, edited by C. Baeumker (Münster: Aschendorff, 1895), II, 8, 37-39. The pluralist position on substantial forms is a staple of Franciscan philosophy; see Thomas M. Ward, *John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes, and Hylomorphism* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), 76-109. For the doctrinal range spanned by various pluralist positions in the 13th century, see the critical study by Roberto Zavalloni (ed.), *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes; textes inédits et étude critique* (Louvain: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur Philosophie, 1951).

[25] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar4 (n. 347), Solutio, 422a (my translation): "sed distinguendum est quod est forma prima, quae perficit materiam, sicut sunt formae elementares, et in talibus forma perficit similiter totam materiam et quamlibet partem, ut totus ignis est ignis et quaelibet pars eius est ignis, et ad hunc modum sunt formae naturales, quae sunt primae commixtionis, sicut est in metallo et huiusmodi mineralibus: totum enim aurum est aurum et quaelibet pars auri est aurum, sicut est de omnibus formis naturalibus quae plurimum appropinquant ad suam materia." See Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 46-47.

[26] Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 48.

from matter".[27] Third, the rational soul is a form "that perfects the whole in such a way that [it does] not [perfect] any of its parts".[28] Accordingly, the soul is not "the act of matter, but the natural act of a complete body in its natural form – and this [natural form] is called the bodily form",[29] which, in turn, holds together the plurality of forms.[30]

We can thus see that according to the *Summa*, the human being is metaphysically complex in the following three respects. First, the human soul is a non-bodily substance that in this life, is essentially united with its body and moves it. Second, the human body has its own separate form that makes its underlying matter what it is. Third, the form of the body holds together a plurality of substantial forms that perfect its underlying matter in different ways.

This gives rise to two systematic questions, which to my knowledge, have not been addressed rigorously in the literature:

1. Why does the human soul have a body with precisely this sort of complexity?
2. How is the *formal* complexity of the human body – that is to say, its being composed of a plurality of substantial forms – related to its *material* complexity – that is to say, its levels of compositions, such as organs, tissues, and elemental mixtures?

Both questions are raised in the *Summa* itself through an argument that probes the logical relation between the properties of the human soul and the material constitution of its body. The argument is first given in response to the question whether Adam's body was composed of all four elements. It can be found in Book II, which was edited by John of La Rochelle and perhaps Alexander of Hales.[31] Later in the same book, the argument is

[27] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar4 (n. 347), Solutio, 422a (my translation): "Est iterum forma naturalis, quae perficit totum et partem, sed non similiter, sicut est anima sensibilis in brutis et vegetabilis in plantis; in hoc enim habent convenientiam: totum enim animal est animal, sed nulla pars animalis est animal, sed plurimae partes sentiunt; similiter quaelibet pars plantae vegetatur, sed non quaelibet est planta. Sic ergo non similiter perficitur totum et quaelibet eius pars, et haec forma plus elongatur a materia: habet enim aliquam individuationem praeter materiam." See Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 46-47.

[28] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar4 (n. 347), Solutio, 422a (my translation): "Est autem tertia forma, quae perficit totum ita quod nullam eius partem, sicut anima rationalis: totum enim est homo, nulla autem pars hominis est homo nec etiam intelligit; totum ergo intellectivum est ita quod nulla pars: unde nullius partis dicitur actus." See Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 46-47.

[29] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, Ti2, C1, Ar4 (n. 347), Solutio, 422b (my translation): "Unde non est ibi proprie actus materiae, sed actus naturalis corporis completi in forma naturali, quae forma dicitur forma corporalis." See Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 41.

[30] See Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 47.

[31] See Doucet, "Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I", CCCLXIX-CCCLXX. The shorter argument indeed has a parallel in John of La Rochelle's *Summa de anima* (written at about 1235-

revisited in much more detail in one of the later additions made between 1245 and 1250.[32] While it was possible to show that some passages of later additions were taken from Bonaventure or Odo Rigaldus, the precise source for the more detailed form of the argument remains open.[33] Nonetheless, we shall see that it clearly refers back to the first form of the argument, and it is the addition that clarifies the metaphysical basis for the logical relation between the plurality of operations of the human soul, the plurality of substantial forms in the human body, and the plurality of body parts. This basis is that of an isomorphism. But before getting there, I need to turn to the shorter argument in the following section.

3. The Shorter Form of the Argument

In the question about whether Adam's body was composed of the four elements, the author of the *Summa* presents an argument for the claim why the human body is maximally composite. It is given twice, once in the *quod sic* and once in the solution, but each time in the same form. To highlight the formal parallelism, I present the two passages side by side:[34]

1236); see Joannes de Rupella, *Summa de anima*, edited by J. Guy Bougerol (Paris: Librairie Philosophique Vrin, 1995), Prima consideracio, cap. 38, 118.42-119.50.

[32] See Doucet, "Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I", CCCVI.

[33] See Doucet, "Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I", CCLXXX. In particular, it is clear that the commentaries on the *Sentences* by Bonaventure and Odo Rigaldus do not contain the argument presented.

[34] The Latin text of the solution is: "Respondeo, ut habetur in libro *De fonte vitae*: Corpus hominum inter omnia corpora compositissimum est. Et ratio huius est, sicut scribitur in libro *Fontis vitae* : Quanto substantia aliqua magis est immunis a materia, tanto plurium operationum est effectiva; anima igitur intellectiva, cum maxime sit immunis a materia eo quod non dependet ex ea secundum essentiam, et cum similiter multarum sit operativa operationum, et ideo, cum has operationes de se habere non possit nisi prout utitur organis, oportuit ipsum corpus, per quod eas exercet, esse heterogeneum et maxime compositum" (Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr2, S1, Q3, Ti1, C1 (n. 434), Solutio, 525b). The *quod sic* reads: "Item, quanto forma nobilior, tanto plurium operationum differentium specie est principium; sed anima rationalis est formarum nobilissima; ergo est principium plurium operationum; operationum huiusmodi usum exercet mediantibus organis propriis; ergo, cum organum proprium ei respondeat in convenienti proportioni, necesse est ipsum esse ex multis naturis compositum; illae autem naturae sunt elementa; ergo etc." (Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr2, S1, Q3, Ti1, C1 (n. 434), [arg.], 524b-525a). Both translations are mine.

Structure	Solution	*Quod sic*
(Conclusion)	I answer as it is claimed (*habetur*) in the *Fons vitae*: The body of humans is the most composite among all bodies.	–
Premiss 1	The reason for this is, as is written in the *Fons vitae*: The more some substance is immune from matter, the more operations it effects (*plurium operationum est effectiva*). Therefore, since the intellective soul is maximally immune from matter – because it does not depend on it according to [its] essence – and since it likewise operates many operations (*multarum sit operativa operationum*),	Again, the more noble a form, of the more operations differing in species it is the principle; but the rational soul is the most noble of the forms; therefore, it is the principle of multiple operations;
Premiss 2	and since it cannot have these operations of itself (*de se*) unless it uses organs, it was necessary that the body itself, through which it exercises them, be heterogeneous and maximally composite.	it performs (*usum exercet*) operations of this kind by means of proper organs; therefore, since a proper organ responds to it in fitting proportion, it is necessary that [the body] be composed from many natures;
Conclusion	–	but these natures are elements; therefore, etc.

Before taking a closer look at the structure of this argument, I want to turn to its Neoplatonic sources.

3.1 Sources

The argument's conclusion is the claim that the "body of humans is the most composite among all bodies", or roughly equivalently, that it is "heterogeneous and maximally composite". In the context of the question, this result is used to argue for the weaker claim that the human body is composed of the greatest number of elements (i.e., four).[35] In this subsection, I take a closer look at the sources in order to show that the maximal composition of the human body also means that it is composed out of the most

[35] It is curious that in the solution to the question, the Summist does not give a more direct argument for this weaker claim but prefers to argue for a stronger conclusion instead; see also Dold, "Why Do Animals Have Parts?", 141-142.

complex types of body parts (i.e., organs). This will also allow me to introduce some metaphysical principles that the *Summa* inherits from the *Fons vitae*.

The claim that the human body is "the most composite among all bodies" is attributed to the *Fons vitae*, as we have seen above. Yet, the exact phrasing cannot be found in the Latin text.[36] The statement could have been taken from a summary or abbreviation, but only the *Epitome Campililiensis* is known,[37] which does not contain the sentence either. If we are to take the Summist's attribution seriously, this leaves us with the task of identifying a doctrine – rather than an exact wording – that expresses this conclusion. In this task, we are guided by a later remark in the *Summa*.[38] In one of the later additions to Book II,[39] we find the following reference to Isaac Israeli:

> For the human being is the most composite among all creatures, as it is claimed in the *Fons vitae*, and as has been touched upon above. Because of this, Isaac says in *De elementis*: The human being is last in natural generation.[40]

Here, the passage is easier to identify. The claim can be found almost verbatim in the first book of *De elementis* as a summary of what Isaac had written before:

> It is, therefore, already clear that the human body is the last [body] in the generation of natural [things], and it is their end. This is why it truly merits the name of composition and its meaning (*eius intentionem*). As this is, therefore, thus, there is no uncertainty that the middle things (*media*) that are between the human body and the elements are composite and simple in a way similar to the soul. For each of those is simple compared to that which is made from it, and composite compared to that from which it is generated. For example, the instrumental body parts are simple compared to the body made from them, and composite compared to the parts of [self-]similar body parts (*ad membra similium partium*), because they are made from them.[41]

[36] See Dold, "Why Do Animals Have Parts?", 142.
[37] See Loris Sturlese, "L'*Epitome Campililiensis* del *Fons vitae* di Avicebron. Note sul testo e sulla tradizione manoscritta," in *Palaeographica, diplomatica et archivistica: studi in onore di Giulio Battelli*, edited by G. Battelli (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1979), 429-453.
[38] See Luca Parisoli, *La Summa fratris Alexandri e la nascita della filosofia politica francescana: riflessioni dall'ontologia delle norme alla vita sociale* (ParmaOfficina di Studi Medievali, 2008), 34, footnote 50.
[39] See Doucet, "Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I", CCLXXX.
[40] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, Ti2, C2 (n. 460), Respondeo, 599b (my translation): "Homo enim inter omnes creaturas est compositissimus, sicut habetur in libro *Fontis vitae*, et ut supra tactum est. Propter quod dicit Isaac, in libro *De elementis*: 'Homo in naturali generatione ultimum est.'"
[41] Isaac Israeli, *Liber de elementis*, in *Omnia opera Ysaac*, vol. 1 (Lyon, 1515), https://www.arabic-latin-corpus.philosophie.uni-wuerzburg.de/text/Isaac_Elem_la.index.xhtml, 4vb31-40 (my translation): "Iam ergo manifestum est quod corpus humanum postremum est generationum naturalium et finis earum: et propter hoc meretur nomen compositionis: et eius intentionem secundum veritatem. Cum id ergo ita sit: tunc non est dubium quin media que sunt inter corpus humanum et elementa: sunt composita et simplicia secundum similem modum anime.

This goes on for lower levels – the humours, plants, food, and the elements.[42] There are several levels of composition in the human body because each level is defined by something that is simple with respect to something else, which is, in turn, composed of it: the elements are simpler than vegetative matter, which is composed of elements, but simpler than food, which is simpler than the humours, which are simpler than self-similar body parts – that is to say, body parts like flesh and bone, whose parts are also flesh and bone, respectively – and self-similar body parts are simpler than instrumental body parts – that is to say, organic body parts or organs, like a hand. These last ones compose the human body. In this chain of levels, the two special positions are taken up by the elements, which are composite with respect to nothing and simple with respect to everything, and the human body, which is composite with respect to everything and simple with respect to nothing. As the human body has all bodily levels, it can be said to be maximally composite, which reveals a second sense of the claim that the human body is maximally composite: it is composed of the maximum number of ontological levels.

We have already encountered an analogue of such ontological levels in Section 2 in the context of the *Summa*'s commitment to multiple types of substantial forms characterised through their relation to matter: a first form, like that of an element or of a mixture, perfects both the whole matter and its parts; other natural forms, such as the vegetative or sensitive form, perfect the whole matter in one way and its parts in another way; lastly, the rational soul perfects only the whole matter. A complex body contains several such forms as different levels. This is a link to the *Fons vitae*, whose ontology builds on the idea of different levels. For Avicebron, these levels or substances include God (at the top), then intelligence, the rational soul, the sensitive soul, the vegetative soul, nature, body, and corporeal body (at the bottom).[43] They are related to each other like form to matter,[44] but they are also related by action. In *Fons vitae* III, 47, this is put as follows:

Unumquodque enim eorum est simplex comparatione sua ad illud quod factum est ex eo et compositum comparatione sui ad illud ex quo ipsum est generatum: verbi gratia. Membra instrumentalia simplicia sunt comparatione sua ad corpus factum ex eis: et composita comparatione sua ad membra similium partium: quoniam facta sunt ex eis."

[42] See Isaac Israeli, *Liber de elementis*, 4vb40-50: "et membra partium similium sunt simplicia comparatione sui ad membra instrumentalia facta ex eis: et composita comparatione sui ad sperma et sanguinem et vtramque choleram (*corr.*; *editio:* cholera) et phlegma. Et sperma et sanguis et reliqui humores sunt composite (*corr.*; *editio:* simplices) comparatione sui ad cibum: et cibus est simplex comparatione sui ad sperma et sanguinem et reliquos humores: et compositus comparatione sui ad plantas et arbores: et plante et arbores sunt simplices comparatione sui ad cibum: et composite comparatione sui ad elementa. Elementa vero sunt simplicia secundum veritatem: quoniam nihil precedit ea ex quo generantur nisi virtus diuina."

[43] See the helpful illustration in Nicola Polloni, *The Twelfth-Century Renewal of Latin Metaphysics: Gundissalinus's Ontology of Matter and Form* (Toronto: PIMS, 2020), 164.

[44] This holds at least if the *Fons vitae* is read through the lens of a "compositional thesis"; see Polloni, *The Twelfth-Century Renewal of Latin Metaphysics*, 146.

> But what is more perfect, acts upon the less perfect and impresses [itself] upon it.[45]

The higher substance, therefore, acts upon the lower substance. It is easy to see the parallel of this model to the *Summa*'s treatment of the soul in relation to its body. Recall here from Section 2 that the Summist argues that the human soul is its own substance that moves the body; that is to say, it is a higher substance acting upon its own body, a substance below.

Moreover, in *Fons vitae* III, 47, Avicebron goes on to claim that the actions proper to the higher substance are like species to the genus constituted by the actions of the lower substance. This can be illustrated by the actions of the vegetative soul upon nature. The actions proper to the latter level or substance are "to attract and retain, to change and repel".[46] The actions proper to the vegetative soul, on the other hand, are to grow, that is, "to move vegetative parts from the centre to the extremes", and to generate, that is, "to create a similar thing from itself".[47] As within a plant, "to attract and to repel mean to move parts of food in space through an opposite motion",[48] they "must be under one genus [together] with the motion of the vegetative parts from the centre to the extremes" (i.e., vegetation).[49] In other words, growth and generation are like species of the genera of attraction and repulsion. The same holds for retention and change.[50] In this way, the actions of a higher level or substance are like species of the actions proper to a lower level or substance. For Avicebron, this means that:

> [...] it is necessary that one of the substances performing these actions impress one of its own powers upon the other [substance], through which it acts what it acts.[51]

Here, the reader should recall a position found in the *Summa* (see Section 2): a form does not move the matter whose act it is, but a matter below it. In a living body, for example, "the vital motion is contrary to the motion of nature", so in an animal, there are not only the natural movements of "up", "down", and "circular", but also movements to the left and right, back and forth.[52] These ideas form the background of the argument

[45] Avicebron, *Fons vitae*. III, 47, 185.8-10 (my translation): "Quod autem perfectius est, agit in minus prefectum et imprimit in illud." See Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought*, 98.
[46] Avicebron, *Fons vitae*, III, 47, 184.15 (my translation): "Attrahere et retinere, mutare et pulsare."
[47] Avicebron, III, 47, 184.19-20 (my translation): "Generare est procreare rem ex se consimilem; uegetare est mouere partes uegetabiles a centro ad extrema."
[48] Avicebron, III, 47, 184.21-22 (my translation): "Attrahere autem et pulsare est mouere partes alimenti in loco motu opposito."
[49] Avicebron, III, 47, 184.22-23 (my translation): "Ergo debent esse sub uno genere cum motu partium uegetabilium a centro ad extrema."
[50] Avicebron, III, 47, 184.24-185.2.
[51] Avicebron, III, 47, 185.4-6 (my translation): "[...] debet ut una substantiarum agentium has actiones sit imprimens in aliam unam uim ex suis uiribus per quam agit id quod agit."
[52] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 321), 386b-387a (my translation): "[...] in hoc discernitur vitam habens a non vivente, quia motus vitalis est in contrarium motui naturae. Videmus enim quod secundum motum naturae grave fertur deorsum et leve sursum, secundum motum vero nutrimenti grave fertur sursum, sicut apparet in plantis, et quod igneum est, ut

found in the *Summa*. In the next subsection, I shall present the structure of the shorter form of the argument in the context of its Jewish Neoplatonic sources.

3.2 Structure

In my translation of the argument for the maximal composition of the human body from the *Summa Halensis*, I have already indicated its division into parts. These parts can be summarised as follows:

- **Premiss 1:** The rational soul effects a maximum number of operations.
- **Premiss 2:** The rational soul can have operations of this kind only if its body has organs.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the human body is maximally composite.

While no proper justification of Premiss 2 is offered – we shall see in the next subsection that this is parallel to contemporary zoological occurrences – we find an appeal to a very abstract hierarchical principle, attributed again to the *Fons vitae*, for justifying Premiss 1. Here, we face the same problem as above when it comes to finding the passage the Summist is quoting from. However, hierarchical principles like this one abound in the *Fons vitae*, so it is at least not surprising why such a statement would be attributed to this work. We have already encountered the principle that the more perfect something is, the more it acts and impresses itself. The same is believed to hold for what is subtler:[53]

> The subtler, stronger, and better [substances] are, the more fit they are to act and impose (*ad agendum et conferendum*) themselves and [what is] theirs.[54]

Likewise,

> the more removed from thickness and darkness [a substance] is, the closer it will be to imposing itself [...].[55]

cholera, fertur deorsum in animalibus, cum nutritur simile simili. Item, motu naturali fertur aliquid sursum vel deorsum vel orbiculariter; sed motu animali fertur in ante vel retro vel dextrorsum vel sinistrorsum, sicut in animalibus; ergo discernitur motus vitalis a naturali." See Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 39-40.

[53] I owe the idea that *Fons vitae* III, 15 is a source to Pietro Rossi, "L'entrata dei libri *De animalibus* nel Medioevo latino", in *La zoologia di Aristotele e la sua ricezione dall'età ellenistica e romana alle culture medievali. Atti del convegno*, edited by M. M. Sassi, E. Coda, and G. Feola (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2018), 237-268, 260.

[54] Avicebron, *Fons vitae*, III, 15, 110.21-22 (my translation): "Quanto fuerint subtiliores et fortiores et meliores, tanto sunt magis aptae ad agendum et conferendum se et sua."

[55] Avicebron, *Fons vitae*, III, 15, 111.3-4 (my translation): "[...] quanto remotior fuerit a crassitudine et tenebrositate, propinquior erit ad conferendum se [...]."

The close connection between immateriality and activity is expressed clearly in the following passage:

> [...] we have found a bodily substance [i.e., matter] that is prevented from imposing itself on account of its thickness of quantity and its darkness, and yet quantity still imposes its shadow upon bodies that are opposite [to it], so much so that having found a bright body, it gives its [own] form to it. On this account, it is, therefore, all the more necessary that a spiritual substance that is immune from quantity exude (*sit effluens*) its essence, power, and light.[56]

The references to light and darkness are instances of Avicebron's frequently used metaphor that associates light with form and matter with darkness.[57] Hierarchical principles like these refer to the ontology of levels we have encountered in the previous subsection: higher substances, which are more spiritual, effect more operations in lower substances. While these principles have a clear directionality, the principle "The more some substance is immune from matter, the more operations it effects" in the *Summa* does not specify the direction of these operations, that is to say, it leaves open what the substances in question act upon. This means that the resulting argument does not make any *explicit* reference to ontological levels and substances that act downwards upon lower substances.

Yet, in light of the sources and the *Summa*'s doctrine on the human soul and body, more can be said. When Premiss 1 establishes that the human soul effects the maximum number of operations, then this must be read as saying that these operations are effected not in the underlying spiritual matter of the soul (i.e., in the matter whose act it is), but rather in the body whose mover the soul is. This explains why Premiss 2 posits that there must be a material complexity in the body that *responds* to these operations – and this complexity is the maximal composition out of organs and all the elements. However, note that as written, the argument does not provide all these details. They only become clear in the context of the sources and other doctrines. I believe that it is this feature of being more neutral with respect to metaphysical commitments that makes it possible for this argument to appear in zoological commentaries of the thirteenth century. There, of course, the form of the argument is used to yield the conclusion that the animal body is composed of organs.

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[56] Avicebron, *Fons vitae*, III, 15, 110.11-18 (my translation): "[...] nos inuenimus substantiam corpoream prohibitam ad conferendum se propter crassitudinem quantitatis et tenebrositatem eius, [et] tamen quantitas confert umbram suam corporibus quae opposita sunt, adeo quod, cum inuenerit corpus lucidum, dat ei formam suam: quanto magis necessarium est secundum hanc considerationem ut substantia spiritualis, quae immunis est a quantitate, sit effluens suam essentiam et uirtutem et lumen suum." I follow the reading of manuscript M (diverging form the editor's established text).

[57] See Polloni, *The Twelfth-Century Renewal of Latin Metaphysics*, 150; Vincent Cantarino, "Ibn Gabirol's Metaphysic of Light", *Studia Islamica* 26 (1967): 49-71.

In the following subsection, I shall discuss the arguments in the question commentaries of Peter of Spain and Albert the Great, but beforehand I want to draw attention to an apparent problem that befalls the shorter form of the argument, namely, that the way in which Premiss 1 is established is argumentatively wasteful in two ways. First, the comparative principle "The more some substance is immune from matter, the more operations it effects" is used to establish an absolute claim (that the human soul effects the most operations). The gradation of operations effected is not really used in the argument. Second, matter, or rather immunity from matter, is invoked in the comparative principle, yet it does not seem pertinent to Premiss 1. In fact, it seems more related to Premiss 2, but it is not invoked at all in that context. So, if we assume that the Summist indeed meant to give the argument using this very principle depending on a hierarchy of remoteness from matter, then it is not correctly formalised in this shorter form. We shall see below that the longer form of the argument remedies this.

3.3 Zoological Commentaries

As I have shown elsewhere, the argumentative scheme just described is implemented by several commentators on Aristotle's *De animalibus*.[58] There, the form of the argument is used to establish the claim that all animals, not just humans, are organised, that is to say, composed of organic (i.e., instrumental, composite, and non-uniform) body parts. Already the earliest extant Latin commentary gives the same argument:[59]

Structure	Peter of Spain's argument
Premiss 1	[...] one argues as follows. The *Fons vitae* says that for every form, the more immaterial and spiritual it is, the more operations it is a principle of. Therefore, since the soul is a simpler form than the form of a mixture or of an element, it will be the principle of [multiple] operations.
Premiss 2	Therefore, it adds something on top of a form of this kind, which can only be a distinction in parts.
Conclusion	This distinction is nothing else but organisation. Therefore, organisation is necessary in animals.

The similarities to the version in the *Summa* are striking. Unfortunately, the historical lines of influence between the circle of Alexander of Hales in Paris in the 1240s and Peter's

[58] See Dold, "Why Do Animals Have Parts?", 130.

[59] Peter of Spain, *Questiones super libro De animalibus Aristotelis*, edited by F. Navarro Sánchez (London: Routledge, 2016), 118.6-11 (my translation): "[...] sic arguitur. Dicit autem liber *Fontis uite*, quod omnis forma quanto immaterialior et spiritualior, tanto plurium est operationum principium, ergo cum anima sit forma simplitior quam forma misti uel elementi, erit principium operationum. Addet ergo aliquid super huiusmodi formam, hoc nisi distinctionem in partibus. Que distinctio non est nisi organitatio, ergo necesse est esse organitationem in animalibus."

commentary are unclear, partly because there is no consensus on the date and place of composition of the latter. José Maria da Cruz Pontes and Tamara Goldstein-Préaud advocate a composition before 1245 in the context of the Parisian arts faculty while Miguel de Asúa suggests a composition between 1246 and 1249 at Siena.[60] Moreover, Peter's commentary does not reveal enough of his metaphysical commitments for us to understand where he would have agreed or disagreed with the Summist. We are in a better position with Albert the Great, who, in his question commentary on the *De animalibus* (dating to 1258), implements the same argumentative scheme – although his argument is less streamlined and contains more explanatory insertions:

> I must say that the diversity of organs is necessary for an animal. The reason for this is that the more a form is perfect, the more operations it can [perform]. But matter somewhat impedes operation; for a form joint to matter is contracted and limited through it. [...] Therefore, a form joint to uniform matter (*materiae uniformi*) has [only] a uniform activity. Hence, any part of fire is fire, and any part [of it] warms in the same way as the whole fire. [...] the soul is the principle of several operations. But as it is united with matter, it cannot perform multiple operations unless its matter is diversified (*diversificata*), for through uniform matter, it performs [only] a uniform operation. Therefore, if the whole body of an animal were like the eye, it would not hear, nor smell, and if the power were in [adequate] proportion, it would see through the whole body. Therefore, it is necessary that the body, which is the matter of the animal, be diversified in [its] parts, so its different works be performed through different parts. For if the body were of one kind (*unigeneum*) in its parts, then it would only perform actions of one kind (*actiones unigeneas*).[61]

Albert, in this passage, also makes use of a hierarchical principle, though he does not attribute it to the *Fons vitae*. This comes at no surprise in light of Albert's later *De causis et*

[60] See Tamara Goldstein-Préaud, "Albert le Grand et les questions du XIIIe siècle sur le 'De animalibus'", *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences* 3/1 (1981): 61-71, 64; José María da Cruz Pontes, *A obra filosófica de Pedro Hispano Portugalense* (Coimbra: Publicacões do Instituto de estudios filosóficos, 1972), 99-102; Miguel J. C. de Asúa, "Medicine and Philosophy in Peter of Spain's Commentary on *De Animalibus*", in *Aristotle's Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, edited by C. Steel, G. Guldentops, and P. Beullens (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), 189-211, 189.

[61] Albertus Magnus, *Quaestiones super libris De animalibus*, edited by E. Filthaut, *Opera omnia* 12 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 1951), I, q. 2, 79.30-52 (my translation): "Dicendum, quod diversitas organorum necessaria est animali. Huius ratio est, quia quanto forma est perfectior, tanto in plures potest operationes. [...] materia quodammodo est impeditiva operationis; forma enim alligata materiae per ipsam contrahitur et limitatur. [...] Forma igitur ligata materiae uniformi uniformem habet actionem. Unde quaelibet pars ignis est ignis et quaelibet pars calefacit sicut totus ignis. [...] anima [...] principium est plurium operationum. Sed plures operationes non potest exercere, cum sit materiae unita, nisi sua materia sit diversificata, quia per materiam uniformem uniformem exerceret operationem. Et ideo, si totum corpus animalis esset sicut oculus, non audiret nec olfaceret, et si virtus esset proportionata, videret per totum corpus. Et ideo requiritur, quod corpus, quod est materia animalis, in partibus sit diversificatum, ut per diversas partes diversa exerceantur opera, quia si corpus in partibus esset unigeneum, et ipsum animal tunc solas actiones unigeneas exerceret." See Dold, "Why Do Animals Have Parts?", 139-140.

processu universitatis (written before 1271), where he takes pains to list those opinions from Avicebron's *Fons vitae* which he finds disagreeable.[62] Among them is the doctrine of universal hylomorphism, the rejection of which forces him to add a qualification to his argument, stating that the proof only applies to bodily (i.e., for him, material) substances:

> [...] these things differ among lower and higher beings. For in higher beings, it is the case that the more perfect something is, the fewer movements it needs to reach its end. Hence, the highest sphere reaches its end through one single movement, and a lower one through several [movements]. [...] The reason for this is that those lower [beings] are joint to matter, and that the form principates action or movement and operation. As therefore, the more something is distant from matter, the more it partakes of the perfection of [its] form, so the more it is distant from matter, the more it partakes of operation. Therefore, among material beings, the human being – as the most perfect animal – reaches its end through several operations (*opera*). Hence, material and immaterial beings follow an opposite order. And the full reason for this is that in material beings, perfection is in remoteness from matter, but in immaterial beings, [it is reached] in closeness to the most simple principle.[63]

The picture that emerges from Albert's discussion is the following. There is a hierarchy among forms with respect to their perfection, rather than their immateriality, as in the *Summa* or in Peter's question commentary on the *De animalibus*. With respect to this hierarchy of forms, a comparative sequence can be formulated, which, however, only holds for forms of material substances: the forms of the elements (the least perfect forms), the forms of mixtures, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul (the most perfect form of material substances). According to the comparative sequence, the rational soul is the principle of more operations than the sensitive soul, the sensitive soul of more than the vegetative soul, and so forth. As uniform (i.e., homogeneous or homeomerous) matter can only support a uniform operation, but the sensitive and rational soul are principles of multiple operations, non-human animals and humans cannot have a uniform body. Albert's argument is not entirely conclusive with respect to what I call Premiss 2, because he fails to show in this passage why a non-uniform body

[62] See Albertus Magnus, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, edited by W. Fauser, *Opera omnia* 17.2 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 1993), I, tr. 1, c. 5, 10 - c. 6, 14; see Weisheipl, "Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism"; also Dag Nikolaus Hasse, "The Early Albertus Magnus and His Arabic Sources on the Theory of the Soul", *Vivarium* 46/3 (2008): 232-252, 236-237.

[63] Albertus Magnus, *Quaestiones super libris De animalibus*, I, q. 2, 79.53-80.10 (my translation): "[...] aliter est de istis inferioribus et superioribus. In superioribus enim est ita, quod quanto aliquid est perfectius, tanto paucioribus motibus attingit suum finem. [...] Et huius ratio est, quia illa inferiora coniuncta sunt materiae, et forma est principium agendi vel movendi et operandi. Sicut igitur quanto aliquid plus distat a materia, tanto plus habet de perfectione formae, sic quanto plus distat a materia, tanto plus habet de operatione. Et ideo inter materialia homo, cum sit animal perfectissimum, per plura opera attingit suum finem. Unde ordo est contrarius in materialibus et immaterialibus. Et tota ratio est, quia in materialibus perfectio attenditur penes remotionem a materia, sed in immaterialibus penes approximationem ad principium simplicissimum." See Dold, "Why Do Animals Have Parts?", 137.

must have organic parts, as I have previously stressed.[64] But what is interesting for us is that Albert is able to employ virtually the same argument that can also be found in the *Summa*, even though his hylomorphic theory is very different. For not only does he reject universal hylomorphism, he also argues against the plurality of substantial forms.[65] This suggests that the form of the argument is not sensitive to – that is, does not track or capture – all relevant underlying metaphysical assumptions of the Summist. Indeed, one of the additions to the second book of the *Summa* is a longer argument that refers to the shorter argument just discussed in order to supply more details. I discuss this longer argument in the following section.

4. The Longer Form of the Argument

In a later question of the *Summa Halensis*, the issue of the maximal composition of the human body is revisited, in a way that at first glance appears independent from the previous argument. However, a reader would quickly notice that essentially, the two premisses are justified again, albeit in more detail. In this section, I first present the way in which the Summist revisits the premisses one by one and stress the argumentative importance of a concept of "isomorphism". I, then, give a detailed reconstruction of the longer form of the argument.

4.1 Revisiting the Premisses

4.1.1 Premiss 2

The treatment starts with the more neglected Premiss 2:

> To this, we must say that the body of the first human, and the human body in general, is the most composite among all bodies. This pertains to it because of the manifold activity (*propter multiplicem actionem*) of its soul, which is brought about or exercised by means of motion both from the soul and to the soul. For since the soul is the likeness of everything, as is said in *De spiritu et anima*, bearing a certain image of God – because there is a multiplicity

[64] See Dold, "Why Do Animals Have Parts?", 140.

[65] See Albertus Magnus, *De caelo et mundo*, edited by P. Hossfeld, *Opera omnia* 5.1 (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 1971), III, tr. 2, c. 8, 240.56-68: "Adhuc autem, videbitur forte alicui quaerendum de formis substantialibus elementorum, utrum maneant in commixto ex elementis vel non. Si enim manere dicantur, tunc videbitur consequi necessario, quod compositum plures habeat formas substantiales, et ad hoc multa sequuntur inconvenientia, quorum unum et primum est, quia nihil simul suscipit multas formas substantiales, ergo nec compositum; adhuc autem, quia per multas formas substantiales poneretur in diversis speciebus; adhuc autem, quia non esset vere unum, sed potius esset contiguum vel per accidens unum, quae omnia absurda sunt." See David Twetten, Steven Baldner, and Steven C. Snyder, "Albert's Physics", in *A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences*, edited by I. M. Resnick (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 173-220, 174.

> (*multitudo*) of ideas in God – there is, in the soul, a multiplicty of powers (*multiplicitas virtualis*) that it exercises by means of the body. There must be in it a multiplicity of self-similar and organic parts (*multiplicitas partium consimilium et organizatarum*) so that there be a conformity between the mover and movable, as on the other side of the analogy (*sicut ex altera parte*), there is a conformity between image and that whose image it is.[66]

The *Summa*'s proposal here is not easy to disentangle. I take it that the concept of a certain type of relation is being introduced: the relation between an image and the imaged, between a representation and that which is represented by it. This relation is called "conformity", *con-formitas*, a likeness or correspondence of form. By analogy – as indicated through the phrase *sicut ex altera parte* – the relation of conformity is applied to the rational soul and its body. On the account of the *Summa* introduced in Section 2 above, both soul and body are hylomorphic compounds: the human soul is composed of a form (combining the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers) as well as spiritual matter while the human body consists of a plurality of substantial forms, held together by the form of the body, as well as extended matter bearing quantity. Accordingly, there is a conformity between the human soul and the human body if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between *all* three powers of the soul (i.e., the vegetative, sensitive, and rational power) and *all* forms of the body.

Already, the passage just quoted suggests that a plurality of substantial forms of the body translates into a certain material complexity and composition out of parts. Why this is so will become clear in the context of justifying Premiss 1. In order to prepare a unified account of the justification of the two premisses, I shall henceforth call the conformity relation an *isomorphism*, using the more recent term familiar from modern logic and mathematics, which, roughly speaking, denotes a one-to-one correspondence between *structures*. By using this term, I highlight that what is at stake in the *Summa*'s strategy to justify Premiss 2 is the structural correspondence between the soul and its three powers on the one hand, and the body and its forms on the other hand. We shall see that Premiss 1 is also justified on the basis of an isomorphism: that between the body and its forms, and the body and its parts.

But before turning to the first premiss, the *Summa* argues for the first isomorphism (in the context of Premiss 2) through three examples: sensation, cognition, and will. With respect to the power of sensing, the isomorphism is justified as follows:

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[66] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, T1, M3, C1 (n. 453), Solutio, 578b (my translation): "Ad hoc dicendum quod corpus primi hominis et generaliter corpus humanum est compositissimum inter omnia corpora: quod conveniebat propter multiplicem actionem ipsius animae, quae tum elicitur sive exercetur mediante motu qui est ab anima, tum qui est ad animam. Cum enim anima sit omnium similitudo, ut dicitur libro *De spiritu et anima*, et quamdam gerens Dei imaginem ex hoc quod in Deo est multitudo idearum, in anima multiplicitas virtualis quam exercet mediante corpore, necessario requiritur quod in illo sit multiplicitas partium consimilium et organizatarum, ut sit conformitas inter motorem et mobile, sicut ex altera parte est conformitas inter imaginem et illud cuius est imago."

> This is clear from the motion among things from outside into the soul. For it has to receive sensibles from different senses, for the apprehension of which a multiplicity of organs is needed, and through which – when apprehended – the soul is moved.[67]

The Summist then cites a simile found in Gregory of Nyssa's *De imagine* that likens the soul to a city. The *Summa* uses this to emphasise that the mind receives various sensations and then orders them internally. The *Summa* concludes:

> Therefore, it is clear that if the nature of the body were merely simple, [the body] would not be an organ adequate (*congruum*) for the soul, neither regarding apprehension, nor regarding motion or operation.[68]

The second instance is taken from the cognitive powers. There are three cognitive powers in the soul, and in line with the isomorphism, there should hence be three relevant parts in the body – and according to the Summist, this is indeed the case:

> Moreover, as those knowledgable in medicine put it, there are three cells serving the cognitive powers: the imaginative (*phantastica*), the logical (*logistica*), and the memory (*memorialis*) cell. The imaginative cell is in the front of the head, where imagination has its seat; the logical cell is in the middle, where reason has its seat; the memory cell is in the back of the head, where memory has its seat. [...] Likewise, some bodily organ serves the operating intellect, which is clear from the Philosopher, who says that the intellect is corrupted, that is to say, the activity or operation of the intellective [power is corrupted] when a certain front [part] is corrupted.[69]

The third justification comes from a consideration of the will:

> Moreover, the same is clear from the motion that comes from the soul, according to that which is treated in another [branch of] philosophy, to wit, in the first book of the

[67] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, T1, M3, C1 (n. 453), Solutio, 578b (my translation): "Hoc patet ex motu in rebus extra ad animam: habet enim recipere sensibilia diversorum sensuum, in quorum apprehensione opus erat multiplicitate organorum, quibus apprehensis anima movetur."

[68] Alexander de Hales, *SH II,* In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, T1, M3, C1 (n. 453), Solutio, 578b (my translation): "Unde patet quod, si tantum simplex esset natura corporis, non esset organum congruum animae neque quoad apprehensionem neque quoad motum sive operationem."

[69] Alexander de Hales, *SH II,* In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, T1, M3, C1 (n. 453), Solutio, 578b-579a (my translation): "Praeterea, sicut ponunt noti in medicina, tres sunt cellulae deservientes viribus cognitivis, scilicet phantastica, logistica et memorialis. Phantastica cellula est in anteriori parte capitis, in qua sedem suam habet imaginatio; logistica cellula est in medio, in qua sedem suam habet ratio; memorialis cellula est in posteriori parte capitis, in qua sedem suam habet memoria. [...] Similiter ipsi intellectui operanti deservit aliquod organum corporale, quod patet ex Philosopho dicente quod corrumpitur intellectus, id est actus sive operatio intellectivae, interiori quodam corrupto." John of La Rochelle was the first Latin thinker to clarify the powers of the soul systematically, and the division of the brain given here can be found in his *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, where he follows Avicenna; see Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought*, 139-145.

> *Nicomachean Ethics*: there is a rational motive [force] that commands and is not commanded, such as free will or (*sive*) practical intellect, which indeed commands all other motive [forces] and is itself (*sibi*) commanded by none; but there is another motive [force] that is subject to the command of reason, to which also another power (*vis*) is subject, such as the concupiscible and irrascible, to which the sensitive power, sitting in the muscles and sinews, is subject, which, as Avicenna says, follows when it is commanded by a higher motive power. Therefore, the execution of the command of motive powers needs organs.[70]

Therefore, the isomorphism between the powers of the rational soul and the various types of forms of the human body is what underpins the truth of Premiss 2 for the Summist.

4.1.2 Premiss 1

The author of the *Summa*, then, transitions to arguing for the truth of the Premiss 1 as follows:

> But there is a twofold cause for the multitude of actions of this kind: the immateriality of the soul and the substantial identity of different powers.[71]

The "twofold cause" is not to be understood here as adducing two different reasons: it is one reason that has two aspects to it. More to the point, the immateriality of the rational soul provides a sufficient reason precisely because of the substantial identity of the rational, sensitive, and vegetative powers in a human being:

> Again, the other cause is the substantial identity of different powers. For many powers are in the same substance: the rational soul. But this is clear because the vegetative, sensitive, and rational [soul] do not differ in substance in a human being. For there is one soul, the rational [one], not differ in substance from the vegetative and sensitive [soul], from which come vegetation and sensation in a human being. Therefore, the distinction that in plants comes from the vegetative soul [...] and the distinction that in brute [animals] comes through organs from the sensitive [soul], in the human being, come from the rational soul, which is unique to a human being, [and] whose parts or powers (*potentiae*) are sensitive and vegetative (*sensitiva et vegetativa*). And besides these distinctions, there is another one added,

[70] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, T1, M3, C1 (n. 453), Solutio, 579a (my translation): "Praeterea, hoc idem patet ex motu qui est ab anima, secundum quod determinatur in alia Philosophia, scilicet in *Ethicis*, I, quod est motiva rationalis imperans et non imperata, ut liberum arbitrium sive intellectus practicus, scilicet quae omnibus aliis motivis imperat et a nulla sibi imperatur; alia autem est motiva, quae subiecta est imperio rationis, cui etiam alia vis subicitur, sicut concupiscibilis et irascibilis, quibus subiecta est vis sensibilis sita in musculis et lacertis, sicut dicit Avicenna, quae exequitur imperata a motivis superioribus: unde executio imperii motivarum organa requirit."

[71] Alexander de Hales, *SH II,* In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, T1, M3, C1 (n. 453), Solutio, 579a (my translation): "Multitudinis autem actionum huiusmodi duplex est causa, scilicet animae immaterialitas et virtutum diversarum substantialis identitas."

> which is attained with respect to interior and motive organs, as is clear from what has been said.[72]

But in what way is the immateriality of the soul part of the reason for the truth of Premiss 1? Recall from above that a fundamental ingredient in the argument was a hierarchical principle that leant on immateriality. But how can the immateriality be established? The Summist here reprises a theme we have already encountered in Section 2, the plurality of substantial forms:

> About the first [point], it is spoken in the *Fons vitae* where it is said: "The more some substance is immune from matter, the more operations it effects." The immateriality of this [substance, i.e., the rational soul] is clear as follows. There are many types of form (*multiplex enim est forma*). For some forms perfect [their] parts and the whole in a similar way, such that the parts receive their name from the perfection of the whole – of this kind are the forms of the elements; and the parts receive their name from the perfection [of the whole] because of the extension (*propter distensionem*) of the matter and its parts. Therefore, since the whole perfection, which the form gives, is in any part of the matter, any part of fire is said to heat, and any part of fire is said to be fire, and so also in the case of the other elements. Therefore, a form of this type communicates [its] act and generic completeness (*complementum in genere suo*) or (*sive*) [its] operation and name to its parts, as has been said. Since a form of this type is maximally material and extended (*distensa*) with respect to the dimension of its matter, it does not require a distinction of the parts of its perfectible (*sui perfectibilis*). Other forms are less material, such as those that do not have an extension in matter, and are not extended with respect to the extension of their matter. Of this type are the vegetative soul in plants, the sensitive [soul] in brute [animals], and the rational or intellective soul.[73]

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[72] Alexander de Hales, *SH II,* In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, T1, M3, C1 (n. 453), Solutio, 580a (my translation): "Item, alia causa est virtutum diversarum substantialis identitas. Multae enim virtutes sunt in eadem substantia, scilicet animae rationalis. Hoc autem patet per hoc quod vegetativa, sensitiva et rationalis non differunt in substantia in homine: una enim est anima, scilicet rationalis, indifferens in substantia a vegetativa et sensitiva, a qua est vegetatio et sensificatio in homine. Unde distinctio, quae est in plantis ab anima vegetativa [...] et distinctio quae est in brutis per organa a sensitiva, sunt in homine ab anima rationali, quae unica est in homine, cuius partes vel potentiae sunt sensitiva et vegetativa. Et praeter has distinctiones addita est alia, quae attenditur penes interiora organa et motiva, ut patet ex dictis." By claiming a substantial identity of all powers of the soul, the Summist takes a position on a problem heavily debated at the time; see Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought*, 104-127.

[73] Alexander de Hales, *SH II*, In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, T1, M3, C1 (n. 453), Solutio, 579a-b (my translation): "De primo dicitur in libro *Fontis vitae*, ubi dicitur: 'Quanto substantia aliqua magis est immunis a materia, tanto plurium operationum est effectiva.' Immaterialitas autem huius patet sic: multiplex enim est forma; quaedam enim formae perficiunt partes et totum similiter, ita quod partes denominantur a perfectione totius, cuiusmodi sunt formae elementorum; et denominantur partes a perfectione propter distensionem materiae et partium eius: unde, quia tota perfectio, quam dat forma, est in qualibet parte materiae, ideo dicitur quod quaelibet pars ignis calet et quaelibet pars ignis est ignis et ita de aliis elementis. Unde forma huiusmodi

Before presenting the next paragraph that discusses the ways in which the three souls are immaterial, and their degree of immateriality, it is worth pausing and reflecting on the Summist's proof strategy. Why is it that the forms of the elements are maximally material? Because of the way the form is present in its corresponding matter, and more precisely because the elements do not have material parts that differ from the whole in name and definition! At first glance, this answer seems question begging at best, if not outright circular. For recall that although we are currently trying to establish that the soul causes a plurality of operations (Premiss 1), the overall goal is to show that the human body is maximally composite (Conclusion). But here we find part of the argument that already presupposes such compositions and uses it for the argument – at least for the elements, but we shall see that it will continue like this up to the rational soul. But appearances can be deceptive, which becomes clear when analysing the proof strategy through the lens of an isomorphism. What is actually involved is a certain isomorphism, but this time a different one. While for Premiss 2, we needed that the three powers of the soul correspond to forms of the body, here we need that forms of the body correspond to parts of the body. The *Summa Halensis* indeed continues in this vein for the vegetative and sensitive souls:

> The vegetative soul perfects the whole and the parts of its matter, but not in a similar way. For it perfects the whole by giving it its own act and by infusing it with life and the completeness of its genus. It communicates [its] act to the parts, but non its completeness in act, but only in potency. For the parts of the plant live, yet a part of the plant is not a plant in act, but only in potency. But the sensitive soul perfects the whole matter and its parts, but [also] not in a similar way. For it communicates its act and completeness to the whole, but it communicates the act to parts [of the animal], yet not to all. For not all parts of an animal can sense, such as neither bones, nor hoofs, nor [anything] of this kind. Nor does it communicate completeness to its parts, neither in act, nor in potency. For a part of an animal cannot become an animal, such as part of a plant [can be] a plant – and we speak here of parts that are properly called parts, such as body parts (*membra*) that can be divided by self-similar and functional body parts. For when a part of a plant is cut off, it becomes a plant, but [when] a part of an animal [is cut off] at no point [does it become an animal]. Therefore, the vegetative [soul], which communicates life and potency close to completeness to [its] parts, than the sensitive [soul], which communicates the sense not to all parts, and completeness to no part of the sensible, neither in act nor in potency.[74]

communicat actum et complementum in genere suo partibus suis sive operationem et denominationem, ut dictum est; et huiusmodi forma, quia maxime est materialis et distensa secundum distensionem suae materiae, non requirit distinctionem partium sui perfectibilis. Aliae sunt formae minus materiales, ut quae non habent distensionem in materia neque distenduntur secundum distensionem suae materiae: cuiusmodi sunt anima vegetativa in plantis, sensitiva in brutis et anima rationalis sive intellectiva [...]."

[74] Alexander de Hales, *SH II,* In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, T1, M3, C1 (n. 453), Solutio, 579b (my translation): "Anima vegetativa perficit totum et partes suae materiae, sed dissimiliter: perficit enim totum dando illi actum suum, influendo ei vitam et complementum generis sui; partibus autem

The rational or intellective soul truly goes beyond matter because it "does not communicate [its] act to the parts, nor completeness or operation and name, because neither is [any] part of its matter a human being, nor does [any] part understand". And so, its form "is the least material" and is "further away from the nature of matter or materiality".[75] The rational soul is, therefore, the most "immune from matter", thus effecting the greatest number of operations, by the principle from the *Fons vitae*.

This is how the Summist revisits the premisses of the shorter form of the argument. Yet, a reader might still be left puzzled by how the longer form is supposed to work. I shall, therefore, give a more coherent reconstruction and streamlined presentation of this form in the next subsection. My reconstruction will heavily rely on the two isomorphisms introduced.

4.2 Reconstructing the Argument

The passages quoted and discussed in the previous subsection are meant to provide further details to the argument already presented in a shorter form earlier in the *Summa*. However, the Summists presentation of the longer form suggests an argumentative form altogether different from the shorter version. Summarising Section 4.1, I propose the following reconstruction of the longer form of argument for the claim that the human body is maximally composed.

Step 1: Setting up the problem (Section 4.1.1). As presented in Section 2, the human soul is one in its three powers. Moreover, the bodily form of the human holds together a plurality of substantial forms. The Summist identifies, and through examples – we might

communicat actum, sed non complementum in actu, sed solum in potentia: partes enim plantae vivunt, non tamen pars plantae est planta actu, sed solum in potentia. Anima autem sensitiva perficit totam materiam suam et partes, sed dissimiliter: toti enim communicat actum et complementum, sed partibus communicat actum, non tamen omnibus: non enim omnes partes animalis sentiunt, sicut nec ossa nec ungulae et huiusmodi; nec partibus communicat complementum nec actu nec potentia: pars enim animalis non potest fieri animal, sicut pars plantae planta – et loquimur de partibus quae proprie dicuntur partes, ut membra quae dividuntur per membra consimilia et officialia – pars enim plantae abscissa efficitur planta, pars autem animalis numquam. Magis ergo materialis est vegetativa, quae communicat partibus plantae vitam et potentiam propinquam ad complementum, quam sensitiva, quae neque omnibus partibus communicat sensum et nulli sensibilis parti complementum neque actu neque potentia."

[75] Alexander de Hales, *SH II,* In4, Tr2, S2, Q1, T1, M3, C1 (n. 453), Solutio, p. 579b (my translation): "Alia autem est rationalis sive intellectiva, quae nec communicat partibus actum neque complementum sive operationem et denominationem, quia nec pars eius materiae est homo nec pars intelligit; et sic patet quod haec forma est minime materialis. Anima ergo rationalis principatum tenet inter formas et plus elongatur a natura materiae sive materialitate; unde ipsa est forma nobilis et multarum operationum principium, et propter hoc necesse est multas esse compositiones et distinctiones in partibus corporis, cui unita est, ut quibus mediantibus multiplices eius potentiae progrediantur in actus suos."

say, inductively – argues for, an isomorphism between the soul with respect to its three powers and the human body with respect to its substantial forms. This isomorphism is an expression of the difference between the form of the body, which makes its matter what it is, and the mover of the body, that is to say, the human soul. Consequently, in order to understand the material composition of the human body, it suffices to study the substantial forms inherent in the body. This first step, therefore, sets up the problem.

Step 2: Enumeration of the types of substantial forms (Section 4.1.2). In a second step the Summist assumes a second isomorphism, according to which there is a one-to-one correspondence between all substantial forms of a body and the different parthood structures of its matter. Through a combinatorial analysis, one then enumerates all possible types of substantial forms. This works as follows. Given a piece of matter that has quantitative parts, we can examine the way in which the form bestows upon it the completeness (C) of its genus and its activity (A). If both C and A are bestowed on all parts of the matter, we have an elemental form. If A is bestowed upon all parts, but C is bestowed upon all parts only in potency, we have a vegetative form. It seems that there is no corresponding form for the theoretically conceivable cases in which C is bestowed on all parts potentially, but A only on some, C is bestowed on some potentially and A on all or some. The next form is the one where C is bestowed on none, but A on some parts. This is the sensitive form. Moreover, if both C and A are bestowed on no parts, we have the rational soul. This is a complete enumeration of all bodily forms. This enumerative step can be summarised in a table, where I also supply the cases not relevant to the Summist:

Completeness (C)	Activity (A)	Type of form
All parts in act	All parts	Elemental form (or form of mixtures)
All parts in potency	All parts	Vegetative form
All parts in potency	Some parts	–
Some parts in potency	All parts	–
Some parts in potency	Some parts	–
No parts	Some parts	Sensitive form
No parts	No parts	Rational soul

For each type of form, there is, accordingly, a type of matter whose act the form is. We can see from the table that the rational soul is separate from the matter of the body. Moreover, from Step 1, we know that on account of the isomorphism, there must be three types of substantial forms held together by the bodily form. From the table, we can see that these must be a form of mixtures, the vegetative form, and the sensitive form. These correspond to levels in the material composition of the human body: elemental matter or matter of a mixture (i.e., uniform matter), vegetative matter (i.e., quasi-organic matter that is non-uniform in the way roots are non-uniform), and sensitive matter (i.e., organic matter). This shows that the human body is maximally composite – both formally, containing the maximum number of substantial forms, and materially, containing the maximum number of levels.

This reconstruction is compatible with the broad strokes of the *Summa*'s hylomorphic theory summarised in Section 2. Step 2, which spells out some features of the isomorphism between the form of the body and the matter of the body, gives further substance to the claim that according to the Summist, the main function of the form in a hylomorphic compound is to make its matter what it is.[76] Concretely, the *type* of quantitative parts of matter – that is to say, uniform parts, quasi-organic parts, or organic parts – are determined by the *type* of its form, which in turn is characterised through the way it relates to its matter (with respect to C and A).

This line of reasoning works very beautifully when applied to human beings. It is also possible to extend it to non-human animals. In this case too, the soul, which has two powers (i.e., vegetative and sensitive), is a substance different from the body of the animal (see Section 2).[77] Running the analogous argument, we obtain that the bodily form must hold together two types of substantial forms: a form of mixtures and the vegetative form. While at first glance, this sounds wrong – an animal should clearly have organic parts – the reader should recall that the sensitive form also has its own matter whose act it is. Unlike in the case of the rational soul, this matter is not non-bodily intellectual matter, but contributes another level to the body. Materially, an animal body, therefore, has the same number of levels as a human body. However, it can be plausibly assumed that the rational soul requires a greater degree of difference and distinction in the organic parts, which makes the human body more complex.[78]

Setting this last issue aside, the Summist's proof strategy can thus be rather straightforwardly applied to animals. This provides a basis for comparison between the account in the *Summa* and in Albert the Great's zoological question commentary. I believe that my reconstruction highlights a strength of the Summist's account for the purposes of natural philosophy. The *Summa* can be read as delineating an *intrinsic picture* of the relation between substantial form(s) and matter in a hylomorphic compound: in a human being, there are multiple powers *in* the soul, multiple substantial forms *in* the body, and multiple types of quantitative parts *in* the matter of the body; and these are seen as isomorphic or structurally equivalent. Applying this picture to the shorter form of the argument, we see that justifying Premiss 2 – which is the hard part for someone like Albert – becomes very easy: the isomorphic relation between form and matter simply *means* that the formal complexity (in terms of operations of which the soul is a principle) *has to* correspond to a material complexity in terms of various levels of composition.

For Albert too, there are multiple powers in the soul, multiple operations effected by these powers, and multiple instrumental parts of the body; and just as in the *Summa*, he also presupposes a tight connection between the kinds of operation and the kinds of parts. However, for him, the composition out of various *levels* cannot be established solely on the basis of the *formal structure* of the body because Albert is no pluralist with respect to

[76] See Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 48.
[77] See Bieniak, "The Soul-Body Union in the Summa Halensis", 40.
[78] See Köhler, *Homo animal nobilissimum*, 6-9.

substantial forms. In the absence of multiple substantial forms, a full argument for Albert – but one not presented by him in this context – would plausibly be one leaning on suppositional (or hypothetical) necessity and teleology, at least to some extent.[79] Yet, while this style of reasoning can serve well to establish why a given organ – say the eye – with a given material composition – pupil, iris, retina, and so on – has the composition it has, it is not immediately clear how to use it to establish that an organ like the eye needs to be composite and non-uniform in the first place, without supposing a specific composition already. For Albert it is, therefore, difficult to establish Premiss 2 in the sense needed for the argument, which is why the *Summa*'s metaphysical picture is, in this regard, argumentatively more powerful. This should not be surprising, but intuitive: approaches built on a formal pluralism have an obvious advantage over unitarian approaches insofar as an explanation of complexity is pursued.

5. Conclusion

When the author of the *Summa Halensis* presents the argument for the maximal composition of the human body in this theological treatise, he tackles the problem of how to cast a claim and a proof strategy (both of which go back to Jewish Neoplatonic sources, mainly the *Fons vitae*) into a form apt for scholastic argumentation. The dense shorter form proposed in the question about the composition of Adam's body out of all four elements does not, as I have shown, succeed in capturing the metaphysical assumptions behind it. Rather, this success is to be found in the later question about the general composition of the human body, where the pertinent metaphysical commitments are elaborated in detail. These are essentially the commitments to two isomorphisms:

1. An isomorphism between the human soul and its three powers on the one hand and the human body and its forms on the other hand;
2. An isomorphism between the human body and its forms on the one hand and the human body and its types of quantitative parts, that is, its levels of composition, on the other hand.

The shorter form of the argument fails to make explicit these two commitments, which come with the kind of hylomorphic theory espoused in the *Summa*. Yet, it is through the shorter rather than the longer form that the *Summa* is linked to contemporary zoological commentaries, perhaps precisely because it is more indifferent with respect to implicit metaphysical commitments. Someone like Albert the Great, for example, can only make use of this version of the argument because it is capable of qualifications that make it sufficiently congruent with his own, more Aristotelian

[79] See William A. Wallace, "Albertus Magnus and the Suppositional Necessity in the Natural Sciences", in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980*, edited by J. A. Weisheipl (Toronto: PIMS, 1983), 103-128.

commitments. This observation raises the question of influences between the authors, a question that remains open.

My study shows that the *Summa* is an important source for students of thirteenth-century natural philosophy. In the debate about the composition of the human body – and by extension of the body of animals – the Summist takes a definite position, making the argument given in the *Summa* relevant even beyond its immediate historical context. For problems of the composition of humans, animals, and plants are closely related to discussions about the material basis of life that are familiar to us mainly from later debates, for example through the historical opposition of vitalism and mechanicism in the early-modern period and after. Insofar as the *Summa* presents us with a premodern yet not strictly Aristotelian perspective on such issues, it can be seen as occupying an important, if neglected, place in the *longue durée* history of this debate.

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THE TWO-WILLS THEORY IN THE FRANCISCAN TRADITION: QUESTIONING AN ANSELMIAN LEGACY

LA TEORÍA DE LAS DOS VOLUNTADES EN LA TRADICIÓN FRANCISCANA: CUESTIONANDO EL LEGADO DE ANSELMO

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Abstract

The medieval Franciscan John Duns Scotus famously distinguished between two different wills, which are characterized by an affection for advantage or happiness and an affection for justice. He identified the source of his theory in the earlier medieval thinker, Anselm of Canterbury, who first articulated the distinction. This article will demonstrate, however, that there is significant disparity between Anselm and Scotus' understandings of the two wills. To this end, the article will explore the two wills theory articulated by Scotus' predecessors, Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, who together composed the so-called *Summa Halensis,* the founding text of the Franciscan intellectual tradition. These authors drew on John of Damascus' distinction between *thelesis* and *boulesis* to delineate the theory that Scotus attributed to Anselm. However, their theory was just as distant from the Damascene's original understanding as Scotus' was from Anselm. In demonstrating this, the article seeks to highlight the originality of the Franciscan theory while at the same time allowing its sources to be interpreted on their own terms.

Keywords

John Duns Scotus; *Summa Halensis*; Alexander of Hales; John of La Rochelle; Will; Justice; Affections; Happiness; Passions; Augustine, Anselm, John of Damascus

Resumen

El franciscano medieval Juan Duns Escoto distinguía entre dos voluntades diferentes, caracterizadas por una inclinación hacia el beneficio o la felicidad y una inclinación hacia la justicia. Identificó la fuente de su teoría en el pensador medieval predecesor, Anselmo de Canterbury, quien fue el primero en articular tal distinción. Sin embargo, este artículo demostrará que existe una disparidad significativa entre la comprensión de las dos voluntades en Anselmo y en Escoto. Con este

fin, el artículo explorará la teoría de las dos voluntades articulada por los predecesores de Escoto, Alejandro de Hales y Juan de La Rochelle, quienes compusieron la llamada *Summa Halensis*, el texto fundador de la tradición intelectual franciscana. Estos autores se basaron en la distinción de Juan de Damasco entre *thelesis* y *boulesis* para delinear la teoría que Escoto atribuyó a Anselmo. Sin embargo, su teoría estaba igualmente alejada del entendimiento original del Damasceno, al igual que la de Escoto lo estaba de Anselmo. Al demostrar esto, el artículo busca resaltar la originalidad de la teoría franciscana al mismo tiempo que permite que sus fuentes sean interpretadas en sus propios términos.

Palabras clave

Juan Duns Escoto; *Summa Halensis*; Alejandro de Hales; Juan de La Rochelle; voluntad; justicia; afectos; felicidad; pasiones; Agustín; Anselmo; Juan de Damasco

1. Introduction

In his *Ordinatio*, John Duns Scotus famously affirms that "every act of the will is elicited either from the affection for justice (*affectio iustitiae*) or from the affection for advantage (*affectio commodi*),"[1] which he describes in detail as follows:

> The first [affection] inclines the will supremely to advantage, while the second moderates it so that in eliciting an act, it does not have to follow its inclination. These two affections are nothing other than the same will insofar as it is intellective appetite and insofar as it is free; because, as was said, insofar as it is merely intellective appetite, it would be supremely inclined actually to the best intelligible (as in the case of the best visible and sight), but insofar as it is free, it can hold itself back in eliciting an act so that it does not follow the inclination – whether as to the substance of the act or as to the intensity of it – to which the power is naturally inclined.[2]

[1] *B. Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia, VIII: Ordinatio, Liber Secundus* (Vatican: Typis Vaticanis, 2001), d. 6, q. 2, ar. 1, 43: "Quia omnis actus voluntatis elicitus aut elicitur secundum affectionem iustitiae, aut commodi, secundum Anselmum." Thomas Williams gives a detailed account of the two affections in "The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus's Moral Philosophy", *The Thomist* 62 (1998): 193-215. See also Terence Irwin, "Scotus: Will, Freedom, and Reason", in *The Development of Ethics, vol. 1: From Socrates to the Reformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 654-678.

[2] Scotus, *Ordinatio,* d. 6, q. 2, ar. 1, 50: "Tamen distinguendo ex natura rei duas rationes primas istarum rationum, in quantum altera inclinat voluntatem summe ad commodum, altera autem quasi moderator eam, ne in eliciendo actum oporteat sequi inclinationem eius, nihil aliud sunt ista quam eadem voluntas, in quantum est appetitus intellectivus, et in quantum libera; quia, sicut dictum est, in quantum est appetitus mere intellectivus, summe inclinaretur actualiter ad optimum intelligibile (sicut est de optimo visibili et visu); in quantum tamen liber est, potest se refrenare in eliciendo actum, ne sequatur illam inclinationem, nec quantum ad substantiam actus, nec quantum ad intensionem, ad quam potentia naturaliter inclinatur".

As Scotus indicates here, the affection for advantage coincides with the natural human appetite for happiness or the fulfilment of human nature. Thus, it concerns what figures like Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas called the intellectual appetite or rational will. This affection is intrinsically bound to objects, whether sensory ones like wealth, health, and so on, or intelligible ones, like knowledge and success.[3] For this reason, it tends to prefer whatever may seem like the most advantageous of such objects at a given time. This poses a problem for Scotus in that what seems advantageous to a particular individual may not actually be compatible with justice, or more specifically, the will of God.

Thus, the affection for justice is required to orient the will towards God and thereby temper any inordinate desire for happiness that may conflict with the divine purposes. According to Scotus, the affection for justice can do this because it "is not bound in every way to will happiness (which the will would want if it were only intellectual appetite, without liberty). Rather, it is bound in eliciting an act to moderate the (intellectual) appetite, which is to moderate the affection for what is advantageous so that it will not will immoderately".[4] Insofar as the affection for justice liberates the will from desires for what is advantageous, Scotus concludes that it is the locus of free will.[5]

As Scotus notes, the distinction between the two affections, for the advantageous and for justice, derives originally from Anselm of Canterbury's work titled, *The Fall of the Devil*. For the most part, moreover, scholars have taken for granted that Scotus' two-wills theory represents a genuine and accurate interpretation of the Benedictine's thought.[6] In this article, however, I will contest that assumption by tracing the origins of Scotus' supposedly Anselmian two-wills theory to an earlier version of it that was advocated by his Franciscan predecessors at the University of Paris, namely, Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle.

These thinkers associated the theory in question with John of Damascus' distinction between *thelesis* and *boulesis*. After outlining the contours of their account, I will examine the theories of the will that were developed by the Damascene and Anselm, whose view builds upon the work of Augustine. This inquiry will highlight the considerable disparity between the Franciscan view and the authorities that were enlisted to bolster it. In

[3] Williams, "The Libertarian Foundations", 199*:* "Similar discussions can be found at *Ordinatio* 2, d. 25, nn. 22-23 (W 13:221-23), where intellective appetite is said to act *per modum naturae* and is identified with the *affectio commodi*; *Ordinatio* 2, d. 39, q. 2, n. 5 (W 13:415-16); and *Ordinatio* 3, d. 26, n. 17 (W 15 :340-41).

[4] Scotus, *Ordinatio,* d. 6, q. 2, ar. 1, 51: "Voluntas libera non tenetur omni modo velle beatitudinem (quae voluntas si esset tantum modo appetitus intellectivus sine libertate, vellet eam); sed tenetur in eliciendo actum moderari appetitum, unde appetitus intellectivus, quod est moderari affectionem commodi, ne scilicet immoderate velle".

[5] Irwin, "Scotus: Will, Freedom, and Reason", 45.

[6] Peter King, "Scotus's Rejection of Anselm: The Two-Wills Theory", in *John Duns Scotus 1308-2008,* edited by L. Honnefelder et al. (Munster: Aschendorff: 2010), 359 in 359-378. Other passages King mentions where Scotus discussions the two-wills theory include his *Lectura* II, d. 6, q. 2 (§ 3), *Reportatio II,* d. 6, q. 2 (§ 5).

undertaking this study, my aim is not merely to allow the sources of Franciscan thought to speak for themselves, but also to highlight the originality and ingenuity of the Franciscan theory of the will in relation to the sources with which it is often conflated.

2. Early Franciscans on the Two Wills

As noted above, Scotus' two-wills theory has long been presumed to offer a legitimate reading of Anselm, though it is also widely heralded for its innovativeness. However, the theory can be found in another form already in the *Summa de anima* of John of La Rochelle, which was written around 1236 and draws on John's earlier *Tractatus* on the powers of the soul which dates to around 1232. The *Summa de anima* eventually became the basis for the account of the will that was offered in the so-called *Summa Halensis.* This text was written between 1236-45, while Alexander of Hales, for whom it is named, was master of the Franciscan school in Paris. However, John of La Rochelle likely wrote volumes 1 and 3 of the work, while volume 2 was prepared by an unknown redactor who nevertheless drew heavily on the works of both John and Alexander.

In his *Summa de anima,* John associates a two-wills theory with John of Damascus that bears striking resemblance to the theory Scotus associated with Anselm. This attribution is not surprising, as the Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa* was a relatively newly translated and immensely popular theological source in John of La Rochelle's generation.[7] In this work, the Damascene distinguishes between the volitional categories of *thelesis* and *boulesis,* which John of La Rochelle defines in terms of the natural and rational will, respectively.[8] According to John, the natural will or *thelesis* is determined to the good in one of three ways.[9] First, it can be determined to the *bonum honestum* or the ultimate and unchanging good, that is, God, by means of *synderesis* or an innate appetite for the supreme good.

[7] On this see Riccardo Saccenti, *Conservare la retta volontà: L'atto morale nelle dottrine di Filippo il Cancelliere e Ugo di Saint-Cher (1225-1235)* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2013).

[8] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, edited by E. M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1955), 2.22, 135-136. See also Richard Cross, "The Reception of John of Damascus in the *Summa Halensis*", in *The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context,* edited by L. Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 71-90.

[9] Jean of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae: texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, edited by P. Michaud-Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964), 98: "Est enim bonum superius bonum rationale, quod dicitur honestum et bonum simpliciter, quod sua vi nos trahit et sua dignitate nos allicit. Et est bonum inferius bonum corporale delectabile carni, quod est bonum apparens siue secundum quid; iterum est bonum medium, quod est bonum naturale, sicut esse, viuere, intelligere et sentire". See also John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, edited by J. Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 287: "Est enim bonum superius bonum racionale, quod dicitur honestum, et bonum simplex, quod sua ui nos trahit et sua dignitate nos allicit; et est bonum inferius bonum corporale delectabile carni, quod est bonum apparens siue secundum quid; et est bonum medium quod est bonum naturale quemadmodum esse et uiuere, et intelligere, et sentire, et quecumque sunt substancialia nature".

Second, it can serve an inferior good or sensuality, which is linked to carnal desires for apparent, changeable goods. Thirdly, the natural will can pertain to any other good of human nature, which the Damascene described in terms of human activities like being, living, understanding, feeling.[10] By contrast to the natural power, the rational power, or *boulesis*, in the view of John of La Rochelle, is undetermined to any good other than God. For this reason, it can choose freely between temporal goods, in a process which John believes occurs in two phases. The first phase is referred to as right reason (*ratio recta*), which deliberates about the best option, and the second involves *boulesis* proper, or the act of the deliberative will to move towards a preferred option. According to John, these two faculties are the same in substance as free choice or *liberum arbitrium,* which presupposes a judgement of reason (*arbitrium*) and the free movement of the power to choose (*liberum*).[11]

According to John, free choice is exercised when the will chooses between two different options, such as A and B, after considering which is most conducive to the will of God.[12] By contrast, the *Summa Halensis* followed Alexander of Hales, who argued that the will chooses between opposites like A and not-A.[13] Paradoxically, Alexander ascribes his novel view to the same authority that John of La Rochelle had claimed for his, namely, John of Damascus.[14] Specifically, he cites the Damascene's claim that "everything that is generable is changeable (*vertibilis*)" to support the contention that free will entails the ability to choose between

[10] Alexander of Hales also treats the *thelesis/boulesis* distinction in, "De libero arbitrio", in *Magestri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae 'Antequam esset frater'*, vol. 1 (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1960), qu. 33, 590. John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus,* 119: "Voluntatem autem diuidit in thelisim et bulisim, id est in voluntatem naturalem et rationalem; thelisis siue voluntas naturalis est respectu bonorum naturalium, que non possumus non appetere, sicut sunt esse, viuere, intelligere; voluntas rationalis est respectu bonorum non naturalium, que possumus velle et non velle".

[11] John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 120: "Sufficientia predicte diuisionis patet sic: vis motiua rationalis aut est determinata ad bonum, sicut est thelesis siue voluntas naturalis, aut indeterminata ad bonum, et hec triplex est: aut enim discernit bonum, sicut est ratio; aut bonum cognitum appetit, sicut est voluntas rationalis siue deliberatiua vel bulisis; aut bonum cognitum et appetitum eligit, sicut liberum arbitrium".

[12] John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 121.

[13] Alexander also took an equally radical view at the time – also distinct from John of La Rochelle's – that free choice consists primarily in the will, which executes the decisions of reason, rather than in the collaboration of reason and will. This is another respect in which he anticipated Scotus and his voluntarism. See Lydia Schumacher, "Free Choice", in *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), 249-75.

[14] Alexander of Hales, *Quaestiones disputatae* 33, 566. John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 121: "Nota quod liberum arbitrium non dicitur liberum, quia flexibile sit ad bonum et ad malum, sed quia potest facere et non facere, quod consulit et instigat synderesis, vel suggerit sensualitas, et decernit ratio, et voluntas appetit naturalis". "Free choice is not called *liberum* because it is flexible between good and evil, but because it is able to do or not to do something, as it consults and is instigated by s*ynderesis*, or as it is suggested by sensuality".

opposites of good and evil.[15] The difference between John and Alexander concerning how to understand John of Damascus therefore brings us to the latter's theory of the will and the question of how it should be interpreted on its own terms.

3. John of Damascus on *thelesis/boulesis*

According to the Damascene's own account, the changeability of human nature is the source of an ability to do or not to do any given thing (*facere et non facere*). As Michael Frede therefore writes, Damascus "does not construe choice as inherently a choice between two [opposing] options, the good and the evil".[16] Although John of La Rochelle did not go as far as Alexander in affirming this, he nevertheless distorted the Damascene's views on the nature of *thelesis* and *boulesis*. The origins of the latter term can be found in Aristotle, for whom *boulesis* is a rational or intellectual appetite that oversees the lower sensory appetites and thus directs us towards our proper ends.[17]

By contrast to *boulesis*, the term *thelesis* has no precedent in the Aristotelian tradition, whether in Aristotle himself, or in his commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias or John Philoponus.[18] Rather, the term seems to derive mainly from Maximus Confessor, who used the distinction between *thelesis* and *boulesis*, which was subsequently copied by Damascene, to differentiate between Christ's human and divine wills. This was part of his strategy for opposing the heresy of monotheletism, according to which Christ possesses only one will.[19] The meaning of *thelesis* in the Greek tradition and the Damascene particularly is fairly clear: it involves the will to obtain all that is good for human nature. As the Damascene writes:

> There is implanted in the soul by nature a faculty of desiring that which is in harmony with its nature, and of maintaining in close union all that belongs essentially to its nature: and this power is called will or θέλησις. For the essence both of existence and of living yearns after activity both as regards mind and sense, and in this it merely longs to realise its own natural and perfect being. And so, this definition also is given of this natural will: will is an appetite, both rational and vital, depending only on what is natural. So that will is nothing else than the natural and vital and rational appetite of all things that go to constitute nature,

[15] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* (ed. Buytaert), 2.22, 152: "Omne enim generabile et vertibile est". See 152-154 more generally on free choice.
[16] Michael Frede, "John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom", in *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources*, edited by K. Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 63-95.
[17] Frederick J. Adelman, "The Theory of Will in St John Damascene", in *The Quest for the Absolute*, edited by F. J. Adelman (Chestnut Hill: Boston College, 1966), 33.
[18] Adelman, "The Theory of Will", 22-37. See also a more extensive discussion of this material in Lydia Schumacher, "The Affections", in *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), 228-248.
[19] Adelman, "The Theory of Will", 37. R.A. Gauthier, "Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 21 (1954), 53.

> that is, just the simple faculty. For the appetite of creatures without reason, since it is irrational, is not called will.[20]

This passage makes unmistakably clear that the natural will for the Damascene is the same as the rational will, which is unique to human beings and governs their lower impulses. These are called passions, which result from the experience of sensory objects as either pleasurable or painful. As Damascus writes: a "passion is a sensible activity of the appetitive faculty, depending on the presentation to the mind of something good or bad. Or in other words, passion is an irrational activity of the soul, resulting from the notion of something good or bad".[21] According to the Damascene, these passions are not good or bad in themselves but only become so depending on how they are managed by the rational will, which must seek to find pleasure and pain in the right things.

As noted already, this rational will is simply *thelesis*. For the Damascene, consequently, *boulesis* or "wish" as he calls it is not a separate kind of will as John of La Rochelle supposed but only concerns the end or object of the will, which may be possible or impossible to achieve.[22] As the Damascene writes: "will (θέλησις) and wish (βούλησις) are two different things...For will is just the simple faculty of willing, whereas wish is will directed to some definite object. Again, the object of will is the matter underlying the will, that is to say, the thing that we will: for instance, when appetite is roused for food. The appetite pure and simple, however, is a rational will".[23]

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[20] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 135-36; translated by E.W. Watson and L. Pullan, *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series*, vol. 9, edited by P. Schaff and H. Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1899), 629: "Oportet scire quoniam animae inserta est naturaliter virtus, 'appetitiva eius quod secundum naturam est, et omnium quae substantialiter naturae adsunt contentiva,' quae vocatur voluntas. Nam 'substantia quidem esse et vivere et moveri secundum intellectum et sensum appetit, propriam concupiscens naturalem et plenam essentiam.' 'Ideoque' et sic determinant hanc naturalem voluntatem: 'thelima (id est voluntas) est appetitus rationalis et vitalis, ex solis dependens naturalibus.' 'Ouare thelisis (id est voluntas) quidem est ipse' naturaliset 'vitalis et rationalis appetitus' omnium naturae constitutivorum, 'simplex virtus,' Qui aliorum enim appetitus, non existens rationalis, non dicitur thelisis (id est voluntas)".

[21] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 132; trans. Schaff/Wace, 628; "Animalium autem passionum terminus est hic: passio est motus appetitivae virtutis, sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter: passio est motus irrationalis animae, per suspicionem boni vel mali".

[22] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 132; trans. Schaff/Wace, 629: "Dicitur bulisis (id est voluntas) et in hiis quae sunt in nobis, et in hiis quae non in nobis sunt, hoc est et in possibilibus so et in impossibilibus". "Wish, however, is used both in connection with what is within our power, and in connection with what is outside our power, that is, both with regard to the possible and the impossible".

[23] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 140-41, trans. Schaff/Wace, 631: "Nam thelisis quidem (id est voluntas) est ipsa simplex virtus volendi. Bulisis vero (id est voluntas) est quae circa quid thelisis. Theliton (id est voluntabile) autem est quae supposita est thelisi res, scilicet quod volumus, puta movetur appetitus ad cibum, qui simpliciter quidem appetitus, qui rationalis thelisis (id est voluntas) est; appetitus autem qui ad cibum, bulisis (id est voluntas) est, ipse autem cibus theliton (id est voluntabile) est".

As the Damascene elaborates:

> The wish, then, has reference to the end alone, and not to the means by which the end is attained. The end is the object of our wish, for instance, to be a king or to enjoy good health: but the means by which the end is attained, that is to say, the manner in which we ought to enjoy good health, or reach the rank of king, are the objects of deliberation.[24]

Although the Damascene clearly states here that *boulesis* exclusively concerns the ends of the will, many scholastic thinkers from Philip the Chancellor through Thomas Aquinas believed it involved willing means as well as or instead of merely ends.[25] In this regard, they seem to overlook the fact that *boulesis* for the Damascene, following Aristotle, is distinct from *bouleuton*, which is the deliberative process concerning the best means to achieving an end. John of La Rochelle was among the scholastics who understood free choice to encompass deliberation about both ends and means to ends.[26] However, he exacerbated this confused reading of the Damascene further in defining *boulesis* as a rational will over and above the natural will – which is in fact rational – when in fact it is only one of a number of different elements that factors into any given act of willing by *thelesis.*

This view may have resulted from the misinterpretation of a passage from Damascene's discussion of *boulesis* which states: "βούλησις or wish is a sort of natural will, that is to say, a natural and rational appetite for some definite thing. For there is seated in the soul of man a faculty of rational desire. When, then, this rational desire directs itself naturally to some definite object, it is called wish. For wish is rational desire and longing for some definite thing".[27] Alternatively, the misreading could simply be an example of the way that scholastics manipulated authoritative sources to support their own positions, in this case, the two-wills theory that was unique to early Franciscans themselves.

[24] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 137, trans. Schaff/Wace, 629-30: "Est autem bulisis (id est voluntas) finis, non eonim es quae sunt ad finem. Igitur finis quidem est voluntabile, ut regem esse, ut sanum esse; ad finem autem est quod consiliabile est, scilicet modus per quern debemus sani esse, vel regnare; deinde, post bulisim (id est voluntatem), inquisitio et scrutatio".

[25] See Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, 6 vols, vol. 1 (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1948-1960), 401: Philip the Chancellor misunderstands *boulesis* and makes it about means rather than ends, when, for Damascus, it only concerns ends. This is an error he passes on to Rochelle and later Aquinas. As Riccardo Saccenti points out in *Conservare la retta volontà,* 95, however, this misunderstanding may come from Burgundio of Pisa, the translator of the Damascene and Aristotle's *Ethics*, or from a gloss included in some manuscripts of the *De fide orthodoxa.*

[26] John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 212. Irene Zavattero also points this out in "*Voluntas est duplex*: La dottrina della voluntà dell'anonimo commentario di Parigi sull'ethica *Nova* e *Vetus* (1235–40)", *Medioevo* 40 (2015): 74.

[27] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 2.22, ed. Butyaert, 136; trans. Schaff/Wace, 629: "Bulisis (id est voluntas) autem est qualitativa naturalis thelisis (id est voluntas), scilicet naturalis et rationalis appetitus alicuius rei. Nam iniacet quidem hominis animae virtus rationaliter appetendi. Cum igitur naturaliter motus fuerit ipse rationalis appetitus ad aliquam rem, dicitur bulisis (id est voluntas). Bulisis (id est voluntas) enim est appetitus et desiderium cuiusdam rei rationalis".

As noted already, this position bears striking similarities to the view that Scotus popularized and associated with Anselm. Both Scotus and John of La Rochelle envisage the existence of a natural will, which is linked necessarily with objects which are perceived to bring happiness or advantage. For both thinkers, this natural will must be moderated by a higher will, which is not linked to any such object other than God and can therefore discriminate freely amongst objects to prefer what is just. Thus, Scotus was not himself the originator of the Franciscan two-wills theory but only of the tendency to link it to Anselm. As the sections below will demonstrate, however, the Anselmian link is just as tenuous as the one early Franciscans forged with the Damascene, particularly when Anselm's thought on the will is interpreted in its Augustinian context, as I will do below. This does not denigrate the value of Scotus' account of the will, let alone that of early Franciscans, but allows for appreciating its novelty, and for interpreting Anselm on his own terms.

4. Anselm on the Two Wills

To this end, I begin by offering some background to Anselm's thought on the will and especially how it becomes susceptible to sin, which can be found in his *De conceptu virginali.* Here, Anselm draws a distinction "between the sin that each man contracts with his nature at his origin, and the sin that he does not contract with his own nature but commits after he has become a person distinct from other persons".[28] The former is original sin, which is the proclivity or potential to sin that is inherited through Adam, and the latter concerns the ways that individual persons actualize that potential, for which they alone are responsible.[29] Anselm's definition of sin in either case is derived from his definition of justice, which involves the "rectitude of the will preserved for its own sake".[30]

On his account, the rectitude of the will does not depend upon the objects of the will as such, which are not good or evil in themselves, but only pertains to the nature or extent of the desires we have for objects under given circumstances.[31] For instance, the desire for success is not in itself evil; it only becomes so when it is given greater priority over the desire to do what is right for the self and other people. In that sense, preserving justice is a matter of prioritizing greater over lesser goods. By the same token, evil involves the failure to desire the good that ought to be prioritized in any given instance.[32]

As a result of this failure, Anselm elaborates, human beings become slaves to their desires, which is why injustice for him is ultimately incompatible with human happiness

[28] Anselm of Canterbury, *On the Virgin Conception and Original Sin (VC)*, in *The Major Works,* edited by G.R. Evans and B. Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 359. For the Latin edition, see *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, 2 vols, edited by F. Salesius Schmitt (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1968-84).
[29] Anselm, *VC* 23, 26.
[30] Anselm, *VC* 3, 362.
[31] Anselm, *VC* 3.
[32] Anselm, *VC* 5, 365.

and flourishing.[33] While Anselm thus acknowledges that evil has negative effects on human life, and that it warrants punishment, he insists that evil is ultimately "nothing" precisely because it involves turning away from the good that should be preferred towards something inferior, which entails a privation or absence of the good.[34] To illustrate this point, Anselm invokes the example of blindness, which is not strictly speaking something present in the eye but entails the absence of the power of sight.[35]

In *De causu diaboli,* Anselm explains how humans come by the ability to will the good and avoid evil, citing a crucial passage in 1 Corinthians 4:7, *"What do you that you have not received?"*[36] According to Anslem's interpretation of this passage, God created all beings, including angels, with the ability to preserve the good or righteous nature they originally received from him.[37] Those that do not persevere in the good do not therefore do so because they did not receive the requisite ability but because they choose not to employ it.[38] The resulting loss of what Anselm calls "original justice" entails not only that the creature in question cannot persevere in the good but also that they cannot regain the ability to choose the good.[39] For Anselm, this raises the question how it was possible that a creature created good could turn to something other than the good, which is in fact evil.[40]

In answering this question, Anselm introduces his famous distinction between the "will for happiness" and the "will for justice". On his account, all beings, including angels, have an innate desire to be happy.[41] This will cannot be fulfilled, however, unless the angel wills what is just or good.[42] As mentioned above, happiness depends upon the harmonization of the two wills, because willing happiness without willing justice results in slavery to the objects of desire. Anselm acknowledges that the fallen angels at least both can and have failed to will the good and that this might seem to suggest that God, as the source of the will, is the cause of their ability to will evil.[43] However, he contests this

[33] Anselm, *VC* 12.
[34] Anselm, *VC* 5.
[35] Anselm, *VC* 5; see Anselm of Canterbury, *On the Fall of the Devil (FD)*, in *The Major Works,* edited by G.R. Evans and B. Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 26.
[36] Anselm, *FD* 1.
[37] Anselm, *FD* 1, 195: "No creature has anything of itself. How can something that does not have being of itself, have anything of itself? In short, if there is only one who creates and whatever is created is from that one, it is clear that he who creates and what he has created is all there is [...] He alone has of himself all that he has, while other things have nothing of themselves. And other things, having nothing of themselves, have their only reality from him".
[38] Anselm, *FD* 3.
[39] Anselm, *FD* 17.
[40] Anselm, *FD* 7, 205: "The will is a thing and is good when it turns to that which it ought to will and is called an evil will when it turns to what it should not".
[41] Anselm, *FD* 13.
[42] Anselm, *FD* 14.
[43] Anselm, *FD* 20.

notion on the grounds that God is only the source of the ability to do good, which can be abandoned in ways he did not intend and for which he is not therefore responsible.

