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ARTÍCULOS | ARTICLES

THE COMPLEX MANUSCRIPT TRADITION OF THE AVICENNIAN WRITINGS ON *MAʿĀD*

LA COMPLEJA TRADICIÓN MANUSCRITA DE LOS ESCRITOS AVICENIANOS RELATIVOS AL *MAʿĀD*

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Abstract

Avicenna's *œuvre* manifested its influence and strength through the activity of exegesis and translation of his texts, as well as through their wide dissemination in terms of copying, transmission, and circulation over the centuries. His 'minor works' concerning the origin (*mabdaʾ*), or the principle of the rational soul, and on its destination (*maʿād*), the place where it will return after death, are an example of this sophisticated process. This article will focus mainly on the substantial manuscript tradition of these authentic or spurious treatises, both in Arabic and Persian.

Keywords

Avicenna; Arabic; Persian; Manuscripts; Origin; Destination

Resumen

La obra de Avicena manifestó su influencia y fuerza mediante la exégesis y la traducción de sus textos, así como a través de su amplia difusión en términos de copia, transmisión y circulación a lo largo de los siglos. Sus 'obras menores' sobre el origen (*mabdaʾ*), o el principio del alma racional, y sobre su destino (*maʿād*), el lugar al que retornará tras la muerte, son un ejemplo de este sofisticado proceso. Este artículo se centrará principalmente en la importante tradición manuscrita de estos tratados, auténticos o espurios, tanto en árabe como en persa.

Palabras clave

Avicena; árabe; persa; manuscritos; origen; destino

Introduction

The Avicennian (pseudo)-corpus includes a conspicuous number of 'minor' treatises, both authentic and pseudepigraphic, and the manuscript tradition testifies to the presence of several texts which have often created difficulty regarding their identification. Different works have been mistakenly assimilated because of identical titles; in some cases, they have been mistaken for other works by the author due to the similar themes they deal with; and in still others they have borne Avicenna's name for centuries, even though they were written after his death. To the writings in Arabic there were added the Persian language versions, which have played a significant role in the transmission and reception of his texts: some were translated from the original Arabic by well-known or less known authors and sometimes attributed directly to the master; others were written directly in Persian and transmitted either anonymously or with false Avicennian authorship.[1]

Among these works are those dedicated to the theme of the origin of the soul and its final destination (*al-mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*),[2] a genre inaugurated by Avicenna himself.[3]

[1] Cf. Gotthard Strohmaier, "Avicenne et le phénomène des écrits pseudépigraphiques", in *Avicenna and His Heritage. Acts of the International Colloquium*, edited by J. Janssens and D. De Smet (Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve: Leuven University Press, 2002), 37-46; David C. Reisman, "The Pseudo-Avicennan Corpus, I", I: Methodological Considerations', in *Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group*, edited by J. McGinnis, with the assistance of D. C. Reisman (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004), 3-21; David C. Reisman, "The Ps.-Avicenna Corpus II: The Ṣūfistic Turn", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 21 (2010): 243-258; Ivana Panzeca, "A Polyphony of Texts: Manuscript Evidence on Avicenna's Minor Works in Persian Translation", in *Scienze, Filosofia e Letteratura nel Mondo Iranico. Da Gundishapur ai nostri giorni*, edited by N. Norozi and P. Ognibene (Milano-Udine: Mimesis 2024), 285-304.

[2] The topic of *maʿād* was widely covered by Jean R. (Yahya) Michot, *La destinée de l'homme selon Avicenne. Le retour à Dieu (maʿād) et l'imagination* (Leuven: Peeters, 1986). See Roger Arnaldez, "*Maʿād*", in *Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition Online* (Brill, 2012). https://referenceworks.brill.com/display/entries/EIEG/SIM_gi_02688.xml?rskey=2IYcrE&result=1.

[3] Cf. the Neoplatonic background in Cristina D'Ancona, "The *Theology* Attributed to Aristotle. Sources, Structure, Influence", in *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy*, edited by K. El-Rouayheb and S. Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1-29, esp. the paragraph 1.2. "A Neoplatonic Model for God's Causality and the Soul's *Provenance and Destination*: The Main Topics of the *Pseudo-Theology of Aristotle* and Their Impact on Arabic-Islamic Philosophy", 15-25; George Vajda, "Les Notes d'Avicenne sur la 'Théologie d'Aristote'", *Revue Thomiste* 51 (1951): 346-406; Dimitri Gutas, "Avicenna's Marginal Glosses on *De Anima* and the Greek Commentatorial Tradition", in *Philosophy, Science & Exegesis in Greek, Arabic & Latin Commentaries* (Essays in Honour of Richard Sorabji), edited by P. Adamson, H. Baltussen, M. W. F. Stone, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* Supplement 83.2 (2004): 77-88; Peter Adamson, "Correcting Plotinus: Soul's Relationship to Body in Avicenna's Commentary on the *Theology of Aristotle*", in *Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries*, edited by P. Adamson, H. Baltussen, M. W. F. Stone (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2004), vol. 2, 59-75; Dimitri Gutas, "Avicenna: The Metaphysics of the Rational Soul", in *The Ontology of the Soul in Medieval Arabic Thought*, edited by

During the two-year period 403H/1013-404H/1014, he wrote two treatises on the subject: *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* (Origin and destination) and *al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar]* (The [Lesser] Destination). These were followed, during the middle period of his production (between 1012 and 1024), by *al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād* (Sacrifice Destination). The three works are part of the section that Gutas called 'Metaphysics of the Rational Soul', a section that, in his most mature phase, Avicenna considered the domain of Natural Theology:

> The subject of the Destination (*maʿād*) of the soul ought not to be discussed in the context of Physics but only in the context of the philosophical discipline (*aṣ-ṣināʿa al-ḥikmiyya*) where the things that are separable [from matter] are investigated.[4]

The period in which he wrote the first two works mentioned represented a transition in the philosopher's path, not only physical and geographical, given the move from Buḫārā to Gurgānğ and then to Ğurğān, but also an evolution towards a metaphysical theory more independent of the Aristotelian model.[5] Several sections of the first two treatises mentioned were then copied *verbatim* in his *summae*, *al-Šifāʾ* (The Cure) and *al-Nağāt* (The Salvation), with the exception of a few parts.

In the *Biography*, written around 1050, his faithful disciple Ğūzğānī inserts the *Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*, compiled in Ğurğān, and *al-Maʿād*, completed in Rayy.[6]

The *Shorter Bibliography* of Avicenna, present in al-Bayhaqī's *Tatimma* (before 553H/1159),[7] and later in al-Qifṭī (d. 646H/1248)[8] and in Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (d. 668H/1270),[9]

A. Shihadeh (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 417- 425; Cf. Amos Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's* Kitāb al-Šifāʾ (Leiden: Brill, 2006), part. 441-460.

[4] Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Second, Revised and Enlarged Edition, Including and Inventory of Avicenna's Authentic Works, (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2014), 293; Ibn Sīnā, *Avicenna's* De anima*. Being the Psychological Part of* Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, edited by F. Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 238.5-7.

[5] See the translation by Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 21-22, based on the Istanbul MS Ahmet III 3268, f. 61r, as copied by Mahdavī and Nūrānī, and the Milan MS Ambrosiana 320, ff. 118v-119r: "In these parts I strive to clarify what they [the Peripatetic philosophers] obscured, proclaim what they concealed and suppressed, collect what they dispersed, and expand what they summarized, to the best of the inadequate abilities of a person like me beset with these afflictions: the age of scholarship is becoming extinct, interests are turning away from the philosophical sciences toward various pursuits, and hatred is heaped upon those who concern themselves with some part of truth; furthermore, earnestness is exhausted and energy dissipates from the minds of those who have been tried as sorely, and subjected to as many vicissitudes of time, as I have been. But God is our resort, with Him is the Power and the Might!".

[6] William E. Gohlman (ed.), *The Life of Ibn Sina. A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1974), 46-47.

[7] al-Bayhaqī, *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, edited by M. Šafīʿ (Lahore: Punjab University, 1935).

[8] Ibn al-Qifṭī, *Ibn al-Qifṭī's* Taʾrīḫ al-ḥukamāʾ, edited by J. Lippert (Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1903).

[9] Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, *ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ*, edited by. A. Müller (Königsberg/Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-wahbiyya, 1882-1884).

gives the same titles (*Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* and *al-Maʿād*), while the *Longer Bibliography*, whose oldest attested manuscript dates back to before 588H/1192 (MS İstanbul, Üniversitesi 4755), adds specifications to both: *Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād fī l-nafs* and *Kitāb al-Maʿād al-aṣġar*. Finally, the Extended Bibliography in *Tatimma* (before 639H/1242), in addition to the first two titles, adds a third, *Kitāb al-Maʿād bi-l-fārisiyya.*[10]

Over the centuries, many works have appeared with the title *Risāla al-maʿād* or *Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* or *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* or simply with a generic *Maʿād*, some authentically Avicennian, others falsely attributed to the *šayḫ al-raʾīs* by bibliographers or scribes or other authors.

Ergin, Anawati and Mahdavī, Avicennian orientalists and bibliographers, list a series of works that bear these titles.[11] The manuscript transmission of these treatises has been considerable and their copies have intersected to the point of inverting works written by Avicenna himself or identifying them with those of other authors who dealt with connected themes or who used similar or even identical titles.[12]

I. The Ramified Manuscript Tradition of *Maʿād*

The analysis of the complex manuscript tradition starts from four miscellaneous codices dating back to the 17th/18th century and today preserved in Iran, Turkey, and

[10] See synopsis in Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 402. Regarding the Persian translations on the soul, see Rüdiger Arnzen, *Aristoteles'* De Anima*. Eine verlorene spätantike Paraphrase in arabischer und persischer Überlieferung. Arabischer Text nebst Kommentar, quellegeschichtlichen Studien und Glossaren* (Leiden-New York-Köln: Brill, 1998).

[11] Osman Ergin, "İbni Sina bibliоğrafyası", in *Büyük Türk Filozof ve Tıb Üstadı Ibn Sina Şahsiyeti ve Eserleri Hakkında Tetkikler* (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi, 1937), 35-36, 39-40; George C. Anawati, *Muʾallafāt Ibn Sīnā. Essai de bibliographie avicennienne* (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1950), 142-144, 252-260; Yaḥyā Mahdavī, *Fihrist-i nusḫah-hā-yi muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā. Bibliographie d'Ibn Sina* (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, 1333Š/1954), 39-41, 212-216, 244-247, 294 [henceforth: *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*].

[12] *Al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* and *Āġāz va anǧām* are the titles of numerous treatises, in Arabic and Persian, by influential exponents of Islamic thought and Avicennian tradition. *Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*: Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī (d. 1111), Aṯīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. *c.* 1265), ʿAzīz al-Dīn ibn Muḥammad Nasafī (13th c.), Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan Nīšābūrī, ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad Turki-yi Iṣfahānī (d. 1433), Ḥusayn ibn Ḥasan Kamāl Ḫwārazmī (d. 1436), Aḥmad ibn Sulaymān ibn Kamāl Pāšā (d. 1534), Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Šaraf al-Dīn (16th c.), Vağīh al-Dīn Šānī Takallū (d. 1614), Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Aḥad Fārūqī (d. 1625), Muḥammad Amīn ibn Ṣadr al-Dīn Širwānī (d. 1627), Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1641), Muḥammad Taqī ibn ʿAbd Ḥusayn Naṣīrī Ṭūsī (17th c.), Mīr Findiriskī (d. 1641), Ḥasan ibn ʿAbd al-Razzāq Lāhīǧī (d. 1710), Muḥammad ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad Amīn Šakīb Sīrāzī (d. 1723), Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Aṣġar Nūrī (19th c.), ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Muḥammad Saʿīd Kurdī (d. 1887), Sayyid Āqā Afšār, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad Bihbahānī (d. 1907). *Āġāz va anǧām*: Aṯīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. *c.* 1265), Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274), ʿAzīz al-Dīn ibn Muḥammad Nasafī (13th c.), ʿAbd al-Razzāq ibn Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāšī (d. *c.* 1329), Muḥammad Aḥmadī, Fayyāḍ (15th c.), Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Rafīʿ Bīdābādī (d. 1782).

the UK. These are valuable *mağmūʿat* or one-volume libraries that contain, among other works, authentic or pseudepigraphic treatises by Avicenna on the theme of the origin and return of the soul.[13] These texts represent a mirror of the transmission of the master's *œuvre*, as well as a manifestation of its circulation and the places where it was received and studied.

1. MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye, *Nuruosmaniye* 4894 (XI/XVII): This *codex compositus* is considered by Anawati to be incontestably the most important among the existing collections. The orientalist had the opportunity to directly view the copy after it was integrated into the Nuruosmaniye library in İstanbul, from the mountains of Anatolia where the codex had been placed in safety. The anthology contains more than 130 *rasāʾil* by Avicenna or pseudepigraphs, the titles of which are reported in detail by Anawati in an article published in 1956.[14]

   Leaf 1r contains a square stamp, probably dated 11th/17th century, and the *waqf* note and stamp of Sulṭān Maḥmūd ibn Muṣṭafā II (r. 1143-1168H/1730-1754).[15]

- *Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* (ff. 337r-361v);
- *al-Maʿād* (*Risāla al-Tuḥfa*) (ff. 430v-435v);
- *Risāla al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* (ff. 435v-436r);
- *Risāla fī l-Maʿād* (*Aḍḥawiyya*) (ff. 485r-493v);
- *al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar]* (ch. 13: *al-Nafs al-falakiyya*) (ff. 542r-543r);
- *Risāla fī l-Nafs wa-baqāʾihā wa-maʿādihā (al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar])* (ff. 577r-587v).

2. MS London, British, Add. 16659 (Cureton-Rieu 978).[16] The codex is dated 1182H/1768-9 (colophon to *al-Aḍḥawīya*), but it was probably copied from its exemplar completed in Akbarabad (Agra) on 18 Ṣafar 1091/10 March 1680, as

[13] Jean R. (Yahya) Michot, "Un important recueil avicennien du VIIe/XIIIe s.: la *majmûʿa* Hüseyin Çelebi 1194 de Brousse", *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 33 (1991): 121-129.

[14] George C. Anawati, "Le Manuscrit Nour Osmaniyye 4894", *Midéo* 3 (1956): 381-386.

[15] David C. Reisman, *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition. The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sīnā's al-Mubāḥaṯāt (The Discussions)* (Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 2002), 44: "35.5 x 24 (text: 24 x 12). 598 folios. Brown leather and board, ovoid medallions with pendants, border; flap with round medallion. Thin, yellowing European paper. Black ink, red rubrics [...] Leaves 1r-3v contain the list of works of the manuscript in red columns (4 x 7)."

[16] William Cureton, Charles Rieu, *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum orientalium qui in Museo Britannico asservantur. Pars secunda, codices arabicos amplectens. Supplementum quatuor auctum appendicibus, cui accedunt addenda et corrigenda, necnon index triplex, in universum catalogum mss. Arabicorum* (Londini: Impensis curatorum Musei Britannici, 1871), item 978, 477-451; Charles Rieu, *Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum* (London: The British Museum, 1881), vol. 2, 438-439.

reported by an erased colophon (f. 552, lines 21-26).[17] It is a compendium of 153 short philosophical and scientific treatises by Avicenna or attributed to him, in addition to commentaries on and translations of his works. The manuscript was purchased by Abū Ṭālib al-Ḥusaynī in Murshidabad in Rabīʿ II 1208/November-December 1793 (f. 4r), on the road from Kolkata to Lucknow, and later acquired in Lucknow by the Scottish orientalist Major Henry Yule 1803 (f. 4r). It is now part of the Yule collection (no. 23), within the Oriental Section of the British Library.[18]

- *Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya fī amr al-maʿād* (ff. 25v-34v);
- Persian translation of *al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar]* (*Risāla al-Maʿād*, long version, ff. 381v-402r);
- Persian translation of *al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar]* (*Risāla al-Nafs*, short version, ff. 403v-410r);
- *Risāla al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* (ff. 411v-413v);
- *Kitāb al-Maʿād* (*al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar]*) (ff. 449v-466r);
- *Risāla al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* (*Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*) (ff. 466v-497r).

[17] https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100000001517.0x000093 (accessed 1 Feb 2025). David C. Reisman, "Avicenna at ARCE", in *Aspects of Avicenna*, edited by R. Wisnovsky (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2001), 131-182, 143-146.
[18] https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100000001517.0x000093 (accessed 1 Feb 2025): ff. i+1+vii+584+vii [...] Dimensions: 230 x 155 mm leaf [text frame 176 x 105 mm] [...] Eastern Arabic foliation in black ink [...] with rubricated headings and overlinings in red [...] each text in the manuscript has a headpiece (*ʿunwān*) illuminated in gold, red and blue; beginning with f. 4, all pages are framed in yellow, black and red [...] *Marginalia*: Few by multiple hands."



© MS London, British Library, Add. 16659 (ff. 2v-3r, *Table of contents*)

3. MS Oxford, Bodleian, *Ouseley* 95 (Ethé 1422), dated 1042H/1632-1633), was purchased by the Bodleian in 1843 from the British officer and orientalist Sir William Ouseley (1767-1842); it is a collection of philosophical treatises, both in Arabic and Persian, among others by Pseudo-Plato, Ibn Nāʿima, Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Sahlān Sāwī, Nāṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, Bar Hebraeus etc...[19]

- Persian translation of *al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar]* (*Risāla al-Nafs*, short version, ff. 19v-20v, 2r-4r);
- Persian translation of *Risāla al-Aḍhawiyya fī l-maʿād* (ff. 22v-31v).