As Anselm observes in his *De Concordia,* God foreknows the decisions human beings will freely take for good or evil.[44] This does not mean he himself necessitates those decisions but only that he is able to see what decisions they will take as a result of his eternal knowledge of all things past, present, and future, as present.[45] For Anselm, God's will is simply that we employ our own free choice, which as noted can only properly be used to will the good, since willing evil entails slavery to an object of desire rather than genuine freedom. As Anselm reiterates, "the freedom also under discussion is the power to preserve uprightness of will for the sake of that very same uprightness".[46]

Although human beings always maintain this freedom, Anselm notes again that "the state of justice is not present by nature but has proved to be separable from the beginning both in the case of the angels in heaven and of human beings in Paradise".[47] When they exhibit justice, it is because they have chosen to use their God-given ability to will the good. Thus, Anselm reiterates 1 Corinthians 4:7, "what do you have that you have not received?" and John 15:5, "without me you can do nothing".[48] Still, humans can abandon that ability of their own accord and turn to something other than what is good.

In this regard, Anselm returns to his discussion of the will and its two affections, which he broadly defines as follows: "The will's tool is that power of the soul we use for willing, just as reason is the tool for reasoning we use when we reason, and sight is the tool we use for seeing. The affectivity of this tool is that by which the tool itself is so swayed toward willing some object".[49] Anselm further details the nature of the two affectivities that sway the will as follows: "when disposed to will their own advantage, people always will their gratification and a state of happiness. Whereas when disposed to will uprightness, they will their uprightness and a state of uprightness or justness".[50] As Anselm elaborates, "all human merit, whether good or evil, comes from the two dispositions termed "wills".

These two "wills" also differ in that willing one's own advantage is unavoidable while willing what is right is avoidable.[51] While human beings always will their own happiness, in other words, they do not always realise that their happiness depends on "the

[44] Anselm of Canterbury, *De Concordia (DC)*, in *The Major Works,* edited by G.R. Evans and B. Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 439: "Therefore, when we say that what God foreknows is going to happen is necessarily going to happen, we are not asserting always that it is going to happen by necessity but simply that it is necessary that what is going to happen is going to happen".
[45] Anselm, *DC* 1.5.
[46] Anselm, *DC* 1.6, 445.
[47] Anselm, *DC* 1.6, 445.
[48] Anselm, *DC* 3.1.
[49] Anselm, *DC* 3.11, 467.
[50] Anselm, *DC* 3.11, 469.
[51] Anselm, *DC* 3.12, 470.

preservation of justice for its own sake". This oversight is the result of the fall into sin, which disrupted the harmony between the two wills or affections that God had initially given both angels and human beings.[52] The consequence of this fall for humans as for angels was that they not only lost the ability to preserve justice but also the ability to regain the ability to preserve justice, which can only be restored by the Incarnation of the Son of God. Without him, human beings only possess the will to happiness without the will to justice that is the key to happiness.

5. The Augustinian Background

Although Anselm famously advanced his arguments without references to authorities, his indebtedness to the tradition of Augustine is widely recognized. As a matter of fact, Augustine is the only source outside Scripture that Anselm ever mentions explicitly in his oeuvre as one of his major sources of inspiration.[53] Thus it is no surprise that Anselm's recurring notion of "preserving justice for its own sake" has clear resonances with Augustine's famous distinction between objects that should be loved or enjoyed for their own sake (*propter se*), or loved for the sake of another (*propter alia*) and thus merely 'used' as means to an end.[54] According to Augustine, God alone should be loved for his own sake, because he is the source of all beings and therefore transcends them in terms of his significance. All other beings should therefore only be loved for his sake.[55]

Augustine parses the precise meaning and implications of his somewhat enigmatic use/enjoy (*uti/frui*) distinction in many places throughout his works. In book 8 of *De Trinitate,* for instance, he observes that human beings often confuse "this good and that good" with *the* Good. In other words, they ascribe absolute significance to temporal objects which they can see and encounter, which is only rightly attributable to the invisible God.[56] The problem with doing this is that temporal objects and experiences are both finite and fleeting in their nature. In short, they are not God, and God, conversely, is not a temporal being.[57] To stake hopes for happiness on them therefore enslaves human beings to desires that cannot ultimately be fulfilled, setting them up for disappointment.

In this context, belief in God is important, because the knowledge of him as the supreme good, that is, the only being to be loved for his own sake, regulates desires for

[52] Anselm, *DC* 3.13.
[53] Anselm of Canterbury, *Monologion*, Prologue, in *The Major Works,* edited by G.R. Evans and B. Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
[54] Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana* (*DDC*), 1.4, translated by J. J. Gavigan, in *The Fathers of the Church* (Washington: D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002), 29-30.
[55] Augustine, *DDC* 1.5; 1.20; see Augustine, *De Trinitate (DT),* 8.8.12, translated by S. McKenna, in *The Fathers of the Church* (Washington: D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, repr; 2002), 262-65.
[56] Augustine, *DT* 1.2.3.
[57] Augustine, *DT* 8.4.6.

other objects and ensures that they do not become disproportional – or subject to what Augustine describes as *concupiscence.* This is the sense in which Augustine suggests that we can love the God we cannot know, namely, by bringing our belief in him to bear on the way we think about and deal with the things that we can know.[58] A key way Augustine tries to impress the need to do this upon his readers – and thus help them avoid projecting their own wishes and ideas onto God – involves asking them to reflect the human mind itself, which is not a direct object of knowledge even though it directs and guides everything that humans do.[59]

As Augustine acknowledges, we can easily forget that the mind, as God's image, is immaterial like God, and thus we become inclined to conflate who we are with our own immediate or temporal needs and desires. In this way, as noted, we become slaves to our desires and live at the mercy of whether they are fulfilled, which is not always possible.[60] According to Augustine, this outcome is a function of the fact that we have turned away from God towards the self as ultimate end and source of happiness.[61] The first step to overcoming this situation is therefore to remember that we do not consist in material things alone and that we possess an immaterial nature and source, namely, God, belief in whom is the key to rightly conceptualizing not only ourselves but also all other objects of our experience.[62]

In his efforts to explain how we do this in the *De Trinitate*, Augustine employs phraseology which clearly anticipates the notion of "preserving righteousness for its own sake" found in Anselm. As he states, the human mind or image of God "lost righteousness and true holiness by sinning, through which that image became defaced and tarnished".[63] The image therefore "cannot give itself the righteousness it has lost, and so has not. For this it received when man was created, and assuredly lost it by sinning".[64] Thus, righteousness can only be restored and the image of God renewed by grace, that is, by God's revelation of himself through his Son as the supreme Good.[65] This illumination not only reinstates the resources we need for upholding righteousness or using and enjoying what we ought but also gives us a perfect model in Christ for doing so.

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[58] Augustine, *DT* 8.5.7; cf. 10.1.1.
[59] Augustine, *DT* 10.5.7.
[60] Augustine, *City of God, Books VIII-XVI* (*DCD*) 14.11, translated by G. G. Walsh and G. Monahan, in *The Fathers of the Church* (Washington: D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1952), 376: The will's "choice is truly free only when it is not a slave to sin and vice".
[61] Augustine, *DCD* 14.13, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 380: "Now, exaltation is inordinate when the soul cuts itself off from the very Source to which it should keep close and somehow makes itself and becomes an end to itself. This takes place when the soul becomes inordinately pleased with itself, and such self-pleasing occurs when the soul falls away from the unchangeable Good which ought to please the soul far more than the soul can please itself".
[62] Augustine, *DT* 10.12.19.
[63] Augustine, *DT* 14.16.22.
[64] Augustine, *DT* 14.15.21.
[65] Augustine, *DCD* 1.11-14.

In this connection, Augustine cites 1 Corinthians 4:7, a favourite and frequently quoted passage of his, "For what have you that you did not receive", a habit clearly emulated by Anselm. Augustine's account starts to anticipate Anselm's even more clearly when he speaks in *De Trinitate* about the desire for happiness which all people possess, even though they have different ideas of what it entails.[66] For example, some people think happiness consists in the pleasures of the body, or in knowledge. Given all people desire happiness, Augustine raises the question why they do not all know that in which happiness consists. This is a question he had already addressed in his earlier work, *Confessions,* where he states explicitly that the desire for happiness is in fact a desire for God.

As he observes here, however, human beings have forgotten that God is the source of happiness as a result of sin, which erased the knowledge of him as the supreme good.[67] By contrast to the Franciscans, consequently, Augustine did not believe human beings have a natural or innate desire to love God. As noted above, the knowledge of God that enables us to love him is exactly what Augustine thinks Christ restored at his Incarnation, at least in principle. Even in the wake of this event, however, the love of God must still be restored in practice in individual human beings as they re-learn the habit of thinking about all aspects of their experience in light of the fact that these are not God and cannot therefore make or break human happiness.

This, I contend, is what it means for Augustine to reinstate or renew the image of God, namely, for the human mind gradually to regain the ability to think of all things as God does in the light of God's supreme and unqualified significance. For Augustine, this process involves re-training the "lower" powers of our being to answer to the higher ones rather than the other way around. The lower powers include what he like Damascus calls the passions, which are the immediate reactions human beings have to objects of sense experience which register those objects as pleasurable or painful, that is, as sources of happiness or unhappiness.[68] As for Anselm and the Damascene, so for Augustine, neither these passions, nor their objects, nor any aspect of bodily life more generally, is intrinsically good or evil.[69]

Although some early Christian writers held these "first movements" of the soul to be sinful in themselves, Augustine stresses that the reactions we have to our experiences are

[66] Augustine, *DT* 13.4.7.

[67] Augustine, *Confessions*, 10.20.29, translated by H. Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[68] Richard Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Templtation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[69] Augustine, *DCD* 14.5, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 356: "We ought not, therefore, to blame our sins and defects on the nature of the flesh, for this is to disparage the Creator. The flesh, in its own kind and order, is good. But what is not good is to abandon the Goodness of the Creator in pursuit of some created good, whether by living deliberately according to the flesh, or according to the soul, or according to the entire man, which is made up of soul and flesh and which is the reason why either 'soul' alone or 'flesh' alone can mean a man".

involuntary and thus unavoidable.[70] Thus, they are not culpable: "For I am not aware that any right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering, or with fear, lest one in danger be destroyed".[71] Since good and bad people alike possess passions, what makes them good or bad for Augustine only concerns whether and how we consent to the passions – approve or curb them – at the level of the rational will.[72] As Augustine writes:

> There are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they [the Stoics] call *phantasiæ*, and it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid.[73]

To illustrate his point above, Augustine cites the famous example of the Stoic sage who suddenly grows pale and trembles when the ship on which he is sailing encounters a turbulent storm. While the wise person controls the passions that thus arise at the prospect of losing his life, the fool succumbs to them.[74] On this basis, Augustine affirms that all the passions named by the Stoics–fear, desire, sorrow, and joy[75] – which respectively pertain to past and future pains and pleasures – can either be passions which are experienced but not yet consented to, or affections which are products of the rational

[70] Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 173. As Knuttila explains, the view that the passions themselves are venial sins which has often been attributed to Augustine actually derives from Gregory the Great whose view was associated with Augustine by Lombard.

[71] Augustine, *DCD* 9.5.

[72] Augustine, *DCD* 9.9; *DCD* 14.7, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 360: "The affection of the upright will, then, is good love and that of a perverse will is evil love".

[73] Augustine, *DCD* 9.4; *DCD* 9.5, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 85: "The Stoics admit that passions of this kind affect the soul even of the wise man who, as they hold, must be above all evil. We must, therefore, conclude, first, that Stoics do not, in fact, consider emotions vices, since the wise man meets them in such a way that they can do nothing to change his mind or mar his virtue".

[74] Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*, 50: "For Augustine passions and affections, like the flesh, were not evil in themselves, but only when they failed to be controlled – when they failed to take their proper place in the order of things. Specifically, reason was the human principle that was properly in command of the passions. In the well-ordered soul, reason was the guiding principle".

[75] Augustine, *DCD* 14.5-6; Augustine, *Confessions*, 10.14.22.

will and its consent. Augustine was quite insistent that his view, which he claimed aligned with those of both Platonists and Aristotelians, was also compatible with the Stoic view.[76]

A number of scholars including Knuuttila and Sorabji have contested his claim, on the grounds that the Stoics did not actually believe that the "first movement of the will", which Augustine described in terms of the passions, involved any quasi-emotional reaction at all, other than a completely involuntary physiological reaction like trembling.[77] The sage who underwent these symptoms did not in other words experience actual fear in the way Augustine assumed. To deny that human beings do thus suffer the emotional effect of first movements, in Augustine's view, would involve an artificial suppression of such emotions and a concomitant denial of our humanity.[78] In that sense, Augustine seems to have been intent on giving a more-charitable-than-realistic reading of the Stoics.

The upshot of his discussion, however, is that the passions can – though need not – cause us to take pleasure in what is easiest or most immediately satisfying and thus to sacrifice what is most important, because of the pain and waiting involved in delayed gratification. As such, the passions are the mechanisms by which we confuse the true source of our happiness with temporal things. The key to avoiding this outcome is to train the will to approve only those passions that are consistent with belief in God as the ultimate source of happiness and to curb those that counteract this belief. Thus, Augustine writes that the mind must be subjected to God, "that he may rule and aid it, and the passions, again, [subjected] to the mind, to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses".[79]

In sum: the key to being sad, fearful, desirous, or joyful about the right things – and not about the wrong things – for Augustine, is belief in God, which helps the will to regulate the passions in the appropriate way. As we learn to do this, what Anselm called the "will for happiness" is gradually harmonized, as it should be, with the "will for righteousness" or justice. At the same time, the righteousness of the will gives rise to happiness, which is incompatible with concupiscence or inordinate preoccupations with temporal things which bind the will to matters outside our control and thus hamper its freedom. As Augustine sums up: "no one lives as he wishes but the blessed (happy), and no one is blessed but the righteous".[80] For him, moreover, the righteous are those who have tapped into the source of happiness which consists in God.

[76] Augustine, *DCD* 9.4, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 81: "In the question whether the wise man is subject to passions or entirely free from them, the controversy, so it seems to me, is one rather of words than of meaning. In so far as the point at issue is the sense and not just the sound of words, in my opinion, the Stoics are at one with the Platonists and Peripatetics".
[77] Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, 372-384; Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy,* 155.
[78] Augustine, *DCD* 14.9, trans. Walsh/Monahan, 370: "Yet, so long as we are clothed with the infirmities of this life, we are not living a proper human life if we are entirely devoid of these emotions".
[79] Augustine, *DCD* 9.5.
[80] Augustine, *DCD* 14.25.

6. John of La Rochelle versus his Sources on the Affections

At this point, we can clearly grasp how Augustine's thinking provided the basis for Anselm's distinction between the affection for advantage or happiness and the affection for righteousness. These were two aspects of one will that must be harmonized if human beings are to flourish. As we have seen, the harmonization process turns, as Augustine said, on learning to love God alone for his own sake or as an unqualified good while using other things as means to loving God – thus recognizing that they are qualified goods that cannot make us happy at all times and in every way. To will freely is not to have a will totally unhinged from all goods – whether qualified or unqualified – as the Franciscans argued, but to be able to prioritize the greater over the lesser good in any instance.

The difference between Franciscans and their authoritative sources on this matter has much to do with their novel understanding of the relation between the "lower" and "higher" powers of the will. The Middle Ages inherited a long tradition of distinguishing between the irascible and concupiscible powers, which are the "lower" powers of the soul that produce passions of aversion or desire for objects of sensory experience.[81] This distinction is found in the Damascene as well as Anselm and Augustine.[82] As we have seen, these thinkers held that the passions – and the irascible and concupisicible powers that produce them – must ultimately be checked by the rational will, which decides which passions to uphold or reject and thus transforms passions into more deliberate "affections".

Following the prior tradition, John of La Rochelle states that all our inclinations towards or away from different objects spring from these two appetitive powers: irascible and concupiscible.[83] Whereas Augustine and the Damascene had understood these inclinations – or passions – as matters of the lower "irrational" appetite, however, John insists that they are ordered towards reason in human beings and thus are quasi-rational. This may be one reason why John uses the term 'affection' and never mentions passions at all, namely, because he sees human "emotions" not as a matter of reacting to passively received sense-data but as an active and thus rational processing of sense material.

While John does presuppose a passive phase in which the human being encounters a sense object, the actual tendency to register the object as good or evil is already for him the work of *thelesis,* which in his view coincides with the irascible and concupisicible powers.[84] Thus, John defines an affection as an "interior motion following on the [sensory] apprehension of good or evil",[85] which thereby encourages the pursuit or avoidance of an object by the natural will. As noted previously, the key shortcoming of *thelesis* for John is that it is determined to specific objects and specifically the natural desire for human

[81] John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 118.
[82] *De spiritu et anima* (PL 40), translated by B. McGinn in *Three Treatises on Man: Cistercian Anthropology* (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publishers, 1977).
[83] John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 126.
[84] John of La Rochelle, *Summa de anima,* 253.
[85] John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus*, 79: "Affectio vero est motus interior consequens secundum boni uel mali apprehensionem". *Summa de anima*, 254-255; see 263, 266.

happiness. As such, it can interfere with the affection to achieve what is just or good, in much the same way that earlier thinkers thought the passions could do so.

That is why free choice as John of La Rochelle understands it, namely, as undetermined to any good, is crucial, namely, because only such a faculty can overcome erroneous natural desires and prioritise greater over lesser goods. In positing this will, John creates a "second level" of the will over and above the rational will posited by Augustine and Anselm. This move was itself a partial consequence of having elevated the work that these thinkers would have assigned to the passions, and the related irascible and concupiscible powers, to the level of the natural will and its affections. Here, it is also worth noting that John's theory of the affections anticipates the account later developed by Scotus, for whom the passions are part passive and sensory and part rational and voluntary.[86] Like Scotus, but before him, John connects the motive powers normally associated only with the senses also to the higher power of the will, or at least the natural will for the goods of human nature, thus re-orienting the prior tradition of thinking about these matters in a way that was consistent with his broader commitments about the relative roles of *thelesis* and *boulesis* in the exercise of free choice.

7. Conclusion

Although the Franciscan views described above are highly original, I have sought to demonstrate in this article that they differ significantly from those found in the sources the Franciscans employed to support their positions, above all, Augustine, Anselm, and John of Damascus. In studying these positions, most scholars have simply assumed that these authorities held the opinions the Franciscans assigned to them. Thus, they have not always fully appreciated precisely how and why Franciscans and scholastics more generally manipulated authorities as part of a tactic for devising and defending their own positions. This article has shown just how far the views of authorities could be and were distorted to achieve scholastic purposes. In this case, the specific purpose of the Franciscans was to posit the radical freedom of the will, which is capable of withholding desire for objects that can bring happiness for the sake of fulfilling the just purposes of God.

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[86] On this, see Ian Drummond, "John Duns Scotus on the Passions of the Will", in *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by M. Pickavé and L. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 53-74.

THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN DAVID OF AUGSBURG'S *DE EXTERIORIS ET INTERIORIS HOMINIS COMPOSITIONE*

LOS PODERES DEL ALMA EN EL *DE EXTERIORIS ET INTERIORIS HOMINIS COMPOSITIONE* DE DAVID DE AUGSBURGO

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Abstract

David of Augsburg, who lived from c. 1200 to 1272, is perhaps one of the least known of the most read authors of the late Middle Ages. His *opus magnum*, *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione secundum triplicem statum incipientium, proficientium et perfectorum*, written in the 1240s in Regensburg, is one of the most successful books of learning in the Northern part of Europe in the Late Middle Ages. It is a voluminous treatise consisting of three books, structured according to Pseudo-Dionysius' three steps of the spiritual life. Within this triple scheme, the three powers of the soul (understanding, memory, and will) are presented as central to the whole trajectory of spiritual growth towards God. This article addresses five paradoxes that one encounters while studying David and his extensive treatise, in particular the parts on the powers of the soul.

Keywords

David of Augsburg; Franciscans; Spiritual Progress; Powers of the Soul; Virtues

Resumen

David de Augsburgo, quien vivió aproximadamente desde el año 1200 hasta 1272, es quizás uno de los autores menos conocidos pero más leídos de finales de la Edad Media. Su obra magna, *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione secundum triplicem statum incipientium, proficientium et perfectorum*, escrita en la década de 1240 en Ratisbona, fue uno de los libros de aprendizaje más exitosos en la parte norte de Europa durante la Baja Edad Media. Se trata de un tratado voluminoso que consta de tres libros, estructurados según los tres pasos de la vida espiritual de Pseudo-Dionisio. Dentro de este esquema triple, se presentan las tres facultades del alma (entendimiento, memoria y voluntad) como centrales para toda la trayectoria del crecimiento espiritual hacia Dios. Este artículo

aborda cinco paradojas que se encuentran al estudiar a David y su extenso tratado, en particular las partes sobre los poderes del alma.

Palabras clave

David de Augsburgo; franciscanos; progreso espiritual; poderes del alma; virtudes

1. A "Monastic" Franciscan

David of Augsburg, who lived from c. 1200 to 1272, is perhaps one of the least known of the most read authors of the late Middle Ages.[1] Little is known about his life. He comes into the picture when, in 1246, he and a fellow Franciscan brother, Berthold of Regensburg (ca. 1220-1272), control the affairs of some monasteries around Regensburg. The fact that he does this on the authority of the Pope, indicates that David enjoyed a certain prestige in ecclesiastical circles. A second rare undisputed fact of his life is his death in Augsburg in the year 1272.[2] We do not know where and when David studied or when he moved to neighboring Augsburg, but his works suggest a solid theological education. In addition to various treatises in Latin, he also wrote a number of works in German, including *The Seven Stages of Prayer*, *The Mirror of Virtue*, and *The Manifestation and Salvation of the Human Race*.[3] These are certainly a product of his activity as a novice master and preacher. As a spiritual author and spiritual director, he addressed himself primarily to other religious. He also wrote sermons for his famous brother in Regensburg, preacher Berthold.

[1] On David, see Cornelius Bohl, *Geistlicher Raum. Räumliche Sprachbilder als Träger spiritueller Erfahrung, dargestellt am Werk* De compositione *des David von Augsburg*, Franziskanische Forschungen 42 (Werl: Dietrich-Coelde-Verlag, 2000); Thomas Ertl, *Religion und Disziplin: Selbstdeutung und Weltordnung im frühen deutschen Franziskanertum*, Arbeiten Zur Kirchengeschichte 96 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006), 292-305; Claudia Rüegg, *David von Augsburg. Historische, theologische und philosophische Schwierigkeiten zu Beginn des Franziskanerordens in Deutschland*, Deutsche Literatur von den Anfängen bis 1700, 4 (Bern etc.: P. Lang, 1989); Dagobert Stöckerl, *Bruder David von Augsburg. Ein deutscher Mystiker aus dem Franziskanerorden*, Veröffentlichungen aus dem kirchenhistorischen Seminar München 4 (München: Lentner, 1914). See furthermore Maarten van der Heijden and Bert Roest, "David ab Augusta (David Augustanus/David von Augsburg, ca. 1200-1272)", available at: https://applejack.science.ru.nl/franciscanauthors/ (25-9-2021).

[2] In 1398, a fire destroyed the Franciscan Church in Augsburg where David was buried.

[3] David von Augsburg, *Die sieben Staffeln des Gebetes. In der deutschen Originalfassung herausgegeben von Kurt Ruh*, Kleine deutsche Prosadenkmäler des Mittelalters 1 (München: Fink, 1965); David von Augsburg, "Der Spiegel der Tugend", in *Deutsche Mystiker des 14. Jahrhunderts* vol. 1, edited by F. Pfeiffer (Leipzig, 1845), 325-341; David von Augsburg, *Von der Offenbarung und Erlösung des Menschengeschlechtes*, edited by F. Pfeiffer, *Zeitschrift für Deutsches Alterthum* 9 (1852): 1-67. For his other works, see Bohl, *Geistlicher Raum*, 21.

David's *opus magnum*, *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione secundum triplicem statum incipientium, proficientium et perfectorum*, written in the 1240s in Regensburg, is one of the most successful books of learning in the Northern part of Europe in the Late Middle Ages. It is a voluminous treatise consisting of three books, structured according to Pseudo-Dionysius' three steps of the spiritual life. The three books, regularly attributed to Bonaventure and transmitted in various combinations with a notable preference for the first book, were not written as one volume but soon came to be seen as one "*Composition of the exterior and interior man according to the triple states of beginners, proficient, and perfect*."[4] The first book, often handed down as a stand-alone manual for novices (*Formula novitiorum* or *Speculum monachorum*), contains an explanation of the rules for the good friar with the corresponding discipline inside and outside the convent. This volume deals primarily with the external, practical design of religious life, but also places a strong emphasis on self-discipline and self-reflection. As such, it presents itself in many ways as a regimen for monks. The second book deals with the inner, spiritual reform of the religious person. Exposed to the temptations of the flesh, the world and the devil, he must arm himself against the vices. In this way he can be inwardly purified and enlightened. The third book describes the seven steps of the religious person towards perfection. These are: fervor, austerity, consolation, temptation, self-mastery, holiness, and wisdom.[5] To these are added the fruits of prayer and the Eucharist.

The *Composition* is actually a very un-Franciscan book: it hardly deals with Francis or his spirituality.[6] In the words of Théophile Desbonnets, his teachings "n'a plus grand chose de franciscain."[7] In terms of concepts and method, David's work connects much more to the long monastic tradition.[8] Silence, self-reflection, and a focus on the inner self are central.[9] Humility, obedience, and poverty, themes that were also central to Francis (!), are often given a monastic interpretation. It seems as if David was primarily concerned

[4] Edition: David ab Augusta, *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione secundum triplicem statum incipientium, proficientium et perfectorum libri tres* (Quaracchi: Ad Claras Aquas, 1899). English translation: Dominic Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress: A Translation of* De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione, 2 vols. (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1937).

[5] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* II, 3.

[6] See for an exceptional instance this passage on the highest degree of obedience: "[...] sicut de sanctissimo Patre nostro Francisco legimus et primis eius sociis" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 267-268). Throughout the work, David touches on mendicant spiritualty, but nowhere systematically. See, illustratively, on mendicant prayer, which is only one of several ways of praying: "Aliquando quasi mendicus et pauper" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 303).

[7] Théophile Desbonnets, *De l'intuition à l'institution: Les Franciscains* (Paris: Editions Franciscaines, 1983), 67.

[8] I thank Marcia Colish for the observation that David may have become a Franciscan relatively late in his life. Dominic Devas refers to a Cistercian influence. Not pursuing the matter further, he states that much prominence is given to behavior when travelling and, "ancillary to this", "the stress laid on the life of retirement as equally and eminently Franciscan, seeing that the Order from its origins has envisaged the secluded life of the contemplative" (Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, xii).

[9] On interiority, see Werinhard J. Einhorn, "Der Begriff der 'Innerlichkeit' bei David von Augsburg und Grundzüge der Franziskanermystik", *Franziskanische Studien* 48 (1966): 336-376.

with training monastics and contemplatives, not preachers and active religious who go through the world proclaiming the salvation of Christ. Does this focus on inner development immediately explain the success of David's work in the circles of the Modern Devotion? The Latin edition of 1899 already mentions 370 manuscripts and early editions (many of them containing only the first book or only two of the three books, the second and third book often under the name *Profectus religiosorum*), and in the following century many Latin manuscripts and translations into the vernacular have been added by such researchers as Morton Bloomfield, Marcel Haverals, and Kurt Ruh.[10] The manuscripts originate mainly from Franciscan monasteries, but (young) Benedictines, Cistercians, Dominicans, and others also used the work, especially the *Formula novitiorum,* intensively. The role of the Brothers and Sisters of the Common Life is striking. They unquestionably regarded the book as fiber-rich and tasty spiritual food. Not only did they themselves copy (parts of) the work, but they also frequently used passages to reinforce their own spiritual considerations. Especially the emphasis on "progress in virtues" (*profectus virtutum*) among pious devout women and men often goes back directly to David's *Composition.*[11]

A closer look at the manuscript evidence reveals some strange production and transmission patterns. In a small number of cases, the order of the books of the *Compositione* has been changed in favor of book three, and of these cases at least six contain the order 3-2. This means that the main structure (*novitii, proficientes, religiosi*) has been abandoned for what must have seemed a more suitable concept of "seven steps

[10] Morton W. Bloomfield *et al*., *Incipits of Latin Works on the Virtues and Vices, 1100-1500 A.D.* (Cambridge: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1979) (nrs. 0019, 2655, 4155, 4283, 5676); Marcel Haverals, "Deux exhortations á la vie monastique de la 'Dévotion moderne'", in *Pascua Mediaevalia. Studies voor Prof. Dr. J.M. de Smet*, edited by R. Lievens *et al*., Mediaevalia Lovaniensia 1-10 (Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1983), 605-618; Kurt Ruh, "David von Augsburg und die Entstehung eines franziskanischen Schifttums in deutscher Sprache", in *Kleine Schriften* 2. *Scholastik und Mystik im Spätmittelalter* (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1984), 46-67. Most of the manuscripts are situated in the German-Dutch area, but whereas the reception of the text in the German area has been scarcely studied, the late medieval Dutch reception is fairly mapped out. This has much to do with the interest in the Modern Devotion and the emphasis the brothers and sisters lay on spiritual practice and *profectus virtutum*. See especially Karl Stooker and Theo Verbeij, "'Uut Profectus'. Over de verspreiding van Middelnederlandse kloosterliteratuur aan de hand van de 'Profectus religiosorum' van David van Augsburg", in *Boeken voor de eeuwigheid. Middelnederlands geestelijk proza*, edited by T. Mertens *et al*., Nederlandse literatuur en cultuur in de middeleeuwen 8 (Amsterdam, 1993), 318-340. See furthermore Crispinus S. Smits, "David van Augsburg en de invloed van zijn Profectus op de Moderne Devotie", *Collectanea Franciscana Neerlandica* 1 (1927): 171-203.

[11] See Krijn Pansters, *De kardinale deugden in de Lage Landen, 1200-1500*, Middeleeuwse studies en bronnen 108 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2007), 165-171; Krijn Pansters, "*Profectus virtutum:* The Roots of Devout Moral Praxis", in *Seeing the Seeker: Explorations in the Discipline of Spirituality. A Festschrift for Kees Waaijman on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday*, edited by H. Blommestijn, Studies in Spirituality. Supplement 19 (Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 231-249.

towards perfection and the acquisition of virtues" *preceding* "the fight against the vices".[12] We could say, with some exaggeration, that the order vice-virtue has been changed in favor of the order virtue-vice. What is striking in this context is that from the six manuscripts mentioned in the edition of 1899 that contain the order 3-2 (out of 370) three are situated in the Low Countries, and one in Gdansk, a well-known medieval Dutch trading partner in Preußen (nowadays Poland).[13] In addition, two other manuscripts in the Netherlands (not mentioned in the edition of 1899) also contain the order 3-2.[14] Even more interesting is the reception of the work in Middle Dutch. Of the 27 known translations of the *Composition*, seven follow the order 3-2,[15] which is almost 25%. I have not examined the manuscripts and their relations any further, nor checked if this is all a matter of coincidence or error, but a preliminary conclusion with regard to this strange inversion may be this: the reception of the *Composition* in the Low Countries evidences the shift in importance from a focus on vice in the pastoral literature of the High Middle Ages to a focus on virtue in the devout literature of the Late Middle Ages.[16] There are, indeed,

[12] The first chapter of the third book deals, among other things, with spiritual consolation, whereas the final chapter deals with the Eucharist. I am reminded here of the reversal of book three (on the Eucharist) and book four (on interior consolation) of the autograph of Thomas a Kempis' *Imitatio Christi* (see Léon M.J. Delaissé, *Le manuscrit autographe de Thomas a Kempis et 'L'Imitation de Jésus-Christ. Examen archéologique et édition diplomatique du Bruxellensis 5855-6*, 2 vols. [Antwerp and Amsterdam: Éd. Érasme, 1956]) by scribes who prefered to end with the chapter on the Eucharist. See Rudolf Th. M. van Dijk, "De Navolging van Christus als concept voor de geestelijke weg. De relevante plaats van het derde en vierde boek", *Ons Geestelijk Erf* 77 (2003): 43-92.

[13] Possible sources for the inversion are ms. Brussels, Royal Library, 1795 (1388) and ms. The Hague, Royal Library, 70 E 10 (1397). Both manuscripts have the inverted order book three-book two. In the Hague 70 E 10, it is the same hand that joins the explicit of book three with the incipit of book two. The Dutch translations are of a later date (and possibly based on these manuscripts).

[14] Stooker and Verbeij, "'Uut Profectus'", 318-340.

[15] Stooker and Verbeij, "'Uut Profectus'", 337-340.

[16] The shift "from vice to virtue" is confirmed by the work of Gerard Zerbolt van Zutphen (1367-1398), the influential theologian of the Modern Devotion from the generation after Geert Grote (1367-1384). His emphasis is on virtues and on progress towards perfection, not on vices. His reception of the *Composition* in his *De spiritualibus ascensionibus* follows the same inversion. In some places Zerbolt starts with the virtues of book three, and then opposes them with the vices of book two. Whereas David treats the vices first and ends with the love for one's neighbor, Zerbolt starts with the love for one's neighbor and ends with a particular vice, for example in the chapter on *invidia* (ch. 60): "Ascensus contra invidiam sunt profectus et gradus dilectionis proximi. Quorum primus est nullum odire, nulli malum cupere, nullius velle bonum impedire, in necessitate proximo auxilium subventionis non subtrahere et breviter, ut nulli faciat vel cupiat malum cum voluntatis consensu et bonum optet et faciat sicut sibi velle deberet si indigeret [...]. Est autem summum remedium invidiae nihil amare eorum, quae mundus amat, honores, divitias, voluptates. In quantum nos aliquod terrenum diligimus in tantum si per aliquem ab eo impedimur ad invidiam concitamur [...]. Secundum remedium est, ut homo diligenter perpendat, quod etiam si alius illo careret bono, de quo ei invidet, attamen ipse illud non haberet [...]". See David: "Dilectionis proximi primus gradus esse videtur nullum odire, nulli malum cupere, in necessitate proximo auxilium subventionis non subtrahere, et breviter, ut nulli faciat malum vel cupiat cum voluntatis consensu, et bonum proximo optet et faciat, sicut sibi velle deberet, si indigeret [...] [3,36]. Primum remedium

good spiritual reasons for the Modern Devout to concentrate on virtue, not vice.[17]

2. The Powers of the Soul

The main theological division outside-inside (*De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione*) that David uses to express the necessity of man's outer and inner reformation is borrowed from Cassian.[18] This author had intended his *Institutiones* and *Collationes* to be a literary unit, aimed at the *homo exterior* and *homo interior* respectively. Thus,

> The *exterior* man means the body which by force of decay – inherent legacy of sin – grows weak, dies and turns to dust; but *the inward man is renewed day by day* (2 Cor. 4,16) in good, and grows up into a more and more perfect *likeness* to Him to whose *image* he has been created.[19]

In addition, David adopts the reformation of understanding, will, memory, the three powers of the soul that he discusses in the second and third book (see below), from Augustine.[20] Other medieval authors who have a considerable influence on David are

contra invidiam est, quod et summum est, nihil amare vel cupere eorum, quae mundus amat, id est honores, divitias, voluptates [...]" [2,37]. "Secundum est cogitare, quod si alius non haberet illud, unde tu ei invides, tamen tu non haberes [...]" [2,37]. The Dutch tradition of inversion ends with the Modern Devout Jan Mombaer (ca.1460- ca.1501), who in his *Rosetum exercitiorum spiritualium et sacrarum meditationum* uses the third and a portion of David's second book in the form of excerpts, summaries, and *versus memoriales* (Pansters, *De kardinale deugden*, 189).

[17] The Dutch historian Leendert Breure, studying the attitudes toward death and life within the Modern Devotion, observes that with the virtues of *ynnicheit* (inner peace) and *puritas cordis* (purity of heart) in possession, there is no need to attach too much importance to temptations, sin, and fear: "The idea existed that it is dangerous to bury oneself too deep in the notion of sin. Thinking less about the problem of sin and fear, the attitude of acceptance of life as it comes was connected with the often-pronounced hope of grace" (Leendert Breure, *Doodsbeleving en levenshouding: een historisch-psychologische studie betreffende de Moderne Devotie in het IJsselgebied in de veertiende en vijftiende eeuw*, Middeleeuwse studies en bronnen 5 [Hilversum: Verloren, 1987], 119; trans. K. Pansters). Furthermore: "The goal was always to produce something useful, in which the devout person could mirror himself. Listing the virtues served that purpose" (Breure, *Doodsbeleving en levenshouding*, 214). And: "Vices had to be ascertained, but not analysed. There was little or no room for reflection on psychological causes behind one's own behaviors" (Breure, *Doodsbeleving en levenshouding*, 258-259).

[18] Bohl, *Geistlicher Raum*, 119. The decision to describe the virtues in just a few outstanding degrees without any intermediate steps also goes back to Cassian (Bohl, *Geistlicher Raum*, 119).

[19] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 83-84. "Exterior homo est corpus, quod ex defectu corruptionis, quae ex peccato provenit, languescit, moritur et incineratur; interior autem homo in bonis de die in diem renovatur et proficit in similitudine eius, ad cuius imaginem creatus est" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 88). "External" powers like physical strength or practical intelligence do not feature in the *Composition*. See, in this regard, David's quotation and explanation of 1 Tim. 4,8: "[...] corporalis exercitatio ad modicum utilis est, pietas autem ad omnia utilis est" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 87).

[20] Bohl, *Geistlicher Raum*, 123-124.

Gregory the Great, Hugh of St. Victor, and Bernard of Clairvaux.[21] With regard to the conceptualization of spiritual progress, the influence of these authors is nevertheless negligible. David's classification of spiritual life (*incipientes, proficientes, perfecti* and the corresponding stages *animalis, rationalis, spiritualis*), which forms the backbone of his religious program, is derived from the prevalent *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei* of William of St. Thierry.[22]

Concerning the theme of progress in the virtues, David does not limit himself to this sixth step of the third book.[23] *Profectus virtutum* is in fact the underlying, connecting theme of all three books of the *Composition*. Whereas one with ardent zeal in each of the three stages (in the three books) necessarily participates in a continuous transformation process,[24] the life of virtue is situated in the dynamics of spiritual development as a continuous discovery and interiorisation of the good (*in bonis*) that is God. Inextricably bound up with the other steps of the spiritual transformation process (that in itself consists of a continuous *proficere*), progress in the virtues relates to this whole process (*processus*) from beginning (*incipere*) to end (*perfectio*). Making progress (*proficere, progredi, promovere, procedere, ascendere*) and becoming perfect (*perfici*) demand a – literally – unremitting effort (*studium, disciplina, labor, exercitium, opera, devotio*). In one of his letters that has been passed down in many manuscripts of the *Composition*, David puts it this way:

> The more one advances [in exercising virtue] the more one sees of the way one has yet to travel and how best to set about it... Not to endeavour to advance [in the practice of virtue] is to risk losing this understanding, for the path itself to holiness [*virtutes*] fades from view.[25]

In the same vein, the three powers of the soul (understanding, memory, and will) are also presented as central to the whole trajectory of spiritual growth towards God. A whole

[21] Bohl, *Geistlicher Raum*, 125-133.

[22] In David's own words: "Beatus Bernardus in Epistola ad Fratres de Monte Dei describit tres status Religiosorum, scilicet incipientium, proficientium, perfectorum. Primum vocat animalem [...]. Secundum vocat rationalem [...]. Tertium vocat spiritualem" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 84). See also: Bohl, *Geistlicher Raum*, 132-134. This work was thought to be written by Bernard of Clairvaux. See also: Jacob Heerinckx, "Influence de l'Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei' sur la composition de l'homme extérieur et intérieur de David d'Augsburg", *Études franciscaines* 45 (1933): 330-347, here 333: "Et n'était-il pas naturel que le maître des novices allemandes, écrivant pour des débutants dans la vie religieuse, s'inspirât du traité composé par l'abbé de Clairvaux, comme on croyait, pour des novices chartreux?"

[23] For this and the previous paragraph, see Pansters, "*Profectus virtutum*", 236-238.

[24] Hein Blommestijn, "Progrès-progressants", *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* 12 (1986): 2383-2405, there 2397.

[25] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 3. "Quanto plus quis altius profecerit in actione virtutis, tanto clarius videt, quid adhuc sibi desit, et qualiter ad ea, quae restant, debeat pervenire [...]. Qui autem non studet in virtutibus semper proficere etiam hoc aliquando perdet, quod necdum viam, qua ad virtutes tendatur, intelligat" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 1). The editors have placed this letter of David before the first book.

chapter is dedicated to them in the second book.[26] Here, in the context of the interior life and the recovery from sin, David gives an overview of the three powers (*potentiae*), their role in the process of interior renovation, and each of the powers' successive stages of "beginning, progress, and perfection". First, the soul, being an image of the Trinity, has three powers. With these powers "it may reach upwards towards God:"[27]

> By the understanding it touches the wisdom of God, by the memory it touches the eternity of God, from whom it need never more be separated, by the will it touches the goodness of God.[28]

Verbs connected to the "touching" (*capere*) of God, the highest good to be reached by the soul (*quod est capax summi boni*), are striving (*studere, diligere*), rising (*apprehendere*), laying hold (*tenere*), desiring (*requirere, desidere*), possessing (*in se habere*), seeking (*quaerere*), and finding (*invenire*). To the "positive" labors that may forward (*quae promovent eam*) the soul's search are added the "negative" efforts to avoid (*omnia vitare et fugere*) the pitfalls on the path.

Second, "interior reformation is to be looked for in the faculties of the soul".[29] The rational soul, in which lies the image of God, needs renovation

> because sin has obscured the reason, enervated and distorted the will and turned the memory aside upon an endless variety of vain courses. How often does reason take falsehood for truth, the will mistake evil for good, the memory busy herself constantly on what brings nothing but disquiet in its train, forsaking the one supreme good in whom she might find all good as in its source.[30]

The renovation (*reformatio*) of interior man therefore begins with setting the three powers straight. Third, understanding, will, and memory each have three stages: beginning, progress, and perfection. Here is an overview of the nine elements (in my analysis) of the reformation of the powers of the soul:[31]

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[26] The chapters of book two are: "Four Points for Beginners", "Fourfold Temptation", "Three Kinds of Religious", "The Soul's Three Powers", "Interior Discord", and "The Seven Capital Sins".

[27] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 81. "[...] habes tres potentias, quibus capax est Dei" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 85).

[28] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 81. "Per rationem potens est capere sapientiam Dei; per memoriam potens est capere virtutem aeternitatis Dei, ut in aeternum nunquam ab eo possit separari; per voluntatem potens est capere bonitatem Dei" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 85).

[29] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 83. "Interior reformatio in spiritu mentis consistit" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 88).

[30] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 84. "Sed per peccatum ratio caeca facta est, voluntas curva et foeda, memoria instabilis et vaga. Ratio recipit saepius falsum pro vero; voluntas eligit deterius pro bono; memoria occupat se illis, quibus semper inquietatur, quia unum et summum bonum deseruit, in quo omnia bona poterat habere" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 88).

[31] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 84-87. Reason: "Initium ergo reformationis rationis est fidem catholicam firmiter credere. [...] Profectus rationis est ex illuminatione divina rationes fidei aliquatenus intelligere [...]. Perfectio rationis in hac vita est per mentis excessum supra se rapi [...]

	Understanding	Will	Memory
Beginning	Firm belief in the truths of the Catholic Faith	Firm determination to resist vice and for God's sake to devote itself sincerely to the acquisition of virtue	Strive to recall it from its habitual wandering to the thought of God by means of prayer, reading, recollection and reflection
Progress	Growing apprehension of the truths of faith, under the light of divine grace	The movements of the will are found so well ordered and set towards the acquisition of virtue that there is neither compulsion on the one hand nor revolt on the other, and that nothing is relished but God's will alone	The success attained in freeing meditation and prayer from importunate distractions, and in maintaining, *with heart enlarged* (Ps. 118,32), an orderly mind
Perfection	Entire elevation of the mind above itself [so] that God is perceived [...] by a radiant clearness of the soul wrapt in contemplation	Become by love *one spirit* with God (1 Cor. 6,17), so that it cannot exercise itself except in God and longs to be filled to the full with His sweetness	Being so caught up with and absorbed in God as to be forgetful of self and all created things, and, without any stir of fugitive thoughts and imaginings, to rest sweetly in God alone

purissima mentis intelligentia Deum in contemplatione videre." Will: "Initium reformationis voluntatis est ex bonae voluntatis assensu vitiis resistere et operibus virtutum fideliter instare propter Deum. [...] Profectus eius est omnes affectiones habere ordinatas et in virtutes formatas sine rebellione vel coactione, ut iam non libeat, nisi quod est secundum voluntatem Dei. Perfectio voluntatis est unum cum Deo spiritum esse per amorem, ut iam non possit velle nisi Deum et eius suavitatis dulcedine inebriari." Memory: "Initium reformationis memoriae est mentem ab evagatione sua ad memoriam Dei cum labore reducere orando, legendo, recolendo vel [...] cogitando. Profectus est bonis meditationibus et orationibus sine importuna evagatione posse intentum esse et in latitudine cordis sui secum deambulare. Perfectio est ita in Deum esse absorptum per mentis excessum, ut et sui ipsius et omnium, quae sunt, obliviscatur homo et in solo Deo absque omni strepitu volubilium cogitationum et imaginationum suaviter quiescat" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 89-92).

After this triple treatment of the soul's three powers (interior man – reformation – three stages), David concludes with an explanation of the intermediate stage of progress:

> It must begin with the *will*, for on the will all depends, virtue, vice and merit, and those inclinations also which tend towards good on the one hand or towards evil on the other. Next in order comes the *memory*, and lastly the *understanding*, or intellect. The *will* is master in the soul, and the *understanding* is the teacher; but the *memory* is for the service of both, implementing the commands of the one, absorbing the instruction of the other.[32]

Here we have the functional (obediential, pedagogical) relationships between the three powers – the triad's internal logic considered from the perspective of monastic living.

A rehearsal of this treatment in the fourth chapter of the second book (on the interior life) can be found in the first chapter of the third book (on progress in a religious soul): "The powers of the soul are the memory, the understanding and the will, and herein is the image of the Blessed Trinity found."[33] Hence, God

> enlightens the intellect that it may know the truth; He enkindles the will that it may love what is good, and He gives to the memory to find its tranquillity and joy in clinging to the good that is true.[34]

Here, in the third stage of the religious person progressing towards perfection, viz., *spiritualis consolatio*, the definitions of the three powers are roughly corresponding to their first stages described in book two. Entirely new is the explanation that spiritual consolation adorns the powers supernaturally,[35] in the sense that natural faculties are adorned (*ornatus*) by God with their characteristic understandings and recognitions, affections and virtues, and thoughts and capacities.[36]

David brings up the three powers in three more places. First, in chapter five (on prayer) of the third book he directly refers to his treatment of the powers in the second

[32] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 87. "De quorum profectibus aliquanto latius est considerandum, et primo de reformatione voluntatis; quia virtus et vitium et meritum dependent ab ea et affectiones, quae tam ad vitia quam ad virtutes inclinantur; postea de memoria et ratione vel intellectu. Voluntas est in anima quasi imperans, ratio vero quasi docens, memoria quasi ministrans utrique, illi quid iubeat, isti quid doceat" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 91-92).

[33] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* II, 5-6. "Potentiae animae, in quibus imaginem summae Trinitatis praefert, sunt tres: ratio, voluntas et memoria" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 164).

[34] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* II, 6. "[...] hoc est a Deo. Ratio illuminatur ad cognitionem veri, voluntas accenditur ad amorem boni, memoria tranquillatur ad fruendum et inhaerendum vero bono" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 164).

[35] "Vera autem consolatio spiritualis consistit in duobus: in naturalium animae potentiarum decoratione et carnis ad spiritum quieta concordatione" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 163-164).

[36] "Rationis ornatus est lucida intelligentia de Deo et de his, quae de Deo sunt et ad Deum conducunt, ut intellectus sacrae Scripturae et rationes fidei et operum Dei [...]. Ornatus voluntatis sunt sanctae affectiones et devotio ad Deum, fervor fidei, fiducia spei, dulcedo caritatis et bonae voluntatis alacritas [...]. Ornatus memoriae est sacrarum copia cogitationum et affluentia utilium meditationum et stabilis memoria Dei [...]" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 165).

book (*dictum est enim supra*) when he asserts that "the perfection of a spiritual life depends upon the enlightenment of the understanding, the rectitude of the will and the ever constant memory of God".[37] Except for a few words on *memoria*, he does not elaborate any further on the triad. Second, at the very end of the same chapter, we read about the best form of prayer as "that calm ecstacy of possession wherein all the fugitive faculties (*vires*) and powers (*potentiae*) of the soul are gathered together and fixed upon the One".[38] Here, too, David gives no further explication. Third, in chapter six (on the states of prayer) of the third book David examines the triple powers as "the steps whereby the soul may advance and approach the summit". The first progressive step in prayer is control of the imagination (*memoria*), which "will move into an atmosphere of tranquillity".[39] The next step is understanding (*intelligentia*), which, "thus lit and enlarged, has now a wide field of thought".[40] The soul progresses towards supreme goodness (God), finally, in the will (*affectus*): "as the understanding advances in its knowledge and truth, so also does the appetite of the soul, the will with its affections, experience truth's sweetness."[41] In this way, when the understanding (*ratio*) "is filled with the knowlegde of God", the will (*voluntas*) "is set uniquely upon the love of God", and the memory (*memoria*) "is wholly absorbed in holding, gazing upon and delighting in God", all the faculties and powers are ultimately unified in the *forma animae*, God.[42]

[37] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* II, 128. "Dictum est enim supra, quod perfectio spiritualis vitae in tribus principaliter constet: in rationis illuminatione, in voluntatis rectitudine et in memoriae iugi circa Deum occupatione" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 294).

[38] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* II, 170. "[...] ubi omnes vires animae et potentiae a suis dispersionibus simul collectae et in unum verum et simplicissimum et summum bonum fixae" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 338).

[39] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* II, 171. "Primo enim assuescit dispersiones memoriae [...] memoria aliquando proficit et stabilitur" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 339).

[40] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* II, 172. "Intelligentia etiam [...] Et hac illustratione dilatatur mens ad multa cogitanda" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 339).

[41] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* II, 173. "[...] ideo, cum intellectus coeperit in agnitione veri dilatari, statim etiam et gustus animae, hoc est interior affectus, incipit quodam spirituali sapore in cognitis delectari" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 341). Here, David reflects on the role of the *affectiones* (*amor, gaudium, spes, timor, odium, dolor, pudor*), noting that "each affective power of the soul has its own proper object" ("Licet enim omnes animae affectiones suos habeant proprios sapores").

[42] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* II, 178. "[...] cum omnibus potentiis suis et viribus in Deum collecta [...] Forma enim animae Deus est [...] nisi cum ratio perfecte iuxta capacitatem suam illuminatur ad cognitionem Dei [...] et voluntas perfecte afficitur ad amandum summam bonitatem, et memoria plene absorbetur ad intuendam et tenendam et fruendam summam felicitatem" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 346).

3. Power Paradoxes

I would now like to address five paradoxes that I have encountered while studying David and his extensive treatise, in particular the parts on the powers of the soul.

(1) This is a Franciscan manual for monastic living, or rather, a monastic manual for Franciscan living. Clear Franciscan themes and elements (going outside the convent, not engaging with women, begging, following the example of Francis, etc.) indicate the intended public (viz., novices and professed friars living in convents), but form, structure, and content follow a thoroughly monastic framework.[43] The Franciscan author is clearly in love with his patristic and monastic sources – a preference that may also be at the root of the reception of the text by the interiority-driven Modern Devout and their strange reversal of books two and three.

(2) The treatise, while focusing on the steps of spiritual progress on the route to perfection (*novitii, proficientes, religiosi*; *incipientes, proficientes, perfecti*; *animalis, rationalis, spiritualis*), employs several philosophical schemes that one expects to find in a scholarly treatise but not (necessarily) in a manual for spiritual life. One of these schemes is the platonic/augustinian quartet of cardinal virtues,[44] another the platonic trilogy of lower powers of the soul (the *vires animae* of reason, spirit, and appetite) – schemes that one will not encounter, for instance, in the writings of Francis. Noteworthy, too, is the central, structuring place of the augustinian trilogy of the higher powers of the soul (the *potentiae animae* of understanding, will, and memory) in the spiritual transformation from vice to virtue in the second book.

(3) The use of these schemes is rather stereotyped.[45] With regard to the three

[43] In some ways, there is no great contrast between mendicant and monastic, or between spiritual and philosophical in the thirteenth century. The medievals simply did not have the same distinctions that we tend to like to draw in these and other ways. Bonaventure, for instance, cannot be categorized as either "spiritual" or "philosophical", to the exclusion of the other: he is both. One suspects the same can and indeed should be said of David, but this is simply not true. Unlike Bonaventure, whose outlook is universal and whose approach is differentiated, David writes a manual for Franciscan novices in distinctly Benedictine, even un-Franciscan terms. His persistent focus on interiority and the life of the soul (instead of mendicancy and the life on the street) is striking in his whole oeuvre.

[44] David gives a short description of the cardinal virtues in chapter four of the third book (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 217, 227). See on the hesitant reception of the cardinal virtues in late-medieval discourse: Pansters, *De kardinale deugden*.

[45] As is so often the case with philosophical schemes in late medieval theology, they are reproduced, repeated, and rehearsed, but not prepared for practical application in natural circumstances. See for example, in general terms, on the Platonic trilogy: "The very fact that it was stereotyped indicates a formal rather than an enthusiastic acceptance of the idea. In the ethical and social and political thought of Plato himself the tripartition unquestionably fulfilled a vitally important role, but we cannot say the same for the part it plays in the long series of his devoted followers" (David

potentiae, we see that they are neither fully integrated in the concept of spiritual progress (as if a friar, who will be naturally drawn toward regular reflection on progress in his virtues, will also continually consider his understanding, will, and memory), nor self-evident for the discipline inside the convent or the development of virtue (where basic considerations, not higher powers dictate daily progress). More importantly, even though they are declared crucial for the interior life and indispensable for the soul's *profectus* both in the context of the recovery from sin and the practice of prayer, they neither provide a functional foundation nor an inspirational framework, like religious exercise or spiritual virtue, for the *practical process* between purification and fruition.

(4) The powers of the soul are inherently connected (not unlike the *connexio* of the cardinal virtues),[46] but this connexion is not maintained everywhere by David. For example, he refers to the powers already at the very beginning of the first treatise, but only partly so: "[...] He has not merely created man, but, in addition, adorned him with reason, enobled him with free-will [...]."[47] After that, *voluntas* and *ratio* keep returning in various places, either in combination or separately, but – with the exception of the "complete" treatment of the triad in chapter four of the second book and in chapter six of the third book – always without *memoria*. Thus, when he deals with the "natural powers of the mind" (*naturales vires animae*) in relation to the movements of the will (*motus affectionum*, viz., the concupiscible and irascible passions, or sense appetites) very concisely, he also mentions will as God's subject and reason as the soul's guide.[48] And when he concludes his book on the vices and their remedies, he observes that "the will is strengthened in the conflict with temptation".[49] In addition, will incidentally appears as part of other divisions, e.g., will, action, and joy as the powers of love,

N. Bell, "The Tripartite Soul and the Image of God in the Latin Tradition", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 47 [1980]: 16-52, there 52). See on the "l'art pour l'art" reception of the cardinal virtues in late medieval society: Pansters, *De kardinale deugden*.

[46] "Nulla istarum valet esse vel perfici sine aliis: si ratio non videret, voluntas non amaret, quia nec sciret, quid esset amandum; si non amaret, non delectaretur in bono; item, si non memoraretur boni, quomodo posset agnoscere vel illud amare?" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 164).

[47] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 3. "[...] quem non solum creavit sicut cetera, sed insuper intellectu decoravit, libero arbitrio nobilitavit" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 1).

[48] "Voluntas nulli debuit esse subiecta nisi soli Deo [...]. et iste appetitus vocatur concupiscibilitas. [...] docente vi rationali [...]. Et haec vis vocatur irascibilitas [...] per vim concupiscibilem appetivit bonum [...] per vim irascibilem tenuit et inhaesit bono" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 92-93). Elsewhere, in a paragraph on "temptation and its methods of approach" in the second chapter of the third book, the translator calls the "lower" *tres animae vires* (*concupiscibilitas, irascibilitas, rationabilitas*) the "three powers of the soul" (Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* II, 185).

[49] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 130. "[...] voluntas roboratur contra tentationes" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 159). There are some independent references to memory, and these usually concern the mindfulness of God, e.g., "huius beatitudinis imitatio quaedam est iugis memoria Dei" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 213).

whereby it remains, unsurprisingly, "informed by reason".[50]

(5) David's clear descriptions of the powers' form, function, and effect remain close to traditional interpretations, but the terminology used is far from consequent. Terminological inconsequence may be a typical trait of the late medieval mindset, but David's variations are nevertheless surprising and occasionally confusing. For example, in one and the same chapter he first calls the powers *memoria*, *intelligentia*, and *affectus*, and then *ratio*, *voluntas*, and *memoria*.[51] Moreover, the internal order of the triad in chapters two (*ratio, memoria, voluntas*; *ratio, voluntas, memoria*) and three (*memoria, intelligentia, affectus*; *memoria, affectus, intellectus*; *ratio, voluntas, memoria*) seems to be somewhat a matter of indifference. In some instances, similarities are so vague as to become futile, for example: "[...] knowing nothing of interior devotion, they pay little heed to the cultivation of true holiness which lies in the intellect [*spiritu*] and in the will [*mente*]";[52] or, in this well-known definition of virtue: "by virtue we mean a movement of the will [*affectus*] acting in accord with a legitimate judgment formed by the intellect [*mentis*]".[53]

4. Conclusion

Returning by way of conclusion to the treatise in its entirety, we can safely say that, in David's conception, *all* human powers (*potentiae*, *vires*, *virtutes*, *affectiones*, etc.) are always entirely spiritual, i.e., functioning within a divine-human relational framework. On the one hand, they are elements of a complete program of religious return to the Creator, thus ultimately to be given back to God: "Therefore you must give Him all – all that you are, all your powers of mind and body."[54] On the other hand, they are essentially

[50] "Dilectio nostra in tribus consistit: in voluntate, in opere, in affectu. Voluntas informata a ratione" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 224).

[51] There are more variations in this chapter: "[...] et quanto ferventius ab inferiorum memoria, affectu et intellectu ad superna sustollitur" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 345); "[...] ut anima toto intellectu et affectu et memoria in Deum feratur" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 346). See also, in chapter 65: "Cum autem devotio sit piae affectionis pinguendo et magis se habeat ad affectum quam ad intellectum" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 354).

[52] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 76. "[...] et interioris dulcedinis ignari, de veris virtutum studiis, quae in spiritu et mente sunt, parum currant" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 80). It is not entirely clear why Devas translates *spiritu* with "intellect" and *mente* with "will"; a better translation would have been one using the more literal "spirit" and "mind."

[53] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* II, 54. "Virtus est ordinatus secundum veritatis iudicium mentis affectus" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 215).

[54] "[...] et ideo debes ei dare totum, quod es et quod scis et potes" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 4). See for a similar example: "[...] nos eum vicissim diligere ex omni, quod sumus et scimus et possumus" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 224). We are dealing here with powers of the soul, not higher powers. However, God's grace is a *basso continuo* in the *Composition*. See, already, the

(potentially) internal and God-directed: "Be a man of God (*devotus Deo*) in real earnest (*cor tuum semper, quantum potes*), and occupy yourself in Him (*occupato cum ipso*)."[55] Even the building blocks of discipline inside the convent – covered in chapter one of book one, on "outward man" – are virtues or *spiritual* habits: obedience ("for the love of God and of His Kingdom of Heaven you have surrendered yourself"[56]), peace with superiors ("believe that in whatever they enjoin, God is behind them working for your soul's good"[57]), care in the divine office ("compel the body to minister to the spirit"[58]), discipline at chapter ("provided his conscience is clear before God"[59]), discipline in the refectory ("be concerned with yourself alone and God"[60]), and so forth. The same goes for discipline outside the convent – covered in chapter two of book one, still on "outward man" – where self-discipline (chapter three), community life (chapter four), and exterior conduct are always a reflection of the soul's devotion, the heart's direction, the desire for religious progress, in short: the interior disposition-in-development, or spiritual *composition*.

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beginning of the introductory letter: "Quod Deo operante bene incepit ipso cooperante melius consummare" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 1).

[55] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 30. "[...] esto devotus Deo et cor tuum semper, quantum potes, occupato cum ipso" (David ab Augusta, *De exterioris*, 35).

[56] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 5.

[57] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 6.

[58] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 7.

[59] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 8.

[60] Devas, *Spiritual Life and Progress* I, 9.

STOICISM *A LA MODE*: SENECAN ETHICS IN ROGER BACON'S *MORALIS PHILOSOPHIA*

ESTOICISMO *A LA MODE*: LA ETICA DE SENECA EN LA *MORALIS PHILOSOPHIA* DE ROGER BACON

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Abstract

While recent scholarship accents early Franciscans' use of Greek and Greco-Arabic sources in their ethics, Roger Bacon's appeal to Stoic ethics via Seneca in his *Moralis philosophia*, the last book of his *Opus maius*, has not been given its due. Bacon's citation of Seneca's dialogues privileges *De ira* and works he associates with it. Placing Bacon's ethics in the context of classical and Christian traditions on anger, this paper argues that Bacon uses Seneca to undermine the arguments for righteous anger in both these traditions, specifically those validated by his Franciscan contemporary John of La Rochelle. Bacon's alternative addresses ethical and political concerns he shares with his dedicatee, Pope Clement IV, and with Franciscan confrères committed to popular preaching and the apostolate to non-Christians. As such, Bacon's Stoic ethics *à la mode* needs clearer recognition in the ongoing reinterpretation of thirteenth-century Franciscan thought.

Keywords

Anger; Ethics; Roger Bacon; Seneca; Stoicism

Resumen

Mientras la investigación reciente resalta el uso que los primeros franciscanos hicieron de fuentes griegas y greco-árabes en su ética, el recurso de Roger Bacon a la ética estoica a través de Séneca en su *Moralis philosophia*, el último libro de su *Opus maius*, no ha recibido el reconocimiento que merece. La referencia de Bacon a los diálogos de Séneca privilegia el *De ira* y las obras que él asocia con ésta. Situando la ética de Bacon en el contexto de las tradiciones clásicas y cristianas sobre la ira, este artículo argumenta que el autor utiliza a Séneca para socavar los argumentos a favor de la ira justa en ambas tradiciones, concretamente aquellos validados por su contemporáneo, el franciscano Juan de La Rochelle. La alternativa de Bacon aborda preocupaciones éticas y políticas

que comparte con su dedicatario, el papa Clemente IV, y con sus compañeros franciscanos comprometidos con la predicación popular y el apostolado con los no cristianos. Como tal, la ética estoica *à la mode* de Bacon merece un reconocimiento más explícito en la actual reinterpretación del pensamiento franciscano del siglo XIII.

Palabras clave

Ira; ética; Roger Bacon; Séneca; estoicismo

Whether as a neutral passion of the soul, a deplorable vice, or an occasional and situational virtue, anger has been discussed since antiquity. Medieval ethicists inherited the classical and biblical components of this legacy. Roger Bacon (c. 1214-92) devotes more attention to anger than any other medieval thinker. But this aspect of his *oeuvre* has not received its due. Contributors to the "history of emotions" ignore Bacon.[1] Some scholars mention the fact that his *Moralis philosophia*, the last book of his *Opus maius* (1266) draws heavily on Seneca's *De ira* and associated works, although accounts of thirteenth-century philosophy, ethics included, accent Aristotle and his Arabic commentators and not the Stoic ethics conveyed by Seneca. Educated at Oxford, where there was no ban on Aristotle in the early thirteenth century, Bacon was a recognized authority on Aristotelianism, among the first to teach it in the Arts faculty at the University of Paris. Yet, as an ethicist, Bacon turned to Seneca on anger, not to Aristotle. This paper considers Bacon's use of Seneca and his reasons for this preference, which also suggests that we should widen our assessment of Franciscan philosophy in Bacon's age to include Stoic ethics.

Classical views on anger are surveyed magisterially by William V. Harris. As he shows, some ancient authors validated anger – if not for women – and some factored humoral theory into their prescriptions for its cure. The leading positions on this theme were Aristotelianism and Stoicism as represented by Seneca. Both Harris' judgments and his presentation of these two positions enjoy a remarkable scholarly consensus, reflected in

[1] Contributors to this historiographical current focus on how medieval authors represent the external expression of anger by both historical and fictional personages, regardless of the feelings they may actually have, viewed through the lens of social anthropology, ritual, dispute-settlement understandings, and/or gender studies, and the terminology they use in so doing. For samples of this approach see Gerd Althoff, "*Ira regis*: A History of Royal Anger", in *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, edited by B. H. Rosenwein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 59-74; Albrecht Classen, "Anger and Anger Management in the Middle Ages: Mental-Historical Perspectives", *Mediaevistik* 19 (2006): 21-50. The latest survey of medieval authors on anger, Peter King, "Emotions in Medieval Thought", in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of the Emotions*, edited by P. Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 167-187, which considers emotions as psychological phenomena, joins the above-cited scholars in ignoring Bacon.

the summary which follows.[2]

Aristotle regards anger as a passion or disturbance of the soul, arising in its concupiscible or irascible faculty. Anger is our response to what we perceive to be an unfair attack. We naturally seek revenge. Aristotle does not require us to validate our perception or to consider any mitigating factors before reacting. Rather, our practical intellect should intervene and moderate the pay-back, avoiding the extremes of cruelty or cowardice. Like all passions of the soul, anger is neutral. The behavior it inspires may be virtuous or vicious. Insofar as it is virtuous, its vindication is appropriate; indeed, we stand dishonored if we do not avenge ourselves.

Seneca explicitly condemns Aristotle on anger. For him, anger is an unbidden emotion which, if it occurs, the sage first judges and then rejects as an irrational passion. Anger is intrinsically vicious, whatever occasions it. It cannot be moderated but must be excised from the soul. Vengeance is never acceptable. In judging anger, sages should consider the mindset and circumstances of those who provoke it. But, as with circumstances beyond our control, the bottom line is that no attack, however unwarranted, causes sages to lose their equanimity. While anger certainly harms others, Seneca accents the damage it does to the angry. He offers remedies combining aversion therapy with cognitive therapy. Aversion therapy confronts readers with examples of angry behavior so loathsome that they will be motivated to abhor and avoid it. Cognitive

[2] William V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), passim and 56-60 on Aristotle; 61-66, 112-118, 220-228, 248-253, 324-326, 338-361, 377-382 on Seneca; 204-206, 212 on Cicero on both views. In accord with Harris are Christopher Gill, "The Emotions in Greco-Roman Philosophy", in *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature*, edited by S. Morton Braund and C. Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 5-15; Richard Sorabji, *Emotions and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 19, 56-57, 66-75, 93-94, 123, 164-166, 175, 191-192, 213-216, 223-224; Bernard Besnier, "Aristote et les passions", in *Les passions antiques et médiévales*, edited by B. Besnier, P.-F. Moreau, and L. Renault (Paris: PUF, 2003), 29-93; David Konstan, "Aristotle on the Emotions", in *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, edited by S. Braund and G. W. Most (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 99-120; A. W. Price, "Emotions in Plato and Aristotle", in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy*, edited by P. Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 121-143 at 132-139; Christopher Gill, "Stoicism and Epicureanism", in *Oxford Handbook*, 143-185 at 145-154; Gill, "Positive Emotions in Stoicism: Are They Enough"? in *Hope, Joy, and Affection in the Classical World*, edited by R. R. Caston and R. A. Kaster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 143-160 (with a useful reminder of the importance of *eupatheia* in Stoic ethics); Robert A. Kaster, introduction to his translation of Seneca, *De ira* in *Anger, Mercy, Revenge*, translated by R. A. Kaster and M. Nussbaum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 3-13. The most detailed and recent treatment of *De ira* is provided by Sharon Weisser, *Eradication ou modération des passions: Histoire de la controverse chez Cicéron, Sénèque et Philon d'Alexandrie* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2021), 183-264, 370-375. For a variant reading of Aristotle on emotions as hard-wired into human biology see Kostas Kalimtzis, *Taming Anger: The Hellenistic Approach to the Limitations of Reason* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012), 73-124; for a variant reading of Seneca in this light see Änne Bäumer, *Die Bestie Mensch: Senecas Aggressionstheorie, ihre philosophischen Vorstufen, und ihre literarischen Auswirkungen* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1982).

therapy promotes the attainment of an anger-free soul by citing inspiring examples of those who possess it and by stressing the advantages of *apatheia*, aided by the nightly examination of conscience. Given his express contrast between his own position on anger and Aristotle's, Seneca is a rich source for both views.

If ancient philosophy offered medieval Christians conflicting positions on anger, so did the New Testament.[3] The Gospels all portray Jesus as angry in ejecting the money-changers from the Temple (Matthew 21:12-13, Mark 11:15-17, Luke 19:45-46, John 2:14-17). Even within the same Epistle, St. Paul enjoins his flock to abandon anger (Ephesians 4:30) and also advises them, "Be angry and do not sin; let not the sun go down on your anger" (Ephesians 4:26). So, Holy Scripture suggests that anger does not always conflict with Christian virtue.

Some historians see Augustine as the chief vector to the Latin Middle Ages of the classical and biblical traditions on anger via his review and critique of philosophical ethics in the *City of God*. Equally if not more important are steps Augustine takes in earlier works where he redefines the cardinal virtues as modes of charity. Well-ordered love thus replaces reason as the norm of virtue. If Stoic *apatheia* is an arrogant fantasy, Stoic *eupatheia* does not go the distance. To the extent that Augustine classifies the passions of the soul, in Book 10 of the *Confessions* he models the temptations he faces on the lusts of the flesh, the lusts of the eyes, and the pride of life (1 John 2:16). Under the third heading, the closest he comes to anger is resentment when others fail to grant him the esteem he deserves.[4]

Medieval discussions of anger owe much more to John Cassian and Gregory the Great, each of whom offers a hierarchy of passions of the soul understood as mortal sins, with a parallel scheme of corrective virtues.[5] Cassian, his authority guaranteed by his status as

[3] The fullest catalogue of biblical citations is provided by Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 391-399. For Christian debates on the wrath of the Old Testament God in late antiquity, a sideline here, see Joseph M. Hallman, "The Emotions of God: Tertullian to Lactantius", *Theological Studies* 42 (1981): 373-393.

[4] Scholars focusing on the influence of the *City of God* alone include Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima: Teorie e usi degli affetti nella cultura medievale* (Florence: SISMEL Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2015), 19-41; King, "Emotions in Medieval Thought", 168-170. For Augustine's assessment of his own temptations see *Confessiones* 10.30-41, edited by L. Verheijen, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 27 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981). For Augustine's wider views, early and late, on the acceptability of Stoic ethics that go well beyond these texts see Marcia L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1990), II:207-225, 233-234, 237-238. For a somewhat different reading of this topic see James Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 45-85, 98-111, 116-126.

[5] On the schemata of these figures see Richard Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues in Latin and the Vernacular* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1993), 99-106, 108-110; Carole Straw, "Cassian and the Cardinal Vices", in *The Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle Ages*, edited by R. Newhauser (Toronto: PIMS, 2005), 33-58; George E. Demacopoulos, *Gregory the Great: Ascetic, Pastor, and First Man of Rome* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015), 23-28, 32-33, 74-76, 113-124, 156; and above all the work of Silvana Vecchio and Carla Casagrande. See Vecchio, "*Ira mala/ira bona*:

recommended reading in the *Rule* of St. Benedict,[6] personifies his advice with examples of biblical worthies and Desert Fathers. Cassian draws on both Aristotelianism and Stoicism. He does not privilege Aristotle's intellectual faculty, above the fray, the arbiter of disturbances in the concupiscible and irascible faculties, since all three faculties are prone to their own distinctive vices.[7] Cassian's scheme moves from the gluttony, lust, avarice, avidity, and other perverse worldly desires of the concupiscible to the anger, impatience, sadness, sloth, cowardice, and cruelty of the irascible to the vainglory, pride, presumption, conflict, and heresy afflicting the rational faculty. Stoic *apatheia* enables us to master the emotions leading to these vices. Cassian's sequencing of the vices reflects his educational goals as a spiritual guide to ascetic monks. While anger occurs at the mid-point in his list, he regards it as the most serious vice, primarily because it destroys the tranquility of the angry and impedes their ability to pray.

By contrast, Gregory writes for a wider audience. His own scheme is etiological, not pedagogical.[8] Holding, with the Stoics, that vices as well as virtues are interconnected, he starts with pride, which engenders envy, which engenders wrath, which engenders sloth, which engenders avarice, which engenders gluttony, which engenders lust. Gregory reprises the Stoics' three-step process by which we succumb to these sins; his terms are *suggestio*, *delectatio*, and *consensus* rather than the *passio*, *propassio*, and *consensus* of most patristic and medieval writers. With Cassian, Gregory thinks we are at least mildly at fault if we dwell with pleasure on a sinful passion before rejecting it. But, departing from Seneca and Cassian alike, he regards anger as sometimes laudable. Anger as the zeal for holiness is virtuous. While Gregory agrees with Cassian that patience, humility, and self-denial are remedies for anger, he does not require an asceticism suited to monks alone and, with Seneca, advocates the regular examination of conscience of which all Christians are capable.

Before, and alongside of, newly translated Greek and Greco-Arabic sources, all the above-mentioned authorities were available to thinkers in Bacon's day. The first to take a notably independent line on anger was William Peraldus, lector at the Dominican

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Storia di un vizio che qualche volta è una virtù", *Doctor Seraphicus* 45 (1998): 41-62 at 44-45; Silvana Vecchio, "Passions de l'âme et pechés capitaux: Les ambiguïtés de la culture médiévale", in *Laster im Mittelalter/Vices in the Middle Ages*, edited by C. Flüeler and M. Rohde (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 45-64; Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *I sette vizi capitali: Storia dei peccati nel medioevo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2000), 54-59; Casagrande and Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima*, 43-65. See also Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities: A History of Emotion in the Middle Ages*, translated by R. Shaw (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2018), 38-39.

[6] *The Rule of St. Benedict* 42.3, 42.5, 72.7, edited and translated by B. Venarde, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 6 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

[7] John Cassian, *Collationes XXIIII*, 24.15.3-4, edited by M. Petchenig, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiaticorum Latinorum 13 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wisssenschaften, 2004).

[8] Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job I-XXXV* 5.82, edited by M. Andriaen, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 143 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1979); *Cura pastoralis* 2.2.16, edited by F. Rommel, translated by C. Morel, introduction by B. Judic (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1992).

studium at Lyon.[9] His *Summa vitiorum* (before 1236) follows Cassian in starting with the corporal sins. Anger heads Peraldus' list as the worst of the spiritual sins. To that list he attaches sins of the tongue, not as an eighth mortal sin but as a means of expressing any of the seven. Peraldus shares Cassian's educational rationale for his chosen scheme, but in this case he writes for fellow-mendicants preparing lay people for confession.

While Peraldus enjoyed a wide medieval reception by Dominicans, Franciscans, and other clerics engaged in the pastoral ministry,[10] if he was known he was ignored by John of La Rochelle, the leading Franciscan ethicist prior to Bacon. Regent master in theology at the University of Paris (1238-44), John applied his own teachings to the ethics of the *Summa Halensis* (1236-55). He receives high marks from historians, for his appeal to Aristotelian faculty psychology, for his use of other Greek and Arabic sources, or for the changes he rings on both Aristotle and Gregory the Great. He occupies a key role in the historiographical revision of early Franciscan thought as the mere replay of Augustine.[11]

John's base-line is the passions of the soul in Gregory's scheme, which he refines. He agrees with Augustine that vices derive from disordered love and applies the Johannine

[9] On Peraldus, who work is still unedited, see Richard Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues*, 127-130; Newhauser, "The Capital Vices as Medieval Anthropology", in *Laster im Mittelalter/Vices in the Middle Ages*, edited by C. Flüeler and M. Rohde (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 119-123; see also Silvana Vecchio, "The Seven Deadly Sins between Pastoral Care and Scholastic Theology: The *Summa de vitiis* of John of Rupella", in *The Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the Middle* Ages, edited by R. Newhauser (Toronto: PIMS, 2005), 104-127 at 107, 117; Marc B. Cels, "Interrogating Anger in the New Penitential Literature of the Thirteenth Century", *Viator* 45 (2014): 203-219 at 203.

[10] On the later influence of Peraldus see Siegfried Wenzel, "The Continuing Life of William Peraldus's *Summa vitiorum*", in *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers*, edited by M. D. Jordan and K. Emery Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 135-163; at 136 and at 156 nn. 6-7 Wenzel notes Franciscan users of this text.

[11] These accolades began with Pierre Michaud-Quantin, "Les puissances de l'âme chez Jean de La Rochelle", *Antonianum* 24 (1949): 489-565 and have been developed further by Vecchio, "*Ira mala/ira bona*", 57-59; Vecchio, "The Seven Deadly Sins", 104-127; Vecchio, "Passions de l'âme", 55-59 (with a detailed visual scheme of the sins at 57-58); Casagrande and Vecchio, *I sette vizi capitali*, 66-70; Casagrande and Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima*, 153-154, 157-158, 161, 175-181, 203-281; Boquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, 153-157; King, "Emotions", 173-175; for the current state of the art see Vecchio, "Passions and Sins: The *Summa Halensis* and John of La Rochelle", in *The Summa Halensis: Doctrines and Debates*, edited by L. Schumacher (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 211-225. These studies are rightly emphasized in the revisionist studies of Lydia Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 1, 8, 9-13, 17-19, 25, 29, 55-77; Schumacher, introduction to *The Summa Halensis* (as above), 1-7, Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 56-64, 112-124, 225-244, 248, 260-261, 285-307 (with my gratitude to Prof. Schumacher for sharing pre-publication material on John). By contrast, Simo Knuuttila, "Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul", in *Emotion and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, edited by H. Lagerlund and M. Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht: Kluver, 2002), 49-83 treats John of La Rochelle's ethics, at 64-69, as dependent on Avicenna, as ignoring Aristotelian faculty psychology, and as not constituting a turning point.

rubrics to Gregory's mortal sins, although John gives more scope than Augustine to our intellect and will in mastering them. On that model, the passions of the soul are all vicious. This presupposition sits uncomfortably with John's Aristotelian schemata, organized under the headings of our vegetative, sensitive, and rational faculties and our concupiscible, irascible, and rational faculties. While John gives intellect and will the job of judging and activating the passions arising in the infrarational faculties, with Cassian he assigns to the rational faculty its own specific passions. Anger is the only emotion John locates in the irascible faculty, giving it a distinctive look. Anger is a neutral passion which may inspire vice or virtue. Good anger fuels our zeal for righteousness. As such, anger is praiseworthy, as are the audacity, greatness of spirit (*magnitudo animi*) and rebelliousness (*insurrectio*) involved in its exercise, moving us to obey God's law come what may. Obedience to God's law is also John's remedy for anger badly used. Philosophical reasoning and our own free will empower us to make the correct assessments and choices, whichever of his taxonomies is involved.

Bacon's hostility to John of La Rochelle's approach to ethics in general and to anger in particular has both disciplinary and personal grounds.[12] As an ethicist Bacon reflects his own expertise in the *artes*. His experience at the University of Paris soured him not only on academic politics but also on ethics as taught by scholastic theologians. He retained this outlook as a private scholar after leaving the university in the late 1240s and after joining the Franciscan order in the mid-1250s. Although the early Franciscans eagerly recruited educated men, by mid-century the order's growth led them to install elementary curricula in the *artes* for adolescent novices. The university-level *Sprachlogik* which Bacon had taught was too advanced for these students. So, he was never assigned a teaching position in any of the order's *studia*.[13]

[12] The best account of Bacon's life and works is Amanda Power, *Roger Bacon and the Defense of Christendom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 29, 32-83; Power, "*Per lumen sapientiae*: Roger Bacon and the Struggle for Hegemonic Rationality", in *'Outsiders' and 'Forerunners': Modern Reason and Historiographical Births in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by C. König-Pralong, M. Meliadò, and Z. Radeva (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018), 123-164. See also Jeremiah Hackett, "Roger Bacon: His Life, Career and Works", in *Roger Bacon and the Sciences: Commemorative Essay*, edited by J. Hackett (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 9-23.

[13] On these developments see Bert Roest, *A History of Franciscan Education (c. 1217-1517)* (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Bert Roest, "The Franciscan School System: Reassessing the Early Evidence (ca. 1220-1260)", in *The Franciscan Organization in the Mendicant Context: Formal and Informal Structures of the Friars' Lives and Ministry in the Middle Ages*, edited by M. Robson and J. Röhrkasten (Berlin: LIT, 2011), 253-279 at 253-254; Neslihan Şenocak, *The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the Franciscan Order, 1209-1310* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 57, 74-77, 210. Not relevant here is Alfonso Maierù, "Formazione culturale e techniche d'insegnamento nelle scuole degli ordini mendicanti", in *Studio e studia: Le scuole dell'ordini mendicanti fra XIII e XIV secolo*, Atti del XXIX convegno internazionale, Assisi, 11-13 ottobre 2001 (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, 2002), 5-32, which confines itself to Dominicans. Power, *Roger Bacon*, 58-60 thinks that Bacon taught for the Franciscans but cites no evidence for this claim. On Bacon's *Sprachlogik* see

In an important and underappreciated study, Beryl Smalley observes that it is a category error to treat Bacon the ethicist as a scholastic theologian *manqué*. He was and remained an *artista*, whose ethics was grounded in the classical authors read in the school traditions of grammar and rhetoric.[14] Seneca was a favorite of his from childhood, and he was delighted to find the manuscript with Seneca's complete moral works that facilitated the writing of his *Moralis philosophia*. Here was philosophical wisdom, wisdom that refuted the Aristotelian and para-Aristotelian lucubrations of scholastics like John of La Rochelle, wisdom packaged in an elegant, eloquent, and persuasive Latin style. Scholars highlighting the appeal of rhetorical arguments in Bacon's ethics have accented his awareness of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* via al-Farabi. But Seneca had already shown the way, in practice.[15] Bacon was never ordained to the priesthood and never had a preaching mission. But he, and other mendicants concerned with the efficacy of preaching *ad populum*, found what they needed in Seneca. Realizing that their mode of intra-university preaching was too technical for this purpose, scholastics sought to reform it. But the resultant *sermo moderatus* style failed to fill the bill. For Bacon, as for other Franciscans such as John of Wales (fl. 1260-70), Thomas of York (fl. 1253-56), and John Russel (fl. 1243-1305), Seneca outpaced other authors in their quest for material suitable for the edification of the laity.[16] To Smalley's list we can now add Juan Gil Zamora, inspired by

Mark Amsler, *The Medieval Life of Language: Grammar and Pragmatics from Bacon to Kempe* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2021), 43-72.

[14] Beryl Smalley, "Moralists and Philosophers in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries", in *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung*, Vorträge des II. internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie, Köln, 31 August-6 September 1961, edited by P. Wilpert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963), 59-67. Without citing Smalley this point is also made by Power, *Roger Bacon*, 84-85,125. At 264, Power notes that Bacon's hope that this ethical project could be united with "the intellectual agendas of the universities" fell on deaf papal and academic ears.

[15] Scholars in this group include Jeremiah Hackett, "Moral Philosophy and Rhetoric in Roger Bacon", *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 20 (1987): 18-40; Irène Rosier-Catach, "Roger Bacon, al-Farabi, et Augustin: Rhétorique, logique, et philosophie morale", in *La Rhétorique d'Aristote: Traditions et commentaires de l'Antiquité au XVIe siècle*, edited by G. Dahan and I. Rosier-Catach (Paris: Vrin, 1998), 87-110; Aurélien Robert, "L'Idée de logique morale aux XIIIe siècle", *Médiévales* 63 (2012): 27-46 (at 36, 37-39 he alone in this group mentions Seneca); Vincent Gillespie, "The Senses in Literature: The Texture of Reception", in *A Cultural History of the Senses in the Middle Ages*, edited by R. Newhauser (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 153-173 at 160-162, 164-165; Casagrande and Vecchio, *Passioni dell'anima*, 300-303, 393-398; Bouquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, 239. See the important point made by Nadia Bray, *La tradizione filosofica stoica nel medioevo: Un approcio dossografico* (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2018), 152, who notes that Bacon read and processed his Greco-Arabic sources via Seneca.

[16] On the would-be scholastic reform of homiletics and the perceived needs of the Franciscans see Roest, *Franciscan Education*, 282-283; Timothy J. Johnson, "Roger Bacon's Critique of Franciscan Preaching", in *Institution und Charisma: Festschrift für Gert Melville zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by F. J. Felten, A. Kehnel, and S. Weinfurter (Cologne: Böhlaus Verlag, 2009), 541-558; Timothy J. Johnson, "Preaching Precedes Theology: Roger Bacon on the Failure of Mendicant Education", *Franciscan Studies* 68 (2010): 83-95; Randall B. Smith, *Aquinas, Bonaventure, and the Scholastic Culture of Medieval Paris: Preaching, Prologues, and Biblical Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021),

Bacon to translate Seneca's *De ira* (1292-95) into Castilian for his king.[17] And it is Seneca himself they cite, Smalley notes, with no reference to the spurious Seneca/Paul correspondence exposed as a forgery in the Renaissance.[18]

That said, it is remarkable how little attention has been given to the specifics of Bacon's use of Seneca in the *Moralis philosophia* even by those scholars to whom we are most indebted for documenting his citations.[19] Aside from his philosophical and pastoral objections to John of La Rochelle's analysis of anger, political events when Bacon was writing this text help to contextualize his concern with anger and related themes. These events also concerned the prelate to whom he dedicated the *Opus maius* with which the *Moralis philosophia* concludes.

That dedicatee, Gui de Foulques, had been sent in 1264 as cardinal-legate by Pope Urban IV (1261-65) to an England fractured by the rebellion led by Simon de Montfort

45-46, 230, 342-343, 416-426. On these other Franciscan figures see Smalley, "Moralists and Philosophers", 63; Smalley, "John Russel OFM", in Beryl Smalley, *Studies in Medieval Thought and Learning from Abelard to Wyclif* (London: Hambeldon Press, 1981), 205-248; Jenny Swanson, *John of Wales: A Study of the Ideas of a Thirteenth-Century Friar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Thomas Ricklin, "Seneca der Minderbruder: Die Réécriture einer moralischen Herausforderung durch Roger Bacon und Johannes von Wales und ihr frühhumanistischer Epilog", in *Ethik:Wissenschaft oder Lebeskunst? Modelle der Normenbegründung von der Antike bis zur frühen Neuzeit*, edited by S. Ebbermeyer and E. Kessler (Berlin: LIT, 2007), 51-74 at 52, 59-67; Fiorella Retucci, "The *Sapientale* of Thomas of York OFM: The Fortunes and Misfortunes of a Critical Edition", *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 52 (2010): 133-159; Power, *Roger Bacon*, 61-62; Bray, *La tradizione filosofica stoica*, 123-147, 159, 162, 181-182; Bray, "Anaxagoras in the Late Middle Ages: A Doxographical Study of Thomas of York's *Sapientale*", in *Past and Future: Medieval Studies Today*, edited by M. J. F. M. Hoenen and K. Engel (Basel: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2021), 317-336 at 320-328, 331-333, who, although accenting metaphysics not ethics here, sees a particular openness to Stoicism in Oxford thinkers.

[17] Juan Héctor Fuentes, "Roger Bacon, el diálogo *De ira* de Séneca y el *Libro contra la ira e saña*", *Revista de poética medieval* 32 (2018): 151-171. Roest, *History of Franciscan Education*, 142, states that Bacon's ethics had a later impact in the Franciscan lectorate program in theology but cites no specifics.

[18] Smalley, "Moralists and Philosophers", 60. For this forgery and its medieval acceptance elsewhere see *Epistolario apocrifo di Seneca e San Paolo,* edited by L. Bocciolini Papagi (Florence: Nardini, 1985).

[19] See in particular the foundational work of Eugenio Massa, *Ruggero Bacone: Etica e poetica nella storia dell'Opus maius* (Rome: Herder, 1955) and Bray, *La tradizione filosofica stoica*, 149-158, 182. See also Rickin, "Seneca als Minderbruder", 53-59; John Sellars, "The Reception of Stoic Ethics in the Middle Ages", in *Barlaam of Seminara on Stoic Ethics*, edited by C. M. Hogg, Jr. and J. Sellars (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2022), 191-206 at199-200. The only scholar thus far to consider why Bacon is so concerned with anger is Power, *Roger Bacon*, 86-90, 160; she relates it to what she calls the "rhetoric of outrage" in contemporary preaching against heretics, to Bacon's hostility to the factional disputes at the university of Paris, or to a self-therapy undertaken for his own personality problems. Power does not consider the Aristotelian and patristic justifications of good anger and its recent vindication by John of La Rochelle as an issue that Bacon addresses.

since 1258 against King Henry III.[20] Desirable as was peace in England, the popes had additional skin in the game. Since 1254 they had been at war in Italy with the last male descendants of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, who claimed title to Sicily and the Regno. The popes needed and thought they had found in Edmund, Henry's younger son, a rich, friendly, available, and non-German anti-Hohenstaufen champion. Henry backed this venture enthusiastically; Parliament's repeated refusal to fund it triggered Simon's takeover of the royal government.[21] In 1264, after much to and fro between rebels and royalists, Simon and Henry both agreed to submit their case to the judgment of King Louis IX of France. Both swore to accept it. Louis, wisely declining to comment on the nuts and bolts of English institutions, ruled that royal authority had been usurped by Simon. It must be restored to Henry forthwith. Breaking his oath, Simon unleashed a full-bore civil war, reaching the apex of his cause at the battle of Lewes later in 1264. This event aborted Gui's legatine mission, since he was refused entry into Simon's England. The tide turned in 1265. Henry defeated the rebels at the battle of Evesham, at which Simon lost his life and his cause. 1265 also saw Gui's election as Pope Clement IV (1265-68). His own cardinal-legate to England, Ottobuono, is credited by some historians with mediating the post-war settlement embodied in the Dictum of Kenilworth (1266) and confirmed by the Statute of Marlborough (1267).[22]

[20] Excellent background on the career of Gui, recognizing the concern he shared with Bacon on the English rebellion but omitting its connection with the popes' investment in the Sicilian venture is supplied by Power, *Roger Bacon*, 62-69, 74; Amanda Power, "Seeking Remedies for Great Dangers: Contemporary Appraisals of Roger Bacon's Expertise", in *Knowledge, Discipline and Power in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of David Luscombe*, edited by J. Canning, E. King, and M. Staats (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 63-78 at 69-71; William Chester Jordan, *Men at the Center: Redemptive Governance under Louis IX* (Budapest: Central European University, 2012), 8-9, 69; Justine Firnhager-Baker, *Violence and the State in Languedoc, 1250-1400* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 28, 31, 33, 38, 55 58, 61, 65, 90. These authors relate Guy's early career as a lawyer, royal councilor, enquêteur, and peacekeeper in Languedoc and then, following a mid-life call to the priesthood, as bishop of Le Puy and archbishop of Narbonne before his elevation to the cardinalate by Urban IV. See also Maurice Powicke, *The Thirteenth Century*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 180, 199.

[21] While these events are agreed on, historians differ on their meaning and on Simon's motives. For a quick fix on these debates see David Carpenter, "What Happened in 1258"? and "Simon de Montfort, First Leader of a Political Movement in English History", both in David Carpenter, *The Reign of Henry III* (London: Hambledon Press, 1996), 183-197 and 219-239. See now the *magnum opus* of David Carpenter, *Henry III: Reform, Rebellion, Civil War, Settlement, 1258-1272* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023), especially 1-2, 73-74, 179-181, 237-238, 455 for Henry's obsession with the Sicilian venture. For other recent assessments see Adrian Jobson, *The First English Revolution* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012); Stephen Church, *Henry III: A Simple and God-Fearing King* (London: Allen Lane, 2017); and Darren Baker, *The Great King England Never Knew* (Stroud, UK, The History Press, 2017).

[22] For the text of the Dictum of Kenilworth see B. Wilkinson, *Constitutional History of Medieval England, 1216-1399 with Selected Documents*, 3 vols. (London: Longmans, 1963), I:184-186. For the controversies resulting from these settlements see Carpenter, *Henry III*, 455-522, 580-588. On Ottobuono's commission from Clement, his role in the settlement, and the fact that it did not

If this outcome took England off the table for Clement, who granted the crown of Sicily to Charles of Anjou, youngest brother of Louis IX, it left if squarely there for Bacon.[23] The head of his family, his eldest brother, was an ardent royalist. Twice captured in battle and twice ransomed by Simon, he was then exiled along with his widowed mother and brothers in England. The Bacon family fortune was ruined. It was this fortune that had enabled Roger to operate as a private scholar, both before and during his career as a Franciscan. While cooling his heels in Boulogne hoping to get into England, Gui learned of Bacon's work. Once he became pope, he ordered Bacon to send him a fair copy of the *Opus maius* at once. Bacon faced difficulties in meeting this demand. The Franciscan order had ruled at its General Chapter in Narbonne in 1260 that its members could not publish works without prior approval of their superiors. Clement was aware of this rule and told Bacon to violate it. Bacon had to scramble for the funds, and the scribes, he needed. In 1266 he resided at the Franciscan convent in Paris where Bonaventure, head of the order, also lived. Bonaventure was scarcely unaware of Bacon's activities. His attitude was that of the Franciscan order in general, which neither hindered nor helped Bacon's work.

These moral and practical difficulties were joined by Bacon's political and family concerns. He never located his exiled relatives. And, given the Dictum's complex provisions for the redemption of property expropriated or destroyed by both sides during the recent conflict, and its equally complex provisions for the punishment of the non-compliance it clearly expected, Bacon's homeland could look forward to a period marked by acrimony, backbiting, favoritism, chicanery, and vindictiveness. These issues gave a contemporary and heartfelt edge to his philosophical and disciplinary interest in the themes of anger, clemency, and the compatibility, or not, of *insurrectio* and *magnitudo animi* with these emotions.

The *Moralis philosophia* has six parts, of which Part 3, based on Seneca, is the longest and was the most frequently copied. Brief comment is needed on the parts that surround it. Ethics involves our duties to God, to others, and to ourselves.[24] In Parts 1 and 4 Bacon proposes to prove, by extremely loose rhetorical argumentation, that the main tenets of Christianity starting with the doctrine of God are reasonable, for the benefit of shaky

provide for the recall of exiles and prioritized the restitution of lands deemed important for national defense, see Powicke, *Thirteenth Century*, 199, 205-207 and Carpenter, *Henry III*, 492-522, 541.

[23] Power, *Roger Bacon*, 31-33, 33 nn. 8-15, 47-48, 72, establishes what we can know about Bacon's family and its fortunes before and after 1264. A possible relative or ancestor, Richard Bacon, a landholder in Essex and Hertfordshire, is flagged by Stephen Bennett, *Elite Participation in the Third Crusade* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2021), 323, with sources that document him.

[24] Roger Bacon, *Moralis philosophia*, edited by E. Massa (Turin: Thesaurus Mundi, 1963), Part 3, general proemium 6-8; Part 4, proemium and passim. As Massa notes in his Introduction at ix-xviii, Part 3 was the primarily the section copied and annotated. This work will be cited below as *MP*.

Christians and the conversion of infidels.[25] These tenets ground our duties to God. Part 5 explains why a rhetorical strategy is appropriate to ethics, a practical science needing attractive garb, with Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, and Seneca as its named proponents, contrasted with the "naked science" anatomized by speculative ethics.[26] Part 6, a brief appendix to part 5, adds nothing to it. Part 2 purports to explain our duties to others in a sketchy essay on political theory, on which we will comment below. Part 3, treating our duties to ourselves, explains and justifies Bacon's reliance on Seneca in aid of his own agenda.[27]

Bacon opens Part 3 by countering Aristotle's list of virtues and vices with those of Seneca and Gregory, adding his own assessment.[28] The emotions leading to sins are not neutral but vicious; they are to be uprooted from the soul not moderated. For Bacon,

[25] *MP*, Part 1.1-5; Part 4 passim for the doctrines involved. The general proemium 14-15 gives Bacon's criteria for proof at 6-7: "Horum autem principiorum quedam sunt mere principia et solum methaphisice nata sunt declarari. Alia, licet sint principia respectu sequentium, tamen vel sunt prime conclusiones huius scientie, vel, licet aliquo principii gaudeant privilegio, tamen, propter eorum maximam difficultatem et quia eis nimis contradicitur, atque propter excellentem utilitatem respectu sequentium, debent sufficienter stabiliri." Bacon here appears to be invoking the norm of rhetorical argumentation of Cicero's *Topica* as reprised by Boethius, *In Ciceronis Topica* 1.2.7-1-2.8, edited by J. Caspar Orelli and J. Georg Baiter (Zurich: Fuessli, 1833), 276-277: "argumentum autem rationem quae ratio rei dubiae faciat fidem." At 4.2.1 Bacon argues, against Gregory the Great, and by extension some of his current supporters, that holding doctrines by reason does not deprive faith of its merit. At 4.2.4-13 he stresses that arguments with non-believers should not appeal to miracles or to authorities they do not accept, diverging from that policy only with respect to the Eucharist at 4.5.1-4.6.4.

[26] *MP* 5.1.1-6.1-2 for the overall defense of rhetoric with Seneca ending the list of practitioners; on opposition to naked science, 5.2.4 at 251: "Sed tamen necessarium est quod flectamur ad bonum et longe magis quam ad speculationem nude veritatis, quia virtus et felicitas sunt magis necessaria et meliora quam sciencia nuda." On this term and theme see also *MP* 3.1.8, 5.1.9 at 49, 249.

[27] *MP* proemium to 3.5.1-4 at 132-33; quotation at 132: "Ampliavi iam hanc partem terciam Moralis philosophie ultra id quod a principio estimavi. Set delectat sencentiarum moraliam pulchritudo, et precipue quia magna racionis vivacitate eruuntur per philosophorum industriam. Et tanto avidius recipiende sunt, quanto nos philosophantes christiani nescimus de tanta morum sapiencia cogitare nec tam eleganter persuadere. Utinam operibus comprobaremus ea, que ipsi philosophi nobis sapienter proponent!" Bacon's justification of his long quotations from Seneca was actually coals to Newcastle for Clement since Senecan MSS. were then more widely available in Italy than France, on which see Leighton Durham Reynolds, "The Medieval Tradition of Seneca's *Dialogues*", *Classical Quarterly* 18 (1968): 353-373; *Texts and Transmission: A Study of the Latin Classics*, edited by L. D. Reynolds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 359-375; Leighton Durham Reynolds and Nigel Guy Wilson, *Scribes and Scholars: A Guide to the Transmission of Greek and Latin Literature*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 84-87, 104, 106, 111-118.

[28] *MP* 3.1.1-3.1.13. For the tradition on avarice see Richard Newhauser, *The Early History of Greed: The Sin of Avarice in Early Medieval Thought and Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Lester K. Little, "Pride Goes before Avarice: Social Change and the Vices in Latin Christendom", *American Historical Review* 76 (1972): 16-49 charts the increasing interest in this sin in Bacon's day but does not mention him.

avarice is the primordial sin. The sequence that follows is neither etiological nor pedagogical. According to Bacon, passions of the soul, whether corporal or spiritual, are motivated by pleasure. They spring from false judgments on what is profitable. Anger is unique. Anger alone neglects what is profitable. Anger, says Bacon, is devoid of any profit. It struggles with adversity and is ultimately defeated by it.

Aside from that motive for avoiding anger, anger sins against truth; it blasphemes God; it lowers the angry to a sub-human state; it destroys their other virtues and their peace of mind. Further, anger is incompatible with clemency and with *magnitudo animi*. Bacon agrees with Seneca, against Aristotle, that *magnitudo animi* is not a monopoly of men in public life who preserve their honor by avenging affronts to it. Vengeance is always wrong. People in private life, women included, can possess greatness of soul. Wielding Seneca against the tradition informing John of La Rochelle, anger is never righteous, for Bacon.[29] He agrees with Seneca: anger has harmful effects wider than those inflicted on individuals. For it is also a political evil, leading to mob violence, organized rebellion, civil war, and devastation. In one of the few passages of Part 3 that is not a quotation from Seneca, Bacon observes, "What kingdom exists in which overthrow and ruin do not lie in wait?"[30]

Another Senecan theme which Bacon takes very seriously and puts his own spin on is wealth. While Seneca frequently maintains that virtue is the sage's only true possession, he dedicates his *De beata vita* to countering critics who charged him with hypocrisy. To some contemporary and later Latin writers, the vast riches Seneca accumulated in public service made a mockery of his philosophical claims; he failed to practice the detachment from worldly goods he preached. True, as Seneca states repeatedly, poverty and wealth

[29]*MP* proemium to Part 3, 3.2.2, 3.3.1. The best study of Bacon on greatness of soul is Jeremiah Hackett, "Roger Bacon on Magnanimity and Virtue", in *Les philosophes morales et politiques au moyen âge*, edited by C. Bazán, E. Andújar, and L. G. Sbrocchi, 3 vols. (New York: LEGAS, 1995), I:367-377. For the classical background on this theme and its reworkings by patristic authors see René-Antoine Gauthier, *Magnanimité: L'idee de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne* (Paris: Vrin, 1951), who dismisses Bacon as incoherent at 242. Gauthier is rightly criticized by J. Warren Smith, *Ambrose, Augustine, and the Pursuit of Greatness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), whose chosen authors reject *magnitudo animi* as self-aggrandizement in favor of charity and forgiveness of enemies. For the philosophical positions on this topic available to medieval thinkers see Terence Irwin, "Magnanimity as Generosity", (accenting Cicero not Seneca as the source of Stoicism) and John Marenbon, "Magnanimity, Christian Ethics, and Paganism in the Latin Middle Ages", (accenting Aristotle and omitting Bacon), both in *The Measure of Greatness: Philosophers on Magnanimity*, edited by S. Vasalou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), at 221-248 and 249-271 respectively. For Seneca on *magnitudo animi* see his *De tranquillitate animi* 3.2; *Consolatio ad Marciam* 19.4-7; *Consolatio ad Helviam matrem* 1.5. Seneca's works here and below are cited in the edition of L. D. Reynolds, *Dialogi libri duodecim* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). Good discussion in Erik Gunderson, *The Sublime Seneca: Ethics, Literature, Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 74-87, 102-103.

[30] *MP* 3.5.15 at 177: "Quod regnum est, cui non sit parata ruina et proculcatio?" My translation. See Seneca, *De ira* 1.2.

are matters of indifference to the Stoic sage. But, along with excusing himself by admitting that, while perfect Stoic virtue is his goal, he has not yet attained it, he stresses that the sage to whom Fortune grants riches need not spurn them. What counts is that he is not a slave to them and treats them as opportunities to benefit others. Poverty is not an entrance requirement for the philosopher.[31] With his own past and current financial situations in mind, Bacon warmly seconds this conclusion. In his citations from *De beata vita* he presents Seneca as having successfully refuted his critics, none of whose attacks in Latin classical or post-classical literature he chooses to mention.[32]

Along with such add-ons and emphases, Bacon's agenda informs aspects of Seneca's argumentation which he omits altogether. Two examples will have to suffice. Seneca's *De clementia*, dedicated to Nero, with whose weaknesses of character he was all too familiar, confines itself to the prudential reasons for adopting this policy. Clemency wins friends and neutralizes enemies. Seneca cites Julius Caesar's adept manipulation of this strategy as Nero's chief role model. Law-enforcement should be as calculating as it is dispassionate. Mitigating its severity should not be confused with pity for malefactors. Feeling their pain involves taking on pain oneself, an irrational vice to be shunned, as are cruelty, arbitrariness, anger, and vindictiveness. For his part, Bacon ignores political prudence as a motive for clemency and omits Seneca's critique of pity.[33] Bacon cites Seneca's *De ira* examples of worthies who mastered anger when victimized by the malicious or powerful, accenting those who suffer the loss of loved ones or property. But he omits Seneca's examples of the wrath of tyrants, of whom Caligula is a favorite. While Seneca supports the Senate's application of *damnatio memoriae* to Caligula after his assassination in 41 CE, the memory of his atrocities remained fresh in Seneca's mind and those of his first-century readers.[34] These *exempla* lack the same valency for Bacon and his own would-be audience. Indeed, Bacon omits this aspect of Seneca's aversion therapy altogether. An absolute and arbitrary autocrat whose subjects are entirely at his mercy, innocent or guilty, is simply not in his *imaginaire*.

Here, a word on the polity in Bacon's Part 2 is pertinent, leaving aside its egregious

[31] Seneca, *De beata vita* 3.3-4, 20.3-23.5. On the criticism of Seneca as a hypocrite from antiquity to the present see Madeleine Jones, "Seneca's Letters to Lucilius: Hypocrisy as a Way of Life", in *Seneca Philosophus*, edited by J. Wildberger and M. L. Colish (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 393-424.
[32] *MP* 3.14-30.
[33] *MP* 3.2.3-25. On pity see Seneca, *De clementia* 2.4.4-2.7.3; an excellent summary of this work is provided by Robert A. Kaster, introduction to his translation of *De clementia* in *Anger, Mercy, Revenge*, translated by R. A. Kaster and M. Nussbaum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 133-144.
[34] *MP* proemium to Part 3, 3.6.2-3.7.10. On Caligula as Seneca's favorite example of the wrath of tyrants see Amanda Wilcox, "Nature's Monster: Caligula as *exemplum* in Seneca's *Dialogues*", in *KAKOS: Badness and Anti-Value in Classical Antiquity*, edited by R. M. Rosen and I. Sluiter (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 441-475. For Seneca's most potent anti-Caligula zingers see *Consolatio ad Helviam* 10.4 and *Consolatio ad Polybium* 17.3.

constitutional inadequacies.[35] The ruler's chief role is enforcing the laws, especially property and inheritance rights. If he has been installed legitimately, there is no excuse for rebellion. Goaded by greed or lust for power, rebels deny God. All citizens rightfully take up arms against rebels and can kill them with no stain of blood-guilt. The only reason for replacing a ruler is his failure to put down a rebellion. For all its unworkability, Part 2 of the *Moralis philosophia* reads as Bacon's judgment on Simon de Montfort's rebellion and its outcome, even as Part 3 is the Senecan weapon of choice he wields against the ethics of John of La Rochelle.

How should Bacon's *Moralis philosophia* be placed in the context of thirteenth-century Franciscan thought? Amanda Power performs a signal service in demolishing the myths attached to Bacon as a joker in the Franciscan deck, suspected, condemned, and even imprisoned by his confrères.[36] Bacon the ethicist has been criticized as a would-be scholastic punching above his weight vis-à-vis Thomas Aquinas or Duns Scotus,[37] or as an incipient Renaissance humanist given his reliance on classical philosophy and literature.[38] It is true that Bacon did not engage in some issues convulsing Franciscans in his day, such as the theology of Joachim of Fiore, the stand-off with university seculars, Latin Averroism, or the *usus pauper* debate. The effort to integrate him into the Franciscan mainstream by paralleling his *Opus maius* with Bonaventure's *Reductio artium in theologiam* is, however, a bridge too far, given that Bonaventure was no supporter of natural ethics.[39]

But there are more fruitful ways of situating Bacon's ethics within the Franciscan calling. His emphasis on ethics as a practical science is integrally related to the mendicant preaching mission. Given Bacon's conviction that Christians best spread the faith not just

[35] *MP* 2.1.2-2.2.3.

[36] Power, *Roger Bacon*, 1-28, 33, 92-94.

[37] See, most recently, Astrid Schilling, *Ethik im Kontext ehrfahrungsbezogener Wissenschaft: Die Moralphilosophie des Roger Bacon (ca. 1214-1292) vor dem Hintergrund der scholastischen Theologie sowie der Einflüsse der griechischen und arabischen Philosophie* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2016).

[38] Massa, *Ruggero Bacone*, 92; Antonio Poppi, "La metodologia umanistica della *Moralis philosophia* di Ruggero Bacone", in Poppi, *Studi sull'etica della prima scuola franciscana* (Padua: Centro di Studi Antoniani, 1996), 41-57; Ricklin, "Seneca als Minderbruder," 66-74.

[39] Bacon's detachment from these concerns is noted by Jeremiah Hackett, "Practical Wisdom and Happiness in the Moral Philosophy of Roger Bacon", *Medioevo* 12 (1986): 55-109 at 57-61; Hackett, "Roger Bacon and the Reception of Aristotle", in *Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter von Richardus Rufus bis zu Franciscus de Mayronis*, edited by L. Honnefelder et al. (Münster: Aschendorff, 2005), 219-247; his preference for Avicenna over Averroes is also noted by Schumacher, *Early Franciscan Theology*, 58. On the effort to compare the *Opus maius* with Bonaventure's *Reductio* see Camille Bérubé, *De la philosophie à la sagesse chez Saint Bonaventure et Roger Bacon* (Rome: Istituto Storico dei Cappuccini, 1976), 87-96; Hackett, "Epilogue", in *Roger Bacon and the Sciences*, 405-409; Hackett, "Moral Philosophy and Rhetoric", 34; Hackett, "Practical Wisdom and Happiness", 61-63; Hackett, "Philosophy and Theology in Roger Bacon's *Opus maius*", in *The God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl OP*, edited by R. James Long (Toronto: PIMS, 1991), 55-69 at 59. For Bonaventure's rejection of natural ethics see his *In II Sententiarum.* d. 41. a. 1. ad 1-2, in *Opera omnia*, edited by Collegium S. Bonaventurae (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1885), II:942-946.

by persuasive arguments and eloquent preaching but also by the force of their moral example, ethics is central as well to the Franciscans' evangelical vocation.[40] Side by side with confrères who applied philosophy to ethics in other ways, Bacon and those who, like him, found Senecan Stoicism *à la mode* deserve more recognition in the ongoing revision of our understanding of the creative uses of philosophy in thirteenth-century Franciscan thought.

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[40] Power, *Roger Bacon* has appropriately made this point a key theme of her book, noting, at 50, 62, 93-94, 214-216, 222-223, 253-256, 258, 259, Bacon's use of the information on non-Christians in the missions to Asia of William of Rubruck OFM at *MP* 3.1.1.6, 3.1.3.5-6, 3.5.9 and of John of Plano Carpini OFM at *MP* 3.1.1.7. She also notes, at 223, 238-239, 310-311, his critique, at *MP* 4.1.21-22, of crusaders, especially the Teutonic Knights in the Baltic, for spreading the Christian faith by the sword – which also gives the mendicants a pass in that connection which they did not deserve; see, on that point, Christoph T. Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); David S. Bachrach, "The Friars Go to War: Mendicant Military Chaplains, 1216-c. 1300", *Catholic Historical Review* 90 (2004): 617-633; Paolo Evangelisti, *Dopo Francesco, oltre il mito: I frati Minori fra Terra Santa ed Europa (XIII-XV secolo)* (Rome: Viella, 2020), 67-136, 159-170.

THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN LATE FRANCISCAN THOUGHT: THE CASE OF PETER OF TRABIBUS

LAS POTENCIAS DEL ALMA EN EL PENSAMIENTO FRANCISCANO TARDÍO: EL CASO DE PEDRO DE TRABIBUS

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Abstract

In the late medieval period, the issue of the composed nature of human beings and its relation to medieval faculty psychology became central. There is ample scholarship on this topic, focusing primarily on authors such as the Dominicans Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, and the Franciscans Alexander of Hales, Hugh of St. Cher, John of La Rochelle, and Peter John Olivi. In this paper, we want to examine the view of one of Olivi's disciples, the Franciscan theologian Peter of Trabibus (fl. 1290s), on the unity of the human soul and the nature of its powers, especially the powers of the intellect and the will. We are particularly interested in his application of the principle of plurality of substantial forms to explain the nature of the relation between the powers of the soul and its essence.

Keywords

Plurality of Forms; Powers of the Soul; Franciscan Thought; Will; Essence

Resumen

En el período medieval tardío, el asunto de la naturaleza compuesta de los seres humanos y su relación con la psicología de las facultades se volvió central. Existen muchos estudios sobre este tema, que se enfocan principalmente en autores como los dominicos Alberto Magno y Tomás de Aquino, y en los franciscanos Alejandro de Hales, Hugo de San Víctor, Juan de La Rochelle y Pedro Juan Olivi. En este artículo, queremos examinar la opinión de uno de los discípulos de Olivi, el teólogo franciscano Pedro de Trabibus (fl. 1290-1300), sobre la unidad del alma humana y la naturaleza de sus potencias, especialmente las potencias del intelecto y la voluntad. Estamos particularmente interesados en su aplicación del principio de pluralidad de formas sustanciales para explicar la naturaleza de la relación entre las potencias del alma y su esencia.

Palabras clave

Pluralidad de formas; potencias del alma; pensamiento franciscano; voluntad; esencia

1. Introduction: Powers

There are various ways to characterize the relationship between the powers of the soul and the soul itself.[1] One way of doing so is by considering the individual powers of the soul, like those of the imagination and the memory, by themselves, focusing on the nature of their operations and objects. Another is by considering the ontological status of clusters of powers, like the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective parts of the soul. We can also consider how these clusters relate to one another (e.g., the sensitive to the vegetative) and how the powers within each cluster relate to one another (e.g., within the sensitive, the relationship between sight and hearing), and how each of these powers relates to a power of other clusters (e.g., how the sensitive power of the imagination relates to the intellective power). Finally, we can also consider how these clusters and powers relate to the essence of the soul considered as a whole.

There is a great variety of ways in which these relations were understood by medieval thinkers, a diversity which has been explored in a significant number of studies on the topic.[2] Within that framework, existing scholarship tends to examine the relationship between the powers on the one hand and between the powers and the essence of the soul on the other, without framing it in the context of the position a given author holds about the unicity or plurality of substantial forms – that is, without considering the ontological status of the clusters of powers: are these parts of the soul, souls, or substantial forms? Yet there seems to be quite a substantial difference between explaining the relation of the power of sight and the power of the intellect from an ontological perspective in one author who holds that these powers belong to two different substantial forms and another author who takes them to belong to one and the same substantial form. The reason why this issue matters is that the whole to which

[1] Research for this article was made possible by funding from the ERC for the research project *Rationality in Perception: Transformations of Mind and Cognition, 1250-1550* under grant agreement number 637747 and from the Academy of Finland for the project *Augustinian Natural Philosophy at Oxford and Paris ca. 1277*, grant number 1331786. Many thanks to two anonymous referees for the journal and to Lydia Schumacher for detailed comments.

[2] See e.g., Magdalena Bieniak, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris ca. 1200-1250*, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1, 42 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013); Sander W. de Boer, *The Science of the Soul: The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's De anima, c. 1260-c.1360*, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013); and Lydia Schumacher, *Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

the power relates is necessarily different, and thus the relation between power and the whole needs to be accounted for in a specific way: that something forms a unit does not sufficiently explain the internal structure or even the nature of its constitutive elements. Whether this matters in any significant way as concerns the way in which the soul works is a different matter.[3]

Finally, in addition to the distinctions involved in the compositional nature of the human soul, i.e., as being constituted by vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual parts or clusters (in turn divided into different powers), one must also point out the fact that powers are defined by their operations. Some of these operations take place by means of the mediation of bodily parts, for instance, the sense organs for the five sense modalities of the external senses, whereas others, like the powers of the intellective part of the soul, namely the intellect and the will, perform their operations without the use of any bodily organ. This distinction has implications for the nature of the operations, their objects, but also for the nature of the powers themselves.

Among the authors who tried to make sense of the distinctions presented above is the Franciscan theologian Peter of Trabibus. In what follows, we examine how Peter of Trabibus' position on the plurality of substantial forms affected his philosophical psychology, namely, how this plurality influenced his account of the powers of the soul and in particular the *rational* powers. We show that due to their superior rational nature, these powers cannot be conceived of as accidents, and that the freedom of the will requires a special ontological status for this power – and by consequence the intellect. This leads Trabibus to conceive of these rational powers as substantial forms in themselves. It has been recently argued[4] that this is Peter John Olivi's own view and thus, although not completely original, Trabibus' conception of the powers of the soul brings new insight concerning how the unicity versus the plurality of forms debate developed

[3] This qualification seems necessary because it is unclear whether there are global consequences for the way in which a given author positions himself in this constellation of possibilities. Some commentators consider that the consequences are not very great. See e.g., Sander de Boer, who goes through pluralist and unitarian models of the soul in order to see whether they answer differently the challenge of the thought experiment of "the eye in the foot", which concerns the bodily location of "mental powers". He concludes: "the thought experiment can be formulated and answered irrespective of whether the distinction [Ockham's] between the two souls is accepted or not. [...] The difference between them seems to stem from a disagreement on how we should analyze the soul in terms of its powers, not from how we should analyze the soul in terms of its substantial unity" (de Boer, *The Science of the Soul*, 227). We are less certain whether this is the case, but this is not the place to elaborate on the reasons for our doubts.

[4] See Can Laurens Löwe and Dominik Perler, "Complexity and Unity: Peter of John Olivi and Henry of Ghent on the Composition of the Soul", *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 89/2 (2022): 335-392, especially 352. The authors elegantly describe Olivi's position as based on "a mereological relation among single-track powers" (355). Although their reading is compelling, there are significant differences between Olivi and Trabibus in terms of the terminology and arguments they employ.

in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, especially among Franciscan authors.[5]

2. Peter of Trabibus

Not much is known about Peter of Trabibus beyond the fact that he was a Franciscan theologian teaching in the Franciscan *studium generale* of Santa Croce at Florence during the 1290s.[6] We also know that Peter was a student of Peter John Olivi and that, like most Franciscans, his thought was also influenced by Bonaventure and the post-Bonaventure Franciscan tradition. Among the preserved works of Peter are his *Quodlibetical disputations* (*Quodlibeta*) and two commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. These exist in two redactions, one in the form of an *Ordinatio* and another as a *Lectura*, probably based on his teaching in Florence.[7] In this paper, we will focus on the *Lectura*, which exist mostly in manuscript form (Ms Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppresi, D.6.359),[8] but also refer to the text of the *Ordinatio*, which has been edited by Hildebert Huning.[9]

There has been a scholarly debate whether Peter of Trabibus was the author of *Lectura*. However, recent studies have demonstrated that *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* have many similarities that justify their attribution to the same author, Peter of Trabibus.[10] The

[5] We remain neutral about the existence of a 'school of Peter John Olivi', as has been suggested by Hildebert Alois Huning, "The Plurality of Forms according to Petrus de Trabibus O.F.M.", *Franciscan Studies* 28 (1968): 137-196, esp. 137.

[6] A good introduction to Peter of Trabibus, including the literature on the authorship of the *Lectura*, can be found in Tuomas Vaura, "Peter of Trabibus on Creation and the Trinity", *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 89/1 (2022): 145-195. See also the excellent recent study by Paola Bernardini, "Nuove ricerche sul fondo di Santa Croce: un frammento del 'Commento alle Sentenze' di Pietro delle Travi (BML, Plut. 4 sin. 3, ff. 211ra-224rb)", *Codex Studies* 6 (2022): 23-51. Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this bibliographical reference.

[7] See Sylvain Piron, "Franciscan *Quodlibeta* in Southern *Studia* and at Paris, 1280-1300", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century*, edited by C. Schabel (Boston: Brill, 2006), 403-438, esp. 409-410. See also Sylvain Piron, "Le poète et le théologien. Une rencontre dans le *studium* de Santa Croce", *Picenum Seraphicum. Rivista di studi storici e francescani* 19 (2000): 87-134.

[8] Some of the questions have been transcribed and can be found freely available in the *Rationality in Perception* website project: https://blogs.helsinki.fi/rationality-in-perception/texts/.

[9] Huning, "The Plurality of Forms".

[10] Against the attribution of authorship of the *Lectura* to Peter of Trabibus are P. Ephrem Longpré, "Nuovi Documenti", *Studi francescani* (1923): 314-328; and Valens Heynck, "Zur Datierung der *Sentenzkommentar* des Petrus Johannis Olivi und des Petrus de Trabibus", *Franziskanische Studien* 38 (1956): 371-398. In favour of the thesis that Peter is the author of *Lectura* we find Victorin Doucet, *Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au repertoire de M. F. Stegmueller* (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1954), 88-170, esp. 94; Hildebert Alois Huning, "Die Stellung des Petrus de Trabibus zur Philosophie", *Franziskanische Studien* 46 (1964): 213-223; Sylvain Piron, "Le poète et le théologien", 8-10; and Russell L. Friedman, *The Sentences Commentary*

Ordinatio in explicitly attributed to Trabibus in the manuscripts. Also, when *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3 - a highly relevant text for the subject of this study - is compared to *Ordinatio*, we find several similarities between these two texts that demonstrate that *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* are by the same author. Some of the similarities are listed in the appendix.

As we noted above, the issue of the composed nature of human beings and its relation to medieval faculty psychology became central in the late medieval period. The 1277 and 1284 Oxford Prohibitions and Condemnations, which targeted certain views concerning the plurality of forms in the human composite, are the expression (and perhaps the result) of ongoing acrimonious debates, often between Franciscan and Dominicans, which continued long after these Prohibitions were issued.[11] Among the main figures in these debates was Peter John Olivi, who denied that the human (intellective) soul is the form of the body. In 1311, the Council of Vienne declared that whoever defends the view that "the rational or intellectual soul is not the form of the human body of itself and essentially is to be considered a heretic", and thus that the unicity of the substantial form is consistent with Christian doctrine.[12] While Olivi's position on this matter has received a fair amount of attention in recent scholarship, the same is not true of Olivi's disciples. In this paper, we want to show that, like Olivi,[13] Peter of Trabibus argued that human beings consist of a plurality of substantial forms, which he took to be compatible with the claim that a human being has only one soul. What is interesting for us here is the way that Trabibus extends this formal plurality to his analysis of the ontological status of the powers of the soul.

To understand Peter's view, we must start with his view on substances, which he takes to be a composite of form and matter. Like many Franciscans of his time, Peter of Trabibus was a defender of universal hylomorphism, the view that hylomorphic (matter-form) composition was not limited to material substances and extended to all substances, including spiritual ones. Angels are therefore a composite of matter and form.[14] Although universal hylomorphism was very popular in the mid-thirteenth century, it also had its

of Peter of Trabibus. With Question Lists and Text Editions on Matter, Form, Body, and Soul (forthcoming).

[11] The literature on this debate is extensive and cannot be considered here in any detail. As introductions to this issue, the reader should consult (for the 1277 Prohibitions) José Filipe Silva, *Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul. Plurality of Forms and Censorship in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2012); and (for the 1284 Condemnations) spearheaded by John Peckham, Andrew E. Larsen, *The School of Heretics: Academic Condemnation at the University of Oxford, 1277–1409* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 42-63.

[12] H. Denzinger, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, edited by N. P. Tanner (London and New York: Sheed & Ward, 1990), 361; see *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Generaliumque Decreta*, vol. II/1 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 405-407: "[...] quod quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpsetit, quod anima rationalis seu intelectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tanquam haereticus sit censendus." It is important to point out that this statement remains compatible with the plurality of substantial forms in composite substances.

[13] On this topic, see Efrem Bettoni, *Le dottrine filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi* (Milan: Pubblicazioni dell'Università cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1959).

[14] "Dicendum est quod angelus habet materiam", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 3, q. 2, f. 6rb.

detractors. Thomas Aquinas, for example, explicitly denied universal hylomorphism and its application to angels;[15] one consequence of his view was that he lacked the conceptual resources to deal with the individuation of angelic intelligences and thus had to admit that each angel constituted its own species.

In a hylomorphic composite, matter plays the role of the indeterminate element, the substrate that underlies all change and all form. Form, on the other hand, plays the role of the determining element, but it plays this role in one of two ways: either as that which determines the already constituted thing in a qualified way (*secundum quid*), i.e., as an accident; or as that which determines the thing in an essential way (*dat esse simpliciter*), i.e. as a substantial form. In the former case, form comes to be in what already exists as one thing or another, whereas in the latter, it comes as a determination, partial or complete – or, better said, dispositional or completive. An important consideration is that Peter does not think that any *one single* substantial form is *the* determination of any individual thing.

Unlike Aquinas,[16] but like Olivi,[17] Peter of Trabibus argues that any given composite is constituted by a plurality of substantial forms. Trabibus especially criticizes Aquinas' view of the unicity of substantial forms, even though he does not mention the Dominican by name. Instead, he says:

[15] "Relinquitur ergo quod anima intellectiva, et omnis intellectualis substantia cognoscens formas absolute, caret compositione formae et materiae", Thomas Aquinas, *Pars prima Summae theologiae, qq. 50–119* (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1889) (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita 5), q. 75, a. 5 co.

[16] "There is an extensive literature on the topic; see e.g., John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000). In several places, Aquinas clearly states his view, e.g. *Summa theologiae* Iª q. 76 a. 4 co.: "Sed si anima intellectiva unitur corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut supra iam diximus, impossibile est quod aliqua alia forma substantialis praeter eam inveniatur in homine. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt quia forma accidentalis non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale, sicut calor facit suum subiectum non simpliciter esse, sed esse calidum. [...] Forma autem substantialis dat esse simpliciter, [...] Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; [...] Et similiter est dicendum de anima sensitiva in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectioribus respectu imperfectiorum."

[17] "[...] idcirco simpliciter teneo in corpore humano praeter animam esse alias formas realiter differentes ab ipsa et etiam credo omnes gradus formales qui in eo sunt concurrere ad unam perfectam formam constituendam, quarum principalior et omnium quodam modo forma et radix est illa quae ultimo advenit", Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, edited by B. Jansen (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922–26), q. 50, vol. II, 35. See Robert Pasnau, "Olivi on the Metaphysics of the Soul", *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 6 (1997): 109-132.

> Some hold that in one matter there is but one form; for they maintain that the substantial form that exists in matter perfects it with respect to every formal act that is in it, and that the last form contains by power and force all preceding forms and every one of their acts in the aforesaid mode; as for example the rational soul makes a human being to be a human being and to be an animal and [to be] a body and a substance.[18]

Trabibus takes such a view to be contrary to both faith and reason.[19] Appealing to a pluralist stock example, he claimed that living things like human beings are constituted of bones and blood, and that bones and blood are compounds of substantial form and matter, and thus are substances in their own right. According to Peter, one and the same substantial form cannot explain why a being is 'human', i.e., belongs to the human species and is made of bone and blood because each of them – bone and blood – are composites that belong to their own substantial genus.[20] In addition, as Aristotle claims that a soul is the act of the physical body which can be alive,[21] a body must exist and thus have a form before the soul is united with it, determining its species. Trabibus also argues that as a spiritual substance lacking quantity, the soul cannot explain the material being of the human body.[22] Therefore, a body must have a form that is distinct from the soul and that explains why it is a body.[23]

[18] "Quidam enim ponunt quod in materia uma non est nisi forma uma; ponunt enim quod forma substantialis existens in materia perficit eam quantum ad omnem actum formalem qui est in ea, ita quod forma ultima continet virtute et potestate omnes formas praecedentes et omnem actum earum modo praedicto; ut, verbi gratia, anima rationalis facit hominem esse hominem et esse animal et corpus et substantiam", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, edited by H. A. Huning, 147. All translations are ours unless otherwise indicated.

[19] "Repugnat enim veritati sanctae scripturae, veritati fidei catholicae, veritati rationis recte, autoritati philosophiae", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, 147.

[20] "Sed contra istam positionem sunt plures rationes, quarum una sit haec. Quia quicquid est in genere, per se participat principio illius generis. Sed ossa et caro et nervi vere sunt in genere substantiae, ergo sunt composita ex materia et forma illius generis. Probatio consequentiae, quia secundum Boethium genus, quod est praedicamentum substantiae, est compositum. Sed si non esset in homine nisi una forma, tunc non esset os et huius in genere nisi per reductionem", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, f. 17ra-b. See also Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, 140.

[21] Aristotle, *De anima* II.1, 412a, 27-28.

[22] "Item, impossibile est quod unum oppositorum det esse formaliter reliquo. Sed anima rationalis est quid spirituale et non quantum. Ergo impossibile est quod det corpori esse quantum formaliter." Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, f. 17ra; see also *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, 150: "[...] ergo cum forma spiritualis sit actus spiritualis, impossibile est quod forma spiritualis daret materiae actum corporalem [...] constat ergo quod impossibile est quod anima faciat hominem vel quodcumque animal esse corpus."

[23] "Item, Philosophus dicit, quod anima est actus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis. Ergo praesupponit ante suam coniunctionem illa existere, vel tempore vel natura, alioquin coniungeretur materiae nudae et non organicae", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, f. 17rb.

This argument was particularly important for theological reasons and was applied to explain the status of the dead body of Christ during the time his corpse lay in the tomb (the so-called *triduum*). For most pluralists, the unicity of form doctrine was unable to explain the relationship that holds between Christ's corpse and his living body, except by claiming that there is a substantial change from one to the other, meaning that one substance (the living body) is replaced by another (the corpse or dead body), with only formless prime matter persisting throughout the change. But prime matter, as pure potentiality, could not "hang on the cross" or "lie in the tomb" because it did not have any properties such as location.[24] For those who defend the plurality of substantial forms, the question of the identity of the living and the dead body is easier to solve because there is a form, which is not the rational soul, that accounts for the constitution of a body when the soul is not present. This principle applies to any essential substantial part of the human composite and thus, Trabibus concludes, for philosophical as well as for theological reasons, that human beings are necessarily constituted by a plurality of substantial forms. Trabibus' statement of this view could not be clearer:

> And it must be said according to a saner doctrine that there are or can be many substantial forms in one composite, except in simple things [e.g., elements]. And this agrees with the truth of the Sacred Scripture, at the beginning of *Genesis*. It is also in agreement with the truth of the Catholic faith in what concerns the conception of Christ, His death, and His being in the Sacrament [i.e., the Eucharist]. It also agrees with the truth of right reason, because the more a form is noble, the more actuality it has and the more remote it is from possibility [i.e., potentiality], but the rational soul etc. [is the most actual and the most remote from potentiality]. It agrees also with the authority of philosophy, as it results from argument. [25]

As numerous scholars have shown, pluralism of substantial forms does not entail that the human composite lacks unity.[26] What pluralists offer us is an account of the principle of unification, not of simplicity. In Trabibus we find precisely the claim that human beings have only one soul despite being composite because unity does not entail simplicity.

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[24] "Item, si anima Christi dabat esse corpus et omnia alia, tunc cum per mortem fuerit fuerit separata, non remansit nisi materia pura, cui non competit iacere in sepulcro, et per consequens nec in cruce pendere, quia illa non habet situm de se", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, f. 17ra. See also Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 3, 149: "Item, materia nudata forma substantiali non potest dici corpus, sicut prius est ostensum; ergo anima a corpore separata, si non sit in homine nisi forma una, non remanet nisi materia sola, et ita non remanet corpus. Falsum est ergo quod dicitur et creditur corpus Christi iacuisse in sepulcro et quod ab ipso iam mortuo emanavit sanguis et aqua."

[25] "Et ideo dicendum secundum saniorem doctrinam, quod in uno composito sunt plures formae substantiales, vel possunt esse, nisi in simplicibus. Et hoc est consonum veritati Sacrae Scripturae [...] Est etiam consona veritati fidei catholicae [...] Est etiam consona veritati rectae rationis, quia quanto forma nobilior tanto actualior et a possibilitate remotior, sed anima rationalis, etc. Est etiam consona auctoritati philosophiae, ut patuit in arguendo", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, f. 17rb.

[26] See e.g., Silva, *Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul*, Part One, for analysis and references.

Among the arguments that Trabibus presents for the unity of the soul is one in which he appeals to Avicenna. According to Trabibus, Avicenna explains that when one power of the soul has an intense act, the acts of the other powers become weaker. Avicenna's idea can be illustrated by the example of trying to think strategically when angry. When one is very angry, it is difficult to think clearly. Trabibus takes this example as evidence that the powers of the soul are connected by one common factor, namely, the essence of the soul, so that the intensity of the act of one power which is rooted in that common subject results in the weakening of the others.[27] Importantly, however, even then the intensity of the operation of one power, say the intellect, does not completely prevent the operation of another power, say the will, which can still be carried out. He takes this as evidence of the fact that each of these powers is a form on its own and thus operates in relative independence of the others.[28] What is interesting in this view is that the simultaneity of operations is often used as an argument for the need to postulate the existence of more than one substantial form, for instance, when we have contrary desires, one rational and one sensory. However, Trabibus uses the simultaneity argument to show that even within the same level of operation, which is rational in this case, two powers can operate despite influencing each other. This he takes as evidence not of the need to separate them ontologically but as two distinct powers operating within the same total entity, the human soul. If the operation of one of these powers does not affect, to some degree, the other, they could be conceived of as separate entities, not connected in any significant sense – without a joint purpose of action, as it were. But that is precisely what he wants to deny because he takes plurality to be compatible with unity (but not simplicity).

Now, the challenges facing a pluralist such as Trabibus concern the unity of the human soul and the unity of the human being. To start, he must explain how these forms come together to constitute one soul. Trabibus answers that what grounds that plurality internal to the human soul is the existence of spiritual matter. He uses the notion of the spiritual matter of the human soul to argue that the substantial forms of the soul inform this spiritual matter directly, and it is this common substrate that gives unity to the composite the soul. Hence, according to Peter, a human being has one soul, which is

[27] "Item, dicit Avicenna, *VI Naturalium*, potentiae animae humanae habent unum vinculum commune et unam radicem communem in qua radicantur. Et probat per hoc, quia una non remitteretur propter alterius actum, si ita non esset. Ergo ex quo remittitur sunt una essentia", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 17, q. 2, f. 22rb.

[28] "[...] si intellectus et voluntas essent forma una, quando intelligere et amaret, divideretur eius intentio et virtus ; sed omnis virtus finita et determinata dispersa facit operationes imperfectas et viles, sicut etiam dicit Commentator, scilicet 18 propositione de causis: quanto magis, inquit, virtus patitur et dividitur, minoratur et debilitatur et efficit operationes viles. Ergo si intellectus et voluntas essent forma una et eadem, quando intelligeret, non posset complete amare, immo cum numquam possit amare, nisi quod intelligit, numquam exiret in actu amoris, nisi per imperfectum, vilem et diminutum, quod constat esse falsum. Relinquitur ergo primum, scilicet quod intellectus et voluntas sint formae essentialiter differentes", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 179.

constituted by many substantial forms that are rooted in spiritual matter.[29] Trabibus is not original in giving this reply, as his view of the hylomorphic structure of the soul follows Olivi's teaching. Olivi believes that a human soul is one substantial form that has three constitutive formal parts: the intellectual part, the sensitive part, and the vegetative part. What binds these parts together in the constitution of one soul is that they inform an intellectual or spiritual matter.[30] The result is a model of the human soul as a composite substance constituted by a plurality of substantial forms. But this characterization of the human soul as a spiritual composite substance represents a challenge to a traditional hylomorphic definition of the human being, i.e., of a conception of the soul as the form of the body. An explanation is owed as to the nature of the relation between the soul thus constituted (of matter and forms) and the human body.

Trabibus tries to solve this inherent tension concerning the union of the body and the soul by discussing separately the lower parts of the soul – vegetative and sensitive – and the higher parts of the soul, the intellect and the will. This brings a certain hierarchy to the substantial forms of the soul, so that the vegetative and the sensitive are those formal parts of the soul that are the act of the body, whereas the intellective powers of the will and intellect are not. Peter argues that "the soul" is united to the body by means of something from itself' (*per aliquid sui*), and what he means by this is that the vegetative and the sensitive powers are those formal parts of the soul that communicate their actuality to the body, whereas the intellective and volitional powers do not. However, insofar as the lower parts operate via the body, only they bear a close connection to the body, such that the vegetative and sensitive substantial forms inform spiritual matter, and this composite completes and perfects – as a form in this qualified sense – the body, constituted by matter (physical matter) and a plurality of forms. Another way to understand this is to say that the soul is united with the body as the form of the body through its formal parts.[31]

[29] "Et non sunt in [uno] homine per consequens nisi una, habens plures partes formales, quarum aliquae sunt eius partes formales communicantes eius actum et aliquae non, ut intellectiva et volitiva", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 17, q. 2, f. 22rb-23va; see also Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 172-173: "[...] anima enim humana est quoddam suppositum in genere spiritualis substantiae constans ex spirituali materia et ex spirituali forma, ad cuius suppositi constitutionem plures formae conveniunt in una materia radicatae, ex quibus quaedam collocant et ordinant ad constituendum compositum ex ipsa et corpore, ut hominem, in esse generis ut vegetativa et sensitiva, quaedam vero in esse suo specifico et completo, ut intelligentia et voluntas."

[30] "Sufficit enim ad hoc quod omnes formales partes animae informent eandem materiam spiritualem, ita quod ex omnibus fiat una totalis forma eius", Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 51, vol. II, 184.

[31] "Item, ratione potest probari, quia anima unitur corpori ut forma, aut ergo est forma se tota, aut per aliquid sui. Sed non potest dici se tota, quia tunc potentia intellectiva esset forma corporis sicut sensitiva, quod est contra Philosophum, *II De anima*, dicente, nullius corporis est actus. Et etiam omnis forma corporis est ligata taliter, quod non potest se reflectere supra se, quod falsum est de intellectiva, quia potest se reflectere. Et omnis talis forma communicat corpori actum suum

Trabibus is again very close to the view we find in Olivi, who also argues that it is (intellectual) matter that explains the unity of the intellectual part of the soul and the sensitive part: both forms (sensitive and intellective) inform that same matter and thus are part of one and the same whole.[32] The unity of these parts informing the same intellectual matter can account for several psychological phenomena, for example, why the intellective part can move the sensitive part freely, for instance in turning one's gaze to a given object, or why the intellective part is so intimately connected with the sensitive part that one can even say that the acts of the sensitive part are its own acts.[33]

We come now to the key question of the status of the powers of the soul. Trabibus states at the outset that "powers are distinguished by their acts, acts are distinguished by their habits, and habits by their objects".[34] But there are different ways of conceiving of the ontological status of powers and their relation to the essence of the soul. It has become traditional in the literature to distinguish between three main theories about this relation, namely the 'identity theory' of thinkers like Philip the Chancellor; the 'distinction theory' of thinkers like Thomas Aquinas; and more recently, the 'middle theory' common among Franciscan authors, such as Bonaventure.[35] We cannot go into this debate here, but it suffices to say that Trabibus follows his Franciscan predecessors and especially contests the distinction theory.

primum et cuilibet eius parti, et tunc oportet, quod quaelibet pars hominis intelligeret, sicut quaelibet pars sentit et quaelibet pars vivit, quod falsum est apud omnis, scilicet, quod quaelibet pars hominis intelligat. Ergo relinquitur, quod anima uniatur corpori per aliquid sui. Sed hoc non potest esse suum materiale. Ergo aliqua pars formalis, scilicet, sensitiva et vegetativa. Est igitur dicendum, quod tota anima corpori coniungitur, sed non est tota eius perfectio, sed aliqua eius partes formales. Et non sunt in [uno] homine per consequens nisi una, habens plures partes formales, quarum aliquae sunt eius partes formales communicantes eius actum et aliquae non, ut intellectiva et volitiva", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 17, q. 2, f. 22rb-23va.

[32] "[...] supposito quod sensitiva sit unita cum parte intellectiva in una spirituali materia seu saltem in uno, ut ita dicam, supposito rationalis animae. [...] pars autem intellectiva et sensitiva sint unitae tanquam duae naturae formales in una materia seu in uno supposito et in una substantia animae et ita invicem sibi consubstantiales tanquam partes substantiales unius formae substantialis animae", Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 59, vol. II, 539.

[33] "Et cum manifeste sentiamus quod superior movet et tenet libere inferiorem: oportet quod inferior sit radicatus in materia superioris et non e contrario", Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, q. 51, vol. II, 124. See also q. 51, vol. II, 122: "Primum etiam est contra experimentum intimum et certissimum quo intra nos sentimus sensitivam teneri et regi et dirigi a parte superiori tanquam aliquid in sua materia intime plantatum; in tantum que sentitur esse plantata in radice superioris partis nostrae quod radix nostrae subsistentiae, ipsa scilicet pars superior, sentit intime et dicit actus sensitivae esse suos."

[34] "Item, potentiae distinguntur per actum, et actus per habitus, et habitus per obiecta", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 24, q. 2, f. 29va.

[35] See Dominik Perler, "Faculties in Medieval Philosophy", in *The Faculties: A History*, edited by D. Perler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 97-139; and Can Laurens Löwe, "Bonaventure on the Soul and Its Powers", *Vivarium* 59 (2021): 10-32.

In fact, Trabibus takes issue with the traditional view that powers are accidents of the soul. He takes this theory to be grounded in two theses:

> (1) nothing that is in act by its own essence is ordered to an ultimate act; but the soul is, by its own essence, in act; therefore, its essence is not ordered to an ultimate act; thus, if the essence of the soul were the immediate principle of its operations, the soul would always be operative, in the same way as [every being that has a soul] is always alive.[36]
>
> (2) the diversity of acts according to nature and species is from the diversity of principles; but to be and to operate are acts of different species; therefore, [they] are from different principles; but to be is from form and to operate is from power; thus, power is something essentially different from form.[37]

According to this view, the powers of the soul are "certain natural properties" (*quaedam naturales proprietates*) by means of which the soul performs its operations, which flow from the soul's essence, and that are better said to be accidents of the second species of quality.[38] But, Peter concludes, this view cannot seem rational for any inquisitive person who loves the truth and does not have a stubborn mind.[39]

The problem Peter sees in this view is that it makes essential features of the type of being in question, for instance, what is essential to being human, to be accidental. If this traditional view was correct, then the power of the intellect, which is responsible for determining a human being in its proper species (*in esse specifico*), would be accidental to the soul.[40] Importantly for a Franciscan author and a disciple of Olivi, the same would be true of the will, meaning that if powers are accidental to the soul, the power of the will would be an accident of the soul. "Not only is this false, it is heretical" (*non solum falsum,*

[36] "Item, nihil quod est actus per suam essentiam est ordinatum ad ulteriorem actum; sed animam per suam essentiam est actus; ergo essentia eius non est ordinata ad ulteriorem actum; ergo si essentia animae esset immediatum principium operationis, semper habens animam semper haberet opera animae, sicut semper est animatum", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 166.
[37] "Item, diversitas actuum secundum naturam et speciem est a diversitate principiorum; sed esse et operari sunt actus secundum speciem diversi; ergo sunt a principiis diversis; sed esse est a forma, operari a potentia; ergo potentia est aliud essentialiter a forma", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 166.
[38] "Quidam enim dicunt quod potentiae animae sunt quaedam naturales eius proprietates quibus anima est facilis ad operandum, fluentes ab eius essentia in essentiae diversitate; unde sunt in secunda specie qualitatis, anima in genere substantiae existente", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 167-168. Both Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas argued that powers flow from the essence of the soul; for Aquinas, see *Summa theologiae* I, q. 77, 6: "[...] omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut principio."
[39] "Sed ista positio homini veritatem amanti et eam mente non obstinata inquirenti minime rationabilis apparet", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 168.
[40] "[...] nullum accidens potest constituere rem in specie sua; sed rationale in homine designat et exprimit specificam eius formam, unde ponitur in eius definitione ut specifica differentia eius, et constat quod accipitur ab intellectu primo et immediate; ergo impossibile est quod intellectus sit accidents animae rationalis", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 168.

sed haereticum apparet: 169), Trabibus pointedly remarks. So, what makes a human being human would only be accidental to the human being, because human being would lack the features of rationality and freedom of choice which we take to be inherently essential to it.[41] According to this view, these powers could be removed from the human rational soul by God. Trabibus strongly argues against this view and reasons that as rationality and free choice of the will are essential for human beings, these powers must therefore be essential parts of the human soul.[42]

For Trabibus, consequently, these powers are clearly essential to the human soul, but the question now remains what kind of being these powers have. What is clear is that:

> it cannot be said that these are accidents, because Augustine proved in the *De trinitate* Chapter 4 that these cannot be accidents, and also because it would follow that a human being could understand without having an intellect or will, if these were accidents. Moreover, a human being would be placed in its species by his accidents, which is completely impossible and absurd.[43]

This passage makes it clear that what is essential to a being cannot be accidental to that being, such as is the case with the powers of the intellect and the will. Otherwise, we would have to say that understanding is not essential to being human, and on the other hand, that it would be possible for a being to understand without having an intellect. Thus, powers cannot be accidents.[44] Instead, he claims:

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[41] "Et etiam quia sequeretur, quod homo posset intelligi non habens intellectum et voluntatem, si essent accidentia. Item, homo iam reponeretur in sua specie per sua accidentia, quae omnia sunt impossibilia et absurda. Ergo, si iste potentiae non sunt accidentia, nec etiam sunt materia, relinquitur per locum a divisione quod sint formae", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 24, circa 2, q. 2, f. 29vb. See also *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4: "[...] nam homo in quantum homo est rationalis, intelligens, liber arbitrio; sed si potentiae istae sint homini accidentia, cum dicant in se aliquam essentiam absolutam, non enim dicunt purum respectum animae, possunt per intellectum ab anima, ab esse, et ita ab homine separari per potentiam divinam; sed illis circumscriptis vel separatis non erit homo rationalis nec intelligens nec arbitrio liber, cum haec insit homini per rationem et voluntatem; ergo poterit intelligi et esse quod non sit rationalis nec intelligens nec arbitrio liber; sed nihil tale est homo; ergo homo non erit homo."

[42] "[...] rationale in homine designat et exprimit specificam eius formam", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 168. An anonymous referee made the point that also Aquinas would deny this possibility because as *propria* the powers of the soul are had necessarily by the soul and cannot (in principle) be separated from the soul even by divine intervention (see e.g., *Quaestiones de anima* 12, 7, edited by Marietti, 327: "Potentiae vero animae sunt accidentia sicut proprietates. Unde licet sine illis intelligatur quid est anima, non autem animam sine eis esse est possible neque intelligibile").

[43] "Sed non potest dici, quod sint accidens, quia Augustinus probat, *IX De trinitate* capitulum 4, quod non possunt esse accidens. Et etiam quia sequeretur, quod homo posset intelligi non habens intellectum et voluntatem, si essent accidentia. Item, homo iam reponeretur in sua specie per sua accidentia, quae omnia sunt impossibilia et absurda. Ergo, si iste potentiae non sunt accidentia, nec etiam sunt materia, relinquitur per locum a divisione quod sint formae", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 24, q. 2, f. 29vb.

[44] "Item, tota dignitas animae rationalis et naturalis excellentia ad alias creaturas consistit in

> these powers are active and not passive, as the nobility of the soul consists in them; if these were passive, they would not be free and reflective of themselves. Thus, if these are active powers, [they] are forms because everything that acts is formal. Therefore, it is necessary that these forms are either substantial or accidental, but it has been proved that these are not accidents; therefore, [they] are substantial forms.[45]

The conclusion that the powers of the intellective soul, the intellect and the will, are substantial forms appears to be the inevitable conclusion of an argument to the exclusion of parts: powers cannot be "accidental to the soul",[46] and yet they must be forms because they are active, and to act is a property of forms. As there are only two types of forms, accidental and substantial, if these powers are not the former, for the reasons indicated above, they *must* be the latter. Thus, the powers of the soul must be substantial forms.

Peter also considers another traditional theory of powers and their relationship with the essence of the soul, which claims that powers are co-substantial with the soul but are not the same as its essence. Peter addresses this common early Franciscan theory by saying that if these powers are of the same substance (but are not essentially the same),[47] this means that they are caused or produced by the substance of the soul; but if that is the case, then they are essentially different from the substance of the soul.[48] However, he claims in particular that he does not understand how the substance and essence of human beings are really distinct. The essence of a human being (*homo*) is constituted by the body and the rational soul, both having a mutual inclination to be connected and united. In that case, the essence of a human being is the same as its substance, and thus:

> that which is the essence of a human being is his substance and vice versa, and the same [is true] of body and soul and any other thing; therefore, that which is the same as another according to substance is necessarily the same according to essence.[49]

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potentiis istis; sed impossibile est quod naturalis nobilitas rei et perfectio et excellentia ad res alias consistat in accidentibus eius, cum nobilitas accidentium dependeat a diginitate et perfectione formae substantialis rei, et non e contrario; ergo impossibile est quod potentiae praedictae sint accidentales", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 169.

[45] "Item, istae potentiae sunt active et non passive, cum in eis consistat tota nobilitas animae, quia si de se essent passive, non essent libere et reflexibiles supra se. Igitur, si sunt potentiae activae sunt formae, quia omne agens est formale. Ergo oportet quod ista forma sit vel substantialis vel accidentalis, sed probatum est quod non sunt accidentia, ergo sunt formae substantiales", Peter of Trabibus, *Lectura* lib. 2, d. 24, q. 2, f. 29vb.

[46] "[...] ergo impossibile est potentias istas esse animae accidentales'", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 168.

[47] A view which we find, among others, in John of la Rochelle and Alexander of Hales: the powers and the soul are the same *secundum substantiam* but not the same *secundum essentiam*. On this, see Schumacher, *Human Nature*, ch. 5.

[48] Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 171.

[49] "[...] unde illud ipsum quod est hominis essentia est eius substantia et e converso, et similiter est de corpore et anima et qualibet re alia; ergo quod est idem cum alio secundum substantiam est necessario idem secundum essentiam", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 172.

The only correct view is that which holds that powers are as it were parts of the whole that is the soul. As an active principle intrinsic to the soul, powers are the formal parts of the soul and can only be substantial forms – rather than accidental. This is primarily the case with the powers of the rational soul, but nothing seems to prevent us from concluding that that is the case with all powers of the soul.

Peter's view about the substantial forms of the soul is quite radical. Usually, philosophers who defended the plurality of substantial forms explained that the substantial forms or formal parts of the human soul were something like the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual parts of the soul, but not the powers included in these parts. For Peter, however, the intellect and the will, which are two powers of the soul, are also substantial forms. Trabibus reasons that insofar as these inform the spiritual matter of the soul, they are called substantial forms, and insofar as they are directed to certain kinds of objects, these are called powers. So, the same entity is both a power and a substantial form: power with respect to an object and form with respect to inhering in a substrate.[50] There is, hence, a distinction between what powers are from the point of view of how they relate to the essence of the soul, and as such, they are not distinct from that essence but are one with it;[51] and from the point of view of being powers and as such each adds something to the soul, namely, its being directed to a certain kind of operation. Thus, the same essence is given different names in accordance with the diversity of operations. However, one should not read this – Trabibus warns us – as meaning that the soul is a simple essence; rather, powers do carve out something for themselves in the ontological structure of the soul. It is this 'ontological carving' that justifies the distinguishability of the powers and essence of the soul. Finally, it is important not to understand the diversity of operations principle as implying that powers simply "flow from the essence of the soul", as effects from a prior cause, as we find in Thomas Aquinas (and his master, Albert the Great). Instead, Peter argues, the human soul is created all at once (*simul*) with all its

[50] "Dicendum igitur quod potentiae istae sunt formae quaedam animae non accidentales, sed substantiales ponentes ipsam in esse intellectuali sive rationali; anima enim humana est quoddam suppositum in genere spiritualis substantiae constans ex spirituali materia et ex spirituali forma, ad cuius suppositi constitutionem plures formae conveniunt in una materia radicatae, ex quibus quaedam collocant et ordinant ad constitiuendum compositum ex ipsa et corpore, ut hominem, in esse generis ut vegetativa et sensitiva, quaedam vero in esse suo specifico et completo, ut intelligentia et voluntas; esse enim specificum hominis non est unum unitate simplicitatis et indistinctionis, sed unitate compositionis et integritatis, quia cum sit perfectissimus et multiplicis actionis, necesse est quod anima ipsuim constituens secundum quod ipsum contituit habet plures formas in sua spirituali materia radicatas, quae, licet ordinem secundum naturam, nam intellectus et affectus, et agunt circa obiecta propria, habeant enim duplicem comparationem, scilicet ad materiam cui innituntur et in qua radicantur, et sic sunt et dicuntur formae, et ad obiecta circa quae operantur, et sic dicuntur potentiae", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 172-73.

[51] "[...] potentiae istae non sunt essentialiter diversae ab essentia animae rationalis", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 169.

powers,[52] which means that powers are not accidental features added to the essence of the soul, but basic, primary constituents of it.

3. Conclusion

In this paper we focused on Peter of Trabibus' account of the human soul and its powers. We hope to have shown that for Trabibus, human beings consist of a plurality of substantial forms, which he takes to be compatible with the claim that they are unitary substances. We have also shown that the originality of Trabibus' view consists of his claim that whereas some forms or powers, like the senses, are united with a body, others, like the intellect and the will, are not so and that makes them special kinds of powers, characterized by their independence of operation. He goes as far as to call them "substantial forms" and takes this plurality as compatible with the claim that human beings have only one soul. The main argument for the special status of these powers is based on their dignified nature, meaning that they cannot be mere accidents being, as they are essential to the definition of a human being. On the other hand, they cannot have their freedom of operation compromised by being dependent on the body. This is particularly the case with the power of the will, the operation of which explains human freedom in action and theological merit, i.e., to be saved or damned. One aspect that is brought to the fore by this view is the reconsideration of the role of substantial form as the unification principle of substance: each power bears the powers of organizing the substance according to the operation it is able to produce or carry out. Only the whole soul is a substance, capable of independent existence, while the powers or capacities that constitute that substance are substantial forms in that they bring about a specific (set of) operation.

Finally, the focus on Peter of Trabibus allows us to show that the debate on the unicity versus plurality of forms in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was not held exclusively at the Universities of Paris and Oxford but rather it spilled over to the system of mendicant *studia* throughout Europe. Certainly, a sign that it was not thought of as vague theological speculation, but that it cut across the philosophical landscape as different ways of thinking about life, human nature, the relation between the body and the soul, the relation between powers within one and the same soul, and the basic structure of reality.

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[52] "[...] ergo istae potentiae immediate concreantur a Deo sicut essentia ipsa [...] omne fluens ab alio est naturaliter posterius illo sicut effectus sua causa; sed illae potentiae naturaliter sunt et intelliguntur simul cum essentia animae rationalis (...) ergo non potest intelligi quod fluant ab ipsa", Peter of Trabibus, *Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 169.

APPENDIX

What follows is a comparison between selected passages of the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio*, with textual similarities underlined. The similarity of views strongly argues in favour of Peter of Trabibus as the author of the two texts.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 139.
[...] quia differentia est inter formam substantialem et accidentalem, quia una dat esse simpliciter per cuius acquisitionem fit generatio simpliciter, et per cuius ablationem fit simpliciter corruptio. Accidentialis autem dat esse secundum quid, et sua praesentia vel absentia non facit generationem nec corruptionem, sed solum alterationem, sed prima substantialis. Ergo omnis post ea adveniens est accidentalis.	Quia differentia est inter formam substantialem et accidentalem, nam forma substantialis dat esse simpliciter, unde per eius acquisitionem fit generatio simpliciter et per eius abscessum corruptio simpliciter. Forma vero accidentalis non dat esse nisi secundum quid; et ideo praesentia et absentia non facit generationem vel corruptionem substantiae, sed solum alterationem. Sed prima forma existens in materia est forma substantialis; ergo prima forma quam habet materia dat sibi esse simpliciter; ergo post illam vel supra illam non potest alia forma, nisi accidentalis, et sic in una re non potest esse nisi forma substantialis.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 139.
[...] si per aliam formam panis est corpus et per aliam panis, poterit substantia panis converti et remanebit corpus subiectus illis accidentibus, quod videtur esse contra fidem, quae dicit quod accidentia sunt sine subiecto.	[...] si panis per aliam formam est panis et per aliam substantia, quando convertitur panis in corpus Christi non remanebit forma panis, poterit tamen remanere forma substantiae; ergo conversio illa non esset transsubstantiatio; quod est contra commune dictum sanctorum.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 142.
[...] vivere viventibus est esse, ergo mori morientibus est corrumpi. Sed si per aliam formam Christus habuit esse et per aliam vivere, ergo separata anima, adhuc corpus eius habebat esse substantiale, et sic non perdidit esse, quod est contra veritatem suae mortis.	[...] vivere viventibus est esse, et mori est corrumpi sive non esse. Sed si sint plures formae, per aliam formam habet corpus esse et per aliam vivere; ergo separata anima habebit corpus esse suum substantiale; ergo non erit mortuum.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 143.
Item, cum in Christo fuerint os et caro et nervi et sanguis, aut haec omnia habent esse per unam formam, scilicet corpoream, aut per plures. Si per plures, cum panis non convertatur nisi in substantiam corporis Christi, tunc vi sacramenti non erit ibi vera caro et sanguis, cuius contrarium dicit veritas, qui manducat etc., et caro mea vere est cibum et sanguis vere est potus.	In corpore enim Christi fuerunt carnes, ossa, et nervi; aut ergo corpus caro et corpus os et corpus nervus dicunt aliquid aliud quam corpus, aut non; si non, cum forma corporis sit universalior quam forma carnis, non different realiter forma magis universalis et minus universalis. Similiter per eandem rationem non differret corpus homo et corpus ignis et sic de aliis. Si corpus caro dicat aliqua duo ita quod caro dicat formam superadditam formae corporis, tunc sequitur quod panis convertatur in solam substantiam carnis et non in formam carnis; sed cum sancti velint quod panis substantia convertitur in solam substantiam corporis ex vi sacramenti, non erit ibi forma carnis; quod est contra illud: nisi manducaveritis carnem filii hominis, et illud: caro mea vere est cibus.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 146.
[...] V Metaphysicae, dicitur, quod unum dicitur quatuor modis, scilicet numero, forma, genere, et proportione. Et habent se per ordinem, quia quod non est unum genere, non est unum specie, et sic de aliis. Et costat, quod si unum numero esset vivum et mortuum, ergo oportet quod sit specie et genere, quod absurdum dicere, et idem specie essent ignis et aequa.	[...] V Metaphysicae quod unum est quadrupliciter: unum numero, unum forma, unum genere, unum proportione. Et ibidem dicitur quod haec se habent secundum proportionem et ordinem, quia quae non sunt unum proportione non sunt unum genere, et quae non sunt unum genere non sunt unum specie, et quae non sunt unum specie non sunt unum numero; sed secundum ponentes plures formas idem corpus erit nunc aqua, nunc ignis, ut si ex aqua generaretur ignis; ergo est unum numero quod non est unum specie; quod est absurdum.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 149.
[...] si in composito non est nisi una forma, ergo ea separata non remanet aliqua nisi materia nuda. Sed nulli tali rei debetur reverentia,nec sepultura etc., quod est contra fidem.	[...] materia nudata forma substantiali non potest dici corpus, sicut prius est ostensum; ergo anima a corpore separata, si non homine nisi forma una, non remanet nisi materia sola, et ita non remanet corpus. Falsum est ergo quod dicitur et creditur corpus Christi in sepulcro et quod ab ipso iam mortuo emanavit.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 147.
Respondeo, dicendum, quod circa quaestionem istam est duplex positio valde solempnis. Quidam enim dicunt, quod in composito non est nisi una forma substantialis, quae continet in virtute omnis praecedentes, ut anima rationalis, quae dat esse corporeum, vivum, animal et hominem. Et ratio eorum est tacta in opponendo.	Circa quaestionem istam duplex est positio. Quidam enim ponunt quod in materia una non est nisi forma una; ponunt enim quod forma substantialis existens in materia perficit eam quantum ad omnem actum formalem qui est in ea, ita quod forma ultima continet virtute et potestate omnes formas praecedentes et omnem actum earum modo praedicto; ut, verbi gratia, anima rationalis facit hominem esse hominem et esse anima et corpus et substantiam; ratio autem earum est ratio prima tacta in opponendo.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 148.
Quia quicquid est in genere, per se participat principio illius generis. Sed ossa et caro et nervi vere sunt in genere substantiae, ergo sunt composita ex materia et forma illius generis. Probatio consequentiae, quia secundum Boethium genus, quod est praedicamentum substantiae, est compositum. Sed si non esset in homine nisi una forma, tunc non esset os et huius in genere nisi per reductionem.	[...] corpus, sanguis, caro, os etc. huiusmodi non dicunt solam materiam, sed dicunt necessario aliquid compositum ex materia et substantiali forma, tum quia quodlibet istorum directe et per se et essentialiter recipit praedicationem substantiae et est in genere substantiae; substantia autem ut genus et praedicamentum dicit quid compositum ex materia et forma, uti vult Boethius Super praedicamenta, ubi distinguens substantiam in materiam, formam, et compositum dicit quod relictis extremis Aristoteles de medio agit, et hoc etiam patet, quoniam materia et forma non sunt per se in genere, sed per reductionem sicut principium; tum quia corpus non praedicatur de materia vel forma, nisi solum denominative; non enim bene dicitur: materia est corpus, vel: forma est corpus, sed quod est corporea.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 150.
Item, impossibile est quod unum oppositorum det esse formaliter reliquo. Sed anima rationalis est quid spirituale et non quantum. Ergo impossibile est quod det corpori esse quantum formaliter.	[...] forma informat materiam et non efficiendo vel causando alium actum a se ipsa, sed se ipsam communicando et actum suum qui est formatio ipsa materiae participando; est enim forma essentialiter actus; ergo cum forma spiritualis sit actus spiritualis, impossibile est quod forma spiritualis daret materiae actum corporalem, quia tuncs sequeretur ipsam esse corporalem; sed actus corporeitatis est corporalis; constat ergo quod impossibile est quod anima faciat hominem vel quodcumque animal esse corpus.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 149.
[...] si anima Christi dabat esse corpus et omnia alia, tunc cum per mortem fuerit fuerit separata, non remansit nisi materia pura, cui non competit iacere in sepulcro, et per consequens nec in cruce pendere, quia illa non habet situm de se.	[...] ergo anima a corpore separata, si non homine nisi forma una, non remanet nisi materia sola, et ita non remanet corpus. Falsum est ergo quod dicitur et creditur corpus Christi in sepulcro et quod ab ipso iam mortuo emanavit.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 150.
[...] Philosophus dicit, quod anima est actus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis. Ergo praesupponit ante suam coniunctionem illa existere, vel tempore vel natura, alioquin coniungeretur materiae nudae et non organicae.	[...] dicitur II De anima quod anima est actus corporis physici; si autem in eadem materia non sit nisi forma una, anima non erit actus corporis et multo minus corporis physici, si coniungeretur materiae immediate.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 150.
[...] Commentator dicit, II Physicorum, quod omnia, quae sunt inter materiam primam et formam ultimam, sunt formae compositae.	[...] Commentator II Physicorum dicit quod omnia quae sunt inter materiam primam et formam ultimam sunt materiae et formae compositae; quod dici non posset, si non essent formae.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 151.
Sed auctoritates huius positionis haec advertentes nituntur se defendere per quandam distinctionem, quae est talis, quia materia potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet indeterminata, ut secundum se ab omnibus formis absoluta, et sic dicunt quod materia habet aliquo modo esse, non tamen potest dici corpus nec totum. Secundo modo accipitur materia determinata et per qualitatem affectam et alia accidentia physica, quibus mediantibus recipit diversitatem in partibus, et facit os et nervos et carnes.	Radix autem et summa modorum sustinendi secundum ipsos est duplex distinctio. Prima est quod est accipere materiam duplicem, scilicet indeterminatam, ut secundum se sumptam et ab omnibus formis absolutam, et sic materia habet esse quodammodo simplex et non potest dici corpus neque totum; alia est materia determinata, determinatur enim per formam signatam per quantitatem, afficitur per quantitatem et alia accidentia physica, quibus et varie affecta recipit in partibus diversitatem, ut dicatur caro quantum ad partem affectam mollitie, os quantum ad partem affectam duritie, et sic de aliis; unde talis materia potest dici corpus et totum et potest esse organica.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 151.
[...] ut genus et sic praedicatur de animali, et est compositum ex forma et materia. Et potest accipi ut pars, et sic non praedicatur, quia pars non praedicatur de toto, nec est compositum ex materia et forma, nec dicit materiam et formam, sed materiam signatam quantitate, affectam qualitate. Et per istam distinctionem defendunt se sicut possunt, sed in veritate non possunt.	[...] ut genus et sic praedicatur de animali et homine et est compositum ex materia et forma; vel potest accipi ut est altera pars compositi, et sic non praedicatur, quia pars non praedicatur de toto, nec est compositum ex materia et forma, nec dicit materiam et formam, sed materiam signatam quantitate, affectam qualitate, organicam, partium quadam diversitate. - Et per hanc duplicem distinctionem in summa nituntur declarare obiecta; sed cuiuslibet horum quae ab ipsis divinantur potest falsitas esse patens tribus conclusionibus ostensis et probatis.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 151.
Suppono enim ad praesens, quod in rebus extra animam non sit dare naturaliter materiam sine forma. Hoc enim dicit Augustinus, De libero arbitrio,expresse in pluribus locis.	Prima est quod in rebus extra animam non est ponere materiam sine forma ac per hoc nec materiam simpliciter et indeterminatam vel aliam communitatem habentem. [...] Primum patet primo per auctoritates Augustini. Dicit enim sic II De libero arbitrio:

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 152-153.
Item, Philosophus, IV Physicorum, dicit, quod materia non est separabilis a forma, sive ab altero contrariorum, licet ratione sit diversa. Item, I De generatione, quod non est possibile materiam esse sine morphea, id est, substantiali forma. Item, Commentator, Super IV Physicorum, hoc idem dicit. Et sic unum membrum destruitur distinctionis eorum.	Item, Philosophus IV Physicorum dicit quod materia non est separabilis a forma sive ab altero contrariorum, licet ratione sit diversa. Item, I De generatione, quod non est possibile materiam esse sine passione et morphea, id est substantiali forma. Item, Commentator Super IV Physicorum: materia numquam denudatur a forma, nam cum separatur ab una, induit aliam, quoniam si denudaretur ab omnibus aliis formis, tunc quod non est in actu esset in actu. [...] primum membrum illius distinctionis ad propositum nihil valet.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 151. (see also 153-154)
Alterum etiam membrum est contra Philosophum, magistrum eorum, VII Metaphysicae, qui dicit, quod accidentia sunt posteriora tempore dicta et cognitione. Et ipsi volunt, quod materia illa possit affici accidentibus sine forma substantiali.	Secunda est quod in materia non potest esse aliquod accidens aliud ab ipsa nec aliqua diversitas generis vel speciei, nisi praesupposita forma substantiali.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 151; 154-155.
Secunda etiam distinctio non valet per ea, quae iam dicta sunt. Et etiam quia omne corpus est in praedicamento substantiae, et de eo substantia praedicatur, quae est composita ex materia et forma, ut dicit Boethius.	Tertia est quod necesse est omne corpus reale compositum esse ex materia et forma. [...] Tertium principaliter et primo patet ex prius probatis. [...] Item, hoc patet ex comparatione corporis ad suum genus [...] Principia autem generis substantiae sunt materia et forma. Quod patet,tum quia dicit Boethius Super praedicmenta quod cum substantia dicatur de materia et forma et composito.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 147-149.
Et ideo dicendum secundum saniorem doctrinam, quod in uno composito sunt plures formae substantiales, vel possunt esse, nisi in simplicibus. Et hoc est consonum veritati Sacrae Scripturae, in principio Genesis. Est etiam consona veritati fidei catholicae, et hoc quantum ad Christi conceptionem, et quantum ad eius mortem, et in quantum habet esse sub sacramento. Est etiam consona veritati rectae rationis, quia quanto forma nobilior tanto actualior et a possibilitate remotior, sed anima rationalis, etc. Est etiam consona auctoritati philosophiae, ut patuit in arguendo.	Sed si positio ista oculo veritatis consideretur, repugnare multipliciter enim veritati sanctae scripturae, rationis rectae, auctoritati philosophiae. Veritati scripturae repugnat, quoniam, sicut patet in I Genesis. [...] Repugnat etiam positio dicta veritati fidei catholicae. [...] Hoc viso patet quod praedicta positio repugnat conceptioni et formationi corporis Christi, [...] Repugnat etiam corpori Christi existenti sub sacramento, [...] Repugnat etiam positio dicta morti Christi. [...] Repugnat etiam positio praedicta veritati rationis rectae, quoniam manifestum est quod anima rationalis est inter omnes formas nobilior; quanto autem forma nobilior tanto actualior et a passibilitate materiae remotior,

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 156.
[...] forma substantialis dat esse simpliciter, quia in genere substantiae, quod distinguitur contra accidens, et tunc est vera illa propositio. Si autem dicas, quod det esse perfectum et quietum, non est uerus nisi secundum gradum.	[...] forma substantialis dare esse simpliciter: aut quia dat esse in genere substantiae, quod est esse simpliciter, et hoc totum dicitur respectu artificis, et sic verum est quod forma substantialis dat esse simpliciter, sed ex hoc non potest propositum concludi; alio modo potest hoc intelligi, quia dat esse totaliter et universaliter perficiens rem secundum omnem gradum perfectionis debitum sibi, et hoc modo non habet veritatem illud respectu formae unius et eiusdem; unde manifestum est quod esse simplex aequivocatur.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17r.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 157.
Ad secundum, dicendum, quod quando panis convertitur in corpus Christi, fertur virtus conversiva non ad formam panis solum, sed ad totum compositum.	Ad tertium dicendum quod in conversione panis in corpus Christi totum illud quod convertitur in principio prolationis verborum est suppositum panis cum omnibus partibus essentiae suae, hoc est materia cum omnibus substantialibus formis quae sunt in ea, et ideo vere dicitur et est transsubstantiatio, quia nihil remanet de substantia panis.