4. MS Qom, Marʿašī, 286, dated 1072H/1661-2, is a multi-text of approximately 100 texts, most of which are philosophical in content; it contains works by Pseudo-Aristotle, Pseudo-Alexander, al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, Pseudo-Fārābī, Miskawayh, Avicenna, Pseudo-Avicenna, Ǧūzǧānī, ʿUmar Ḫayyām, Ibn Sahlān Sāwī, Šihāb al-

[19] Edward Sachau and Ernest Ethé, *Catalogue of the Persian, Turkish, Hindûstânî, and Pushtû Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library*, part I: The Persian Manuscripts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), 875: “Ff. 169, ll. 25-27; small cursive Nastaʿlīḳ, very like Shikasta; size, 12 3/8 in. 7-7 3/8 in.”

Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī, Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, Nāṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, Faḫr al-Dīn Rāzī, Bābā Afḍal Kāšānī, Šams al-Dīn Muḥammad Šahrazūrī, Quṭb al-Dīn Šīrāzī, ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāšānī, al-Sayyid al-Šarīf Ǧurǧānī, Sayyid Niẓām al-Dīn Aḥmad Daštakī, Mullā Ṣadrā, etc...[20]

On the fly-leaf (f. 3r) there is a *waqf*-statement dated 1063H/1654 by Muḥaqqiq Sabzawārī (d. 1090H/1679), a glossator of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* (*Book of the Cure*), and on the fly-leaf (f. 3r) another *waqf* dated 1117H/1705 by his son Muḥammad Ǧaʿfar.[21]

- *al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar]* (ch. 1: *R. fī l-Quwā al-ǧismāniyya*, pp. 121-124);
- *al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād* (pp. 240, 315, 329 excerpts);
- *Risāla al-Tuḥfa* (pp. 232-233);
- Persian translation of *al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar]* (*Māhiyyat al-nafs*, short version, pp. 316-328).

II. *The Origin and Destination*: Authentic and Spurious Works

II.1 *Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*[22] was written by Avicenna between 403H/1013 and 404H/1014.[23] The dates coincide with his arrival in Ǧurǧān and the meeting with his

[20] Sayyid Aḥmad Ḥusaynī and Sayyid Maḥmūd Marʿašī, *Fihrist-i nusḫah-hā-yi ḫaṭṭī-yi Kitābḫāna-yi ʿŪmūmī-yi Ḥaḍrat-i Āyat Allāh al-ʿUẓmā Marʿašī Naǧafī*, vol. I (Qom: Kitābḫāna-yi Buzurg-i Āyat Allāh Marʿašī Naǧafī, 1364-1366Š/1985-1988), 312-333; Hossein Mottaqi, "MS Qom, Kitābḫāna Āyatullāh Marʿāšī 286. An 11th/17th Century Iranian Anthology of Philosophical and Theological Works in Arabic and Persian", *Studia Graeco-Arabica* 6 (2016): 141-184, part. 141-142: "ff. II. 447.00, 11,5x27 cm, 27/28 lines on 18x27.5 cm. Persian *nastaʿlīq* [..] Catchwords at every page impair (verso of the folio). Diagrams on pp. 22, 29 and 33. Marginal notes on pp. 91, 239, 342, 353, 616, 626, 659, and 660 [...] Copyist: Šāh Murād Farāhānī (p. 317r and p. 447r)."

[21] See Mottaqi, "MS Qom, Kitābḫāna Āyatullāh Marʿāšī 286": 142.

[22] Ibn Sīnā, *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʾād li-al-Šayḫ al-Raʾīs*, edited by ʿA. Nūrānī (Tehran: The Institute of Islamic Studies, 1984); Ibn Sīnā. *Avicenne, Livre de la genèse et du retour*, translated by Y. (Jean R.) Michot (Oxford: 2002, on-line PDF version available at http://www.muslimphilosophy.com /sina/works/AN195.pdf), French translation with critical notes of variant readings based on ten MSS; Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 20-22 (English translation of *Introduction*), part. 20: "The printed text made available by Nūrānī, *Al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* (1984), is unsatisfactory. A truly critical edition in preparation by Y. Michot has not been completed, but he has kindly made available on-line his draft translation in French, annotated with many variant readings from a number of manuscripts (*Livre de la genèse*)". Cf. August Ferdinand Mehren, "La *Philosophie d'Avicenne* (*Ibn-Sina*): Exposée d'après des documents inédits", *Le Muséon* 1 (1882): 389-409, esp. 506-522; Jean R. (Yahya) Michot, "Avicenne et la destinée humaine. A propos de la résurrection des corps", *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 44 (1981): 453-483.

[23] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 165.

faithful disciple and collaborator Ǧūzǧānī, who in the *Biography* reports that Avicenna wrote the treatise for one Abū-Muḥammad al-Šīrāzī:[24]

The first of a long series of writings on the subject, *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*, linked the 'fruit' of Physics and the 'fruit' of Metaphysics, which would later become the second section of the theological part of the Metaphysics.[25] In the introductory part of the work Avicenna wrote:

> In this treatise I wish to indicate the real doctrine of the Validating Peripatetic philosophers concerning Provenance and Destination in an effort to find favor with Master Abū-Aḥmad ibn-Muḥammad ibn-Ibrāhīm al-Fārisī. This treatise of mine contains the fruits of two great sciences, one of which is characterized by being about metaphysical, and the other physical, matters. The fruit of the science dealing with metaphysical matters is that part of it known as theologia, which treats [the subjects of] Lordship, the first principle, and the relationship which beings bear to it according to their rank. The fruit of the science dealing with physical matters is the knowledge that the human soul survives and that it has a Destination.[26]

The work is divided into three sections, as announced by Avicenna in the introduction, of 52, 11 and 20 chapters respectively.

> I have divided this book into three parts: (a) Establishing the first principle of the universe and its oneness; enumeration of the attributes befitting it. (b) Indicating the order of the emanation of being from the being [of the first principle], beginning with the first being [emanating] from it and ending with the last beings after it. (c) Indicating the survival of the human soul; the real bliss in the Hereafter, and what is a certain kind of bliss that is not real; the real misery in the Hereafter, and what is a certain kind of misery that is not real.[27]

The first two parts concern the Principle and the emanation of being and are copied later in the section *Ilāhiyyāt* ([Science of] Divine Things, 8 and 9) of *al-Šifāʾ* (The Cure) and *al-Naǧāt* (The Salvation, the second *maqāla* of Metaphysics), omitting the parts relating to the First Mover by way of motion. The third part, which deals with the survival of the human soul, is discussed by Avicenna in *al-Maʿād* [*al-aṣġar*] (The [Lesser] Destination) and

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[24] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 101, n. 1: "In his dedication, Avicenna refers to this person as Abū-Aḥmad ibn-Muḥammad (or simply Abū-Muḥammad in the Istanbul MS Ahmet III 3268, Nūrānī 1 and Mahdavī 212) ibn-Ibrāhīm al-Fārisī. Neither person, if they are two, has been identified so far". See Gohlman (ed.), *The Life of Ibn Sina*, 44-45: "There was in Jurjān a man called Abū Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, who was an amateur of the sciences and who bought a house in his neighborhood for the Master to live in [...] and composed for Abū Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī *The Origin and the Return*."

[25] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 292: "Avicenna came to the realization that the Metaphysics of the Rational Soul thematically belongs with Natural Theology when he identified the former as the 'fruit' of Physics and the latter as the 'fruit' of Metaphysics, and decided to write an independent work on the subject that would combine both subdivisions of what was later to become the Theological part of Metaphysics. This was *The Provenance and Destination*, the first of many treatments of this subject he had originated."

[26] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 20-21.

[27] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 21.

then included equally in *The Cure* and in *The Salvation*.[28] The work has a considerable manuscript tradition, which goes from 580H/1184-5, the date of the earliest attested copies (MSS İstanbul, Topkapı, *Ahmet III* 3227 and 3268, plausibly copied from the same exemplar), down to the 19th century (MS Tihrān, Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif, 1000/18, 1333H), with a peak during the 17th century Safavid period (more than 20 copies, see Appendix).[29]

In particular, the work can be found at number 35 (ff. 466v-497r) of the precious *codex compositus* mentioned above, preserved at the British Library, MS Add. 16659.

[28] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 101. Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Ilāhiyyāt min al-Šifāʾ li-Šayḫ al-Raʾīs Abū ʿAlī Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Sīnā maʿa taʿlīqāt*, 2 vols., edited by ʿA. K. Šarīf Šīrāzī (Tehran: Madrasa Dār al-Funūn 1303H/1885); Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Ilāhiyyāt min Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*, edited by Ḥ. al-Āmulī (Qom: Maktab al-Iʿlām al-Islāmī, Markaz al-Našr, 1376Š/1997-1998); Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt* (1), edited by Ǧ. Š. Qanawatī and S. Zāyid (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-ʿāmma li-šuʾūn al-maṭābiʿ al-amīriyya, 1960); Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt* (2), edited by M.Y. Mūsā, S. Dunyā and S. Zāyid (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-ʿāmma li-šuʾūn al-maṭābiʿ al-amīriyya, 1960, repr. Tehran: Intišārāt-i Nāṣir-i Ḫusraw, 1363Š/1984-1985); Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt wa-taʿlīqāt Ṣadr al-mutaʾallihīn ʿalayhā Kitāb al-Šifāʾ (Metaphysics), with Marginal Notes by Mullā Ṣadrā, Mīr Dāmād, Ḫwānsārī, Sabzavārī and others*, edited with introduction and notes by Ḥ. Nāǧī Iṣfahānī (Tehran: Society for the Appreciation of Cultural Works and Dignitaries, 1383Š/2004); cf. https://www.avicennaproject.eu/#/ "Philosophy on the Border of Civilizations and Intellectual Endeavours: Towards a Critical Edition of the Metaphysics (*Ilāhiyyāt* of *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*), ERC project directed by A. Bertolacci; Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Naǧāt*, edited by M. Ṣ. al-Kurdī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-saʿāda, 1331H/1913); Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Naǧāt*, edited by M. T. Dānešpažūh, (Tehran: Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh, 1364Š/1985).

[29] In addition to the copies reported by Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 216, and Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 471-472, also indicated are the copies preserved in Muṣṭafā Dirāyatī, *Fihristgān-i nusḫah-hā-yi ḫaṭṭī-yi Īrān (Fanḫā)* (*Union Catalogue of Iran Manuscripts*) (Tehran: Cultural & Research Institute of al-Ǧawad, 1391Š/2012-1393Š/2015), XXVII, 773-776 [henceforth: *Fanḫā*]. Anawati also lists the following manuscripts: Gotha 1158; Istanbul, Millet Kütüphanesi, *Feyzullah* 1213 (1093H); Istanbul, Süleymaniye, *Nuruosmaniye* 2715 (653H); Istanbul, Topkapı, *Ahmet III* 3215 (in Ergin no. 3115).



© MS London, British Library, Add. 16659/35 (*Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*)

From the existing bibliography some inconsistencies emerge regarding a Persian translation of the treatise preserved at ff. 411v-413v of the MS British Add. 16659/24 and at ff. 19v-20v and 2r-4r of the MS Bodleian 1422/2 (Ouseley 95).[30] Anawati wrongly claimed that they preserved the translation of *Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*.[31] Mahdavī corrected Anawati, specifying that the MS British Add. 16659/24 is actually a Persian treatise falsely attributed to Avicenna, *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*, and included it among the spurious works in his *Bibliographie d'Avicenne*.[32] The digital archive of the Qatar library also considers the

[30] Instead, it preserves the condensed Persian translation of the treatise *al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar]*.
[31] Anawati, *Muʾallafāt Ibn Sīnā*, 253; Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 213.
[32] Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 294, no. 215.

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copy a Persian condensed translation of a work on metaphysics by Avicenna.[33] This information is probably extrapolated from *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum orientalium qui in Museo Britannico asservantur*,[34] later rectified in the publication dedicated by Rieu exclusively to the Persian codices preserved at the British Library.[35] Reisman, in *Avicenna at the ARCE*, omits reference to this treatise in its description of the contents of the codex.[36] Another copy attributed to Avicenna is preserved in the Sipahsālār Library with the number 6747/2.[37] The erroneous authorship is also evident from the *explicit*, in which the *šayḫ* is clearly referred to (MSS British Add. 16659/24; Mağlis 5138/40; 9541/25; 17490 ض).

Risāla-yi mabdāʾ va maʿād in Persian is divided into two parts (*mabdaʾ* and *maʿād*), of six and four chapters respectively, and deals with the Necessary Existence, its uniqueness and transcendence, pure souls, resurrection and revelation.

The authorship of this work is quite controversial. There are several copies that report the attribution to Aṯīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. *c.* 663H/1265),[38] although in some manuscripts the treatise is mistakenly identified with another of his works, *Kalimāt ʿašara*.[39] In a witness preserved in the Mağlis Library, MS 14590/156, dated Muḥarram 723H/1323, authorship is assigned to Zayn al-Dīn Sayfī (VII/XIII).[40] The copy has been restored and reports an inscription in *nastaʿlīq*, "*Safīna Tabrīz*", the title of the encyclopedic collection compiled by Abū al-Mağd Muḥammad ibn Masʿūd Tabrīzī in Ilkhanid Iran during the years 721-723H/1321-1323. The compendium was printed by the

[33] https://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100148048612.0x00002c (accessed 1 Feb 2025).
[34] Cureton and Rieu, *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum orientalium qui in Museo Britannico asservantur*, II, 449, no. XXII: "Commentatio de existentiæ principio et fine, Persice, fol. 411: Continet primum sex Capita in quibus de rerum principio disseritur, tum alia quatuor, quæ de animæ humanæ post mortem conditione tractant. Interpres Persa, cujus nomen latet, observationes aliquot proprias addidit". The note explicitly refers to *Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*: "Opusculum Arabicum, ex quo hoc conversum est, scriptum est ab Avicenna in Jurján, in gratiam Shaikhi Abu Muhammad al-Shírázi."
[35] Rieu, *Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the British Museum*, II, 439, no. VII.
[36] Reisman, "Avicenna at the ARCE", 143-146.
[37] Dirāyatī, *Fanḫā*, I, 214.
[38] Dirāyatī, *Fanḫā*, I, 213-214: Mashhad, Šayḫ ʿAlī Ḥaydar 1365_{13} (1083H); Qom, Marʿašī 6547_{2}, 11251_{8} (XI/XVII); Dānišgāh-i Ṭihrān 242_{10} (form. Ilāhiyyāt), 2401_{34} (XI/XVII), 3238_{5} (1241H), 4732_{6}, 5968_{2} (1000H), 8211_{13} (XI/XVII); Tehran, *Dāʾirat al-maʿārif* 1070_{4} (XI/XVII); Tehran, Mahdavī 281_{8}; Tehran, Mağlis, ض 17490, 5138_{140} (XI/XVII), 9541_{25} (1287H), 10704_{7} (1347H); Tehran, Nafīsī 470; Millī 32507_{8}; Tehran, Sipahsālār 2912_{93l}; Yazd, Vazīrī 3067_{3} (1081H).
[39] Aṯīr al-Dīn Al-Abharī, *Kalimāt ʿašara* (Ten Words), in *Čahārda risāla* (Fourteen treatises), edited by. M. B. Sabzawārī (Tehran: University of Tehran Press, 1340Š/1961-1962), 163-174.
[40] Dirāyatī, *Fanḫā*, I, 213.

Islamic Council Library in 1381H/2001, and the treatise *Aġāz va anǧām* present within it is attributed to Sayfī (pp. 646-650).[41]

Of unknown authorship, some copies of the same treatise are also listed in *Fanḫā*, entitled *Mabdaʾ va maʿād* (see MS Maǧlis 6489/14, dated 1087H/1676-7).[42] Most witnesses of the treatise report seven chapters in the first part and five in the second. In addition to the MS British Add. 16659/24, the only one identified that preserves four chapters in the second section is MS Maǧlis 5138, a *maǧmūʿa* of at least 153 works, which at number 140 (pp. 988-990) preserves *Aġāz va anǧām* attributed to al-Abharī. The part that is omitted in both copies concerns the fifth chapter on miracles. Taking into account the oldest copy identified to date (Maǧlis 14590), the treatise was certainly written by 723H/1323, but the work circulated in the 17th century as a Persian translation of an Avicennian treatise.

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[41] Abū al-Maǧd Muḥammad ibn Masʿūd Tabrīzī, *Safīna-yi Tabrīz: A Treasury of Persian Literature and Islamic Philosophy, Mysticism, and Sciences* (Facsimile Edition of a manuscript compiled and copied in 721-3/1321-23) (Tehran: Iran University Press, 1381Š/2003); Asghar Seyed Gohrab and Sen McGlinn (eds.), *Safina Revealed. A Compendium of Persian Literature in 14th Century Tabriz* (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2011); Asghar Seyed Gohrab and Sen McGlinn (eds.), *The Treasury of Tabriz: The Great Il-Khanid Compendium* (Amsterdam-West Lafayette: Rozenburg Publishers and Purdue University Press, 2007).

[42] Dirāyatī, *Fanḫā*, XXVII, 791-792: Baghdad, Wahabī 2023; Mashhad, Gawharšād 483_1; Qom, Gulpāyigānī 446_4-3-66; Qom, Huǧatiyya 442_2; Tabriz, Millī 3198_5; Tehran, Maǧlis 6489_{14}.