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17v.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 160.
[...] vivere est esse viventibus non simpliciter, sed secundum genus determinatum, puta esse vivum. Et illud bene volo, quod destruatur. Et sic in Christo vere fuit destructum esse vivium per mortem suam. Et quod iste sit intellectus Philosophi in ista propositione, patet ibidem per suum Commentator, qui ita exponit.	[...] vivere viventibus est esse; quod non intelligitur de esse simpliciter et universaliter, sed de esse generis derterminati, esse vivum; et quod iste sit intellectus patet per Commentatorem sic exponentem:

Lectura lib. 2, d. 12, q. 3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. D. 6. 359, f. 17v.	*Ordinatio* lib. I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, 161.
[...] unum numero dicitur de uno singulari, sed unum specie vel genere non dicitur nisi de pluribus, ut dicit Commentator. Unde dicit, quod istud, quod est unum numero est unum specie, cum eo a quo differt numero.	[...] unum numero non potest dici nisi de uno singulari, unum autem specie non potest dici nisi de duobus vel pluribus, ut etiam dicit Commentator; dicit enim quod illud quod est unum numero est unum specie cum eo a quo differt numero;

DUNS SCOTUS'S ENTANGLED DOCTRINES OF UNIVOCITY, FREEDOM, AND THE POWERS OF THE SOUL

LAS DOCTRINAS ENTRELAZADAS DE DUNS ESCOTO: UNIVOCIDAD, LIBERTAD Y LOS PODERES DEL ALMA

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that that three of Duns Scotus's most controversial philosophical positions, namely, his doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being, his radical voluntarism, and his formal distinction between the soul and its powers, are related in the following way: The latter two depend upon the former, sometimes in obvious ways that Duns Scotus owns, and sometimes in ways that are not licensed by the doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being as Scotus himself claims to employ it. In particular, I argue that in Scotus's development of his theory of freedom and his understanding of the powers of the soul, he makes inferences from God to creatures that the doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being does not allow and that, coupled with inferences that are licensed by that doctrine, result in circularity.

Keywords

John Duns Scotus; Univocity of the Concept of Being; Freedom; Formal Distinction; Powers of the Soul

Resumen

En este artículo, argumento que tres de las posiciones filosóficas más controvertidas de Duns Escoto, a saber, su doctrina de la univocidad del concepto de ser, su voluntarismo radical y su distinción formal entre el alma y sus poderes, están relacionadas de la siguiente manera: las dos últimas dependen de la primera, a veces de una forma obvia reconocida por Duns Escoto, y a veces de formas no autorizadas por la doctrina de la univocidad del concepto de ser – tal y como el mismo Escoto afirma emplearla. En particular sostengo que, en el desarrollo de su teoría de la libertad y su comprensión de los poderes del alma, Escoto realiza inferencias de Dios a las criaturas que la doctrina de la univocidad del concepto de ser no permite y que, combinadas con inferencias

autorizadas por esa doctrina, implican una circularidad.

Palabras clave

Juan Duns Escoto; univocidad del concepto de ser; libertad; distinción formal; poderes del alma

1. Introduction

Chief among Duns Scotus's most controversial philosophical positions are: his doctrine of the univocity of being; his radical voluntarism about the human will; and his formal distinction between the soul and its powers.[1] In this paper, I argue that these three philosophical positions are related in the following way: the latter two are dependent upon the former. This is true sometimes in obvious ways which Duns Scotus owns, and sometimes in ways that are not licensed by the doctrine of univocity of being and result in circularity. In particular, I will argue that Scotus's understanding of divine freedom is obviously derived from his understanding of human freedom by an explicit appeal to the doctrine of univocity of being (hereafter sometimes "the doctrine of univocity" or "univocity"); however, his understanding of human freedom is, in turn, built upon an inference from divine contingency that relies on an implicit and unlicensed appeal to the doctrine of univocity. Similarly, I will show with respect to the powers of the soul that univocity is deployed in an obvious way, to describe God's powers by reference to human powers, and in a non-obvious and illicit way, to infer from the divine essence how human powers are arranged. To make my argument, I will first give an overview of Scotus's understanding of univocity in order to highlight certain relevant parts of the doctrine. Next, I will show how Scotus's understanding of human and divine freedom is shaped by and dependent upon the doctrine of univocity in a way that is circular. Following that, I will show that the same doctrine plays a major role in motivating and shaping Duns Scotus's understanding of the nature of the powers of the soul and their arrangement in both God and creatures. It will be clear that Duns Scotus arrives at this knowledge using the doctrine of univocity in ways that he officially approves, but also that the knowledge Scotus derives about God from creatures ultimately turns upon an appeal to univocity that, by his own lights, he cannot condone.

[1] I am grateful to Robert Pasnau and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

2. Univocity of Being: A Primer

The doctrine of the univocity of being as conceived by Duns Scotus is the doctrine that the same concept of being can be truly predicated of both God and creatures. Such a doctrine flies in the face of the teachings of Scotus's most prominent predecessors, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, each of whom taught that there were no terms common to both God and creatures, but terms denoting concepts that apply to creatures can only be applied to God analogically. Though Thomas's and Henry's theories of analogical predication differed, both denied that there could be terms that applied to both God and creatures in the same way, even at the most basic level.

Scotus's response to such theories of analogical predication reveals what appears to be his fundamental motivation for developing a theory of univocal predication: an explanation for how humans can have some knowledge of God in this life. On Scotus's definition, a univocal concept is a concept which:

> is one in such a way that its unity suffices for contradiction, by affirming it and denying it about the same thing; it also suffices as a syllogistic middle term, so that the extreme terms, united by the middle term as one, may be concluded to be united to one another, without the fallacy of equivocation".[2]

That is, a univocal concept is so unambiguous that it cannot be both affirmed and denied of the same being. Furthermore, for any two beings to whom the concept truly applies, that concept is a viable middle term for uniting the extreme terms designating those entities in a syllogism. So, for Scotus to hold that there are univocal concepts between God and creatures means that the relevant concepts must be applied in the very same way to both. Scotus's motivation for adopting the doctrine of univocity is primarily epistemic. Being and, as we will see, other perfections and simple concepts must be univocally predicable of God and creatures, otherwise it would be impossible for humans to have a concept of God.

Scotus's epistemic motivations are clear in his rejection of Henry of Ghent's doctrine of analogy, which he claims would lead to a complete inability to assign univocal concepts to any beings at all.[3] But his positive arguments for the doctrine of univocity reveal an especially important commitment to preserving and explaining the way in which human beings learn about and understand God, and sheds light on how the doctrine of univocity contributes to that process. Consider the following two arguments Scotus gives for thinking that there must be univocally predicable concepts between God and creatures: first, all real concepts in the human mind come from phantasms and the agent intellect.

[2] John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, edited by C. Balić et al, *Opera omnia* vols. I-XIV (Civitas Vaticana: typis Vaticanis, 1950-2013), 1.3.2 26: "ita est unus quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem; sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri." All translations are mine. Citations are given in the format "Book.Distinction.Question paragraph".
[3] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.3.2 30.

But if there are concepts that cannot be impressed upon the human mind by these, then the human mind cannot grasp those concepts, and so humans would have no natural concept a God of whom nothing can be predicated in common with creatures. Since we do have such a concept, Henry's theory of analogical predication cannot be right, and there must be some concept common to God and creatures.[4] Second, if simple perfections are not commonly predicated of both God and creatures, then either they are only predicated properly of creatures, and simple perfections do not belong to God, an absurd result; or they are only properly predicated of God, and what follows is that nothing can be attributed to God, since human concepts, as analogous, would necessarily be imperfect and so unable to be applied to God, of whom only perfections can be rightly predicated.[5] Being, then, must be univocally predicable of both God and creatures, and not only being, but also all simple perfections.

So, univocity of being, for Scotus, entails univocity of perfections, in a way that allows us to meaningfully apply a host of concepts to God that we are capable of understanding. Scotus outlines the process by which we apply these perfections to God in the following way:

> [T1] Every metaphysical inquiry about God proceeds in this way, by considering the formal account of something and removing from that formal account the imperfection which holds in creatures, and by retaining that formal account and attributing to it the altogether highest perfection, and by attributing it in this way to God [...] Therefore, every inquiry about God supposes that the intellect has the same univocal concept which it has received from creatures.[6]

Scotus affirms in this same place that humans attribute an intellect and will and all other perfections to God according to this method. Importantly for my argument, Scotus unequivocally states that every inquiry about God begins with a concept initially found in creatures. Hence, our univocity-based inferences always run in the direction of creature to God. So, on Scotus's view, univocal predication is not only possible, but necessary for discussing God, because all philosophical examinations of God and the attributes we assign to Him depend upon stripping the imperfections from concepts as they apply to creatures. And it is this necessity that will drive Scotus to adopt his particular and divisive views about the nature of freedom, both human and divine. I turn now to discussing Scotus's thought on freedom, in light of his views about and arguments for univocity.

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[4] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.3.2 35. For more on Duns Scotus's rejection of Henry of Ghent's doctrine of analogy, see Giorgio Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*: The Solution to a Riddle", *Medioevo* 30 (2005): 69-110, especially 73-76.

[5] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.3.2 38.

[6] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.3.2 39: "Omnis inquisitio metaphysica de Deo sic procedit, considerando formalem rationem alicuius et auferendo ab illa ratione formali imperfectionem quam habet in creaturis, et reservando illam rationem formalem et attribuendo sibi omnino summam perfectionem, et sic attribuendo illud Deo [...] Ergo omnis inquisition de Deo supponit intellectum habere conceptum eundem, univocum, quem accepit ex creaturis."

3. Radical Voluntarism

As shown above, for Duns Scotus, univocity of being also entails univocity of perfections. And so freedom, as a perfection in both God and creatures, must be univocally predicable of both. A connection between univocity and voluntarism has been gestured at in recent scholarship, though as far as I know, no effort has been made to clearly establish the link between the two doctrines.[7] In this section, I will argue that Scotus's doctrine of univocity leads to his voluntarism, in an important but obvious way that he is quite explicit about, and in a far more interesting way that he declines to acknowledge. First, though, I will clarify precisely what view I mean to attribute to Scotus when I refer to his "radical voluntarism".

Duns Scotus is a voluntarist in that he holds the will to be a prime mover, its own sole and direct governor. As Thomas Williams puts it, "the will's mode of acting is irreducible and basic; the will is by its very nature (ex se) such as to be able to act or not act, and to do this or that. In particular, Scotus emphasizes that the will's freedom does not derive from its relation to the intellect".[8] The will is not beholden to the governance of the intellect (though it does make its choices in light of it), and it is absolutely undetermined by anything external to itself. This belief about the will is depended upon or alluded to almost anywhere Scotus discusses the will, and Scotus makes it especially clear when, from the Augustinian dictum that "nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself", he draws the following two conclusions:[9] "First, therefore, an act of the will is more in the power of the will than is any other act; second, therefore, that act is in the power of the will not only mediately but immediately".[10] The will, then, is absolutely free from external determination.

Duns Scotus's voluntarism is radical in part because of its historical context. Writing after the Condemnations of 1277 and following Henry of Ghent's and Peter John Olivi's embrace of the will as a first mover, Scotus is not the first to accept a radical freedom of the will, but he goes further in treating it systematically and making it the

[7] Thomas Williams has noted this alleged connection and the lack of evidence for it in his unpublished paper, "Radical Orthodoxy, Univocity, and the New Apophaticism": "[Catherine] Pickstock also suggests that univocity leads to voluntarism, but we are given no reason to suppose that this is so, and even I – an ardent proponent of both univocity and voluntarism – can discern no connection between the two. I find this a shame, since I would love to have a really good argument for voluntarism". See Thomas Williams, "Radical Orthodoxy, Univocity, and the New Apophaticism", *Unpublished Paper* (2006), 8; and Catherine Pickstock, "Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance", *Modern Theology* 21 (2005): 543-574.

[8] Thomas Williams, "Duns Scotus", in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Action*, edited by T. O'Connor and C. Sandis (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 5.

[9] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.1.2 91. Scotus cites Augustine's *Retractationes* and quotes the following: "Nihil est tam in voluntatis potestate quam ipsa voluntas."

[10] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.1.2 92: "Primus, ergo actus voluntatis magis est in potestate voluntatis quam aliquis alius actus; secunda, ergo actus ille est in potestate voluntatis non tantum mediate sed immediate."

centerpiece of the human soul than his predecessors.[11] But the Subtle Doctor is also a radical in the way he chooses to explain the freedom of the will: the will is absolutely free for opposites not just diachronically, but *synchronically*. That is, Scotus does not hold that a will is free by virtue of a diachronic contingency, so that the will is able to will *a* at t_1 and then to will ~*a* at t_2, though this was the prevailing view of Scotus's predecessors.[12] Rather, Scotus taught that the following sort of contingency was necessary for the will's freedom:

> Indeed, in that same instant in which the will has one act of willing, in the same instant and at the same instant it is able to have an opposite act of willing, so that if it is posited that a will should exist only for one instant and that in that instant it willed something, then it is not able to will and will-not successively, and nevertheless for that instant and in that instant in which it wills *a*, it is able to will-not *a*. For to will at that instant and in that instant is not essential to that will nor is it a natural condition of it. Therefore, [willing] follows from that will accidentally.[13]

Since the will is not necessitated toward its object, it must be capable of willing or not willing it. Gesturing at Anselm's thought experiment of the partially composed angel, Scotus concludes from this that a will existing for one moment would be capable of not willing some end, even while it is willing it in that moment, since it wills contingently and not necessarily.[14] These two features, the will's immediate and absolute control over itself and the will's synchronic power for opposites, suffice to explain Scotus's label as a voluntarist. With this view of the will in mind, we can now undertake to see how Scotus's voluntarism and doctrine of univocity are connected.

The bare concepts of univocity and voluntarism are not necessarily related, as nothing in the fact that perfections must be predicated of God and creatures in the same way entails what those perfections must be. But the fact that Scotus has a voluntaristic

[11] For a history of the development of Duns Scotus's theory of the freedom of the will, see Tobias Hoffmann, *Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), especially chapters 3 and 5. My understanding of this topic has also benefitted from reading a draft of Robert Pasnau's unpublished book on medieval voluntarism.

[12] For more on the origins of synchronic contingency, see Stephen Dumont, "The Origin of Scotus's Theory of Synchronic Contingency", *The Modern Schoolman* 72 (1995): 149-167. Dumont argues that while Scotus was in his time the most well-known proponent of the synchronic contingency of the will and developed the view, he was not the first to propose such a model of contingency. It is likely that he was influenced by and received the model of synchronic contingency from his predecessor and fellow Franciscan, Peter John Olivi.

[13] John Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, edited by C. Balić et al, *Opera omnia* vols. XVI-XXI (Civitas Vaticana: typis Vaticanis, 1950-2013), 1.39.5 50: "Nam in eodem instant in quo voluntas habet unum actum volendi, in eodem et pro eodem potest habere oppositum actum volendi, – ut si ponitur quod voluntas tantum habeat esse per unum instants et quod in illo instant velit aliquid, tunc successive non potest velle et nolle, et tamen pro illo instant et in illo instant non est de essential ipsius voluntatis nec est eius passio naturalis; igitur consequitur ipsam per accidens."

[14] For Anselm's thought experiment referenced here, see: Anselm, *De casu diaboli*, edited by F.S. Schmitt, S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi *Opera omnia* vol. I (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946), chapters 12-14.

understanding of human freedom means that freedom as it is predicated of humans must also be predicated in the same way of God. This is the important but obvious way in which univocity leads to voluntarism: namely, the fact that humans are free in a radically voluntaristic way and the fact that perfections must be predicated of God and creatures in the same way jointly entail that God must be free in a radically voluntaristic way. In [T1], Scotus laid out the process of attributing perfections to God by identifying perfections in creatures and removing any creaturely imperfections from them, a process to which I will hereafter refer as Scotus's "method of univocal predication". In his treatment of contingency, we see Scotus's method of univocal predication put to work, most explicitly in his *Reportatio* discussion of the topic:

> Here I say that, by taking what a matter of perfection in our will with respect to its act and rejecting what is a matter of imperfection in it, and by transferring those things which are matters of perfection in it to the divine will, the solution to the question [of how the divine will is the cause of contingency] is clear at once. For our will is contingently indifferent to diverse acts, and through these diverse acts it is indifferent to diverse objects and to many effects. Its first indifference is a matter of imperfection; its second indifference is a matter of perfection and therefore ought to be posited in God.[15]

Scotus painstakingly walks the reader through the method of univocal predication in the case of freedom. Here and elsewhere, Scotus makes the inference from the radical voluntarism of the human will and the doctrine of univocity to the radical voluntarism of the divine will explicit, an obvious outcome of his views on being, perfection, and freedom.[16]

Less obvious, but more interesting, is a trend in Scotus's thought to infer the contingency of the human will from divine contingency. In book V of his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Duns Scotus remarks that:

> in any absolute entity, necessity is a matter of perfection. And with respect to a prior thing upon which something depends, if it were necessary, it would not imply imperfection in the absolute entity. But with respect to something later by nature, [if it were necessary], it would necessarily imply something imperfect in the absolute entity.[17]

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[15] John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio*, edited by A. B. Wolter and O. V. Bychkov, 2. vols, *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture. Reportatio 1-A*, vol. II (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2008), 1A.39.3 38: "Hic dico quod, assumendo quae sunt perfectionis in voluntate nostra respectu sui actus et dimittendo quod est imperfectionis in ea, – transferendo ea quae sunt perfectionis in ea ad divina, statim apparet propositum. Voluntas enim nostra indifferens est contingenter ad actus diversos, quibus mediantibus est indifferens ad diversa obiecta et ad plures effectus. Prima indifferentia est imperfectionis, – secunda est perfectionis, et ideo ponenda in divinis."

[16] See also various places in *Lectura* 1.39.5 53-54.

[17] John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, edited by G. Etzkorn et al., 2 vols., *Opera philosophica* vols. III-IV (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1997). 5.3 26: "[...] in omni entitate absoluta, necessitas est perfectionis. Etiam in respect ad prius a quo aliquid

Scotus is arguing here in defense of the Avicennian position that *per se* necessary beings have no cause. In particular, he is repudiating the claim that the noblest cause causes what it causes necessarily. And in the last sentence quoted, Scotus makes clear that, though God is Himself necessary, His effects, those things which depend on Him for existence, are not, since for His effects to be necessary would be an imperfection. In proving the contingency of God's effects here, Scotus has not even implicitly referenced creatures, since his conclusions are drawn from the nature of an absolute entity, which no creature is.

This notion of divine contingency, here and elsewhere argued for without reference to human freedom or creaturely contingency, returns in Book IX of the same work.[18] Scotus brings it to bear in the following argument for the contingency of the human will:

> [1]For, without contradiction, a created active principle is capable of that perfection which we have attributed to the will, namely, that it is not only not determined to one effect or act, since it has many effects and acts in its power, but also it is not determined to any of those things for which it has sufficient power. [2]For who denies that something active is more perfect in proportion to how much less it is dependent and determined and limited with respect to its acts and effects? [3]And if this is conceded about unlimitedness toward multiple and contrary effects, although with a natural determination toward any of them, how much more should this be conceded if something is posited with the first indeterminacy and the second? [4]For this contingency is more noble than necessity, as was shown in Book V [...], namely, how it is a matter of perfection in God that He causes nothing by necessity. [5]If, therefore, that perfection, which we have attributed to the will, is not contradictory to a created active principle, and the will is the highest such principle, reason demands that this perfection must be attributed to the will.[19]

In the quoted passage (with its sentences numbered for ease of reference), Scotus makes a quick but crucial move from a fact about the divine will to a fact about created

dependet, si esset necessitas, non poneret imperfectionem in absolute; sed ad posterius natura necessario poneret imperfectionem in absolute."

[18] For another place where Scotus argues for the contingency of God's effects without reference to human freedom, see *Reportatio*, 1A.39.3 31-35.

[19] Scotus, *Quaestiones*, 9.15 44: "Quia principium activum creatum capax est sine contradictione illius perfectionis quam attribuimus voluntati, scilicet quod non solum non determinetur ad unum effectum vel actum, quia multos habet in virtute, sed nec ad aliquem illorum determinatur quos in virtute sufficienti habet. Quis enim negat activum esse perfectius, quanto minus dependens et determinatum et limitatum respectu actus vel effectus? Et si hoc conceditur de illimitatione ad multos et contrarios effectus, cum determinatione tamen naturali ad quemcumque illorum, quanto magis si cum prima indeterminatione ponitur et secunda? Haec enim nobilior est contingentia necessitate, sicut tactum est in V [...] scilicet quomodo perfectionis est in Deo nihil necessario causare. Si ergo ista perfectio, quam attribuimus voluntati, principio activo creato non repugnat, et summum tale est voluntas, sibi rationabiliter est attribuenda." My translation of this passage is in places derivative of Father Allan Wolter's translation, especially in translating "rationabiliter" as "reason demands".

wills.[20] In sentences 1, 2, and 3 Scotus establishes that it is not a contradiction that the created will be undetermined in its acts and effects, and he argues that it is fitting to attribute this sort of contingency to the will. His justification for this, given in sentence 4, is that God has already been shown (in the quoted passage from Book V) to be contingent in this way as a matter of divine perfection. Hence, since it is possible that the will has this perfection, and since it has been shown to be a matter of perfection that active principles are contingent in this way, "reason demands" that the same contingency be attributed to the will as was attributed to God back in Book V. Though Scotus is not explicit about it here as he is when he is employing his method of univocal predication, he is tacitly relying upon the doctrine of univocity here. Duns Scotus's inference from the contingency of the divine will to the contingency of the human will is plausibly motivated by a principle of attributing to a nature what is most noble; this seems a likely candidate for the force of reason necessitating the attribution of contingency to the created will in sentence 5. But such a principle only has force if, as Scotus notes, the perfection-to-be-attributed "is not contradictory" to a nature. And it seems that the only likely reason Scotus has for thinking that the human will could receive a perfection of the divine will, a perfection that was posited in God without using the method of univocal predication, is the doctrine of univocity.

Above, it was shown that Scotus explicitly and predictably infers divine radical voluntarism from human radical voluntarism and his doctrine of univocity. But close examination of his writings on the nature of the will as a rational power show that Scotus ultimately derives his view on the freedom of the human will from prior beliefs about divine contingency that do not originate as beliefs about humans. So, the concept of freedom, univocal to God and humans, seems to have its origin in God. The doctrine of the univocity is implicitly invoked in inferring the human will's contingency from divine contingency, since no other principle would explain why it is possible and (coupled with the principle of positing what is more noble) necessary that a divine perfection be attributed to a creature. And as the initial inference moves from God to creature, it is unlicensed by the method of univocal predication as given in [T1]. So, the following circular pattern emerges, in which the true impact of Duns Scotus's doctrine of univocity on freedom is visible: Contingency, as a matter of perfection, must be attributed to God, the only *per se* necessary being; *by the doctrine of univocity*, it is predicable of both uncreated and created active principles (i.e., wills); this contingency forms the basis of human freedom, characterized by the will's being synchronically free and wholly within its own power; and since freedom is a perfection, it is ultimately predicable of God *by the method of univocal predication*, who is therefore free in a radically voluntaristic way. Hence, the doctrine of univocity of being serves to secure from God an absolute indeterminacy for the human will, whose more easily observed and described freedom, ultimately based on

[20] This is not the only place Scotus establishes the contingency of the will based on divine contingency. For further instances in which Duns Scotus argues for the indeterminacy of the human will from divine indeterminacy, see: Scotus, *Quaestiones*, 9.15 32 and 9.15 62.

this indeterminacy, is attributed back to God by the very same doctrine. This circle of predicating perfections of God and humans univocally, presented ostensibly as an inference from creature to creator, but with the root of the perfection really beginning in God and then being illicitly predicated of creatures, is comparatively easy to observe in Scotus's treatment of divine and human freedom. But, as I will argue, it also appears in other places in Scotus's thought.

4. The Soul and Its Powers

The first case, radical voluntarism, concerned the nature of human and divine freedom, though not the power of the will in particular. In this section, I will show that the same circular pattern I highlighted in the above section, concerning Scotus's uses of univocity, recurs in his theorizing about the powers of the human soul and of the divine essence. Before showing that a covert inference from God to creature, dependent upon univocity, occurs in the case of the powers of the soul, I will begin by laying out an important but obvious way in which Scotus deploys the doctrine of univocity.

That the powers of the divine essence are derived from our understanding of the powers of the human soul is easy to see in Scotus's thought. In the following passage, to which I will return throughout my argument, Scotus asserts that our understanding of the divine intellect and will are attained by the method of univocal predication:

> [T2] Indeed, in this way are intellect and will posited formally in God, and not only absolutely but with infinity, – thus are power and wisdom [posited in God]; thus is freedom of the will [posited in God...].[21]

Intellect and will (along with freedom) are perfections we posit in God, and they are posited according to the method of univocal predication (which Scotus has described in the passages immediately previous to [T2]) and with infinity added. Regardless of the mode (infinite or finite) of the perfection, the concept is the same between God and creatures. Scotus offers a clear example of this elsewhere, when he explicitly equates the divine and human will:

> The will in us, as it is part of the image [of the Trinity], represents the will in God with respect to that act of uniting which is of our will, but with respect to another act, namely, as our will is the principle of producing an act concerning the same object which was the object of our memory and intelligence, since the will in God is the principle of producing love equal to the divine essence, which is the first object of the divine memory, intelligence, and will [...][22]

[21] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.8.3 72: "Ita enim formaliter ponitur in Deo intellectus et voluntas, et non tantum absolute sed cum infinitate, – ita potentia et sapientia; ita ponitur liberum arbitrium [...]"
[22] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.6.1 27: "Voluntas ergo in nobis ut est pars imaginis repraesentat voluntatem in Deo non quantum ad actum istum copulandi, qui est voluntatis nostrae, sed quantum ad alium

Here, Scotus casts the human will as a representation of the divine will and performs the critical operation of removing imperfections from the will so that the term may be properly predicated of God. In the human will, an act of willing toward an object is accompanied by an act of uniting the object to the mind's knowledge of the object. In God, the primary production of the divine will is perfectly adequate to the divine essence, which is grasped completely by God prior to its being an object of willing. As the act of uniting the will's object to the intellect is an imperfection resulting from limitation, Scotus removes it in the case of the divine will and attributes to God the same will as is in humans, albeit perfected. And, though a corresponding explicit comparison of the human intellect to the divine intellect is not available, it is clear that Scotus would endorse such a comparison; indeed, in the very paragraph that Scotus outlines the method of univocal predication, having referenced, intellect, will, and wisdom as examples of the method, he writes: "Therefore, every inquiry about God supposes that intellect has the same univocal concept which it receives from creatures".[23] And so we see that the doctrine of univocity allows Scotus to say a great deal about the divine intellect and will by understanding them as essentially the same as creaturely intellect and will, with imperfections removed. Just as in the case of freedom, Scotus is quite transparent about how univocity of being entails that certain similarities between creatures and God can be inferred from our knowledge of creatures and our knowledge of perfections. However, as in the case of freedom, Scotus's view also depends upon the doctrine of univocity in a way he doesn't acknowledge. The doctrine of univocity of being has significant ramifications for how Scotus understands the human soul's relation to its powers and the divine essence's relation to its powers.

Before discussing the powers of the divine essence and human soul, it will be worthwhile to clarify the nature of the distinction that obtains in each case: the *formal* distinction. For Scotus, the formal distinction is a distinction that is less than real but more than conceptual. This sort of distinction was not in itself radical or original to Scotus, as the concept of some mediate distinction between real and conceptual was well established in the thought of at least one of his predecessors, namely, Henry of Ghent.[24] It was, rather, Duns Scotus's use of the formal distinction to explain the relationship between the soul and its powers, and between the powers themselves, that was controversial. Duns Scotus's theory is in some ways a *via media* between previous

actum, in quantum scilicet voluntas nostra est principium producendi actum circa idem obiectum, quod fuit memoriae et intelligentiae nostrae, quia voluntas in divinis est principium producendi amorem adaequatum essentiae divinae, quae est obiectum primum memoriae divinae et intelligentiae et voluntatis [...]".

[23] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.3.2 39: "Ergo omnis inquisition de Deo supponit intellectum habere conceptum eundem, univocum, quem accepit ex creaturis".

[24] For a summary of the history of formal distinction, see Timothy Noone, "Alnwick on the Origin, Nature, and Function of the Formal Distinction", *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1993): 231-245.

extremes, captured clearly by Marilyn Adams in the following passage:[25]

> Scotus agrees with Aquinas against Henry that soul-powers – both active and passive *per se* and immediate causal principles – are absolutes, not relatives. Scotus agrees with Henry against Aquinas, that such absolutes are not really distinct from the soul-essence itself. Adapting this position to square with pressure from secondary theological authorities, Scotus proposes that intellect and will are distinct formally – in that their absolute formal rationes are mutually exclusive – but (Wadding reads) "unitively" and (Ockham reports) "virtually" contained in the same soul-essence.[26]

The "unitive" or "virtual" containment that Adams mentions are features of Scotus's understanding of the formal distinction, by which he attempts to retain the real identity of the soul and its powers, while also introducing a more robust distinction between the soul and its powers that is grounded not in their relations to their objects, but in the soul and the powers themselves.

Scotus's understanding of the formal distinction changed in subtle but important ways across the course of his life.[27] However, as he holds that the same formal distinction obtains between the divine essence and its power as does between the human soul and its powers, it does not particularly matter which of his formulations we use here. I will, therefore, discuss the formal distinction as Scotus understands it in his *Reportatio*, summarized by Adams as:

> *x* is not formally the same as *y*, if and only if (a) *x* and *y* are really the same, and (b) if *x* and *y* are definable, *y* is not included in the definition of *x*, and (c) if *x* and *y* are not definable, then if they were definable, *y* would not be included in the definition of *x*.[28]

This formal distinction, on which something is really the same as something else but

[25] William of Ockham, writing in response to Scotus, held that the intellect and will are "really the same as and in no way distinct from one another or from the intellectual soul itself" and rejected in general any application of the formal distinction (Marilyn Adams, "Ockham on the Soul: Elusive Proof, Dialectical Persuasions", *Proceedings of the ACPA* 75 [2002]: 44). The views of Scotus's immediate predecessors constitute either extreme between which his view is a middle ground. Henry of Ghent held that "the will is a natural power in the soul and is nothing but the substance of the soul", and so just is identical to the soul's essence, distinguished as will by its relation to an object (and the same is true of the intellect) (see Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* 3.14). Aquinas understood the soul's powers as "the natural properties of the soul" which "flow from the essence of the soul as from a principle [...]" (Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a.77.6) For a description of Ockham's rejection of the formal distinction, see Claude Panaccio, *Ockham's Nominalism: A Philosophical Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023), chapter 2. For an overview of Henry's and Aquinas's views on the soul, and a comparison with Scotus's view, see J. Travis Paasch, "Powers", in *The Routledge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, edited by R. Cross and J.T. Paasch (New York: Routledge, 2021), 107-125.

[26] Adams, "Ockham on the Soul", 66.

[27] For a history of Scotus's understanding of the formal distinction, see Stephen Dumont, "Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction", *Vivarium* 43 (2005): 7-62.

[28] Marilyn Adams, "Ockham on Identity and Distinction", *Franciscan Studies* 36 (1976): 40.

does not include it in its definition, holds between the divine essence and the divine intellect and will, as well as between the human soul and its powers. Before going on to show how the arrangement of the divine and human powers are related by the doctrine of univocity, I will first describe the way the formal distinction obtains in each case. In the case of the divine essence and its powers, Scotus's doctrine of divine simplicity will act as both a paradigm case of a formal distinction being put to work, as well as an obvious instance of such a distinction being drawn between the divine essence and powers. Scotus's understanding of divine simplicity will also contain an instance in which the doctrine of univocity appears to be working in a way licensed by the method of univocal predication, though I will later offer evidence against this.

For the sake of conciseness, I will not here lay out the whole of Duns Scotus's theory of divine simplicity, but will instead rely on a relevant argument made by Jeff Steele and Thomas Williams for expositing its relationship to the doctrine of univocity. Steele and Williams have noted that:

> Scotus's view [of divine simplicity] seems like a sneaky reinterpretation of simplicity in order to fit within his unique metaphysical framework, namely, the univocal predication of being with respect to God and creatures. Given that (for example) being, truth, unity, and goodness are not altogether identical, when we predicate being, truth, unity, and goodness of something – whether that something is God or a creature – those predications do not pick out altogether the same thing.[29]

Since "being" must be predicated of all entities in essentially the same way (according to univocity), and as truth, unity, and goodness are proper to but distinct from being in creatures, that means there must exist a distinction even in the divine existence between existence and its proper attributes (here is an apparent inference from creature to God based on univocity). This distinction alone puts Scotus at odds with proponents of absolute divine simplicity, such as Aquinas, for whom it is the case that "God is not only His own essence [...] but He is also His own existence".[30] For, any distinction at the level of existence implies distinction within the divine essence. According to Steele and Williams, Scotus attempts to preserve divine simplicity by employing the aforementioned notion of unitive containment, wherein something holds together other things so that it, as Scotus has it, "contains all things unitively so that that they are not other things".[31] This unitive containment, wherein multiple things are so closely contained as to be inextricable from one another, explains the distinction between God's essence and the proper attributes of being (i.e., truth, goodness, unity) while maintaining His simplicity.

[29] Jeff Steele and Thomas Williams, "Complexity Without Composition: Duns Scotus on Divine Simplicity", *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 93 (2019): 630.
[30] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, edited by J. Mortensen and E. Alarcón, 8 vols., Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas vols. XIII-XX (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012), 1a.3.4: "Deus non solum est sua essential [...] sed etiam suum esse."
[31] Scotus, *Quaestiones*, 4.2. 143: "continet et omnes unitive, sic quod non sunt alia res [...]"

Since truth, goodness, and unity are necessarily co-extensive with being and the four are absolutely inseparable, they are really one thing, and yet truth, goodness, unity, and being do not fall under one another's *rationes*, and so are formally distinct.

So, as Steele and Williams put it,

> For Aquinas, all of God's attributes are identical with each other and identical with God's essence (distinguished only in our minds). In contrast, Scotus argues that the divine attributes must be necessarily coextensive with each other and with God's essence, but distinct from each other (independently of our conception of them.)[32]

The above quote makes clear that, in addition relying on unitive containment to explain how God can have essential distinctions while remaining simple, Scotus also employs the concept to explain the relationship of the divine essence to the divine powers. Scotus affirms that the divine attributes are contained in, but distinct from, the divine essence, when he writes that "the divine 'to be' unitively contains every actuality of the divine essence".[33] They are somewhat distinct from one another, since, as Scotus says, "there is no union without any distinction" and yet they are also not really distinct, since "[really distinct things] are contained multiply or disparately".[34] The unitive containment of God's attributes in his essence calls for "some union which denies any composition or aggregation of distinct things".[35] There is, in short, a formal distinction between the divine essence and the divine attributes. So, as Steele's and Williams's argument goes, the doctrine of univocity combines with the doctrine of divine simplicity in Scotus's thought with the result that God's essence contains His attributes and perfections in such a way that His essence is formally, but not really, distinct from His attributes. And Scotus also holds that God's perfections (the attributes relevant for us) are formally distinct from one another. Consider the following passage:

> [T3] just as in God intellect is not formally will, nor the converse, although one is the same as the other by the truest identity of simplicity, so also justice is not formally the same as mercy, or the converse.[36]

So, among the divine essence and the divine perfections, there is a twofold formal distinction: one between essence and perfection, and one between a perfection and any other perfection. Hence, though formally distinct, God's essence and perfections are all

[32] Steele and Williams, "Complexity Without Composition", 628.
[33] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 4.46.3 74: "divinum 'esse' unitive continent omnem actualitatem divinae essentiae."
[34] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 4.46.3 74: "unio non est sine omni distinction [...]"; "illa multipliciter sive dispersim continentur."
[35] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 4.46.3 74: "talem unionem quae repugnant omni compositioni et aggregation distinctorum [...]"
[36] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 4.46.3 71: "sicut in Deo intellectus non est formaliter voluntas, nec e converso, licet unum sit verissima identitate simplicitatis idem alteri, ita et iustitia non est formaliter idem misericordiae vel e converso."

really identical with one another.

The same twofold formal distinction occurs within the human soul. Scotus writes that "the powers [of the soul] are not formally the same, or quidditatively, neither among themselves nor also with the essence of the soul. Nevertheless they are not other things, but they are the same by identity".[37] Here is present the claim that the powers of the soul are not formally the same as the soul, (although they are really the same), as well as the claim that the powers of the soul are formally distinct from one another, and therefore really the same. Hence, the human soul, the human intellect, and the human will are all formally distinct but really identical. So, in both God and humans, the powers and the soul (or divine essence) stand in the same relationship to one another. This similarity between the human soul and divine essence is not a coincidence, but a product of univocity. In order to show how the two are connected by the doctrine of univocity, it will be helpful to first explain the context in which Scotus discusses the powers of the human soul.

Scotus discusses the formal distinction between the powers of the soul in the context of the following question: Whether there is an image of the Trinity in the three distinct powers of the soul. He ultimately concludes that there is not a perfect image.[38] The reason that he concludes that the human soul is not a perfect image of the Trinity is that the human soul does not represent the real distinction of the persons of the Trinity from one another; rather, "the soul represents through its essence [...] the divine persons with respect to the unity of their essence [...] it is less representative of the persons of the Trinity than of the unity of their essence".[39] The soul, with its formal distinction between itself and its powers, is not suited to be an image of a Trinity of really distinct entities; but it is suited to represent the unity of the divine essence which, as shown above, is really identical with but formally distinct from its powers. Similarly, in human beings, the powers of the soul and the soul itself are formally distinct from one another. This similarity of complex unity between powers and soul/powers and essence is a product of Scotus's commitment to the univocity of being. This is not immediately obvious. Marilyn Adams has described the development of Scotus's position on the powers of the soul as a product of his responses to his predecessors (namely, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Bonaventure) in combination with pressure to yield to the authority of the established intellectual tradition (most notably, that of Pseudo-Dionysius).[40] This is confirmed by Scotus's own words; indeed, the response to the question posed in the *Reportatio* is a summary and refutation of previous views followed by an explicit

[37] Scotus, *Reportatio*, 2.16.1 18: "Similiter non sunt potentiae idem formaliter, vel quidditative, nec inter se, nec etiam cum essentia animae, nec tamen sunt res aliae, sed idem identitate."
[38] Scotus, *Reportatio*, 2.16.1 19; See *Ordinatio* 1.3.3.3 596, where Scotus affirms that the soul does not perfectly represent the Trinity, though when taken with its operations it offers in imperfect image.
[39] Scotus, *Reportatio*, 2.16.1 22.: "anima repraesentat per essentiam [...] personas divinas quantum ad unitatem essentiae... minus est repraesentativa Trinitatis personarum quam unitatis essentiae."
[40] Adams, "Ockham on the Soul", 62. See Scotus, *Reportatio*, 2.16.1 18.

concession to the established opinion that the powers of the soul are somehow distinct from one another and from the soul. Nevertheless, lurking in the background is another motivation for describing the soul as he does: the doctrine of univocity.

Consider passages [T2] and [T3], which I quote again here:

> [T2] Indeed, in this way are intellect and will posited formally in God, and not only absolutely but with infinity, – thus is power and wisdom [posited in God]; thus is freedom of the will [posited in God...].
>
> [T3] Just as in God intellect is not formally will, nor the converse, although one is the same as the other by the truest identity of simplicity, so also justice is not formally the same as mercy, or the converse.

In [T3], Scotus affirms that intellect and will are formally distinct in God; in [T2], he confirms that intellect and will are posited in God according to his method of univocal predication. This pair of quotes, coupled with Scotus's claim in [T1] that *every* philosophical investigation of God begins with an account of a univocal concept that is located in creatures, imply that the intellect and the will in God are posited according to how they are first found to exist in humans, with imperfections removed, in both nature and arrangement. That is, the powers of the soul exist in God as they are found in creatures, and they relate to the divine essence in the same way as they do to the human soul.

[T2] and [T3] suggest that the powers of the soul and their arrangement are understood of God in the same way as they are understood of humans in virtue of the doctrine of univocity. [T1] makes clear that these perfections must first be found in humans and only then assigned to God. Duns Scotus's explicit claims that the human will represents the divine will and that the human soul represents the divine essence are instances of this univocal predication of perfections. And the peculiarities of Scotus's understanding of divine simplicity (i.e., the complexities in the form of distinctions in the divine essence and among its attributes) suggest that the doctrine of univocity has played a tacit role in shaping Scotus's view of the divine essence and perfections, though one which is licensed by the method of univocal predication outlined in [T1], since the inferences run from creature to God. Here again, we see that inferences from knowledge about creatures to knowledge of the divine, licit according to Scotus's method of univocal predication, abound and are foundational in Scotus's thought. But again, as in the case of the nature of freedom, there are also unlicensed inferences from God to creature that are happening in the background of Scotus's thought on the soul and its powers.

In the first place, *contra* what he states in [T2], Duns Scotus does not rely on the doctrine of univocity to initially posit intellect and will in God. Nor, against what Steele and Williams suggest, is the doctrine of univocity ultimately responsible for Scotus's understanding of the formal distinction of divine essence from divine powers. Early on, in the second distinction of the *Ordinatio*, Scotus sets out an argument for the existence of an infinite being, which he begins by showing " that the first efficient cause has an

intellect and will such that its intelligence is of infinite things distinctly and such that its essence, which essence is indeed its intelligence, is representative of infinite things".[41] Scotus's proofs for the existence of intellect and will in God rest on the first cause's absolute priority and the presence of contingency in the world, and make no reference to creatures, save an invocation of the fact that creatures act contingently as evidence that there is contingency in the world. However, it is the first cause's absolute priority and the fact that there is contingency in the world that Scotus uses to establish the intelligence and voluntariness of the divine action, and the nature of this intelligence and volition, and not any inference from a created intellect and will to the divine intellect and will.[42] Scotus also establishes that the intellect and will of the first cause are really identical with its essence not by reference to the human soul, but by examining the divine powers themselves. Arguing that the intellection and volition of the divine intellect and will are the same (*idem*) as the divine essence Scotus goes on to say that this conclusion has certain corollaries, the relevant ones being: "the will is the same as the first nature", and "the intellect is the same thing as that [first] nature".[43] The proofs of these corollaries do not rely on knowledge of the nature or arrangement of the powers of the human soul, and so the presence of intellect and will in God, and their identity with the divine essence, at least in their most basic forms, are not arrived at by the method of univocal predication, contrary to what Scotus's own words have led us to expect.

Scotus uses this determination that God has an intellect and will identical with His essence to draw conclusions about the human powers and soul in ways that are easy to miss but nonetheless present. And, as they are inferences from God to creature that depend upon the doctrine of univocity, they are unlicensed by the method of univocal predication. A minor example of such an unlicensed inference occurs in Scotus's *Ordinatio* discussion of divine simplicity, in his argument against the opinion that a distinction of reason can be drawn between God's essence and attributes only through an act of the intellect, Scotus recites and endorses the following argument from Henry of Ghent that the opinion is false: "Since true and good in a creature are distinguished by a distinction of reason, from which distinct things, therefore, is this distinction taken? From none, but from true and good in God, which differ by reason".[44] In this brief argument, Scotus accepts that true and good are distinguished by a distinction whose basis is solely in God. Such an argument, which explicitly begins with the divine attributes, can only work if an inference from divine goodness and truth to human goodness and truth is valid. And what else could make this inference valid but an implicit appeal to the doctrine of univocity of being?

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[41] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.2.2 74: "quod primum efficiens est intelligens et volens, ita quod sua intelligentia est infinitorum distincte, et quod sua essentia est repraesentativa infinitorum, quae quidem essentia est sua intelligentia."

[42] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.2.2. 77-81.

[43] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.2.2 94, 96: "voluntas est idem primae naturae [...]"; "intellectus sit idem illi naturae [...]".

[44] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.8.4. 172. The editors of the Vatican edition of the *Ordinatio* suggest that Scotus is here arguing against the opinion of Thomas of Sutton.

The above case is evidence that the distinction of being from its proper attributes, which distinction Steele and Williams argued exists in Scotus's theory of divine simplicity as a concession to the doctrine of univocity, is initially found in God and transferred (illicitly) to humans. It is not, as it first appeared to be, a case of inferring something about God's existence from the nature of human existence. The circular pattern of identifying a kernel of a concept in God, inferring its presence in creatures from its presence in God *via* univocity, and then re-predicating of God the same concept, now more fleshed out in creatures because of their epistemic accessibility, was particularly easy to see in the case of freedom, and it presents itself again here. However, the dependency of the distinction between being and its proper attributes on a univocal predication from God to creatures is only a forerunner to a far more important instance of the doctrine's tacit presence in Scotus's though on the powers of the soul. Scotus's *Reportatio* discussion of the arrangement of the soul's powers, already discussed above in the context of the method of univocal predication, contains a more crucial, but subtle, appeal to univocity than any we have yet seen.

As indicated above, *Reportatio* 2.16 is a crucial passage for understanding Scotus's view on the human soul and its powers. Scotus's ultimate position, that the powers of the soul are formally distinct from one another and from the soul itself, is ostensibly a concession to established authority. But an examination of how Scotus arrives at that position and a comparison of his ultimate position with the one he argues for before his concession to authority suggest that the divine powers and essential unity for which he argues in the second distinction of the *Ordinatio* are in his mind and actively shaping the way he views the powers of the human soul. Before settling on the formal distinction, Scotus first makes a case for the absolute identity of the powers of the soul with the soul. Among several other arguments for this view, Scotus advances the following (with sentences numbered again for ease of reference):

> [1]I say to the question that something less should be posited where something more is not necessary; and possibility, where impossibility cannot be proved; and a nobility of nature, where an ignobility cannot be proved. [2]But the immediacy of the first act to the second act is a nobility, as is clear in God, and it is not able to be proved that it is impossible for the second act to follow immediately from the first act in creatures, as is clear, since there are sophisticated arguments that prove this; [3]and so it is all the more necessary to posit something less that makes [human] nature more noble, than something more that is not necessary and does not make [human] nature more noble.[45]

[45] Scotus, *Reportatio*, 2.16.1 14: "Dico igitur ad quaestionem, quod paucitas est ponenda, ubi pluralitas non est necessaria; et possibililas, ubi non potest probari impossibilitas; et nobilitas in natura, ubi non potest probari imposibilitas. Sed immediatio actus primi ad actum secundum nobilitas est, ut patet in Deo, et non potest probari quod impossibile est actum secundum esse immediate ab actu primo in creaturis, ut patet, cum rationes sint sophisticae hoc probantes; igitur magis est ponenda paucitas nobilitans naturam, quam pluralilas non necessaria, et non nobilitans eam."

The argument against positing something other than a soul, intellect, and will that are entirely indistinct to explain human intellectual and volitional acts relies on Scotus proving that it is more noble for the soul and its powers to be identical (from sentence 1). And the proof for this comes in sentence 2, where Scotus openly appeals to how God's powers are related to His essence. This claim reinforces what I argued for above, that Scotus has decided how God's powers are related to His essence independently of the relationship between the human soul and its powers. And sentence 3 constitutes a clear instance of Scotus predicating of the human soul a nobility in the divine essence, a predication that, as in the case of freedom, can only occur if its motivation of attributing nobility to nature is made possible by an assumption of the univocity of the concepts of existence, intellect, and will in the case of God and humans. Hence, we see again that Scotus finds in humans a perfection initially discovered in God and does so by an inference from God to creatures that is illicit according to the method of univocal predication.

In a final instance of an inference from God to creature that is based on univocity, Scotus proves that a human soul could be absolutely identical with its powers by appealing to this reality in God. The Subtle Doctor writes that:

> That way of arguing [that a single indistinct thing can produce many different effects] cannot be disproved through reason, since just as the first cause, which is always unlimited, is entirely the same thing, and is the immediate principle of diverse things, thus what is unlimited in some respect of its own, though not absolutely so with respect to other things, can be entirely the same really and conceptually, although the things it produces are distinct.[46]

Duns Scotus's claim here is that, since it is possible in the case of God (the first cause) to be one thing while having diverse effects, so is it possible in the case of the human soul. That the human soul's sameness with its powers is possible merely because the same arrangement obtains between the divine essence and its powers is a conclusion that could only be made with the assumption in mind that the being and powers of God and the being and powers of humans are essentially the same, though the divine existence, intellect, and will are infinite.

Scotus ostensibly rejects the view just described in favor of a view that makes the human soul and its powers formally distinct. However, this does not mitigate the fact that Scotus is comfortable with drawing conclusions about human perfections by appealing to divine perfections whose existence and nature were established independently of any reference to their creaturely counterparts. And just how meaningful Scotus's rejection of this view is has been called into question. At least one scholar, John van den Bercken, has suggested that the view Scotus seems to reject and the one he puts forth in its stead are

[46] Scotus, *Reportatio*, 2.16.1 17: "Ista via per rationem improbari non potest, quia sicut prima causa, quae est semper illimitata, est omnino eadem, et est principium diversorum immediate, ita quod est illimitatum suo modo, licet non simpliciter respect istorum, omnino idem re et ratione potest esse, quamquam producta sint diversa."

not actually opposed. Rather, the latter is a qualified version of the former, with the same sense of real identity retained across both.[47] I think van den Bercken is right to suggest this, for a further reason that he does not offer, which is that it resolves an apparent puzzle in *Reportatio* 2.16. Recall that Scotus explicitly argues in other places for a formal distinction between the divine attributes and between the divine essence and attributes. Such a position would be at odds with the passage just quoted, in which the absolute identity of the first cause's powers and essence are used to prove the possibility of the same arrangement in humans, unless a formal distinction is actually consistent with the sort of identity Scotus has in mind. Hence, if the two views are understood as consistent, then though Scotus adds in a qualification where he thinks none is needed, the qualification does not compromise the real identity between the divine essence and its powers, nor between the human soul and its powers.

If it is true that the soul's identity in Scotus's second *Reportatio* view is consistent with the identity of Scotus's first *Reportatio* view, then it is clear from what has been said about Scotus's appeals to the divine essence to establish that identity that the doctrine of univocity plays a role in Scotus's view that is unlicensed by his own standards. For, while Scotus has argued that the univocity of being is essential for us to have a notion of God, and that the method of univocal predication runs in the direction of creature to God, Scotus's treatment of the powers of the soul turns on inferring facts about creatures from facts about the divine, facts that were established independently of any reference to perfections in creatures. The same circularity that emerged in the case of the freedom of the will and the distinction of being from its proper attributes is apparent here: knowledge of the identity of the divine essence, intellect, and will depends on an inference from the identity of the human soul, intellect, and will, according to the method of univocal predication; this knowledge of the human soul and its powers, in turn, rests on conclusions about human being and perfections drawn from divine being and perfections, conclusions that are made possible and necessitated by the doctrine of univocity of being.

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[47] See John Van den Bercken, "John Duns Scotus in Two Minds about the Powers of the Soul", *Recherches de theologies et philosophie médiévales* 82 (2015): 199-240. Van den Bercken argues that, although Scotus presents what appear to be two different views on the soul in *Reportatio*, 2.16.1, and accepts the second, in reality Scotus never abandoned the first view, but only qualified it (by the addition of a formal distinction) out of respect for authority.

OCKHAM'S FLYING SOUL
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST HENRY OF GHENT ON THE POWERS OF THE SOUL

EL ALMA VOLADORA DE OCKHAM:
UN ARGUMENTO CONTRA ENRIQUE DE GANTE SOBRE LOS PODERES DEL ALMA

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Abstract

Medieval thinkers unanimously believed a human soul has various powers. Yet, the latter point is also nearly the only one they agreed upon. In the paper, I focus on two contrary opinions maintained by Henry of Ghent and William of Ockham. Whereas Henry of Ghent held powers of the soul are defined with respect to the activities they are powers-for, Ockham refuted such a contention. To make his point Ockham launches a thought experiment: if God created an intellective soul without creating anything else, wouldn't the powers in this soul still exist fully? Upon succinctly presenting Henry of Ghent's view on the powers of the soul, I provide a detailed analysis of Ockham's counterargument. I argue Henry could still reply to Ockham's rebuttal, and show how the latter bares a remote resemblance to Avicenna's flying man argument.

Keywords

Henry of Ghent; William of Ockham; powers of the soul; relations; flying man

Resumen

Los pensadores medievales estuvieron unánimemente de acuerdo en que el alma humana tiene diversas facultades. Sin embargo, este punto es casi el único en el que estuvieron de acuerdo. En el artículo, me centro en dos opiniones contrarias mantenidas por Enrique de Gante y Guillermo de Ockham. Mientras que Enrique de Gante sostenía que las facultades del alma se definen con respecto a las actividades para las que son facultades, Ockham refutó tal afirmación. Para respaldar su punto, Ockham lanza un experimento mental: si Dios creara un alma intelectual sin crear nada más, ¿no existirían plenamente las facultades en esta alma? Tras presentar sucintamente la visión de Enrique

de Gante sobre las facultades del alma, proporciono un análisis detallado de la contraargumentación de Ockham. Argumento que Enrique aún podría responder a la refutación de Ockham, y muestro cómo esta última guarda un parecido remoto con el argumento del hombre volador de Avicena.

Palabras clave

Enrique de Gante; Guillermo de Ockham; facultades del alma; relaciones; hombre volador

Introduction

When we think, love, believe, or exercise any other similar mental activity, these activities are usually directed towards some object. When we love, say, we love *someone* or have loving thoughts *about something* as opposed to experiencing some pure, abstract, and objectless love. Indeed, saying "Cindy loves" might strike us as fairly meaningless unless complemented with the object of Cindy's love, whether she loves Greg, or that she loves her chocolate dark. In other words, the objects of human mental activities seem to be so inherently tied to the actual experiences of those activities as to be their essential constituents.

Ever since Anthony Kenny's fundamental venture into the topic of emotions and their objects,[1] the issue of the relation between a particular mental state and its object has been widely debated by contemporary scholars of philosophy and psychology. Scholars have raised various concerns, pointing at just how difficult it is to define what an object of a mental state is and just how and to what extent the latter is truly determined by the former.[2] This paper proposes to examine some arguments that tackle the same issues way before the contemporary debate. I will focus on two medieval philosophers, Henry of Ghent and William of Ockham, both of whom offered insights into the mechanism of human psychology and provided divergent answers to the question how determinative, if at all, the objects of human psychological capacities are for those capacities.

[1] Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion, and Will* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), not to even mention Brentano's theory of intentionality and all its echoes.

[2] With emotions and their objects the literature spans from early responses to Kenny's theory in J. R. S. Wilson, *Emotion and Object* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), and, for instance, Richard E. Aquila, "Emotions, Objects and Causal Relations", *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 26/3-4 (1974): 279-285, to contemporary repercussions like Fabrice Teroni, "Emotions and Formal Objects", *Dialectica* 61/3 (2007): 395-415, or Daniel Shargel who makes an attempt to argue that emotions lack intentional objects whatsoever, in Daniel Shargel, "Emotions Without Objects", *Biology and Philosophy* 30 (2015): 831-844. Needless to say, scholarly literature on the intentionality widely construed is vast and – with disciplines like the philosophy of mind and cognitive science – also ever growing.

When speaking about the powers of the soul – which for medieval thinkers comprised a wide range of human abilities including thinking, willing, sensing, digesting, and also experiencing emotions like love – Henry of Ghent claimed that the powers of the soul are to be defined in terms of the activities to which they are related, i.e., the activities for which they are powers.[3] On Henry's view, the activity (and by extension the object of that activity) essentially determines the power itself. In other terms, if Cindy's love is not a love for someone or a love of something, it does not make sense for us to speak of it as love at all.

William of Ockham, however, challenged Henry's conception that powers are relational in nature. To prove his point, Ockham employed a brief yet compelling argument: powers cannot be defined in terms of relations, claims Ockham, since God could create an intellective soul before he created anything else, and the powers of this soul would – even in such a world where there would be no relata around – still exist completely.[4] What Ockham wanted to point out with this counterargument, it seems, is that powers are so essential to the soul that they continue to exist even when there is no object on which they can act. Even a soul in such a pre-created world would still be able to love. Yet, however plausible Ockham's objection to Henry might be, it still seems to remain rather limited. For one, we could still defend Henry and argue that positing powers in a void-like world only inhabited by a single soul is, in turn, nonsensical. For what good would the powers do, and would they still be powers at all, if they never got to exercise the activity for which they are powers?

In what follows, I will first succinctly present Henry of Ghent's view on the powers of the soul as relations and then analyse and evaluate Ockham's counter arguments against Henry's account. As it will turn out, Ockham's refutation was in fact inspired by Ockham's Franciscan predecessor, John Duns Scotus. Both Ockham and Scotus' rebuttal of Henry's view, however, fail to fully engage with the metaphysical commitments that undergird Henry's view on the powers of the soul. Finally, in the concluding part of the paper, I will briefly point to the potential link Ockham's counter argument against Henry bears with the most famous thought experiment regarding a man in a void-like world, i.e., Avicenna's flying man argument.

Henry of Ghent on the Powers of the Soul

Henry's most extensive and detailed treatment of the powers of the soul can be found in his *Quodlibet* 3.14.[5] There, he first dismisses Aquinas' account which describes the

[3] Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta*, edited by J. Badius (Louvain: Bibliothèque S. J., 1961 reprint). I provide more detailed references below.

[4] William of Ockham, *Questiones in librum secundum Sententiarum = Reportatio*, II., q. 20, Opera Theologica V, edited by G. Gál and R. Wood (St. Bonaventure N.Y.: St Bonaventure University, 1981), 432, 10-15.

[5] The full English translation accompanied by a succinct exposition of Henry's account was made

powers of the soul as distinct from the essence of the soul. The overarching question to which Henry responded differently than Aquinas is the following: how is it that living beings are – thanks to their souls – always alive but not always carrying out their life activities like thinking, willing, sensing, or digesting, which medieval thinkers understood as the "powers of the soul". Alternatively, how can the soul as the principle of life be at all times enlivening a human being and yet not at all times performing its natural functions?

On Aquinas' view, powers of the soul should not be identified with the essence of the soul precisely because, if one were to do that, it would be impossible to explain how these powers are not always active.[6] As Aquinas points out, if the powers were the same as the essence of the soul, which first and foremost enlivens the body, human beings would have needed to incessantly think, sense, or digest without pause as long as they lived. Hence, for Aquinas the powers of the soul are something over and above the essence of the soul and are not to be identified with the soul's essence.

Henry of Ghent departs from Aquinas' view, arguing that it is untenable on the pain of infinite regress.[7] For if a power is something distinct from the essence, we would need to posit another power that actually enables the essence to use some power, in order to explain how the soul becomes powerful. This however raises the question what would enable the first power to be linked to that further power. Since we can continue positing

freely available online by its author J.T. Paasch (Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 3.14, translated by J.T. Paasch. Available at: Academia.edu) and is soon to appear in *Medieval Philosophical Writings on the Powers of the Soul from Aquinas to Ockham*, translated and edited by C. L. Löwe and R. L. Friedman, with B. Embry, J.T. Paasch, and J.H.L. van den Bercken (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming). I am most grateful to Russell Friedman who shared some of the excerpts of this forthcoming book with me. J.T. Paasch writes about Henry's view on the powers of the soul also in a chapter entitled "Powers", in *The Routledge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, edited by R. Cross and J.T. Paasch (New York: Routledge, 2021), 111-114; and in his book *Divine Production in Late Medieval Trinitarian Theology Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 117-122. For positioning Henry within the general medieval discussion on the powers of the soul and their nature, see the still useful Celestino Piana, "La controversia della distinzione fra anima e potenze ai primordi della Scuola Scotista", in *Miscellanea del centro di studi medievali*, vol. 1 (Milano: Società Editrice Vita e pensiero, 1956), 65-169. To date, not many scholars focused on Henry's view in sufficient detail. For a brief analysis, see Adam Wood, "The Faculties of the Soul and Some Medieval Mind-Body Problems", *The Thomist* 75/4 (2011): 602-615. Only recently, Henry of Ghent's view on the powers of the soul received a more extensive treatment in Can Laurens Löwe and Dominik Perler, "Complexity and Unity: Peter of John Olivi and Henry of Ghent on the Composition of the Soul", *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 89/2 (2022): 365-386.

[6] Aquinas tackles the issue of the powers of the soul in *QDA*, q. 12 and *ST* I, q. 77, art. 1. For a detailed analysis of Aquinas' position, see Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 143-170.

[7] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.8; 13-15. All English translations are taken from J.T. Paasch (as quoted above), who used as a basis of his translation the 16th century Latin edition by Jodicus Badius (Paris, 1518), reprinted in Louvain: Bibliothèque S. J., 1961.

such powers *ad infinitum*, says Henry, it is necessary that some powers be identified with their essences, i.e., it is necessary to posit essences themselves as being powerful.

Henry considers the example of fire and its power, heat.[8] If fire was not capable of heating on the basis of what it is, i.e., its essence, then we would have needed to posit another power that would enable the fire to heat in the first place. Furthermore, even this power would need a further power to be able to come into force. Thus, we would end up with an infinite regress, "unless we stopped at something through which the other acts and which is essentially the power."[9] For Henry, precisely as is the case with fire and heat, the essence of the soul and its powers entirely overlap: the soul itself is powerful. In Henry's view, powers cannot be distinct from the soul itself. Having settled the question of their identity, Henry now faces the old question of how is it that the powers are not always active despite the fact that they are the same as the essence of the soul.

Henry proceeds to resolve this issue by maintaining a distinction between active and passive powers.[10] Whereas only God, who is *per se* powerful, is fully and essentially active, and only prime matter is fully and essentially passive, every creature in between these two extreme ends of the spectrum,[11] is never either entirely passive or entirely active. Thus, even though the powers of the soul are the same as the essence of the soul, this in no way means that they are always active. Henry notes that creatures, in contrast to God, always depend on something else in order to go into act. The powers in the created world, Henry contends, are "not always operating, but only when they are brought to act by another."[12]

To clarify what he has in mind, Henry again employs the example of fire: even though, in his view, heat and fire are essentially one and the same thing, their identity does not imply that fire is at all times heating. Rather, fire heats only in the presence of some heatable object.[13] Furthermore, even if there was just heat, abstracted from the materiality of fire itself, this heat would still not be always heating, since to heat, it needs an object which it can heat. Thus, as Henry insists, even the heat in its purest form would necessarily need the right external circumstances prompting the power to spring forth into action.[14] As Henry sees it, no power can fully activate itself of its own accord. Rather,

[8] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl*., 3.14.8.
[9] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl*., 3.14.8.
[10] First introduced at the very beginning of Henry's *Quodl*., 3.14 and constituting the general frame of his discussion on the powers of the soul. Note that Henry's distinction between an active and a passive power highlights a different point from the classical distinction between having the power to cause change on the one hand and having the power to undergo change on the other. Rather, for Henry here, an active power – as opposed to passive power – can spring into action completely out of its own accord.
[11] Aristotelian origins of such a spectrum with two ends, one totally active the other totally passive, is found in *Meteorology* IV 390a3-7.
[12] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl*., 3.14.8.
[13] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl*., 3.14.13.
[14] Henry refers to the example of such abstracted heat repeatedly: see Henry of Ghent, *Quodl*., 3.14. 13; 21; and 86.

it acts only when triggered by external stimuli.[15]

In Henry's view, the powers of the soul are just like the power of fire: they only spring forth into action when there is something present on which they can act. Our souls are thus at all times enlivening our bodies but activate their powers only when triggered by external stimuli. Put differently, a soul always remains the principle of life but becomes a principle of operation only in the right circumstances. As Henry puts it: "the form in every single thing gives the act of being and the principle of operation, and it is called 'essence' insofar as it is the principle of being and it is called 'power' insofar as it is the principle of operation."[16]

Finally, despite Henry's claim that the powers of the soul overlap with the essence of the soul, Henry still maintains that they "differ from it and from one another", but this is "solely by reason of respect" to the activity they are powers-for.[17] On his view, the soul has different respects to diverse acts "and it is from this that it takes on the names of diverse powers."[18] Henry succinctly concludes that "a power is said to be what it is from its relation to act."[19] Thus, what a specific power is a 'power-for' forms a constitutive part of what this power is. In other words, Henry affirms that to define a power one needs to know how this power is related to an act, i.e., what this power is a power-for.

To recapitulate, Henry claims that powers are the very same things as substances. The heat is the same as fire, as are the powers of thinking, willing, sensing, or digesting the same thing as the human soul. However, both the powers of the soul and the power of fire only get exercised when there is something out there that prompts their activation. In the case of fire, this would be some heatable object, and in the case of the powers of the soul, some thinkable, willable, sensible, or other object corresponding with the powers of our souls. For Henry, powers can only be defined in relation to what they are powers-for. Their relation to act is their essential character. Or, as Henry himself puts it while speaking about causal powers in general: "Concerning power in as much as it is a power: a power is that which is spoken of with respect to an act, in the way that a power is not an absolute thing, but rather a respect that is founded upon that absolute thing."[20]

[15] Later in the *Quodl.* 3.14, Henry goes at great pains to show how the external stimuli work for different powers of the human soul, firs the sentient and then the rational, see, Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.48-90.
[16] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.26.
[17] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.24.
[18] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.42.
[19] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.67: "Potentia enim id quod est dicitur ex relatione ad actum." See also Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.35: "Potentia enim non definitur nisi ex relatione ad actum."
[20] "De ratione potentiae in quantum potentia, est quod dicatur ad actum, ita quod nihil absolutum sit, sed solus respectus fundatus in re super aliquo absolute" (Henry of Ghent, *Summa* 35.2, Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia 28, edited by G. A. Wilson [Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994], 15), the English translation is mine.

William of Ockham Against Henry of Ghent

Ockham discards the notion of the powers of the soul as relational. His brief but heavily loaded rejection of Henry's view is to be found in Ockham's *Reportatio* and merits quotation in its entirety:

> If there were a relation of this sort in the soul, it would be either a real relation or a relation of reason.
>
> It is not a relation of reason, because a relation of reason is due to some intellect's act of comparing; but the powers exist completely [*perfectae*] in the essence of the soul prior to any act of the intellect.
>
> Nor is it a real relation, because even he [sc. Henry] agrees that there is never a real relation without a really existing terminus; but the powers of the soul can be complete when no object exists, since God can make an intellective soul without making any object in the world. In that case the powers of the soul would be complete [*perfectae*] and yet there would be no actual terminus (since there are no objects); therefore, etc.[21]

Ockham sets out to refute Henry's view by breaking it down to two possible sorts of relations. As Ockham claims, if Henry was right and the powers of the soul were relational in nature, that would mean they are either 1.) relations of reason or 2.) real relations.[22] Evidently, Ockham is going to deny that powers of the soul could fall under either of these two categories.

As regards the first option according to which the powers of the soul are relations of reason, Ockham states that they exist independently of any act of the intellect. Ockham's argument is based on the more general presupposition among medieval thinkers who conceived of a relation of reason as relying on the intellect inferring relations. That is to say, a relation of reason would not exist if the intellect did not establish it. If the powers of the soul were relations of reason, this would thus imply that the intellect at some point acknowledged them as such. If spelled out, a more detailed counter-argument that Ockham likely had in mind would proceed as follows: 1) if the powers of the soul were indeed the

[21] Ockham, *Reportatio* II, q. 20 (OTh V: 432, 10-15): "Si in anima esset talis respectus, aut est respectus realis aut rationis. Non rationis, quia ille est per actum intellectus comparantis. Sed ante omnem actum intellectus sunt potentiae in essentia animae perfecte. Nec est respectus realis, quia nunquam est respectus realis sine termino realiter exsistente, secundum eum etiam. Sed potentiae animae possunt esse perfectae et nullum obiectum [esse], quia Deus potest facere animam intellectivam non faciendo aliquod obiectum in mundo. Et tunc erunt potentiae animae perfectae, et tamen nullus terminus in actu, quia nullum obiectum, igitur etc." The English is taken from a recent translation of a selection of Ockham's works by Eric W. Hagedorn, *William of Ockham, Questions on Virtue, Goodness, and the Will* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 11.

[22] On Ockham's view on relations in general see Mark G. Henninger S.J., *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 119-150, and Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, vol. 1 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 215-277.

powers of the soul they are only if they were relations of reason; 2) they could not have been the powers they are before the intellect established the relation; 3) but at least the intellect was exactly the power it is even before the relation was established, since 4) the relation of reason allegedly obtaining in the powers of the soul is itself an act of intellect. Ockham thus concludes that the view equating the powers of the soul with relations of reason begs the question. For him, the powers of the soul cannot be relations of reason.

But neither does Ockham allow for the powers of the soul to be real relations. In medieval philosophy, real relations are those that obtain between two really existing relata, regardless of our intellect acknowledging this or not. For example, any human being is identical to herself, and the intellect does nothing to bring about this identity. Or else, Peter and Paul are really related as brothers since if there was no Paul, Peter would not be a twin– there would be no relation of brotherhood obtaining. Ockham disagrees with the view that the powers of the soul would be such real relations. To demonstrate his point, he provides us with a counterfactual scenario of an intellective soul as the only inhabitant in a world where nothing else has yet been created. Even in such a soul, with no relata around, claims Ockham, the powers of the soul would exist completely (*perfecte*). There would be no thing that the powers of the soul could get related to, no object upon which they can act, and yet, claims Ockham, the powers of the soul would exist completely.

When parsed in full, Ockham's argument against Henry can be outlined as follows: 1) every real relation needs a relatum to really exist, 2) powers of the soul can exist without a real relatum, 3) powers of the soul are not real relations. What Ockham is employing is a *reductio ad absurdum* argument designed to make us realize how untenable it is to hold that powers of the soul are relations.[23] As Ockham claims, if the powers of the soul were relations, the soul would be powerless in circumstances where there is no terminus they could be related to. In his view, even if there were no external circumstances triggering the powers of the soul to spring forth into act, the human soul would still be perfectly capable of exercising those acts. In other words, in Ockham's view, a relation cannot be regarded as the integral part of what a power is. For those powers themselves form too essential a part of the essence of the soul to be at a danger of non-existence qua powers in the absence of any relata. If, as Henry claims, having a power means having a relation to act, then when there is no possibility for a relation to obtain, there is no power. But to endorse that view, Ockham avers, is nonsensical: powers of the soul cannot just cease to exist qua powers in the absence of any relata. It is the respective objects of the powers of the soul that rely on those powers and not vice versa.

[23] See Heine Hansen, who in his chapter on relations in medieval philosophy spontaneously employs the same reasoning: "Of course, a human being can be the double of something, namely by standing toward that something in a certain way, but a human being in and of itself is not a relative. If God made everything else disappear, you could still be a human being, but you could not be double, for there would be nothing else for you to stand toward in that way" (Heine Hansen, "Relations", in *Routledge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, edited by R. Cross and J.T. Paasch [New York: Routledge, 2021], 97).

In some other places when Ockham is discussing the theory of relations in general, he speaks along the same lines, employing the example of fire: "I prove this [sc. that relation of heat is not a thing outside the fire], first, from the fact that a real relation of the sort in question does not have nothing as its terminus. But what is capable of being heated can be pure nothing with respect to which to which the heat is a thing capable of producing heat."[24] That is to say, for the ability to heat to exist, for Ockham, no real heatable object or really exercised act of heating is necessary. Fire just is an absolute thing with the essential ability to heat, regardless of whether some heatable objects really exists around the fire or not.[25]

The argument Ockham is levelling against Henry's account, however, is not as original as it may seem at first glance.[26] For even before Ockham, his important Franciscan predecessor, John Duns Scotus had argued against Henry's view in a similar way. What is more, his rebuke is even more extensive and technical.[27] To establish his point, Scotus refers to the distinction between the natural priority and natural posteriority with which he signifies the dependence of the posterior thing on the existence of the prior thing. In simplified terms, Scotus' main objection to Henry is that something that is naturally prior

[24] Ockham, *Quodl*., 6.13: "Quod probo primo, quia talis relatio realis non est ad nihil sicut ad terminum; sed calefactibile potest esse purum nihil, respectu cuius est calor calefactivus" in Opera Theologica IX, edited by Joseph C. Way (St. Bonaventure N.Y.: St Bonaventure University, 1980), 633, 11-13. The English translation above is by Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), 533.

[25] See Ockham on the intellect and its ability to acquire knowledge: "According to everyone, if a relation is real, then its extremes must actually exist. But as long as the quality that is called knowledge remains in the soul, then regardless of whether or not the knowable objects exist, the quality will be called knowledge all the same – especially if it is knowledge properly speaking, which is of necessary [truths]" (Ockham, *Quodl*., 6.14, English translation as in the previous footnote, 535).

[26] It should be noted, however, that Ockham engages with Henry's theory on relations widely construed also in some other loci. In *Quodl*. 4.32 he refers to Divine omnipotence discussing the same possibility of God sustaining a cause without there ever being an effect; see also *Quodl*. 6.8. Further, in *Ordinatio* 1.7.1, Ockham writes about the sun and its relation to the world; while he discusses the relation the prime matter allegedly has with a form (Henry of Ghent, *Quodl*., 3.14.14-18) immediately after using the flying soul in *Reportatio* II, q. 20.

[27] John Duns Scotus' discussion is to be found in his *Quaestiones super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* 9.5.8-10; 9.5.15, edited by R. Andrews *et al.* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute Press, 1997), translated by Girard J. Etzkorn and Allan B. Wolter, in *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by John Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute Press, 1998). See the fundamental article on Scotus' view on relations by Richard Cross, "Accidents, Substantial Forms, and Causal Powers in the Late Thirteenth Century: Some Reflections on the Axiom *actiones sunt supositorum*", in *Compléments de substance: Études sur les propriétés accidentelles offertes à Alain de Libera*, edited by C. Erismann and A. Schniewind (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 133-146. For a shorter analysis focused on the powers of the soul see Paasch's chapter on the "Powers", in *Routledge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, 114-118. On Scotus' view on relations more generally see van den J. H. L. Bercken, "John Duns Scotus in Two Minds About the Powers of the Soul", *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 82/2 (2015): 199-240.

cannot be dependent upon something that is naturally posterior. Therefore, the power, which is naturally prior to the effect it causes by its action, cannot be essentially dependent on that very effect. For in Scotus' view, Henry is endorsing precisely the view that relations are essentially constitutive of powers. If one were to embrace Henry's view, claims Scotus, the (prior) essence of the power would depend on the (posterior) effect the power brings about. Scotus sees such contention as a plain contradiction, saying:

> But the intrinsic [or essential] relation of an active power must be prior by nature to what is principiated. Consequently, no such constitutive relationship whatsoever can be found for an active power.[28]

For Scotus, the powers of the soul as conceived by Henry stand on a metaphysical ground that is upside-down. If we borrow Henry's example of fire and heat and ask why fire has the power to heat, the correct answer – for Scotus – would be that the fire is essentially powerful and not because the power is related to the heatable objects. In other words, if fire did not have the power it has even before some heatable objects were around, it could not have started to heat the heatable objects around it in the first place. The heatable objects themselves do not contribute, much less constitute the power of the fire. As Paasch fittingly puts it: for Scotus relations show up "too late on the metaphysical scene" to do any essential constituting of the power.[29]

Having examined Scotus' main counterargument against Henry of Ghent, it is easy to tell where Ockham probably took his cue from. For both Scotus and Ockham, the main error of Henry's account was that it established too tight a link between the essence of a power and a relation, i.e., the thing a power is a power-for. If such a claim would be right – as Scotus' radicalized account in Ockham's counterfactual example shows – the essence of the intellective soul free-floating in a world before creation would be powerless. But to hold that an intellective soul can ever be powerless, i.e., having no intellect and no will, is unsustainable. For both Ockham and Scotus, powers are at all times essential parts of the soul, regardless of their respective acts.

In Defence of Henry

Both Scotus and Ockham offer a solid objection to Henry's theory of the powers of the soul. Contra Henry, they claim that powers of the soul are first and foremost essentially in the soul being exactly the powers they are, with actions they are powers-for contributing nothing to their essential definitions. It is not the actions they are powers-for that make them the powers they are. Rather, the powers act in this or that way precisely *because* of the powers they are in the first place. In other words, Scotus and Ockham think Henry was wrong in endorsing the view that the relations have anything to do with the essential nature of a power. If they did, the flying soul in Ockham's thought

[28] John Duns Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, 9.5, n. 10 (tr. Etzkorn and Wolter), 505-506.
[29] Paasch, "Powers", 117.

experiment would end up being powerless.

The above arguments notwithstanding, we cannot exclude a defence of Henry's view against Ockham's thought experiment of a flying soul. For in the case of a lonesome soul, the sole inhabitant of the pre-created world, one could legitimately start questioning the need to posit any sort of powers whatsoever.[30] For even if those powers would nevertheless be fully present in the soul, they would also be positively irrelevant – the flying soul having the powers or not having them would not make a difference since the powers could never get exercised anyhow. More generally, if a power was never exercised, would we still speak of it as a power at all? Is a power that is never activated in an everlasting potency still a power? If Ockham claims that powers do not need to ever exercise the actions to which they are related in order to be exactly the powers they are, one could object by saying what kind of a power at all would a power be which never exercised the act to which it is related.

That is to say, in reality we always live in a world *after* creation, surrounded by objects that trigger our powers to elicit acts. Even though one can contemplate what would happen with the powers in a free-floating soul in a vacuum, the plain truth is this: any power of the soul a human being has in their life is a power-for-something. Henry could thus still object to Ockham's counterargument: if a power was not a power-for-something, be it exercised or not, we probably would not speak of it as a power at all. Thus, the relation a power has with its own action may still be seen as an essential part of what a power is.

One other point needs to be made, namely, that Ockham, as well as Scotus before him, might both have underestimated Henry's account, which is in fact more nuanced than it appears to be when read through Ockham and Scotus' eyes. To understand what Henry had in mind when maintaining that the powers of the soul are relational in nature, his account needs to be read against the backdrop of his view on relations in general. As Henninger shows in a fundamental study on Henry's theory on relations, Henry makes an intentional distinction between the basic thing, i.e., the foundation, and the relation, which is founded upon that foundation.[31] Even though Henry holds that the relation and foundation are the same, he still sees them as intentionally distinct. Namely, they are distinct in so far as a relation, in Henry's view, in fact amounts to *a mode of being* of some

[30] Paasch already hinted in that direction in "Powers", 119.

[31] Henninger, *Relations: Medieval Theories*, 40-59. On Henry's intentional distinction see also Raymond Macken, "Les diverses applications de la distinction intentionnelle chez Henri de Gand", in *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13.2), edited by W. Kluxen (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 1981), 769-776. Following up on Henninger's study is an article arguing for the indispensable need of reading Henry's theory on relation within the Trinitarian context by Jos Decorte, "*Relatio* as *Modus Essendi*: The Origins of Henry of Ghent's Definition of Relation", *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10/3 (2002): 309-336; Scot M. Williams argues that Decorte, in turn, misinterpreted Henry's theology in "Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity: The Case for Numerical Sameness Without Identity", *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 79/1 (2012): 109-148.

foundation. That is, for Henry, a relation is a mode of *being-toward-another* that can get, as it were, switched on when needed and goes to a sleeping mode when there is no "another" around that the foundation can be "directed-towards."[32]

In simpler terms, if we have two white chairs, there is a relation of similarity somehow obtaining between those two chairs being both white. In Henry's view, a relation of similarity is nothing that is going on only in someone's mind, i.e., is not a relation of reason. Nor is this relation of similarity a real thing in the sense of being an additional accident that inheres in both chairs alongside the accident of whiteness. As Henry sees it, the relation of similarity is a mode that the same "whiteness" in both chairs enters into. That is to say, one and the same whiteness now has two aspects: firstly, it exists by inhering in the chair and secondly, it exists as looking-toward-the-other-chair. This same whiteness is thus, for Henry, simultaneously and overlappingly an accident inhering in the chair and a relation towards another chair.

The powers of the soul operate in like fashion. They are the same as the essence of the soul, while that very essence can also have a "respect to diverse actions and diverse objects /.../ which adds nothing beyond its essence (sc. that of the soul) except a respect to acts."[33] As Henry further claims, even "without any help from anything else, the soul has in its essence the character (*ratio*) of the power by which it springs forth into action."[34] Elsewhere in the same text, Henry will also write about powers residing in the essence of the soul as a "root."[35] Thus, the basis of what a power of the soul can do is, for Henry, always already a part of the basic essence of the soul. What the external stimuli condition that triggers the powers to elicit an act does is only to individuate the powers, i.e., make them be specific powers directed towards a specific object. Properly understanding Henry's metaphysics of power can therefore reduce the strength of Ockham's counterargument considerably. Henry could counter Ockham's flying soul thought experiment simply by underscoring the point that he himself never claimed that the very existence of the powers qua powers is in any way determined by the actions the power is a power-for. The only thing that an action itself determines is the very specific character of a power of the soul.[36] Powers could never get exercised as specific powers since there

[32] In Henry's own words (Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, IX, q. 3): "Because of this we often said elsewhere that a relation 'contracts' its reality from its foundation, and of itself is only a bare condition that is only a certain mode holding a thing toward another, and so not a thing in so far as it is of itself, but only a mode of a thing" ("Propter quod saepius alibi diximus quod relation realitatem suam contrahit a suo fundamento, et quod ex se non est nisi habitudo nuda, quae non est nisi modus quidam rem habendi ad aliud, et ita non res quantum est ex se, sed solummodo modus rei"). The Latin text and its English translation are taken from Henninger, *Relations: Medieval Theories*, 53.
[33] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.22.
[34] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.35.
[35] See Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.22; 39; 75; and 84.
[36] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.67: "For a power is said to be what it is from its relation to act, and it takes its species from its objects. But from the nature of its absolute substance insofar as it is a substance, the soul does not determine for itself an act ... and for that reason it also does not

would be no object around which would call for their specific action.

Henry even deals with an example similar to Ockham's flying soul: that of abstracted heat.[37] He points out that if the heat as the power of fire was separated from the latter, even this abstracted bit of pure heat could not heat in the absence of a heatable object. For Henry, such a heat would only be hot in potency.[38] Within the same discussion concerning abstracted heat, Henry distinguishes between the potential agent (*in potentia agens*) and an agent in act (*agens in actu*).[39] For him, the heat always has a power to heat potentially, whereas for this heat to actually heat and therewith become an agent in act is possible only insofar as something heatable is present.

Henry's view that the powers of the soul are nothing but relations to act is thus more nuanced than either Scotus or Ockham allow. For even though the relational aspect is of paramount importance in Henry's definition of a power, the power for him remains exactly the power it is even if there is no relatum around. Therefore, a flying soul in a pre-created world would still have the same powers of the soul. With this difference, however, that Henry would claim those powers could not become relations – could not enter into a mode of *being-towards-another* since there would be no *another* around. They would always remain an unspecified potential power. To claim anything else, would, from Henry's perspective, hardly make any sense.

The Flying Soul

Above I attempted to outline Ockham's counterargument against Henry and the possibility of Henry facing the objections. In this last section, however, I would like to put forth a more unconventional reading of Ockham's thought experiment of the flying soul. Namely, his thought experiment (advertently or not) provides ground for the question of what exactly would the powers of such a flying soul actually amount to. For if one took Ockham to be saying that the powers in the free-floating soul would not only perfectly exist qua powers (Ockham's phrasing is *potentiae animae possunt esse perfectae*), but also have the possibility to be "perfected", i.e., actualized, we could wonder what this actualization would amount to. Could the powers of the intellectual soul, e.g., the intellect and the will, be exercised even if there was no external world around, i.e., there was

determine the character of the power. It is therefore required that, in order to determine a power in it, [the substance of the soul] be determined by something [else] in order that it may determinately have a respect to a determinate act and through this the character of a power." ("Potentia enim id quod est dicitur ex relatione ad actum, quae ex obiectis sumit species: anima autem ex natura substantiae suae absolutae, ut substantia est, non determinat sibi actum ... quare neque rationem potentiae. Oportet igitur ad determinationem potentiae in ea eam aliquo determinari, ut determinate ad actum determinatum habeat respectum, et per hoc rationem potentiae").

[37] See the first chapter of this paper.

[38] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.13.

[39] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.*, 3.14.20.

nothing for the powers of the soul to act on. That is to say, would even a flying soul in a void-like world think and will? What would the flying soul think about if there was nothing in the world but itself? Would it really still think? Would it know that it thinks?

Even though such an interpretation of Ockham's rejection of Henry as I have just suggested most likely amounts to reading into Ockham, it can still be seen as worth mentioning. I would humbly note that it merits a comment for two reasons. Firstly, it may be seen as an indirect echo of the most famous thought experiment evoking the same sort of questions, i.e., Avicenna's flying man argument. Secondly, since it could bear a link – however slight – with some hotly debated issue among contemporary Ockham scholars.

First, Avicenna's flying man argument. To date, not many scholars have brought their attention to the *Nachleben* of Avicenna's flying man argument in the Latin West of the Middle Ages. The first to provide a list of the names was Étienne Gilson,[40] who mentions: Dominicus Gundissalinus (d. c.1190-1993), William of Auvergne (d. 1249), John of la Rochelle (d. 1245), Matthew of Aquasparta (c.1240-1302), and Vital du Four (1260-1327). Later, Dag Nikolaus Hasse[41] adds Peter of Spain (fl. c.1240) and the anonymous author of *Dubitationes circa animam*, while Juhana Toivanen proposes to upgrade the list with the name of Peter of John Olivi (c.1248-98).[42]

While Ockham's flying soul is evidently not employed for the same purposes nor does it have the same structure as Avicenna's flying man argument, it can still be seen as fitting into the wider story of the reception of Avicenna's argument. To be more precise, Ockham's flying soul resembles an argument Peter of Olivi uses when discussing his theory of perception. Even though the structure of the argument is similar, Olivi's flying man is not in fact "a flying man". Rather, Olivi invites us to imagine a "man before creation", introducing the argument within the framework of his theory of perception.[43]

[40] Étienne Gilson, "Les sources gre´co-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 4 (1929): 40-42.

[41] Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna's* De anima *in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), 80-92 and 236.

[42] Juhana Toivanen, "The Fate of the Flying Man: Medieval Reception of Avicenna's Thought Experiment", *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy* 3 (2015): 64-98. Note that the first to address Avicenna's flying man argument in the Latin West were certainly the translators of Avicenna's *De anima* themselves, Domenicus Gundissalinus and Avendouth, that prepared the possibly direct primary source for all the subsequent authors who made use of this argument. On their role and context of their translatory activity see Nicola Polloni, *The Twelfth-Century Renewal of Latin Metaphysics: Gundissalinus's Ontology of Matter and Form* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2020).

[43] Peter John of Olivi, *Summa II = Quaestiones in secundum librum sententiarum*, edited by B. Jansen (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 4-6) (Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922-1926), q. 73, 68-9: "For example, given that only a man whose eyes are open would have been created before the creation of everything else, and he would strive with all effort to tend to see by his eyes as if there were external visible things: it is clear that in that case his *aspectus* would not be terminated at or determinately carried to any external object. If, after a while, all the external things (which exist now) were created, the first *aspectus* of the eyes would be thereby fixed at external objects." ("Ut verbi gratia, detur quod solus homo apertis oculis esset ante omnia

Olivi deploys the argument to underpin his active theory on perception: he wants to show that even a man before creation would try to actively sense the world around him even though there would be no world around him. Olivi and Ockham thus both invite us to imagine a pre-created world with only a single inhabitant. Moreover, they both conclude that the powers of the soul would nevertheless retain their essential nature, even if there was no object whatsoever that surrounded the lonely resident of the void-like world. Following a fundamental article of Juhana Toivanen, where he proposed to count Peter of Olivi among the authors remotely echoing Avicenna's flying man in the Latin West, I propose to add a further echo: William of Ockham possibly taking his cue from Peter of Olivi.

Secondly, Ockham's flying soul could also bear some potential implications for Ockham's theory on cognition in general. In Ockham scholarship, his theory on intuitive cognition and self-awareness has been a subject of an extensive debate. The scholars tackling this issue are divided into the supporters and the opponents of Ockham's theory of cognition being externalistic.[44] According to the externalist reading, the mental content of someone's intuitive cognition in Ockham is, at least in part, essentially determined by the sensible external object. The opponents of externalism rebuke such a reading, appealing to the fact that Ockham famously allows for an intuitive cognition of a non-existent thing to occur. God could, Ockham claims, create an intuitive cognition of a thing in us even though this thing was not in our near proximity and we could not have cognized it. Even more, God could even create in us an intuitive cognition of a thing that doesn't exist at all. On a non-externalist reading of Ockham, those two examples are the strongest weapons with which to counter the externalists' claims.

Humbly adding to this debate, I would suggest that if the effect or side-effect Ockham wanted his flying soul argument to have truly might be the contention that even in a void-like world we could exercise full mental activities, this would be an additional argument showing that Ockham is not as much of an externalist as he seems to be. For his flying

creatus et sic toto conatu niteretur per oculos intendere ad videndum acsi essent visibilia extra: constat quod tunc aspectus eius non terminaretur nec determinate ferretur in aliquod extrinsecum obiectum, et si paulo post omnia exteriora sicut nunc sunt crearentur, eo ipso primus aspectus oculis determinaretur ad obiecta exteriora. Ero tunc primus aspectus esset immediata causa secundi, quamvis primus motor esset imperium voluntatis vel alius motor per naturalem colligantiam causans et conservans primum") English translation is from Toivanen, "The Fate of the Flying Man", 88.

[44] On the externalists' camp, some of the most notable contributions were published by Peter King, Calvin Normore, Gyula Klima, and Claude Panaccio. Opposing the externalistic reading is Susan Brower-Toland, most recently in "Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham", *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 24/4 (2007): 317-335, whereas Philip Choi attempted to carve out a middle path and argued in favour of "Ockham's Weak Externalism", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 24/6 (2016): 1075-1096. Sonja Schierbaum, furthermore, has already established some link between Ockham's theory on cognition and his theory on the powers of the soul: Sonja Schierbaum, "Ockham on Awareness of One's Acts: A Way Out of the Circle", *Society and Politics* 12/2 (2018): 8-27.

soul argument levelled against Henry of Ghent might allow for the possibility of fully active thinking and willing going on in the soul surrounded by the external nothingness.

Conclusion

This paper attempted to show Henry of Ghent's answer and Ockham's rejection of Henry's answer to the question how to define a power of the soul. Henry claims that powers are relations to acts and thus defined with respect to the actions they are powers-for. Ockham disagrees with this contention. In his view, if a power was nothing more and nothing less than a relation to act, then where there would be no objects around on which a power could act, the power qua power would cease to exist. Or as Ockham phrases it, if Henry was right, a soul God created before he created anything else would be powerless. That is to say, in Ockham's view Henry's account on the powers of the soul ends up being untenable. Or so Ockham's thought experiment at least sought to show.

In light of Ockham's critiques, I argued that Henry could still defend his own view. For one, his theory of relations is far more nuanced than Ockham makes it seem. As outlined above, Henry never held that the powers of the soul are real relations that cannot exist in the absence of relata. Secondly, moreover, even if we were to concede to Ockham's view that the powers of the soul before creation would perfectly well exist qua powers, the question remains: would such powers be powers at all? To return to the opening lines of this paper: even if the flying soul could had the ability to love, what would this love be? If it could not be directed to someone and something, would it still be love? How should we define a power if we do not have the slightest idea what this power is a power-for? In light of these considerations, it seems that there is no way around admitting that a relation plays an important and constitutive part of what a power is, at least to a certain degree. In other words, love is always love for someone or something, or else we would have a hard time saying it is love at all.

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THE LATE MEDIEVAL DEBATE ABOUT THE NATURE OF PHENOMENAL REALITY IN FRANCISCAN THEOLOGY AND ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND ITS GREEK SOURCES

EL DEBATE TARDOMEDIEVAL SOBRE LA NATURALEZA DE LA REALIDAD FENOMENAL EN LA TEOLOGÍA FRANCISCANA Y EL PENSAMIENTO ISLÁMICO Y SUS FUENTES GRIEGAS

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Abstract

The tendency to question the accuracy of sensory perception is found in various medieval theological traditions, including Franciscan and Islamic. In both these traditions, the source of the idea that we cannot trust our sensory perception seems to have been the Greek commentaries on Aristotle. However, both traditions go beyond ideas contained in Greek Aristotelian literature and independently develop similar arguments and come to similar conclusions about the reliability of sensory perception.

Keywords

Medieval; Franciscan; Islamic; Sensory Perception; Reality

Resumen

Encontramos la tendencia a cuestionar la precisión de la percepción sensorial en diversas tradiciones teológicas medievales, incluyendo la franciscana y la islámica. En ambas tradiciones, parece que los comentarios griegos a la obra aristotélica están en el origen de la idea de que no podemos confiar en nuestra percepción sensorial. Sin embargo, ambas tradiciones van más allá de las ideas contenidas en la literatura aristotélica griega y desarrollan de manera independiente argumentos similares y llegan a conclusiones similares sobre la fiabilidad de la percepción sensorial.

Palabras clave

Medieval; franciscano; islámico; percepción sensorial; realidad

1. Introduction

The field of neuroscience recently revealed the stunning fact that the "brain generates its own reality, even before it receives information coming in from the eyes and the other senses".[1] This process is called building an "internal model"[2] or making "predictions, or 'best guesses', about the causes of sensory signals".[3] What results is a "kind of waking dream – a controlled hallucination – that is both more than and less than whatever the real world really is"[4] or a "top-down, inside-out neuronal fantasy that is reined in by reality, not a transparent window onto whatever that reality may be".[5] This "neuronal fantasy" or a "hallucination" that consists of "perceptual best guesses" that are controlled in a waking state by sensory input is so pervasive that according to Seth "you could even say that we're all hallucinating all the time. It's just that when we agree about our hallucinations, that's what we call reality".[6] The process of building this "waking dream" blurs the boundaries between "abnormal" hallucination and "normal" perception as "both share a core set of mechanisms in the brain. The difference is that in 'normal' perception, what we perceive is tied to – *controlled by* – causes in the world, whereas in the case of hallucination, our perceptions have, to some extent, lost their grip on the causes".[7] Thus "what we call 'hallucination' is what happens when perceptual priors are unusually strong, overwhelming the sensory data so that the brain's grip on their causes in the world starts to slide"[8] and "hallucination can be thought of as uncontrolled perception".[9] Neuroscientists such as Eagleman[10] use a number of examples such as visual illusions, hallucinations, and dreams to support the discovery that our brain creates a phenomenal picture of "external reality" in our mind that, first, can persist quite independently of sensory input and, second, can be generated in more or less the same way no matter whether the source of interpreted signals is external or internal.

Although seemingly novel, this article will demonstrate that these recent findings in neuroscience merely affirm what has been argued by theologians and philosophers in certain traditions for thousands of years. The exact nature of what we refer to as external reality was called into question perhaps earliest of all in the Hindu and Buddhist traditions, for different theological and philosophical reasons. Both Hindu and Buddhist theologians and philosophers doubted the reliability of sensory perception and presented

[1] David Eagleman, *The Brain: The Story of You* (New York: Vintage Books, 2017), 56.
[2] Eagleman, *The Brain*, 56-57.
[3] Anil Seth, *Being You. A New Science of Consciousness* (New York, N.Y.: Dutton, 2021), 84.
[4] Seth, *Being You*, 79.
[5] Seth, *Being You*, 88.
[6] Seth, *Being You*, 92.
[7] Seth, *Being You*, 89.
[8] Seth, *Being You*, 128.
[9] Seth, *Being You*, 89.
[10] Eagleman, *The Brain*, 56-57.

what we call external reality as an illusion. In support of this belief, they relied on a number of common examples, such as visual illusions, dreams, hallucinations, sensory perception affected by diseased organs and so forth.[11] In the Mediterranean tradition the same train of thought was picked up most vocally by the Greek Sceptics, for yet another set of philosophical reasons.[12] Both Pyrrhonian and Academic Scepticism thrived in both Greek and Latin Mediterranean traditions until the official acceptance of Christianity in the Roman Empire. These forms of Scepticism even made it into some early Christian writers such as Augustine as part of the polemic against pagan authors, and they relied all along on examples of perceptual experiences that signal the lack of reliability of sensory perceptual processes.

This skeptical train of thought as well as the debates around it all but disappeared from the Western European intellectual tradition after the demise of the pagan Western Roman empire. However, as scholastic theological debates in Western Europe in the 1300s became much more advanced, the reliability of sensory perception was questioned once again in the context of the debate about just how much of reality can be known by the human mind, which preceded the discussion whether the human mind can know God in commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Notably Franciscan theologians were at the forefront of the reinvented debate about the reliability of the sensory perception of external reality. Medieval Franciscan theologians do not inherit the debate from the Greek or ancient Latin sources directly (with one exception) but from the Islamic tradition (both Arabic and Persian). It is also most interesting that similar debates develop in the medieval Islamic tradition in parallel to Franciscan scholastic debates and unbeknownst to Franciscan theologians. In constructing their arguments both Franciscan theologians and their late medieval Islamic counterparts rely on examples of visual illusions, dreams, and hallucinations.

The current study will begin by looking at the late medieval Franciscan debates about the reliability of sensory perception. It will continue by analyzing the common sources – both Greek and early Islamic – of debates about the nature of phenomenal reality[13] and

[11] About the discussion of phenomenal reality and reliability of sensory perception in Buddhism see Louis de la Vallée Poussin, "Documents d'abhidharma: la controverse du temps", *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 5 (1936-1937): 1-158, at 27-47 and Collett Cox, "On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarvāstivādin and Dārṣṭāntika Theories", *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 11/1 (1988): 31-87. References to the same discussion in the Nyāya tradition in Hinduism can be found in Cox, "On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object", 69, n. 1.

[12] There is a good chance that Pyrrho could have absorbed the main idea and some of the arguments from either Buddhist or Hindu ascetics on his documented trip to Northern India as part of the retinue of Alexander Macedo, although this is a topic for another study. See Christopher I. Beckwith, *Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2015) and Richard Stoneman, *The Greek Experience of India: from Alexander to the Indo-Greeks* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2019), 346-357.

[13] The term "phenomenal reality" (from the Greek φαίνομαι, to appear) here is used in the sense in which it is used in 20th-century phenomenology: to denote the apparent picture of reality that

the reliability of sensory perception for both late medieval Franciscan theologians and late medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers by tracing the examples that both groups use to substantiate their claims or counterclaims about the reliability of sensory perception of "external reality". It will end by examining developments in the later medieval Islamic version of the debate that parallel discussions in Franciscan circles in the 1300s, again by discussing contexts of examples of sensory experiences that seem to undermine its reliability in the work of two prominent medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. It is important for the history of ideas to show that what neuroscience recently discovered about the nature of phenomenal reality and the reliability of sensory perception was suggested a long time ago without the benefit of present-day science but based purely on observations of perceptual experiences. So, the study will conclude by outlining common threads in the understanding of the nature of sensory perception in these historical traditions and modern neuroscience. Ultimately, the study will defend the claim that once one begins debating the nature of the phenomenal picture of reality that we experience, no matter what one's official "dogmatic" stance is on this matter, inevitably it becomes clear that our phenomenal experience can be created and persist independently from the senses and whatever we call "external reality". Specifically, the view that our sensory system somehow communicates "true" or "objective" information about the "world out there" (direct perceptual realism)[14] is severely undermined.

2. The Debate Around Phenomenal Reality in Franciscan Circles in the 1300s

The debate among Western theologians, and specifically in Franciscan circles, is well documented.[15] The crux of it consists in what could be called, using present-day philosophical terminology, an analysis of the nature of our phenomenal experience of external "reality", including its sensory perception, such as the visual experiences of color or shape. Naturally, visual illusions present a particularly suitable opportunity for analyzing the status of the phenomenal picture in the human mind. Just as ancient and

is created in our mental awareness and that includes not only visual information but also sounds and other sensations. The term does not communicate anything about the veracity of this picture or its correspondence with things "out there".

[14] Direct perceptual realists claim that correct or "objective" information from external things somehow reaches our mind directly during the act of sensory perception.

[15] See Oleg Bychkov, "The Status of the Phenomenal Appearance of the Sensory in Fourteenth-century Franciscan Thought after Duns Scotus (Peter Aureol to Adam of Wodeham)", *Franciscan Studies* 76 (2018): 267-285. Researchers specifically focus on the issues of scepticism, certitude of sensory cognition, intentionality, and the positions of externalism or internalism in medieval cognitive theories: See Katherine H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham* (Leiden: Brill, 1988); Henrik Lagerlund (ed.), *Rethinking the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Background* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010); Gyula Klima (ed.), *Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), specifically essays by Panaccio and Karger.

medieval discussions about the nature of reality resemble some recent revelations in neuroscience, so the medieval scholastic debate in Franciscan circles about reality and the reliability of sensory perception exhibits striking similarities with present-day philosophical debates about these issues.[16] Namely, participants in the Western medieval version of the debate fall roughly into the same categories as those in present-day debates. The majority, both then and now, consider sensory cognition to be a relation between the external thing and the sensory or cognitive faculty thus falling either into the direct perceptual realist camp or into the relationist camp to various degrees.[17] Franciscan theologians such as William of Ockham (d. 1347) in his later work, Walter Chatton (d. 1343), and Adam of Wodeham (d. 1358) fall into those two camps. The antirealist position that our entire phenomenal picture is a mental construct and does not have to correlate with "things out there" faces steep opposition in the Middle Ages, as it does in modern times and in the present. Scholars such as Peter Aureol (d. 1322) or the early Ockham, who either hold this position or appear to hold it, are forced to modify their stance in favor of direct realism, as in the case of Ockham, or something like relationism as in the case of Aureol. Ultimately, the sharpest and subtlest minds, such as Aureol and Wodeham, whatever their doctrinal stances, are forced to accommodate the undeniable dialectic of our experience of sensory perception, namely, that on the one hand our phenomenal picture is not exactly the same as external things, and yet on the other hand somehow it is, for it allows us good practical contact with them.[18]

Some questions raised by Peter Aureol, the most controversial of this group of Franciscans, exemplify the issues related to the status of the phenomenal picture of the world that were discussed in Franciscan circles in the 1300s. These questions include: What is the status of the phenomenal appearance of something when we have a case of sensation, the most prominent case being that of vision? Is the phenomenon "out there" or only in our mind, or in between? And is it generated by some object "out there" or by our mind? And is there a way to tell? In other words, are phenomenal appearances simulations generated by the mind, true reflections of something "out there", or a case of interaction between our mind and what is "out there"? The issue can also be recast in terms of the question of intentionality. What are these "stand-ins" for what we instinctively take to be "external objects": are they "things out there"? or are they something internal to our mind? or are they both? and how is this phenomenon of "standing in for something" to be thought? Aureol gives this mysterious entity of

[16] See Gary Hatfield, *Perception and Cognition. Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009); Mazviita Chirimuuta, *Outside Color. Perceptual Science and the Puzzle of Color in Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA and London, England: MIT Press, 2015).

[17] Relationists are those who view sensory experiences strictly as interactions – relations – between sensory objects and sensory faculties.

[18] The debate and its intricacies are documented in my article, Bychkov, "The Status of the Phenomenal Appearance", 267-285. Specifically, I attempt to demonstrate that although Aureol actually tries to adjust his model to something like a relationist point of view, ultimately his attempts are incoherent and his model remains antirealist, whatever his overt claims may be.

phenomenal appearance an array of names that later begin to be used by all other parties to the debate: "apparent being", "objective being", "intentional being", and so forth.

Fourteenth-century Franciscans also use a number of examples that cast doubt on the reliability of the sensory perception of "reality". Typical examples include visual and other sensory illusions when one perceives arguably something that is not there; hallucinations; and dreams that are also phenomenal experiences of something that seemingly does not exist. Such examples are used by all camps, either to prove that our perception of reality is unreliable and that there is no way to establish what is ultimately real, or, after refutations, to demonstrate that one can trust our sensory perception of reality and can establish what is real. Such examples are scarce in scholastic texts in the early 1300s but gradually accumulate to dozens and dozens towards mid-1400s, e.g., in the work of Bero Magni.[19] The aforementioned four Franciscan scholars who debated the reliability of sensory perception and the nature of phenomenal reality in the 1300s all used a number of such examples.

Aureol either is the clearest representative of the antirealist position, or his position was interpreted as such by his contemporaries.[20] He claims that when we are having a phenomenal experience, such as that of color, we are dealing with a special type of being ("apparent", "intentional", "conspicuous", and so forth), which can exist independently from external objects even under natural conditions. "The act of the intellect is terminated at a thing that is posited in formed, intentional, and apparent being". Using the example of seeing a rose, Aureol claims that the act of intuitive cognition "does not terminate at a rose that really exists, but at a formed, conspicuous, and apparent being".[21]

[19] Robert Andrews, *Bero Magni de Ludosia, Questions on the Soul. A Medieval Swedish Philosopher on Life* (Stockholm: Sällskapet Runica et Mediaevalia, Centre for Medieval Studies and Stockholm University, 2016), 134-227, specifically at 155, 325.

[20] Aureol's position has been thoroughly examined in multiple studies since the 1940s and is well known: see Philotheus Boehner, "*Notitia intuitiva* of Non Existents According to Peter Aureoli, O.F.M. (1322)", *Franciscan Studies* 8 (1948): 388-410; Katherine H. Tachau, "Peter Aureol on Intentions and the Intuitive Cognition of Non-existents", *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin* 44 (1983): 122-150; Dominik Perler, "Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality. A Text Edition with Introductory Remarks", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 61 (1994): 227-262; Dominik Perler, "What Am I Thinking About? John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol on Intentional Objects", *Vivarium* 32/1 (1994): 72-89; Dallas G. Denery II, "The Appearance of Reality: Peter Aureol and The Experience of Perceptual Error", *Franciscan Studies* 55 (1998): 27-52; Dominik Perler, "What Are Intentional Objects? A Controversy Among Early Scotists", in *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, edited by D. Perler (Leiden, Boston and Köln: Brill, 2001), 203-226; a chapter in Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, 85-112; most recently, Russell L. Friedman, "Act, Species, and Appearance: Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition and Consciousness", in *Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation*, edited by G. Klima (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 141-165. My article Bychkov, "The Status of the Phenomenal Appearance", 267-285 cited above shows in detail that the position that Aureol attempts to assume (whether successfully or not) is much more nuanced and can probably be characterized as "relationist"; see there.

[21] *Scriptum* 1, dist. 2, sectio/qu. 10, C, a. 4d; Peter Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, vol.

This simulated reality, for example, "the reality of vision, does not require a real presence of an existent [external] object" but can exist by itself. It is only the falsity or "truth of vision" that "requires" this real absence or presence, "because the truth of vision adds to the reality of vision a relation of conformity to a [real external] thing".[22] The "presential mode" in visual cognition is maintained whether the object of vision is present or absent.[23] For example, speaking of visual illusions and using the example of the dove's neck common in Cicero and Augustine,[24] Aureol claims that the "colors of the dove's neck or other [false] appearances do not actuate [the sense of] vision"[25] because strictly speaking they are not present in the real thing and cannot act on our vision, and yet they are generated within our phenomenal picture. Ultimately it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Aureol, as early as in the fourteenth century, comes close to portraying phenomenal experiences as simulations generated by the mind that can exist independently of external objects.

To prove his point, Peter Aureol uses the following examples: residual images that remain in our phenomenal field after we have seen a bright object while the object is no longer present;[26] phenomenal experiences of non-existent things produced by dreams[27] or emotions such as fear, i.e., hallucinations;[28] sensory experiences produced by defective sensory organs, such as bloodshot eyes that make objects appear red;[29] a false perception of movement of objects on the shore while on a moving boat; a circle produced in one's visual field by a rotating object, such as a torch, which is another case of a residual or trace image;[30] a stick appearing broken if semi-submerged in water; a doubling of a visual object if one applies pressure to one of the eyeballs; and the perception of different colors on a dove's neck depending on the angle of vision.[31]

2, edited by E.M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1956), 548, n. 91.

[22] Peter Aureol, *Scriptum* 1, Prooemium, sectio 2, C, resp., art. 3; Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, vol. 1, edited by E.M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1952), 200, n. 91; see 203, n. 100.

[23] Aureol, *Scriptum* 1, Prooemium, sectio 2, C, resp., art. 3; vol. 1, 204, n. 106; see Aureol, *Scriptum* 1, dist. 2, sectio/qu. 10, C, a. 4d; vol. 2, 548, n. 95.

[24] See Augustine, *Contra academicos* 2.12.27, and Cicero, *Academica* 2.7.19 and 2.25.79.

[25] Aureol, *Scriptum* 1, dist. 2, sectio/qu. 10, C, a. 4d; vol. 2, 549-550, n. 99.

[26] Aureol, *Scriptum* 1, Prooemium, sectio 2, C, resp. art. 3; vol. 1, 198-9, n. 82.

[27] Aureol, *Scriptum* 1, Prooemium, sectio 2, C, resp. art. 3; vol. 1, 199, n. 83; vol. 1, 202-3, n. 99.

[28] Aureol, *Scriptum* 1, Prooemium, sectio 2, C, resp. art. 3; vol. 1, 199, n. 84.

[29] Aureol, *Scriptum* 1, Prooemium, sectio 2, C, resp. art. 3; vol. 1, 199, n. 86.

[30] Aureol, *Scriptum* 1, dist. 3, q. 14, resp. art. 1; vol. 2, 696, n. 31.

[31] Aureol, *Scriptum* 1, dist. 3, q. 14, resp. art. 1; vol. 2, 697, n. 31. Robert Greystones is a stand-alone thinker who is not well known in the Middle Ages but makes a particularly strong case for scepticism. See Robert Andrews, Jennifer Ottman, and Mark G. Henninger (eds.), *Robert Greystones on Certainty and Skepticism. Selections from His Commentary on the* Sentences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). He uses some of the same examples as the Franciscan theologians discussed in this study, such as: the circle created by whirling a flaming torch (Prologue q. 1, n. 142, p. 70); Augustine's example of afterimages from *De Trin*. 11 (Prologue q. 1, n. 143, p. 70); the

Although William Ockham eventually becomes as rigorous an opponent of Aureol's "apparent being" as one can be, his earlier model of phenomenal experience as a certain *fictum* that exists in "objective being" was interpreted by his critics, notably Walter Chatton, as identical to that of Aureol.[32] Curiously, the power of Aureol's position was such that even Chatton, his most ardent critic, succumbs partially to this position by admitting that residual images can continue even naturally for a short period of time after the external thing is gone.[33] Even though he, as just about everybody else at that time, attempts to distance himself from Aureol's position by stating that afterimages cannot be *initiated* in the absence of external things, the bare fact of their brief *continuance* in the absence of an external thing cannot but lead to the same conclusion that they are independent simulations. In brief, Aureol pioneered a bold position that something is generated in the mind that is not necessarily a real-time reflection of external things. Although Aureol's position seems to have impacted several other Franciscans, an extreme position of this sort, such as that of Berkeley or Hume in modern times, made most scholars uncomfortable even then. So the predominant current of early fourteenth-century Franciscan thought ran against Aureol's model, or at least against what they thought his model was.

Although his earlier theory of *fictum* was reminiscent of Aureol's position, Ockham is perhaps the only true representative of direct perceptual realism among the four Franciscan theologians: a position sometimes referred to as "externalist".[34] Ockham rejects any intermediate between the external thing and the cognitive faculty. He rejects the sceptical position of the "ancients" – also shared by Aureol in his opinion – that "all things are as they appear".[35] A non-white thing appears to be white directly "by the apprehension or the act of the [cognitive] faculty without any intermediate" (such as "apparent being") only when the senses provide an occasion for deception and "a thing

stick in water that appears bent (Prologue q. 1, n. 192, p. 96); the afterimages that appear when we walk into a darkened room (Prologue q. 1, n. 146a, p. 72; *Quaestio disputata* 1, n. 45, p. 208); the apparent movement of trees on the shore to the sailor; the world seems to rotate after one has stopped spinning (*Quaestio disputata* 1, n. 48, p. 210).

[32] See Ockham, *Ord.* 1, d. 2, q. 8 (*OTh* 2, 268ff; 271-2), and Tachau, *Certitude*, 149. On Chatton's interpretation of this position see Tachau, *Certitude*, 202, with reference to Chatton, *Rep.* I, d. 3, q. 2. Ockham will be cited according to the edition: William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum* [etc.] *Sententiarum. Ordinatio*, Opera Theologica 1, 4, edited by G. Gál *et al.* (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1967, 1979), further abbreviated as *OTh* 1 and 4; Chatton will be cited according to the editions: Walter Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus*, edited by J.C. Wey (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1989); Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super Sententias, Liber I, distinctiones 1-9*, edited by J.C. Wey and G.J. Etzkorn (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002).

[33] Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura*, Prologue, q. 2, a. 2, 86-97.

[34] See Tachau, *Certitude*, 147, 151-152, 202, and Claude Panaccio, "Ockham's Externalism", in *Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation*, edited by G. Klima (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 166-185, at 180-181 and 183.

[35] Ockham, *Ord.* I, d. 27, q. 3 (*OTh* 4, 250).

is judged to be such as it is not"; when there is no deception, however, "a thing is judged [to be exactly] as it is".[36] Ockham's position is well documented. To be sure, he shares the general concession that God could cause a phenomenal picture of a thing without that thing being actually present.[37] However, to affirm the absolute infallibility of the senses under natural conditions seemed untenable even to such perceptual realists as Chatton.

Although Chatton avoids Ockham's radical trust in the reliability of sensory perception, his position also fits the direct perceptual realist model. Thus intuitive intellectual cognition is different from abstractive in that it is only sustained by the presence of the object.[38] Further, what Scotus and Aureol call *esse obiectivum* is not distinct from the act of perception or cognition itself: "intuitive act does not put the thing into some [mode of] being that is distinct from the act of vision and the thing itself that is seen."[39] The language of a thing "being" in the soul is improper or metaphorical speech.[40]

Direct perceptual realism can also be attributed to Adam Wodeham.[41] Wodeham's position certainly sounds like direct perceptual realism: "we receive evident and certain assent by which the intellect judges that this thing exists after some visible whiteness is shown [to us]."[42] Wodeham rallies against the position that vision can be caused in the absence of a really existing object.[43] The direct realist position is proven from experience. Wodeham argues that as whiteness will be seen even if one brackets all other "diminished being" except for the act of seeing, "it is superfluous to put there this sort of diminished being"; "we do not experience anything emanating as a medium between vision and a thing that is seen out there".[44] Trying to explain away the example of a circle that is perceived when a stick is rotated – which does not have real existence, therefore suggesting the mental simulation model – Wodeham points out that in order to have some "being" this circle must have its being independently from vision. However, "although

[36] Ockham, *Ord*. I, d. 27, q. 3 (*OTh* 4, 251).
[37] See Ockham, *Ord*. I, Prologue, q. 1.
[38] Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura*, Prologue, q. 2, a. 1, 81.150-155.
[39] Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura*, Prologue, q. 2, a. 2, 87.25-26.
[40] See Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura*, Prologue, q. 2, a. 2, 88.65-70, a position that Tachau (*Certitude*, 188) thinks is close to that of Radulphus Brito: "minus videtur inconveniens concedere quod ipsemet actus videndi sit esse obiectivum rei extra..."; Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura*, Prologue, q. 2, a. 2, 89.83-86: "ipsa cognitio potest dici aliquod esse obiecti per extrinsecam denominationem, quia est qua posita verum est dicere quod res est cognita; et hoc non est nisi cognitionem illam esse in anima..."
[41] Elizabeth Karger, "Adam Wodeham on the Intentionality of Cognitions", in *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, edited by D. Perler (Leiden, Boston and Köln: Brill, 2001), 287, views Wodeham as a "direct realist".
[42] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1,* Prologue, qu. 1; Adam de Wodeham, *Lectura secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum. Prologus et Distinctio prima*, *Distinctiones II-VII*, edited by R. Wood and G. Gál (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1990), 10.
[43] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, qu. 3, 71.
[44] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, qu. 4, 90.

the ocular vision itself is not the apparition itself, nevertheless this vision cannot be circumscribed, because this apparition is constituted out of it as of its part".[45]

Rejecting Aureol's "apparent being", Wodeham sides with Chatton in affirming that afterimages, one of Aureol's proofs of the existence of "apparent being", are not as clear and not quite the same as when the object is actually in the line of sight.[46] He attributes these afterimages to the impact of the sensory species. Thus reexamining the example of light passing through a stained glass window used by Ockham and Chatton, Wodeham observes, in a direct realist fashion, that "the fact that I see redness that is produced on the wall from the passing of the ray of the sun through red [stained] glass does not make me conclude that I see the glass but only that I see that redness".[47] In other words, our vision includes situational awareness, or the perception that there is no direct line of sight to an object, which saves us from the error of "seeing" the original object in the case of an afterimage. Our vision takes into consideration the position of the body vis-à-vis the object.[48] The answer to one of the questions Wodeham poses would exactly distinguish a direct perceptual realist model from any other: "Is any apparent or visual being caused by vision that is distinct from vision and the object of vision?"[49] Following Chatton, Wodeham explains authoritative statements about "things having being in the soul" in the sense that the "cognition itself [of the object] is called a certain 'being' of the object", which is, according to him as it was for Chatton, "metaphorical and improper speech".[50] Thus objects of sensory cognition do not have any other being of a different mode, against that which Aureol claims: there is only the object of perception and the faculty of perception. The apparition of the object is the process of perception itself.[51]

Overall, the difference between the positions of Ockham on the one hand, and those of Chatton and Wodeham on the other, is that the latter two are less extreme and more sensitive to actual sensory experience. Chatton and Wodeham do not accept absolute reliability of the senses; however, neither do they accept that our phenomenal picture is generated without any contact with external reality (this is their dogmatic position irrespective of actual human experiences of perception).

As part of the polemic against Aureol Ockham, Chatton, and Wodeham use some of the same examples as Aureol: residual images;[52] dream images;[53] delusions and

[45] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, qu. 4, 106.
[46] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*. Prologue, qu. 3, 75.
[47] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*. Prologue, qu. 3, 76.
[48] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, qu. 3, 78.
[49] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, qu. 4, 84.
[50] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, qu. 4, 89.
[51] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, qu. 4, 84, 88, 89, 96. See a direct realist position expressed in Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, dist. 1, q. 1, 186 in another debate against Ockham.
[52] Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura*, Prologue, q. 2, a. 2, 91.150-158, 92.175ff; Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, q. 3, par. 3, 68-69, 73, 75.
[53] Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura*, Prologue, q. 2, a. 2, 95.255-266, 96.282-285, 96.289-292; Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, q. 3, par. 3, 68-69, 73, 75, 80.

hallucinations in certain psychological states;[54] a false perception of movement of objects on the shore from a moving boat;[55] a false circle created in the air by a moving object;[56] a stick appearing broken in water;[57] varied colors perceived on a dove's neck;[58] diseased sensory organs causing sensory distortions;[59] visual illusions.[60]

But how does Ockham – as well as Chatton and Wodeham who follow him on that[61] – explain sensory illusions? They are errors of "judgment" in a higher sensory faculty.[62] However, the judgment these scholars have in mind is "judgment" in the sense in which Augustine uses the term in application to the senses. This concerns the immediate "judgment" (we would, perhaps, call it "response" or "reaction") that results, e.g., in a phenomenal picture of a circle when a rotating stick is present. So blaming everything on this sort of "judgment" and shifting the generation of sensory illusions from one sensory system to another seems to be simply an evasion. Technical arguments as to where exactly in the sensory system the circle is generated do not eliminate the factual reality: the result is the same, because experientially we have a true visual experience of a circle, and not a rational judgment about it (the rational judgment, in fact, tells us there is no circle). It is difficult to see, then, if one truly pays attention to our sensory experiences, how the extreme position that there is no intermediate being between the external thing and our visual experience can be maintained. First, if our phenomenal experience is nothing but mental simulation, intermediate reality is all we see. And even if one believes that there is external reality behind it, one's model still needs to include something in between that can account for the phenomenal picture that sometimes does not correspond to this external reality, although is mostly dependent on external reality.

Before we continue tracing the common examples in late medieval Franciscan theological debates that seem to suggest the lack of reliability of sensory perception, to sum up, examples of questionable phenomenal apparitions in the Franciscan debate in the 1300s fall into several major categories as regards to how they challenge our perceptual belief in external reality: sensory illusions, i.e., perceptual objects appearing as something else or differently while they are still there; persistence of perceptual

[54] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, q. 3, par. 3, 68-69, 73, 75, 80.
[55] Ockham, *Ord*. 1, d. 27, q. 3 (*OTh* 4, 245); Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura*, Prologue, q. 2, a. 2, 93.194-213, 94.224-236; Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, q. 4, par. 7, 97ff.
[56] Ockham, *Ord*. 1, d. 27, q. 3 (*OTh* 4, 246-247); Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura*, Prologue, q. 2, a. 2, 93.194-213, 94.224-236; Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, q. 4, par. 10, 103-104.
[57] Ockham, *Ord*. 1, d. 27, q. 3 (*OTh* 4, 247); Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura*, Prologue, q. 2, a. 2, 93.194-213, 94.224-236; Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, q. 4, par. 11, 106; and *Lectura secunda 1*, dist. 2, q. 1, 28.
[58] Ockham, *Ord*. 1, d. 27, q. 3 (*OTh* 4, 248); Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, q. 4, par. 11, 107.
[59] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, q. 3, par. 3, 68-69, 73, 75.
[60] Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, q. 3, par. 3, 82.
[61] E.g., Chatton in *Reportatio et Lectura*, Prologue, q. 2, a. 2, 93, and Wodeham in *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, q. 2, 48 and q. 3, 80ff.
[62] Ockham, *Ord*. 1, d. 27, q. 3 (*OTh* 4, 245); also *Ord.* 1, Prologue, qu. 1, art. 6 (*OTh* 1, 70).

objects in the waking state after the sensory input is over and the object is no longer there (which can be determined by other means); perception of objects in the waking state by one person that others do not perceive (hallucinations); and perception of objects in a state of sleep where there should be no sensory perception. The first type at least can be explained by some sort of perceptual distortions (even though from the point of view of present-day neuroscience some of them cannot as they are simply "false predictions"), so the most convincing types of examples that seem to prove that external "reality" is a mental construct are the last three, which will be the main focus for the remainder of this study.

3. The Greek and Islamic Sources of Medieval Debates About Phenomenal Reality

While the immediate sources of such examples in the West in the mid-1300s and 1400s can be traced to contemporary debates,[63] the initial origins of these examples are less clear. Medieval Western scholastics had no direct access to any Greek texts that contain Sceptical debates or examples of sensory perception that undermine our ability to know reality (not to mention Buddhist or Hindu texts). Nor do their texts exhibit any awareness of the two major Latin texts that contain such examples, namely Cicero's *Academica* and Augustine's *Contra Academicos*.[64] Both texts survived in some form throughout the Middle Ages but were not widely available or known.[65]

What first comes to mind as a potential source of examples of visual illusions and distortions for medieval authors, both Western Christian and Islamic, are treatises on optics by so-called perspectivists. These texts are of Greek origin and go back to Ptolemy (who draws on Euclid), whose *Optics* was translated into Arabic and later into Latin and available in both the West and the Islamic world. The more common and widely available text was *Optics* by al-Haytham, which draws heavily on Ptolemy and was also translated into Latin and widely available in the West. The most prominent perspectivist Roger Bacon in his *Perspectiva* draws on both Ptolemy and al-Haytham.[66] As will be shown below,

[63] The four aforementioned Franciscan scholars bounce them off each other, and Andrews traces many of Bero Magni's abundant examples to late medieval authors. No such examples are detectable in most early scholastics from the 1200s.

[64] Fourteenth-century Franciscans, instead, use Augustine's *De Trinitate*, which contains a very limited number of such examples, such as the one of residual images. Of course one could gain some awareness of the position of Academic Sceptics who doubted the reality of sensory objects, as well as of some of their examples (such as an oar appearing broken in water, false movement of objects on the shore, and the states of dreaming and insanity), from Augustine's *De Trinitate* 15.12.21, as did Ockham in *Ord.* 1, prol., q. 1, a. 1 (*OTh* 1, 43.11-13), but these are only brief references that lack any discussion.

[65] E.g., see L.D. Reynolds (ed.), *Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983). For more information, see bibliography to Oleg Bychkov, *A Propos of Medieval Aesthetics: A Historical Study of Terminology, Sources, and Textual Traditions of Commenting on Beauty in the Thirteenth Century* (PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1999).

[66] On Bacon and his relevance to the medieval Western debate about phenomenal reality see

later medieval Islamic authors also draw on al-Haytham in similar discussions. All three treatises – Ptolemy's *Optics*, Al-Haytham's *Optics*, and Bacon's *Perspectiva*[67] – describe the following optical illusions that partly coincide with those mentioned in the Franciscan debate about reality and partly with those that appear in the late medieval Islamic debates that are discussed later: a spinning top or a potter's wheel containing different colors appears to be of a homogenous color;[68] fast moving point-like objects such as shooting stars or a torch appear as lines or leave long traces;[69] faraway objects such as the moon or the stars appear to move against clouds or to travel along side us when we move;[70] residual images; colored objects skew perception of color in other objects;[71] transparent media take on colors of objects behind them or in them;[72] doubling of objects, naturally or if one squints;[73] stationary objects on the shore observed from a ship appear to be in motion.[74]

Ptolemy and al-Haytham share the example of stationary objects appearing as moving and vice versa.[75] Ptolemy's treatise adds the examples of objects that appear closer or farther than they are[76] and the effect of the "broken" oar in water.[77] Al-Haytham adds the following examples: the dimness of sight affects perception;[78] faraway objects appear smaller;[79] objects close to the eye appear larger;[80] several objects appear as one and one as several.[81] Two examples are shared by al-Haytham and Bacon: multicolored

Tachau, *Certitude*, 23.

[67] Albert Lejeune (ed.), *L'Optique de Claude Ptolémée dans la version latine d'après l'arabe de l'émir Eugène de Sicile* (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 2nd ed.; Al-Ḥasan Ibn Al-Haytham, *Kitāb Al-Manāẓir, Books I-II-III <On Direct Vision>*, edited by A. I. Sabra (Kuwait: The National Council for Culture, Arts and Letters, 1983); Roger Bacon, *Perspectiva*, edited by D. C. Lindberg (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

[68] Ptolemy, *Optics*, §96, 60-61; al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 7, n. 235, 511-512; Bacon, *Perspectiva*, Part. II, dist. 3, c. 1, 202.122-134.

[69] Ptolemy, *Optics*, §96, 60-61; al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 7, n. 222-225, 506-508; Bacon, *Perspectiva*, Part. II, dist. 3, c. 1, 200.98-108.

[70] Ptolemy, *Optics*, §99, 62-63; al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 4, n. 7, 388; ch. 7, n. 32-33, 430-431; Bacon, *Perspectiva*, Part. II, dist. 3, c. 6, 228.509-510, 230.521.

[71] Ptolemy, *Optics*, §107, 66; al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 6, n. 27, 409-410; Bacon, *Perspectiva*, Part I, dist. 5, c. 1, 60.20-30; Part. II, dist. 3, c. 1, 202.116-121; Part. II, dist. 3, c. 2, 206.174-178.

[72] Ptolemy, *Optics*, §109, 67-68; al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 6, n. 16, 404-405; Bacon, *Perspectiva*, Part I, dist. 6, c. 3, 84.212-215; Part. II, dist. 3, c. 1, 202.114-116.

[73] Ptolemy, *Optics*, §115ff, 71ff; al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 7, n. 258-259, 520-521; Bacon, *Perspectiva*, Part I, dist. 5, c. 2, 64.75-78; Part II, dist. 1, c. 3, 170.156-164; Part II, dist. 2, c. 3, 188.

[74] Ptolemy, *Optics*, §132, 79; al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 7, n. 81, 453; Bacon, *Perspectiva*, Part. II, dist. 3, c. 6, 232.563-566.

[75] Ptolemy, *Optics*, §98, 62; al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 7, n. 34, 432.

[76] Ptolemy, *Optics*, §115ff, 71ff.

[77] Ptolemy, *Optics*, §120, 72-73.

[78] Al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 6, n. 29, 410; ch. 7, n. 250, 517.

[79] Al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 7, n. 13, 419.

[80] Al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 7, n. 24, 426-427.

[81] Al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 7, n. 31, 430.

objects perceived as homogeneously colored or colors not being perceived as they are;[82] flat objects appear three-dimensional and three-dimensional objects appear flat.[83] Finally, Bacon adds the example of the dove's neck appearing to be of various colors.[84]

However, despite one's initial hunch, although Ptolemy and al-Haytham (and Bacon for the Western tradition) do provide some of the examples of visual illusions for both Franciscan[85] and Islamic debates about phenomenal reality, optical treatises contain no in-depth philosophical analysis of the implications of these illusions for our experience of phenomenal reality as this was not their primary purpose. Most of explanations of illusions there are very technical and have to do with the various conditions that impede and distort normal visual perception such as distance to the object, the angle of vision, visual obstructions, etc. Also, given their focus on optics and the geometry of vision, they do not engage dream perception or hallucinations and therefore exclude a number of examples that are crucial to the debate about reality. Therefore, optical treatises ultimately end up being of limited use as sources for the debate.

At the same time, the texts that the aforementioned Franciscan theologians do quote and refer to in the 1300s in the context of their debates about the reliability of sensory perception[86] belong to Islamic commentators of Aristotle, such as Ibn Rushd (Averroes), or Islamic philosophers who have been influenced by Aristotle, such as Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). Those texts were widely available and used in Latin translations beginning with the late 1100s and early 1200s. Naturally, examples related to sensory perception in the Peripatetic tradition mostly come from commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* or texts that have been influenced by the tradition of commenting on the *De anima*, as this is where sensory perception and lower cognitive faculties are discussed. However, Aristotle's *De anima* itself contains very few examples of this sort, as Aristotle did not seem to be interested in the debate as to whether our sensory powers deliver an accurate picture of reality. His main point is that the perception of primary qualities,[87] such as color, by individual senses is always accurate, but their interpretation by higher cognitive powers

[82] Al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 5, n. 1, 390; see Bacon, *Perspectiva*, Part. II, dist. 3, c. 1, 202.122-134.
[83] Al-Haytham, *Optics*, Bk. 3, ch. 7, n. 8 and 11, 415-416, 418; see Bacon, *Perspectiva*, Part. II, dist. 3, c. 3, 210.241-212.264.
[84] Bacon, *Perspectiva*, Part I, dist. 5, c. 1, 62.38-41.
[85] Even earlier Franciscan authors such as Scotus clearly knew optical treatises and used some of their examples, although rarely. Thus in *Rep*. II, dist. 13, q. un. (Oxford, Merton College 61, f. 172r-v) Scotus specifically mentions Al-Haytham, Euclid and perspectivists and uses the examples of a ray of light being colored while passing through stained glass, bright colors coloring other objects, etc. Out of the four Franciscans in question, Wodeham definitely uses examples that match closely those used in optical treatises, such as a white sail appearing as black at distance; one object appearing as two; large things appearing as small; a part of one object appearing as part of another; something at rest appearing as moving (Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, Prologue, q. 4, par. 12, 109), and trees appearing as growing downwards if reflected in water (Wodeham, *Lectura secunda 1*, dist. 2, q. 1, 28).
[86] Apart from the example of residual images that they borrow from Augustine's *De Trinitate* 11.2.
[87] Which Aristotle thought were really present in physical objects.

(such as the "common sense") and attribution to particular substances can be wrong, which accounts for all sensory illusions and deceptions.[88] For example, one could take yellow sticky substance for bile, while it could be honey.[89] While the attribution may be wrong, the perception of the primary quality, i.e., the color yellow, is correct. Aristotle also briefly discusses "unreal" representations in dreams.[90]

Therefore, Islamic scholars must have obtained the examples elsewhere. Although they had access to a wide variety of Greek philosophical material in Arabic translations, Ibn Rushd's commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* and Ibn Sīnā's psychological texts, as well as some of the latter's correspondence where he mentions his sources, contain no references to Greek Sceptical debates about these issues. Neither scholar seems to use examples that are directly reminiscent of those contained in optical treatises. However, both Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sīnā do refer to and discuss several Greek commentators of Aristotle, whose texts were available to them in Arabic translations. Therefore it is these texts that are the most likely sources of relevant examples that expose the unreliable nature of sensory perception.

The three key Greek commentators of Aristotle who are named and known by Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd and are mentioned in *De anima* commentaries by Ibn Rushd are Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd-3rd c. AD), Themistius (4th c. AD), and Philoponus (5th-6th c. AD). All three uphold Aristotle's view that the senses are always right about their proper objects (i.e., primary qualities), and errors in sensory perception come from the common sense misindentifying the subjects of these qualities.[91] Alexander of Aphrodisias's selection of examples is the poorest; the examples that are closest to those that make their way into Islamic and fourteenth-century Western scholastic debates about sensory perception are things not always appearing to be of the same color depending on conditions (similar to the dove's neck example), false representations that result from disease, emotions, and dreams, and relativity of perception of motion.[92] Themistius is a bit more prolific as well as specific, providing, among others, examples of sickness altering one's sense of taste, perceiving a yellow substance either as honey or as bile, a stick submerged in water appearing broken, and images of non-existent objects in dreams.[93] Philoponus is the most prolific and provides multiple examples, some of which

[88] Aristotle, *De an.* 3, 428*b* 18-22.
[89] Aristotle, *De an.* 3, 425*a* 30-*b*4.
[90] Aristotle, *De an.* 3, 428*a* 4-9, 11-18.
[91] Ivo Bruns (ed.), *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter Commentaria Scripta Minora: De Anima Liber cum Mantissa*, Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1887), 41.13-42.3; Leonhard von Spengel (ed.), *Themistii paraphrases Aristotelis librorum quae supersunt* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1998, reprint), 57.17-24, 31-35 (Γ, 418*a* 6-19); Michael Hayduck (ed.), *Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis De anima libros commentaria*, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 15 (Berlin: Reimer, 1897), 313.15-21, 27-32 (418*a* 11). The same position is shared by Al-Haytham, ch. 5, n. 1.
[92] Bruns, 41.13-42.3, 42.16-18, 70.9-16, 70.14-19, 71.18, 71.15-26.
[93] Spengel, 71.36-72.3 (Δ, 422*b* 9); 81.36-39, 82.1-6, 20-31 (E, 425*a* 8-*b* 4); 89.36-90.5 (E, 427*b* 21-428*b* 2); 91.18 (E, 428*b* 2-429*a* 11).

match very well what both Islamic commentators and fourteenth-century Franciscan scholastics discuss. Philoponus (similar to treatises on optics) lists conditions of correct sensing, such as sense organs not being diseased and being located in a suitable position as regards their objects and at an appropriate distance from them. The examples include, among many others, colors on the neck of a dove, stationary objects appearing to move from a moving boat, identifying substances as honey or resin upon perceiving yellow color, objects submerged in water appearing different (larger), and representations of non-existing things in dreams.[94]

Shifting to Islamic philosophers and commentators of Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā (970-1037), according to his correspondence, was aware of and read Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and Philoponus not only late but also early in life.[95] Although strictly speaking Ibn Sīnā has produced no commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, certain sections from two of his major works – the *al-Najāt* (the book of *Salvation*) and *al-Shifāʾ* (the book of *Healing*) – are usually referred to as *De anima* (or *Book Six of Natural Philosophy*).[96] Ibn Sīnā employs the examples of the following sensory illusions that match those used by the three aforesaid Greek commentators of Aristotle: a drop of rain falling down is perceived as a straight line and a rotating point is perceived as a circle;[97] a dress or the neck of a dove is perceived as being of different colors, diseases affect taste, hearing and vision;[98] an image of the sun remains in the eye;[99] a yellow substance is perceived as honey;[100] hearing non-existing sounds or seeing colors in certain psychological states, such as sleep, disease, fear, and insanity; images perceived in dreams; sensory perception being affected by the movement of surrounding things.[101]

[94] Hayduck, 315.28-30 (418*a* 23); 314.11-15; 454.16-22, 26-28 (425*a* 13); 455.14-18, 22-25; 455.30-456.11; 486.34-487.5 (427*a* 17).

[95] See Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 60, 62, 289.

[96] Ibn Sīnā's texts are referred to according to the following editions: Majid Fakhry (ed.), *Avicenna, Kitāb al-Najāt* (Beirut: Dār al-'āfāq al-jadīda, 1982) and Ján Bakoš (ed.), *Psychologie d'Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne) d'après son oeuvre aš-Šifāʾ. I. Texte arabe* (Prague: Editions de l'Académie tchécoslovaque des Sciences, 1956).

[97] Ibn Sīnā, *De anima* of the *Shifāʾ* 1.5 (Bakoš, 44-45; 3.7, Bakoš, 138).

[98] Ibn Sīnā, *De anima* of the *Shifāʾ* 2.2 (Bakoš, 63-64).

[99] Ibn Sīnā, *De anima* of the *Shifāʾ* 3.7 (Bakoš, 138).

[100] Ibn Sīnā, *De anima* of the *Shifāʾ* 4.1 (Bakoš, 160).

[101] Ibn Sīnā, *De anima* of the *Shifāʾ* 4.1 (Bakoš, 158, 166-167). At least some of these examples in Islamic thought date to earlier periods, although they probably have the same Greek sources. Thus Hadi Rabiei from Art University, Tehran, alerted me of the occurrence of the following examples in al-Fārābī (870-950?): diseased states, such as fever, affecting one's taste (Fauzi M. Najjar [ed.], *Al-Fārābī's The Political Regime* (*al-Siyāsah al-madaniyyah*) [Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1964], 83); straight or circular lines being drawn in the common sense by fast moving objects; dream images of non-existing things; and visual and auditory hallucinations in the state of fear: Al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, edited by M. H. Al Yāsīn (Qom: Bīdār, 1405/1985), 83-5, faṣṣ 52. أبى نصر الفارابى، فصوص الحكم، المحقّق محمد حسن آل ياسين، قم: بيدار، ١۴٠۵.

Ibn Rushd (1126-1198) in his Long Commentary on the *De anima* (تفسير or شرح) mentions Alexander of Aphrodisias twice in Book 1, once in Book 2, and has a long discussion of his position in Book 3. He mentions Themistius twice in Book 1 and twice in Book 2, and has a long discussion of his position in Book 3. He was also familiar with Philoponus.[102] It is Ibn Rushd's commentary on the *De somno et vigilia*, however, that is most fully used by fourteenth-century Franciscan theologians.[103] This text contains observations on sleep, to the effect that one has a full sensory experience in dreams, as well as on false dreams about desired objects.[104] The passage on one's sensory perception during the states of dreaming, fear, and sickness is quoted by Peter Aureol in full from a medieval Latin translation:

> And it occurs to a person [in sleep] that they perceive sensory data, and those [data] were not present outside (لم يكن موجودة خارجا), because their meanings (معانى) happened to be in the organs of the senses. And there is no difference as to whether those meanings arise from the outside (من خارج) or from the inside (من داخل). And [something] similar to this happens during the waking state to a frightened or sick person, and this is due to the excess of activity of the imaginative power in these states.[105]

A number of examples about dreams and sensory illusions are contained also in the Long Commentary on the *De anima*:[106] a yellow substance can be taken either for honey or bile;[107] experiences of non-existent things in dreams;[108] the senses being correct about their proper objects (i.e., primary qualities) and wrong about accidental qualities;[109] a

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[102] Amos Bertolacci, "Arabi, ebrei e bizantini", in *Storia della filosofia occidentale*, vol. 2: *Medioevo e Rinascimento*, edited by G. Cambiano *et al.* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014), 111-145, at 143.

[103] References are according to the following edition: Harry Blumberg (ed.), *Averrois Cordubensis Compendia librorum Aristotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur*, Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem. Versiones Arabicae 7 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Medieval Academy of America, 1972).

[104] Blumberg, 52.7-8 (453*b* 26-27); 54.12-55.10 (458*a* 25-32); 68.9-69.7 (461*a* 25-*b* 3); 91.4-92.1.

[105] Ibn Rushd, *De somno et vigilia* (Blumberg, 69.10-71.1). Translation from the Arabic. All translations in this essay are mine unless otherwise indicated. Again, al-Fārābī expresses a similar idea in *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (83-4) using some of the same words: "this power also is capable of producing in it internal images in sleep, so that the percept (مُدرَك) in truth is what is pictured (يتصور) in it, regardless whether it came into it from the outside or originated in it from the inside, so what is pictured in it happens to be seen (مشاهدا)..." Note that Ibn Rushd provides an explanation of this phenomenon that is very close to Anil Seth's model of "perceptual priors" in such states being "unusually strong, overwhelming the sensory data" (as quoted above).

[106] References are according to Crawford's edition of the Latin text (the Arabic original has not survived): F. Stuart Crawford (ed.), *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros* (Cambridge, MA: The Medieval Academy of America, 1953). References are also given to an Arabic reconstruction from the Latin: *Averroes, Grand Commentaire sur le Traité de l'Ame d'Aristote*, translated by B. Gharbi (Tunis: Académie Tunisienne des Sciences des Lettres et des Arts "Beït Al-Hikma", 1997).

[107] Ibn Rushd, *De anima* 2, text. com. 134 (Crawford, 332-335; Gharbi, 200-201).

[108] Ibn Rushd, *De anima* 2, text. com. 156 (Crawford, 366-367; Gharbi, 218).

[109] Ibn Rushd, *De anima* 2, text. com. 161 (Crawford, 374; Gharbi, 226).

perfectly real picture of a thing in the imagination (خيال) can come either from the senses or from ideation (فكر).[110]

Although fourteenth-century Franciscan authors such as Peter Aureol, as opposed to thirteenth-century authors, do not refer to Ibn Sīnā as often as they do to Ibn Rushd, many of them could be qualified as "Scotists" to some extent[111] and they were certainly familiar with the texts of Scotus. Scotus himself only occasionally uses such examples in his discussion of perception, but he does use some of Ibn Sīnā's examples of visual illusions in his commentary on the *De anima*,[112] e.g., about a drop of rain appearing as a line, a circle created by a rotating object, and the perception of motion from a moving boat that appear in *De anima* of the *Shifāʾ* 1.5, 3.7, and 4.1.[113] Some of the aforementioned four Franciscan authors in their debates about sensory perception also use the famous example from Ibn Sīnā about the sheep and the wolf.[114] The fact that the sheep instinctively reacts to a particular shape (the "wolf shape") with fear according to Walter Chatton in *Reportatio* 1, dist. 3, qu. 1, art. 2, n. 38, 40 (p. 218-19) can lead to a sensory deception: the sheep would be frightened by the "wolf shape" even if it were created falsely, e.g., by making a sheep look like a wolf. Ibn Rushd is used more frequently and directly: e.g., Aureol uses Ibn Rushd's examples of altered sensory perception during the states of dreaming, fear, and sickness from the latter's commentary on *De somno et vigilia* quoted above. It is clear from the lists of the examples, however, that even if Islamic authors are not always directly quoted or cited, many examples are exactly the same, and since there is no evidence of direct access to Greek or Latin sources of such examples (apart from Augustine for some examples), the most likely sources were Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd, with some examples coming from treatises on optics.[115]

As it happens, both Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd seem to emphasize the two aforementioned observations that are crucial to the view that external "reality" is a mental construct: first, that our phenomenal perception of things persists (according to ancient and medieval Aristotelians, in the common sense or the imagination) even after those things have ceased to function as proper objects of sensory perception;[116] second, that our phenomenal experience of things is the same no matter whether the

[110] Ibn Rushd, *De anima* 3, text. com. 33 (Crawford, 476; Gharbi, 288).
[111] See Caroline Gaus, *'Etiam realis scientia': Petrus Aureolis konzeptualistische Transzendentalienlehre vor dem Hintergrund seiner Kritik am Formalitätenrealismus* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 1-18.
[112] References according to the following edition: C. Bazán *et al.* (eds.), *B. Ioannis Duns Scoti quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima* (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 2006).
[113] See references to the edition of Ibn Sīnā above. Scotus, *De an.* qu. 9, n. 11-12, and qu. 10, n. 16 (Bazán, 74-75, 85).
[114] The example appears in Ibn Sīnā's *De anima* of the *Najāt* (Fakhry, 200) and *De anima* of the *Shifāʾ* 1.5 and 4.1 (Bakoš, 43 and 160).
[115] As mentioned above, the examples of illusions from optical treatises are less decisive in the debate about the relative independence of phenomenal reality from external inputs.
[116] E.g., in Ibn Sīnā, *De anima* of the *Shifāʾ* 1.5 (Bakoš, 44-45), see above.

source of this experience is outside of us, as in the waking state, or inside of us, as in dreams.[117]

Both of those ideas, however, are already contained in Greek commentators of Aristotle, e.g., in the following passage from Alexander of Aphrodisias's *De anima*:

> Now the traces (ἐγκαταλείμματα) that arise from the sense in act become the substrate of the imaginative power, being, as it were, internal sensory objects (αἰσθητὰ ἐντός), just as they function as external sensory objects (αἰσθητὰ ἐκτός) to the sensory [power]. Now such traces in act are called 'sense,' inasmuch as they are the products of the sensory act. And sensing in act amounts to having this form in oneself from objects of sense that exist outside. As for the imaginative power, it is the same as the sensory [power] as far as their substrate is concerned (κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον), but is different conceptually. Now it is the sensory [power] to the extent that it is receptive of objects of sense that are separate from that, which has [this power], and are present (παρόντων), while the imaginative [power], to the extent that the other [i.e., the sensory power] is in act as regards the objects of sense that exist externally, in the same way [is in act] as regards imaginary objects in the body that has this [imaginative power], which act as sensory objects to it, even if [proper] sensory objects are no longer present (εἰ καὶ μὴ παρείη ἔτι τὰ αἰσθητά).[118]

It seems, then, that Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd echoed these ideas that appear in Greek commentators of Aristotle, and their texts served as the means of transmitting these ideas to the fourteenth-century Franciscan tradition, where they were amplified and generated a full-blown discussion about the reliability of sensory perception and the true nature of our phenomenal experience, which ultimately seems to be independent from the senses and "external reality" – the discussion that existed neither in Greek commentators nor in Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd to that extent.

4. The Debate About Phenomenal Reality in Later Medieval Islamic Thought[119]

As the discussion of the reliability of sensory perception and thus, if by implication, of the nature of phenomenal reality in Greek commentators of Aristotle, via Islamic sources such as Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd, generated a heated debate in Franciscan theology in the 1300s, so it did in Islamic theology and philosophy in the late 1100s to late 1200s. It is curious that both debates independently exhibited similar patterns and trains of thought.

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[117] E.g., in Ibn Rushd's *De somno et vigilia* (Blumberg, 69.10-71.1), quoted above. Ibn Rushd expresses the same idea that a perfectly real picture of a thing in the imagination (خيال) can come either from the senses or from ideation (فكر) in the Long Commentary on the *De anima* 3 (Crawford, 476; Gharbi, 288).

[118] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De anima* (Bruns 68.31-69.11).

[119] This section could not have been written without the assistance of Hadi Rabiei from Art University, Tehran, who not only alerted me of the existence of the debate but also carefully checked my translations from the Arabic and Persian and offered valuable comments.

The most notable debate took place between Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1149?-1210), a Sunnī (Ash'arite) theologian although somewhat independent in his views who studied under Majd al-Dīn al-Jīlī, who also taught Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (1154-1191),[120] and Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (1201-1274), a Shī'ī (Imāmīyyah) philosopher of Peripatetic orientation. Both thinkers draw on Ibn Sīnā, of whom Fakhr is mostly critical and whom Khwājah vigorously defends. Some of Khwājah's works are dedicated primarily to refuting Fakhr's arguments against Ibn Sīnā. The best known instance of their debate is commentaries on Ibn Sīnā's *al-Ishārāt w'al Tanbīhāt* (*Remarks and Admonitions*), Fakhr's *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt* and Khwājah's *Sharḥ*.[121] The debate between Fakhr and Khwājah about phenomenal reality, and more precisely about how exactly external reality is perceived or known by the mind, is illustrated in their commentaries on *al-Ishārāt* where they draw on some of Ibn Sīnā's examples of visual illusions to bolster their respective claims and, just like Franciscans in the 1300s, seem to fall into distinctive epistemological camps that can be roughly defined as "relationists" and "phenomenalists". However, another instance of the debate between Fakhr and Khwājah about phenomenal reality that contains the maximum number of examples of sensory illusions and other relevant mental experiences – and thus is more relevant to the present study – comes from a different context: Fakhr's *al-Muḥaṣṣal* (*The Compendium*) and Khwājah's critical work about it titled *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal* (*A Summary of the Compendium*).

5. The Issue of God's Knowledge; "Presential" Knowledge

While in late medieval Franciscan theology the debate about the reliability of sensory perception seems to have originated with the position that God can create any phenomenal experience without any external object generating it, the context of the epistemological positions of Fakhr and Khwājah seems to have been the debate in medieval Islamic theology about God's ability to know particulars. Ibn Sīnā famously denied that God can know particulars as according to his Aristotelian epistemology knowing involves an imprinting (انطباع) of an image or form (صورة) in the knower, and this would imply change in God.[122] Al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) considered this view heretical

[120] Fathalla Kholeif, *A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and his 'Controversies in Transoxiana'* (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq Éditeurs, 1966), 17.

[121] Hamid Dabashi, "Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī: The Philosopher/Vizier and the Intellectual Climate of his Times", in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, edited by S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman, Routledge History of World Philosophies 1 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 527-584, at 546, 548-549.

[122] The discussion can be found in *al-Ishārāt*, Part 3, 7th Class, Chapters 15-21, Ibn Sīnā, *Remarks and Admonitions, with the Commentary by Researcher Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and the Commentary on the Commentary by the Most Learned Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī*, vol. 3 (Qom: Nashr al-Balaqhah, 2013), 301-313ff. ابن سينا، الإشارات والتنبيهات، مع الشرح للمحقق نصير الدين الطوسي وشرح الشرح للعلامه قطب الدين الرازي، ج ٢، ٣، قم: النشر البلاغة، ١٤٣٥.
See Hasan Hasani, *Study and Judgments in Disputed Issues between two Islamic philosophers Khajeh Nasir Tusi and Imam Fakhr Razi* (Tehran: University of Tehran Publishing Institute, 1954), 241.

and refuted it, seemingly having no problem with some change in God.[123] However, for most Islamic theologians and philosophers the notion of change in God was unacceptable, and some developed ways of reconciling the idea of knowing particulars with the absence of change in the knower. Notably, Suhrawardī developed a theory of knowledge as a "presential-illuminative" (حضوریّ اشراقیّ) "relation" (اضافة) that makes things directly present to the knower. "Temporal knowledge in a way that requires change [is] impossible (ممتنع) in the truth of the Necessary Being"; however, "if his [the knower's] knowledge were presential-illuminative, not by means of images in his self (ذات), then if the thing were to cease (بطل), for example, and if the relation ceased, there doesn't have to be a change in himself".[124] As no change in the illuminative relation involves a change in the knower, the problem of God's knowledge of particulars is solved. Presential-illuminative cognition in Suhrawardī applies not only to God's cognition, but also to the self's cognition of oneself. In *Intimations* (کتاب التلویحات) Aristotle in a dream instructs Suhrawardī as follows: "You are a perceiver (مدرِك) of yourself, so your perception of yourself [is] by yourself."[125] In the case of presential-illuminative knowledge there is no change in the perceiver: "As for the aforementioned illuminative knowledges, if they are acquired after not existing, then something happens to the perceiver that didn't exist: and this is the illuminative relation, nothing else, and there is no need for correspondence."[126] However, humans know external things when they are reflected in the mind as imprinted images or forms that correspond to external objects: "when a perceiver (مدرك) knows (علم) something... if [something] happens (حصل) [to the perceiver], then it is necessarily due to correspondence (مطابقة)... knowledge by way of images (العلم الصوریّ) necessarily will be like that."[127] An external thing can be united to a mental image of it, which is not identical to it in every respect, through semblance or resemblance (مثال) in content and identity (هویة) in form.[128] The illuminative relation illumines this

حسنی، حسن، ، بررسی و داوری در مسایل اختلافی میان دو فیلسوف اسلامی خواجه نصیر طوسی و امام فخر رازی، تهران، مؤسسه انتشارات دانشگاه تهران، ۱۳۷۳.

[123] Al Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of The Philosophers (Tahāfut al-Falāsifah): A Parallel English-Arabic Text*, edited by M. E. Marmura (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), no. 13 at 160-163.

[124] Suhrawardī, *Paths and Havens* (کتاب المشارع و المطارحات), in *Shihaboddin Yahya Sohravardi, Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, vol. 1, edited by H. Corbin (Tehran: Institut d'Etudes et des Recherches Culturelles, 1993), 488.

[125] Suhrawardī, *Intimations*, in Corbin, *Shihaboddin Yahya Sohravardi*, vol. 1, 70.

[126] Suhrawardī, *Paths and Havens* (Corbin, vol. 1, 489).

[127] Suhrawardī, *Paths and Havens* (Corbin, vol. 1, 489).

[128] Mehdi Ha'iri Yazdi, *The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 48; Morteza HajjHuseini, "An Examination and Analysis of Opinions of Muslim Philosophers about the Definition of Knowledge, from Ibn Sīnā to Ṣadr al-Mutālahīn", *Journal of the Faculty of Literature and Human Sciences* 98 (Winter 1381/1962): 79-164, at 81-82; حاج حسيني، مرتضي، "بررسي و تحليل آراء فيلسوفان مسلمان در مورد تعريف علم از ابن سينا تا صدر المتالهين"، مجله دانشكده ادبيات و علوم انساني، دانشگاه تهران، ش ۹۸، (زمستان ۱۳۸۱)، ۷۹-۱۶۴.

A. Haqqi and M. Zekhtareh, "A Study in Brentano's Intentionality and its Comparison with Fakhr Al-Razi's Theory of Relation", *Comparative Theology* 1/4 (Winter 2011): 39-52, at 40; علی حقی، ملیحه زختاره، پژوهشی در حیث التفاتی برنتانو و تطبیق آن با نظریه اضافه فخر رازی، الهیات تطبیقی، دوره ۱،

correspondence.[129]

6. The Nature of Knowledge in Fakhr and Khwājah; Commentaries on *al-Ishārāt*

The division into "presential" (حضوری) and "acquired" (حصولی) knowledge becomes generally accepted in medieval Islamic thought.[130] The question becomes what exactly is included under either type, where there are some disagreements. Both Fakhr and Khwājah seem to have shared the view of "presential knowledge" as far as God's knowledge is concerned, even though in many respects they do not share Suhrawardī's ontological and epistemological framework.[131] On the issue of God's knowledge Khwājah prefers Suhrawardī's model of knowledge "by presence" to that of Ibn Sīnā.[132] As far as the human knowledge of external things is concerned, however, Khwājah's epistemology is mostly Avicennian, i.e., that of the "imprint" of form.[133] Fakhr's epistemology is much harder to pinpoint. In order to preserve God from change in the process of cognition of particulars, Fakhr maintains that knowledge is a specific type of relation, no change in which affects the knower. God's knowledge cannot amount to an imprint in some

شماره ۴، شماره پیاپی ۴، تاریخ: ۱۲/۱۳۸۹، صفحه ۵۲-۳۹.

Muhammad Javad Pashai and Muhammad Zabihi, "Examination and Criticism of Mental Being from Fakhr Razi's Point of View", *Philosophical-Theological Research* 13/3 (Serial Number 51, Qom, Iran, Spring 2012): 205-228, at 208-209.

محمد جواد پاشایی، محمد ذبیحی، "نقد و بررسی وجود ذهنی از دیدگاه فخر رازی"، پژوهش‌های فلسفی-کلامی، دوره ۱۳، شماره ۳، شماره پیاپی ۵۱، خرداد ۱۳۹۱، صفحه ۲۰۵-۲۲۸.

[129] According to Yazdi, *The Principles of Epistemology*, 52, 54, "knowledge by correspondence always emerges from its rich and ever-present source, which is knowledge by presence" and the human mind "illuminates from the depth of its own presential knowledge the rays of its immanent act of knowledge by correspondence". A more detailed discussion of Suhrawardī's theory of presential-illuminative knowledge can be found in Yazdi, *The Principles of Epistemology*, 43-56, and Hossein Ziai, "Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī: Founder of the Illuminationist School", in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, edited by S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman, Routledge History of World Philosophies 1 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 434-464, esp. at 437-438.

[130] Knowledge-by-presence grasps the essence of the thing with no "intermediate being between the knower and the known". Acquired knowledge roughly aligns with knowledge by correspondence as it requires an "attainment of an image of the thing in the intellect", which serves as an intermediary between the external thing and the knower: Ali AllahDadi Hazaveh and Ali Allah Bedashti, "An Analysis and Study of Fakhr Razi's and Khwaja Nasir Tusi's Theory Regarding Notion and Assertion", *Philosophical-Theological Research* 23/2, Issue 88 (Summer 2021): 5-26, at 9.

علی الهدادی هزاوه، علی اله بداشتی، تحلیل و بررسی نظریهٔ فخر رازی و خواجه نصیر الدین طوسی دربارهٔ تصوّر و تصدیق پژوهش‌های فلسفی-کلامی، ۲۳ (۸۸)، ۵-۲۶.

[131] For a more detailed discussion on the issue of God's knowledge of particulars in Fakhr and Khwājah see Hasani, *Study and Judgments*, 241-244.

[132] Dabashi, "Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī", 549; Hasani, *Study and Judgments*, 117-118; Yazdi, *The Principles of Epistemology*, 24.

[133] See HajjHuseini, 80: Khwājah "regarded mental images (صور ذهنی) as [shadowy] apparitions (اشباح) of external things, which indicate (دلالت دارند) [external things] because of likeness (مشابهت) to external things".

material cognitive faculty as God is immaterial and therefore would not know himself or the things he acts on.[134] However, Fakhr extends the understanding of knowledge as a relation to human knowledge as well. The human self's knowledge of itself seems to be direct and "presential", following Suhrawardī's model. Thus, Fakhr attempts to prove that the concept of knowledge is self-evident through the observation that "I know necessarily that I am a knower of my existence".[135] The situation with Fakhr's understanding of the human knowledge of things other than the human self is less clear. Fakhr objects to the concept of knowledge as an impression (انطباع) of an image or form (صورة) in the mind or as an occurrence (حصول) of the "truth" of the object in the mind and upholds only the idea that knowledge is a "relation" (اضافة).[136] According to Fakhr, it has been "established... that perception does not consist in impression itself, but in truth it is a relative-relational state (حالة نسبيّة إضافيّة). So we know intuitively (بالبديهة) that when we see someone (زيدا), then there is a special relation (نسبة خاصّة) to that [person] in our visual powers".[137] "It is impossible for that, which is understood, and that, which is imagined, to be impressions in the mind or the imagination."[138] For example, "vision (الإبصار) consists in the relative condition (حالة إضافيّة) that arises between the visual power and the object of vision (المرئى) that exists externally, without the picture of the object of vision being imprinted (تنطبع) in the visual power... And the same can be said of hearing, taste, smell, and touch".[139] Just like many fourteenth-century Franciscan theologians of the perceptual realist persuasion, Fakhr rejects the phenomenist position that the "object of vision is its [the external thing's] representation (مثال) and apparition (شبح)" because of the threat of scepticism as "this casts doubt on the clarity of the most necessary and robust sciences (فإنّه تشكّك فى أجلى العلوم الضّروريّة و أقواها)".[140]

However, the extreme view that the human knowledge of external objects is merely a relation presents considerable problems that Khwājah is quick to point out.[141] For example, Fakhr himself indicates the problem with the perception and knowledge of things that "can occur in the absence (عند عدم) of objects of perception externally". Indeed, a "relation (إضافة) to a thing requires the existence (وجود) of this thing. So if this thing does

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[134] Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Rāzī, *Commentary on* Remarks and Admonitions, Introduction and Emendation by Alīrezā Najfazādeh (Iran: Association of Cultural Artifacts and Honors, 1384/1964), 229, subsequently Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*.
رازی، فخرالدین محمد، شرح الاشارات و التنبیهات، مقدمه و تصحیح علیرضا نجف زاده، ایران، انجمن آثار و مفاخر فرهنگی، ۱۳۸۴.
[135] A. Nūrānī (ed.), Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (1201-1274), *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, Wisdom of Persia 24 (Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University) (Tehran: Haidari Press, 1980), 155, similar to Suhrawardī's passage from *Intimations* (Corbin, vol. 1, 70) quoted above.
[136] *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 156, HajjHuseini, 82, Hasani, *Study and Judgments*, 113; for a general discussion of the relative being of perception in Fakhr see Haqqi and Zekhtareh, 40ff.
[137] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 233.
[138] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 221.
[139] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 218.
[140] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 233.
[141] Hasani, *Study and Judgments*, 108, 109, 116.

not exist externally, it is impossible for the perception to consist of a relation to it".[142] Khwājah echoes the same point.[143] Initially Khwājah seems to agree that "it is possible" that the perception of "sensory objects that are perceived only if they were existent" is a "relation in the perceiver to those" sensory objects;[144] there has to be an image for the perception of objects that do not exist externally. However, according to Khwājah even a relation to existing external things poses a problem. While it is easy to characterize the correspondence of a mental image "to the outside" or a lack thereof as either knowledge or ignorance, no relation takes into account such correspondence with external objects, as no relation exists externally, "so perception in the sense of 'relation' will not be knowledge or ignorance".[145] Khwājah's definitive refutation of the relational model of knowledge is similar to the one used by both ancient and modern sceptics in all cultures: "if in one place its [perception's] nature indicated that it [perception] is something other than relation, to which relation is added, it is known for sure that [the truth of perception], wherever it were, is not the same as relation."[146]

Also, unlike Suhrawardī, Fakhr is reluctant to describe exactly what sort of "relation" the human knowledge of external things is.[147] Both Fakhr and Khwājah agree that the perceiver or knower is the soul. According to Fakhr, it is the rational soul that is the perceiver of both particular and universal perceptions,[148] for which he has a "solid argument".[149] However, because of his relationist understanding of knowledge Fakhr, against the Aristotelian tradition, denies any need to theorize the internal senses.[150] Khwājah agrees that the soul is the perceiver but defends the need for theorizing the internal senses.[151]

The discussion about the existence of the internal senses such as the common sense and the imagination is crucial to the issue of phenomenal reality as it is virtually impossible to defend the position that there is never a mental image of perceived reality in the mind at a certain point. Instead of using Ibn Sīnā's model of the internal senses,

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[142] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 218-219.

[143] Khwājah, *The Commentary* (*Sharḥ*) on *al-Ishārāt*, in Ibn Sīnā, *Remarks and Admonitions, with the Commentary by Researcher Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and the Commentary on the Commentary by the Most Learned Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī*, vol. 2 (Qom: Nashr al-Balaqhah, 2013), 313-314, subsequently Khwājah, *Sharḥ*.
ابن سينا، الإشارات والتنبيهات، مع الشرح للمحقق نصير الدين الطوسي وشرح الشرح للعلامه قطب الدين الرازي، ج ٢، ٣، قم: النشر البلاغة، ١۴٣٥.

[144] Khwājah, *Sharḥ*, 317.

[145] Khwājah, *Sharḥ*, 316. It is curious that while Suhrawardī uses the same trait of the illuminative relation – i.e., that it cannot be true or false as it excludes correspondence – positively, Khwājah uses it against the theory of knowledge as a relation.

[146] Khwājah, *Sharḥ*, 18.

[147] *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 157 (he uses the term تعلّق in this particular instant), Hasani, *Study and Judgments*, 113.

[148] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 222, 250, 254-255; see Hasani, *Study and Judgments*, 137.

[149] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 264-265.

[150] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 246ff.

[151] Khwājah, *Sharḥ*, 311-312, 321; Hasani, *Study and Judgments*, 138.

Fakhr theorizes that there could be one power (i.e., the soul) that accounts for multiple categories of perceptions.[152] Again, eliminating the image (or "phenomenal being" in Aureol's terminology) as an intermediary would solve the theological problem of God's knowledge of particulars but also remove the philosophical threat of scepticism.[153] Fakhr examines Ibn Sīnā's famous example of a descending drop of rain creating a line and a rotating object creating a circle in our phenomenal experience and gives a very accurate Avicennian explanation that there must be a physical internal power where that line or circle are as the immaterial soul can receive no such impressions.[154] This phenomenological observation is almost impossible to explain away no matter what epistemological view one holds, which pushes Fakhr to defend absurd positions such as that those lines or circles can form physically in the air[155] or that colored objects can color the adjacent air,[156] all of which are easily refuted by Khwājah.[157]

Further, if the soul is one side of the relation and there is no intermediary, what does the soul relate to? Fakhr seems to be inconsistent as to whether human knowledge is a relation between the soul and the mental image of an object or between the soul and an external object directly. Thus in the *Investigations of the East* (المباحث المشرقية) he holds that "knowledge is a kind of special relation between the soul and the imprinted form",[158] in *al-Muḥaṣṣal* he "does not seem to believe in the existence of a mental form and considers science as a relation between the knower and the outside",[159] and his "final view" in *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt* is "that the truth of perception is a relative relation between the knower and the known, but with respect to this knowledge as to whether the relation... is to the received shape, intelligible shape, or to its external being, there is no clarity (بیان روشنی ندارد)".[160] "And the truth according to us is that perception does not consist in the occurrence of this form itself, but in a relational state (حالة نسبيّة إضافيّة) either between the intellectual power and the essence of the image that exists (الموجودة) in the intellect, or between the former and the thing that exists externally."[161]

[152] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 247.

[153] "If it were conceivable as regards something that we see (نشاهد) for it not to exist externally, his example would be conceivable in all objects of visual experience (مشاهدات). And this necessarily will amount to removal of safeguards from the existence of objects of sensory experience, and this is sophistry and folly" (*Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 249).

[154] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 247-248. The view that Fakhr subsequently refutes.

[155] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 250.

[156] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 249.

[157] The discussion about visual illusions that involve reflection off colored surfaces goes back to Greek commentators of Aristotle and appears in both Ptolemy and al-Haytham.

[158] Pashai and Zabihi, "Examination and Criticism of Mental Being", 213.

[159] Pashai and Zabihi, "Examination and Criticism of Mental Being", 215.

[160] Pashai and Zabihi, "Examination and Criticism of Mental Being", 216; see Hasani, *Study and Judgments*, 106, 114.

[161] Fakhr, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 226.

7. The Discussion of Self-Evidence of Assertions in *al-Muḥaṣṣal*

Fakhr's epistemological position in *al-Muḥaṣṣal*,[162] which is most interesting for its analysis of phenomenal experiences, must be viewed in the context of the division of knowledge in medieval Islamic thought into presential and acquired.[163] Acquired knowledge was usually seen as consisting of "conception" (تصور) and "assertion" (تصديق), the latter often viewed as conception with the addition of judgment.[164] Conception and assertion are two foundational concepts in medieval Islamic epistemology.[165] Fakhr shares the basic division of knowledge into conception and assertion.[166] However, for Suhrawardī the notions 'conception' and 'assertion' do not apply to God's knowledge and to our knowledge of ourselves (that is, to presential-illuminative knowledge): "as for what belongs to the knowledge of the First and knowledges of perceivers of themselves, they do not in truth belong to conceptions and assertions."[167] Given Fakhr's views of presential knowledge, it is safe to assume that he would agree with this position. As far as human knowledge that goes beyond ourselves is concerned, whereas medieval Islamic logicians customarily divide both conceptions and assertions into self-evident and acquired, Fakhr claims that all conceptions are self-evident, i.e., not acquired, as "in many of his logical writings"[168] Fakhr "claims that all of human conceptions are self-evident and it is not at all possible to acquire a conception in the manner of a definition".[169] This clearly goes against the traditional position that is supported by Khwājah who disagrees with Fakhr.[170]

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[162] Cited according to A. Nūrānī's edition of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal* abbreviated as Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*; Fakhr's text is copied together with Khwājah's comments (and this is the only form in which it has survied) so the texts of both authors are cited using the same edition of *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*.