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

© MS London, British Library, Add. 16659/24 (*Risāla-yi mabdāʾ va maʿād*)

II.2 Among the eschatological treatises attributed to Avicenna that bear a similar title, mention is made in some manuscripts of a short epistle in Arabic, *Risāla al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* (Epistle on the Origin and Destination), which answers four questions posed by the *šayḫ* Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī al-Ḫayr[43] relating to our provenance, why we are in the world, where we will go and what condition we will be in after leaving it. The work is not attested in any of the medieval bibliographies and Michot consecrated its Avicennian

[43] Reisman, *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition*, 138 ff.

inauthenticity in *L'épître sur la genèse et le retour*,[44] a French translation based on the editions done in Iran[45] and Cairo,[46] compared with other manuscripts.[47] This spurious treatise circulated during the Safavid era and many copies dating from the 17th century are today preserved in Iran (see Appendix).[48]

There is also a late Persian translation of the work preserved in MS Tihrān, Mağlis 631/20 (1268H/1851-1852, pp. 321-360) and in MS Tihrān, Nūrbaḫš 607/7 (1261H/1845, pp. 357-382).[49] The title reported is *Ḫayr al-zād dar mabdaʾ va maʿād* and the translation is attributed to Faḫr al-Dīn ibn Aḥmad Rūdbārī (19th c.), originally from Kurdistan. Ibrāhīm Dībāğī, in the catalogue of manuscripts of the Nūrbaḫš Library, reports that Rūdbārī in 1253H completed *Kanz al-Hidāya*, a Persian translation of *Al-Aqwāl al-Kāfiyya* by ʿAlī ibn al-Malik al-Muʾayyad Dāʾud ibn Yūsuf al-Yamīnī, one of the Rasulid sultans of Yemen (r. 1296-1322).[50] He further adds that he began the translation of *Taḏhīb al-marām fī tarğama tahḏīb al-kalām* in 1260H, completing it on 8 Ğumāda I 1261H and presenting it to the Ardalān ruler, Amānullāh Ḫān II (r. 1799/1800-1824/1825). In the preface, the translator mentions and praises his teacher, an unidentified *šayḫ* Muḥammad Ibrāhīm.

[44] Jean R. (Yahya) Michot, "'L'épître sur la genèse et le retour' attribuée à Avicenne. Présentation et essai de traduction critique", *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 26 (1984): 104-118.
[45] *Ağwibat Asʾila min al-Šayḫ*, in the margins of Mullā Ṣadrā, *Šarḥ al-Hidāya al-Aṯīriyya* (Tehran: 1313H/1895), 372-374.
[46] Muḥyīddīn Ṣabrī al-Kurdī (ed.), *Mağmūʿat al-rasāʾil* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Kurdistān al-ʿilmiyya, 1328H/1910), 250-256.
[47] Michot, "'L'épître sur la genèse et le retour' attribuée à Avicenne", 109: Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Pertev Paşa 617 (*c.* 1113H) (ff. 18v-19v); Istanbul, *Topkapı*, Ahmet III 3447 (866H) (ff. 473v-474v);[47] Cairo, *Dār al-Kutub*, Tīmūr Mağāmī 66 (ff. 126-128) and 200 (ff. 189v-190v). See George C. Anawati, "Un cas typique de l'esoterisme avicennien: sa doctrine de la resurrection des corps", *La Revue du Caire* (Millénaire d'Avicenne) 141 (1951): 68-94, part. 73-74.
[48] The copies are also listed in Anawati, *Muʾallafāt Ibn Sīnā*, 253, no. 196, and Mahdavī, *Fihrist-i nusḫah-hā-yi muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 216, no. 106; other witnesses are listed in Dirāyatī, *Fanḫā*, XXVII, 776-777. Anawati inserts the following copies, not confirmed afterwards by Mahdavī: Istanbul, Süleymaniye*, Fātiḥ* 3217; Istanbul, Süleymaniye, *Nuruosmaniye* 4896 (Ergin, "İbni Sina biblioğrafyası", 35, no. 4986); Istanbul, Süleymaniye, *Pertev Paşa* 617. Ergin adds the MS Umumi Beyazıt, *Hafiz Davut Paşa* 207.
[49] The same miscellaneous codex, at number 361_{22}, reports in Persian translation a part of Ibn Sīnā-al-Ḫayr epistolary correspondence (see Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 7). Dirāyatī, *Fanḫā*, XIV, 194, considers the copies as belonging to two distinct works.
[50] Muḥammad Muḥsin *Āqā* Buzurg Ṭihrānī, *Al-Ḏarīʿa ilā taṣānīf al-šīʿa*, 25 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwāʾ, 1403-1406H/1983-1986); 24 vols. in 27 (Najaf-Tehran: 1355-1398Š/1936-1978); a supplement, ed. A. Ḥusaynī, was published as vol. 26 (Mashhad: 1364Š/1985), see XVIII, 170, no. 1234.

Rūdbārī translated into Persian other treatises and commentaries on Avicenna's Qurʾān, among which *Risāla al-ʿArūs* (The Groom),[51] *Tafsīr Sūrat al-Tawḥīd*,[52] *Tafsīr Sūrat al-Nās*,[53] and *Tafsīr Sūrat al-Falaq*.[54] These translations are preserved in some *maǧmūʿat* and in particular in the above-mentioned codices Maǧlis 631 and Nūrbaẖš 607, which respectively at numbers 22 and 9 also preserve Rūdbārī's Persian translation of other parts of Ibn Sīnā – al-Ḫayr correspondence.[55]

In the same collections, MSS Maǧlis 631/4 and Nūrbaẖš 607/6, the translation of another spurious eschatological treatise by Avicenna, *Risāla fī Maʿrifat al-nafs al-nāṭiqa wa-aḥwālihā* (On the Knowledge of the Rational Soul and its States).[56] This treatise is not included in the medieval bibliographies and its authorship is attributed to various authors.[57] Both Mahdavī and Michot[58] argue that, although the work is totally imbued with Avicennian philosophy, it was written about 100 or 150 years after the philosopher's death; Marmura, on the other hand, has defended its authenticity.[59]

II.3 Among the works in Arabic that bear the same title, *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*, and which are falsely attributed to the *šayḫ*, Ergin includes two copies preserved at the

[51] The *Risāla* is part of a set of fragments of works which are transmitted under the various titles (*al-ʿUrūš*; *al-ʿArš*; *al-ʿAršiyya*; *Silsilat al-falāsifa*; *al-Ḥayra*; *Iṯbāt al-wuǧūd*; *Iṯbāt al-ʿuqūl*) dealing with God, the soul and its destiny. Cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 493-494. MSS: Nūrbaẖš 607_{8}; Maǧlis 631_{21} (see *Fanḫā*, vol. XXII, p. 586).
[52] Dirāyatī, *Fanḫā*, VIII, 725: MSS Dānišgāh-i Ṭihrān د 90_{12}; Tehran, Nūrbaẖš 607/3; Tehran, Maǧlis 631_{1}. Cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 506; Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 64-65; Anawati, *Muʾallafāt Ibn Sīnā*, 262-264.
[53] Dirāyatī, *Fanḫā*, VIII, 778: MSS Dānišgāh-i Ṭihrān د 90_{14}; Tehran, Nūrbaẖš 607_{5}; Tehran, Maǧlis 631_{3}. Cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 507; Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 65-66; Anawati, *Muʾallafāt Ibn Sīnā*, 265-266.
[54] Dirāyatī, *Fanḫā*, VIII, 778: MSS Dānišgāh-i Ṭihrān د 67_{1}; Tehran, Nūrbaẖš 607_{4}; Tehran, Maǧlis 631_{2}. Cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 507; Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 65-66; Anawati, *Muʾallafāt Ibn Sīnā*, 264-265.
[55] Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 6-7; Reisman, *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition*, 138 ff.
[56] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 524-525: "Other titles: *R. fī ʿIlm al-nafs*, *R. fī al-Nafs al-nāṭiqa wa-kayfiyyat aḥwalihā*, *Ḥaqīqat al-nafs*". M. T. al-Fandī, "Risāla fī Maʿrifat al-nafs al-nāṭiqa wa-aḥwālihā", *al-Mashriq* 1 (1934): 324-336; A. F. al-Ahwānī, (El Ahwany), "Risāla fī Maʿrifat al-nafs al-nāṭiqa wa-aḥwālihā", in *Les états de l'âme par Avicenne* (Cairo: Issa El-Baby El-Halaby & Co., 1371H/1952), 181-192; A. F. al-Ahwānī, (El Ahwany), "Treatise concerning our knowledge of the rational soul and its different states", in *Islamic Philosophy* (Cairo, 1957), 157-172.
[57] Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 302-303. Anawati, *Muʾallafāt Ibn Sīnā*, 163-165.
[58] Jean R. Michot (Yahya), "'L'épître sur la connaissance de l'âme rationnelle et de ses états' attribuée à Avicenne. Présentation et essai de traduction", *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 82 (1984): 479-499.
[59] Marmura, "Avicenna and the Kalām".

Süleymaniye of Istanbul, MSS *Esat Efendi* 1234 and 1239[60] (see Appendix), later mentioned by Anawati,[61] and by Mahdavī, who underlines its inauthenticity.[62]

II.4 *Al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar] (Ḥāl al-nafs al-insāniyya)* (The [Lesser] Destination) (State of the Human Soul),[63] or merely *Maʿād*, divided into sixteen chapters, was written by Avicenna during his stay in Rayy in about 404H/1014, when he was in the service of al-Sayyida and her son, the Buyid Maǧd al-Dawla, as Ǧūzǧānī relates.[64] The work appears in the *Biography* and in several manuscripts under the generic title *al-Maʿād*. Together with the preceding treatise (*Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*), it is part of Avicenna's "transition period" and this is evident from its still immature style and the use of Greek rather than Arabic vocabulary.[65] Avicenna composed the work for friends "pure in heart" and the topic is the soul and its afterlife.[66] It serves as a complement to *Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* and was then inserted in the corresponding parts on *Nafs* in *The Cure*[67] and *The Salvation.*[68]

> [This treatise] contains the marrow [of the theory] about the state of the human soul arrived at through demonstrative proofs, the heart of the matter about its survival—after the disintegration of the [physical] temperament and the decay of the body—provided by

[60] Ergin, "İbni Sina biblioğrafyası", 36, no. 162.
[61] Anawati, *Muʾallafāt Ibn Sīnā*, 254-255, no. 197.
[62] Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 294, no. 216.
[63] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 102-103, 477-479. Ibn Sīnā, *Aḥwāl al-nafs*, edited by A. F. al-Ahwānī, (El Ahwany) (Cairo: Dār iḥyāʾ al-kutub al-ʿarabiyya, 1371H/1952), 43-142; Guy Monnot, "La transmigration et l'immortalité", *Midéo* 14 (1980): 149-166, 156-158 (French transl.ch. 10); Jean R. (Yahya) Michot, "Prophétie et divination selon Avicenne. Présentation, essai de traduction critique et index de *l'Épître de l'âme de la sphère*", *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 83 (1985): 507-535 (French transl. ch. 13); Jean R. (Yahya) Michot, "Avicenne, La définition de l'âme. Section I de l'*Épître des états de l'âme*. Traduction critique et lexique", in *Langages et philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet*, edited by A. De Libera, A. Elamrani-Jamal, A. Galonnier (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 239-256 (French transl. ch. 1); Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 22-24 (English transl. ch. 16).
[64] Gohlman (ed.), *The Life of Ibn Sina*, 48-51.
[65] Cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 102: "Just as *The Provenance and Destination* established the version of Avicenna's doctrine of the 'fruit' of Metaphysics with which he was most content, so also this *Destination* established the version of his doctrine of the 'marrow' of Physics, i.e., his theory of the soul and its afterlife; and just as the former treatise was copied extensively in the Metaphysics part of *The Cure* and *The Salvation*, so also this one was copied in the *De Anima* parts of both works."
[66] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 102.
[67] Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Šifāʾ*, *al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, *al-Nafs*, edited by G. C. Anawati, and S. Zāyid (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-miṣriyya al-ʿāmma li-al-kitāb, 1395H/1975); Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Shifāʾ: al-Nafs*, edited by Ḥ. Ḥasanzāda Āmulī (Qom: Maktab al-Iʿlām al-Islāmī, 1375Š/1996); Ibn Sīnā, *Psychologie d'Ibn Sina (Avicenne). D'après son œuvre* al-Shifāʾ, edited by J. Bakoš, 2 vols. (Prague: Éditions de l'Académie Tchécoslovaque des Sciences, 1956); Ibn Sīnā, Avicenna's *De anima*.
[68] Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Naǧāt*; Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Naǧāt*.

unequivocal research, and an examination of [the question of] resurrection and the circumstances that lead to it in the afterlife.[69]

Sebti questioned the authenticity of the treatise, arguing that a compiler had extrapolated parts from *al-Naǧāt*, to which he then added three new chapters (I, XIII and the final part of XVI).[70] The first and thirteenth, the most discussed and controversial chapters, circulated independently.[71] Michot approved its authenticity[72] and, according to Gutas, in the present state of the art there are no substantial and decisive elements to indicate we should not consider it authentically Avicennian.[73]

The manuscript tradition, in this case too, covers a wide time frame, both of the work written in Arabic by Avicenna and of its translations into Persian. There are at least two versions in Persian, an extended one, known by the generic title *al-Maʿād*, and a condensed one, entitled *al-Nafs* in most witnesses.[74] The tradition is quite ramified and complex, since the short summary version is even attributed to Avicenna and has a considerable transmission in terms of copies.[75]

The long version was instead transmitted with an anonymous author; according to Mahdavī, the latter is preserved at the British Library and the Sipahsālār in Tihrān,[76] but the present research has revealed other copies preserved mainly in Iran and Turkey, many of which circulated in the 17th century.[77]

[69] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 102; Ibn Sīnā, *Aḥwāl al-nafs*, 45.4-7.
[70] Meryem Sebti, "La question de l'authenticité de l'*Épître des états de l'âme* (*Risāla fī aḥwāl al-nafs*) d'Avicenne", *Studia Graeco-Arabica* 2 (2012): 331-354.
[71] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 477: "*R. fī n-Nafs ʿalā ṭarīq ad-dalīl wa-l-burhān*; *Fī n-Nafs an-nāṭiqa*; *Aḥwāl an-nafs*; *an-Nafs al-falakiyya* [Chapter 13]; *an-Nufūs* [Chapter 1]; *R. fī l-Quwā l-jusmāniyya* [Chapter 1]."
[72] Michot, "Avicenne, *La définition de l'âme*"; Michot, "Prophétie et divination selon Avicenne".
[73] Cf. Jules Janssens, "Le Maʿârij al-quds fî madârij maʿrifat al-nafs", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 60 (1993): 27-55.
[74] Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla-yi Nafs*, edited by M. ʿAmīd (Tehran: Danišgāh-i Tihrān 1331Š/1952, Hamadan: *Anǧuman*-i Āṯār wa Mufāḫir-i Farhangī, 1383Š/2004); Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 246-247; Anawati, *Muʾallafāt Ibn Sīnā*, 163, thought that a Persian translation of *Maʿād* was instead a translation of Avicenna's *Compendium on the soul*.
[75] Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 246-247. There are other versions recorded as translations of *al-Maʿād*, some of which are actually different works. This topic will be discussed in a forthcoming article.
[76] London, *British*, 16659_{21} (1182H, ff. 381v-402v); Tehran, *Sipahsālār*, 8371_{23} (1026H).
[77] The diversified manuscript tradition concerning *al-Maʿād*/*al-Nafs* will be discussed in a forthcoming article.


كتاب المعاد تاليف الشيخ الرئيس ابي علي الحسين بن عبد الله بن سينا رحمه الله

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

© MS London, British Library, Add. 16659/34 (*Al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar]*)

II.5 The generic title of the above-mentioned work, *al-Maʿād*, has often been mistakenly identified with another Avicennian treatise, *Al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād* (The Sacrifice Destination, on the occasion of *ʿīd al-aḍḥā*).[78] The work is divided into seven

[78] Alternate title: *al-Maʿād.* Cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 472-477; Ibn Sīnā, *al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī amr al-maʿād*, edited by S. Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1368H/1949); Ibn Sīnā, *al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād li-Ibn Sīnā*, edited by Ḥ. ʿAṣī (Beirut: al-Muʾassasa al-ǧāmiʿiyya, 1407H/1987); Francesca Lucchetta, *Avicenna. Epistola sulla vita futura* (Padova: Antenore, 1969); Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the *Kalām*", *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften* 7 (1991-1992): 172-206, 197-198. Repr. in Michael E. Marmura, *Probing in Islamic Philosophy: Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī and Other Major Muslim Thinkers* (State University of NY at Binghamton: Global Academic Publishing, 2005, 97-130 (English translation of some parts of chapters 2 and 3); Davlat Dadikhuda, "The Necessity of the Return (*al-maʿād*):

chapters and is dedicated to the place where the soul is destined to go after death. It was written in honor of an unidentified al-Šayḫ al-Amīn (or al-Amīr?) Abū-Bakr Muḥammad ibn ʿUbayd or Abū-Bakr ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿUbayd/ʿAbdallāh, probably in the period preceding Avicenna's stay in Iṣfahān.[79] By contrast, Bayhaqī reports that it was written for the vizier Abū-Saʿd al-Hamaḏānī, although the information in our possession does not allow us to verify this information.[80] Gutas places the drafting of the work in the time span from 1012 to 1024, in Ğurğān, Rayy or Hamaḏān.[81] In the *Biography*, Ğūzğānī does not mention it, perhaps because it was written and delivered by Avicenna to his protector before he met his disciple or simply because no copy was preserved.