[163] AllahDadi Hazaveh and Allah Bedashti, "An Analysis and Study", 9.

[164] AllahDadi Hazaveh and Allah Bedashti, "An Analysis and Study", 8, 10.

[165] Al-Fārābī was the first to use this division, which is later picked up by Ibn Sīnā in *al-Ishārāt* (AllahDadi Hazaveh and Allah Bedashti, "An Analysis and Study", 8) and his logic (*Najāt*, ch. 2, Yazdi, *The Principles of Epistemology*, 46): "Every piece of knowledge and apprehension is either by conception (تصور) or confirmation (تصديق). Knowledge by 'conception' is the primary knowledge which can be attained by definition or whatever functions as definition. This is as if by definition we understand the essence of human being. Knowledge by 'confirmation' on the other hand is that which can be acquired by way of 'inference.' This is as if we believe the proposition that 'for the whole world there is a beginning.'"

[166] "When we perceive the truth, either we consider it by itself, without judgment about it, either negative or positive: this is conception; or we judge about it negatively or positively, and this is assertion" (Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 6). Fakhr expresses a similar view in other works, see AllahDadi Hazaveh and Allah Bedashti, "An Analysis and Study", 11-12.

[167] Suhrawardī, *Paths and Havens*, Corbin, vol. 1, 489.

[168] See Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 6.

[169] Akbar Faydei, "Fakhr Razi's Logical Innovations and His Challenges to the Avicennian School of Logic", *Knowledge* 76/1 (Spring and Summer 1396/2017): 127-145, at 130.
اکبر فایدئی، اندیشه‌های منطقی فخر رازی و طرح چالش‌های نوین او در مکتب منطقی سینوی، شناخت ۷۶/۱، بهار و تابستان ۱۳۹۶، ص ۱۲۷-۱۴۵.

[170] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 8ff.

Fakhr proves by two arguments that conceptions cannot be acquired, one of which is that it is not possible to obtain a full definition of a compound essence, as this can be achieved only by means of defining all of its parts, which is pretty much impossible.[171] This position in fact is similar to Suhrawardī's, who undermines the value of conceptions by claiming that the knowledge of a full conception is required, which is obviously impossible.[172]

As far as assertions are concerned, according to Fakhr some are self-evident and some are acquired,[173] so acquired knowledge is limited to non-self-evident assertions. Ultimately, however, all assertions are based on self-evident assertions,[174] of which there are three types: sensory experiences, awareness of one's own mental states, and self-evident axioms. One's awareness of his or her mental state is the least important as it is not shared. According to Fakhr, the two remaining categories of self-evident assertions are treated differently by four different schools of thought. The first school includes those who admit both sensations and self-evident axioms; they are the majority that includes Fakhr himself. The second school includes those who criticize sensations only but recognize self-evident axioms; they can be broadly characterized as Platonists.[175] Fakhr presents a lengthy list of their arguments against the reliability of sensory perception but does not refute them. The third school includes those who only admit sensations and reject self-evident axioms. They consider thoughts to be derivative from sensations and deny the possibility of knowledge without the senses.[176] The representatives of the fourth school, the Sophists, reject both sensations and axioms.[177] After describing the fourth school Fakhr answers why he does not refute their arguments (and one assumes the arguments of the Platonists earlier on): because doing so will achieve their purpose of sowing doubt. He also states – a standard defense against scepticism – that their arguments do not make us treat either sensory perceptions or self-evident axioms any differently. He promises to provide "detailed answers" to these arguments later but never seems to deliver.[178]

[171] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 7-9; see Faydei, "Fakhr Razi's Logical Innovations", 130.
[172] "From the illuminationist position, things cannot be defined as such because of the impossibility of discretely enumerating all the essentials of a thing. Thus, there must be some prior illuminationist foundation of knowledge" (Ziai 446, see details at 446-447).
[173] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 10, 12.
[174] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 12.
[175] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 12. Curiously, Fakhr includes among them not only Plato but also Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Galen who supposedly acknowledge only intelligible things as certain (Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 12). As Khwājah (Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 13) is quick to point out, this seems to be false at least in application to Aristotle. The only explanation of Fakhr's position could be that he somehow sides with Islamic Neoplatonists such as al-Fārābī, who, similar to pagan Neoplatonists, tried to achieve a "harmonization of the opinions of Plato and Aristotle" (Yazdi, *The Principles of Epistemology*, 10).
[176] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 26-44.
[177] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 45.
[178] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 46.

Of most importance here are Fakhr's arguments on behalf of the second school of thought, the Platonists, that attempt to undermine the reliability of sensory experiences by presenting a number of phenomenal experiences that appear to provide false knowledge. As Fakhr never refutes these arguments, it falls to Khwājah to refute them: as a true Aristotelian he is ready to oblige despite the fact that they do not represent the position of Fakhr, who is the primary object of his attack. As Khwājah cannot really deny instances of sensory illusions, his main line of defense is that sensory experiences "cannot be characterized as being certain or not, or true or false, or right or wrong" as these are characteristics of "intellectual judgments". Thus errors – a standard Aristotelian position – belong not to the senses, which make no errors, but to higher cognitive faculties.[179]

Fakhr's arguments on behalf of the Platonists[180] include a list of "errors" of sensory judgment, such as sensory illusions, as well as other examples of phenomenal experiences that seem to suggest that our phenomenal picture of external reality that is formed by sensory experience is unreliable. The ensuing critique by Khwājah is reminiscent of the debate about phenomenal reality in Franciscan circles in the 1300s. Unlike the examples used in Franciscan circles in the 1300s, the majority of Fakhr's examples on behalf of the Platonists can be traced to optical treatises of Ptolemy and al-Haytham, especially judging by Khwājah's very technical explanations of these examples based on optical geometry. The following examples occur in both Ptolemy and al-Haytham: one thing (such as the moon) is perceived as two, as in the cases of pressing one of the eyeballs, squinting, and reflections in water;[181] multiple things are perceived as one, e.g., different colors merge into one color on a rotating millstone;[182] fast moving objects leave traces such as lines and circles in one's visual field;[183] perceiving a moving object, such as one's shadow, as motionless, and a motionless object, such as a river bank, as moving when sailing on a ship;[184] things seem to move in the direction that is opposite to their actual motion, such as a star or the moon seen against moving clouds.[185] The following examples occur in al-Haytham: small things appear to be large (at a distance in the dark, in water, at close range);[186] upright things can look upside down, as trees reflected in a river;[187] things appear crooked in crooked mirrors;[188] some transparent substances, such as ice or glass, appear white when they are broken up or cracked.[189] Many of the aforementioned examples, of course, are of low importance to the issue of phenomenal reality, for the reasons explained previously. Fakhr's Platonist also uses the more relevant examples of

[179] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 12, 13.
[180] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 14ff.
[181] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 17.
[182] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 18.
[183] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 18; this example also occurs in Ibn Sīnā.
[184] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 19.
[185] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 19.
[186] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 14-15.
[187] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 20.
[188] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 21-22.
[189] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 24-25.

dream images and hallucinations in certain mental states[190] that probably come from Ibn Sīnā. He also uses the examples of mirages and magical tricks[191] that are very common in Hindu and Buddhist discussions of reality as an illusion but whose source in *al-Muḥaṣṣal* is uncertain.

The discussion of these examples, however, reveals the perennial philosophical struggle to account for our phenomenal experiences of "external things" that do not in fact correspond to anything in external reality. Whereas Fakhr rejects the internal senses and in any case provides no refutation of "Platonic" arguments, Khwājah's explanations of many of these examples are based on the operation of the internal senses, similar to Ibn Sīnā's account. For example, the case of different colors merging into one color on a rotating millstone is explained as follows: "Everything that the senses perceive is conveyed to the common sense... So if the vision perceived a color and quickly shifted to another color, a trace (أثر) of the first color would be in the common sense together with the perception of the second color, and the observer would see the two, as it were, together, and perhaps there is no time between the two for the soul to distinguish one of the two in it from the second, and it operates as if the two [were] mingled..."[192] In other words, there is a capacity in the common sense to retain and hold images of past sensory things that have since ceased to be perceived. Of course, Khwājah, as other defenders of the reliability of sensory perception, denies that we have a case of sensory perception of non-existent things here. One can observe, however, that he cannot deny that we still have an *experience* of non-existent things.

The Platonists, on the other hand, as presented by Fakhr, are eager to prove that "we may perceive what is non-existent (معدوم) as existent (موجودا)" as in the cases of mirages, magical tricks, and the falling drops of rain and rotating torches.[193] Khwājah's Avicennian explanation of trace lines and circles in the visual field confirms that our mind is capable of causing the persistence of phenomenal objects that have since ceased to be perceived: "what the vision perceives in the position, in which the moving thing is moving [now], is in continuity with what the common sense perceived from its existence (كون) in another position previously and stored in it [in the common sense], and the soul perceives as united (يدرك جميع) what is in two organs [i.e., in two different faculties] and reckons it as one united thing."[194]

To present the Platonic position, Fakhr even uses the opinion of Ash'arite theologians that accidents such as colors are not capable of persisting on their own but that God recreates them at every instant. Of course we still perceive colors as continuously existing, thus the "sense may be absolutely certain about the continuity in the thing, although this is not the case, because the sense does not differentiate between the thing

[190] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 23.
[191] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 18.
[192] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 18.
[193] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 18.
[194] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 18-19.

and its likeness, and due to this a confusion happens between the thing and its likeness, so in the estimation of the continuous succession of likenesses the sense perceives a single, continuous existence".[195] Although this scenario is theologically based, it accurately accounts for the way our perception works, for example, in the case of magical tricks when we fail to notice quick substitutions of objects. Khwājah's explanation[196] is that in such cases it is our intellectual judgments about continuity that are in error; however, one cannot deny that whatever is responsible for the error, our phenomenal experience is one of continuity.

While previous scenarios deal with the phenomenal persistence of something that has been perceived at a certain point, in the cases of dreams and hallucinations we experience what we think are sensory perceptions where there is no sensory input whatsoever. Employing a traditional sceptical train of thought, Fakhr's Platonist uses the specific case of dreaming to question the reliability of sensory perception generally: "a dreamer sees something in a dream and is absolutely certain of its certainty; then it becomes evident to them in the waking state that this certainty was invalid. And if that is conceivable, then why is it not conceivable here for it to be a third situation, in which we are shown the delusion of what we saw in the waking state?"[197] Khwājah's explanation[198] lays the blame for the deception on the "soul" instead of the senses, but cannot deny that the mechanism of phenomenal appearance is the same whether the source is internal or external: "The dreamer sees in his or her imagination, just as the one awake sees, except that since the one awake is familiar with judgments of the waking state, he or she judges that one of these states [is] real [and] the truth, and the other unreal and not the truth. And since the dreamer is unaware of the sense perception, he or she reckons that the real is that, which they see in the imagination. And this is not due to a sensory error, but this is an error in the soul from the lack of distinction between the thing and its likeness in the case of being disconnected from the thing."[199]

The example of mental states that cause hallucinations is similar to the one about dreaming. According to Fakhr's Platonist, "someone affected by pleurisy sees images, which do not exist externally (قد يتصور صوراً لا وجود لها فى الخارج). And he or she sees (يشاهد) them and judges that they have existence (وجود), and screams out of fear of them; and this indicates that it is possible for a condition (حالة) to be present in a human being, on account of which they see what is not really existent externally (يرى ما ليس بموجود في الخارج

[195] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 22.
[196] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 22.
[197] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 23.
[198] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 23.
[199] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 23. See Khwājah, *Sharḥ*, 312: "the truth represented to the perceiver" (الحقيقة المتمثلة عند المدرك) "[is] either an image (صورة) extracted (منتزعة) from the outside if the perception is acquired (مستفاد) from the outside, or an image [whose] origin occurs in the perceiver, regardless whether the external [image] is acquired [apart] from it or not."

موجودا).”[200] Khwājah[201] attempts a standard defense of the senses by perceptual realists, i.e., that the senses never perceive what is not there: “due to being absorbed by the imagination and unaware of sensory perception, their soul judges in the same way as a dreamer would judge. And in all these cases no state occurs to a human being, on account of which they would see what is not really existent, so they would not *see* that, but rather *perceive* something by their imagination, disregarding the senses together with that.”[202] Again, no matter what one calls the phenomenal experience of a thing that has no external existence, one cannot deny the experience.

Fakhr’s Platonist presses on by applying the same logic that one specific case of false perception puts into question sensory perception in general: “and if that is conceivable, then why is it not conceivable for it to be like that in that, which healthy people see [...]?” So any of these scenarios “can only be clarified by a careful examination, if possible, so no assertion (جزم) about an existence of a sensory thing should be permissible except after a rational examination of this evidence. And this indicates that the mere judgment of the senses is not acceptable”.[203]

As the phenomenal evidence is undeniable, Khwājah at this point also attempts to restore trust in the reliability of sensory perception by rational means, except that it leads him to the opposite conclusion: “as for the permissibility of error in what the healthy see due to its permissibility in what a dreamer and a sick person perceive, the clear intellect rejects it. And we did not establish trust in the sensory data by evidence, but we say: the clear intellect requires it”. Khwājah admits that ultimately he cannot account for these phenomenal experiences and that he provides those explanations of illusions simply because the “intellect has judged that this is an error in the mind, not for the purpose of proving the validity of what we perceive by the senses”. However, “had we established the validity of the judgment through the certainty of the external sensory data through evidence”, Fakhr’s Platonist’s point would have been valid.[204]

While presenting the case of transparent substances appearing white, Fakhr’s Platonist seems to anticipate and thwart Khwājah’s overly technical explanations[205] in principle by pointing out that explaining *why* a sensory error happens (in this case, according to Khwājah, who seems to follow al-Haytham, by “false inference”) does not eliminate the *fact* that the phenomenal picture is wrong: “this does not detract from our intention, because” the explanation “is only a clarification of the cause, on account of which we see snow as white, although in its essence it is not white.”[206]

[200] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 23. Galen describes pleurisy as causing fever, so perhaps it is the fever that causes hallucinations?
[201] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 23.
[202] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 23; my italics.
[203] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 23-24.
[204] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 24.
[205] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 25.
[206] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 24.

As a result of this cross-generational "debate", the two parties come to opposite conclusions. According to Fakhr' s Platonist, "it has been proved in these ways that the judgment of the senses may be invalid or may be true. And if this is so, reliance on their judgment is not permissible... but rather a different judge, who is above him [the "suspect" that stands for the senses – O.B.], is necessary in order to distinguish his correctness from his error. And according to this assessment, the sense is not the primary judge..."[207] And according to Khwājah, "it has become obvious that the sense has no judgment about any of the matters, so the statement that the judgment of the sense may be mistaken is rejected..."[208]

8. Conclusion

What the medieval debate about phenomenal reality shows is a remarkable continuity of understanding of the nature of sensory perception in ancient Greek, medieval Latin (specifically Franciscan), and medieval Islamic texts,[209] which also resonates with the findings of present-day neuroscience. The two main trends of arguments, just as they do in present-day philosophical debates about the nature of sensory perception, defend either some type of phenomenism – an "image/apparition" model where what we ultimately become aware of in sensory perception is some sort of a mental construct – or some sort of a direct perceptual realist view, where what we become aware of is the external object of perception itself. The relationist view is a variation of the latter that claims that sensory perception is simply the process itself of relating to or interacting with an external object. The present analysis shows that medieval debates about the nature of sensory perception severely undermine both the direct perceptual realist and purely relationist views. One must note that they do that no matter what the stated doctrinal position of the debater is or whether their arguments are successful or not.

The examples of at least some visual illusions, but certainly of afterimages, hallucinations and dreams show that at least at some point what we "perceive" is a mental image that is independent from any external reality. The logic "if in this situation then why not in all situations" that was first applied by Hindus and Buddhists and continued in medieval Islamic and Franciscan thought but was not definitive in the Middle Ages is confirmed by contemporary neuroscience. The latter shows definitively that there is simply no known mechanism of any direct contact with an object of perception. According to Anil Seth's convincing model, all our experience of awareness is a continuously generated "hallucination" that is controlled by inputs from the sensory but also other, purely internal systems. Depending on which input is stronger, the

[207] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 25.
[208] Khwājah, *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 26.
[209] The question about how the debate relates to Hindu and Buddhist sources remains to be answered in a different study.

phenomenal picture may be more or less disconnected from whatever influences it from the outside. However, it is never in direct contact with any external objects, and this is why it can exist independently. In fact, it always exists independently. The examples of its independent existence are not exceptions, they are the proofs of the rule. It is quite remarkable that this mechanism was described pretty much in the same terms in medieval Islamic thought and subsequently in medieval Franciscan thought.

Thus, again, no matter what their stated doctrinal position is, every party to the medieval debate has to acknowledge – if implicitly – that some phenomenal picture of external reality is created in the mind that is more or less independent from what is outside. No matter what the cause, images can persist in the mind and be created without sensory input. Some type of phenomenalism or "image/apparition" model is necessary to account for our phenomenal experience no matter how much it undermines the certainty of knowledge. And yet this acknowledgement can be used to argue for opposite positions, both in medieval Franciscan and medieval Islamic thought: for example, that sensory perception is unreliable and one must establish what is real by other means, or that sensory perception is mostly reliable, and exceptional cases can be explained away by other means.

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WILLIAM OF OCKHAM AND WALTER CHATTON ON SENSORY POWERS AND THE MATERIALITY OF SENSATION

GUILLERMO DE OCKHAM Y WALTER CHATTON SOBRE LOS PODERES SENSORIALES Y LA MATERIALIDAD DE LA SENSACIÓN

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Abstract

While many thirteenth-century scholastic philosophers thought that the human powers of sensation are distinct from the human intellect, this apparent consensus collapsed in the 1320s, '30s, and '40s. The proximate cause of this transformation was Walter Chatton's rejection of William of Ockham's arguments that the human powers of sensation are distinct from the human intellect. This article examines Chatton's implicit and explicit motivations for rejecting Ockham's arguments. I show that Ockham thinks that the senses are distinct from the intellect because he holds that sensing is material and embodied in a way that thinking is not. I show that Chatton, on the other hand, sees no need to posit such a difference between sensation and thought with respect to materiality or embodiment because he thinks that nothing about the character of sensory experience shows it to be material or embodied in a way that thinking is not.

Keywords

William of Ockham; Walter Chatton; Sensation; Medieval Cognition Theory; Powers of the Soul

Resumen

Muchos filósofos escolásticos del siglo XIII creían que los poderes sensoriales humanos son distintos del intelecto humano. Este aparente consenso colapsó en las décadas 1320, 1330 y 1340. La causa inmediata de este cambio fue el rechazo de Walter Chatton a los argumentos de Guillermo de Ockham de que los poderes sensoriales humanos son distintos del intelecto humano. Este artículo examina las motivaciones implícitas y explícitas de Chatton para rechazar los argumentos de Ockham. Por un lado, muestro que, de acuerdo con Ockham, los sentidos son

distintos del intelecto porque sostiene que el acto de percibir es material y está ligado al cuerpo de una forma que el pensamiento no lo está. Por otro lado, señalo que Chatton no ve la necesidad de postular tal diferencia entre sensación y pensamiento en cuanto a materialidad o corporalidad, ya que considera que nada en la naturaleza de la experiencia sensorial manifiesta que esta sea material o corporal de una manera diferente a como lo es el pensamiento.

Palabras clave

Guillermo de Ockham; Walter Chatton; sensación; teoría medieval de la cognición; poderes del alma

1. Introduction

Imagine sitting in a garden in the spring.[1] You might see some yellow daffodils, hear a sparrow's song, or feel a warm breeze. You might also hope that an upcoming

[1] I will use the following abbreviations and citation conventions. (Note that, while Chatton's *Reportatio* and *Lectura* each occupy multiple volumes produced by the same editors, each volume was published as a self-standing work rather than as part of a single, multi-volume work. The citation conventions used here treat the volumes of each work as if they were part of a single, multi-volume edition by numbering them 1-4 and 1-3 respectively):

— Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super Sententias*, edited by J.C. Wey and G.J. Etzkorn, 4 vols., Studies and Texts 141-142, 148-149 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002-2005): *Rep.* book.distinction.question.article (volume.page,line). (Volume 4 is not divided into distinctions and so will be cited as book.question.article);

— Walter Chatton, *Lectura super Sententias*, edited by J.C. Wey and G.J. Etzkorn, 3 vols., Studies and Texts 156, 158, 164 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007-2009): *Lect.* distinction.question.article (volume.page,line).

— Walter Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus*, edited by J.C. Wey (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1989): *Pro.* question.article (page,line).

— William of Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum secundum[-quartum] Sententiarum (Reportatio)*, edited by G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, F.E. Kelley, and R. Wood, 3 vols., *Opera theologica* V-VII (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1981-1984): *ORep.* book.question (*OT* volume page,line).

— William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, edited by J. C. Wey, *Opera theologica* IX (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1980), QS quodlibet.question (page,line).

In all citations, I will omit line numbers when citing an entire unit of text, such as a question or article. For Chatton's quodlibetal questions, q. 5, I have relied on my own transcription of q. 5 in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15805, f. 55ra. All translations are my own except where otherwise noted.

frost will not damage the daffodils, wonder whether the sparrow is a song sparrow, or believe that the breeze is coming from the southwest. Seeing yellow daffodils, hearing a sparrow's song, and feeling a warm breeze are all instances of what medieval scholastic philosophers called *sensatio* ("sensation") or *sentire* ("sensing"). Hoping that an upcoming frost will not damage the daffodils, wondering whether the sparrow is a song sparrow, and believing that the breeze is coming from the southwest are all instances of what medieval scholastic philosophers called *intellectio* ("thought") or *intelligere* ("thinking").

It was typical for medieval scholastic philosophers to see both sensing and thinking as actualizations of *capacities* or *powers* (*potentiae*) to sense and to think, respectively. Medieval scholastic philosophers were also highly attuned to questions of power identity and distinction: They debated whether the agent intellect was distinct from the possible intellect, the precise number of distinct sensory powers, and even whether the intellect and will are distinct powers.[2] But it might seem that when it comes to the powers of sensation and thought, there was broad consensus that the powers of sensation *are* distinct from the power(s) of thought. For instance, despite their many differences, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham all agree that powers of sensation are distinct from powers of thought. Moreover, there seems to be a deep philosophical commitment underlying this consensus: Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham all think that sensing is radically different from thinking in such a way that a single power could not be responsible for both kinds of actualization. In particular, they seem to see sensing as *material* or *embodied* in a way that thinking is not.[3]

But this apparent consensus did not even last through the second quarter of the fourteenth century. Instead, it collapsed in the 1320s, '30s, and '40s. In a little-studied development, many of the most influential scholastic philosophers at the University of Oxford and (later) the University of Paris came to think that in human beings the power to sense is identical to the power to think.[4] The writings of William of Ockham and his confrere Walter Chatton provide a window onto this transformation.[5] Chatton may be

[2] See, for example, Dag Hasse, "The Soul's Faculties", in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, vol. 1, edited by R. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 305-319; Robert Pasnau, "The Mind-Soul Problem", in *Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima*, edited by P. J. J. M. Bakker and J. M. M. H. Thijssen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 3-21; Dominik Perler, "Faculties in Medieval Philosophy", in *The Faculties: A History*, edited by D. Perler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 97-139.

[3] See Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, edited by C. Bazán et al., *Editio leonine*, t. 24, 1 (Rome-Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1996), 116,213-117,231 (q. 13); John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio, liber quartus: distinctiones 43-49*, edited by C. Balić et al., *Ioannis Duns Scoti opera omnia studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae*, vol. 14 (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglot Press, 2013), d. 43, q. 2 (20,439-21,462) and d. 44, q. 1 (114,607-616). For Ockham's view, see sections 2 and 3 below.

[4] See the beginning of Section 2, below.

[5] On Chatton's biography and his interactions with Ockham, see William Courtenay, *Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His Life and Writings* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 66-75.

the earliest extant philosopher from the 1320s and '30s to hold that in human beings the power to sense is not distinct from the power to think. Moreover, Chatton defends the view against Ockham's arguments that the power to sense and the power to think must be distinct. Plausibly, it was Chatton's influence that directly or indirectly led later figures, such as Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini, to adopt the view that the powers of sensation and the power to think are identical.[6] Thus, one way to understand the proximate causes of this transformation is by examining Chatton's reasons for rejecting Ockham's arguments for distinguishing sensory powers from the power to think.

This is precisely the project I undertake in this article. I examine Ockham's six main arguments that powers of sensation must be distinct from the power to think, and try to understand Chatton's reasons, in some cases implicit and in others explicit, for rejecting those arguments. As a result, this article is organized in the following way: Section 2 will briefly characterize Chatton and Ockham's shared assumptions and the nature of the disagreement between them about the distinction or lack thereof between the senses and the intellect in human beings. Sections 3-6 will examine Ockham's six main arguments that sensation must be material and embodied in some important way that thought is not (with two sets of two closely related arguments considered together in Section 3 and Section 5), and Chatton's grounds for rejecting those arguments.

From this close examination of Ockham's arguments and Chatton's grounds for rejecting them, a coherent picture will emerge. On the one hand, it will become clear that Ockham thinks that powers of sensation must be distinct from the power to think because the *kind of actualization* that is sensing is material and embodied in a way that the kind of actualization that is thinking is not. On Ockham's view, actualizations that differ in this crucial way must be actualizations of distinct powers. Chatton, on the other hand, finds Ockham's view that the actualization of sensing is material and embodied in this way unpersuasive. Since he sees no reason to posit a difference in the respective materiality or embodiment of sensation and thought that would require the two kinds of state to have distinct subjects, he also sees no need to hold that the capacity for sensation is distinct from the capacity for thought. It will also emerge from our examination of Ockham's arguments and Chatton's rejection of them that Chatton thinks that there is no need to posit such a difference between sensation and thought with respect to materiality or embodiment because he thinks that nothing about the nature of *sensory experience* indicates that sensation is material or embodied in a way that requires a distinct subject from the subject of thought.

[6] In an article in progress, "The Immaterial Turn in Medieval Latin Theories of Sensation" I trace Chatton's influence on Wodeham and Rimini.

2. Framing the Debate: Ockham's Arguments that the Subject of Thoughts is Distinct from the Subject of Sensations

Chatton's adoption of the view that in human beings powers of sensation are not distinct from the power to think heralds a significant and largely unexamined shift in late medieval thought. When he began to defend it, it is not clear that Chatton's view was held by anyone else in his milieu in England whose works are extant. Over the next four decades, it was endorsed by many of the most influential philosophers at Oxford and Paris, including Adam Wodeham (who was closely familiar with Chatton's work), William Crathorn, John Buridan, and Gregory of Rimini (who inherited the view from Wodeham).[7] Nor was this view a passing fourteenth-century fad. The influence of Chatton, Wodeham, and Rimini is visible in later scholars who endorse the view that the powers of sensation are not distinct from the immaterial human soul, including Gervasius Waim (sixteenth century, who receives the view from Gregory of Rimini) and Rodrigo de Arriaga (seventeenth century).[8] Surprisingly little scholarly attention has been devoted to examining this significant development in the history of philosophy. Indeed, there is no published work devoted to Chatton's views on the topic, even though he was apparently the proximate source for this fourteenth-century development.[9] This is a surprising development: The view that sensations are embodied and material in a way that thought is not is often seen as a cornerstone of medieval Aristotelianism.[10] Knowing that this view is abandoned by influential fourteenth-

[7] Adam Wodeham, *Lectura secunda*, edited by R. Wood and G. Gál, 3 vols. (St. Bonaventure: St. Bonaventure University, 1990), vol. 1, Prologue, q. 1 (10,28-11,55); William Crathorn, *In primum librum Sententiarum*, edited by F. Hoffman, *Quäestionen zum ersten Sentenzenbuch* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1988), q. 7 (349,28-32); Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*, edited by A. D. Trapp, V. Marcolino, and M. Santos-Noya, 7 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979-1987), vol. 5, l. 2, d. 16-17, q. 3 (354,11-373,15). On Buridan's account of the powers of the soul, see Can Laurens Löwe, "Aristotle and John Buridan on the Individuation of Causal Powers", *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy* 6/1 (2018): 189-222.

[8] Gervasius Waim, *Tractatus noticiarum* (Paris: 1519), "An potentia animae distinguatur ab anima", 41-42. Rodrigo de Arriaga, *Cursus philosophicus* (Antwerp: 1632), *De anima*, disp. 2, sec. 2, subsec. 2, 660b; disp. 3, sec. 3, subsec. 4, 669a.

[9] An exception is the recently published Marilyn McCord Adams, *Housing the Powers: Medieval Debates about Dependence on God* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 69-82. Adams focuses on the relationship between Ockham and Wodeham, whereas I will focus on Chatton's responses to Ockham. And unlike Adams, I am primarily concerned with the reasons fourteenth-century philosophers had for thinking that sensation must be material and embodied, and why Chatton found those reasons unpersuasive. Another exception is Sandra W. De Boer, who notes in an introductory article that Wodeham thinks that sensations are non-extended spiritual forms and that Wodeham thinks that disembodied sensation is metaphysically possible. Sander W. de Boer, "Dualism and the Mind-Body Problem", in *Philosophy of Mind in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance*, edited by S. Schmid (New York: Routledge, 2019), 63-82. De Boer notes that "this shift is as yet underexplored in the scholarly literature". "Dualism", 215.

[10] See, for example, Robert Pasnau, "Mind and Hylomorphism", in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 496; Peter King, "Why Isn't the Mind-Body

century figures reshapes our picture of the development of late-medieval cognition theory.[11]

Ockham and Chatton share crucial metaphysical commitments about the nature of sensations and sensory powers. This article will not attempt to motivate these commitments or explain them in detail. However, to understand the disagreement between Ockham and Chatton we do need to know what these commitments were. Ockham and Chatton agree that sensations are items in the Aristotelian category of quality. In particular, sensations are qualitative features of humans and animals that qualify them as sensing.[12] Ockham and Chatton also think that when qualities such as sensations inhere in a substance, they do so by inhering in one of the metaphysical parts of that substance. That is, a feature qualifies a whole substance only mediately or secondarily, in virtue of immediately or primarily qualifying one of its metaphysical parts. Ockham and Chatton call the metaphysical part in which a quality immediately inheres its "immediate subject" or "primary subject".[13] In what follows, I will sometimes refer to the immediate or primary subject of sensation simply as "the subject of sensation". On the other hand, when I refer to the proximate or mediate subject of

Problem Medieval?", in *Forming the Mind*, vol. 5, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 187-205; Dominik Perler, "Seeing and Judging: Ockham and Wodeham on Sensory Cognition", in *Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by S. Knuuttila and P. Kärkkäinen, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2008), 151-169.

[11] My article in progress "The Immaterial Turn in Medieval Latin Theories of Sensation" discusses just how this shift reshapes our understanding of late-medieval cognition theory.

[12] Chatton and Ockham think that all occurrent human *cognitiones*, both thoughts and sensations, are qualities. See William of Ockham, *Summula philosophiae naturalis*, edited by S. Brown, *Opera philosophica* VI (St. Bonaventure N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1984), 135-394, l. 3, c. 14, 293,13-17; l. 3, c. 20, 309,18-23; *Lect* 3.1.2 (2.50,27-19); *Lect*. 3.3.1 (2.119,33-120,5). Chatton and Ockham's shared view of the metaphysics of sensation seems to originate with Scotus. See Giorgio Pini, "Two Models of Thinking", in *Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by G. Klima (New York: Fordam University Press), 81-103.

[13] On Ockham's view that the immediate subject of a substance's qualities is a metaphysical part of that substance, see William of Ockham, *Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis: Libri IV-VIII*, edited by R. Wood et al., *Opera philosophica* V (St. Bonaventure N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1984), l. 6, c. 1, 455,110-456,116. See also Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 661-664; and Richard Cross, "Ockham on Part and Whole", *Vivarium* 37/2 (1999): 143-167, 160-166. For Chatton's endorsement of the view that a composite cannot be the immediate subject of an accident, see *Ord*. 3.3.2.1 (3.41,20-25). Note that while Cross suggests that for Ockham there are some "accidents" that have more than one part of a substance for their immediate subject, Cross's use of the term "accident" includes predicates that do not, according to Ockham, refer to qualities (such as "being generated"). As Cross shows in detail, Ockham argues that any quality with "parts of the same nature" can have only one immediate subject. But according to Ockham all qualities have parts of the same nature. See William of Ockham, *Brevis summa libri Physicorum*, edited by S. Brown, *Opera philosophica* VI (St. Bonaventure N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1984), 1-394, l. 3, c. 1, 40,31-41,35. Thus, Ockham must deny that any quality has more than one immediate subject.

sensation I will make it explicitly clear that I am doing so. For Ockham and Chatton, the basic metaphysical parts of a composite substance are substantial form, prime matter, and accidents. Both Chatton and Ockham think that the immediate subjects of human sensations are substantial forms.

Ockham and Chatton are both pluralists about substantial forms: they think that one substance can have more than one substantial form. And in particular, they are pluralists about the substantial forms of human beings. Ockham thinks that each human being has three substantial forms: the form of the human being's body, a sensory soul (responsible for sensation and sensory desires), and a rational soul (responsible for thought and volition).[14] Chatton thinks that a human being has two substantial forms: the form of the human being's body and her rational soul (the latter of which is responsible for both sensory and intellectual states).[15] Thus, Chatton is a pluralist about substantial forms but not a pluralist about souls.

Ockham and Chatton both take an immediate subject's power to be characterized by a quality to be in no way distinct from the immediate subject itself.[16] They disagree, however, over whether the immediate subject of human sensations is or is not the

[14] *QS* 1.10 (62-65); *QS* 1.12 (68-71); *QS* 2.10 (156-161); *QS* 2.11 (162-164). When I use the term "substantial form of a human being", I mean to refer to a form that inheres at every location at which the human being of which it is the substantial form exists. The issue of whether the *integral parts* of the human body have their own substantial forms is not relevant here.

[15] For Chatton's view that the intellectual soul is a substantial form of the human body, see *Rep*. 2.16-17.1 (3.309,17-18). For his view that there is a form of the body that is not a soul, namely the "form of corporeity", see *Rep*. 4.5.4 (4.293,6-8). In *Pro*. 2.4, Chatton is cautious not to directly assert the view that there is just one soul in human beings. However, in the *Reportatio*, *Lectura*, and *Quodlibeta* he directly asserts the view. See, e.g., *Quodlibeta*, q. 5, f. 55ra: "Et dico quod anima intellectiva [is the subject of sensory passions] quia illa non distinguitur a sensitiva"; *Rep*. 2.15.1.1 (3.300,6-10); *Rep*. 4.7.1 (4.300,9-11).

[16] I take it as basically clear that this is the correct interpretation of Ockham and Chatton, though neither ever gives a fully general statement of the view. In *ORep* 2.20 (*OT* V, 425-447) and *ORep* 3.4 (*OT* VI, 130-139), Ockham argues that the power to think and the power to sense are in no way distinct from the immediate subjects of thoughts and sensations, respectively. Note that in *ORep* 3.4 Ockham distinguishes a use of the term "sensory power" according to which anything that is a partial causal of a sensation is a sensory power (*OT* VI, 135,2-6). In this usage, sensory powers include the dispositions in sense organs that allow them to produce sensations. *ORep* 3.4 (135,7-136,15). However, in this article I am interested in sensory powers in the more narrow usage according to which something is a "sensory power" if and only if it is a power to sense; it seems that on Ockham's view, dispositions in organs are only powers to *produce sensations*. While Chatton frequently claims that the human rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, he never bothers to explicitly state the view that human sensory powers are not distinct from the rational soul. I take this to be because he took the latter view to be an obvious consequence of the former given his other commitments. And indeed it is: In *Lectura* 3.8.1, Chatton argues that the powers of intellect, memory and will are not distinct from the rational soul on grounds general enough to show that any power for any occurrent psychological state is not distinct from the soul that has that power (2.266,34-267,9).

human rational soul. Chatton thinks that the rational soul is the immediate subject of human sensations (and, of course, denies that there is a separate sensory soul in human beings).[17] Ockham thinks that the sensory soul is the immediate subject of sensations.[18]

In fact, in two of the three places in which Ockham argues that the subject of sensations is distinct from the subject of thoughts (*Reportatio* 4.9 and *Quodlibeta* 2.10), he does so in order to show that there must be a *sensory soul* distinct from the intellectual soul. In the third location (*Quodlibeta* 1.15), Ockham argues for this conclusion in order to support his claim that *if* there is no substantial form other than the intellectual soul in human beings, then that soul *still* cannot be the subject of sensations. In all, Ockham gives six direct arguments that the subject of sensations is distinct from the subject of thoughts. These arguments are represented in the following table:

Argument Number	**Argument**	**Location(s)**	**Section in which the Argument is Discussed**
1	Argument from the Materiality of Sensation	*Rep*. 4.9 (162,12-18)	§3
2	Argument from the Sameness in Kind of Human and Non-Human Sensation	*Rep*. 4.9 (162,19-22)	§6
3	Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing	*QS* 1.15 (84,21-23); *QS* 2.10 (158,49-53)	§5
4	Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing	*QS* 1.15 (84,23-26)	§5
5	Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought	*QS* 2.10 (158,48-49)	§3
6	Argument from the Extended Subject Requirement	*QS* 2.10 (159,62-65)	§4

Ockham also gives three arguments that the subject of sensory *desires* must be distinct from the subject of rational desires.[19] Since these arguments do not directly show that the subject of sensations (rather than sensory desires) is distinct from the subject of thoughts, I will not examine these three arguments in this article.[20]

[17] *Pro*. 2.4 (108,88-93); *Rep*. 1.3.5.1 (1.299,19-21); *Rep*. 2.15.1.1 (3.300,7-9); *Lect*. 3.6.2 (2.235,8-12).
[18] *QS* 2.10 (158,42-159,60).
[19] See *QS* 2.10 (157,11-19; 158,32-40); *ORep* 3.9 (161,8-162,3).
[20] Some of these arguments, along with some of Ockham's arguments (1)-(6) are discussed in Adams, *Housing*, 71-75 (including Ockham's arguments (3) and (5)); Dominik Perler, "Ockham über die Seele und ihre Teile", *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 77/2 (2010): 315-350, 323-329 (including Ockham's arguments (3) and (6)); and Adam Wood, "The Faculties of the Soul and

Arguments (1) and (5) are connected in a way that makes it natural to discuss them together, so I discuss both of them in Section 3. Likewise, arguments (3) and (4) are connected in a way that makes it natural to discuss them together, so I discuss both of them in Section 5. As Section 4 will note, my reading of argument (6) as an argument from a feature of sensation is not obviously correct, though there is evidence to support it.

Chatton develops either explicit or implicit responses to each of Ockham's arguments (1)-(6) in his *Reportatio*, *Lectura*, and *Quodlibet*. In fact, in the *Reportatio* and *Lectura*, Chatton endorses no philosophical arguments that sensory powers are not distinct from the human rational soul.[21] Instead, he apparently takes the philosophical plausibility of the view to rest on his having established that there is no need to posit a distinction between the human rational soul and a sensory soul (in other words, Chatton implicitly argues from parsimony). Thus, Chatton's rejection of these six arguments plays a central role in his endorsement of the view that the powers of sensation are not distinct from the power of thought. However, Chatton does not respond *explicitly* to all of these arguments, and at points it is not clear whether he has one of Ockham's arguments in mind or not. In this article, I will focus on those texts from Chatton's *corpus* that show why he was unmoved by each of Ockham's six arguments, whether or not Chatton wrote those passages with Ockham in mind. Since Chatton's rejection of Ockham's arguments (1) and (5) is in some ways the most useful or understanding the disagreement between him and Ockham, I will begin with those arguments.

3. The Organ-Dependent Nature of Sensing: The Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought (5) and the Argument from the Materiality of Sensation (1)

Ockham states the Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought in *QS* 2.10 as an argument for the minor premise of an argument that there is a sensory soul distinct from the intellectual soul:

> Sensations are in the sensory soul as a subject either mediately or immediately, and they are not in the rational soul as a subject. Therefore, [these two kinds of soul] are distinguished. The major is clear, because nothing else can be a subject of sensations

Some Medieval Mind-Body Problems", *The Thomist* 75/4 (2011): 585-636, 611-612 (including Ockham's argument (6). Adams, Perler, and Wood do not discuss Chatton's responses to these arguments.

[21] He does give two arguments from authority and one theological argument in *Pro.* 2.4 (107,55-108,81). Ockham briefly dismisses these arguments in *QS* 2.10 (160,87-161,19). In his *Quodlibet*, q. 5 Chatton does offer at least one philosophical argument for the view that the sensory soul is not distinct from the rational soul. That argument and its role in the fourteenth century is the subject of my paper "The Immaterial Turn in Medieval Latin Theories of Sensation".

> except a sensory soul or a sensory power. And if a power is an accident of a soul, it will be in the sensory soul as a subject. *The minor is* proven, *because otherwise every apprehension of the sensory soul would be a thought, because it would be in the intellectual soul as a subject.*[22]

Ockham argues as follows:

(i) If the rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, then every apprehension of the sensory soul is a thought.
(ii) Not every apprehension of the sensory soul is a thought.
(iii) The rational soul is not the immediate subject of sensations.

The phrase "apprehension of the sensory soul" should be read as referring, *de re*, to those sensory states that Ockham's theory takes to be in the sensory soul, but which Chatton's theory takes to be in the rational soul. These apprehensions are what Chatton and Ockham both call *sensationes* ("sensations"). On the plausible assumption that the distinction between sensation and thought is exclusive, (ii) is true.

However, it is not at all clear why Ockham thinks (i) is true. A natural first thought is that he takes different kinds of actualizations to require distinct immediate subjects. Thus, (i) would be supported by the principle: *If two actualizations have the same immediate subject, they must belong to the same basic kind* (e.g., if sensations belong to the rational soul as their subject, they must be the same type of actualization as thoughts). But it is clear that Ockham thinks this principle is not true in general. For instance, he thinks that the human rational soul can be the primary subject of both thoughts and volitions, two radically different kinds of state.[23]

A more promising conjecture is that Ockham takes (i) to be true because he thinks that no quality that inheres in a rational soul could have the feature or features *in virtue of which a quality is a sensation and not a thought.* That conjecture is reinforced by the Argument from the Materiality of Sensation:

> [If the sensory soul and the rational soul are not distinct], then bodily seeing and the other operations of sensory powers are just as immaterial and spiritual as thought and intellectual seeing, because they are received in the rational soul just like the operation of the intellect is.[24]

Ockham argues as follows:

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[22] *QS* 2.10 (158,42-49): "Sensationes sunt subiective in anima sensitiva mediate vel immediate; et non sunt subiective in anima intellectiva; igitur distinguuntur. Maior patet, quia nihil aliud potest assignari subiectum sensationum nisi anima sensitiva vel potentia; et si potentia sit accidens animae, erit subiective in anima sensitiva. Minor probatur, quia aliter omnis apprehensio animae sensitivae esset intellectio, quia esset subiective in anima intellectiva". Emphasis mine.
[23] *ORep*. 2.20 (*OT* 5 435,4-443,23).
[24] *ORep*. 4.9 (*OT* 7 162,12-15): "Item, si sic, tunc visio corporalis et aliae operationes potentiarum sensitivarum sunt ita immateriales et spirituales sicut intellectio et visio intellectualis, quia recipiuntur in anima intellectiva sicut operatio intellectus".

(iv) If the subject of sensations is not distinct from the rational soul, then sensing is just as immaterial and spiritual as thought.
(v) Sensing is not as immaterial and spiritual as thought.
(vi) Therefore, the subject of sensations is distinct from the rational soul.

It is not surprising that Ockham would endorse (iv), which follows from the seemingly plausible assumption that a quality is just as immaterial and spiritual as the subject in which it inheres. But (v) tells us something important: Ockham thinks that sensation is material in a way that thought is not. And Ockham thinks that nothing that is material in this way inheres in a rational soul.

Our conjecture about why Ockham thinks (i) is true was that he thinks that no quality that inheres in a rational soul could have the feature or features in virtue of which a quality is a sensation and not a thought. If an apprehension's being material in the way that Ockham refers to in (v) is what makes it a sensation rather than a thought, this fits well with the conjecture. After all, it is clear from (iv) that Ockham thinks that any quality that inheres in a rational soul lacks this sort of materiality. Thus, if it is this kind of materiality that makes an apprehension a sensation rather than a thought, this explains why any apprehension that inheres in a rational soul is a thought, as (i) claims.

Some additional support for this reading of Ockham comes from the fact that he does not seem ever to offer *any other way* of drawing the distinction between thought and sensation. As we will see, Chatton will develop another way of distinguishing sensation from thought.[25] But it is not clear that Ockham has any other way of drawing the distinction.

For instance, it seems that for Ockham the difference between sensation and thought is not a difference in *content*. For, as we will see below, Ockham thinks that for any human sensory apprehension with a given content, there can be an intellectual apprehension (i.e., a thought), with the same content.[26] Given two apprehensions with the same content, what makes the quality in the sensory soul a sensation whereas the quality in the rational soul is a thought? The only obvious candidate is the *materiality* of the first quality.

Chatton will disagree with Ockham's way of drawing the distinction between thought and sensation. This allows him to reject both the Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought and the Argument from the Materiality of Sensation. To see the precise nature of the disagreement, we need to see in *exactly what sense* Ockham thinks sensation is more material or spiritual than thought. There are two ways not shared by qualities inhering in a rational soul in which a quality that inheres in the sensory soul is material and non-spiritual. First, such a quality essentially depends on a form that itself essentially depends on prime matter. Second, such a quality has integral parts that are

[25] See below in this section.
[26] See below in this section.

distinct in location from one another. Let us say that a quality Q is *material* if it has the first property and *extended* if it has the second property:[27]

> An accidental form Q is *material* if and only if either Q essentially inheres in prime matter or Q essentially inheres in a form that by nature depends for its existence on prime matter.[28]
>
> An accidental from Q is *extended* if and only if Q has potentially or actually distinct integral parts that by nature exist in distinct locations.[29]

Chatton and Ockham apparently think that a quality is extended if and only if it is material.[30] I also assume that Ockham thinks no material and extended quality could inhere in a form such as the rational soul.[31] In what follows, I will refer to a quality that is material and extended as a "physical quality" and to a quality that is neither material nor extended an "immaterial quality".[32]

Ockham holds that sensations, since they inhere in a material and extended form (see Section 2), are physical qualities. Thoughts are immaterial qualities. This is the

[27] While I do think that I am using the terms "material" and "extended" in the way that Ockham uses the terms *materialis* and *extensa*, respectively, I do not take my usage of the terms to be *justified* by its match with Ockham's usage. (See, for instance, *ORep*. 3.2 (*OT* 6 57,2-4); *QS* 4.19 (396,10-11); *Expositio* l. 4, c. 17, 182,120.) Instead, I simply use them to pick out the concepts defined here.

[28] On fourteenth-century uses of the term *materialis*, see footnote 32 below.

[29] The idea that Ockham or Chatton think that any *quality* is extended in the sense here defined may seem implausible: qualities do not have integral parts! But the texts are unambiguous: Ockham and Chatton think that material forms, both accidental and substantial, are extended and have integral parts. See *Brevis summa*, l. 4, c. 1, 52,77-84; *Expositio*, l. 4, c. 6, 56,9-16; *QS* 4.19 (396,33-38). That Chatton shares Ockham's view on this issue is clear from, for instance, *Rep*. 4.4.1-2 (4.274,15-276,12).

[30] It is less clear whether Ockham and Chatton think that *necessarily*, every extended quality is also material. To my knowledge, neither considers the possibility of God making an extended form that does not essentially depend, directly or indirectly, on prime matter (though both think that God could supernaturally keep in existence a form that essentially depends on prime matter without the existence of that matter).

[31] Ockham apparently takes for granted that a material and extended quality must have a material and extended immediate subject. This principle is not obvious. And once Chatton rejected the principle that every quality of an immaterial subject must characterize it at every place at which it exists (see Section 4 below), there was no obvious reason to hold it. See Rodrigo de Arriaga's extensive defense of the view that sensations are material and extended qualities that immediately inhere in the immaterial human soul in *Cursus*, *De anima*, disp. 3, sec. 2, subsec. 1 (659a-660b).

[32] It might seem unfitting to use the term "immaterial" to refer to a quality that both does not depend on matter and is not extended. After all, wouldn't *immaterialis* mean *just* "not dependent on matter" for medieval philosophers? In fact, both John Duns Scotus and William Crathorn list being "indivisible" (Crathorn) or "in no way extended" as one of the senses in which a quality can be immaterial. William Crathorn, *In primum librum*, q. 1, 120,8-16. John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio 43-49*, d. 43, q. 2 (21,478-22,492).

precise sense in which Ockham thinks sensation is more immaterial and spiritual than thought (and thus the precise sense in which he thinks (v) is true). I have also suggested that Ockham thinks that being physical is the *differentia* of sensation – given an apprehension of, say, a cat, the apprehension is a sensation if it is a physical quality, but a thought if it is an immaterial quality. Since Ockham thinks any quality that inheres in a rational soul is an immaterial quality, we can see why he takes (i) to be true.

Chatton rejects both (i) and (v). That is, Chatton thinks both that the feature that distinguishes sensations from thoughts can be possessed by a quality that inheres in the rational soul and that sensations are no less material and spiritual than thoughts. Chatton considers the Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought in his *Reportatio* and *Lectura*, as well as in his *Quodlibeta*.[33] In all three locations, Chatton's response is the same. He offers his *own account* of what makes something a sensation rather than a thought. On this account, the sensation-making feature is compatible with the qualities that are sensations inhering in a rational soul. Since on Chatton's account the feature in virtue of which a quality a sensation rather than a thought is compatible with that quality's having a rational soul as its immediate subject, Chatton is able to reject (v) as well – on Chatton's view, sensations are just as immaterial as thoughts.

So, to understand Chatton's response to Ockham, we need to understand Chatton's account of the feature that distinguishes sensations from thoughts. In the following passage from the *Reportatio*, Chatton responds to the view (which he does not attribute to any particular author) that sensations simply are thoughts because they inhere in the rational soul:

> These people do not make a substantive point, but only disagree about the signification of a word. For I ask, what do they call thought? Either every actualization received in the soul, or only that which the soul has in its power. If the latter, then my claim follows. If the former, then they only equivocate, and we agree about the facts. For then they concede that there is one [kind of] actualization that we experience in the pupil of the eye in response to a change in an organ, and other actualizations which are in our power. If, as they want to do, they call both thoughts, then the difficulty is merely verbal.[34]

This passage shows us exactly how Chatton would respond to (i): by noting that the feature that distinguishes sensations from thoughts can be possessed by a quality that

[33] *Rep*. 1.3.6 (1.335,15-337,3); 1.; *Lect*. 3.8.2 (2.270,11-16; 2.275,14-276,34); *Quodlibeta* q. 5. Chatton considers the view under the guise not of Ockham's argument, but rather of a view (which he does not attribute to any particular individual) that sensations simply *are* thoughts because they have the same subject as thoughts.

[34] *Rep*. 1.3.6 (1.336,14-22): "Item, isti nihil reale dicunt, sed solum variant in significato vocabuli. Quaero enim quid vocant intellectionem. Aut omnem actum receptum in anima; aut solem quem habet anima in potestate sua, et si hoc, propositum. Si primo modo, tunc tantum aequivocant, et in re concordamus. Nam tunc concedunt unum actum quem experimur in pupilla oculi ad transmutationem organi, et alios actus qui sunt in potestate nostra. Si vocant, sicut volunt, ambas intellectiones, difficultas tantum est vocalis".

inheres in a rational soul. Unlike Ockham, Chatton does not think that this feature consists in being a physical quality. Instead, Chatton characterizes this feature an apprehension's being such as to occur naturally in response to a change in organ. Chatton describes this feature again in a passage in his *Lectura*:

> Sensations are the kind of actualizations which necessarily are caused when their objects are present and there is no impediment which is suited to impede their natural action, and consequently we experience the sort of actualizations that are caused just as necessarily in us through a change in [our] organs as they are in non-rational animals.[35]

According to Chatton, any apprehension that occurs (a) unavoidably (given the absence of impediments) and (b) in response to a change in an organ is a sensation. Consider, for instance, a case where one sees a straight stick half in and half out of the water as bent. The visual awareness of the stick seems to fulfill these criteria: (a) given that one's visual system is in good condition and one looks at the stick in good lighting, one will be unable to avoid seeing the stick; (b) one's seeing the stick occurs in response to reflected light entering one's eyes. Thoughts, Chatton thinks, are in our power and we do not experience them as occurring in response to changes in bodily organs.

If this is what Chatton thinks the distinction between sensation and thought amounts to, then we would expect him to reject (v). That is, we would expect him to think that an immaterial quality can fulfill conditions (a)-(c) just as well as a material quality can. And indeed he does. Chatton writes that "sensation is no more extended or quantified than thought."[36] According to Chatton, sensations are just as immaterial as thoughts.

Thus, Chatton rejects Ockham's Argument from the Distinction Between Sensation and Thought (5) and his Argument from the Materiality of Sensation (1) because he disagrees with Ockham about what distinguishes sensing from thinking. Ockham thinks it is the materiality of sensation that differentiates it from thinking. Chatton thinks sensation's not being under a subject's direct control and its occuring in response to a change in an organ differentiates it from thinking.

I propose that this disagreement between Ockham and Chatton signals an important difference in the way they approach theorizing about sensation. Chatton takes the distinction between thought and sensation to be *an introspectable difference between kinds of experiences*. Notice that in the two passages previously quoted, Chatton states that "there is one [kind of] actualization that we *experience* in the pupil of the eye

[35] *Lect*. 3.8.2 (2.276,3-8): "[...] sensationes sunt tales actus qui necessario causantur, obiectis praesentibus, circumscripto impedimento quod natum esset impedire actionem naturalem, et per consequens tales actus experimur qui aeque necessario causantur in nobis per transmutationem organorum sicut in brutis". Chatton repeatedly offers the same account of the difference between thought and sensation. See, for instance, *Lect*. 3.8.2 (2.275,17-20); *Pro*. 2.4 (109,127-131); *Rep*. 1.3.5.1 (1.295,14-17).

[36] *Lect*. 3.6 (2.235,8-9): "[...] sensatio non magis extenditur nec est quanta quam intellectio".

in response to a change in an organ" and that "consequently we *experience* the sort of actualizations that are caused just as necessarily in us through changes in [our] organs as they are in non-rational animals" (emphasis mine). In addition, Chatton sometimes introduces his account of the distinction between sensation and thought by asking *how we become aware* of the difference between these two kinds of states. For instance, in the *Prologus* he asks (rhetorically) "I ask, in what way is the distinction between sensation and thought made known to us?"[37] Chatton responds to this rhetorical question by arguing that

> [...] the distinction between thought and sensation is disclosed because every actualizations that is caused in response to a change in an organ is a sensation, no matter what it is received in.[38]

In other words, we introspectively distinguish sensations from thoughts *not* by noticing that we have one type of state (sensation) that is more material than or in a different subject than another type of state (thought), but by noticing that we have one type of state that occurs in response to bodily changes in a way outside of our control (which we call sensation) and another state that seems unnecessitated to bodily changes and under our direct control (which we call thought). Chatton even apparently thinks that the only reason we draw a distinction between thought and sensation at all is because we notice that some of our mental states come about in response to changes in organs and others apparently do not:

> Through *this alone* is it made known to us that some actualization is volitional [i.e., involves rational desire], or even that it is rational: that it is not necessarily caused in response to a change in an organ.[39]

In short, Chatton thinks that the distinction between sensations and thoughts is given in introspection and that, but for these introspectable differences, we would have no reason to distinguish sensations from thoughts at all.

Ockham, on the other hand, does not obviously think of the difference between thought and sensation as an introspectively given difference. In *QS* 1.15, which directly responds to some of the arguments in Chatton's *Prologus* 2.4, Ockham considers Chatton's question "In what way is the distinction between sensation and thought made known to us?"). Ockham answers:

> I say that the difference between sensory seeing and rational seeing is made known to us partly through reason and partly through experience. Through experience, because a

[37] "Quaero per quem modum innotescit nobis differentia inter sensationem et intellectionem?" *Pro*. 2.4 (109,112-113).
[38] *Pro*. 2.4 (109,127-129): "[...] arguatur distinctio inter intellectionem et sensationem, quia omnis actus qui causatur ad transmutationem organi est sensatio, in quocumque recipiatur".
[39] *Rep*. 3.33.1.6 (3.207,24-26): "Nam per hoc solum innotescit nobis quod actus est volitivus, vel intellectivus etiam, quia non causatur necessario ad transmutationem organi". Emphasis mine.

> child sees sensorily but not rationally. Through reason, because a separated soul is able to have intellectual seeing, but not sensory seeing.[40]

Ockham claims that we become aware of the distinction between sensing and thinking through both experience and reason. This is already a difference from Chatton, who takes the distinction to be given by experience alone. More importantly, however, notice that Ockham's appeal to experience is not an appeal to introspection at all: Instead, Ockham points to the third-personally observable (rather than first-personally introspectable) fact that children have one type of cognition but lack another type.

I suggest, then, that Ockham and Chatton fundamentally disagree about the nature of the distinction between thought and sensation: Chatton thinks that it is an introspectively given distinction. Ockham rejects this view. This becomes especially clear when Chatton rejects one of Ockham's most distinctive views about the nature of sensation. According to Ockham, for every sensation with a given content in the sensory soul, there can be a thought *with that same content* in the intellectual soul. That is, Ockham posits *duplicates* of our simple sensory apprehensions in the rational soul: For each sensory seeing, there is an intellectual seeing in the rational soul.[41] For instance, when you hear a song sparrow in the garden, there are *two distinct qualities*, one in your sensory soul and one in your intellectual soul, both of which are simple (i.e. non-propositional) apprehensions of the song sparrow's song, one in your sensory soul and one in your rational soul.

Chatton objects that this view leaves us with no way to distinguish sensation from thought:

> [If this view were true], then the way of discovering the difference between sensation and thought would be destroyed, because it is not clear what way [of discovering this difference] there would be unless it is posited that every actualization which occurs with natural necessity in response to (*causatur ad*) a change in an organ whenever impediments are absent, and even after deliberation, is a sensation. But a thought is that actualization which is able to be caused or not to be caused, even after deliberation, when every sensory impediment is absent.[42]

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[40] *QS* 1.15 (84,37-85,41): "Dico quod differentia inter visionem sensitivam et intellectivam innotescit nobis partim per rationem partim per experientiam: per experientiam, quia puer videt sensibiliter et non intellectualiter; per rationem etiam, quia anima separata potest habere visionem intellectivam, non sensitivam".

[41] William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio*, edited by S. Brown et al., *Opera theologica* 1 (St. Bonaventure: St. Bonaventure University, 1967), l. 1, Pro., q. 1 (25.15-26.10).

[42] *Lect.* 3.6.1 (2.219,19-220, 6): "[...] tunc periret via investigandi differentiam inter intellectionem et sensationem, quia non apparet quae sit via nisi ponendo quod omnis ille actus sit sensatio quae causatur ad transmutationem organi necessitate naturali, amotis impedimentis, etiam post

On Chatton's reading of Ockham's view, both the qualities in the sensory soul that Ockham calls sensations *and* the duplicate states in the rational soul that Ockham calls thoughts are introspectively experienced as occurring necessarily in response to changes in bodily organs. But on such a view, Chatton argues, there would be no introspectable difference between sensation and thought.

This difference between Ockham and Chatton is crucial to understanding Chatton's view that powers of sensation are not distinct from powers of thought. As we saw from our analysis of Ockham's arguments (1) and (5), Ockham thinks that the subject of sensations must be distinct from the subject of thoughts precisely because he thinks that sensations are material and embodied in a way that requires a subject that is material or embodied. However, given Chatton's way of drawing the distinction between thought and sensation through introspectively experienced differences between thought and sensation, it seems likely that he will only accept Ockham's view that human sensations require such a subject if some feature of *sensory experience* seems to require a material and embodied subject. And it is not at all obvious why the kind of state that occurs outside of a subject's control and in response to a change in an organ would have to occur *in a material subject*. It seemed to Chatton that this kind of state could also occur in a rational soul. However, as we will see in the following section, there *is* one aspect of the experience of sensing that Chatton thinks requires explanation on the view that sensation occurs in an immaterial soul.

4. The Embodied Experience of Sensation: The Argument from the Extended Subject Requirement (6)

In *QS* 2.10, Ockham argues that the immediate subject of sensations is distinct from the immediate subject of thoughts:

> Numerically the same form is not extended and non-extended, material and immaterial. But the sensory soul in a human being is extended and material, whereas the rational soul is not, because the rational soul is whole in whole and whole in every part. Therefore, [the sensory soul is distinct from the rational soul].[43]

For a given sensory and rational soul in a given human being, Ockham's Argument from the Extended Subject Requirement runs as follows:

(vii) The sensory soul is extended and material.
(viii) The rational soul is not extended and not material.
(ix) No soul is both extended and not extended or both material and not material.

deliberationem; sed intellectio est ille actus qui potest causari vel non causari, etiam post deliberationem, amoto omni impedimento sensitivo".

[43] *QS* 2.10 (159,62-65): "Eadem forma numero non est extensa et non extensa, materialis et immaterialis; sed anima sensitiva in homine est extensa et materialis, anima intellectiva non, quia est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte; igitur etc".

(x) Therefore, the sensory soul is distinct from the rational soul.

Since Ockham holds that the sensory soul is the subject of sensations and the rational soul is the subject of thoughts, it follows that the subject of sensations must be distinct from the subject of thoughts.

We know that Ockham is committed to (viii), and (ix) is plausible. However, it is hard to see what Ockham's motivation for (vii) could be. In *QS* 2.10, Ockham gives this argument as a proof that there exists a sensory soul distinct from the rational soul. Of course, if there is such a soul *and it is distinct from the rational soul*, it is plausible that (vii) is true of it. But in the context of this argument Ockham cannot assume that the sensory soul is distinct from the rational soul, since that is the conclusion of the argument.

So what evidence does Ockham take himself to have for (vii)? Before he has shown that the sensory soul is distinct from the rational soul, Ockham can still distinguish it *functionally* from the rational soul. For instance, we know that the sensory soul is that soul (whichever one it is, perhaps even the rational soul) that is the subject of sensations and sensory desires. Likewise, we know that the sensory soul is that soul, whichever one it is, in virtue of which a human being is a living animal. Perhaps, then, Ockham can defend (vii) by arguing that one of the functions performed by the sensory soul could only be performed by a form that is extended (i.e., having distinct parts in distinct spatial locations) and material (i.e., depending essentially on prime matter for its existence).

What might these functions be? In *QS* 2.10, Ockham does not say. However, a look at his *Reportatio* 3.4 brings to light a possibility. There, Ockham carefully develops an account of the way in which sensory powers are distinct from another. The view that the sensory soul is an extended form is essential to this account. Ockham argues that the sensory powers are in some sense distinct from one another because the sensory soul is extended and divisible.[44] Ockham suggests that a particular sensory power is that *part* of the sensory soul which informs the organ corresponding to that power. Thus, for instance, when we speak of "Jill's power of sight" or "Jill's capacity to see" we refer to the part of Jill's sensory soul that informs her organs of sight, but not the part of Jill's sensory soul that informs, say, her left elbow.[45] In short, Ockham's view that the sensory soul is extended allows him to assign unique bodily locations to sensory powers.

Ockham does not explain *why* he wants to assign unique bodily locations to sensory powers in this way. However, it is clear that Chatton thinks that a feature of *sensory experience* should incline us to assign unique bodily locations to sensations. As we will see below, he thinks that introspection presents sensations as occurring at unique

[44] *ORep* 3.7 (*OT* 6 136,22-137,11).

[45] *ORep* 3.7 (*OT* 6 139,4-7). Ockham is quick to point out that it is not as if the part of Jill's sensory soul in her eyes is somehow intrinsically better suited to seeing from the part in her left elbow – the former part is just better placed to take advantage of the causal activity of Jill's eyes. *ORep* 3.7 (*OT* 6 138,6-17).

bodily locations. Seeing seems to occur in the neighborhood of the eyes, some tactile sensations seem to occur in one's fingers and toes, and so on. In short, sensations seem to have unique bodily locations. This gives Chatton a reason to accept (vii). As Ockham's account in his *Reportatio* 3.4 suggests, an account on which the subject of sensations is extended and material can easily explain why sensations seem to have unique bodily locations: For instance, a sensation in my thumb seems to be located where my thumb is located and not where my eye is located because it is a quality that informs the part of my sensory soul that is in my thumb, but not the part that is in my eye.

Chatton, who thinks that the primary subject of sensations is the rational soul, cannot opt for this explanation. Chatton *does* think that the human rational soul is in every part of the body. But he must deny that the human rational soul has spatially distinct parts such that none of these parts is the whole soul. If it did have such extended parts, it would be a material form rather than an immaterial form. According to Chatton, the subject of human sensations is *holenmerically located* in every place in which the body exists. A holenmerically located entity exists in multiple locations at once, but in such a way that all of it exists in every location at which it exists.[46] It is, to use the medieval terminology that Ockham uses in his statement of the argument "whole in whole and whole in every part", rather than existing in such a way that it has "parts outside of parts". Now, it seems natural to think that every *feature* that characterizes a holenmerically located entity characterizes it in every place that it exists. It seems that if, for instance, my touch sensation of my keyboard that I seem to feel in my thumb characterizes an immaterial soul that exists wholly in every part of my body, then my sensation of the keyboard will be in every part of my body. But then I would not have the touch sensation in my thumb rather than in my toes! So it seems that Ockham's account of the immediate subject of sensation explains the fact that sensations seem to have unique bodily locations. Chatton's account leaves this fact unexplained.

Chatton gives significant attention to explaining how the human soul can experience some of its qualities as located in some proper part of the body in which it is holenmerically located.[47] In these passages, Chatton points out that we experience *thoughts* as having unique bodily locations *as well as sensations*, stating, for instance, that "we experience ourselves to think in our head and not in our feet".[48] But thoughts, Chatton and Ockham agree, immediately inhere in the human rational soul, which is

[46] See Robert Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 16. For Chatton's endorsement of this standard account of the metaphysics of the human rational soul, see, e.g., *Rep.* 2.16-17.2 (3.310,6-13). However, note that in this location Chatton is pointing out that the fact that thoughts and volitions seem to have unique bodily locations is a reason to think that the human soul is not present in every part of the body (albeit a reason that Chatton thinks must be rejected as inconclusive, since it contradicts a view Chatton thinks is required by theological authorities).

[47] The crucial texts are *Rep.* 1.3.6.1 (328,21-329,20) and *Lect.* 3.8.1 (2.267,23-268,7).

[48] *Rep.* 2.16-17 (3.310,11-13): "[...] experiamur nos intelligere in capite et non in pede".

holenmerically located in the whole body. Thus, a cognition's being immediately received in an immaterial soul must be compatible with its being experienced as having a determinate bodily location.

These statements suggest that Chatton has a strong, albeit implicit, response to Ockham's Argument from the Extended Subject Requirement: Ockham must grant that the datum on which the argument seems to be based (the experience of sensations as having unique bodily locations) is not enough to show that the subject of sensations is extended and material, because Ockham himself must admit that there are some qualities of our immaterial soul which we experience as having unique bodily locations. As Chatton points out, even though the principle that a feature that characterizes a holenmerically located entity characterizes it everywhere that it is located seems powerful, our experience of thought shows that it must be false (on the assumption that thoughts are immaterial qualities of an immaterial soul, which both he and Ockham accept):

> This [that thoughts do not have unique bodily locations because they are in a subject that is holenmerically located in the whole body] is a very weighty argument against me, but nevertheless it need not move me, because, given the fact that we so evidently and certainly experience ourselves to think more in one part than in another, and that it does not appear to us that this argument proves the opposite as evidently [i.e., as evidently as that experience shows that the conclusion of the argument is false], is to be followed more here.[49]

Chatton thinks he has a reason to reject the introspective data in support of (vii): We experience thoughts as having unique bodily locations. But this experience is not incompatible with thoughts inhering in the rational soul. Thus, there is no reason to suppose it is incompatible with sensations inhering in the rational soul either.

Chatton may have raised his view that sensations and thoughts are both experienced as occurring at unique bodily locations while he and Ockham were at the Franciscan convent in London, as Ockham responds to it in his *Quodlibeta* 1.12.[50] Ockham responds that we do not experience thoughts as having bodily locations, but only as being *caused* by qualities with bodily locations:

> I say that we do not experience ourselves to think in our head any more than in our foot. But we often experience that we are more aided in thinking or impeded from thinking

[49] *Rep*. 1.3.6.1 (1.329,1-5) "Istud est gravius argumentum contra me, sed tamen non debet me movere, quia ex quo ita evidenter et ita certitudinaliter experimur nos intelligere plus in una parte quam in alia, nec apparet nobis quod istud argumentum ita evidenter concludat oppositum, magis adhibendum est hic experientia".

[50] *QS* 1.12 (69,26-27; 71,54-63). On the evidence that Ockham's quodlibets sometimes represent *viva voce* debate between Ockham and Chatton, likely at the Franciscan convent in London, see Rondo Keele, "Oxford *Quodlibeta* from Ockham to Holcot", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, edited by C. Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 651-692, 666-678.

> through a disposition of our head than of our foot, just as we experience that often we are more aided by a disposition of our eye than of our hand.[51]

Ockham simply denies that we experience thoughts as occurring at unique bodily locations. Instead, we experience our thoughts as being aided or impeded by states that themselves have unique bodily locations. This may be a plausible response: It seems plausible that that having a unique bodily location is part of the phenomenology of sensation. On the other hand, it is less clear that thoughts have their own phenomenology at all.[52] And even if they do, it is not obvious that this phenomenology includes an experienced, unique bodily location.

On the other hand, Ockham response to Chatton's claim that thoughts are experienced as having unique bodily locations highlights one way in which Chatton might *explain away* the apparent unique bodily locations of sensations. Just as Ockham suggests that thoughts do not have unique bodily locations but are rather aided or impeded by states with unique bodily locations, so Chatton might explain away the apparent unique bodily location of sensations by proposing that what we do not experience sensations as possessing unique bodily locations, but only as being aided or impeded by states with unique bodily locations.

In fact, this is one of two strategies that Chatton offers for explaining the apparent bodily location of sensations. Chatton refers to the feature in virtue of which occurrent mental states such as thoughts and sensations seem to have unique bodily locations as their being "mediately received" in an organ.[53] In the *Lectura* and the *Reportatio*, Chatton considers two possible accounts of what it is for an occurrent mental state to be mediately received in an organ: According to the first, (1) it is not the case that necessarily, every feature of a holenmerically located entity characterizes that entity at every place in which it exists.[54] Instead, a sensation can characterize the rational soul at only some but not all of the places at which it exists. As Adams shows, Wodeham will later adopt this response.[55] Chatton states that this is his less preferred response. He claims to prefer the view that (2) what we experience is not the occurrence of sensation in a unique bodily location, but its "essential dependence" on that location alone, a view that sounds much like Ockham's account of the supposed apparent location of thoughts.[56]

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[51] *QS* 1.12 (71,54-58): "[...] dico quod non plus experimur nos intelligere in capite quam in pede. Sed experimur frequenter quod plus iuvamur et impedimur ad intelligendum per dispositionem capitis quam pedis, sicut experimur quod frequenter plus adiuvamur per dispositionem oculi quam manus".

[52] For an introduction to the debate over the existence of "cognitive phenomenology", see Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague, "Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction", in *Cognitive Phenomenology*, edited by T. Bayne and M. Montague (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), viii-34.

[53] *Pro.* 2.4 (109,123-126). Note that Chatton thinks that both thoughts and sensations are mediately received in organs.

[54] *Rep.* 1.3.6.1 (1.329,16-20). *Lect.* 1.3.8.1 (267,28-32).

[55] See Adams, *Housing*, 80.

[56] *Rep.* 1.3.6.1 (1.329,6-15); *Lect.* 1.3.8.1 (267,32-268,2).

Despite claiming that (1) is his less preferred view, Chatton defends the view that there is no contradiction in a quality characterizing a holenmerically located entity at only some of the places at which it exists in much greater detail in his discussions of the eucharist in *Reportatio* 4.4.[57]

By Chatton's lights, the fact that sensations seem, upon introspection, to have unique bodily locations is some reason to accept the first premise of Ockham's Argument from the Extended Subject Requirement. But Chatton thinks that the force of this consideration is limited for several reasons. First, he thinks that considerations of this sort apply to thoughts as well, but he is committed to the view that thoughts do not inhere in an extended subject. Second, it is not obviously true that a quality that modifies a holenmerically located subject must modify it at every place at which it exists. Third, it is not clear that the phenomenology of sensation shows that sensations really do have unique bodily locations rather than uniquely depending on unique bodily locations.

To my knowledge, Chatton does not consider any other introspectable features of sensation that would indicate that it is material or embodied in a way that thought need not be (thus requiring a distinct subject from thought). However, we can gather from Chatton's *Reportatio* and *Lectura* how he did or would have responded to Ockham's three additional arguments that the subject of sensations must be distinct from the subject of thoughts. All three arguments seek to show that sensation must be material or embodied in a way that thought is not. And in each case, I will suggest, Chatton is unconvinced because he sees nothing about the nature of sensory experience that requires it to be material or embodied in a way than merely would require a subject distinct from the subject of thought.

5. Sensing Without a Body: The Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing (3) and the Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing (4)

Ockham's Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing and his Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing are closely related. Ockham recognized that identifying the power to sense with the power to think (and thus the subject of sensations with the subject of thoughts) would challenge a foundational commitment of medieval Aristotelian psychology: Sensing is possible only for an *embodied* cognizer. Angels do not touch or see or taste, and neither do human souls when separated from the human body. In fact, touching and tasting may even be *deficient* ways of grasping the objects of touch and taste – ways that a more perfect cognizer would not be capable of simply on account of being more perfect.[58]

[57] *Rep*. 4.4.2 (277,5-12; 278,2-9). See also *Rep*. 4.3.2 (4.266,16-20) where Chatton explicitly asserts that he adopts solution (1) in the context of a discussion of whether Jesus's body can be multilocated.
[58] For a discussion of precisely what this deficiency might amount to, see Therese Scarpelli Cory, "Embodied vs. Non-Embodied Modes of Knowing in Aquinas: Different Universals, Different Intelligible Species, Different Intellects", *Faith and Philosophy* 35/4 (2018): 417-446, 439-442.

Ockham highlights this problem with both the Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing and the Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing in *QS* 1.15:

> For if [sensory seeing] were received in the rational soul, then a separated soul would be able to have in itself every sensation of the five senses, at least through divine power, which seems untrue. For, if this were the case, an angel would always lack some natural perfection. For, it seems that it would be able to have such forms [i.e., sensations] even naturally, because corporeal things would be merely efficient causes of those forms.[59]

Ockham's Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing runs as follows:

(xi) If the rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, then it is metaphysically possible for a disembodied rational soul to undergo sensations.
(xii) But it is not metaphysically possible for a disembodied rational soul to undergo sensations.
(xiii) Therefore, the rational soul is not the immediate subject of sensations.

Ockham's Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing has a similar structure:

(xiv) If the rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, then it is naturally possible for angels to have sensations.
(xv) If it is naturally possible for angels to have sensations, then sensations are a perfection for angels.
(xvi) Angels never have sensations.
(xvii) Thus, if the rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, angels always lack a state that is a perfection for angels.
(xviii) But there is no state that is a perfection for angels that is such that angels always lack that state.
(xix) Thus, the rational soul is not the immediate subject of sensations.

Both arguments highlight Ockham's Aristotelian view that sensing is the sort of activity that can only be accomplished by embodied creatures. Angels and human souls after death are not embodied, so they cannot sense.

Chatton rejects this Aristotelian commitment. In response to the Argument from the Impossibility of Disembodied Sensing, Chatton simply rejects (xii):

[59] *QS* 1.15 (84,21-26): "Si enim reciperetur in anima intellectiva, anima separata, per potentiam Dei saltem, posset habere in se omnem sensationem quinque sensuum; quod non videtur verum. Quia si sic, angelus semper careret aliqua perfectione naturali, quia videtur quod naturaliter etiam posset tales formas habere, quia corporalia non essent nisi causae efficientes illarum formarum". Ockham repeats a similar argument at *QS* 2.10, where instead of trying to show that there is an implausible implication of sensation being possible for a separated soul, he simply claims that the implication is absurd. *QS* 2.10 (158,49-53): "[...] tunc anima separata posset sentire, quia ex quo sensatio est subiective in anima intellectiva et Deus potest conservare omne accidens in suo subiecto sine quocumque alio, per consequens posset conservare sensationem in anima separata; quod est absurdum".

> I do not see why the actualization of touching [i.e., the touch sensation] now immediately received in a soul would not be able to remain in that soul while it is separated from the body, if God wanted it to. [60]

In fact, it is unclear whether Chatton's position is at a significant disadvantage to Ockham's in this respect even by Ockham's own lights: As Gregory of Rimini would later point out, it seems that Ockham must grant that God could supernaturally separate a *sensory* soul from its body while preserving its sensations in it.[61]

To see how Chatton would respond to the Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing, we can look to two of Chatton's discussions of angelic mental states, one in his *Lectura* and one in his *Reportatio*. In the *Lectura*, Chatton suggests the view that disembodied spirits have apprehensions that are phenomenally and intentionally like sensations, while leaving it open that those apprehensions differ in kind from sensations in some other way. Chatton states:

> If some actualizations like the sensations of souls with bodies were to be posited in disembodied spirits, then it should consequently be posited that in those spirits intellectual pleasure and sadness are distinguished from those pleasures and sadnesses that are like sensory pleasure and sadness.[62]

He promises to discuss the issue of whether this it is in fact true that disembodied spirits have sensations "elsewhere".[63]

That reference may be to Chatton's *Reportatio* 4.11, where he considers as a philosophical thought experiment the question (motivated by scholastic theological commitments) of how both separated human souls and fallen angels could suffer from physical fire after death. The issue here is directly related to the issue of whether disembodied spirits can sense: If disembodied spirits cannot have touch sensations, then how could fire cause them pain or sadness? After setting out two possible views, Chatton gives what he identifies as his preferred view. According to this view, separated souls and fallen angels have apprehensions that are just like our touch sensations:

> [On Chatton's preferred view] that fire would have some quality which could cause an actualization in a spirit or separated soul that is like the actualization of touching (*talem actum qualis est actus tangendi*) now immediately received in our soul (because, just as I have frequently said, all our vital actualizations are immediately received in the soul

[60] *Rep* 4.11.1 (4.351,3-5): "Non video quin actus tangendi modo receptus in anima immediate posset manere in ipsa si placeret Deo, ipsa separata corpore".
[61] Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura*, l. 2, d. 16-17, q. 2 (344,29-33). I take Chatton's denial in *Pro*. 2.4 that a separated soul "potest in actus sentiendi" to be the denial that a separated soul would be *naturally* able to sense because sensations are naturally caused by changes in sense organs (115,295-299).
[62] *Lect*. 1.2.2, (1.68,20-23): "[...] si in spiritibus separatis ponantur aliqui actus similes sensationibus animarum coniunctarum, tunc consequenter esset ponendum quod in illis delectatio et tristitia intellectualis distinguerentur a delectationibus et tristitiis illis quasi sensitivis".
[63] *Lect*. 1.2.2, (1.68,24-27).

> itself) upon which an actualization that is similar to our actualization of touching would follow that distressing pain.[64]

A disembodied soul's cognition of a singular material quality is phenomenologically and intentionally like sensory awareness of that same quality. Angels feel heat just like embodied humans feel heat. And a bit later in the same passage, Chatton points to a natural and plausible justification for this view: "for otherwise it would not be explained how a spirit would have evident awareness of the qualities that are sensed by touch (*tangibilium*)".[65] Chatton thinks that, if disembodied spirits could not have states phenomenally and intentionally like our sensations, it is unclear how they could be aware of sensible qualities at all.

These passages hint at how Chatton would respond to the Argument from the Impossibility of Angelic Sensing. It seems he would reject either (xiv) or (xvi):

(xiv) If the rational soul is the immediate subject of sensations, then it is naturally possible for angels to have sensations.
(xvi) Angels never have sensations.

How we answer the question of which premise he would reject turns on how we interpret Chatton's talk of states that are "like" sensory states in angels and of an "actualization that is similar to our actualization of touching." If these qualities *are of the same kind* as human sensations, then it seems that Chatton would reject (xvi). On the other hand, if they are only like, but not of the same kind as human sensations, then presumably Chatton would reject (xiv) – just because a certain kind of quality can inhere in a human soul, it does not follow that it can inhere in an angel.

Either way, when Chatton states that the qualities in angels are like sensations, it seems plausible that he *at least* holds that they are phenomenally and intentionally similar to human sensations. But if this is the case and they are not of the same kind, then in what way would they differ from human sensations? Perhaps by not requiring changes in a bodily organ as efficient causes? Chatton doesn't say.

Once again, I suggest that we can understand the disagreement between Chatton and Ockham here if we remember that Chatton is thinking of sensations as *sensory experiences*. Chatton sees no reason to deny that a disembodied soul or an angel could have a sensory experience such as feeling heat. He finds it easy to conceive of sensory intentionality and phenomenology as belonging to a disembodied subject. On Ockham's view, on the other hand, there is more that is essential to a quality's being a sensation

[64] *Rep*. 4.11.1 (4.349,3-8): "[...] ille ignis haberet aliquam talem qualitatem quae posset causare in anima separata vel in spiritu talem actum qualis est actus tangendi recepta immediate modo in anima nostra, quia sicut frequenter dixi, omnis actus noster vitalis immediate recipitur in ipsa anima, ad quem quidem actum similem actui nostro tangendi sequeretur dolor ille afflictivus".
[65] *Rep*. 4.11.1 (4.349,21-22): "[...] aliter enim non salvaretur quomodo spiritus haberet cognitiones evidentes tangibilium".

than that it be a sensory experience – or even a sensory experience with the right kinds of causes. After all, as we have seen, he thinks that for every sensory cognition in the sensory soul, there is a duplicate experience with the same content in the rational soul – but the latter kind of experience is not a sensation.[66] Thus, for Chatton, a quality's being a sensory experience in a human being is *sufficient* for it to be a sensation, whereas Ockham rejects this view. And this difference explains why Chatton sees no difficulty in the metaphysical possibility of disembodied sensations (since, after all, there is no obvious problem with disembodied subjects having sensory experiences).

6. The Sensory Powers of Non-Human Animals: The Argument from the Sameness in Kind of Human and Non-Human Sensation (2)

Like other medieval scholastic philosophers, Ockham and Chatton would deny that non-human animals have immaterial souls. This commitment is the basis for Ockham's Argument from the Sameness in Kind of Human and Non-Human Sensation:

> A human being and a non-human animal's actualizations of seeing the same object are of the same nature. Therefore, they have subjects of the same nature. But in the non-human animal, the sensory soul insofar as it is something distinct from an intellectual soul is the subject of the seeing. Therefore, the same is the case for the human being. [67]

Ockham argues as follows:

(xx) A human being's actualization A and a non-human animal's actualization B of seeing the same object are of the same nature.
(xxi) Actualizations of the same nature have subjects of the same nature.
(xxii) An extended, material sensory soul is the subject of B.
(xxiii) Thus, an extended, material sensory soul is the subject of A.

While Chatton never directly responds to this argument, it seems that he could respond by rejecting either (xx) or (xxi).

First, consider (xx). It seems that there are two ways in which human and animal sensations might be of the same nature. On the one hand, they might be of the same nature with respect to their metaphysical structure, as it were – e.g., they could both be extended and material qualities. On the other hand, they might both be of the same nature "from the inside" – with respect to the kind of experience that a subject undergoes in virtue of being qualified by these qualities. I assume that Chatton thinks that human and non-human animal sensations are of the same nature in the latter sense – they are the same kind of experience. But it is less clear that he feels any

[66] See Section 3.
[67] *ORep*. 4.9 (*OT* 7 162,19-22): "Visio hominis et bruti respectu eiusdem obiecti sunt eiusdem rationis, igitur habent subiecta eiusdem rationis. Sed in bruto sensitiva est subiectum visionis ut distinguitur ab intellectiva, igitur eodem modo in homine".

pressure to maintain that they are of the same nature with respect to their metaphysical structure.

Perhaps more surprisingly, it is not clear that Chatton needs to accept (xxi). For Chatton and Ockham, physical qualities and immaterial qualities are very much *alike* in nature. Ockham and Chatton both think that physical qualities are (a) extended, (b) directly or indirectly dependent on prime matter, and (c) spatially located. Immaterial qualities on the other hand can be spatially located, but they are not extended and do not depend directly or indirectly on prime matter.[68] Now, the fact that physical qualities have (b) but immaterial qualities lack it does not obviously provide a reason for Chatton to posit a difference in kind, because Chatton denies that qualities are individuated by the kinds of subjects they have.[69] So the basis for a radical difference between physical and immaterial qualities comes down to the difference between being extended and being non-extended. Here, however, the difference turns out to be surprisingly thin. Ockham and Chatton both think that physical qualities such as color, heat, and sensations (assuming Chatton thinks there are physical sensations – see below) have integral parts.[70] And, crucially, these integral parts are *of the same kind* as the quality itself. An integral part of heat is itself a bit of heat; an integral part of a sensation *is itself a sensation*.[71] Now, Chatton thinks that continua are composed of indivisibles, and thus holds that extended qualities have *indivisible*, *non-extended* integral parts.[72] Thus, sensations that are physical qualities, if there are such qualities, are composed of non-extended parts that are *themselves sensations*. It is not clear, then whether there is any irreducible difference in kind between human and animal sensations, or whether animal sensations are just composites that are composed of the kinds of qualities that are human sensations. In fact, Chatton's Dominican contemporary William Crathorn adopted a view very much like this: According to Crathorn, physical and immaterial qualities do not differ in kind. Even colors, Crathorn claims, can inhere in immaterial subjects, such as angels.[73]

In fact, however, the only indication Chatton ever gives of how he would respond to this argument suggests that he would adopt an even more radical response: Chatton thinks it is philosophically plausible to reject (xx)'s implication that non-human

[68] I take the view that immaterial qualities can have locations to follow from Chatton and Ockham's shared view that the immaterial human soul is located where the human body is located. Chatton even thinks that a material, extended form can be wholly present in multiple distinct locations. See *Rep*. 4.3.2 (4.266,6-20).
[69] *Rep*. 4.10 (4.345,19-29).
[70] See footnote 29 above.
[71] See *ORep*. 2.7 (*OT* V 126,11-127,4).
[72] *Rep*. 2.2.3.4 (3.134,20-22). Chatton thinks that it is possible for God to make these indivisibles exist apart from the wholes they compose: *Rep*. 2.2.3.4 (3.123,16-27). That indivisibles are not extended is clear from Chatton's response at *Rep*. 2.2.3.4 (3.136,1-4) to Ockham's argument found at 2.2.3.1 (3.116,1-8).
[73] William Crathorn, *In primum librum*, q. 1 (120,17-29).

animals sense. That is, Chatton thinks that it is reasonable to hold that animals *do not have sensations at all*. In his *Reportatio*, Chatton explains that the term "sensory soul" can refer to one of two things: a substantial form that is the immediate subject of sensations or the "vital spirits" that are immediately responsible for the motion of the parts of animal bodies.[74] Chatton then makes a startling proposal. "Anyone who dares", Chatton suggests, could say that there is no sensory soul in the former sense in animals, but only vital spirits that move the body:

> Anyone who dares could respond in another way, that in a given part of a non-human animal there is only one substantial form. For instance, in one part there is only the form of blood, in another only the form of bone, but in another only the form of vital spirit. And this person could say that just as blood is distributed throughout the whole body, so also the vital humors and spirits are distributed throughout the whole body, and the non-human lives through those spirits.[75]

In short, Chatton thinks it would be philosophically plausible (though perhaps socially perilous, since he says it is a view one must "dare" to hold) to hold that *there is no sensory soul* in animals. But Chatton thinks that only a soul in the former, proper, sense, which he often calls a "living form" (*forma viva*) could be the immediate subject of a thought or a sensation.[76] Thus, if there are only animal spirits in animals, animals do not have sensations. This becomes clear when Chatton responds to an objection which claims that, on the view Chatton has described, "that vital humor in a non-human animal receives sensations".[77] Chatton responds by denying that the vital spirits would receive sensations: "I say that this is not the case".[78]

On Chatton's view, we lack compelling philosophical grounds to think that animals have sensory experiences. And, given Chatton's close identification of sensations with

[74] *Rep*. 2.15.1.1 (300,7-10).
[75] *Rep.* 2.15.1.1 (299,20-25): "Aliter posset dicere – qui auderet – quod in eadem parte bruti tantum est unica forma substantialis, puta in una parte tantum forma sanguinis, in alia tantum forma ossis, sed in alia tantum forma spiritus vitalis. Et ille diceret quod sicut sanguis diffunditur per totum corpus, ita et spiritus et humores vitales diffunduntur per totum corpus, et per istos spiritus vivit brutum".
[76] See *Lect*. 3.6.1.1 (2.222,24-26); *Lect*. 3.6.1.2 (2.235,8-10); and, most significantly, *Pro*. 2.4 (108,90-93). This is a crucial difference between Chatton and Ockham, the latter of whom suggests in *QS* 1.15 (83,17-84,20). that anyone who holds that there is just one soul in human beings could plausibly hold that sensations are received in the body rather than in the soul. It seems there is a difference between Ockham and Chatton's conception of sensation such that Ockham can imagine a sensation in a body but Chatton can only see a sensation as occurring in a soul. It seems plausible that this difference is that Chatton think that a subject of sensation always experiences her sensation just in virtue of having it, whereas Ockham rejects this view. See Susan Brower-Toland, "Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton", *Philosopher's Imprint* 12 (2012): 1-29.
[77] "[...] ille humor vitalis in bruto recipit sensationes". *Rep*. 2.15.1.1 (3.300,11).
[78] "Dico quod non". *Rep*. 2.15.1.1 (3.300,13).

sensory experiences, we therefore lack compelling philosophical grounds to hold that animals have sensations. On this view, the Argument from the Sameness in Kind of Human and Non-Human Sensation fails to get off the ground.

7. Conclusion

In this article, I have shown that Ockham held that powers of sensation are distinct from the power to think because he thinks that the immediate subject of sensations must be distinct from the immediate subject of thoughts. And he held that the immediate subject of sensations must be distinct from the immediate subject of thoughts because he thought that sensations are by nature embodied or material in a way that thoughts are not. We have also seen that Chatton rejected Ockham's view that human sensations are material or embodied in a way that requires them to have an immediate subject distinct from the subject of thoughts. I have argued that Chatton rejected this view precisely because he sees nothing about the introspectable character of sensory experience that requires it to be material or embodied in a way that would require an immediate subject distinct from the immediate subject of thought.

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ROBERT GROSSETESTE, PETER JOHN OLIVI AND JOHN DUNS SCOTUS ON FREEDOM OF THE WILL

ROBERT GROSSETESTE, PEDRO JUAN OLIVI Y JUAN DUNS ESCOTO SOBRE LA LIBERTAD DE LA VOLUNTAD

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Abstract

Duns Scotus's claim that the will, both human and divine, has a capacity for opposites at a single instant has been seen as a turning point in the history of modality. But historians have discovered anticipations of Scotus's position in Robert Grosseteste and Peter John Olivi. I argue that none of these three authors focuses on modality or has a new modal theory, but that the discussions do show the development of a new view about freedom of the will and what is required for it. The discussions also raise the question of whether immutability (the impossibility of changing) is sufficient for God's simplicity, or whether it must also be impossible for God to be in any way otherwise, as Grosseteste, but not Scotus, holds.

Keywords

Will; Freedom; Choice; Possibility; Necessity; Immutability; Aristotle

Resumen

La afirmación de Duns Escoto de que la voluntad, tanto humana como divina, tiene la capacidad de abarcar opuestos en un único instante ha sido vista como un punto de inflexión en la historia de la modalidad. Sin embargo, los historiadores han descubierto anticipaciones de la posición de Escoto en Roberto Grosseteste y Pedro Juan Olivi. Argumento que ninguno de estos tres autores se centra en la modalidad ni tiene una nueva teoría modal, sino que las discusiones muestran el desarrollo de una nueva visión sobre la libertad de la voluntad y lo que se requiere para ella. Las discusiones también plantean la pregunta de si la inmutabilidad (la imposibilidad de cambiar) es suficiente para la simplicidad de Dios, o si también debe ser imposible para Dios ser de alguna otra manera, como sostiene Grosseteste, pero no Escoto.

Palabras clave

Voluntad; libertad; elección; posibilidad; necesidad; inmutabilidad; Aristóteles

The following pages are about freedom of the will in thirteenth-century Franciscan thought. Two of the writers treated, Peter John Olivi and John Duns Scotus, were Franciscan friars, working at the end of the century; the other, Robert Grosseteste, not a Franciscan himself, was the first lector to the Franciscans at Oxford about fifty years earlier, c. 1229-1235.

My starting point, however, is provided not by freedom of the will, but by modality and its metaphysical significance. (Note that I use "freedom of the will" as a label for the broad question, still debated by philosophers, a central part of which, in the medieval discussion, was investigation of *liberum arbitrium* – "free choice"). One of Duns Scotus's most famous claims is that our will has not just the power to will something at one instant and the opposite at the next, but also a power for opposites at the same instant.[1] This position has often been used to support, and interpreted in the light of, the view that Scotus was a great modal innovator, who introduced the idea of synchronic possibilities, thereby opening the way to contemporary theories of possible worlds. Over the last four decades, historians have found passages by Robert Grosseteste and Peter John Olivi which, they claim, to some extent anticipate Scotus's modal discovery.[2]

[1] There are three versions available in modern editions of the discussion among Scotus's work. The earliest (1298-99) is in his *Lectura* on the *Sentences*, I, d. 39, qq. 1-5 (the text of the Vatican edition along with a translation and a commentary, which illustrates exactly the possible worlds view of medieval modalities I am criticizing, is found in: Antonie Vos Jaczn, et al., *John Duns Scotus. Contingency and Freedom. Lectura* I, 39. Introduction, Translation and Commentary, New Synthese Historical Library 42 (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer, 1994). In the *Ordinatio* of Scotus's Oxford commentary on the *Sentences,* the commentary on I, d. 39 was not included in the manuscript put together by the author, but a version (the "Apograph") was made, probably after his death by a follower with access to authentic material by Scotus: it is printed in an Appendix to the Vatican edition: *Ioannis Duns Scoti opera omnia* VI, edited by C. Balić (Vatican City: Vatican Multilingual Press, 1963), 401-444. The third version is in the examined *reportatio* of Scotus's Paris lectures on the *Sentences,* from the early 1300s: John Duns Scotus, *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture. Reportatio I-A*, II, edited by A. Wolter and O. Bychkov (St Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2008) – designated henceforth as 'R', d. 39-40, qq. 1-3; 467-491.

[2] Stephen Dumont, "The Origin of Scotus's Theory of Synchronic Contingency", *The Modern Schoolman* 72 (1995): 149-167 – claiming that Scotus used ideas from Peter John Olivi's q. 57 in his Commentary on *Sentences* II (Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum sententiarum* II, edited by B. Jansen [Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924], 305-394 [henceforth designated by "OL"]); Neil Lewis, "Power and Contingency in Robert Grosseteste and Duns Scotus", in *John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics*, edited by L. Honnefelder, R. Wood and M. Dreyer, Studien und Texte

But should the discussions be placed within *this* context? The present paper follows from my recently published wider-ranging article, where I argue against looking at medieval thinking about modalities as a step on the way to the discovery or invention of possible worlds.[3] In his powerful and persuasive critique of this view, Robert Pasnau describes the discussion in Scotus as "one of the best-developed early statements of a libertarian conception of freedom", but he chooses not to develop this idea but to look at "the more properly modal aspects of the question".[4] By contrast, I shall argue that this discussion in Scotus, and in the two authors who have been identified as anticipating it in some respects, is centrally about the will and its freedom. None of these authors is trying to put forward a new view of modality, but all three think about modality in terms of the will, especially God's will.

The three discussions are probably linked historically. Grosseteste's discussion takes place in *De libero arbitrio,* which was quite well known in England and may have had some diffusion in France.[5] It is possible that Scotus, and even perhaps Olivi, may have known it.[6] There is good evidence that Scotus knew some of Olivi's work, and it is likely that he knew the discussion examined here and borrowed ideas from it without acknowledgement.[7] The reason for comparing the discussions by these three authors is not, however, to look for Olivi's or Scotus's sources, but because each of these treatments of similar themes, from partly distinct, partly coinciding perspectives, throws light on the others and on new ways of thinking in the thirteenth century.[8]

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zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 53 (Leiden, New York and Cologne: Brill, 1996), 205-225. Neil Lewis has now produced an edition with parallel translation of the text he discussed there: Robert Grosseteste, *The Two Recensions of On Free Decision*, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 29 (Oxford: The British Academy, 2017) (henceforth designated by "DLA").

[3] John Marenbon, "Medieval Modalities. Is There Still a Story to tell?", *Studi sull'Aristotelismo medievale (secoli VI-XVI)* 3 (2023): 121-161.

[4] Robert Pasnau, "Medieval Modal Spaces", *Aristotelian Society Supplementary* 94 (2020): 225-254, 238-239.

[5] See DLA, lxxxi-lxxxiii.

[6] Calvin Normore ("Scotus, Modality, Instants of Nature and the Contingency of the Present", in *John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics*, edited by. L. Honnefelder, R. Wood and M. Dreyer, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 53 [Leiden, New York and Cologne: Brill, 1996], 161-174, 170) declares that "it is very unlikely that Scotus was not influenced by Grosseteste's discussion".

[7] See Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 148, for Scotus's reading of Olivi on cognition, despite the ban for Franciscans on reading his work, and see Pasnau, "Medieval Modal Spaces", 238.

[8] One general preliminary: Many of the texts to be examined are about the power of an agent, usually God, to will, know or do something and its opposite. What is meant by 'its opposite'? Is the opposite of willing *a* (i) not willing *a* (as, strictly, it should be) or (ii) willing not-*a*? In my discussion I take it to be (i), but the medieval authors sometimes write as if it is (ii). In the contexts considered, however, where at any given instant *a* or not-*a* must be chosen, not willing *a* amounts willing not-*a*.

Robert Grosseteste

Grosseteste wrote his *De libero arbitrio* in the late 1220s or early 1230s, and it survives in two recensions. Although the existence of a second recension might suggest that Grosseteste polished his work, both versions give the impression of thinking in progress, full of ideas that are not always worked out fully. For the sections concerned with the theme in question here, the first recension often contains a somewhat fuller version of the material, and so it will be most frequently used, but there are some important additions in the second recension that will also be considered.

Grosseteste: Immutability with Doing Otherwise

Grosseteste asks his readers to consider the following line of reasoning about your sitting tomorrow, a powerful version of the argument from God's prescience to there being no future contingents that thinkers had been discussing since Boethius. In Grosseteste's formulation, the problem centres around God's immutability.

(1) If God knows something, it is, was or will be. (Meaning of 'know')
(2) God knows my sitting. (Divine omniscience)
(3) Your sitting is, was or will be. [9]

He points out that (1) is obviously necessary, and then argues that (2) is also necessary: God's knowledge is infallible and immutable. From immutability, he says, it follows that God cannot do (taken in a wide sense, to include being and knowing) otherwise than he does. If God knows something, he cannot not know it – in this case, given that he knows your sitting, he cannot not know your sitting; that is to say, God necessarily knows it.[10] Grosseteste then cites the principle of modal logic that a conclusion from two necessary premisses is itself necessary. (3) is therefore necessary, and since your sitting tomorrow is neither past nor present, it is something that must take place in the future necessarily. "Therefore", Grosseteste concludes, "your sitting tomorrow is not contingent; therefore, it does not come from your free choice; and therefore, for the same reason, anything of the same sort. And so free choice does not exist". Grosseteste sketches one way of countering this argument, by holding that the necessity in (1) is not fully-fledged necessity, but what Anselm calls 'sequent' necessity and Boethius 'conditional' necessity, 'which brings nothing about'.[11] Grosseteste speculates that if (1) is necessary in just this attenuated sense, then, although (2) is necessary, what follows – (3) – remains contingent.

Grosseteste prefers, however, to attack the argument against free choice from a

[9] DLA 1.1.4 (14:29-31).
[10] DLA 1.1.4 (14:34-37): "si hanc sessionem scit Deus, non potest non scire eam, cum eius scientia sit infallibilis et immutabilis. Et si non potest non scire eam, de necessitate scit eam; et si de necessitate scit eam, ipsum scire eam est necessarium." All translations are my own.
[11] DLA I.3 (22-28).

different direction, by denying that from the immutability of his knowledge it follows that God cannot do otherwise, and so blocking the inference that God cannot not know what he knows. Grosseteste is enabled to do so by making what he considers to be a key logical distinction: the same sentence can be necessary in that its truth has no ending, but contingent in that it could have without a beginning not been true.[12] Grosseteste applies this distinction to God's knowledge:

> "God, knowing *a*, can not know *a*" is similarly ambiguous, because it can be understood to mean that God has the power (*posse*) to not know it after knowing it, and in this sense it is false. Or that he has the power without qualification to not know it in the future – to not know it, that is, continuing from not knowing it in eternity without beginning.[13]

Although Grosseteste begins from a logical distinction, he realizes that the truth and falsehood of the sentences in question need metaphysical grounding. At some points he writes as if it lies in the existence or non-existence of *dicta*, what sentences say. He refers to "truths about the future" such as that Antichrist will come to exist and explains that "when their truth exists it cannot have non-existence after existence", but that "there is a power (*posse*) that they were true from eternity and without beginning, and a power that they were false from eternity and without beginning".[14] But he makes it clear that the eternal power of the *dictum* that Antichrist will come to exist to have had and not to have had truth without beginning is nothing other than God's power (*posse*) to will and know, or not to will and not to know, from eternity and without beginning that the Antichrist will exist.[15]

According to Grosseteste, this power is both prior to its act and yet it is nothing other than the knowing and willing. The priority, he explains, is not temporal nor even in nature, but "causal", like the priority of the Father to the Word or of animal to human in the generic hierarchy.[16] The priority allows for the distinction between God taken as the agent of the act in question that he in fact wills and knows, and – what is causally prior – God not qualified in this way.[17]

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[12] DLA I.7.12 (44:83-86): "in eadem propositione ex parte aliqua est necessitas propter hoc quod non finibilis est eius veritas, et ex parte alia contingentia, quia quae est vera potuit sine initio non fuisse vera, ex qua potentia sequitur rerum contingentia [...]"

[13] DLA I.7.16 (44:106-109): "Et similiter est haec duplex, 'Deus, sciens *a*, potest nescire *a*', quia potest intelligi quod habet posse ad nescire post scire, et sic est falsa; vel quod habet posse nescire simpliciter in futuro – nescire, dico, continuatum cum nescientia aeterna sine initio."

[14] DLA 2.6.3 (134:14-18): "Et tale est 'Antichristum fore futurum' et veritates omnium eorum quae sunt de futuro, quia eorum veritas, cum est, non potest habere non esse post esse, ut supra ostensum est. Est tamen posse ad hoc, ut ab aeterno et sine initio fuerint vera, et posse ad hoc, ut ab aeterno et sine initio fuerint falsa." There is a parallel passage in the earlier recension at 1.7.4 (40:20-24), which talks explicitly of *dicta*, but does not actually give an example.

[15] DLA 1.9.5 (54:73-77), as noted by Lewis in his Introduction (xlviii), who considers that Grosseteste "leaves this idea undeveloped".

[16] DLA 1.9.1 (50:5-18).

[17] DLA 1.9.1 (52:25-29).

Does Grosseteste think that rational beings other than God, angels and humans, have this power? He quotes, with apparent agreement, Anselm's principle that the power (*posse*) for free choice temporally precedes the volition itself: at the very moment when I will, I cannot not will, because to do so would entail the contradiction of willing and not willing at the same moment.[18] Grosseteste uses the temporal process of human free willing to provide an illustrative analogy to God's non-temporal willing. The divine nature not qualified as performing a given act of volition (which can not will what it wills) is like human free will "naked" of its act before it wills, the divine nature as agent of the act (which necessarily wills what it wills) is like human free at the moment when it is actually willing.[19] As an imaginary example to make what he has just said clearer (*ad iam dictorum evidentiam*), Grosseteste takes the case of an angel or the first human whose power of free choice is not created before he first wills in act, adding that we should consider his state to be that of an instant or eternity. He considers it obvious that the angel or human would have had free will and would therefore have had "in the same indivisible instant along with the act of one of the opposites the power for the opposite act" (*cum actu unius oppositorum habuisset in eodem invisibili uterque posse ad actum oppositum*).[20] All this is, though, completely hypothetical. Grosseteste believes that, in reality, humans and angels exercise their free will over time, not instantaneously; rather he holds that what fundamentally allows the will to choose is not the temporal priority of power to act, but, as in God, its causal priority and the distinction between the will regarded in itself and the will as agent of a given volition.[21]

The power for opposites in an instant does not, Grosseteste continues, answering objections he had earlier raised to his own theory, go against Aristotle's view that "what exists, when it is, necessarily exists" (Aristotle's principle of the necessity of the present: see *On Interpretation*, 19a23), because it is not being said about one and the same thing in the same way that it is necessary, and its opposite is possible (*non redit praedicatio necessitatis et possibilitatis oppositi super simpliciter idem et eodem modo consideratum*).[22] Grosseteste thus interprets Aristotle's principle as allowing the will, regarded not as the agent of the particular volition to *a*, to have, even at that very moment of willing to *a*, the power not to will to *a*.

[18] Anselm writes in *De concordia* 1.3, edited by F. Schmitt, *S. Anselmi opera omnia* II (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946), 251:20-23: "Itaque quod vult libera voluntas et potest et non potest non velle, et necesse est eam velle. Potest namque non velle antequam velit, qui libera est, et cum iam vult non potest non velle, sed eam velle necesse est, quoniam impossibile illi est idipsum simul velle et non velle." Grosseteste quotes this (slightly changing the start) at DLA 1.9.2 (52:33-36). In the second version (2.8.3 [154:33-37]) he paraphrases the passage.

[19] DLA 1.9.2 (52:36-42).

[20] DLA 1.9.5 (54:57-73).

[21] Cf. DLA 1.9.2 (52:43-45): "vel forte utrimque eam facit prioritas causalis et subiecti, super quod redit praedicatio diversa, diversa consideratione.Sed manifestior est distinctio ubi comitatur prioritas temporalis."

[22] DLA1.9.6 (54:79-83). The objection is made at DLA 1.7.2 (46:9-12).

Grosseteste's Change of Direction: God in Himself Cannot Do Otherwise

One criticism Grosseteste needs to tackle is that, if God knows *a*, then the possibility for otherness without change, that he does not know *a* (in the sense that from eternity he did not now *a*), is empty because it is impossible for it to be actualized. He answers by explaining that the possibility in question is a "rational possibility" and "the same rational possibility is of the [two] opposites, and whichever of the opposites exists, it is brought into act, because it is one and the same for both of them."[23] The idea of a rational possibility comes from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (IX.2 – 1046b, cf. also *On Interpretation* 13 – 22b-23a*).* Aristotle is talking about powers and contrasting the way in which an irrational thing that is hot has the one-way power to make other things hot, but a human being who has learned medicine can make someone well or ill. Grosseteste goes far further when applying this idea to God, claiming in effect that his power to do *a* and not to do *a* is numerically one, and so God actualizes his power not to will *a*-at-t1 by willing *a*-at-t1.[24] This idea is of a piece with the third of three themes Grosseteste brings up at the end of his discussion of prescience.

The first of these themes is developed only in the later recension. There Grosseteste explains how God knows in exactly the same way the existence of a future thing (his example is Antichrist), as he knows its non-existence before and after it exists.[25] The second theme, although related to this one, is found in both recensions: it is the distinction between God's relation to creatures of creating them and being their lord, on the one hand, and knowing them on the other. It is put differently in the two recensions, but the idea is that when a creature ceases to exist, God's relation of being creator and lord of it simply vanishes, without any change in God. But this is not the same for God's knowing that a creature exists. If God came to know that the creature began to exist or ceased to exist, God would change.[26] This point shows why it is important for Grosseteste to insist (as he does in the second recension) that God does not come to know such things. Rather, he knows in exactly the same way the existence and non-existence of things in time.

The third new theme is partly disguised by these two others. Grosseteste seems to be thinking as he is writing, without clearly demarcating his different points. In the sections immediately preceding, Grosseteste has been trying to deny that God cannot do or know otherwise than he does, while upholding divine immutability: what God knows could have been different without God's ever having to have changed, because God might never have known *a,* but rather not known *a*. But now he resiles from this position. In the case

[23] DLA 1.9.7 (56:86-88): "[...] quia est possibilitas rationalis et eadem oppositorum, et utrum oppositorum sit, in actum suum educitur, cum ad utrumque sit una et eadem."
[24] Normore ("Scotus, Modality", 170) points out Grosseteste's assumption that the opposite powers are numerically one, although there is no evidence that Grosseteste extended it, as he suggests, to rational beings other than God.
[25] DLA 2.8.9; 158:86-88, 90-92.
[26] DLA 1.9.11 (58:130-138); 2.8.10-11 (158:97-112).

of an angel which wills *a* (Choice 1) but retains in that very instant the power not to will *a* (Choice 2), there is a difference in the angel depending on whether it makes Choice 1 or 2. These are different volitions, and so the angel is different, depending which it has, although the angel might be unchanging in making the choice, because it happens at the first instant of its existence. But this is not the case for God, "because, although he has the power for the opposite of that which he has (i.e., when he is Φ-ing he can not-Φ), in no way because of this would he be diverse or other or something else from what he is".[27] Or as the second recension puts it:

> In [God] considered absolutely the knowledge by which he knows that Antichrist exists if he is going to exist and the knowledge by which he knows that he does not exist, if he is not going to exist, is entirely the same. And in the same way to will and not to will in him are the same, although in creatures their diversity begins. For if in God himself they were diverse, he would not be the simplest substance, but a composite and mutable one.[28]

There is a moment in the second recension where, on a quick reading, Grosseteste seems to contradict himself on this point. Developing the idea that God knows in exactly the same way the existence and non-existence of something in time, he says:

> I do not say that [God] knows in the same way that Antichrist exists if he is going to exist, and that he does not exist if he is not going to exist, because this is impossible.[29] (2.8.9; 158:88-89)

In fact, there is no contradiction, because Grosseteste does not claim that God knows the existence of Antichrist or his non-existence if he does not exist *in the same way*, but by the same knowledge considered *absolutely*, and so there is no difference in him, absolutely, whether he knows the one or the other.[30]

For Grosseteste, then, in the end it is not enough that God does not change in any way.[31] In addition, he cannot be in any way different in himself, he cannot in himself do or know otherwise than he does, although he has the power to bring about, without himself being changed, different things from those in fact he does. Considered absolutely, Grosseteste's God has no alternative ways of action, but when God is considered along with his relations to creatures, then there are alternatives. These relations turn out to be Grosseteste's fundamental tool for reconciling God's single, immutable act of will with the

[27] DLA 1.9.9 (156:102-107).
[28] DLA 2.8.8 (158:78-82).
[29] DLA 2.8.9 (158:88-89).
[30] In the second recension, DLA 2.8.11-12 (158:97-160:119), Grosseteste makes very clear that God's knowledge of the same thing existing and not existing in time is by exactly the same way (*modus*).
[31] In the excellent doctrinal analysis in the Introduction to his edition (DLA, xli-liii), Lewis does not draw attention to this important turn in Grosseteste's argument. In "Power and Contingency", 220-223, however, Lewis does discuss this part of *De libero arbitrio*, recognizing the problems it creates for the coherence of his theory, but without underlining that Grosseteste is here insisting on a stricter view of God's inability to be otherwise than mere immutability.

claim that the effects of that will, the history of the created universe, might have been different. There are, he says,

> from eternity innumerable and eternal different relations of him to created things, and even if there had not been going to be created things, there would still have been innumerable eternal relations to their absences.[32]

These relations have little ontological standing. Grosseteste denies that they are God, but is willing to tolerate the view of some that each relation, taken singly, is God (2.9.10; 56:118-58:122). In the later recension, Grosseteste discusses these eternal relations, and the *dicta* which can be analysed into them, in detail (2.8.18-42; 166-184). In one sense, he suggests, relations can be understood as the essence on which a relation is founded, and on account of which the relation is said to exist. It is in this sense that these relations are God. If the relation is understood, however, as the ordering (*ordinatio*) of the two related things, then "this relation neither is the [divine] essence nor is something else than it" (*nec est ipsa essentia nec aliud ab ipsa*).[33]

Peter John Olivi

Olivi's discussion comes in a context very different to Grosseteste's. Olivi is not, like Grosseteste, answering a classic argument from God's foreknowledge to the non-existence of human freedom of the will. Olivi starts, rather, at the other end. He is writing about human free will, the subject of the long q. 57 of his *Quaestiones* on the second book of the *Sentences.* That "there is in human beings freedom of choice (*liberum arbitrium*)", that "something should be recognized in human beings through which they can do some things freely" – the matter at issue in q. 57 – is to Olivi both most obviously true and of central importance to the rest of his thinking. His remarks at the beginning of his response could scarcely be less understated:

> It should be held without any trace of doubt that we have freedom of choice. For this is so certain that denying it goes contrary to the clearest deliverances and experiences of truth, and destroys all the goods of rational nature. The contrary position cannot be founded or maintained except through the most false of principles, which at once overturn everything true and good.[34]

Olivi bases his "top-down" approach to free will – as Robert Pasnau has described it – on the obviousness to us in our everyday experience of life that we are free to make choices. He examines seven pairs of opposed attitudes, which make up much of the fabric

[32] DLA 1.9.10; 56:116-118.

[33] DLA 2.8.39; 180:366-367. Note that the *ordinatio* of which Grosseteste speaks is a genuine polyadic property – a relation of the post-Fregean sort that medieval authors are supposed not to have known about. Grosseteste wisely refuses to grant such an item any independent existence.

[34] OL *resp.* (316).

of our experience: anger and mercy, friendship and enmity, pride and shame, gratitude and ingratitude, subjection and lordship, hope and lack of confidence, solicitude and carelessness. None of these attitudes would be possible, he argues, without free will. If we lack free will, then our behaviour is false and perverse, and founded on a basis that is completely false and perverse – and this is impossible; and it is also impossible that when following a course that makes us better and perfects every good in us, as we do when we suppose we have free will, we should be following the greatest of falsities.[35]

Olivi on the Will's Simultaneous Power for Opposites

Q. 57 begins, as expected in a *quaestio*, with a series of arguments, each intended to prove the position Olivi rejects. One of them (10), reduced to its essentials, is as follows:

> (4) At the moment when a cause produces an effect, it is able not to produce it. (Premise for *reductio*)
> (5) At the moment the cause produces an effect, both the cause and the effect are in act. (Nature of causality)
> (6) At the moment when an effect exists it is possible that it does not exist. (4,5)
> (7) It is not the case that (4) (By *reductio*, because (6) is impossible according to Aristotle's principle of the necessity of the present – see below).
> (8) If it is not the case that (4), then every cause produces its effect necessarily.
> (9) Every cause produces its effect necessarily. (7,8)
> (10) The will is a type of cause. (Assumed premise)
> (11) The will has no freedom of choice. (What produces its effect necessarily does not do so freely).[36]

This first stage of the argument, (4)–(7), depends on Aristotle's principle that "what is, when it is, necessarily is". The idea behind this principle is that what is now the case, at this very instant, cannot be changed, although it could be for the next instant, and at the instant before it could have been. There is switch in front of me turned to the "Off" position. Even supposing it can turn instantaneously to the "On" position, it cannot be in that position in this very instant, because it is in fact in the "Off" position, no more than it could have been on five minutes ago, if it was in fact off then. Aristotle is not at all trying

[35] OL *resp.* (317 and 316-323); see Robert Pasnau, "Olivi on human Freedom", in *Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248-1298). Pensée scolastique, dissidence spirituelle et société*, edited by A. Boureau and S. Piron, Études de philosophie médiévale 79 (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 15-25.

[36] OL arg. 10 (308): "Omnis causa, dum operatur seu dum est in hora qua operatur, non potest non operari, quoniam res, dum est, non potest non esse et, dum fit, non potest non fieri et, dum facit, non potest non facere; dum autem causa operatur, tunc non solum ipsa est actu operans, sed etiam suus effectus tunc est actu et fit actu; si igitur tunc posset non operari illum effectum, tunc simul possent contradictoria esse vera, scilicet, ipsum effectum esse et non esse et simul fieri et non fieri et ipsam causam simul facere et non facere; sed si non potest non operari, dum operatur, semper quando agit, necessario agit; ergo et cetera."

to argue that everything is determined, a position he rejects completely. Rather, he is putting forward an intuitively obvious point, with which most people in his time would have agreed, and most people today too (philosophers perhaps excepted!). Yet the second stage of the argument moves from what has been established by Aristotle's principle to a determinist conclusion. It does so because of (8), which most of Olivi's predecessors would have rejected. (8) requires that, for a cause not to be necessary, then at the same instant as it causing *a*, it must be able not to cause *a*. This, arguably, is an unreasonable demand, where the cause in question is the human will.

When we normally think about our freedom to choose what to will, we have in mind the freedom to choose what we shall will at the next instant. To take again the example of the switch. We would normally think that I have free choice with regard to it if it is off now and I am able to will at the next instant to turn it on. It would be unreasonable to demand that at this instant, when I am not willing to turn it on, I can will to turn it on. My freedom to will at the next instant is all that is needed for incompatibilist freedom of agency and so to avoid the terrible moral consequences that many philosophers believe follow from denying it.

This line of thought seems to have been usual among philosophers before Olivi. Olivi himself recognizes this as the position of "some", who answer that "the power [of the will] is not to opposites with respect to the present, but only with respect to the future" (*potentia non est ad opposita respectu praesentis, sed solum respectu futuri*).[37] Olivi cites Hugh of St Victor, but Hugh was probably looking back to Anselm, whose Principle, that when I will I cannot not will, because to do so would entail a contradiction, was quoted approvingly by Grosseteste.[38] Peter the Lombard puts forward the same position in the *Sentences* (II, d. 25), which Olivi and the other scholastic theologians were commenting, and it is maintained in Olivi's own time by Henry of Ghent.[39]

Olivi, however, expressly rejected this position, and he justifies this view at length in q. 57. His central argument is as follows:

> But this position expressly destroys free choice and all that has been said above. For it is clear that free choice cannot in fact perform a future act in the instant that precedes that future act. Therefore with regard to this preceding instant, when free choice is in it, it cannot make actual the opposite act, and it cannot [make it actual] in the instant to come, because it is not yet there, and when it is there all the less will it be able to do so, because [according to the position] the power for opposites is said to be with respect to the future, not the present.[40]

[37] OL ad 10 (348).
[38] See above, n. 17.
[39] See Dumont, "The Origin of Scotus's Theory", 161-162.
[40] OL ad 10 (349): "Sed istud expresse destruit liberum arbitrium et omnia supra dicta; constat enim quod liberum arbitrium actum futurum non potest de facto agere in nunc quod praecedit illud futurum. Ergo pro illo nunc sic praecedenti, dum est in eo, non potest actu in opposita, nec

Olivi is saying that, according to the position held by Hugh of St Victor and others:

(12) The will that Φs at t1 cannot at t1 not-Φ at t1, and

(13) The will that Φs at t1 can at t2 not-Φ at t2.

Olivi then adds the following principle, which he considers obvious: "Free choice cannot in fact perform a future act in the instant that precedes that future act", that is to say:

(14) At t1 the will cannot Φ at t2, and cannot not-Φ at t2.

Olivi then asks where the power for opposites, in which he considers free choice to consist, is to be found: not at t1, because, suppose that the will is Φ-ing at t1, then his opponents have ruled out by (12) that the will can at t1 be not-Φ-ing at t1; but not at t2, because (14) rules out that at t1 the will can be not-Φ-ing at t2, and – just as happened with t1 – (12) rules out that, when the will is Φ-ing at t2, it can at t2 be not-Φ-ing at t2.

In a way, Olivi's position is obvious. What I actually will is something I control from instant to instant, and so the only way that I can will something at t1 is to will it at t1. If, then, human free will really is a power for opposites, a two-way power, the power actually to will *a* or not to will *a*, it must be a power than can be exercised at a single instant with regard to that instant. Still, as already suggested, Olivi seems to be demanding a lot for there to be freedom of will. His opponents are not suggesting that our will can act in the future – they would accept (14). Rather, they consider that it is enough for freedom (as indicated in [13]) that my will can will at t1 to leave the switch off at t1, and at t2 not will to leave the switch off at t2 and so will to turn the switch on at t2. Olivi does not consider this enough, because to the ordinary requirement for human freedom – that we can make choices and, incompatibilists will add, that these are choices between genuine alternatives – he adds a special demand about the nature of the will: that it acts as a first cause, a mover that is itself unmoved.[41] Given this conception of the will, it is easier to see why he insists that it is has the power to choose either of two alternatives at the same instant, and so the power to choose at t1 not to Φ at t1 even when its choice at t1 is to Φ at t1.

Olivi, then, given his conception of the human will, cannot reject (8), and so he needs to find another way of avoiding the conclusion (11), that there is no human free will, that follows from (4)–(10). To do so, he must either reject Aristotle's principle or show that it is compatible with (4). Olivi chooses this second option. Aristotle, he explains, is saying that the existence of something cannot go together with its negation. He did not mean that "the cause, at the moment when it is producing the effect, is necessarily determined and inclined to producing it" (*causa, dum operatur ipsum effectum, est necessario determinata et inclinata ad ipsum producendum*) – a position that would remove "liberty not just from us but from God".[42]

pro nunc futuro, quia nondum est ibi, et quando erit ibi, tunc respectu eius hoc minus poterit, quia potestas oppositorum dicitur esse respectu futuri et non respectu praesentis."

[41] See Pasnau, "Olivi", 22-23, citing Olivi, *In secundum librum sententiarum*, q. 58 resp., ed. Jansen, 411 and OL ad 5 (342).

[42] OL ad 10 (348).

John Duns Scotus

The discussion in Scotus, like Grosseteste's and unlike Olivi's, comes in the context of tackling the much-debated problem of how to reconcile divine prescience with human freedom. There is, though, an important difference in the angle of approach. Grosseteste's concern is to reject a powerful formulation of the argument that moves from God's foreknowing everything to there being no contingency. Scotus, indeed, deals in passing with this argument in various formulations, but he structures his discussion around a deeper problem about contingency: from where does it arise? Grosseteste is willing to assume that there is contingency, so long as arguments against it from divine prescience can be refuted. Scotus has a different viewpoint. It is not that he doubts in any way that there is contingency, which he considers a necessary condition for human free will. If nothing happened contingently, all human and political society would be destroyed, and virtue, punishment and reward rendered unnecessary.[43] Yet he writes as if he regarded, as well he might within the framework of Aristotelian physics, necessary causation as the default position. If there is to be contingency, it must be introduced from somewhere. But from where? Scotus gives his answer by arguing against Aquinas's position.

Scotus on the Origins of Contingency

According to Aquinas, God wills necessarily, not contingently, and contingency arises in the passage from this first cause and its proximate effects to its ultimate ones.[44] Aquinas offers, as an illustrative comparison, the germination of a plant, which is contingent although its primary cause, the motion of the sun, is necessary.[45] Scotus claims not to understand this position. If God causes necessarily, he argues, then, given his omnipotence, all secondary causes will cause necessarily too, because "if a cause that moves because it is moved is moved necessarily, then it moves necessarily, and this applies to every mediate cause right down to the final effect".[46]

According to Scotus, the origin of contingency is to be found in God himself: in God's will and its act in relation to other things (*in voluntate divina (vel actu eius) comparata ad alia a se*). If God's will caused necessarily, then everything would come about of necessity.[47] Scotus's task will be to explain how the divine will can cause contingently.

The two difficulties that stand in the way of accepting that God causes contingently had already been considered by Olivi and Grosseteste. There is, first, the Problem of the Instant. How can a single instant of time provide room for the openness to opposites

[43] R, d. 39-40, qq. 1-3, nn. 25-30 (471-473).
[44] R, d. 39-40, qq. 1-3, nn. 10-11 (468-469).
[45] *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13, ad. 1 (cf. also his Commentary on the *Sentences* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5). Scotus refers his readers explicitly to the *Summa Theologiae* Book 1.
[46] R, d. 39-40, qq. 1-3, n. 13 (469): "[...] causa quae movet quia movetur, si necessario movetur, necessario movet, et sic de qualibet causa media usque ad ultimum effectum."
[47] R, d. 39-40, qq. 1-3, nn. 31-32 (473).

necessary for freedom of will? Olivi, as has been seen, had to answer this question because he thought that, for there to be freedom of the will, a two-way choice has to exist at an instant. Scotus in fact accepted this position, but in any case, he and Grosseteste were also faced with the problem because they were both thinking primarily about God's free will and they held that God exists in an instant-like eternity. Second, there is a problem about immutability. How can God will contingently – that is to say, be open to willing *a* or not willing *a* – and yet be, not merely unchanging, but unchangeable? The problems are closely connected, because the explanation of how a two-way choice need not involve change will also show how it is possible at an instant; and, indeed, Scotus, like Grosseteste, approaches the problem mainly as one about immutability. There is, however, another aspect to the problem about immutability, the Special Immutability Problem, which is brought out by Grosseteste's change of direction at the end of his account.

Scotus and the Problem of the Instant

Scotus considers that God "can will nothing except in eternity or the one instant of eternity". God is "contingently the cause of *a* (any given thing) through a single willing in this single instant".[48] It was Olivi who most probably provided Scotus with the tools to explain how such an instantaneous willing can be contingent, even though he was concerned with human and not divine will. Olivi thought that *any* free willing has to take place at a single instant, at which the willer retains the power to will the opposite. Scotus adopts this unusual position about human will. Given that humans will contingently, he claims that "in the same instant that it is a cause [the will] is able to will the opposite, for otherwise it would cause necessarily at that instant".[49] Scotus's outlook is, however, less radically opposed than Olivi's to the widespread view that we are free to will the opposite only at the next instant, not the present one. Olivi bases human freedom of choice entirely on our capacity to will opposites at the same instant. Scotus, by contrast, recognizes our will's potential to opposites in succession – that I can will *a* at t1, and not will *a* at t2 – as evident and as providing an obvious ground for our free will.[50] This sort of potential for opposites in succession is, however, limited to changeable things. It is the human will's less obvious sort of potential for opposites, at an instant, in the manner of Olivi, that allows Scotus to use our willing to explain how God too can will contingently.

[48] R, d. 39-40, n. 43 (477): "Deus enim nihil potest velle nisi in aeternitate sive in instanti uno aeternitatis, et mediante unico velle in illo unico instanti contingenter est causa ipsius *a*."
[49] R, d. 39-40, n. 42 (477): "Sed voluntas nostra in illo instanti in quo elicit velle sive causat, vult contingenter, et in eodem instanti ut est causa eius potest velle oppositum (alias tunc necessario causaret in illo instanti)."
[50] R, d. 39-40, nn. 40-41 (476-477).

Suppose, Scotus suggests,

> that my will just existed for one instant of time, it would contingently elicit the act of willing in that instant (and would be able to be meritorious), not because it existed before at another instant, but because it freely and contingently elicited that act of willing.

The same, he says, goes for God's will (*sic voluntas divina*):

> In that instant of eternity in which it produces *a*, there could be not-*a*. Otherwise it would follow that, when it is a cause, *a* would be necessary.[51]

But what, Scotus asks, is this power (by which it can not produce *a*, at the instant it is producing *a*)? Like Olivi, Scotus explains it using the idea of natural, as opposed to temporal, priority. It does not precede its act by duration, which would involve mutability,

> but it is a power naturally prior to the contingent act. Therefore, the will, which is naturally prior, can be along with its opposite without durational ordering[52] –

that is to say, the power to produce *a* and not to produce *a*, that is the will, coexists in the same instant-like eternity with the volition to produce *a* (and not not to produce *a*), because the will as a power is naturally, but not by duration, prior to the will's willing.

Like Olivi, Scotus has to explain how this approach is compatible with Aristotle's principle that what is, when it is, necessarily is. Scotus envisages an opponent arguing that, given Aristotle's Principle, since there is only one instant of eternity, whatever God wills in it he wills necessarily. Scotus explains, in response, that this would be true if Aristotle's words were interpreted as meaning that whatever-is-when-it-is is necessary But, he suggests, this is not how they should be understood. Rather, Aristotle's principle means that whatever is, is necessarily-when-it-is; and from this qualified sort of necessity (necessity-when-it-is) no inference can be made to unqualified necessity.[53] Another of Scotus's replies is very close to Olivi's. The opponent cites the rule that, if *p* is false at t1, it is not possible that it is true at t1, but only at some other instant. To maintain his view, Scotus would have, therefore, to maintain that what he admits is in fact false at an instant (that I do not will *a*, when at the instant I am willing *a*) is not false. Scotus denies that the rule is correct, citing like Olivi the underlying cause as justification: at t1 "the other opposite [e.g. my willing not to *a*, when in fact at t1 I will to *a*] can be true, by the power of its naturally prior cause, through which it can be made true" (*aliud oppositum potest esse verum potentia suae causae prioris naturaliter, per quam potest verificari*).[54]

[51] R, d. 39-40, n. 43 (477).
[52] R, d. 39-40, n. 44 (477): "[...] sed est potentia prior naturaliter actu contingente; ergo prius naturaliter voluntas potest esse cum opposito illius sine ordine durationis."
[53] R, d. 39-40, n. 45 (478) Objection; nn. 49-50 (478-479) Response.
[54] R, d. 39-40, n. 48 (478) Objection; n. 56 (480) Response.

Scotus goes on to make the single remark in this whole discussion that might be taken as proposing a new modal theory. Suppose there were just one instant of time and at it everybody was disputing, it is possible, he says, that in this instant they were not disputing.[55] But this comment should be understood in the light of the causal explanation he has just given. Scotus is not contrasting one possible one-instant world where everyone disputes and another possible one-instant world where they do not, but maintaining that our power to dispute is a two-way power, to dispute and not to dispute, and this power is naturally prior to its being exercised one way at the same and only instant. Neither, then, in this response, and even less in those to the other objections, does Scotus develop a different view of modality from Aristotle's.[56] Rather, he is trying to show that his Olivi-esque theory of willing can withstand the sort of criticisms his peers, versed like him in Aristotelian logic and metaphysics, would be likely to make.

Scotus and the Special Immutability Problem

In so far as mutability involves change from one instant to another, by showing that the will has a two-sided power even in a single instant, Scotus shows how the will can be two-sided – a precondition, he believes, for freedom – without mutability. But there remains the Special Immutability Problem. Is it enough to show that God cannot change from one time to another or must God be unable to be otherwise in an even stronger way, as Grosseteste argues in the final part of his discussion? Grosseteste ends by holding that God in himself, and so God's willing, considered internally, cannot be otherwise than it is. God is, in himself, no different whether his eternal will is that Antichrist should exist or is not that Antichrist should exist. Grosseteste leaves the difference to be explained entirely by God's relations to other things. What is Scotus's attitude to the Special Immutability Problem?

Two of his replies to objections clearly indicate that, for Scotus – unlike Grosseteste – God might have willed otherwise than he does, although God's will cannot change from one time to another. One of these objections is that, since God foreknows immutably, he foreknows necessarily.[57] Scotus answers by explaining that "immutable" has a wider extension than "necessary". What is immutable cannot be otherwise successively, what

[55] R, d. 39-40, n. 56 (478) : "[...] si non esset nisi unum instans temporis et omnes disputarent, dico quod in eodem instanti poterant non disputare [...]"

[56] To Objection 2 (R, d. 39-40, n. 46 [478]), that his position implies it is possible to will and not to will *a* at the same instant, Scotus answers (nn. 51-52 [479-480]) that this does not follows, just as from (i) body A can occupy place *x* at t1 and (ii) body B can occupy place *x* at t1, it does not follow that (iii) body A and B can both occupy place *x* at t1. Objection 3 simply begs the question and Scotus repeats (R, d. 39-40, n. 54 [480]) his point that *prius naturaliter potest stare cum opposito posterioris naturaliter* (i.e. the naturally prior two-way power of volition to *a*/not to *a* can exist at the same instant as the naturally posterior volition to *a*, although this volition is incompatible with the volition not to *a*).

[57] R, d. 39-40, n. 5 (468).

is necessary can neither be otherwise successively nor non-successively.[58] If this distinction is to be a reason for rejecting the objection, Scotus must be saying that, although God's will cannot be otherwise successively, it can be otherwise without succession, and so it is not necessary. Scotus goes on to say that the power that applies to God is immutability, because what is immutable cannot be otherwise than it was before, and contrasts mutability with not being (in any way) able to be otherwise.[59] A little later, rejecting the assertion that "whatever is not *a* and can be *a*, can begin to be *a*", Scotus says that the entailment is not formally valid, but holds with regard to things that are changeable because they lack a form. By contrast, he says, "in eternity [...] which exists without a beginning God can have a form that he does not have without change" (*in aeternitate autem, quae est sine inceptione, potest Deus habere formam quam non habet sine mutatione*).[60]

At first sight, however, Scotus's explicit analysis of how God wills might seem to suggest, contrary to these passages, that the divine will cannot be otherwise in any way at all. Scotus begins by saying that, because God's will acts in a perfect way, in making the comparison between our will and his we must eliminate anything imperfect. Our will is two-sided (*indifferens*) with respect to diverse acts, and, through them, to diverse objects and many effects. Our will's relationship to effects is, however, merely secondary, and its relationship to different acts involves change and so imperfection. Our will, though, is like God's in its two-sidedness with regard to its objects. But for God, this two-sidedness is not, then, a matter of having many acts. Rather, the act of the divine will

> is one and simple and two-sided with regard to different objects. But it is necessary with regard to its first act. But it is related through it to other things contingently. In this way, therefore, the divine will is not two-sided with regard to opposite acts, as something actually willing is formally, but it is two-sided through one act, because this act is unlimited and infinite.[61]

Scotus, it could be argued, is insisting here, like Grosseteste, that any being otherwise, not just mutability, cannot be in God himself but only outside him and in relation to him. But this would be a misinterpretation. When Scotus says that God's will is "necessary with regard to its first act", he is talking about how God is simply by having the nature he does – he is saying it is necessary that God has a will. He is not talking about the contents of God's will, the result of its operating, which is its second act.[62]

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[58] R, d. 39-40, n. 67 (485).
[59] R, d. 39-40, n. 68 (485).
[60] R, d. 39-40, n. 73 (487).
[61] R, d. 39-40, n. 38 (476): "[...] actus eius, scilicet divinae voluntatis, est unus et simplex et indifferens ad diversa obiecta; habet tamen se necessario ad actum primum, tamen mediante illo se habet ad alia contingenter. Sic ergo voluntas divina non est indifferens ad actus oppositos, ut est actu volens formaliter, sed per unum actum est indifferens, quia illimitatus et infinitus."
[62] The distinction between *in actu primo, in actu secundo* is well explained in Scotus, *Reportatio I-A*, II, 591-592 (Glossary).

The account in the earlier Oxford *Lectura* leaves no room for doubt:

> [...] the divine will in a single volition wills in eternity that the stone exists and is able in eternity to will that the stone does not exist [...] in such a way that the divine will, in so far as it operates within God (*ad intra*), and so is prior to its effect, can produce and not produce its object [...][63]

According to Scotus, then, God himself, internally, with regard to his will, *can* be otherwise than he is, although he cannot change.

Conclusion

Although the discussions in Grosseteste, Olivi and Scotus have been linked together because of what they tell, supposedly, about the history of modality, their real pertinence lies in what they show, taken together, about the history of conceptions of the will. All three authors make the ordinary distinction between the will as a power for two-way acts of volition from these volitions themselves, but then go on to do something special. To be actualized at a given instant, a two-way power has to be determined one way or other: so, for instance, at t1 I will to *a*. But these authors insist that, even at this instant, the two-way power remains: at t1, although at t1 I will to *a*, because of this power I can not will to *a* at t1. Grosseteste explains the point by distinguishing between the power with the act chosen and the power naked of the act. Olivi uses the idea of natural (non-chronological) priority of the two-way power to its act, and Scotus follows him; both of them also explain this priority as causal. Grosseteste does not think that this analysis is pertinent to the normal process of human free willing, which is successive in time, but it explains how God's will, without ever changing, can be other than it is and so allows him to reject a powerful argument from divine prescience to necessitarianism. Olivi, by contrast, holds that only because the two-way power of willing remains at every instant, naturally prior to the volition, is there any free will, for humans or for God. Scotus apparently accepts Olivi's argument for this position, but he is mainly interested in using it so that, by a comparison with our own process of willing, we can understand how God can will contingently, without change in the single instant of eternity, since otherwise, he holds, everything would be necessary.

The outlook shared by Grosseteste, Olivi and Scotus is sharply different from that which would characterize thinkers who were using, or moving towards, the idea of possible worlds. Possible worlds are parallel to each other. One of them, indeed, is actual, and other possible worlds are closer or more distant from it, but each possible world is equally possible. The three Franciscan thinkers, by contrast, introduce an idea of priority and posteriority, and do so strictly in the context of powers to act, not that – as in a possible worlds type theory – of how things are. There is indeed a link between their thinking about the will and questions about how things are and might have been, about

[63] *Lectura* I, 39, n. 54; Jaczn *et al.*, *Contingency,* 128.

the modal history of the universe. The link is provided by God's will. Calvin Normore is right to claim that Scotus is a modal monist and that for him "to assert a possibility is to attribute a power to something".[64] Grosseteste and Olivi also take this view. All three thinkers see human free will as one source of possibilities, and in the texts by them examined here both Grosseteste and Scotus argue that God's will is the ultimate foundation for possibility.

Some readers of Scotus would query this conclusion about him. They, like those who first pointed out the relationship between his discussion and those in Grosseteste and Olivi, would point out that Scotus moves beyond these two predecessors precisely by shaping their thoughts into a new modal theory. According to Dumont

> [Scotus] distinguished sharply, in ways that Olivi did not, the different levels of possibility that it implied, both logical and real. What is more, Scotus drew out the logical consequences of this theory of will and gave them accurate expression by expanding considerably the tools of logical analysis for modal statements.[65]

Lewis goes further in his comparison:

> Despite the deeply theological setting of Scotus's account of the possibility of things, his views, unlike Grosseteste's, lend themselves to a development of a modal theory divorced from theological concerns, a development that ultimately led to contemporary notions of modality formulated in terms of logical compatibility or possible worlds.[66]

Scotus's texts do not bear out this distinction between him and the two earlier authors. Certainly, in the *Lectura* version and the Apograph, when Scotus introduces the will's non-successive two-way power, he says that it is accompanied by a "logical power" (*potentia logicalis*) or "logical possibility" (*possibilitas logica*).[67] But Scotus's point here is simply that no logical contradiction is involved. Indeed, the way in which he explains the logical possibility in the Apograph expressly refers to the causal priority of the will to the volition: "For the opposite of willing *a* does not logically contradict the will as first act (i.e. the existence of the will as a two-sided power), even when it is willing not-*a*" (*voluntati enim ut actus primus, etiam quando producit hoc velle, non repugnat oppositum velle*).[68] Scotus's analysis of the logic of statements about necessity is certainly more elaborate than Grosseteste's or Olivi's, but he uses, if in a more complex way than usual, the traditional tools of distinguishing between composite and divided senses (wide and narrow-scope modal operators). Lewis emphasizes that Scotus, unlike Grosseteste, wants to show that there is an interpretation of the words of Aristotle's principle ("What is, when it is,

[64] Normore, "Scotus, Modality", 161.
[65] Dumont, "The Origin", 167.
[66] Lewis, "Power and Contingency", 225.
[67] Lectura I, 39, nn. 49-59 (Vos Jaczn, *Contingency,* 116-118); Apograph, n. 16 (Scotus, *Opera omnia* VI, 418:16-22).
[68] Apograph, n. 16 (Scotus, *Opera omnia* VI, 418:17-19).

necessarily is") under which it is false.[69] But Scotus is not trying to reject Aristotle's principle, merely wrong readings of it. As he says explicitly in the Apograph: "No true sense of this sentence says that an existence, at the instant when it is, is necessary, but only that it is necessary in a qualified way – necessary-when-it-is."[70] Lewis also, like a number of commentators, points to the sense in which in Scotus "the possibility or impossibility of things is not grounded *ex parte Dei*".[71] This is a complicated issue, but Lewis himself seems to accept that God is responsible for what is possible except that what are compatible or incompatible is a given, even for him.[72] God, then, is constrained by the most basic laws of logic (as most philosophers, Descartes arguably apart, have agreed) – and nothing else.

The Franciscan discussions examined here do not, therefore tell a story about changing ideas of modality, but rather about developments in thinking about freedom of the will, especially God's will. The most striking of them lies in the difference between Grosseteste, who finally demands that God cannot be in any way otherwise, and Scotus, who is content so long as God is shown to be immutable. It is a big change in outlook, and Scotus's role in reaching it deserves further investigation.

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[69] Lewis, "Power and Contingency", 214.
[70] Apograph, n. 18 (Scotus, *Opera omnia* VI, 23:1-2).
[71] Lewis, "Power and Contingency", 214.
[72] I discuss this question in a little more detail (with references) in "Medieval Modalities", 154-155.

WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH ANGELS? ANGELIC MATERIALITY AND THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IN SOME EARLY FOURTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCISCANS

¿QUÉ SUCEDE CON LOS ÁNGELES? MATERIALIDAD ANGELICAL Y EL INTELECTO POSIBLE EN ALGUNOS FRANCISCANOS DE PRINCIPIOS DEL SIGLO XIV

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Abstract

While the question of whether angels are composed of matter and form, may seem, to the modern reader, somewhat odd, medieval thinkers saw it as a genuine puzzle. On the one hand, angels are purely intellectual creatures, which, according to some (perhaps most famously Aquinas), seems to imply that they are altogether devoid of materiality. On the other hand, however, angels are capable of change, which, according to the broadly-speaking Aristotelian framework, seems to imply an underlying material substrate. This paper traces the views of some early fourteenth-century Franciscan texts, according to which angels are material: the *Disputed questions* by Gonsalvus of Spain, a *De Anima* question-commentary sometimes attributed to the early Duns Scotus, and the *Sentences* commentaries of Peter of Trabibus and of Peter Auriol. As will be seen, the question of angelic materiality gave ample opportunity for these thinkers to elaborate on what they meant exactly by 'matter', and to hint at the ways in which this metaphysical principle is related to other important metaphysical notions in the neighborhood, such as change, corporeity, or potency.

Keywords

Angels; Matter; Peter Auriol; Peter of Trabibus; Gonsalvus of Spain

Resumen

Si los ángeles están compuestos de materia y forma puede parecer al lector moderno una cuestión algo extraña, pero los pensadores medievales la consideraban un auténtico enigma. Por un lado, los ángeles son criaturas puramente intelectuales, lo que, según algunos (quizás el más famoso

es Tomás de Aquino), parece implicar que están completamente desprovistos de materialidad. Por otro lado, los ángeles son capaces de cambio, lo que, de acuerdo con el marco aristotélico, parece suponer un sustrato material subyacente. Este artículo presenta las opiniones de algunos textos franciscanos de principios del siglo XIV, según los cuales los ángeles son materiales, a saber: las *Quaestiones disputatae* de Gonzalo Hispano, un comentario al *De anima* que suele considerarse una obra temprana de Duns Scotus, y los comentarios a las *Sentencias* de Pedro de Trabibus y de Pedro Auriol. Como se verá, la cuestión de la materialidad angelical fue una gran oportunidad para que estos pensadores elaboraran exactamente qué entendían por 'materia' y para indicar cómo este principio metafísico está relacionado con otras importantes nociones metafísicas relacionadas, como las de cambio, corporeidad o potencia.

Palabras clave

Ángeles; materia; Pedro Auriol; Pedro de Trabibus; Gonzalo Hispano

1. Introduction

Angels, in a broadly-speaking Christian framework, are spiritual, incorporeal beings, and yet capable of change.[1] But how can that be, if change, in a broadly-speaking Aristotelian framework, means matter (successively) taking on different forms?

This and some related questions troubled medieval thinkers starting from the earliest reception of Aristotle's writings in the West. And while angelology, or the discipline concerning angels, may seem to the modern reader as a somewhat obscure part of medieval theology, it has been well documented that angels often provide interesting test cases for various theories within metaphysics or the philosophy of mind.[2] This paper will focus on one particular such test case, namely, on the question of how to make sense of spiritual creatures capable of change within the metaphysical framework of hylomorphism.

Some parts of this story are relatively well known, while other parts are less so. In this paper, I offer a sketch of the debate concentrating on some early fourteenth-century

[1] Research for this paper was funded by the project "Studying Medieval Hylomorphism Whole, 1300–1330," KU Leuven Internal Fund, grant C14/20/007. I am very grateful to the audience of the conference "The Powers of the Soul in Medieval (Franciscan) Thought" (London, 27-28 May 2022) for their questions on a preliminary version of this paper, to the anonymous referees for their comments, and especially to Lydia Schumacher for her careful observations and editing.

[2] For a general overview of this methodological point, see, e.g., Dominik Perler, "Thought Experiments: The Methodological Function of Angels in Late Medieval Epistemology," in *A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by T. Hoffmann (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 143-154; and the Introduction in the same volume.

Franciscan authors who advocated for positing a material principle in angels: Gonsalvo of Spain; the author of a *Quaestiones de anima* sometimes attributed to Duns Scotus; Peter of Trabibus; and, to a lesser extent, Peter Auriol. I will start by giving some background to the fourteenth-century debate, after which I turn to discuss the main arguments that the aforesaid authors proposed for their unusual view. My main aim will be to clarify the reasons why someone may think that mental acts imply the existence of spiritual matter, and to try to shed some light on what that spiritual matter is supposed to be. I will close with pointing out some ways in which considerations about spiritual matter may lead us to a better understanding of the more familiar, corporeal kind.

The discussion here will primarily focus on angels, since they provide a metaphysically simpler case than the human soul. While they share many characteristics, most importantly having intellect and will, the latter is a form joined to a material body, which, even if we consider it in its separated state, may or may not make a salient difference with respect to its metaphysical constitution. Thus, while Aquinas thinks that metaphysically speaking, the human soul (even in its separated state) is quite different from an angel,[3] some of the authors we will be looking at apply the angelic considerations directly to the human soul as well. In what follows, I will leave most of this application aside.

2. Some Background

According to Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, serving as the well-established basis of theological education in the fourteenth century,[4] angels possess four attributes: they are simple essences (*essentiae simplices*, which, according to the Lombard, implies that they are indivisible and immaterial);[5] distinct persons; possess natural reason; and possess free will.[6] Based on this list and especially on its first item, it may seem puzzling why some thinkers concerned themselves with the question of angelic materiality at all.

Nevertheless, the question whether angels have matter as a metaphysical constituent had troubled medieval thinkers at least from the earliest Western reception of Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. As is well known, one way in which Aristotle introduces the distinction between matter and form is to account for change, primarily for change in the

[3] E.g., they are individuated differently – as Aquinas somewhat infamously maintains, angels are individual because they each belong to a different species, while the human soul is individuated by the body that it was first united with. See, e.g., *De ente et essentia*, ch. 5.

[4] For a general introduction, see G. R. Evans (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2002); and Philipp W. Rosemann (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

[5] Even though later he also notes that "Simul ergo visibilium rerum materia et invisibilium natura condite est, et utraque informis fuit secundum aliquid, et formata secundum aliquid" (Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*: Liber I et II, edited by P.P. Collegii S. Bonaventurae [Grottaferrata: Ad Claras Aquas, 1971], II.2, c. 5).

[6] Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris*, II.3, c. 1.

sublunary world, where things are generated and cease to be.[7] 'Matter,' according to this broad picture, is the underlying substrate of change: either something already composite, as in the case of accidental changes, receiving a new accidental form (Socrates becoming sunburnt after being pale); or prime matter, as in the case of substantial change, receiving a new substantial form (Socrates dying). While this very rough outline of the hylomorphic framework is relatively clear, its details are murky. We are going to leave most of this murkiness aside, and focus on one particular question, namely on whether this hylomorphic framework can be applied to angels as well. If so, how can we make sense of their material component, given that they are supposed to be purely spiritual? If not, how can we account for angelic mutability, if the main reason to introduce hylomorphic composition in more usual things was to account for change?[8]

The earliest commentators on Aristotle's physical and metaphysical works were already aware of these questions.[9] For instance, the early Franciscan Richard Rufus of Cornwall, one of the earliest commentators on Aristotle's physical writings,[10] spends five whole folios in his Oxford *Sentences* commentary on the question, considering in detail Augustine's, Hugh of St.-Victor's, and others' arguments in detail, only to conclude that "we cannot posit as more probable that angels have matter than that they do not".[11] Or, as he notes in the earlier treatise dedicated particularly to the topic, "What should we say

[7] See especially *Physics* II.1-3, in Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, edited by J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

[8] A related problem, which is just the other side of this same coin, was the question of whether celestial bodies – bodies that are unchanging and unchangeable – can possess matter. I am not going to deal with this question in depth here, but for some analysis, see Edward Grant, "Celestial Matter: A Medieval and Galilean Cosmological Problem", *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 13 (1983): 157-186; and Edward Grant, *Planets, Stars, and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos, 1200–1687* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), especially ch. 12. I will briefly return to this issue below.

[9] For the early debate, see D. Odon Lottin, "La composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles: les débuts de la controverse", *Revue Néo-Scolastique de Philosophie*, 2e Serie 34 (1932): 21-41; David Keck, *Angels and Angelology in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); R. James Long, "Of Angels and Pinheads: The Contributions of the Early Oxford Masters to the Doctrine of Spiritual Matter", *Franciscan Studies* 56 (1998): 239-254; and Lydia Schumacher, "The *De Anima* Tradition in Early Franciscan Thought: A Case Study in Avicenna's Reception", *Mediaevalia: Textos e Estudos* 38 (2019): 97-115. For a helpful overview of the 13th-century debates, as well as plenty of further bibliography, see John F. Wippel, "Metaphysical Composition of Angels in Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Godfrey of Fontaines", in *A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by T. Hoffmann (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 45-78. See also Brendan Case, "*Seraphicus Supra Angelicum*: Universal Hylomorphism and Angelic Mutability", *Franciscan Studies* 78 (2020): 19-50 for a helpful setup of some of the problems.

[10] Whether or not he was in fact the first one to comment on the *Physics* is contentious and does not matter for the present. See, e.g., Rega Wood, "Richard Rufus of Cornwall and Aristotle's *Physics*", *Franciscan Studies* 52 (1992): 247-281; and Silvia Donati, "The Anonymous Commentary on the *Physics* in Erfurt, Cod. Amplon. Q. 312 and Richard Rufus of Cornwall", *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 72 (2005): 232-362.

[11] Rufus, Sententiae Oxonienses, II.3: "[V]ideo quod non possit probabilius poni angelum [pro: angelus] materiam habere quam non habere" (MS London, BL Royal 8 C iv, fol. 84rb).

to this? I do not know. But I do know truly that the kind and essence of those blessed spirits inexpressibly exceed our sense and reason."[12] It is clear, however, in all these instances of Rufus's treatment of the issue, that he thinks that certain characteristics of angels, especially mutability and individuation, provide strong motivations, if not demonstrative reasons, to attribute some material component to them. His examples of angelic mutation include change in place, acquiring new accidents (presumably new knowledge or acts of will), and, most importantly, the fall of angels.

Rufus was not the only one to call attention to these examples. Indeed, his treatment, as David Keck has pointed out,[13] strongly reminds one of Bonaventure's, who, with his confrère, Peter John Olivi, was undoubtedly the most famous thirteenth-century advocate of spiritual matter. Since Bonaventure's and Olivi's views provide, in some way, the background for the discussion by our later authors, but since they have been analysed in detail elsewhere,[14] we can limit ourselves to a very brief summary of them here.

Bonaventure advances several reasons for positing matter in spiritual creatures, but one of them, just like Rufus's consideration, relies on the possibility of angelic change. According to Bonaventure, all creatures are in some way changeable, and since matter is the principle of change, all creatures are also material. He also thinks that angelic individuation requires matter, and that unless material, angels would be pure actualities, which characteristic should pertain to God alone.[15]

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[12] Rufus, *De materia in angelis*: "Quid dicemus ad hoc? Nescio. Sed hoc veraciter scio quod illorum beatorum spirituum species et essentia sensum nostrum et rationem ineffabiliter excedunt" (MS Assisi, Conv. Soppr. 138, fols. 263ra-264va, at 264rb). We should note that Long interprets Rufus to endorse the doctrine of spiritual matter (see Long, "Of Angels and Pinheads", especially at 251), but this seems to be a somewhat hasty reading even of the Paris *Sentences* commentary, where Rufus does indeed conclude that "angelus habeat compositionem ex forma et materia," but then explains also that by 'materia' he means "large sumpto nomine 'materiae' ⟨pro⟩ omne possibile" (MS Vat. Lat. 12993, fol. 143vb).

[13] Keck, *Angels and Angelology*, 99.

[14] For recent treatments of Bonaventure, see, e.g., Keck, *Angels and Angelology*, especially 93-105; Case, "*Seraphicus Supra Angelicum*"; and especially Alberto Ara, *Angeli e sostanze separate: l'idea di materia spiritualis tra il secolo XII et il secolo XIII* (PhD Thesis, Facoltà teologica dell'Italia Centrale, 2005), ch. 11, and the ample further literature cited therein. For Olivi, see the Introduction in Feliciano Simoncioli, *Il problema della libertà umana in Pietro di Giovanni Olivi e Pietro de Trabibus* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1956); Tiziana Suarez-Nani, "Pierre de Jean Olivi et la subjectivité angélique", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire Du Moyen Âge* 70 (2003): 233-316; Olivier Ribordy, "Materia Spiritualis: Implications anthropologiques de la doctrine de la matière développée par Pierre de Jean Olivi", in *Pierre de Jean Olivi – Philosophe et théologien: Actes du Colloque de Philosophie Médiévale, 24-25 Octobre 2008, Université de Fribourg*, edited by C. König-Pralong, T. Suarez-Nani, and O. Ribordy (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 181-228; and the literature cited therein. See also the Introduction in Petrus Iohannis Olivi, *La matière*, edited by T. Suarez-Nani (Paris: Vrin, 2009).

[15] See Bonaventura, *In Sententiarum* (henceforth: *Sent.*) II.3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1-3, in *Opera Omnia* (Quaracchi: Collegium S Bonaventurae, 1882), 2: 102-110.

Olivi treats the topic of spiritual matter in perhaps the greatest detail among his contemporaries.[16] In question 16 of the second book of his commentary on the *Sentences*, which asks whether angels contain matter at all, he examines twenty-two objections in detail, as well as six arguments for the alternative position, together with various contemporary views. In the first step of his argumentation, just like Bonaventure, he aims to provide a metaphysical description of the created world that applies universally to all created substances. The metaphysical description starts with the claim that there must be passive potency in all created things (otherwise they would be like God), which passive potency is something substantial (*subsantialis*) in all things. As Olivi elaborates, this means that this passive potency must be a receptacle, and not be in a subject, which is just what we call 'matter.'[17]

Second, having argued in these general terms for the necessity of matter in all created things, Olivi enumerates several reasons for positing spiritual matter in particular, one of which is of special interest here. As he argues, the only reason why Aristotle posits matter at all in regular sublunary bodies is to account for how they can undergo various kinds of changes, and this is also what spiritual matter enables. As this suggests, Olivi thinks that admitting the possibility of change in something without also admitting matter in it, would altogether undermine the foundations of hylomorphism.[18] Besides this, Olivi also thinks that positing matter in spiritual substances as well as in the human intellect is the only way to guarantee their substantial unity, and that it enables self-knowledge in intellectual substances.[19]

While Bonaventure and Olivi agree that positing matter in spiritual things is necessary, nevertheless, they disagree on the kind of matter that should be posited. While Bonaventure seems to think that matter is uniform in all creatures across the board,[20] Olivi argues that spiritual matter and corporeal matter differ in their accounts (*secundum rationes*), even if they are both purely potential.[21] Whether or how we can make sense of this difference will be a major issue for our early fourteenth-century authors as well.

[16] The relevant part of this *Sentences* commentary is questions II.16–21, all of which take up almost a hundred pages in the modern edition (see Petrus Iohannis Olivi, *Quaestiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum*, edited by B. Jansen [Quaracchi: Collegium S Bonaventurae, 1922], 291-388).

[17] Even though Aquinas will reject Olivi's final conclusion, he does admit that what we call 'matter' is a passive potency in the genus of substance: "id communiter materia prima nominatur quod est in genere substantiae ut potentia quaedam, intellecta praeter omnem speciem et formam, et etiam praeter privationem, quae tamen est susceptiva et formarum et privationum" (Aquinas, *De spiritualibus creaturis*, q. 1).

[18] Bonaventura, *Sent*. II.16, in *Opera Omnia*, 2, 318-319: "Iis autem attestantur Augustinus et Aristoteles et omnes eius sequaces, quoniam non per aliam viam nec per aliam rationem probaverunt materiam esse in rebus corporalibus nisi per hoc quod in toto motu et sub contrariis terminis eius oportebat dare unum commune subiectum mobile et mutabile, hoc autem necessario ponunt esse materiam et nullo modo formam."

[19] Bonaventura, *Sent*. II.16, in *Opera Omnia*, 2, 315-319.

[20] Bonaventura, *Sent*. II.3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3, in *Opera Omnia*, 2, 100.

[21] Bonaventura, *Sent*. II.20, in *Opera Omnia*, 375-376.

As is well known, the early theories of spiritual matter came under attack already by Albert the Great[22] and more famously by Aquinas,[23] who seem to regard the position as resting on a confusion. More precisely, Aquinas seems to maintain that the positions just presented rest on two mistakes: the first is to attribute a potential intellect to angels at all; the second is to equate this potential intellect with matter.[24] Thus, while Olivi will think that being a receptacle and a potency just means having a material component, Aquinas denies that explicitly: "prime matter receives a form contracting it to individual being; but an intelligible form is in the intellect without such a contraction [. . .] Therefore, an intellectual substance is not capable of receiving form on account of prime matter, but rather because of the opposite [i.e., on account of lacking prime matter]."[25] As Aquinas argues, we can very well account for some kind of composition in angels without invoking hylomorphic composition of matter and form; and in fact, hylomorphic composition is not only unnecessary but rather impossible, since it would be incompatible with both the angels' incorporeity as well as their intellectual nature.[26]

These are issues in Aquinas's thought that would merit studies of their own.[27] What we need to keep in mind for the present one is that the early fourteenth-century authors seem to be largely familiar with these points of criticism, and these questions – that is, whether there is change in the angelic intellect, and whether that change implies matter – were

[22] For Albert, see Albert the Great, *Super II Sententiarum*, edited by A. Borgnet, *Opera Omnia* 27 (Paris: Ludovicus Vivès, 1893), II.1.4; for some analysis, James A. Weisheipl, "Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron", *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 10/3 (1979): 239-260; and Anna Rodolfi, *Il concetto di materia nell'opera di Alberto Magno* (Florence: Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2004).

[23] Aquinas treats the issue multiple times during his career, most extensively in the *De substantiis separatis* and in the first article of the disputed question *De spiritualibus creaturis*, but also in the earlier *Sententiarum* II.3.1.1. The positions he introduces in these works, as well as Aquinas's own stance on the question, do not seem to change.

[24] We should note, however, that Aquinas is less than perfectly clear on the precise mode of angelic cognition. He seems to maintain that the angelic intellect is not in potency to the intelligible species in the same way as the human intellect is in potency to them, whence Kainz argues that angels do not have potential intellect at all, but instead know analogously to the way in which a starfish sees all at the same time (Howard P. Kainz, *Active and Passive Potency in Thomistic Angelology* [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972], 56). But in the *Quaestiones de spiritualis creaturis* (henceforth: *QDSC*), Aquinas also notes that "in a created spiritual substance there must be two elements, one of which is related to the other as potency is to act" (q. 3).

[25] Aquinas, *QDSC*, q. 1: "[N]am materia prima recipit formam contrahendo ipsam ad esse individuale; forma vero intelligibilis est in intellectu absque huiusmodi contractione [...] Non est ergo substantia intellectualis receptiva formae ex ratione materiae primae, sed magis per oppositam quamdam rationem."

[26] See, e.g., Aquinas, *Sententiarum,* II.3.1, and the *De spiritualis creaturis*, q. 1. Some of the issues are also raised in *De ente*, c. 5; and *De veritate*, q. 9, a. 1.

[27] There is a discussion of some of these issues in Kainz, *Active and Passive Potency*; and John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Thirteenth-Century Philosophy* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), 275-280.

discussed often and also sometimes separately.[28] (Olivi already addresses both of these concerns in his treatment, but we can disregard the details of that treatment for now.)

3. Angelic Matter

With this background in mind, let us turn to see in more detail the considerations that led some early fourteenth-century Franciscan authors to posit matter in angels. As will become clear, their positions are far from homogenous, as they disagreed both on some of the arguments for positing spiritual matter, as well as, more importantly, on the nature of spiritual matter itself. But before turning to these details, perhaps it will be helpful to say a few words about our sources.

I will be focusing on four texts. The first is from Gonsalvo of Spain's *Disputed Questions* (especially q. 11), written probably around 1302-3, when Gonsalvo was in Paris.[29] The second is a *De anima* question-commentary, sometimes attributed to Duns Scotus (and indeed edited as part of Scotus's *Opera Philosophica*).[30] While some doubts surround the authenticity of this text, especially since some of the doctrines represented in it are in stark contrast with Scotus's views expressed elsewhere, my interest here is on the positions themselves rather than on the authors who endorsed them; thus I will remain noncommittal on the question of authorship. The date of this work is also somewhat dubious; if it was indeed written by Scotus, then, as the editors argue,[31] it must have been composed early in his career, around the turn of the century or even in the early 1290s. The third text is the *Sentences* commentary of Peter of Trabibus, also a Franciscan theologian, heavily influenced by Olivi; this work also originates from around the turn of the century.[32] Finally, fourth, I will also make use of the undoubtedly most well-known

[28] E.g., Bernard of Trilia, a Dominican thinker around Aquinas's time, devotes a rather long quodlibetal question to the the first of them, while not treating the second at all (see his *Quodl.* I.9: "Utrum angeli proficiant in scientia vel cognitione", edited in Bernard of Trilia, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Cognitione Animae Separatae*, edited by P. Künzle, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi [Bern: A. Francke Verlag, 1969]).

[29] For the text, see Gonsalvus of Spain, *Quaestiones Disputatae et de Quodlibet*, edited by P. L. Amorós (Florence: Collegium S Bonaventurae, 1935) (henceforth *QD*). For an analysis, see also Michael B. Sullivan, "The Debate over Spiritual Matter in the Late Thirteenth Century: Gonsalvus Hispanus and the Franciscan Tradition from Bonaventure to Scotus" (PhD thesis, The Catholic University of America, 2010), ch. 4.

[30] See Johannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium de Anima*, in *Opera Philosophica* 5, edited by B. C. Bazán, K. Emery, R. Green, T. Noone, R. Plevano, and A. Traver (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 2006) (henceforth *QDA*). For a brief comparison with Gonsalvus, see Sullivan, "The Debate over Spiritual Matter", ch. 5.2.

[31] See the Introduction to the volume, especially 139*-143*. On the question of authenticity, see 121*-137* and the literature cited therein.

[32] For Peter in general, see Franz Pelster, "Beiträge zur Bestimmung der theologischen Stellung des Petrus de Trabibus (vor 1300)", *Gregorianum* 19 (1938): 37-57, 376-403, with a (very) partial edition of the relevant questions in 388-390; Simoncioli, *Il problema*; Hildebert Alois Huning, "Die Stellung des Petrus de Trabibus

text of this group, the *Sentences* commentary of Peter Auriol, who will serve more as a reference point here than a focus in his own right. The second book of Auriol's *Sentences* dates from a short generation later than our other texts, from around 1316–17.[33]

Concerning the general issue of the materiality of angels and of the human soul, Gonsalvo of Spain, the *Quaestiones*, Peter of Trabibus, and Auriol all agree: there is some material component in them. Thus, when the *Quaestiones* addresses the problem whether the soul is composed of matter and form, its answer is a somewhat unassertive affirmative: "I say that in a probable way it can be said that there is matter in the soul, both according to the principles of the Philosopher, and of those who posit the opposite."[34] Gonsalvo agrees, more decidedly: "Every created thing is matter or having matter, so that matter is in corporeal things just as well as in incorporeal things."[35] So do Peter of Trabibus ("we have to grant therefore that an angel has matter"[36]) and Auriol ("the philosophers and saints who most diligently inquired about their nature explicitly meant that they are composed of matter and form. And so this is what I hold with them").[37]

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zur Philosophie: Nach dem zweiten Prolog zum ersten Buch seines Sentenzenkommentars, Ms 154, Biblioteca Comunale, Assisi", *Franziskanische Studien* 46 (1964): 193-286; and Antonio Di Noto, *La théologie naturelle de Pierre de Trabibus, OFM: Choix de questions du Ier Livre des Sentences (MS 154 de la Bibliothèque Communale d'Assise)* (Padua: Antonio Milani, 1963). For the state of current research on Peter, see especially Russell L. Friedman, "Peter of Trabibus (Fl. 1295), o.f.m., on the Physical and Mental Abilities of Children in Paradise", *Syzetesis* 6/2 (2019): 433-460; and Tuomas Vaura, "Peter de Trabibus on Creation and the Trinity", *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 89/1 (2022): 145-195. I am very grateful to Russell Friedman for providing me with a preliminary version of his forthcoming edition of Peter's text, which I have checked against MS Florence, Bibl. Naz. Conv. Soppr. cod. B 5 1149 (henceforth 'F'). While it may be less than ideal to call people by the name of their place of origin, in what follows, I will refer to Peter of Trabibus as 'Trabibus' in order to avoid confusion with his namesake, Peter Auriol.

[33] That Auriol advocated for spiritual matter has been noted, but has also resulted in some puzzlement in certain commentators. Thus, Duhem thinks that Auriol's endorsement of spiritual matter is a "purely verbal concession" (Pierre Duhem, *Le Système du Monde: Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic* [Paris: A. Hermann, 1913], 6: 414), while Petagine leaves the details somewhat blurry (Antonio Petagine, *Il fondamento positivo del mondo: Indagini francescane sulla materia all'inizio del XIV secolo (1330–1330 Ca.)* [Rome: Aracne editrice, 2019], especially chs. 7.1 and 9.3.1). I will point to some of the reasons below as to why Auriol advocates for the position, but will leave the detailed analysis to elsewhere. For Auriol's text, I will give page numbers to the early modern edition (Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum [Sic] in Secundum Librum Sententiarum* [Rome: Zannetti, 1605]), which, being notoriously unreliable, I have silently corrected against MS Padua, Bib. Ant. 161 and, when in doubt, against the other manuscripts.

[34] Johannes Duns Scotus, *QDA*, q. 15, 131: "Respondeo quod probabiliter potest dici quod in anima est materia, et secundum fundamenta PHILOSOPHI et eorum qui ponunt contrarium."

[35] Gonsalvus of Spain, *QD*, q. 11, 204: "[O]mne creatum est materia aut materiam habens, ita quod materia sit tam in rebus corporalibus quam in incorporalibus."

[36] Peter of Trabibus, *Sententiarum* (henceforth: *Sent.*). II.3.1.2, F 23rb: "Concedendum igitur est angelum materiam habere."

[37] Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. II.3.1.3, 59a: "Philosophi et Sancti qui diligentissime investigaverunt de naturis illorum, expresse intellixerunt quod essent compositae ex materia et forma. Ideo teneo

Besides sharing the main position, the authors' arguments also have a lot in common. In general, they all seem to think that angelic materiality follows from Aristotle's principles, and that – *pace* Aquinas – it does not violate any theological givens about the angelic nature. In order to get an overview of the main arguments for the view, I have collected them into four groups.