The work was widely circulated between the 16th and 18th centuries and has a remarkable manuscript tradition (see Appendix).[82] *Al-Aḍḥawiyya* was also translated into Persian and there are at least two different versions of it: the oldest attested copy dates back to 879H/1474-5, but the other three we know of are all dated to the 17th century.[83]

Another work by Avicenna, *Risāla al-Tuḥfa* (The Present),[84] in the manuscripts sometimes bears the title *al-Maʿād al-aṣġar* and this created misreadings and misinterpretations in some medieval bibliographies.[85] The treatise is contained in some

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Avicenna on the Posthumous States of the Human Soul in *Aḍḥawiyya* 6-7", in *Islamic Thought and the Art of Translation. Texts and Studies in Honor of William C. Chittick and Sachiko Murata*, edited by M. Rustom (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2022), 298-310: Tariq Jaffer, "Bodies, Souls and Resurrection in Avicenna's *ar-Risāla al-Adhawīya fī amr al-maʿād*", in *Before and After Avicenna: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group*, edited by D. C. Reisman with the assistance of A. H. al-Rahim (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 163-174.

[79] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 473.

[80] al-Bayhaqī, *Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, 33-48.

[81] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 475.

[82] Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 40; Dirāyatī, *Fanḫā*, 336-339.

[83] Dirāyatī, *Fanḫā*, IV, 339; Aleksandr A. Semenov, *Sobranie vostočnyh rukopisej Akademii nauk Uzbekskoj SSR* (Tashkent: Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoj SSR, 1952-1971), 11 vols., IV, 317-318. MSS: Oxford, Bodleian, *Ouseley* 95_5 (Ethé 1422) (1042H); Qom, Fāṣl Qāʾīnī, no number (879H); Tashkent, Bīrūnī, 561_9 (1054H); Tehran, Sulṭanatī, 189_3 (1055-1056H).

[84] Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla fī l-saʿāda wa-l-ḥuǧaǧ al-ʿašr*, edited by Z. ʿĀ. Mūsawī, *Maǧmūʿa rasāʾil al-Šayḫ al-Raʾīs Abī ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh Ibn Sīnā al-Buḫārī* (Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-maʿārif al-ʿuṯmāniyya, 1353-1354H/1934-1935), fifth *Risāla*, 14.6-18. Cf. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 481: "*M. fī Taḥṣīl as-saʿāda wa-tuʿrafu bi-l-ḥujaj al-ʿašr*; *Fī s-Saʿāda*; *al-Ḥujaj al-ʿašr fī jawhariyyat nafs al-insān*; *R. fī n-Nafs wa-mā taṣīru ilayhi baʿda mufāraqatihā l-badan*; *al-Maʿād al-aṣġar*"; Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 55-56; Anawati, *Muʾallafāt Ibn Sīnā*, 147-149.

[85] Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 481-482: "The valuable Istanbul ms Üniversite 4755, usually helpful in resolving bibliographical issues, in this case adds to the confusion, for the scribe adds, next to the main title of this treatise, *wa-tuʿrafu bi-l-Maʿād al-aṣġar*. But this can hardly be correct for the same scribe says the same thing about the original 'Lesser' *Maʿād*" [...] It is important to note that the SB, which does list the *Tuḥfa* (no. 26), also lists the *Maʿād* separately (no. 19), which is identified with *al-Maʿād al-aṣġar* in the LB. This means that the very reliable SB did not consider the *Tuḥfa* to be identical with the *Maʿād* either. Besides, the identity of Tuḥfa

precious *maǧmūʿat* that also preserve some of the works mentioned in this paper concerning the beginning and the end of the human soul.[86]

Conclusions

The analysis of Avicennian pseudo-corpus is still in its infancy and many copies of his treatises, authentic, spurious or dubious, remain to be explored.[87] The falsely attributed works, intentionally or not,[88] represent important indicators for interpreting how the readers were influenced and what was actually received and transmitted by exegetes and translators. That many works with Avicennian authorship circulated during the Safavid Renaissance was certainly a noteworthy fact, especially since they were read within the intellectual and Šīʿite circles of Iṣfahān. The study of Avicenna, as Reisman rightly pointed out, also passes through the reception of his thought by later scholars.[89]

This paper has examined the state of the art of the manuscript tradition of Avicennian short treatises, both authentic and spurious, on the origin and return of the soul, an issue he addresses in several of his writings and occupies a major place mainly in his metaphysics. From a preliminary survey, it is clear that the codices were widely copied and therefore circulated preserving within them authentic works or attributed to Avicenna, in both Arabic and Persian. The copies examined, mostly included in anthologies, cover a wide time range, from the 12th to the 19th century, especially from the 15th century onwards, when there was an increase in the copying of works written in Persian, mainly during the reigns of the cultured and refined Ottoman sultans Bāyezīd II (r. 1481-1512), Selīm I (r. 1512-1520), and Süleyman I the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566). This phenomenon reached its peak during the 17th century, when a renewed interest in the Persian language manifested through the translations from Arabic, both literal and

with what is known as *al-Ḥujaj al-ʿašr or as-Saʿāda* is verified by the contents of the latter which correspond to what Avicenna says about it in the *ʿIšq*."

[86] Mahdavī, *Muṣannafāt-i Ibn-i Sīnā*, 56. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 482: Bursa, Hüseyin Çelebi 1194; Hyderabad, Asafiya I, 732; Istanbul, Bayazıt, *Veliyüddin* 3263_{5}; Istanbul, Süleymaniye, *Esat Efendi* 3688_{6}; Istanbul, Süleymaniye, *Fātiḥ* 3170_{13}; Istanbul, Köprülü 1602_{2}; Istanbul, Süleymaniye, *Nuruosmaniye* 4894_{80}; Istanbul, Süleymaniye, *Pertev* 617_{20}; Istanbul, Süleymaniye, *Ragıp Paşa* 1461_{15}; Istanbul, Topkapı, *Ahmet III* 3447_{60}; Istanbul, Topkapı, *Emanet Haznesi* 1730_{42}; Istanbul, Topkapı, *Revan* 2042_{11}; Istanbul, Üniversitesi 1458_{83}, 4724_{15}, 4755_{9} (588H); Lisbon, Academia das Ciencias, *Arab.* V.293; Manchester 384c; Marāġa, pp. 226-243 Pourjavady; Mashhad, Razavī IV 1/1025; Rampur I 389; Tehran, Danišgāh, *Miškāt* 1074_{1}, 1149; Tehran, Maǧlis 599_{13}, 625_{51}; Tehran, Malik 2001_{13}, 2003_{9}; Tehran, Sipahsālār 8371_{4}.

[87] Strohmaier, "Avicenne et le phénomène des écrits pseudépigraphiques", 37: "Il ya avait plusieurs raisons pour un auteur de camoufler son identité. La première était l'intention de soutenir une positions idéologique par une autorité plus ancienne."

[88] Cf. Reisman, "The Pseudo-Avicennan Corpus, I", 6-7.

[89] Reisman, "The Pseudo-Avicennan Corpus, I", 8.

paraphrased,[90] and an exponential increase in exegetical activity on classical texts. Submerged texts resurfaced and works by Avicenna or attributed to him were translated and commented on.

One might initially suppose that these treatises circulated widely for their brevity and density, as happened in the first centuries after Avicenna's death, when the first readers approached the shorter works and the "prime exponents of *falsafa* and *kalām* privileged 'minor' *summae* as the quintessence of Avicenna's philosophy, like the *Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlāʾī* (Book of Science for ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla), chosen by al-Ġazālī for his account of Avicenna's thought in the *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa* (The Aims/Doctrines of the Philosophers), the *Kitāb al-Naǧāt*, of which a very ancient transmission is attested, and the *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma* (Sources of Wisdom), which, together with the *Naǧāt*, was commented upon already in the 6th/12th century."[91]

This hypothesis regarding the minor treatises on origin and destination is contradicted, however, by the same exponential increase in copies of Avicenna's masterpiece, *al-Šifāʾ*, and commentaries on it, during the 17th and 18th centuries.[92] From the data collected, it is certain that the master's early writings on some specific topics of philosophical theology, attracted Safavid scholars. In the early phase of the Empire, philosophy had played a crucial role in theological writings, so much so that it was often identified with the latter.[93] As the Šīʿite configuration of the kingdom became increasingly predominant, also through the installation of the new generation of *ʿulamāʾ*, rational sciences and philosophical investigations acquired increasing prestige during the early and mid-17th century.[94] The *madrasa*s of Iṣfahān were steeped in Qurʾān studies and the Imamite tradition, but the eclectic scholars possessed a profound knowledge of

[90] Cf. Panzeca, "A Polyphony of Texts", 285-304; Ivana Panzeca, "On the Persian translations of Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt*", *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 28 (2017): 553-567.

[91] Amos Bertolacci, "Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* (Book of the Cure/Healing): The Manuscripts Preserved in Turkey and Their Significance", *Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph* 67 (2017-2018): 265-304, part. 286-287. Cf. Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Amos Bertolacci (eds.), *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012).

[92] See https://www.avicennaproject.eu/#/downloads/indirect; Robert Wisnovsky, "Avicenna's Islamic reception", in P. Adamson (ed.), *Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 190-213; Ivana Panzeca, "Traditions, Transmissions, Translations: An Overview of the Commentaries on Ibn Sīnā's *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* Preserved in India", *Palermo Occasional Papers* 0 (2022): 9-64. Reza Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Period: Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī and His Writings* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011); Sajjad Rizvi, "The Many Faces of Philosophy in the Safavid Age", in *The Empires of the Near East and India: Source Studies of the Safavid, Ottoman, and Mughal Literate Communities*, edited by H. Khafipour (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 305-318.

[93] Maryam Moazzen, *Formation of a Religious Landscape: Shiʿi Higher Learning in Safavid Iran* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 126 ff.; Gerhard Endress, "Philosophische Ein-Band-Bibliotheken aus Iṣfahān", *Oriens* 26 (2001): 10-58, esp. 11-13.

[94] Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke, "Twelver Shīʿī Theology", in *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology*, edited by S. Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 456-472.

philosophy and *fiqh*, as well as religious sciences, literature, and grammar.[95] Intellectuals enjoyed the support of ʿAbbās I, Ṣafī I and ʿAbbās II, who promoted the activity of both philosophers and traditionalists, offering them contracts and specialized madrasas and commissioning works.[96] The 17th century represented a unique event in the revival of the ancient tradition and the climax of this flowering occurred primarily in Šīrāz and Iṣfahān, although it also involved the areas bordering Persia, namely Transoxiana, Anatolia and India.[97]

In addition to the traditional *curricula studiorum*, the Safavid theologians showed a renewed interest in the works of the founders of the *falsafa* and returned to the texts of the gnostic and Neoplatonic *ḥikma* dating back to the first period of the reception and translation of the Greek sources.[98]

> The quest for a philosophical, Neoplatonic identity distinct from that of the Sunnī *kalām* tradition significantly affected by Avicennism became characteristic of Iranian scholars from the 17th century onwards. Philosophical discussions were accordingly oriented towards religion, and many of the philosophers were at the same time religious authorities.

Avicenna had partly eclipsed the early speculations of the *falsafa* with his *summae*, in particular *al-Šifāʾ* and *al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*, and probably his early writings returned to the limelight also thanks to their Greek and Neoplatonic implications.[99] The substantial process of exegesis and translation into Persian during the Safavid period certainly contributed to the diffusion of his minor treatises, although at that stage of his scientific production he had not yet renounced the Physicists' approach. The (pseudo)-Avicennian corpus on *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* had a wide dissemination, certainly because concise and more accessible than the *summae*, but above all due to the crucial topic theme, in harmony with the theological-philosophical propensities of the Safavid era in the 17th century. The fascinating path traced by Avicenna in his early writings led to what Endress defined "the enchantment of the last reinterpretation of his metaphysics at the service of theology"[100]

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[95] Moazzen, *Formation of a Religious Landscape*, 139-140. Cf. Ata Anzali, S. M. Hadi Gerami (eds.), *Opposition to Philosophy in Safavid Iran: Mulla Muḥammad-Ṭāhir Qummi's* Ḥikmat al-ʿĀrifīn (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

[96] Moazzen, *Formation of a Religious Landscape*, 140.

[97] Endress, "Philosophische Ein-Band-Bibliotheken aus Iṣfahān", 11-12; Khaled El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century. Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Asad Q. Ahmed and Reza Pourjavady, "Theology in the Indian Subcontinent", in *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology*, edited by S. Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 606-624.

[98] Cf. Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke, "An Eastern Renaissance? Greek Philosophy under the Safavids (16th-18th centuries AD)", *Intellectual History of the Islamicate World* 3 (1-2) (2015): 248-290.

[99] Pourjavady and Schmidtke, "An Eastern Renaissance?", 255.

[100] Endress, "Philosophische Ein-Band-Bibliotheken aus Iṣfahān", 12.

and which the Safavid scholars followed according to a parable that still remains to be explored in depth.

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Appendix: Manuscripts[101]

II.1 *Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*: Bursa, *İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi*, Hüseyin Çelebi 1194; Hamadan, *Madrasa Ġarb*, 700_{2}; Istanbul, *Topkapı*, Ahmet III 1584 (914H/1508-9), 3225, 3247_{1}, 3268_{7} (580H); Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Fātiḥ 3217_{1}; Istanbul, *Millet Kütüphanesi*, Feyzullah Paşa 2188_{1}; Istanbul, *Köprülü*, 869_{12}; Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Nuruosmaniye 4894_{65}; Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Ragıp Paşa 872 (625H), Istanbul, *Üniversitesi*, 1630, 4390_{2} (920H); Leiden 864 (no. 1485), 1464-2479 Cod. 1020a Warn; London, *British*, Add. 1665935; Manchester, 384_{5}; Mashhad, *Gawharšād*, 1714_{2}; Mashhad, *Ḥaydar*, 491_{1} (925H); Mashhad, *Raḍavī*, 862 (VI-VII/X-XI), 863, 864, 865 (1078H), 871, 5865 (1005H), 7892 (1115H), 21624 (XII/XVIII), 22384; Milan, *Ambrosiana*, 3204; Qom, *Marʿašī*, 286_{38} (1072H), 12748_{2} (XI/XVII), 6895_{10} (1045H); Qom, *Markaz-i Iḥyāʾ*, 2869 (1264H); San Lorenzo, *Escorial*, 703_{10}; Shiraz, *Ṭabāṭabāʾī*, 863 (XI/XVII), 404_{2} (1101H); Tehran, *Dānišgāh*, 242_{3} (ex *Ilāhiyyāt*) (XI/XVII), 810_{4} (ex *Ilāhiyyāt*) (1087H), Miškāt 861_{5} (1283H), 1037, 1149_{34} (before 962H), 2106_{4} (XI/XVII), Ḥuqūq 112_{6} ج; Tehran, *Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif*, 1000_{18} (1333H); Tehran, *Maǧlis*, 634_{30}, 1255_{45} (1091H), 5331 (1311H), 1809_{1} (1285H), 1960_{1}, 14473_{19} (XII/XVIII), 18752 (XIII/XIX), 3975_{2} (1088H), 4530_{1} (1085H), 4547 (1021H), 15232_{19} (1035H), Tangābunī 171_{2}, 308_{1}; Tehran, *Malik*, 685 (XI/XVII), 2007_{8}, 2013_{21}, 2019_{4}, 4693_{22} (XII/XVIII), 4694_{7} (XI/XVII), 4694_{11} (XI/XVII), 4694_{16} (1021H), 4694_{18} (1021H); Tehran, *Miftāḥ*, 168_{11}; Tehran, *Sipahsālār*, 1216_{45} (XII/XVIII), 1217_{41}, 2912_{3} (1266H); Tehran, *Sulṭanatī*, 67_{6} (1082H); Yazd, *Yazdī*, no number/2.

II.2 *Risāla al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*: Istanbul, *Beyazıt*, Velieddin 3263_{10} (942H); Istanbul, *Topkapı*, Ahmet III 3447_{61} (866H); Istanbul, *Köprülü*, 1602_{6} (948H); Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Nuruosmaniye 4894_{82}; Istanbul, *Üniversitesi*, 1458_{18} (1242H), 2874_{4} (1320H); Qom, *Marʿašī* 11619_{4} (XII/XVIII), 13426/9 (XI/XVII); Tehran, *Danišgāh*, Miškāt 1046_{20} (1061H), 1149_{56} (before 962H), 6616_{14} (1071H), 9216_{11} (X/XVI); Tehran, *Maǧlis*, 14_{10} (X-XI/XVI-XVII),

[101] These data are extrapolated from the bibliography previously cited in the notes.

Ṭabāṭabāʾī 206_{23} (XI/XVII), Ṭabāṭabāʾī 860_{2} (XI/XVII), 10029_{65} (XI/XVII); Tehran, *Millī*, 2707_{2} (1071H), 3936_{14} (1295H); Tehran, *Narāqī* number? (X/XVI).

II.3 *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*: Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Esat Efendi, MSS 1234 and 1239.

II.4 *al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar] (Ḥāl al-nafs al-insāniyya)*: Alexandria 3131; Berlin, *Staatsbibliothek*, 5343; Hamadan, *Madrasa Garb*, 1187_{23} (X-XI/XVI-XVII); Isfahan *ʿŪmūmī*, 2813_{2} (1073H); Istanbul, *Millet Kütüphanesi*, Feyzullah Paşa 2188_{6}; Istanbul, *Köprülü*, 1605_{8}; Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Ayasofya 2052 (687H), 4829 (XII/XVIII), 4849 (VIII/XIV), 4853 (VII/XIII); Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Hamidiye 1448_{21} (IX/XV) Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Nuruosmaniye 4894_{128}, Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Ragıp Paşa 1461_{20}; Istanbul, *Topkapı*, Ahmet III 3247_{3}, 3447_{38}; Istanbul, *Üniversitesi*, 1458_{12}, 4755_{8} ff. 125b-169a (588H); Leiden 1464_{3}; Lisbon, *Academia das Ciencias*, Arab. V.293 (ff. 62b-66a, ch. 1 only); London, *British*, Add. 1665934, 1349_{2}; Mashhad, *Raḍavī*, iv 1/703, 704, 705, 706; Mashhad, *Raḍavī*, 567 (XI/XVII), 641, 642, 6427, 22686 (XI/XVII); Qom, *Gulpāyigānī*, $6879/33\text{-}35_{59}$ (X/XVI); Qom, *Marʿašī*, 6525_{10} (1042H); Rampur, *Raza*, 2955; Shiraz, *Maḥallātī*, 17_{9} (1056H); Tehran, *Danišgāh*, 601/28 (ex *Ilāhiyyāt*) (1309H), 861_{9} (1283H), 1037_{7}, 1149_{2} (before 962H), 1925_{5} (1081H), Miškāt 861_{8}; Tehran, *Malik*, 2003_{7}, 2005_{13}; Tehran, *Malik*, 4681_{9} (XI/XVII); Tehran, *Mağlis* I 1807, *Mağlis*, 149 (570H), 625_{5}, 5138_{83} (XI/XVII), 5283_{29} (XI/XVII), 5283_{82} (1102H), 14473_{8} (XII/XVIII), 15733_{13} (1028H), Tunikābunī 317_{22}; Tehran, *Millī*, 213/3 ف; Tehran, *Sipahsālār*, 2799_{49}, 2912_{70} (1266H), 8371_{9} (1026H).

al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar] (Persian translation 1): Oxford, *Bodleian*, Ouseley 95_{2} (Ethé 1422) (1042-1043H); London, *British*, 1665922 (1182H); London, *British*, India Office 2149; Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Ayasofya 4851_{5}; Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Fātiḥ 5426_{5} (726-727H); Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Hamidiye 1452_{8} (XII/XVIII?); Istanbul, *Topkapı*, Ahmet III $3447_{82,84}$ (866H); Istanbul, *Üniversitesi*, A 1458_{23}; Mashhad, *Raḍawī*, 587 (700H); Tehran, *Dānišgāh*, Miškāt 1089_{2}; Tehran, *Mağlis*, 631_{5} (1268H); Tehran, *Malik*, 2007_{11}; Tehran, *Sipahsālār*, 1217_{12}, 8371_{22}.

al-Maʿād [al-aṣġar] (Persian translation 2): London, *British*, 16659_{21} (1182H, ff. 381v-402v); Tehran, *Sipahsālār*, 8371_{23} (1026H).

II.5 *al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād*: Berlin, *Staatsbibliothek*, 2734; Cairo[2] I 186; Hamadan, *Madrasa Ġarb*, 1187_{8} (X-XI/XVI-XVII); Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Ayasofya 4829_{28} (XII/XVIII); Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Hamidiye 1448_{20} (IX/XV); Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Nuruosmaniye 4894_{99}; Istanbul, *Süleymaniye*, Ragıp Paşa 1461_{6}; Istanbul, *Topkapı*, Ahmet III 3247_{2}, 3447_{14} (866H); Istanbul, *Topkapı*, Emanet Haznesi 1730_{29}; Istanbul, *Topkapı*, Rowān 2042_{10} (888H); Istanbul, *Üniversitesi*, 1458_{79}, 4724_{6} (700H), 4755_{15} (588H); Leiden 1465; London, *British*, Add. 166596; Manchester 384_{1}; Marāġa (Nasrollah Pourjavady (ed.), *Majmūʿah-ye Falsafī-e Marāghah. A Philosophical Anthology from Maraghah* (Tehran: Iran University Press, 2002), 365-402; Mashhad, *Gawharšād*, 827_{2} (XI/XVII); Mashhad, *Raḍavī*, 5873, 5953, 6123 (1094H), 11452_{4} (1019H), 15088 (1078H); Qom, *Marʿašī*, 9900_{1}, 11855_{3} (1049H), 14709_{19} (1095H);

Rampur, *Raza*, i 712; Shiraz, *Maḥallātī*, 277_{1}; Tehran, *ʿAbd al-ʿAzīm*, 628_{4} (1349H); Tehran, *Dānišgāh*, 242/48 (ex *Ilāhiyyāt*) (1061H), Miškāt 422_{1}, 601_{3} (ex *Ilāhiyyāt*) (1308H), 1074_{2} (1061H), 1149_{74} (before 962H), 8225_{1} (1006H) Tehran, *Mağlis*, 634_{25}, 1264_{6}, 1830_{10} (1058H), 3923_{3} (VIII/XIV), 4547_{17}, 8780_{6} (1102H); Ṭabāṭabāʾī 1280_{1} (1122H), Tangābunī 40_{1}, 793; Tehran, *Mahdavī*, 587_{13} (VI/XII); Tehran, *Malik*, 2003_{10}, 4651_{15} (VII/XIII), 4681_{12} (XI/XVII); Tehran, *Sipahsālār*, 2912_{10}, 8371_{3} (1026H), 1095_{11}.

al-Aḍḥawiyya (Persian translation): Oxford, *Bodleian*, Ouseley 95_{5} (Ethé 1422) (1042-1043H, ff. 22v-31v)[1]; Qom, *Fāṣl Qāʾīnī*, no number (879H); Tashkent, *Bīrūnī*, 561_{9} (1054H, ff. 76v-112v); Tehran, *Sulṭanatī*, 189_{3} (1055-1056H).

“EL SANADOR DE LAS HERIDAS” Y EL ENCUENTRO ENTRE IBN ʿARABĪ Y AVERROES

“THE HEALER OF WOUNDS” AND THE MEETING BETWEEN IBN ʿARABĪ AND AVERROES

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Resumen

La enigmática entrevista entre Ibn ʿArabī y Averroes ha sido objeto de múltiples interpretaciones durante el último siglo, tanto en el campo de los estudios akbaríes, como entre los especialistas en filosofía averroísta. Sin embargo, apenas hay investigaciones que se hagan cargo de “El Sanador de las Heridas” (*Mudāwī l-Kulūm*), una misteriosa figura sobre la que gira todo el capítulo de *Las Iluminaciones de La Meca* (*al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*) donde aparece la narración. En el presente trabajo, ofrecemos un estudio exhaustivo sobre el texto akbarí, con especial atención al papel de ese misterioso *sanador*, y consideramos algunos pasajes de la obra de Averroes. Ello nos permitirá interpretar el encuentro en profundidad y responder a diversas cuestiones que aún siguen abiertas.

Palabras clave

Ibn ʿArabī; Averroes; escatología; conocimiento; amor

Abstract

The enigmatic conversation between Ibn ʿArabī and Averroes has been the subject of multiple interpretations in the last century, both in the field of Akbarian studies and among specialists in Averroist philosophy. However, there are hardly any studies dealing with “The Healer of Wounds” (*Mudāwī al-Kulūm*), a mysterious figure around whom the entire chapter of *The Meccan Revelations* (*al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*)—in which the account appears—revolves. In this paper, I offer a comprehensive study of the Akbarian text, with a special focus on the role of this mysterious healer, while also examining some passages from Averroes’ work. This will allow us to interpret the encounter in depth and to address several questions that remain open.

Keywords

Ibn ʿArabī; Averroes; Eschatology; Knowledge; Love

Introducción

En cierto pasaje de *Las Iluminaciones de La Meca* (*al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*), Ibn ʿArabī recuerda el día en que conoció a Averroes. El místico murciano apenas había entrado en la adolescencia, pero el célebre pensador deseaba entrevistarse con él, pues había oído noticias sobre el vasto conocimiento que había adquirido a través de una experiencia iluminativa. Nada más verlo, se levantó para abrazarlo y le dijo: "sí". El muchacho devolvió un "sí" y Averroes se llenó de alegría; pero enseguida añadió un "no". Visiblemente turbado, el filósofo le espetó: "¿Cómo, pues, encontráis vosotros resuelto el asunto mediante la iluminación y la inspiración divina? ¿Es acaso lo mismo que a nosotros nos enseña el razonamiento?" Su respuesta fue: "Sí, no. Y entre el sí y el no, los espíritus salen volando de sus materias y las cervices de sus cuerpos". Averroes palideció y comenzó a repetir la frase: "No hay poder ni fuerza sino por Dios", como si hubiera comprendido el sentido de la alusión. Más tarde, daría las gracias por haber conocido a alguien que gozase de aquel estado cuya existencia él había sostenido.

Durante el último siglo, esta enigmática entrevista ha recibido gran atención por parte de los expertos en sufismo akbarí. Su popularización debe mucho a Miguel Asín Palacios, quien la tradujo al castellano en *El Islam cristianizado* (1931). Y por supuesto, a Henry Corbin que en *L'imagination créatrice dans le soufisme d'Ibn ʿArabî* (1958), la cifró como símbolo del choque entre la tradición aristotélica y la neoplatónica, así como de la separación entre Occidente y Oriente.[1] A un lado quedaba Averroes, el enemigo de Avicena que, en su intento de restaurar el peripatetismo auténtico, negaba las jerarquías angélicas, el conocimiento supra-intelectual, el creacionismo y la resurrección individual. Al otro, Ibn ʿArabī, continuador de la filosofía aviceniana, cuyas enigmáticas palabras lo descubrían como discípulo del Ḫaḍir –o Ḫiḍr–, el guía invisible que conduce al mundo imaginal, allí donde lo espiritual se sensibiliza y lo sensible se espiritualiza. El libro de Corbin gozó de un gran éxito, pero también fue objeto de graves críticas.[2] En 1988, Michel Chodkiewicz llamó la atención sobre un importante dato relacionado con la entrevista. Al traducir la respuesta del joven místico, había eliminado la mención al "Sanador de las Heridas" (*Mudāwī al-Kulūm*), un misterioso personaje sobre el que orbita todo el capítulo donde aparece el encuentro.[3] Efectivamente, según indica el propio Ibn ʿArabī, la respuesta a Averroes coincide con el contenido de un discurso que una vez pronunció ese *Mudāwī*. Chodkiewicz dedujo que dicha figura era, en realidad, Idrís-Enoch-Hermes –pues

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[1] Henry Corbin, *La imaginación creadora en el sufismo de Ibn ʿArabî* (Córdoba: Almuzara, 2023).

[2] Michel Chodkiewicz, *Le sceau des saints. Prophétie et sainteté dans la doctrine d'Ibn Arabî* (París: Gallimard, 1986); William C. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination* (Nueva York: SUNY, 1989); Michel Chodkiewicz, *Un océan sans rivage. Ibn Arabî, le Livre et la Loi* (París: Seuil, 1992); Franz Rosenthal, "Ibn ʿArabī Between 'Philosophy' and 'Mysticism': 'Sūfism and Philosophy are Neighbors and Visit Each Other'. *Fa-inna at-taṣawwuf wa-t-tafalsuf yatajāwarāni wa-yatazāwarāni*", *Oriens* 31 (1988): 1-35, 4.

[3] Michel Chodkiewicz, "Toward Reading the *Futûhât al-Makkiya*", en Ibn ʿArabī, *The Meccan Revelations*, vol. 2 (Nueva York: Pir, 2004), 35-36. Chodkiewicz no reparó en que Corbin simplemente había volcado al francés la traducción de Asín Palacios.

el texto le atribuye importantes conocimientos en alquimia, astrología y cosmología–; y señaló la resurrección de los cuerpos y el adelanto escatológico, como el verdadero tema de la conversación. Esta aportación fue sin duda de gran valor. Pero también resultaba un tanto escueta: zanjaba la cuestión en poco más de un párrafo y no terminaba de aclarar el sentido de la alusión akbarí. Desde entonces, se han producido numerosas aproximaciones de diversa orientación. Algunos investigadores han indagado en el sentido del "sí" y el "no", pero sin considerar apenas el papel del Sanador de las Heridas.[4] Otros han asumido la visión de Chodkiewicz sin demasiada discusión.[5] Y solo unos pocos se han ocupado del Mudāwī de un modo amplio: Mikko Telaranta, que sostiene que en realidad se trata de Empédocles y más recientemente, Stephen Hirtenstein, que defiende la tesis de Idrís, pero también apunta a Jesús.[6]

La recepción del texto akbarí entre los especialistas en Averroes se ha desarrollado en otras direcciones y, al menos hasta donde conocemos, sin ningún tipo de atención al *Mudāwī*. De forma general, se acepta que el encuentro tuvo lugar, así como el contenido de la conversación.[7] Pero algunos investigadores han cuestionado la supuesta reacción del filósofo.[8] Probablemente, la crítica más dura hasta la fecha sea la de Dominique Urvoy. El relato de Ibn ʿArabī le parece que demuestra su perfecto desconocimiento de la

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[4] William C. Chittick, "Between the Yes and the No: Ibn al-ʿArabī on *Wujūd* and the Innate Capacity", en *The Innate Capacity*, editado por R. Forman (Oxford: OUP, 1998), 95-110; Steffen Stelzer, "Decisive Meetings: Ibn Rushd, Ibn 'Arabi, and the Matter of Knowledge", *Alif* 16 (1996): 19-55; Salman H. Bashier, *Ibn al- ʿArabī's Barzakh* (Nueva York: SUNY, 2004), 56-74; Salman Bashier, "Ibn al-ʿArabī's Encounter with Ibn Rushd and the Merging of the Two Seas of Mysticism and Philosophy in Islam", *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ʿArabi Society* 64 (2018): 53-68; David Fernández Navas, "El 'sí' y el 'no' de Ibn ʿArabī a Averroes: un profundo 'sí' de amor", en *Filosofía, método y otros prismas: historia y actualidad de los problemas filosóficos*, editado por V. Raga Rosaleny y M. Bermúdez Vázquez (Madrid: Dykinson, 2022), 145-159.

[5] Véase Gerald T. Elmore, *Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 51; Mohamed Haj Yousef, *Ibn 'Arabî – Time and Cosmology* (Nueva York: Routledge, 2008), 120-155.

[6] Mikko Telaranta, *Aristotelian Elements in the Thinking of Ibn al-'Arabí and the Young Martin Heidegger* (Tesis doctoral: Universidad de Helsinki, 2012), 293-322; Stephen Hirtenstein, "The Healer of Wounds: Interpreting Human Existence in the Light of Alchemy of Ascension", *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ʿArabi Society* 70 (2021): 23-49.

[7] Miguel Cruz Hernández, *Abû-l-Walîd Muhammad Ibn Rušd (Averroes). Vida, obra, pensamiento, influencia* (Córdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Córdoba, 1986), 38; Josep Puig Montada, "Materials on Averroes's Circle", *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 51/4 (1992): 241-260; Joaquín Lomba Fuentes, "Apuntes sobre la significación de Ibn ʿArabī de Murcia", en *Homenaje al Profesor Juan Torres Fontes* (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia y Academia Alfonso X El Sabio, 1987), 901-911; Emile Fricaud, "Le problème de la disgrâce d'Averroès", en *Averroès et l'averroïsme. Un itinéraire historique du Haut Atlas à Paris et à Padoue*, editado por A. Bazzana, N. Bériou y P. Guichard (Lyon: PYL, 2019), 155-189, 132.

[8] Dominique Urvoy, *Averroes: las ambiciones de un intelectual musulmán* (Madrid: Alianza, 1998), 181-184. Majid Fakhry, *Averroes: His Life, Works and Influence* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001), 166-167; Mohammed Salah Bouchtalla "ʿAn ʿalāqat al-mutaṣawwif bi-l-faylasūf: Ibn ʿArabī mušayyiʿan Ibn Rušd", *Tabayyun* 5, 21 (2017): 45-62.

psicología averroísta, además de su profundo narcisismo y resentimiento hacia el mundo almohade. En un tono muy distinto, Emilio Tornero y Rafael Ramón Guerrero han llamado la atención sobre un fragmento del *Kašf ʿan manāhiǧ al-adilla* de Averroes que encajaría con la narración akbarí.[9]

En el presente trabajo, ofrecemos un estudio exhaustivo sobre el texto de Ibn ʿArabī –con especial atención al "Sanador de las Heridas"– y consideramos algunos pasajes de la producción teológico-filosófica de Averroes –el *Tahāfut*, el *Faṣl* y el *Kašf*–. Nuestro objetivo es interpretar: a) cuál fue el tema de la conversación; b) qué significa el sí y el no; c) a qué alude el vuelo de los espíritus y las cervices; d) qué pudo entender Averroes; e) hasta qué punto su reacción resulta plausible; f) y quién es esa misteriosa figura llamada *Mudāwī l-Kulūm.*

1. El Sanador de las Heridas y la realidad de Muhammad

La primera mención al "Sanador de las Heridas" aparece al final del capítulo 14 de *Futūḥāt.*[10] Ibn ʿArabī cuenta que, una vez tuvo una experiencia visionaria, mediante la que conoció a los veinticinco polos perfeccionadores de las comunidades anteriores al Enviado y que uno de ellos se llamaba *Mudāwī l-Kulūm*. Según la tradición, el polo (*quṭb*) es la persona que ocupa el puesto más alto en la jerarquía de la santidad (*walāya*), en cada época.[11] Los polos son, en este sentido, los amados preferidos de Dios y el modelo de humanidad perfectamente realizada. Una de sus funciones principales es la guía iniciática hacia el ascenso espiritual que permita el encuentro íntimo con la divinidad. Ibn ʿArabī entiende que cada polo hereda la sabiduría de un profeta determinado, aunque al mismo tiempo, todos son expresión de la realidad de Muhammad, cuya existencia e influjo espiritual precede a su aparición histórica:

> El polo único es el espíritu de Muhammad [...]. Se le preguntó: '¿Cuándo fuiste profeta?' Y respondió: 'Cuando Adán estaba entre el agua y la arcilla'. Su nombre era el Sanador de las Heridas (*Mudāwī l-Kulūm*) porque es experto en curar las llagas (*ǧirāḥāt*) del amor pasional (*hawā*), la opinión, el mundo, Satán y el yo (*nafs*); con el lenguaje profético (*nabawī*), de los mensajeros (*risālī*) y de la santidad (*walāya*) es sumamente experto. Tenía puesta su mirada

[9] Emilio Tornero Poveda, "La filosofía andalusí frente al sufismo", *al-Qantara*, 17 (1996): 3-17; Rafael Ramón Guerrero, *Averroes. Sobre filosofía y religión. Introducción y selección de textos* (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1998), 114.