3.1 The Argument from Passibility

One argument that is shared between the *Quaestiones*, Gonsalvo, Peter of Trabibus, and Auriol is what we have already alluded to when discussing the earlier authors. It goes like this: (1) both angels and the soul can undergo passion (in other words, they are mutable or passible); but (2) pure forms are pure acts and hence cannot undergo passions; therefore, (3) angels (and the human soul) must have some non-formal, hence material constituent. As Gonsalvo notes, "just as being and acting show forth form, so potency and passion show forth matter; but in angels and in the soul, there can be real passion".[38] Peter of Trabibus talks about mutability rather than passibility, but the reasoning is the same: "from the immutability of God the saints conclude his simplicity and immateriality; but from the mutability of a creature, they conclude that it has matter."[39]

Auriol's argumentation is somewhat similar. He dismisses the Boethian (and Thomistic) solution of accounting for angelic composition in terms of *quod est* and *quo est* and argues that one could not account for angelic willing and understanding except by positing a purely potential component: "in the genus of intellectual substances, there is something that can receive all actual entities in the genus of intelligibles. But that which receives in this way cannot be in act, whence it is in pure potency without any actuality."[40] As Auriol argues, an angel is capable of understanding, or mentally entertaining, possibly any created thing, which, in the Aristotelian framework, means that he is capable of receiving any intelligible form. But then, since all these intelligible forms are actual, and "the receiver must be devoid of the nature of the received,"[41] Auriol concludes that this

cum eis [...]" Auriol's treatment of this particular issue is rather brief, but he thinks that once he has established that there is pure potentiality in angels, their materiality follows; more about that later.

[38] Gonsalvus of Spain, *QD*, q. 11, 217: "Sicut esse et agere attestatur formae, ita potentia et passio attestatur materiae; sed in angelis et in anima potest esse vera passio."

[39] Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. II.3.1.2, F 23rb: "Ex immutabilitate enim Dei concludunt sancti eius simplicitatem et immaterialitatem, ex mutabilitate autem creaturae concludunt ipsam habere materiam."

[40] Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum [Sic] in Secundum Librum Sententiarum* (henceforth: *Sent.*) II.3.1.1, 56b: "[I]n genere substantiarum intellectualium est dare aliquid quod potest recipere omnem entitatem actualem in genere intelligibilium. Illud autem sic recipiens non est ad actum trahibile, quare illud est ens in pura potentia absque omni actualitate."

[41] See Averroes, *In De anima* III.4; *Auct. Arist. De an.*, 212: "Omne recipiens debet esse denudatum a natura recepti" (Jacqueline Hamesse [ed.], *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis: Un Florilège Médiéval* [Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1974], 191).

is only possible if a part of the angelic intellect is pure potency at least in a similar way to that in which prime matter is pure potency.[42]

The Argument from Act and Potency

Another common argument, defended in the *Quaestiones* as well as by Peter of Trabibus and Auriol, relies on the notion of a common genus. As the author of the *Quaestiones* puts it,

> If in any genus, there are common and really distinct principles [...] then everything falling in that genus must be composed of those; but matter and form are such principles in the genus of substance. Proof: act and potency are the most common principles in any genus; but act, in the genus of substance, is form, and potency in the same genus is matter; therefore, matter and form are the most common principles in the genus of substance [...] Therefore, since the angel is a species of [the common genus of] substance, it is composed of [matter and form].[43]

The argument is somewhat convoluted but seems to amount to this: (1) If there are some general constituents of a genus, then everything that falls under that genus must have those constituents. (For example, if the genus of mammals is characterized by having lungs, then any species that falls under the genus 'mammals' must also be characterized by having lungs.) (2) Act and potency, however, are the most general characteristics of all creatures – not only in the sense of being what Scotus originally called 'disjunctive transcendentals' (one of the pair being true of every single thing), but also in the sense that *both* members of the pair apply to everything, including all things in the genus of substance. (3) But in the genus of substance, in particular, act corresponds to form, while potency corresponds to matter; (4) therefore, in any species falling under the genus 'substance,' including that of angels, we must posit matter and form.

Both this and the previous argument (as well as the one briefly seen in Olivi) rest on the crucial and controversial premise that potency, insofar as it is a potency in something that falls under the category of substance, must mean 'matter'. While our authors rarely discuss this premise and their justification for it explicitly, they do offer a consideration

[42] Peter Auriol, *Sent*. II.3.1.1, 59a: "[I]n istis substantiis intellectualibus et in anima sunt duae verae substantiae, quarum una est mere potentialis et alia est mere actus, ex quibus intrinsece componuntur. Et una dicitur intellectus possibilis, quo talis substantia patitur, id est, recipit intellectionem aliorum a se, et per consequens, quo formaliter intelligit; alia vero est intellectio sui per quam est in actu."

[43] Johannes Duns Scotus, *QDA*, q. 15, 134: "[Q]uia in quocumque genere sunt principia communia [...] et realiter distincta, oportet omnia illius generis esse ex eis composita; materia et forma sunt talia principia in genere substantiae. Probatio: actus et potentia sunt principia communissima in quolibet genere; actus autem in genere substantiae est forma, potentia in eodem genere est materia; igitur materia et forma sunt principia communissima in genere substantiae [...] Igitur cum angelus sit species substantiae, est ex eis compositus."

that seems to support it. For instance, as Peter of Trabibus puts it, potency can only be accounted for by the thing that is *primarily* in potency (just as heat can only be accounted for by the thing that is primarily hot, namely fire). But what is primarily in potency is matter, which means that whatever has potency, must also have matter.[44] We will return to this issue later, but it is worth pointing out here that according to Trabibus and the other proponents of this argument, it is difficult to make sense of the concept of matter if one thinks that it is not exhausted by the notion of potentiality, since besides being potential, matter is supposed to be devoid of all characteristics or forms.

3.2 The Argument from Proper Characteristics

A third argument is shared by the *Quaestiones*, Gonsalvo, and Peter of Trabibus. According to this, something cannot possess the most characteristic properties (*proprietates*) of matter without also possessing matter as a metaphysical constituent; these properties, however, can be found in spiritual as well as in corporeal things. There are two of these properties that the *Quaestiones* calls attention to: one is that of ungenerability and incorruptibility; and the other is that of standing under accidents.

First, the soul as well as the angels are ungenerable and incorruptible.[45] But these characteristics primarily belong to matter, since matter is the ungenerable and incorruptible substrate of all substantial generation and corruption. But, resembling the argument made above, this means that it is only by possessing matter that these characteristics belong to other things, which leads to the conclusion that the soul and the angels must possess matter as well.[46] (Interestingly, Auriol does not share this argument. As he makes clear when he argues for the immateriality of celestial bodies, he thinks that having matter is precisely what makes something corruptible.[47])

Second, Peter of Trabibus elaborates more on the characteristic of *sub-standing*. As he notes, it is clear that substance itself underlies (or substands, *sub-stare*), since it underlies all its accidents. A cat underlies its being tabby, or a human being underlies its being pale

[44] Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. II.3.1.2, F 23ra: "[C]um natura potentialis per se non sit nisi materia, erit ibi compositio materiae et formae, et sic positio implicat contradictionem ponendo in angelo compositionem ex actu et potentia et negando compositionem ex materia et forma [...] Et necesse est talem potentiam ad primum possibile reduci, et cum haec sit materia, necesse est angelum habere materiam ex quo habet compositionem ex potentia et actu."

[45] That is, save by divine creation and annihilation.

[46] Gonsalvus of Spain, *QD*, q. 11, 214: "[P]rincipia debent proportionari principiatis illorum; igitur magis et verius sunt aliqua principia in quibus magis inveniuntur proprietates illorum principiorum; sed proprietates materiae [...] verius inveniuntur in incorporalibus omnibus quam in corporalibus; ergo magis et verius erit materia in incorporalibus quam in corporalibus. Assumpta patet: quia proprietas materiae, quantum ad suum esse, est quod sit ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis [...] Haec autem singulariter conveniunt incorporalibus; [...] Ergo etc." For the *Quaestiones,* see Johannes Duns Scotus, QDA, q. 15, 133.

[47] See his arguments in Peter Auriol, *Sent*. II.14.1.1.

rather than being tanned. But this kind of underlying is derivative of that first and foremost underlying that is a characteristic of matter: matter underlies the substantial form that inheres in it (or perhaps multiple substantial forms successively or even simultaneously[48]). In other words, without the matter underlying the substantial form, there would be no substance to start with, so no substance underlying its accidents. Moreover, Trabibus argues, there is no further entity that would be underlying matter itself, which means that indeed, matter is what first and primarily underlies, and the underlying of all other substrates is derivative of this primary underlying. As Trabibus concludes, this means that every substance must have matter, since otherwise we could not account for its characteristic sub-standing of its accidents. Angels also underlie their accidents, such as their volitions and other mental acts, and thus, like all other substances, must possess matter.[49] Gonsalvo's argument is virtually identical to Peter's, thus there is no reason to repeat it here.[50]

3.3 The Argument from Individuation

A further argument is shared by the *Quaestiones* and Gonsalvo, as well as by the earlier authors briefly mentioned above. The argument maintains that the materiality of the soul and the angels follows from Aristotle's view of individuation: that having multiple individuals in the same species requires matter.[51]

In particular, Gonsalvo and the *Quaestiones* cite *Metaphysics* 12, where Aristotle arguably claims that there are no multiple celestial movers within a species, since they lack matter.[52] But, as the argument continues, it is obvious that there are multiple

[48] Again, the debate about the plurality of substantial forms – i.e., whether matter can have, simultaneously, more than one substantial form – is orthogonal to the present issue, but it should be noted that Trabibus is a pluralist. See Hildebert Alois Huning, "The Plurality of Forms According to Petrus de Trabibus o.f.m", *Franciscan Studies* 28 (1968): 137-196.

[49] Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. II.3.1.2, F 23ra: "[S]ubstare sive subsistere primo et per se et principaliter convenit materiae secundum quod probat Aristoteles, VII *Metaphysicae*, tali ratione: illud quod substat aliis subsistit et ei nihil habet magis rationem substantiae. Sed materia est quae substat omnibus aliis, substat enim formae et mediante forma accidentibus, sibi autem omnino nihil substat; ergo materia magis habet rationem substantiae. Ergo cuicumque convenit ratio subsistendi, convenit ei per materiam cum substare sive subsistere dicatur de aliis per attributionem quandam ad materiam. Cum ergo manifestum sit angelum quibusdam accidentibus subsistere, necesse est angelum materiam habere."

[50] See Gonsalvus of Spain, *QD*, q. 11, 214-215.

[51] Angelic individuation was, as has been well documented, a vexed issue for most of the medieval period. On Scotus's view (not identical with that of the *Quaestiones*), see Giorgio Pini, "The Individuation of Angels from Bonaventure to Duns Scotus", in *A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by T. Hoffmann (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 79-116. See also Tiziana Suarez-Nani, *Les Anges et la Philosophie: Subjectivité et fonction cosmologique des substances séparées à la fin du XIIIe siècle* (Paris: Vrin, 2002), 39-50.

[52] See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.8, 1074a 32-36.

individuals in the species of the rational soul; hence it follows that this rational soul must have matter. The same is true of angels, for which Gonsalvo argues explicitly, quoting Saint Paul that the angels rejoice with one another and genuinely care for one another, which would not be possible if they belonged to different species (as Gonsalvo remarks, a deer does not care for or rejoice with a cow!).[53]

As both the *Quaestiones* and Gonsalvo are aware, an opponent of spiritual matter could make a rejoinder along the lines of Aquinas, who suggests that once matter has individuated the rational soul, it can remain individual even if the originally individuating matter is no longer joined to it. Gonsalvo notes, however, that this answer would result in some serious metaphysical difficulties: saying that the rational soul is individuated by the human body that it perfects would imply that the soul receives its (individual) existence from the body, and thus is metaphysically secondary to the body, which is not true. Or, as he puts it again, a soul can be united to a particular body only if it is already different from other souls, and thus, the soul itself must have its individuality prior to and independently of this union and of the body to which it is united.[54]

Apart from these arguments that are almost uniformly shared among the four authors considered here (and some with Bonaventure and Olivi as well), there are some that are more unique. Thus, for instance, Gonsalvo argues that matter perfects being (otherwise it would not have been created to start with!), and thus spiritual things, which are in general more perfect than corporeal ones, should not lack it.[55] Or, as Peter of Trabibus notes, since every substance is either matter or form or a composite of these two, and since angels cannot be the former two, they must be the latter.[56] Trabibus also thinks, similarly to Olivi,[57] that we need to posit matter in both the human intellect and

[53] Gonsalvus of Spain, *QD*, q. 11, 215-216: "[Q]uaecumque sunt plura eiusdem speciei habent materiam [...] sed anima et angeli sunt plures eiusdem speciei; ergo habent materiam. Minor patet [...] nisi angeli essent eiusdem speciei, sequeretur quod inter eos non esset amor naturalis." For the *Quaestiones* see Johannes Duns Scotus, *QDA*, q. 15, 131-132.

[54] Gonsalvus of Spain, *QD*, q. 11, 215: "Sed ad hanc plurificationem et distinctionem animarum sub eodem specie non sufficit materia in qua sunt et quam perficiunt, ut corpus humanum, quia corpora sunt propter animas, et anima est finis corporis [...] ergo plurificatio et distinctio animarum non est per corpora, sed magis e contra." See also Johannes Duns Scotus, *QDA*, q. 15, 132, making the very same point: "Anima non est propter corpus, sed potius e converso; igitur nec distinctio nec pluralitas animarum est propter distinctionem corporum, sed potius e converso."

[55] Gonsalvus of Spain, *QD*, q. 11, 214: "[Q]uod facit ad perfectionem substantiae in quantum substantia est ens distinctum [...] et tale ponendum est in entibus nobilioribus sive magis perfectis [...] Sed materia est huiusmodi, quod ipsa facit ad perfectionem substantiae [...] ergo etc."

[56] Peter of Trabibus, *Sent.* II.3.1.2, F 22vb: "[O]mnis substantia aut est materia aut forma aut compositum. Sed materia et forma secundum quod in hac divisione accipiuntur sunt partes essentiales substantiae compositae, materia enim non est substantia ut totum sed ut pars; nec forma similiter, cum dicantur relative. Ergo omnis substantia aut est substantia composita aut pars substantiae compositae. Sed non potest dici quod angelus sit pars substantiae compositae. Ergo est substantia composita ex materia et forma."

[57] Petrus Iohannis Olivi, *Sent.* II.16, esp. 315-316.

the angels in order to account for their unity, despite having distinct faculties or powers.[58] But the primary aim here was to give an overview of the main considerations thinkers endorsed for maintaining hylomorphic composition in angels, and for that, this overview will suffice. Besides these general hylomorphic considerations, our authors also often endorsed theological ones; e.g., by alluding to Augustine's literal commentary on Genesis, according to which when the Bible says that "God created heaven and earth," what is denoted by 'earth' is the formless matter of all creatures, spiritual as well as corporeal.[59] But we will leave these theological considerations aside for now as well.

4. The Nature of Angelic Matter

While this shared background may suggest that the four texts examined here ultimately agree on the main metaphysical characteristics of spiritual matter, that is not the case. While Gonsalvo and the author of the *Quaestiones* think, agreeing with Bonaventure and earlier perhaps with Avicebron, that the same kind of material component is found across all creation, spiritual and corporeal alike, Peter of Trabibus and Auriol argue, agreeing with Olivi, that matter must be different in spiritual and corporeal things. The way they account for this difference, in turn, will also shed some light on their notions of spiritual matter, corporeity, and matter in general.

a) The Uniform Matter View

The first position, endorsed by the author of the *Quaestiones* and by Gonsalvo, is what we can label as the 'uniform matter view', that is, that "that matter [in the spiritual substances] is of the same nature as the matter of corporeal things, so that in all created things, there is matter of the same nature".[60] Gonsalvo is already keenly aware that this is a somewhat controversial position even among those who endorse spiritual matter; as he notes, "of those maintaining this opinion [i.e., that there is matter in angels], some say that matter is of a different nature in those three kinds of things, because of their intransmutability to one another; and some say that in everything there is [matter] of one and the same nature, which seems to me more probable".[61] This latter position is what we

[58] See especially Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. I.8.4.4.

[59] For Augustine's less than unambiguous account, see his *De genesi ad litteram*, I.1 (Aurelius Augustinus, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis 1: Books 1–6*, edited and translated by J. Hammond Taylor [New York, N.Y.: Newman Press, 1982], 19-20).

[60] Gonsalvus of Spain, *QD*, q. 11, 219: [D]icendum est quod non solum materia est in rebus spiritualibus, sed quod illa materia eiusdem rationis est secundum se cum materia corporalium, ita quod in creatis per se entibus est materia unius rationis." For the *Quaestiones*, see Johannes Duns Scotus, *QDA*, q. 15, 135-136.

[61] Gonsalvus of Spain, *QD*, q. 11, 204: "Sed de numero istam opinionem tenentium, quidam dicunt quod materia est alterius rationis in isto triplici gradu entium propter eorum

may also call 'universal hylomorphism': the hylomorphic composition of creatures is fundamentally of the same in kind, regardless of the kind of creature in question.[62]

While both Gonsalvo and the author of the *Quaestiones* think that this view is simply more plausible than its alternative, they also provide a few arguments for the position.

According to the first, what we may call the *Argument from Hierarchy*, if spiritual and corporeal matter were not of the same kind, then one would be more noble than the other, in some sense of 'nobility'. Regardless, however, of how we flesh out this hierarchy – that is, whether we posit spiritual matter to be more or less noble than the corporeal one – we will run into difficulties.[63] The same argument was indeed often proposed against the distinction between celestial and terrestrial matter, that is, of the matter of immutable celestial bodies and mutable corporeal ones, in which case the difficulties hinted at are in fact easier to see. On the one hand, if celestial matter is more noble than the terrestrial one, then it must be perfected by a more noble form; but it is not, since the rational soul is more noble than the form of an inanimate celestial body. On the other hand, if celestial matter is less noble, then it must be perfected by less noble forms than those perfecting terrestrial matter; but this is not the case either, since the form of a celestial body is more noble than the form of a terrestrial element or of an inanimate body.[64] Gonsalvo seems to think, although without elaborating on the details of how it is exactly supposed to work, that the same consideration applies to spiritual matter as well. Moreover, he and the author of the *Quaestiones* claim that even if one could establish a hierarchy without immediate metaphysical contradictions, nevertheless, since – according to Augustine – matter is between something and nothing,[65] one of the kinds would either fall into pure nothingness or into full actuality.[66]

intransmutabilitatem ad invicem; quidam vero quod in omnibus sit unius rationis et eiusdem, quae videtur mihi probabilior."

[62] Universal hylomorphism was of course best known in the West through Avicebron's theory; as Weisheipl already noted, one can trace the lineage from Avicebron to Gundissalinus to the later Western commentators. See Weisheipl, "Albertus Magnus".

[63] See Gonsalvo, even though his argument, as stated, is about celestial matter: "[S]i in caelo esset materia alterius rationis quam in istis corporalibus, et in rebus spiritualibus quam in rebus corporalibus, oportet quod materia in corporibus caelestibus esset nobilior quam materia istorum inferiorum [...] Ergo forma perficiens materiam in caelestibus esset nobilior forma perficiente materiam in generabilibus animatis; et sic caelum esset animatum anima intellectiva, quod tamen falsum est" (Gonsalvus of Spain, *QD*, q. 11, 220).

[64] The argument, used for establishing the unity of celestial and terrestrial matter, can be found in many authors, including Scotus, Ockham, and earlier Francis of Marchia. For a more detailed analysis of the argument, see Mark Thakkar, "Francis of Marchia on the Heavens", *Vivarium: A Journal for Mediaeval Philosophy and the Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages* 44 (2006): 21-40.

[65] See Augustine, *Confessionum libri tredecim*, XII.7, lin. 13: "[U]nde fecisti caelum et terram, duo quaedam, unum prope te, alterum prope nihil" (Patrologia Latina, 32:659).

[66] This same argument can also be found in some opponents of spiritual matter, who regard it as a reductio against the view; see, e.g., Landolphus Caracciolo, also a Franciscan contemporary, *Sent.* II.3.1.2 (Landulphus Caracciolo, *Liber Secundum Super Sententias* [Venice: Adam de Rottweil, 1480]).

The second argument Gonsalvo and the author of the *Quaestiones* propose for their position is what can perhaps be regarded as the main challenge of the opposite view: namely, that if one were to accept the diversity view, one would have to account for where the diversity of matter comes from. It clearly cannot come from form or the composite itself, since matter as such is devoid of these; but it is difficult to see what other option there could be, since in all other things, it is form that gives difference. Gonsalvo also thinks that the view that would place the origin of the difference in the diverse aptitudes for form (a view perhaps advocated for by Auriol, as below), is mistaken: matter as such, being pure potency, must be in potency to all kinds of forms and hence cannot have diverse aptitudes.[67]

What can the diversity view say to these arguments, and indeed, how can it maintain that matter can be diversified? Both Peter of Trabibus and Auriol think that the matter of spiritual things is different in kind from the matter of corporeal ones, and besides giving some arguments for this position, they also clarify how one can conceive of the distinction.

b) The Diverse Matter View

The first way in which both Trabibus and Auriol characterize the difference between corporeal and spiritual matter is that "the matter of corporeal things according to its essence has extension, while the matter of spiritual things according to its essence lacks extension".[68] Trabibus thinks that corporeal matter includes extension in its essence because he thinks that every corporeal form already presupposes a more or less determinate extension – which means that this extension cannot come from that corporeal form. For instance, when the substantial form of a cat is united to matter, that matter already has to be of a certain size; one cannot take the matter of a small droplet and turn it into a cat by informing it with a cat-soul. (In this sense, Peter seems to believe in a principle akin to the preservation of quantity of matter.[69]) As Auriol puts it, somewhat similarly, all forms received by corporeal prime matter are quantized, and consequently, the matter that can stand under this kind of form must also be intrinsically quantized, in the sense of having indeterminate quantity.[70] Trabibus and Auriol also note that extension must be a characteristic that follows upon corporeal matter (as opposed to

[67] Gonsalvus of Spain, *QD*, q. 11, 219-220.
[68] Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. II.3.1.4, F 24va: "[M]ateria corporalium secundum suam essentiam habeat extensionem, materia autem spiritualium secundum suam essentiam extensione careat."
[69] For some discussion of this principle, see, e.g., Robert Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes, 1274-1671* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), ch. 4.5, 71-76.
[70] The notion of indeterminate quantity or indeterminate dimensions has received some attention in Silvia Donati, "The Notion of *Dimensiones Indeterminatae* in the Commentary Tradition of the *Physics* in the Thirteenth Century", in *The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century*, edited by C. Leijenhorst, C. Lüthy, and J.M.M.H. Thijssen (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 189-224. For Auriol's view, see Petagine, *Il fondamento positivo*, 78-84.

form), since it does not make a composite substance active but rather passive.[71] Finally, they argue, if matter is essentially extensionless, then it cannot receive extension without changing its essence – and since the latter is implausible, we must grant that corporeal matter inherently possesses extension.[72] (In contrast, the author of the *Quaestiones* and Gonsalvo explicitly argue for the claim that neither extension nor its lack is part of the essence of matter.[73])

The second main argument for the diverse matter view is also shared between Trabibus and Auriol. As they note, matter, primarily, is the source of passive potency, by which things can undergo passion (as was seen above, this was one of the main reasons to posit matter in the first place, among spiritual things). However, the passive potency of corporeal and of spiritual things are different; and thus, so must be their matter. For Trabibus and Auriol, the difference of passive potencies consists in the fact that while corporeal things undergo substantial transmutation, spiritual things do not, but only accidental ones.[74] Thus, Trabibus concludes that the matter of corporeal and spiritual things has identity by analogy only, which analogy is based on three characteristics that are shared amongst the different kinds: matter is perfectible and perfected by the form; it sub-stands; and it is a potency.[75] These characteristics do not imply, however, that the different kinds of matter would share a common essence or a common definition.

Both Peter of Trabibus and Auriol are aware that the main reason why someone may endorse the unicity view is that it seems implausible (if not impossible) to posit any

[71] Even though Auriol also thinks that corporeity itself must be a formal characteristic (being due to one of the most universal forms on the Porphyrean tree). See his treatment of immaterial celestial bodies, Peter Auriol, *Sent*. II.14.1.2, 189a.

[72] Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. II.3.1.4, F 25ra-26ra.

[73] E.g., Johannes Duns Scotus, *QDA*, q. 15, 139: "Ratio autem materiae secundum se est quod nec est quid nec quantum, et caetera, sed est potentia unumquodque."

[74] Peter Auriol, *Sent*. II.3.1.1, 57b: "Tertia differentia est ex natura transmutationis, quia materia prima est illud quo aliquid recipitur cum transmutatione et cum abiectione alterius, et hoc accidit sibi ratione trinae dimensionis, quae necessario trahitur ad determinatam figuram et exigentiam formae receptae; sed intellectus possibilis est illud quo aliquid recipitur sine transmutatione et abiectione alicuius." Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. II.3.1.4, F 25vb: "[N]isi esset materia non esset passio; pati enim aequivoce dicitur de spiritualibus et corporalibus, quia in corporalibus passio est cum substantiali transmutatione quo modo in spiritualibus esse non potest. Ergo nec materia potest esse unius rationis hic et ibi."

[75] Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. II.3.1.4, F 25vb: "Ex quo concluditur necessario quod [...] habet identitatem secundum analogiam tantum, quae quidem analogia attendatur in tribus. In comparatione essentiae, quia sicut substantiae corporales habent essentiam compositorum ex duplici principio quorum unum est de se imperfectum et interminatum, quod dicitur materia, perfectibile et terminabile ab alio [...] In ratione subsistentiae, quia sicut in substantiis corporalibus invenitur aliquid cui primo convenit ratio subsistentiae, quod quidem est materia, sic et in substantiis spiritualibus se habet. In ratione potentiae, quia sicut in corporibus invenitur aliquid per quod sunt in potentia ad communem perfectionem substantialem vel accidentalem, sic et in substantiis spiritualibus aliquid est per quod sunt in potentia ad aliquam perfectionem quae eis potest acquiri."

distinction in things that altogether lack formal characteristics, since all distinction comes from the form. As was seen above, this was indeed a common objection against the diversity view. Trabibus thinks, however, that the main assumption of this reasoning is false. As he notes,

> The aforementioned argument for the position, without doubt, posits something false, namely that matter in itself does not have actuality, but all its actuality is from the form, and because of this it cannot have any distinction except by the form. For this is false, because all essences, necessarily, have some actuality, a complete essence complete [actuality], and an incomplete [essence] incomplete [actuality].[76]

Thus, in Trabibus's view, whether we can distinguish various kinds of matter is strongly tied to the question of whether or not matter has any actuality. Trabibus thinks that all essences must have some kind of actuality, otherwise they would not be essences. Since an essence is that which pertains to a thing when all other things are bracketed or removed, if matter has an essence, it pertains to it in actuality when all other things (including forms) are removed.[77]

While Trabibus's argument, starting from the actuality of matter, seems to indicate that the distinction between various kinds of prime matter indeed implies that prime matter is not purely potential, we should note here that some form of the distinction thesis was relatively wide-spread, even among those who thought that matter had no actuality on its own. Thus, Aquinas, while arguably thinking that matter is pure potency,[78] also argues that the matter of celestial bodies and the matter of terrestrial elements differ.[79] When explaining how such a distinction can be made between purely potential prime matters, he gives the analogy of distinguishing the highest genera from one

[76] Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. II.3.1.4, F 24va: "Ratio autem praedictae positionis indubitanter ponit falsum, scilicet quod materia de se non habeat actualitatem, sed tota eius actualitas sit a forma, ac per hoc nec aliquam possit habere distinctionem nisi a forma. Hoc enim est falsum, quia omnis essentia necessario habet aliquam actualitatem, completa completam, incompleta incompletam."

[77] Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. II.3.1.4, F 24va-vb: "Item, essentia cuiuslibet rei dicitur illud quod res est absolute omni alio circumscripto. Sed essentia materiae aliqua essentia est. Ergo habet aliquod esse de se omni alio circumscripto. Ergo forma nec simpliciter | dat esse materiae nec distinctionem."

[78] Whether matter is indeed purely potential for Aquinas has been the subject of some controversy; see, e.g., Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, ch. 3.1; and for a different take, Jeffrey E. Brower, *Aquinas's Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chs. 5.4 and 5.5. See also Matthew Kent, *Prime Matter According to St Thomas* (PhD diss., Fordham University, 2006).

[79] See, e.g., Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I.66.2: "Materia enim, secundum id quod est, est in potentia ad formam. Oportet ergo quod materia, secundum se considerata, sit in potentia ad formam omnium illorum quorum est materia communis [...] Sic ergo materia, secundum quod est sub forma incorruptibilis corporis, erit adhuc in potentia ad formam corruptibilis corporis [...] Impossibile ergo est quod corporis corruptibilis et incorruptibilis per naturam, sit una materia." See also Aquinas, *Sent*. II.12.1.

another: it cannot be done based on some specific difference (since they do not fall under any further common genus), but rather, they are *just* different.[80] The distinction was also drawn on similar grounds by Hervaeus Natalis, between the possibly very many kinds of prime matter, referring to the different essential grades that these different matters have, while all of them being purely potential.[81]

Auriol does not delve into the metaphysical specificities of matter at least in this context;[82] he merely notes that although both the prime matter of corruptible things and the possible intellect are recognized by transmutation, they do not undergo the same kind of transmutation: we learn of prime matter by observing substantial change, while we learn of the possible intellect by observing mental change in human beings and assuming change of intellect and perhaps of will in angels. Now, transmutation in the Aristotelian framework means the actualization of a potency; thus, having these altogether different kinds of transmutations point to different underlying substrates, or different potencies of spiritual and corporeal things.[83]

Apart from pointing out the difference in these general terms, Auriol also thinks that matter in spiritual and corporeal things can be distinguished based on the kinds of act they are contrasted with. (Aquinas would, again, agree at least with this much: as he explains the difference between kinds of matter, "the different matters themselves are distinguished by analogy to the different acts, inasmuch as a different grade [ratio] of possibility can be found in them".[84]) In other words, in order to understand how corporeal and spiritual matter differ as passive potencies, we need to look at the kinds of forms to which they are in potency. On the one hand, the matter of an earthly corporeal body,[85] such as a cat, is the kind of matter that is in potency to all particular substantial forms – it can receive the substantial form of a cat, the substantial form of a cat-corpse, and so on. However, unlike

[80] Aquinas, *Sent*. II.12.1.1: "[S]imiliter etiam genera generalissima non dividuntur aliquibus differentiis, sed seipsis."

[81] Hervaeus Natalis, *In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Commentaria* (Paris: Dionysius Moreau, 1647), II.12.3, 239b: "[P]otentiae aliquo distinguuntur essentiis suis intrinsece et realiter, ita quod in essentiis suis habent diversos gradus." Hervaeus thinks we may need as many kinds of prime matter as there are celestial bodies, in order to preserve their incorruptibility; a view that Ockham will ridicule later (William of Ockham, *Quaestiones in Librum Secundum Sententiarum (Reportatio)*, in *Opera Theologica* 5, edited by G. Gál and R. Wood [St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1981], II.18, 398).

[82] For a brief examination of what he says about them elsewhere, see Russell L. Friedman, "Is Matter the Same as Its Potency? Some Fourteenth-Century Answers", *Vivarium* 59 (2021): 123-142.

[83] See Peter Auriol, *Sent*. II.3.1.1, as quoted above (n. 74).

[84] Aquinas, *Sent*. II.12.1.1, ad 3: "[D]iversae materiae seipsis distinguuntur secundum analogiam ad diversos actus, prout in eis diversa ratio possibilitatis invenitur." For the claim that passive potencies are individuated based on the corresponding actualities, see, e.g., *ST* I.77.3 and *ScG* III.45, and for some analysis, Gloria Frost, *Aquinas on Efficient Causation and Causal Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), ch. 5.2.

[85] As was mentioned above, Auriol thinks that the celestial bodies are corporeal yet immaterial, hence this qualification. See Peter Auriol, *Sent*. II.14.1.1.

the potential intellect of an angel, it cannot receive universal or intelligible forms. And the reverse is true as well: while the material component or possible intellect of an angel is in potency to receive all intelligible (and hence universal) forms, it is not in potency to receive the substantial form of a particular cat. Thus, Auriol thinks that the underlying substrate of angels and material things can be characterized by saying that the former is in potency to all universal intelligibles, while the latter is in potency to all forms of particular sensible objects, while both of them being purely potential since they can receive any form in the realm of universal or particular forms, respectively.[86]

5. Spiritual and Corporeal Matter

What can we say about angelic matter, or matter in general, in light of these considerations? One, perhaps obvious immediate conclusion is that even among authors who advocated for spiritual matter, the positions diverge. Some maintained that this spiritual matter essentially differs from the corporeal kind; some denied this distinction. Proponents of the diverse matter view think that the matter of corporeal things is necessarily extended; proponents of the unicity view, on the other hand, believe that matter as such can acquire extension but that extension does not become part of its essence. (Again, in this they agree with some of the spiritual immaterialists, such as perhaps Aquinas.)

As it has been mentioned in passing but is worth making explicit, the debate on spiritual matter closely resembles the one on the matter of celestial bodies. The resemblance is not incidental, as the two cases indeed seem to be two sides of the same coin: while angels (or indeed, the separate human soul) present an instance of incorporeal but changeable substances, celestial bodies present an instance of corporeal but unchangeable ones.[87] Consequently, some authors who thought that angels must be material precisely for the reason that they are changeable, also thought that celestial bodies are incorporeal precisely for the reason that they are unchangeable.[88]

It is interesting to note, however, that no specific view about celestial matter is obviously implied by any specific view about spiritual matter, or vice versa, and hence a

[86] Peter Auriol, *Sent*. II.3.1.1, 57b: "Prima [differentia] est quod sicut totum genus sensibilium differt a toto genere intelligibilium, sic haec materia ab illa, quia materia est quoddam ens trahibile ad totum genus sensibilium, non intelligibilium; intellectus vero potentialis econtra ad totum genus intelligibilium, non sensibilium."

[87] On some of Aristotle's empirical data for this unchangeability, see Grant, *Planets, Stars, and Orbs*, ch. 10, esp. 203-205; for a helpful general introduction of Aristotle's cosmology, David C. Lindberg, *The Beginnings of Western Science* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 52-60.

[88] Again, this is Auriol's view. While this was the main reason why Duhem regarded Auriol's endorsement of spiritual matter as merely "verbal", this does not seem to me plausible. These two positions point to Auriol's conception of matter as a purely metaphysical substrate of change. I examine Auriol's view in more detail in "Heavenly Stuff: Peter Auriol on the Materiality of Angels and Celestial Bodies," *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy*, forthcoming.

variety of combinations emerges. Some thinkers, such as Gonsalvo and the author of the *Quaestiones*, think that the same matter underlies all creation, be it spiritual or corporeal, celestial or terrestrial. Others, such as Auriol, think that while spiritual beings are material, having matter that is distinct from the matter of terrestrial bodies, the heavenly bodies are not material at all. Trabibus takes the diversity view in both cases: while he thinks that there is spiritual matter, this spiritual matter is distinct from corporeal matter (the latter is essentially extended while the former is not), and that the matter of celestial and terrestrial bodies also differ.[89] Some deniers of spiritual matter, such as Ockham, will argue that while spiritual substances are immaterial, the matter of heavenly bodies is the same as that of the terrestrial elements[90]; while other deniers, such as Aquinas or Hervaeus, think that the matter of celestial bodies differs from that of the terrestrial ones (and perhaps even from one another).[91]

If one would like to attempt to systematize some of these positions, perhaps it is useful to pay attention to two interrelated issues. The first is the relationship between corporeity and materiality; the second is that between matter and its potency.

First, while it may be tempting for the modern reader to treat corporeity and materiality as identical characteristics, that was not so for some of the medieval thinkers we have considered here. For instance, for Auriol, materiality and corporeity come apart in such a way that neither one of them implies the other. In other words, Auriol conceives of matter strictly as an underlying substrate of change, dividing it altogether from the question of whether something is a body in the sense of being made of "stuff". (As was mentioned above, he regards corporeity as a formal characteristic.[92]) This means that, for Auriol, as we have seen, there can be immaterial and yet corporeal substances, such as the celestial bodies, and also material yet incorporeal ones, such as angels. Our everyday objects, cats, statues, and the like, happen to be both material and corporeal, but that implies nothing with respect to the logical relation between these notions.

Other proponents of spiritual matter, such as Trabibus, Gonsalvo, or the author of the *Quaestiones*, seem to think that one must have matter in order to have a body, but the former does not imply the latter. Thus, they admit of material and yet incorporeal things (angels, souls), but not of things that are corporeal and yet immaterial.

[89] The view is more complex; they differ according to certain conceptions but are analogically speaking identical. See Peter of Trabibus, *Sent*. II.12.4, F 72ra-va.
[90] William of Ockham, *Reportatio* II.18.
[91] Aquinas, *Sent*. II.12; Hervaeus Natalis, *Subtilissima Hervei Natalis Britonis theologi acutissimi Quodlibeta Undecim cum octo ipsius profundissimis tractatibus* (Venice: Antonius Zimara, 1513), III.10, f. 82vb; Hervaeus Natalis, *De materia caeli*, q. 3 in the same volume; and Hervaeus Natalis, *In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Commentaria*, II.12, 235 ff.
[92] Peter Auriol, *Sent*. II.14.1.2, 189a: "Materiam enim esse in caelo non concludit corporeitas; forma enim dat esse corporeum, non materia. Nec illam concludit quantitas, licet enim quantitas interminata sit ratione materiae, tamen quantitas terminata inest ratione formae (in caelo autem tantummodo est quantitas terminata). Tertia, non sensibilis qualitas."

For other authors, materiality seems to imply corporeity, and vice versa. For instance, as was briefly seen above, Aquinas thinks that spiritual substances must be immaterial, since, for one, materiality would hinder their intellection. In particular, for Aquinas, a material intellect could not understand for the precise reason that it would then be a body; thus, it seems that for him, materiality implies corporeity. He also thinks that celestial bodies must be material because they are *bodies*, in other words, corporeal beings; which indicates that corporeity also implies materiality.[93] In other words, for Aquinas, something is material just in case it is also corporeal, and the same seems to be the view of most of the later Franciscan authors as well, including Ockham.[94]

The question of how matter and its potency are related is a convoluted one that we cannot deal with in this paper.[95] But it is worth noting that for some, like Bonaventure and Gonsalvo, who think that the same matter underlies all creation, 'matter' indeed seems to be synonymous with 'potency', as contrasted with pure actuality. For these authors, just as for Auriol, having matter does not imply being corporeal; but, in contrast with Auriol, it does not necessarily imply being changeable either (since celestial bodies are not such, even though they possess matter). Being material, in this sense, merely implies that the thing in question is not purely actual in the way God is purely actual – which is, of course, true of all created things. Aquinas (following Albert) explicitly criticizes this identification of matter and potency, and as is well known, argues that there can be potency where there is no matter; but he does agree with the position at least in thinking that there can be matter where there is no potency for change (as in the case of heavenly bodies). All this seems to indicate that while virtually everyone in our period agreed that matter is (or implies) potency, the understanding of 'potency' here differed greatly: for some, it meant a kind of incomplete essence as distinguished from pure actuality, for others, it meant particularly a potency for successively taking on different forms, in other words, a potency for change.

All in all, as this brief sketch shows, the question of angelic materiality gave ample opportunity for thinkers to elaborate on what they meant exactly by 'matter', and to hint at the ways in which this metaphysical principle is related to other important metaphysical notions in the neighborhood, such as change, corporeity, or potency. How to make sense of spiritual substances that are changeable (including both angels and the human soul), and of celestial bodies that are unchangeable, was a challenge that well

[93] As Aquinas notes: "[D]imensiones quantitativae sunt accidentia consequentia corporeitatem, *quae toti materiae convenit*" (*Summa Theologiae* I.76.6 ad 2, emphasis added). For some analysis of Aquinas's conception of materiality and body, see Antonio Petagine, *Matière, Corps, Esprit: La notion de sujet dans la philosophie de Thomas d'Aquin* (Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, 2014).

[94] Scotus in notoriously noncommittal regarding the question of the materiality of celestial bodies, seemingly regarding Aristotle's view as incompatible with theology. The perhaps most detailed treatment is in the *Reportatio*, II.14.1 (Johannes Duns Scotus, *Ioannis Duns Scoti Reportata Parisiensia*, in *Opera Omnia* 11.1, edited by L. Wadding [Lyon: Laurentius Durand, 1639], 336-339).

[95] For an overview of some of the fourteenth-century intricacies, see Friedman, "Is Matter the Same as Its Potency?".

illustrates some of the emerging, more subtle problems with Aristotelian hylomorphism. But we need a fuller study of the later, fifteenth-century developments to see how these problems influenced the ultimate fate of the theory.

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RESEÑAS DE LIBROS | BOOK REVIEWS

Ardis Butterfield, Ian Johnson and Andrew Kraebel. Eds. *Literary Theory and Criticism in the Later Middle Ages. Interpretation, Invention, Imagination*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. xxv + 331 p. ISBN: 9781108698351. Hardcover: £ 100

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The comprehension of literary theory and criticism that we currently have diverges from the prevailing views during the Middle Ages, where such frameworks were largely non-existent. In fact, the conception of literature itself has become far more dynamic than in medieval times. While some foundational concepts of contemporary theory might find their roots in medieval texts, it is undeniable that modern literary theory and criticism present themselves as established schools of thought, occasionally even assuming institutional form. Moreover, the approach to literary theory and criticism varies considerably, often intertwining with commentaries and blending with diverse realms of thought – be it religious, philosophical, or cultural. Perhaps owing to these factors, alongside others (such as fragmentation or even lack of theoretical texts), there is a tendency for a certain detachment between Medieval Studies and Literary Theory and Criticism. Nevertheless, despite this perceived divergence, Ardis Butterfield, Ian Johnson, and Andrew Kraebel were not deterred from publishing *Literary Theory and Criticism in the Later Middle Ages*, a compilation crafted in honour of Alastair Minnis. On account of its innovation alone, the book merits praise – and the quality of the twelve articles that comprise the book in no way disappoints this praise and initial suspicion that one would be facing a dense, complex work of serious scientific rigor.

The edition opens with a note by Vincent Gillespie entitled "The Career and Contributions of Alastair Minnis". Always dedicated to medieval exegesis and scholastic literary theory, in a time when these were in need of a profound renovation to become more rigorous, Minnis studied, published, and taught in several universities all around the world. Being a *pontifex* figure, the scholar created a productive synthesis among Literary Studies, Theory and Criticism, Historiography and Scholastic Philosophy. Described by his pupils as a *magister lectoris,* he has revolutionized the peripheral area of late medieval literary studies with comprehensive and systematic works.

The introduction, titled "Criticism, Theory, and the Later Medieval Text" and written by Andrew Kraebel, not only outlines the themes of each subsequent chapter

but also delves into the topics of interpretation, invention, and imagination. Despite the rejection of categorical schisms between the vernacular and the religious Latin, he is forced to agree that the scholastic task was that of interpretation and invention, in a restricted sense of combining pre-existing materials and methods. The phantastic and imaginative, on the other hand, were more restricted to the vernacular, and were looked at with suspicion. Moreover, Kraebel also delves into the world of criticism and theory in the scholastic world. While the author chose to name the commentaries – in form of disperse and paratextual glosses, regarding the texts of the Antiquity, or forming a more systematic and autonomous unit of prose, in the case of Holy Writ – with the contemporary term «criticism»; he carefully expounded the idiosyncrasies of the scholastic thought and terminology regarding theory. *Theoria* or *theorica* was understood as contemplation of the Divine Light. Although it could be obtained through the Holy Scripture and should be the ultimate purpose of the *physis* and *philosophia*, as well as its orienting principle, it had nothing to do with the study of text, a task that belonged to the vague and subsidiary of rhetoric, *poesis*. After this illuminating exposition, the reader is given to understand that what is now known as literary studies had, in the late Middle Ages, no well stablished body or frontiers, being, thus, in an embryonic state.

Cleverly, the chapter's section opens with Marjorie Curry Woods' essay, "Access through Accessus Gateways to Learning in a Manuscript of School Texts", wherein she delves into the discussion of 6 *accessüis* found in *Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 391*, which are believed to have been extensively familiar to medieval scholars. Much like an *accessus* in its own right, Woods' scholarly essay merits commendation for its skilful blend of elucidation and exploration. She clarifies the texts by offering concise reflections after each *accessus*, addressing various facets of each, while also delving into comparative insights gleaned throughout her analysis. Ultimately, it provides the reader with a clearer grasp of the *accessus* presented, and it elucidates their application in the instruction of Latin literature during the Middle Ages.

In order to sustain the comprehensiveness and unity of the literary studies and production in the Late Middle Ages, Jocelyn Wogan-Browne shows the affinities of "Scholastic Theory and Vernacular Knowledge" in a chapter of the same title. Following Curry Woods' topic *accessus ad auctores*, the author then clarifies the changes that occurred within the prologues after the adoption of the Aristotelian principle of the four causes. Henceforward, Wogan-Browne illustrates them with several examples of vernacular texts that were built upon this scheme, the most exemplary being the *Lumere as lais* (1268). This Old-French theological encyclopaedia by Pierre de Fetcham has, according to him, God and the human author – His instrument – as efficient cause, and Christ as creator and creature – the theme of the encyclopaedia – as material cause. The formal cause refers to the structure or manner in which *Lumere as lais* is written, such as a book of questions and answers. Its final cause pertains to the intended audience and the author's aim of seeking forgiveness of sins and attaining grace to behold the face of God. The author then proceeds with the presentation of several

examples that illustrate the stereotypical and topological dimension that this prologue-structure gained, from treatises on falconry to hybrid compositions of historiography, novel, and *chanson de geste*. One the one hand this shows the harmony between the precepts of scholastics and literary practices, on the other hand it also clarifies the challenging and precarious status of the literary and the thoughts concerning it in the Middle Ages, because of the abundance of different texts that showed the same Aristotelian principles.

In the following chapter, "Poetics and Biblical Hermeneutics in the Thirteenth Century", Gilbert Dahan expounds how the rediscovery of Aristotle's works, especially the translation of *Poetics* paved the way to profound developments in exegesis and in the poetic science. Embedded in scientific spirit, theology was not only elevated to the status of science, but it was also considered to be the first and most noble of them, having, therefore, the most noble and scientific of languages. Hence, the artificial or scientific language emerged as the paragon, characterized by qualities such as clarity, definition, analysis, and synthesis. This line of thought was complemented by the suspicion and devaluation of poetic language, which was prone to falsity and listed the metaphorical, parabolic, and symbolic among its character. However, the Church Doctors were quick to realize that the Holy Writ shared much more of the poetic mode than that of the scientific. Arguing that the word of God revealed eternal truths that were too overwhelming for man's reason, the Scripture was taken in its material form as containing a sum of several poetic modes and devices that alluded to spiritual truths to be uncovered by the exegete. This task required the mastering and ordering of several poetic modes, such as the narrative, the exhortative and enigmatic mode. Of high interest in this contribution is the scholastic view of poetic language, in a rather contemporary way, not as an entity in itself, but as something that dwells in diverse manners in different texts. Nevertheless, this analysis primarily served as a means of dissecting biblical texts for religious purposes.

Ralph Hanna opens the subsequent chapter with "Robert Holcot and *De vetula*: Beyond Smalley's Assessment". His focus lies on the exegete Robert Holcot, specifically his ideas and their clear connection to the pseudo-Ovidian *De vetula*, extending Beryl Smalley's analysis to offer a deeper understanding of the exegetical significance within the author's texts. This expanded exploration also serves as a way to try and explain Holcot's fascination during the Middle Ages. To accomplish this, Hanna leads the reader through a close reading examination of sections from the prologue of the *Super Sapientiam Salomonis*, showcasing how the author's classroom performances and theological insights are both captivating and thought-provoking, requiring a thoughtful consideration of both biblical and non-biblical texts.

Notwithstanding the relevance of Andrew Kraebel's next chapter for the question of authorship and exegesis in the Late Middle Ages, its focus lies more on religious and scholastic-thinking historiography than on literary theory or criticism. Apart from the insight on Rolle's synthesis on the two bonaventurean instances of *commentator* and

auctor, as well as on his inspirational view of the authorship – a literary question as old as literature –, there is not much that relates directly to literary theory in "The Inspired Commentator. Theories of interpretative Authority in the Writings of Richard Rolle". In the more mystical works of Richard Rolle (d. 1349), the contemporary problem of Holy Ghost-Guidance of the Church Authors was the real question being answered. Unlike all rival positions, Rolle claimed to derive his authorship and authority directly from his mystical contemplations, asceticism and the Holy Ghost. These had previously guided the Church Fathers, a spirit that this author, who referred to himself as *modernus*, seeks to revive.

Joe Stadolnik proceeds to offer what appears to be an unconventional reflection: "Guitar Lessons at Blackfriars: Vernacular Medicine and Preachers' Style in Henry Daniel's *Liber uricrisiarum*". The title refers to Stadolnik's opening reflection, where he draws on the advice of the English Dominican John Bromyard that preachers should learn from musicians—specifically, their emphasis on efficiency in tuning, avoidance of excessive strumming, and ability to engage the audience effectively. The focus of the article is, however, on one of the authors influenced by Bromyard's thoughts (properly contextualized within the article), namely Henry Daniel. Throughout the text, Stadolnik focuses on Daniel's stylistic approach in *Liber uricrisiarum* in comparison with Dominican rhetorical theories, which allows the reader to comprehend how Daniel's methods align/diverge with established rhetorical norms within that same tradition. With clearly defined objectives and employing a particularly illuminating and comparative approach, Stadolnik positions Henry Daniel within his historical and intellectual milieu, thus shedding light on the nuances of his approach to communication and its implications for both medical discourse and preaching practices of the time.

Similar to the fifth, the seventh chapter, "The Re-cognition of Doctrinal Discourse and Scholastic Literary Theory: Affordances of *Ordinatio* in Reginald Pecock's *Donet* and *Reule of Crysten Religioun*", by Jan Johnson, deals with a late and atypical scholastic conception of authority and authorship. However, this time the focused author (d.1459) is the archbishop Reginald Pecock. Pecock seems to deposit a high trust in rational procedures and – since reasoning was a gift from God, it could never defraud its user. Following this principle and writing for his new urban audience, in *Donet* and *Reule of Christen Religion*, Pecock excels in giving old topics such as the *Ten Commandments* and *The Creed* of the Apostles an unprecedented *ordinatio* so that they would fit his own system of Christian virtues. Johnson's topic is very cleverly chosen to elucidate the true meaning and potential of the *compilator*, as well as the scholastic view on textual structures, *i. e.*, they are always inherently hierarchical and the order in which a subject is treated has the power to add a certain evaluation of the *compilator*, without requiring any explicit writing from him. Nevertheless, this chapter remains more pertinent to the historiography of catholic late-scholastic thought than for literary theory or criticism.

In Jessica Rosenfeld's forthcoming chapter, "Arts of Love and Justice: Property, Women, and Golden Age Politics in *Le Roman de la Rose*", she delves into one of medieval literature's most emblematic works exploring themes of love and its reimagining of the Golden Age utopia, while also pondering Ovidian ideas, particularly the intertwining of the erotic and the political. This examination of the text is deeply influenced by Aristotelian philosophy (and its interpretations during the Middle Ages), which highlights gender power dynamics largely centred on male dominance over women, often viewed as possessions. Through specific examples and three well-structured subsections, Rosenfeld compellingly demonstrates how these interpretations surface within the text, revealing the tensions between the empirical realities of scholastic philosophy and mythical narratives. Consequently, the article offers an intriguing perspective, showcasing a clash between ancient works (both mythological and theoretical) and scholastic ideology, thus illuminating the complex interplay of critical viewpoints on matters of love, politics, and ultimately, gender.

The article authored by Nicolette Zeeman transitions from the thirteenth to the fourteenth century and from French to English territory: "The Many Sides of Personification Rhetorical Theory and *Piers Plowman*". It seamlessly integrates into this anthology, as it delves into a concept central to literary criticism, namely personification and its related concepts. Zeeman's approach is noteworthy for its depth and thoroughness. She initiates with a succinct yet comprehensive overview of the Latin rhetorical theories of personification inherited by the Middle Ages, ensuring that the application of these theories is appropriately contextualized. Subsequently, Zeeman engages in a practical analysis, exploring the versatility, hybridity, and multifaceted nature of personification in medieval allegorical texts, particularly focusing on the works of William Langland and its implications for his understanding towards the Church. The article offers, therefore, a notably methodical perspective and, at times, quite innovative insights into the concept of personification, along with its significance in enhancing our understanding of literary texts.

Mary Carruthers in her turn offers a nuanced exploration of the realm of imagination, focusing particularly on its role in the act of creation. Entitled "Encountering Vision – Dislocation, Disquiet, Perplexity", Carruthers' work opens with an excerpt from Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, delving into Francis of Assisi's seraphic vision, which serves as a cornerstone for his method of meditation. Notably, Bonaventure himself adhered to monastic traditions of meditation and contemplation, themes which Carruthers further explores as integral components of creation and composition, by extending to various theoretical texts from authors such as Quintilian, Peter of Celle, and Bernard of Clairvaux. These texts underscore the significance of contemplative envisioning, wonder, and awe as pathways to understanding and appreciation, both within philosophy and art. Leveraging these visionary experiences, Carruthers corroborates these teachings with medieval literary works by providing readers with a comprehensive survey, referencing texts such as William Langland's *Piers Plowman*, Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Chaucer's *Squire's Tale* and *Pearl*, which she delves

into with depth. In essence, Carruthers' article offers a literary account deeply rooted in the genesis of textual creation and it effectively bridges the realms of doctrinal practices and their application in literature.

Ian Cornelius' chapter, "George Colvile's Translation of *Consolation of Philosophy*", provides valuable insights into the production and publishing contexts of this peculiar work printed in 1556. Its first edition was a bilingual *quarto* with a dedication to Queen Mary of England and a prologue to its readers, which was shorter and simpler than usual and did not display the usual scholastic scheme. Its intellectual framework is clearly scholastic, in contrast to the more recent humanistic translations and works on Boethius; however, the exact sources and traditions that culminated in Colvile's translation are still unclear. After delving into a comparison with earlier translations and commentaries Cornelius concludes that one cannot establish precisely the sources and affinities of Colvile's translation, although it bears closer resemblance to those of Chaucer and Pseudo-Thomas. Despite the rigour and research evident in this article, as well as its relevance for the reception of Boethius in England, it is difficult to find a manner in which it may be related to any problematic concerning literary theory and criticism.

The final chapter, by Rita Copeland, "When did the Emotions become Political?", opens with a metatheoretical claim: theory was taken in this book as something as comprehensive as to embrace the emotional aspects of political discourses, as well as argumentative and linguistic structures of literary texts. With these delimitations drawn, she proceeds to analyse the pioneering *Rhetoric* of Aristotle in its systematic, pragmatical and phenomenological treatment of human emotions and the way in which this was again taken into consideration by Giles of Rome. After producing a commentary on *Rhetoric* in 1271, Giles wrote in 1277 a political treatise, *De regimine principum*, in which the ideal prince is advised to take the best advantage of his *pathos* and that of his subjects, for emotions are a sort of universal language. Without being able to ascertain whether Thomas Hobbes or Giambattista Vico had ever read *De regimine*, Copeland then demonstrates how the Hobbesian conception of the political human and the affirmations of Vico's *New Science* concerning the origin of language share some similarities with the thoughts of Giles of Rome. She then concludes her essay with her initial and thought-provoking assertion that it was this scholastic author who started the modern emotional conception of the political and that (literary) theory should also embrace this probable future pilot-science of the emotions.

The collection of essays is certainly praiseworthy for a variety of reasons. Not only does it treat a relatively unstudied topic with scientific rigor, expertise, and detail, but it also serves as an introduction to scholastic thought on text, writing, the linguistic and the literary for every interested reader. In fact, any serious attempt to merge the modern and intricate field of literary theory with the also highly complex and now so distant medieval thought is in itself awe-deserving. However, the difficulty of this task seemed to have gained the upper hand in some essays, where, notwithstanding their

overall relevance and intrinsic value no proper literature theoretical or critical issue was being treated. In fact, the vast majority of the essays, besides frequent logic gaps in relating some topics, only collected abstract scholastic models or frameworks, and tried to find their reflexion on contemporary written productions, regardless of their literary status. Yet, not every abstraction applied, or related in some way to a text or discourse necessarily falls into the realm of literary theory or criticism.

This is understandable and, to a certain point, even expectable: literary theory, as a contemporary field, may present challenges when juxtaposed with past understandings of that which we now call «literature». However, and despite this incoherence, the anthology is dense, complex, and scientific, as delving into diverse literary, critical, and theoretical potentials remains vital for comprehending Literature and its development as an entity and institution.

Rafael Ramis Barceló. *La segunda escolástica. Una propuesta de síntesis histórica*. Madrid: Dykinson, 2024. 443 p. ISBN: 9788410701656. Paperback: 42€

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El Dr. Rafael Ramis Barceló es en la actualidad catedrático en la Facultat de Dret – IEHM, Universitat de les Illes Balears; muy conocido como divulgador de Ramon Llull, medievalista e historiador de las universidades, sobre todo catalanas. Miembro de SOFIME de viejo, ha participado en numerosos congresos nacionales e internacionales sobre dichas temáticas, y otras de sus múltiples especialidades, en donde su trabajo realmente hercúleo y honda erudición, en el trato humano, ha ido siempre emparentada y acompañada por la simpatía y humor personal propio. No es anecdótico entre los que trabajamos en la cantera de estas categorías, formales y pétreas casi, que coexistieron en el tiempo con las catedrales románicas y góticas, y, como vestigio, monumento o arqueología, nos sobrevivirán. (Y, si se nos permite el añadido, han sabido en ocasiones reinventarse, y siguen siendo el fundamento de un pensamiento vivo aún en otros.)

Como el espacio de que disponemos en una reseña es corto, nos gustaría subrayar sobre todo el esfuerzo de síntesis, la novedad, la calidad de la información que nos aporta, y sobre todo el enfoque y los trazos a destacar de su trabajo. El medio en que se publica es de un gran prestigio: es un trabajo que, ni más ni menos, figura como monografía del Programme «History of Universities» del *The Figuerola Institute of Social Science History* (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), financiado con dos proyectos de investigación. No son méritos menores, ya decimos, para empezar. Esto quiere decir que ha sido sometido a los trabajos de valoración de especialistas, y autoridades académicas y científicas de prestigio, no sólo de la Universidad española en la que tiene su sede la editorial, sino de las Universidades de Bologna, Louvain o Lyon. Que se escriba al amparo de dos grandes proyectos de investigación altamente competitivos: «Conflictos singulares para juzgar, arbitrar o concordar (siglos XII-XX)», dirigido por Josep Capdeferro y el propio Rafael, financiado también por el programa Prometeo 2022 (CIPROM/2021/028) de la Conselleria de Innovación, Universidades, Ciencia y Sociedad Digital de la Generalitat valenciana y responde a líneas de investigación del *Instituto de Estudios Hispánicos en la Modernidad* (IEHM), Unidad asociada al CSIC. Tampoco es un mérito académico menor, no voy a insistir, esta segunda circunstancia.

Creo que lo que procede aquí es que digamos algo de su introducción y conclusiones, y recoger el utilísimo y riquísimo esqueleto de la investigación, dejando para el lector su propio trabajo de lectura, que, ya anticipamos, será amena, adecuada comprensión y disfrute del texto mismo. En la Introducción, para evitar ambigüedades, deja sentados los pilares de la investigación, y de ellos no se desvía ni una «iota» en el libro, como decían los clásicos: «Es probable que un historiador de la escolástica hubiera

realizado una tarea mucho más refinada. Sin embargo, como historiador de las universidades, tiendo a ver la escolástica no tanto como un sistema de grandes autores, sino como un conjunto de escuelas. Me interesa analizar la escolástica en acción: cómo, cuándo, qué, por qué y por quién se enseñó. El análisis de las cátedras universitarias y de los cursos escolásticos colegiales y conventuales proporciona otra mirada, de corte más sociológico que filosófico-teológico. En efecto, en este libro prima la historia sociológica e institucional, frente a la historia de la filosofía y de la teología» (p. 16). Todo lo demás es aplicación pura del sistema. Parte de otro punto fundamental: descarta de plano la tesis de L. Rougier que ve en toda la cascada de escolásticas la premonición de un desenlace final de fracaso (vid. L. Rougier, *Histoire d'une faillite philosophique, la scolastique*, Paris, J.-J. Pauvert, 1966). Y no me entretendré en el detalle, pues reproduzco un resumen o índice del contenido: Introducción (p. 15-27). Capítulo 1: El debate historiográfico y la propuesta de estudio: 1. La noción de "segunda escolástica" y otros sintagmas similares, 2. Discusión, y 3. Propuesta de estudio (p. 27-54) (no daremos nombre de autores ni de escuelas, ni de problemas abordados); Capítulo 2. Los antecedentes de la "segunda escolástica": 1. El método escolástico, 2. Las escuelas, y 3. La crisis de la escolástica, y 4. La crítica del humanismo al escolasticismo (p. 55-78) (dejaremos para el lector nombre de autores, obras y orientación); Capítulo 3: El primer período (1507/1517-1607/1617): 1. Los inicios de la "segunda escolástica", 2. La primera etapa: 1512/1517-1545, 3. La segunda etapa: 1545-1563, y 4. La tercera etapa: 1563-1607/1617 (p. 78-168) (no aportaremos nombres, ni ibéricos ni de extranjeros con influencia); Capítulo 4 (p. 79-168). El segundo período (1607/1617-1665/1670): 1. Los límites de la escolástica, 2. Las causas externas, 3. Las consecuencias para la escolástica católica, 4. La primera etapa: 1607/1617-1637, y 5. La segunda etapa: 1637-1665/1670 (p. 169-230) (ni nombres, ni tendencias); Capítulo 5. El tercer período (1665/1670-1773): 1. Rasgos del período, 2. La primera etapa (1665/1670-1705), 3. La segunda etapa (1705-1740), 4. La tercera etapa (1740-1773) (p. 221-315) (dejamos al lector el detalle menor); Epílogo: De la "segunda escolástica" a la "tercera escolástica" (p. 316-346) (no daremos nombres de autores y escuelas); Conclusiones (p. 347-356); Bibliografía (amplísima, p. 367-441); e Índice general (p. 447 ss.) Toda una vida de abnegado y clarividente trabajo. Por su segundo apellido, tal vez nuestro autor tenga alguna relación familiar con el conocido artista balear Miquel Barceló, en todo caso, sea así o no, de lo que no cabe duda es de que esta obra culmina un proyecto sólido y espectacular como la cúpula de la Sala XX de los Derechos Humanos y de la Alianza de Civilizaciones de la ONU, la *capilla sixtina* de la ONU, la capilla sixtina del siglo XXI o sencillamente la cúpula de Barceló del Palacio de las Naciones de Ginebra, Suiza, 2007-2008); tiene mucho de pintura, el legado filosófico-teológico de una época no clausurada del todo, y de escultura, la nervatura institucional que la acoge. Y, además, detalle menor, ha citado un Congreso del que tuve la fortuna de ser Secretario en mi juventud: V. Muñoz Delgado, «La crítica de los humanistas a la ciencia y lógica de la escolástica tardía», donde junto al acrónimo AA.VV. y como reparo historiográfico debiera decir, Baliñas Fernández, C. y M. González Fernández (eds.), *Filosofía y ciencia en el Renacimiento*, Santiago de Compostela, Universidad de Santiago, 1988, p. 341-358

(quedamos agradecidos por citar, además, a otro grande, especialista en la lógica del momento, y gallego de nación).

Autor prolífico, es dado a sembrar tempestades. Sobre el tema que aborda a mí se me ocurren algunas: ¿se puede hablar de una 3ª o 4ª escolástica española representada por autores, incluso discípulos de D. José Ortega y Gasset, como Xavier Zubiri? ¿no tienen vigencia todavía algunos de los conceptos de la 1ª, 2ª y 3ª o 4ª escolásticas europeas, como, por poner sólo un ejemplo, el concepto de *haecceidad* de Juan Duns Escoto, o la teoría de la unicidad del ser, que vemos reivindicados por uno de los fundadores de nuestra posmodernidad, Gilles Deleuze, y de cuyo reconocimiento de paternidad huyen otros más apocados y más cercanos a nosotros? (Recomiendo aquí la lectura de un trabajo que recientemente ha caído en mis manos, *The Gothic Deleuze*, 2019). La escolástica del origen, de repente, cruzada con doctrinas como la del rizoma o de la inteligencia sintiente, fecundadas o no por elementos modernos como la noción spinoziana del ser modal, parece recobrar la frescura de una juventud inesperada. Y hablando de otros trabajos que hemos ocasión de revisar últimamente, hay uno del año pasado, 2023, titulado *Philosophia perennis*, que nos lleva a otras preguntas de contexto: el «perennialismo» no está muerto, está muy arraigado en USA y ellos sabrán el por qué (vid. Houman, Setareh: *From the Philosophia Perennis to American Perennialis*, trad. Edin Q. Lohja, Chicago:Kazi, 2014, 481 págs.; existe ed. francesa, que hemos podido consultar, debe tratarse de la original). En estos trabajos, y en toda una línea historiográfica que nos lleva a Louis Masignon o Toshihiko Izutsu (por ejemplo, de este autor japonés, *Sufismo y Taoísmo: Ibn Arabî, Laozi y Zhuangzi* (El Árbol del Paraíso, 95), en trad. de Anne-Hélène Suárez Girard. Madrid: Siruela, 2019), y a todo el suizo Círculo Eranos, donde lo que se plantea es algo diferente a la *scientia perennis* de la que habla Rafael para la segunda escolástica salmantina, sino de una estructura común, válida para Occidente como para el Próximo o Lejano Oriente, de una sincronía absoluta: se habla, a espaldas de la historia, de un relato que se pierde en la noche de los tiempos, reiterativo, y que se puede resumir en una pequeño grupo de verdades eternas (diálogos en la meta-historia). Y la espiral de interrogantes se dispara al infinito. Nos obliga a preguntarnos, por ejemplo, como ese momento de ruptura que supuso el final de la primera escolástica, de la escolástica original europea, con la empresa ockhamista es recuperado luego a través de la *logica modernorum* y las cátedras universitarias *de gabrielis*. (Y tiene páginas hermosas sobre esto.) ¿Con qué maquinaria sofisticada podemos reagrupar fuerzas, reforzar economías ideológicas y simbólicas y mantener el crédito y, por así decir, la estabilidad y el criterio de autoridad tras las crisis? Tal vez estas inquietudes nuestras, tengan respuesta en otra obra suya, que seguro que la habrá, dado su empeño y dedicación a la filosofía medieval.

En fin, este libro no es una inocente continuación de otro texto magistral, sobre la primera generación de la escolástica salmantina, y española. Sin duda, completa otro trabajo encomiable, de María Martín Gómez, original por su planteamiento como en el caso del de Rafael por su apoyo en la historia de las instituciones, nos referimos a *La Escuela de Salamanca, Fray Luis de León y el problema de la interpretación* (Col. «Pensamiento

medieval y renacentista», 178), Pamplona: Eunsa, 2017, algo más breve. Y tiene un eco de sabor de época, para escenas parciales, como la del movimiento nominalista, que el propio Ramis menciona: «*Philosophia nominalium vindicata*, de Jean Salabert (1600-1665), presbítero de Agen, que luego profesó como cartujo. Se trata de una obra histórica, que quería reivindicar la unidad de la escuela nominalista desde Pedro Abelardo hasta Mair y Celaya» (p. 227). Todo le ha enriquecido. Es la antorcha de la vida de que hablaba el pagano Lucrecio. Tiene su propia complejidad, y también su propio estímulo, y despierta sus propias curiosidades. Ambos nos hacen pensar, y es el mejor elogio que de ambos se puede hacer. Por lo demás, la monografía, el monumento historiográfico, el monolito, que la obra de Ramis nos presenta, nos habla de su trabajo incansable y proseguido en el tiempo. Dice Aristóteles en algún lugar de su *Política* que el valor de los íberos se medía por la cantidad de monolitos que adornaban sus sagradas tumbas, uno por cada gran guerrero vencido. Sospecho que, en la bibliografía de Rafael, todavía quedan algunos más por batir. En filosofía medieval, ¡queda tanto por hacer!

Steven Rozenski, Joshua Byron Smith e Claire M. Waters. Eds. *Mystics, Goddesses, Lovers, and Teachers. Medieval Visions and their Modern Legacies. Studies in Honour of Barbara Newman.* Turnhout: Brepols, 2023. 420 p. ISBN: 9782503599748. Hardback: 85€

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Este volume, editado por Steven Rozenski, Joshua Byron Smith e Claire M. Waters, compila um conjunto de estudos sobre o visionarismo medieval e o seu legado moderno. Forjada em honra de Barbara Newman, incontornável figura no âmbito da crítica literária, do medievalismo, da história religiosa, da espiritualidade feminina e da mística, esta obra mantém com a autora uma espécie de relação especular ao engendrar-se multidisciplinar, como multidisciplinar e diversa é a investigação de Newman, qualidade essa que fica bem ressalvada e demonstrada nas introduções deste volume, mas também um pouco por todo o seu decurso, sendo que autora é amiúde citada a propósito de matérias distintas.

De facto, esta obra está organizada em três partes essenciais, cada uma delas dizendo respeito a três grandes tópicos, o que não implica que cada um dos estudos incorporados em cada secção não possua perspetivas, também elas, distintas entre si. A nível temático e de autores este é um volume bastante rico, procurando refletir a transversalidade dialogante que é predicado necessário para uma investigação mais profícua.

A primeira parte centra-se sobre o tema da mística e das visões místicas, apresentando um leque variado de estudos. Kathryn Kerby-Fulton trata Hildegarda de Bingen e as iluminuras presentes na sua obra *Scivias*, concedendo novas pistas sobre os processos de produção das mesmas e sobre a sua autoria. Jesse Njus foca-se sobre Juliana de Cornillon, explicitando a sua estreita ligação com a introdução da festa de Corpus Christi nas celebrações católicas, bem como resgatando a influência da sua teologia eucarística e crística, de forte apologia da transubstanciação, na *mimesis* patente nas peças medievais redigidas em vernáculo e forjadas no âmbito daquela festa litúrgica. Neste sentido, coloca-se a descoberto a arduidade da justa atribuição da autoria feminina que ainda persevera, intentando combatê-la. Andrew Kraebel debruça-se sobre *Canticum Amoris* de Richard Rolle, investigando este poema endereçado à Virgem Maria nos seus conteúdos, temas e formas, mas também no âmbito dos dois manuscritos que subsistem e das traduções mais recuadas. Inclui-se, ainda, no fim, a transcrição do poema em latim e, de seguida, a sua tradução para o inglês, o que muito é fértil no que toca não somente o estudo mais propriamente filológico do *Canticum Amoris*, servindo também um preceito de difusão e de acessibilidade ao apresentá-lo traduzido para um das línguas mais faladas no mundo. Nicholas Watson revisita Julian of Norwich e a sua

emblemática obra *Revelation of Love*, texto que integra as revelações que a mística recebe por intervenção divina, mas que vem a redigir apenas quinze anos mais tarde. Watson, além de refletir sobre esta componente anagógica e divina do texto, vem a demonstrar, na esteira da hipótese de Barbara Newman, que ele é fruto de dois ciclos de ampliação e de revisão. Laura Saetveit Miles trata, precisamente, esta questão da escrita por inspiração divina e dos processos visionários nela patentes, em Juliana of Norwich e em Philip K. Dick. Reflete ainda sobre a limitação da linguagem humana face à plena descrição da experiência extática e mística que dá origem a estas textualidades, orientadas à expressão da infinidade de Deus através de mecanismos estilísticos e descritivos próprios. Bernard McGinn explora o que considera ser um místico negligenciado, Tomás de Jesus, explicitando a sua biografia e detendo-se na sua obra principal, o tratado *Divine Prayer*. Um breve nota para o facto de McGinn não mencionar a pegada deste carmelita em Portugal, que foi sem dúvida considerável, e que a presença de livros da sua autoria em diversas livrarias monásticas portuguesas corrobora (exempli gratia, *Compêndio de Orações*, de 1615, presente na livraria do Mosteiro de S. Dinis e de S. Bernardo de Odivelas). Não obstante, o autor apresenta trechos de *Divine Prayer* traduzidos para o inglês, o que é, sem dúvida, uma mais-valia, em muito contribuindo para a difusão da obra deste importante místico. Carla Arnell, num salto que à primeira vista parece temático e que é sem dúvida temporal, apresenta Charles Williams, perspetivando-o enquanto autor cuja poesia arturiana se encontra insuflada de um teor um tanto místico e teológico, em que as metáforas matemáticas configuram um sentido de sagrado.

A segunda parte deste volume incide sobre Deusas e os seus legados, históricos ou simbólicos. Maeve Callan investiga Mary of the Gael, Virgem adorada na Irlanda medieval, relacionando-a com outros santos irlandeses e até com movimentos heréticos, ressalvando a sua importância no coração da devoção (e também da polícia) na Irlanda da Idade Média. Katharine Breen trata as personificações da fama desde Hesíodo a Chaucer, refletindo sobre a qualidade feminina e deificada desta figura de estilo, amiúde produto de processos imaginativos combinados com processos de incorporação, capazes de unir real e imaginário. Lora Walsh explora também esta capacidade simultaneamente simbólica e imanente destas textualidades de fundo espirito-devoto (e eclesiológico) ao debruçar-se sobre a Igreja Mãe enquanto deusa cristã no *Tractatus de Ecclesia* de John Wyclif. Susan E. Philips e Claire M. Waters enfatizam a presença e papel de deusas em diversas tradições, que servem frequentemente como a porta de entrada de imagéticas associadas à maternidade ou, melhor, ao feminino maternal divinizado.

A última secção é a mais abrangente a nível temático. Carissa M. Harris trata a colisão (ou comunhão) entre os mundos secular e religioso através de narrativas medievais que continham matérias obscenas e sexuais, e que circularam amplamente em diversas fontes, constituindo, por vezes, instrumentos pedagógicos. Harris chama ainda pertinentemente a atenção para a necessidade de *crossover* no processo investigativo, mecanismo que, de resto, sustenta o seu artigo. Stephanie Pentz estuda a

teologia pacifista de coordenadas não-violentas no *Alliterative Romance of Alexander and Dindimus*, apresentando as críticas à guerra santa que aí se tecem, bem como às Cruzadas, demonstrando como este foi um documento pouco ortodoxo na moldura da conceção teológica do seu tempo. Craig A. Berry retoma Chaucer, investigando o aspeto autoral e de identidade autoral como mecanismo redentor e salvífico no plano escatológico. Dyan Elliott explora, por seu turno, os rituais fúnebres pagãos e cristãos, demonstrando como o desprezo pelo corpo defunto dos inimigos era um *modus operandi* da Roma Antiga. Trata, também, do culto cristão das relíquias, apontando a sua ligação com o martírio dos primeiros tempos do cristianismo, amiúde conseguido pela perseguição e profanação dos corpos dos seus fiéis e das suas campas, a que se liga, ainda, a forte apologia à ressurreição arquetípica da espiritualidade cristã, que terá sido uma resposta à necessidade de um ritual fúnebre apropriado.

Concluo, por um lado, assinalando a pertinência desta obra na sua abrangência e atualização, e, por outro, forçosamente reiterando o viés transdisciplinar que une todos os estudos que integram este volume e que, sendo consagrados a Barbara Newman, certamente lhe fazem justiça.

Johannes Duns Scotus. *Questionen zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles, Buch 1. Lateinisch – Deutsch*. Edition, translation and introduction by Joachim Söder (HBPhMA). Freiburg-Basel-Wien: Herder, 2024. 400 p. ISBN: 9783451396229. Hardback: 65€

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Scholarly work on Scotus in the last decades has made it clear that the *Questions on the Metaphysics* occupy a central place in Scotus' overall production and provide a privileged access to his metaphysical views. Aristotle's text gives Scotus the opportunity to raise a number of doctrinal questions, whose discussion is carried out against the background not only of Aristotle, but also of the subsequent philosophical tradition. Many of these discussions may, at first sight, appear as inconclusive and at times even inconsistent; one of the greatest merits of scholarship – first of all, of the critical edition – has been to trace back these puzzling features of the text to the way in which the text was composed and then handed down to us. First of all, the *Questions* were composed by Scotus over a long period of time; second, even within a single *quaestio* some passages ('*extra*'/'*additio*') should be considered as later additions by Scotus, which were eventually transmitted together with the original text.[1] The acknowledgement of these facts opens the doors to closer analyses of the *Questions*, which turn out to be a unique source of information on the development of Scotus' metaphysics. A new contribution to the study of the *Questions* has lately been given by Joachim Söder, who provided a new German translation of the prologue and of the questions on the first book of the *Metaphysics*.

The volume prepared by Söder consists of three parts: an introduction, a parallel Latin-German text of Scotus' work, and an appendix. I will first briefly describe these three parts in turn, before putting forward some further considerations.

The introduction serves a twofold purpose: its first sections provide a general introduction to the *Questions* and their author, while its second half clarifies specifically the features of the volume at hand, in particular of the Latin-German text and of the appendix. As for the first purpose, Söder starts by providing a very brief picture of relevant developments in the history of metaphysics, against the background of which Scotus' contribution should be appreciated. He continues with outlining Scotus' biography – which is also the occasion to mention some of his major works, especially his commentaries on the *Sentences*.[2] Finally, the *Questions* themselves are briefly introduced: their origin and their

[1] See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Libri I–V*, edited by R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, F. Kelley, G. Marcil, T. Noone and R. Wood (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1997), Introduction, xlii-xlvi.

[2] As for the mention of the *Reportatio Examinata* at p. 14, the interested reader can now consult Stephen D. Dumont, "John Duns Scotus's *Reportatio Parisiensis Examinata*: a Mystery Solved",

relationship with the *Notabilia*, the background against which Scotus develops his conception of metaphysics, and – most importantly – some matters related to the composition and the transmission of the text (the distinction between 'basic text', passages marked as '*extra*'/'*additio*', and '*textus interpolati*'/'*adnotationes interpolatae*'; the chronology of the composition of the 'basic text' of different books; the current state of research about the possibility of providing a *stemma codicum* for the extant manuscripts).[3] The relevance of the distinction between 'basic text' and '*additiones*' for detecting Scotus' doctrinal development is then concretely exemplified with the discussion of the subject of metaphysics in *Questions* I, 1, in which Scotus defends different positions in basic text and additions, respectively.

The rest of the introduction provides some clarifications on Latin text, translation, and appendix. First of all, the Latin text printed in the volume is largely the one printed in the 1997 critical edition and, just like in the edition, the distinction between 'basic text', '*extra*', and 'interpolated texts' is conveniently visible. However, the text printed by J. Söder parts from the one of the critical edition in two respects. First, the subtitles which are introduced by the editors in the critical edition – and mark a *divisio textus* internal to the single *quaestiones* – are consciously omitted by Söder, in order not to impose on the reader a determinate understanding of the structure of the text, especially in the case of a chronologically stratified work as the *Questions* are. Second, as far as Scotus' text itself is concerned, Söder proposes and prints 17 emendations to the text of the critical edition. In a section of the appendix, these emendations are listed in a table alongside the readings of the critical edition they replace, before being justified explicitly.[4]

A German translation, which is also the core and primary motivation of the volume, accompanies the Latin text. Providing a translation is in general not an easy task, and the highly technical nature of the *Questions* and Scotus' writing more generally add their own difficulties. In the introduction, Söder states that the translation would attempt, on one hand, to convey the Latin text as precisely as possible; on the other, to make the text "understandable" (which entails, among other things, providing an interpretation for obscure and ambiguous passages). I found this attempt quite successful: the translation does indeed follow faithfully and translate rigorously the Latin text, while at the same time striving for readability (e.g. avoiding to reproduce literally convoluted sentences when a reasonable plainer alternative is available; slightly expanding some passages between square brackets; making at times explicit the reference of personal pronouns; etc.).

Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 85/2 (2018): 377-438.

[3] See Dominique Poirel's introduction to the Latin text in Jean Duns Scot, *Questions sur la Métaphysique. Volume I. Livres I à III,* introduction, traduction et notes par Olivier Boulnois et Dan Arbib, avec une introduction au texte latin par Dominique Poirel (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2017), 19-26.

[4] The first of these justifications actually concerns a reading of the critical edition which is preserved in Söder's volume (and is defended against a reading printed in the Vivès edition), rather than an emendation. For three of the 17 emendations Söder expressly follows Jean Duns Scot, *Questions sur la Métaphysique. Volume I. Livres I à III*.

The translation is accompanied by a large quantity of footnotes which serve various purposes, for example:

- clarification of technical vocabulary, either Scotus' own or belonging to the philosophical tradition (especially Aristotelian);
- references to other texts, either by Scotus or by a number of other authors; these texts are often reported in translation (translations are by Söder himself); some of these references are already given in the critical edition, while several others are not;
- remarks on the translation, especially when the Latin text presents difficulties and the translator could not opt for the grammatically most intuitive interpretation of the text;[5]
- the translation of interpolated texts/annotations is also provided in footnotes.

Footnotes are typically kept short; some of them are further expanded in a section of the appendix, where more detailed clarifications or longer quotations are provided (when this is the case, the relevant footnote points forward to the appendix explicitly).

The appendix is closed by a bibliography including primary and secondary sources, as well as by an index of proper names mentioned in Scotus' text.

With its introduction, the Latin-German text, and the appendix, the new book edited by Söder will be valuable, I believe, both for future research on the *Questions* (and on Scotus more generally) and for a larger – especially German-speaking – philosophical audience.

The latter will definitely benefit from a reliable new translation – to my knowledge, the first integral translation into German of *Questions*, prologue and book 1 – of one of the most important philosophical works by Scotus, made more accessible by the large number of footnotes clarifying technical vocabulary and doctrinal points. The introduction is in this respect very helpful, in so far as it allows the non-specialist reader to get acquainted with Scotus and his work, as well as with the complicated composition of the *Questions*. The general outline of the problem of the status of metaphysics and of its subject is also helpful, in spite of the little space which could be devoted to this in the introduction (in particular, Scotus' immediate interlocutors – first of all, Avicenna, Averroes, and Aquinas – are only briefly mentioned, which might make it difficult to appreciate Scotus' originality with respect to his predecessors).[6]

[5] See for example p. 296 n. 613.

[6] There are different attitudes in scholarship as far as the exact nature of Scotus' innovations is concerned. Söder's introduction follows part of existent scholarship in stressing the discontinuity of Scotus' metaphysics with respect to previous authors. For an analysis that underscores the continuity, in certain respects, of Scotus' approach with 13th-century authors, the reader can consult Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to*

As for the scholarly community, the emendations on the Latin text, the translation itself, and the number of sources reported in the footnotes will be of particular interest.

The emendations proposed in the volume are, I would say, of two kinds. In some cases, the reading of the edition is strictly speaking preserved, but the punctuation or the formatting is slightly changed in order to account for a different interpretation of the text (different understanding of an argument;[7] identification of quotations;[8] different understanding of the reference of a given word).[9] In other cases, Söder opts for a variant reading, which is either found in the manuscript tradition or the result of a conjecture. All proposed emendations with their justifications certainly deserve attention – and at least some of them, I believe, would be easily accepted by the scholarly community as unproblematically correct. As for the choice of variant readings, it has already been remarked that the final aim of the research on the *Questions* should consist in critical choices which are consistent with a *stemma codicum*, and that this remains as yet a major *desideratum*.[10] A preliminary reflection on variant readings – just like the one provided by Söder's justifications of his emendations – can nonetheless be useful in preparation for a more complete assessment of the manuscript tradition and the identification of criteria to follow for future critical choices.

A translation can also in general be considered an important scholarly contribution, insofar as the translator is required to offer an understanding of the text in its details. This is all the more true when dealing with a difficult text as Scotus' *Questions* – where a number of passages admit of more than one grammatical construction, and single words or expressions can be interpreted in more than one way. The interpretative options offered in this new translation, together with the large number of indications of sources and parallel texts, should undoubtedly be consulted by anyone carrying out a closer study of passages of Scotus' *Questions*.

It is to be hoped that J. Söder's project to provide a translation of the following books of the *Questions* will soon result in a complete German translation of Scotus' work.

Francisco Suárez (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012).

[7] See for example the emendation at p. 338,13 (ed. Söder).

[8] See for example p. 54,18; p. 352,14-15; p. 354,1-2 (ed. Söder).

[9] For example, at 76,15 (ed. Söder) Söder prints "physica" – physics meant as a science – instead of "*Physica*" – Aristotle's work.

[10] See Giorgio Pini, "Critical Study. Duns Scotus's Metaphysics: The Critical Edition of his *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*", *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 65/2 (1998): 362-365; see also the remarks by Söder in the introduction of the volume under review (p. 18). The critical edition does not provide a *stemma*; no edition seems to have made so far editorial choices based on a *stemma*, in spite of the fact that the volumes containing the French translation provide provisional *stemmata* for single sections of the text. Cf. Tobias Hoffmann, "*Questions sur la métaphysique* by Jean Duns Scot (review)", *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 60/3 (2022): 503-505.