[10] Muḥyī l-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, vol. 1, ed. 'Abd al-'Azīz Sulṭān al-Manṣūb (Yemen: Wizārat al-Ṯaqāfa, 2010), 431. En inglés, existe una traducción a cargo de Eric Winkel: Ibn ʿArabī, *The Openings Revealed in Makkah*, vol. 2 (Oceans Within, 2022), 249-292.

[11] Este es solo uno de los sentidos en que Ibn ʿArabī considera los polos. Sobre este tema, véase Ibn ʿArabī, *The Meccan Revelations*, vol. 1, 189-197; Ibn ʿArabī, *Il mistero dei custodi del mondo*, editado por C. Casseler (Turín: Il Leone Verde, 2001); M. Chodkiewicz, *Le sceau des saints*; Iskandar Arnel, "The Poles (*Aqtâb*) in the Thought of Ibn ʿArabî", *Jurnal Ushuluddin* 13/2 (2008): 123-131.

> en el lugar de nacimiento de su cuerpo, La Meca, y en La Siria [espiritual] (*al-Šām*)[12]. Luego, su mirada se dirigió a un lugar cuyo calor y frescura eran intensos al mismo tiempo, un lugar donde ningún descendiente de Adán puede llegar con su cuerpo (*ǧasad*). Una persona, sin salir de La Meca, pudo ver esos lugares, pues la tierra le fue allanada, y así los contempló.[13]

Puede apreciarse la referencia a la tensión originaria del ser humano hacia Dios y el papel terapéutico del Enviado, como figura mediadora entre Dios y la comunidad. Ibn ʿArabī considera que toda persona sufre una profunda herida de amor: el anhelo de retornar al origen, de reunirse con el Creador.[14] De modo que todo deseo hacia las cosas mundanas no es más que un efecto de superficie de esa honda llaga. Y aunque ésta no se cerrará del todo hasta el día de la resurrección, sí es posible un alivio transitorio: el adelanto escatológico. Una unión parcial y por un instante, con ese Amado que se oculta siempre que se muestra, que se escurre como agua entre los dedos, pues todo deseo, toda vocación concreta hacia la Realidad esencial (*al-Ḥaqq*), implica una dualidad, una relación de velamiento y desvelamiento, donde la Ipseidad del Absoluto resulta inaccesible. Muhammad cura las heridas porque es guía hacia la elevación espiritual: allí donde confluyen los contrarios; la Siria espiritual donde la ocultación y la manifestación del Amado se dan cita sin cesar; donde el amante espiritual es capaz de gozar de la presencia de un Amado siempre esquivo que se descubre apenas por un suspiro. La palabra iniciática es, por tanto, alivio temporal para la laceración metafísica que no podrá sanar mientras la persona se mantenga anclada al plano de lo terrenal.

2. La herida del amante espiritual

El Sanador de las Heridas es el gran protagonista del capítulo 15 de *Futūḥāt*.[15] El texto comienza con unos versos que condensan aspectos cruciales de la experiencia del amante espiritual. Escribe el maestro andalusí:

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[12] En el capítulo 178 de *Futūḥāt*, Ibn ʿArabī ofrece un poema que describe su entrada en La Siria (*al-Šām*) espiritual, como espacio de encuentro con el Amado donde se superponen dimensiones aparentemente contrapuestas y del que solo se puede hablar mediante el símbolo. En ese ámbito se le reveló que la perfección del amor consiste en la conjugación de Lo Oculto y Lo Manifiesto. Véase Muḥyī l-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, vol. 5, ed. ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz Sulṭān al-Manṣūb (El Cairo: al-Maǧlis al-Aʻlā li-l-Ṯaqāfa, 2017), 603-604; David Fernández Navas, *Un jardín entre llamas: la concepción del amor en Ibn ʿArabī* (Córdoba: Almuzara, 2025), 142-143.

[13] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 431 [salvo cuando se indique lo contrario, todas las traducciones de *Futūḥāt* son propias].

[14] Véase Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt V*, 610-629; también David Fernández Navas, “Amor divino, espiritual, natural y elemental en Ibn ʿArabī”, *Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía* 41/1 (2024): 27-37.

[15] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 431. El título es: “Sobre el conocimiento (*maʿrifa*) de los alientos (*al-anfās*) y el conocimiento de sus polos: los realizadores [de la realidad divina] (*muḥaqqiqīn*) acceden a través de él a sus secretos”.

El mundo de los alientos [es] de mi aliento (*ʿĀlamu l-anfāsi min nafasī*)
y ellos son los más elevados en la santidad (*wa-humu l-ʾaʿlūna fī l-qudsī*).
Su elegido es un señor elocuente (*Muṣṭafā-hum sayyidun lasinun*)
y su inspiración le llega en el timbre (*wa-ḥyuhu yaʾtī-hi fī l-ǧarasī*).
Hablé con el portero, cuando vio (*Qultu li-l-bawwābi ḥīna raʾā*)
lo que sufro en la vigilia (*mā uqāsī-hi mina l-ḥarasī*).
Dijo: "¿Qué esperas de él, hijo mío?" (*Qāla: Mā tabġī-hi yā waladī?*)
Respondí: "La cercanía del señor puro (*Qultu: Qurba l-sayyidi al-naddusī*),
mi intercesor para la guía espiritual, quizá (*man šafīʿī li-l-imām ʿasā*),
una presencia suya, para el arrebatado" (*ḫaṭratun min-hu li-muḫtalisi*).
Dijo: "No ofrece sus fragancias (*Qāla: Mā yuʿṭī ʿawārifa-hu*)
a un rico no que no ha sido probado" (*li-ġaniyyin ġayri mubtaliʾsi*).[16]

El poeta sufre porque anhela la presencia de un Amado que siempre se sustrae. El mundo de los alientos simboliza la presencia de Aquel por Quien no duerme. Si coincide con su propio aliento –su propio yo (*nafs*)– es porque el acceso a la realidad divina está siempre mediado por la propia limitación, la propia carencia. Hay aquí una consonancia con el célebre aforismo de Ǧunayd: "el agua es del color del recipiente que la contiene". Desde esta perspectiva, se entiende que no haya santidad (*quds*) más elevada que la de quien goza de los alientos, pues ir más allá sería cancelar la diferencia entre las criaturas y el Creador. Por eso, Ibn ʿArabī advierte, en otro pasaje de *Futūḥāt*, que el punto más alto del amor humano hacia Dios es la dualidad.[17] El disfrute de los alientos está, además, íntimamente ligado a la elocuencia. En *Los Engarces de las Sabidurías* (*Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*), el maestro andalusí presenta a los elocuentes como aquellos capaces de nombrar a Dios en todas las cosas, pues perciben la unidad del deseo (*hawā*) originario: captan que todo anhelo humano es, en última instancia, anhelo de unión con el Creador y que todo objeto de adoración es, por tanto, receptáculo para la manifestación divina.[18] Los elocuentes son, asimismo, los "servidores del instante" (*ʿubbād al-waqt*).[19] Su compromiso con el carácter trascendente del Amado no les permite detenerse en ninguna de Sus faces, más que por un segundo. El vínculo del poema entre elocuencia y sonoridad redunda, justamente, en el carácter efímero de la experiencia teofánica. Ibn ʿArabī suele distinguir entre el amor de la vista –dirigido a los cuerpos y que puede extenderse en el tiempo– y el amor del oído –dirigido a los espíritus y que dura apenas un suspiro–.[20] Que la inspiración de la elocuencia llegue en el timbre enfatiza, así, la dimensión pneumática y el carácter perentorio de la unión. El guardián de la puerta señala, finalmente, que el gozo de los

[16] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 432.
[17] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt V*, 594.
[18] Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, ed. Abū al-ʿAlāʾ ʿAfīfī. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1946), 195.
[19] Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, 196.
[20] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt V*, 602.

alientos está vetado para el rico, esto es, para quien se aferra a lo que ya tiene: lo exterior y ya disponible, sus propias capacidades cognoscitivas, los bienes terrenales... Según el Corán, Dios es El único Rico (*al-Ġanī*) y los seres humanos, siempre, los necesitados.[21] La advertencia parece clara. Quien no se despoje de toda pretensión de señorío y reconozca la radical dependencia respecto al Creador, la íntima herida que lo define desde lo más profundo de su ser, no podrá acceder al ámbito de la manifestación ni disfrutar de la fragancia del Amado. La cuestión del señorío y la desposesión tiene, además, una importante dimensión gnoseológica. Sabemos que Ibn ʿArabī se inició en la vía sufí de la mano de ʿUraybī, un maestro de la servidumbre (*ʿubūdiyya*) que igual que el Profeta, fue conocido como un iletrado (*ummī*), alguien que no quiso reducir la amplitud de lo Real a los límites del intelecto, y que intentó estar siempre disponible a la comparecencia del Amado.[22] En palabras de nuestro autor:

> Es iletrado aquel que no emplea su consideración reflexiva y su juicio racional para desentrañar los sentidos y misterios que encierra el Corán. No utiliza pruebas racionales para obtener conocimiento de las cosas divinas [...]. Allí donde el corazón está a salvo de consideración reflexiva (*naẓar*), entonces, de acuerdo tanto a la Ley como a la razón, hay recepción hacia la apertura divina en el modo más perfecto y sin demora.[23]

3. Los caminos de la sanación

Ibn ʿArabī explica que los alientos son brisas (*rūḥī*) de cercanía (*qurb*) a la Verdad (*ilāhī*) divina; y que cada que vez que los conocedores de fragancias –los gnósticos– (*ʿārifūn*)[24] perciben un aroma, se produce una inflamación del deseo, una renovación del anhelo de la presencia.[25] El Sanador de las Heridas se ofrece entonces como guía:

> [El Sanador de las Heridas] tiene el secreto que buscan y el conocimiento que desean alcanzar de Él. El Verdadero (*al-Ḥaqq*) lo estableció entre ellos [la humanidad] como un polo (*quṭb*) alrededor del cual gira Su esfera y como un guía (*imām*) a través del cual se establece

[21] C. 35:15.

[22] "Uno de mis maestros [ʿUraybī] practicaba la invocación *Allāh*, *Allāh* sin añadir nada, y le pregunté: "¿Por qué no dices más bien *Lā ilāha illā Allāh* (No hay más dios que Dios)? buscando con mi pregunta beneficiarme de una enseñanza espiritual. Me respondió: "Hijo mío, el soplo del que respira está en las manos de Dios, no en las suyas, y toda letra es un soplo. Así pues, temo que pronunciando *lā* (no) para decir la fórmula *lā ilāha illā Allāh* ese *lā* sea mi último soplo y que así muera en la terrible soledad de la negación", Claude Addas, *Ibn ʿArabī o la búsqueda del Azufre Rojo* (Buenos Aires: Yerrahi, 2021), 57.

[23] Chittick, *Sufi Path*, 235-236.

[24] Aunque la palabra *ʿārif*, en un contexto sufí, suele traducirse como "gnóstico", en otro trabajo hemos propuesto la fórmula "conocedor de fragancias", véase Fernández Navas, "Amor divino, amor espiritual", 4.

[25] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 432, 14.

> Su reino (*mulūku-hum*). Su nombre es el Sanador de las Heridas. A través suyo, se difunde un conocimiento (*ʿilm*), sabiduría (*ḥikma*) y secretos (*asrār*) que ningún libro puede abarcar.[26]

El maestro andalusí presenta varios de los caminos de curación hacia los que guía el Mudāwī: El primero tiene que ver con el conocimiento del tiempo: "[Del Sanador de las Heridas] brota el secreto del tiempo (*dahr*) del que se forman los tiempos (*duhūr*)".[27] Este saber está estrechamente vinculado a dos hadices auténticos: "Allāh existía y no había nada con Él" y "No maldigáis al tiempo (*dahr*) porque Allāh es el tiempo (*Dahr*)".[28] En otra sección de *Futūḥāt*, Ibn ʿArabī diferencia entre el tiempo en sentido absoluto (*dahr*) –tiempo de la Eternidad, sin límite e incondicionado que pertenece únicamente a Dios– y el tiempo relativo (*zamān*) –propio de los seres humanos–.[29] El tiempo relativo se despliega en tres dimensiones: tiempo cíclico –el orden cósmico, las estaciones, los días y las noches...–; tiempo lineal, cronológico y cuantitativo –del inicio al fin de la creación, del nacimiento a la muerte...–; y tiempo cualitativo y discontinuo de la experiencia teofánica –que se yergue verticalmente frente a la horizontalidad del tiempo lineal–. Cada una de estas dimensiones temporales es, también, una epifanía del tiempo absoluto. Esto nos permite comprender la potencia curativa del conocimiento temporal. El *Mudāwī l-Kulūm* es guía hacia una experiencia fugaz que, de forma análoga al *kairós* paulino, satisface aquí y ahora, *hic et nunc*, el íntimo anhelo del Reino de lo Eterno.[30] Por eso el tiempo de la manifestación es curativo.[31] E Ibn ʿArabī asegura que quien conoce su secreto "no se detiene en ninguna atribución de lo Real (*al-Ḥaqq*)".[32] Es verdadero testigo del instante, amante en continuo tránsito, imantado por la amplitud (*ittisāʿ*) de un Amado que no deja de ofrecerse en formas inéditas.

El Sanador de las Heridas goza, además, de la espiritualidad procedente del cielo de Saturno.[33] En la cosmología akbarí, cada esfera planetaria está asociada a una sabiduría profética.[34] A Saturno le corresponde la de Abraham. Éste proporciona guía sobre la firmeza (*ṯabāt*) y la estabilidad (*tamkīn*) y también sobre la duración (*dawām*) y la subsistencia o perduración (*baqāʾ*). La firmeza en esta vida y en la otra es, según el Corán

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[26] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 432, 15-18.
[27] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 432, 20.
[28] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 441, 14-18.
[29] Véase Pablo Beneito, "El tiempo de la gnosis: consideraciones acerca del pasado y el futuro de la mística en la obra de Ibn ʿArabī", en *La mística en el siglo XXI* (Madrid: Trotta, 2002), 89-106.
[30] Sobre las conexiones entre la temporalidad de la experiencia imaginal akbarí y el *kairós* paulino, véase José Antonio Antón Pacheco, "*Hic et nunc*: una categoría de la hermenéutica de la existencia en Henry Corbin", *Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana* 72 (2016): 113-121.
[31] Véase Fernández Navas, "Amor divino, amor espiritual".
[32] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 441.
[33] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 441.
[34] Véase Juan Antonio Pacheco Paniagua, "La cosmología de Ibn al-ʿArabī", en *Los dos horizontes: Textos sobre Ibn al-ʿArabí*, editado por A. Carmona González (Murcia: Editorial Regional, 1992), 339-360; Fernando Mora, *La tierra del despertar: cosmología y poética en Ibn ʿArabī* (Córdoba: Almuzara, 2024).

(C. 14:27), uno de los dones que Dios regala a la humanidad, mientras que la estabilidad es un término que Ibn ʿArabī suele asociar a la perfección humana. Para el maestro andalusí, el ser humano perfecto (*al-insān al-kāmil*) es aquel que logra la estabilidad en la variación (*al-tamkīn fī l-talwīn*): aquel cuyo corazón acoge la variabilidad de la multiplicidad de las teofanías, al tiempo que permanece estable en el compromiso con la dimensión oculta de lo real. Esta ambivalencia está presente en el propio Libro: “No hay nada como Él y Él es el Oyente, el Observador”.[35] Gracias a la facultad intelectual (*ʿaql*), el corazón es fiel a la dimensión de la incomparabilidad (*tanzīh*) y reconoce el abismo que separa a Dios y las criaturas. Gracias a la facultad imaginal (*ḫayāl*), accede a la dimensión de la similaridad (*tašbīh*) y aprecia la faz del Amado en el mundo de lo creado. Si el corazón corporal se abre para acoger sangre y se contrae para expulsarla, el corazón espiritual dice “sí” a cada nueva manifestación del Amado para luego decir “no”, pues ninguna de las teofanías puede agotar el caudal de lo real. Este dinamismo constante especula adecuadamente el continuo servicio amoroso de El Omni-Compasivo (*al-Raḥmān*) hacia las criaturas. Según Ibn ʿArabī, cada exhalación divina insufla vida en el mundo, mientras que cada inhalación supone una aniquilación, de tal modo que, a cada instante, estamos ante una renovación de la creación, una nueva creación (*ḫalq ǧadīd*). Esta última perspectiva nos permite enlazar con los otros dos términos asociados a la sabiduría de Saturno-Abraham: duración y subsistencia. La palabra duración (*dawām*) aparece en la azora *al-Raḥmān* para expresar la permanencia del Rostro divino frente a la caducidad de todo cuanto existe sobre la tierra.[36] Mientras que la subsistencia o perduración (*baqāʾ*), en un contexto sufí, refiere a lo que queda del siervo tras la experiencia aniquiladora que supone el paso por las llamas del amor. Podemos entonces concluir que la espiritualidad del cielo de Saturno confiere al Sanador de las Heridas la capacidad de aniquilar el ego, transitoriamente, para asistir servicialmente a cualquiera de las manifestaciones de lo Real. Es así como espeja la omni-compasividad divina y consigue realizar la propia esencia del ser humano, en cuanto ser creado a imagen y semejanza de Dios. Desde este punto de vista, se entiende que Ibn ʿArabī conecte la sabiduría de Abraham al conocimiento de la responsabilidad (*amānah*) que corresponde a la humanidad, según El Libro.[37] Gracias a la espiritualidad de Saturno, el *Mudāwī* ayuda a curar uno de los dolores más profundos que puede experimentar una persona: la duda sobre cómo conducirse en este mundo. Por eso, es como la estrella que alumbra en el camino.[38]

A través de Saturno-Abraham, el Sanador de las Heridas domina también el arte de la transformación alquímica.[39] Ibn ʿArabī parece desmarcarse aquí de la tradición que identifica la alquimia con Idrís-Enoch-Hermes. Según el maestro andalusí, el *Mudāwī* es un experto en medidas que trata las enfermedades que nacen del desequilibrio. Es así como consigue transformar el hierro en plata y oro. Con ello, no busca enriquecerse, sino

[35] C. 42:11.
[36] C. 55:26-27.
[37] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 441.
[38] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 439-440.
[39] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 433.

ayudar a los minerales a alcanzar la perfección hacia la que tienden de forma natural. Y otro tanto sucede cuando trata a los seres humanos, pues su propósito no es más que restaurar el equilibrio original para que logren la "perfección en la servidumbre" (*ʿubūdiyya*) a Dios.[40] Las enfermedades se descubren, entonces, como un mero desequilibrio de los cuatro elementos –tierra, agua, aire, fuego– y los cuatro humores –bilis negra, flema, sangre, bilis amarilla–, a partir de los cuales fue creada la humanidad. Ibn ʿArabī reproduce en este punto las líneas típicas de la medicina hipocrática y pseudo-empedóclea que tanto éxito tuvieron en el medievo islámico. Pero lejos de remitir a fuentes griegas, dice basarse en uno de los libros revelados a los hijos del Pueblo de Israel,[41] al tiempo que introduce una perspectiva que evoca la cita coránica del *camino de Dios como un sólido edificio*:[42] "el arte alquímico permite componer (*tarkīb*) y descomponer (*taḥlīl*) los elementos, los espíritus y los cuerpos, de forma que resplandezca la faz divina".[43]

El "conocimiento profundo sobre el cielo estrellado" es otro de los caminos que enseña el Sanador de las Heridas.[44] Lo importante, en este caso, es el adecuado uso de las facultades cognoscitivas. El *Mudāwī* accede a una posición firme y estable en la realidad esencial. Pero su consideración racional (*naẓar*) no va más allá del séptimo cielo, esto es: no opera con su intelecto (*ʿaql*) más allá del mundo de lo creado. Su contemplación se conforma con lo que recibe en la puerta del saboreo (*ḏawq*) –la experiencia íntima y directa del rostro del Amado–. Esto encaja con lo mencionado, más arriba, sobre el iletrado que no reduce el sentido de la revelación a los límites de su intelecto. También, con el "no" del corazón del ser humano perfecto. Pues cuando se trata de considerar la realidad divina, Ibn ʿArabī solo admite el ejercicio intelectual en su dimensión negativa: el recuerdo de la dimensión la incomparabilidad que marca el abismo entre Dios y las criaturas. Según el maestro andalusí: "Incomparabilidad (*tanzīh*) significa describir al Real como no teniendo conexión alguna con los atributos de las cosas originadas temporalmente [...] quien conoce a Dios, a través de la consideración reflexiva (*naẓar*), Lo percibe como completamente apartado de sí mismo".[45] Por este motivo, el intelecto, adecuadamente encauzado, conduce al reconocimiento de la Unidad divina, mientras que la facultad imaginal, como experiencia de saboreo imantada por la perspectiva de la similaridad, afirma la infinita multiplicidad de las teofanías. Fruto de este juego binocular entre lo Uno y lo múltiple, el Sanador de las Heridas guía hacia una concepción multiperspectivista de la verdad. "Las verdades no pueden percibirse completamente en

[40] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 433.
[41] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 433.
[42] Sobre el tratamiento akbarí de este símbolo, véase David Fernández Navas, "Hacer del propio ser un regalo de amor", *Horizonte*: *Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião* 21/64 (2024): 1-19.
[43] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 433. Las expresiones *tarkīb* y *taḥlīl* son equivalentes a las latinas *solve* y *coagula*.
[44] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 434.
[45] Chittick, *Sufi Path*, 70-71.

conjunto; deben ser consideradas gradualmente, en sus niveles y grados. [El *Mudāwī l-Kulūm*] por medio de su espiritualidad, contempla continuamente en las esferas los grados y los minutos de estas verdades, glorificando a Dios”.[46]

Un quinto aspecto del Sanador de las Heridas destacado por Ibn ʿArabī, es su vínculo con Ḫaḍir, la misteriosa figura mediante la que Moisés comprendió la limitación de todo conocimiento humano y la importancia de ser guiado más allá del sentido exterior de la letra revelada.[47] Según la tradición profética, Moisés se jactó, en cierta ocasión, de ser el más sabio entre toda la gente.[48] Dios lo amonestó por no atribuir todo conocimiento a Dios. Y le dijo: “En la confluencia de los dos mares, hay un siervo nuestro que es más sabio que tú”. Moisés preguntó cómo podría conocerlo. Dios dijo: “Toma un pez y colócalo en una canasta. Luego emprende tu camino, y donde pierdas el pez, allí lo encontrarás”. Moisés emprendió el viaje hacia la confluencia de los dos mares, hasta que se encontró con Ḫaḍir –“uno de Nuestros siervos a quien habíamos hecho objeto de una misericordia venida de Nosotros y enseñado una ciencia de Nosotros” (C. 18:65). El profeta pidió convertirse en su discípulo, pero éste le advirtió que no tendría paciencia suficiente, pues los conocimientos otorgados a cada uno eran muy diferentes. En ese momento, un pájaro se acercó a las aguas marinas para beber. Ḫaḍir añadió: “Mi conocimiento y tu conocimiento, comparados con el conocimiento de Dios, son como lo que este pájaro ha tomado con su pico del mar”. Moisés prometió paciencia y obediencia. Pero Ḫaḍir insistió en marcar distancia: “Si me sigues, pues, no me preguntes nada sin que yo te lo sugiera”. Mientras caminaban por la orilla, apareció un barco que se ofreció a llevarlos. Una vez a bordo, Ḫaḍir hizo un boquete en la nave. Moisés le gritó “¡Esta gente nos dio un viaje gratis, y tú sin embargo has dañado su barco como para hundirlo y ahogar a su gente! Has hecho algo terrible”. Ḫaḍir replicó: “¿No te dije que no podrías tener paciencia conmigo?” Abandonaron, así, la embarcación y prosiguieron su viaje a pie, hasta que se encontraron con un niño que jugaba con unos amigos en la arena. Ḫaḍir lo mató sin mediar palabra. Y Moisés protestó horrorizado. Pero la réplica del maestro fue la misma: “¿No te dije que no podrías tener paciencia conmigo?” Finalmente, llegaron a una ciudad a cuyos habitantes pidieron de comer, pero éstos les negaron toda hospitalidad. La reacción de Ḫaḍir fue reparar uno de los muros de la urbe que estaba a punto de derrumbarse. Moisés le reprendió una vez más: “Si hubieras querido, habrías podido recibir un salario por eso”. Entonces, Ḫaḍir le dijo que había llegado el momento de separarse. Y le explicó cómo cada una de las acciones llevadas a cabo tenía un propósito oculto que se ajustaba a la voluntad de Dios. En virtud de esta y otras narraciones, Ḫaḍir es habitualmente considerado, entre los círculos sufíes, como el guía invisible de aquellos que no tienen guía en este mundo. Su nombre está asociado al color verde (*aḫḍar*), símbolo del conocimiento verdadero y de

[46] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 434.
[47] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 434.
[48] Véase C. 18:60-82; también Sahîh al-Bukhârî, *The Translation of the Meanings*, vol. 6, traducido por M. Muhsin Khan (Ryad: Darussalam, 1997), libro 3, hadiz 74, 196-209. Disponible en línea: al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, “Book of Prophets,” hadiz 3401, en *Sunnah.com*, https://sunnah.com/bukhari:3401

la vida eterna. Por eso es conocido como el que reverdece, el que da vida. En otro pasaje de *Futūḥāt*, Ibn ʿArabī compara su conocimiento con el del "iletrado". Gracias a la Misericordia divina, ambos *reciben* una sabiduría que trasciende los márgenes de quienes se conducen mediante la consideración racional (*naẓar*), como los legisladores y los pensadores especulativos.[49] Según el maestro andalusí, el Sanador de las Heridas fue discípulo de Ḫaḍir y se destacó en el conocimiento (*ʿārif*) del mundo (*dunyā*) y de las ciencias de poder (*ʿilm al-quwwa*), pero no mostró este saber a todos sus amigos por miedo a que resultase peligroso para ellos.[50] Entre los dones que se le otorgaron, se incluye, además, el secreto para revivir a los muertos y la capacidad para traer abundancia y bendiciones al lugar donde se encuentre.

4. El discurso del Sanador de las Heridas

Cuenta Ibn ʿArabī que el Sanador de las Heridas reunió un día a sus seguidores y pronunció este discurso:

> Entended lo que simbolizo con estas medidas, reflexionad (*fakkirū*) y extraed su abundancia y la amplitud de su tiempo (*zamān*) [...]. Lo que no admite separación ni puede ser contenido en un solo corazón, debe sin duda estar en la comunidad (*al-ǧamāʿa*), en naturalezas diversas y mentes no unificadas. El objeto de la comunidad es uno (*wāḥid*). A este propósito se dirige mi palabra [...]. Cada estación espiritual (*maqām*) tiene su discurso (*maqāl*), cada ciencia (*ʿilm*) sus personas y cada valle su propia condición. Así que comprended lo que digo y retened lo que escucháis, porque por la luz de la luz he jurado, y por el espíritu de la vida y la vida del espíritu he prometido solemnemente [...]. Si vuestra morada ha sido sutil y prevaleció la esencia (*maʿnā*) sobre la letra (*al-ḥarf*), entonces ¡la Realidad es la Realidad! ¡y el camino es el camino! Pues se combinaron el Paraíso y este mundo en el ladrillo y la construcción, aunque uno fuera de barro y paja (*ṭīn wa-tibn*), y el otro de oro puro y gemas (*asǧad wa-ʿaǧīn*).[51]

Pueden apreciarse las distintas faces de la sabiduría del *Mudāwī* que hemos presentado: conocimiento del tiempo, liderazgo comunitario, sanación alquímica, mirada binocular y adelanto escatológico. La enseñanza para sus seguidores parece clara. Cada perspectiva, cada aroma captado por los conocedores de fragancias (*ʿārifūn*) es único y valioso, pues ninguna presencia puede agotar el caudal de la Realidad esencial, ninguna comparecencia del Amado representa más que una unión fugaz y parcial de Aquel cuya amplitud permite una incesante renovación de la manifestación. Quienes permanecen estables en el compromiso con el fondo inagotable de lo Real y abiertos a la dimensión de las presencias, disfrutan de la mirada binocular donde concurren los opuestos. Son capaces de contemplar al Amado tanto en su Ocultación como en Su Manifestación; en

[49] Chittick, *Sufi Path*, 236-237.
[50] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 434, 8-17.
[51] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 435, 4-15.

ellos se combina la Realidad (*ḥaqīqa*) y el camino (*ṭarīqa*), este mundo y el paraíso, como un edificio donde se unen el ladrillo y la construcción, la materia y la estructura nacida de la unión entre las partes. Su tiempo es el tiempo del instante donde contraen nupcias el tiempo absoluto de la eternidad y el tiempo relativo de lo humano; ese tiempo en el que sana la profunda herida que sufren los amantes.

5. El encuentro con Averroes

Justo a continuación del discurso del *Mudāwī*, Ibn ʿArabī recuerda el día que conoció a Averroes:

> Cierto día, en Córdoba, entré a casa de Abū l-Walīd Ibn Rušd [Averroes], cadí de la ciudad, que había mostrado deseos de conocerme personalmente, porque le había maravillado mucho lo que había oído decir de mí, esto es, las noticias que le habían llegado de las revelaciones que Dios me había comunicado en mi retiro espiritual (*ḫalwa*); por eso mi padre, que era uno de sus íntimos amigos, me envió a su casa con el pretexto de cierto encargo, sólo para dar así ocasión a que Averroes pudiese conversar conmigo. Era yo a la sazón un muchacho imberbe. Así que hube entrado, levantóse del lugar en que estaba y, dirigiéndose hacia mí con grandes muestras de cariño y consideración, me abrazó y me dijo: ‘Sí’. Yo le respondí: ‘Sí’. Esta respuesta aumentó su alegría, al ver que yo le había comprendido; pero dándome yo, a seguida, cuenta de la causa de su alegría, añadí: “No”. Entonces Averroes se entristeció, demudóse su color, y comenzando a dudar de la verdad de su propia doctrina, me preguntó: ‘¿Cómo, pues, encontráis vosotros resuelto el asunto (*masʾala*) mediante la iluminación y la inspiración divina (*al-kašf wa-l-fayḍ al-ilāhī*)? ¿Es acaso lo mismo que a nosotros nos enseña el razonamiento (*al-naẓar*)?’ Yo le respondí: ‘Sí, no. Y entre el sí y el no, los espíritus salen volando de sus materias y las cervices de sus cuerpos’. Palideció Averroes, sobrecogido de terror, y comenzó a repetir ‘No hay poder ni fuerza sino por Dios’ (*lā ḥawla wa-lā quwwata illā bi-llāh*), como si hubiera penetrado en el sentido de mis alusiones (*išārāt*). Esto es exactamente lo mismo que mencionó el polo espiritual conocido como el Sanador de las Heridas.
>
> Más tarde, después de esta entrevista que tuvo conmigo, solicitó de mi padre que le expusiera éste si la opinión que él había formado de mí coincidía con la de mi padre o si era diferente. Porque como Averroes era un sabio filósofo, consagrado a la reflexión, al estudio y a la investigación racional, no podía menos de dar gracias a Dios que le permitía vivir en un tiempo, en el cual podía ver con sus propios ojos a un hombre que había entrado ignorante en el retiro espiritual para salir de él como había salido, sin el auxilio de enseñanza alguna, sin estudio, sin lectura, sin aprendizaje de ninguna especie. Por eso exclamó: ‘Es este un estado (*ḥāl*) que hemos sostenido, pero sin que jamás hubiésemos conocido persona alguna que lo experimentase. ¡Loado sea Dios que nos hizo vivir en un tiempo, en el cual

> existe una de esas personas dotadas de tal estado místico, capaces de abrir las cerraduras de sus puertas, y que además me otorgó la gracia especial de verla con mis propios ojos!'[52]

Ya podemos afrontar las preguntas que adelantábamos en la introducción ¿Cuál es el asunto sobre el que pregunta Averroes? ¿Por qué Ibn ʿArabī dice "sí" y "no"? ¿Cuál es el significado de la alusión a los espíritus y las cervices? ¿En qué sentido coincide con lo mencionado por el *Mudāwī l-Kulūm*? ¿Qué pudo entender Averroes? ¿Es posible que reaccionase así?

6. El asunto de la conversación

Es sabido que Averroes demostró interés por el sufismo. Y también que Ibn ʿArabī sintió un gran respeto hacia su persona. En otro pasaje de *Futūḥāt*, lo describe como uno de los hombres más inteligentes que conoció en vida, alguien que poseyó gran conocimiento sobre la medida de los mensajeros de Dios y se preocupó por preservar la Sunna de Muhammad.[53] Esta imagen coincide, en buena medida, con el contenido de algunos de los textos más importantes del cordobés, como el *Faṣl al-maqāl* y el *Kašf*, donde expresa una profunda preocupación por la "unidad" y la "salud" espiritual de la comunidad de creyentes.[54] Ibn ʿArabī poseía, además, una copia del *Bidāyat al-muğtahid wa-nihāyat al-muqtaṣid*,[55] obra monumental de derecho islámico, donde Averroes examina cuestiones de culto y relaciones sociales, comparando las opiniones de las principales escuelas de jurisprudencia sunnitas.[56] Este libro sería heredado, más tarde, por los hijos del maestro murciano, incluido Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī quien desempeñará un papel crucial en la transmisión del legado espiritual del Šayḫ al-Akbar.[57] No parece, sin embargo,

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[52] Ibn ʿArabī, *Futūḥāt I*, 435-436, (16; 1-12). Hemos seguido la traducción de Asín Palacios en *El Islam cristianizado: estudio del "sufismo" a través de las obras de Abenarabi de Murcia* (Madrid: Plutarco, 1931), 39-40, salvo en tres puntos: (1) Asín omite la referencia al Sanador de las Heridas; (2) escribe "sí y no", mientras que en el original solo leemos "sí, no" (*naʿam, lā*)) –sobre la importancia de invisibilizar la conjunción copulativa, véase Fernández Navas, "El 'sí' y el 'no' de Ibn ʿArabī"–; (3) traduce: "es este un estado psicológico cuya realidad nosotros hemos sostenido con pruebas racionales", pero el texto akbarí es menos comprometido –"este estado lo hemos establecido" (*hāḏihi ḥālat aṯbatnā-hā*)–.

[53] Chittick, *Sufi Path*, 38.

[54] Véase Averroes, *Sobre filosofía y religión*, 75-139.

[55] Bouchtalla, "ʿAn ʿAlāqat", 47.

[56] La obra se divide en dos partes. La primera trata sobre los actos de adoración: el ritual de purificación (*ṭahāra*), la oración (*ṣalāt*), la limosna obligatoria (*zakāt*), el ayuno (*ṣiyām*), el retiro espiritual (*iʿtikāf*), la peregrinación (*ḥağğ*), la guerra (*ğihād*), los juramentos (*aymān*), los votos (*nuḏūr*) y los sacrificios (*ḍaḥāyā*). La segunda parte se ocupa de transacciones y relaciones sociales: matrimonios, divorcios, compras, herencias, regalos, usurpaciones...Véase Ibn Rushd, *The Distinguished Jurist's Primer*, traducido por I. A. Khan Nyazee, 2 vols. (Reading: Garnet, 2000).

[57] Bouchtalla, "ʿAn ʿalāqat", 47.

que ninguno de los temas de este tratado, de tan marcado carácter práctico, fuera el asunto sobre el que conversaron nuestros protagonistas el día en que se conocieron.

Coincidimos con Michel Chodkiewicz en que la mención al discurso del Sanador de las Heridas apunta al adelanto escatológico y la resurrección de los cuerpos como el asunto más probable de la conversación.[58] Cuál fuese la postura de Averroes es, sin embargo, un tema delicado. Según la tradición islámica, las almas se separan de los cuerpos en el momento de la muerte; son interrogadas por dos ángeles sobre Dios, el Profeta y la Escritura; permanecen en la tumba en estado de espera hasta el Último Día; y finalmente, responden sobre las obras realizadas ante Dios, quien las devolverá al cuerpo y decidirá si se dirigen al infierno o al paraíso.[59] Los castigos y los deleites de la otra vida son descritos, en el Corán, con un marcado acento sensual. A un lado, agua hirviente, llamas abrasadoras, ropas de alquitrán... Al otro, finas ropas de seda, ríos de agua, leche, miel y vino... El Libro advierte, además, contra quienes dudan de la resurrección corporal: “¿Cree el hombre que no juntaremos sus huesos? ¡Claro que sí! ¡Somos capaces de recomponer sus dedos!”[60] Este horizonte escatológico fue objeto de diversas interpretaciones y no pocas discusiones entre teólogos y filósofos de diverso signo, a las que Averroes no permaneció ajeno. En *La incoherencia de los filósofos* (*Tahāfut al-falāsifa*), Al-Ġazālī recoge con detalle los argumentos de algunos peripatéticos musulmanes que negaban la resurrección corporal. Así lo resume Asín Palacios:

> [...] una de dos: o sólo volverán a la vida las partes que constituían el cuerpo al morir, o todas las que lo formaron mientras vivió. En el primer caso, los cuerpos de los bienaventurados irán al cielo afeados y oprimidos por los defectos físicos y enfermedades que al morir padecían. Y en el segundo caso, ¿cómo podrá resucitar el cuerpo de quien hubiese muerto devorado por antropófagos si sus partes todas quedaron asimiladas, por la digestión, a los cuerpos de sus verdugos? Y sin recurrir a este caso extraordinario de canibalismo, ¿no se convierte a menudo los cementerios en campos, de cuyos frutos nos alimentamos los hombres y las bestias? ¿Qué parte, pues, de materia orgánica podrá asegurarse que no haya sido cuerpo de muchos y diferentes hombres?[61]

Frente a estas objeciones, al-Ġazālī apela a la resurrección como una repetición de la creación. Si Dios unió una vez el alma al cuerpo, no habría motivo para maravillarse por que lo hiciera una segunda.[62] Puede reconocerse el enlace con la noción coránica de la nueva creación (*al-ḫalq al-ǧadīd*): “Cuando seamos huesos y polvo, ¿es verdad que se nos resucitará a una nueva creación?”[63] En *La incoherencia de la incoherencia* (*Tahāfut al-tahāfut*),

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[58] Chodkiewicz, “Toward Reading *Futūḥāt*”, 35-36.
[59] Véase William C. Chittick, “Muslim Eschatology”, en *The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology*, editado por J. L. Walls (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 132-150.
[60] C. 75:3-4. Trad. Julio Cortés, *El Corán* (Barcelona: Herder, 2000).
[61] Véase Miguel Asín Palacios, *La espiritualidad de Algazel y su sentido cristiano*, tomo I (Madrid: Publicaciones de las Escuelas de Estudios árabes de Madrid y Granada, 1934), 94-95.
[62] Asín Palacios, *La espiritualidad de Algazel*, 93.
[63] C. 17:49. Trad. Cortés.

Averroes adopta una solución similar, si bien advierte que el cuerpo resucitado no es el mismo: “lo que surge de los muertos es un simulacro de esos cuerpos terrenales, no esos mismos cuerpos, pues lo que ha perecido no regresa individualmente, y una cosa sólo puede regresar como una imagen de aquello que ha perecido”.[64] Como apunta Idoia Maiza, este enfoque le permite conciliar la promesa coránica con la doctrina psicológica de Aristóteles*:* “nada perecedero puede permanecer para siempre uno y lo mismo”.[65] Esta conciliación entre la palabra revelada y la luz del intelecto resulta coherente con la ruta trazada en el *Faṣl al-maqāl*. El filósofo cordobés defiende allí que cuando hay contradicción entre la literalidad del Corán y el resultado de la indagación racional, es necesario interpretar adecuadamente el sentido oculto del texto, ya que el propio Libro anima a cultivar el conocimiento demostrativo y “la verdad no puede ser contraria a la verdad”.[66] Interpretar (*taʾwīl*) adecuadamente significa extraer lo interior (*bāṭin*) de lo exterior (*ẓāhir*), a través del arte del silogismo, de modo que solo quien domina el razonamiento demostrativo estará autorizado a indagar en el sentido oculto de la Palabra. Con un espíritu similar, siempre atento a la abismática diferencia entre lo inmanente y lo trascendente, Averroes subraya en el *Tahāfut* la distancia que media entre esta vida y la otra:

> [Lo que la Ley musulmana] dice respecto a la otra vida mueve más a las acciones virtuosas que lo que se dice en otras distintas. Por eso, simbolizar la otra vida para ellos [los fieles] por medio de cosas corpóreas es mejor que simbolizarla por medio de cosas espirituales, tal como dice Dios, loado sea: ‘Imagen del Jardín prometido a quienes temen a Dios: fluyen arroyos por sus bajos’. Y el Profeta, sobre él sea la paz, dijo: ‘En él hay lo que ningún ojo ha visto, ni oreja ha oído, ni idea que haya tenido mente humana’. Ibn ʿAbbās también ha dicho: “Nada de este mundo hay en la otra vida excepto los nombres”. Quiere decir que aquella existencia es de otro origen más elevado que esta existencia y de otra clase más excelente que la de esta clase.[67]

Algunos especialistas consideran que, aunque Averroes admitió *algún tipo de vida* tras la muerte, su deuda con Aristóteles le impidió admitir la resurrección individual, así como la posibilidad de una unión en vida con el intelecto agente.[68] Otros defienden que el verdadero Averroes no es el comentarista, sino el del *Kašf* y el *Faṣl.*[69] Obviamente, no

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[64] Idoia Maiza Ozcoidi, *La concepción de la filosofía en Averroes* (Madrid: Trotta, 2001), 382; Aristóteles, *De anima*, 2.4, 315 b.
[65] Maiza Ozcoidi, *La concepción de la filosofía en Averroes*, 382.
[66] Averroes, *Sobre filosofía y religión*, 84.
[67] Averroes, *Sobre filosofía y religión*, 134.
[68] Richard Taylor, “Personal Immortality in Averroes, Mature Philosophical Psychology”, *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 9 (1998): 87-110; Richard Taylor “Averroes on the Ontology of the Human Soul”, *The Muslim World* 102 (2012): 580-596; Stephen R. Ogden, *Averroes on Intellect. From Aristotelian Origins to Aquina's Critique* (Oxford: OUP, 2022), 224.
[69] Ovey N. Mohammed, *Averroes’ Doctrine of Immortality. A Matter of Controversy* (Waterloo: Wilfried Laurier, 1985); Cruz Hernández, *Abû-l-Walîd*; Josep Puig Montada, “Averroes y el entendimiento”,

pretendemos resolver aquí esta polémica. Nos basta con recalcar que cuando trató explícitamente la resurrección, habló de una nueva creación y subrayó la diferencia entre la vida terrena y la futura.

7. El sí y el no

Ahora ya podemos considerar el "sí" y el "no" de Ibn ʿArabī. El joven místico afirma que el conocimiento que se le ha otorgado coincide y no coincide con el que Averroes obtiene mediante la especulación racional. Es cierto que ambos usan el intelecto para preservar la dimensión de la incomparabilidad divina. Averroes advierte sobre la diferencia que hay entre este mundo y el otro. Ibn ʿArabī seguramente asentiría, pues la fidelidad a la dimensión del *tanzīh* es irrenunciable. Pero no podría compartir la idea de un sentido oculto de la Palabra que sólo se revela al filósofo experto en el arte del silogismo. Tampoco el partir de una observación racional sobre el mundo físico, para aclarar el sentido de la promesa coránica. Para el maestro murciano, tan importante es reconocer a Dios según Su incomparabilidad, como según Su similitud. A la primera perspectiva, se accede mediante la luz del intelecto. A la segunda, mediante la facultad imaginal. Y ninguna es reductible a la otra. A su juicio, el problema de la mayoría de los pensadores racionales es que están velados a la experiencia gustativa, ese mundo de los alientos que se abre a los conocedores de fragancias.[70] Esta combinación de ópticas aparentemente enfrentadas era justamente una de las claves del discurso del *Mudāwī l-Kulūm*.

Pero la convergencia-divergencia con Averroes no queda ahí. En otro pasaje de *Futūḥāt*, Ibn ʿArabī se vale de la noción de creación continua y dibuja importantes diferencias entre el cuerpo terrenal y el resucitado.[71] La dimensión exterior de Dios es contemplada como un proceso de transformación constante, fruto del incesante acto recreación del mundo pues Él "siempre está ocupado con algo".[72] Su interioridad quedaría en cambio a salvo de toda variación. El ser humano, como imagen de la divinidad, posee también una dimensión interna y otra externa, pero le sucede como a los espejos que invierten lo reflejado. Su exterioridad –es decir el cuerpo– permanece estable, mientras que su interioridad no deja de transformarse. Una vez accede al paraíso, se produce un cambio crucial. Si en la vida terrenal, disponía de una constitución ambivalente, donde se mezclaban los atributos de Misericordia e Ira, el paso a la nueva vida supondrá una depuración de los rasgos iracundos. Y si el ámbito de las intenciones está velado para los otros en este mundo, en la nueva vida la voluntad más íntima quedará visible. El cuerpo

Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 9 (2002): 49-62. Maiza Ozcoidi, *La concepción de la filosofía en Averroes.*

[70] Chittick, *Sufi Path*, 202-203.

[71] Véase William C. Chittick, "Death and the World of Imagination on Ibn al-Arabi's Eschatology", *The Muslim World* 78/1 (1988): 51-82.

[72] C. 55:29.

resucitado será entonces el mismo, pero con una composición distinta a la terrenal. Y aunque el ser humano seguirá reflejando la realidad divina, ya no lo hará de un modo tan perfecto.

8. El vuelo de los espíritus y las cervices

Queda aún ahondar en el significado de la enigmática alusión: "Sí, no. Y entre el sí y el no, los espíritus salen volando de sus materias y las cervices de sus cuerpos". Nuevamente el discurso del Sanador de las Heridas resulta clave. El *Mudāwī* enseña que, para disfrutar de la presencia del Amado, es necesario un doble movimiento de humildad y elevación. *Permanecer en lo sutil y dar prevalencia a la esencia sobre la letra* significa reconocer humildemente la limitación de cualquier aproximación a la Realidad, así como el valor de todas y cada una de las perspectivas. Esto implica admitir *que la herida que atraviesa al ser humano nunca podrá sanar del todo*. Por eso en el poema akbarí, el ámbito de las fragancias estaba vetado al rico. Y por eso, es necesario despojarse de todo rasgo de señorío y aceptar la propia menesterosidad. Solo así, y mediante la asistencia de un otro –el aliento del Omni-Compasivo, el acompañamiento del guía espiritual–, será posible el ascenso: la elevación hacia ese ámbito donde se goza de lo eterno por un instante, allí donde *este mundo y el paraíso se combinan en uno solo*.

9. ¿Qué pudo entender Averroes?

Ahora bien, ¿qué pudo entender Averroes? Creemos que la elevación desde el plano material hacia el espiritual no es algo que pudiera sorprender a un experto en jurisprudencia. El Corán está plagado de ese tipo de imágenes, a veces referentes a la resurrección; otras, a personas amadas por Dios que disfrutaron de una elevación en vida –Muhammad, Idrís…–.[73] La imagen de las cervices que se separan de los cuerpos tampoco creemos que pudiese resultarle extraña. En los pasajes coránicos donde se habla de la otra vida, el cuello, como símbolo de soberbia o humildad, suele ser la clave de si se produce un ascenso al paraíso o la condena al fuego del infierno.[74] La cuestión es qué idea pudo venir a la mente de un filósofo que deseaba conocer a un joven del que se decía que había accedido a una experiencia iluminativa, sin ningún tipo de preparación ni enseñanza previa.

No parece disparatado considerar la posibilidad de que Averroes reconociese cierta alusión a su propio quehacer intelectual. La interpretación (*taʾwīl*) puede ser considerada como una elevación desde de la mirada del vulgo a la mirada del sabio, pero también como cierto caso de soberbia, pues el sabio se cree capaz de acceder mediante sus propias fuerzas al sentido oculto de la Palabra, de modo análogo a cómo Moisés creyó una vez no necesitar de nadie. Si así fuera, se entendería el uso de la expresión "No hay poder ni

[73] C. 7:46-49; C. 17:1; C. 19:56-57.
[74] C. 26:4; C. 13:5; C. 14:45; C. 36:8; C. 40:71; C. 47:4; C. 54:8; C. 70:36.

fuerza sino por Dios" por parte del juez cordobés, una fórmula que los creyentes utilizan para reconocer la dimensión majestuosa de la Realidad divina.

En cuanto a la posibilidad de que Averroes hubiese aceptado una experiencia de esta clase en sus escritos, coincidimos con Tornero y Ramón Guerrero en que no se puede ignorar este fragmento del *Kašf*:

> Los métodos de los sufíes no son especulativos, o sea, no están compuestos a base de premisas y silogismos, sino que, según ellos, el conocimiento de Dios y de los otros seres es algo que se encuentra en el alma al despojarla de sus pasiones [...] Este método, *aunque reconocemos su existencia*, no se da en la generalidad de los hombres en tanto hombres [...] pues entonces sería ociosa y vana entre los hombres la vía especulativa, y, por otro lado, todo el *Corán* es una invitación a la consideración y a la especulación racional.[75]

Justo a continuación, Averroes añade unas líneas que resultan especialmente interesantes para nuestra indagación:

> Sí; no ignoramos que la mortificación de las pasiones es condición para un correcto razonamiento, como también lo es la salud; no [sostenemos, sin embargo] que la mortificación de las pasiones sea la que por sí misma proporcione el conocimiento, aunque sea condición de ello, como también la salud es condición para el aprender, aunque ella no sea la que lo da. En este sentido, la Ley exhorta a este método e invita a él en general, es decir, a practicarlo; pero no es suficiente por sí mismo, como piensan algunos. Por el contrario, si es útil para lo propio del razonamiento, es sólo según el aspecto que ya hemos dicho. Esto es evidente para quien sea ecuánime y considere el asunto por sí mismo.[76]

El filósofo cordobés atribuye a los sufíes un conocimiento que nace del propio esfuerzo. Pero Ibn ʿArabī no se cansa de recordar a lo largo y ancho de su obra, el indispensable papel de la gracia. Por mucho que el amante cuide su casa, todo depende, en última instancia, de la visita del Amado. La humildad de quien reconoce la íntima herida de su ser avoca, justamente, a esta perspectiva. Y quizá fue esto lo que entendió Averroes: que aquel joven que le había llamado la atención sobre su propia soberbia intelectual, no se arrogaba haber logrado nada por sí mismo; que su conocimiento solo precisaba de humildad y gracia.

10. La identidad del Sanador de las Heridas

Solo nos falta tratar la identidad del Sanador de las Heridas. Como ya indicamos, Mikko Telaranta sostiene que el *Mudāwī* es en realidad Empédocles.[77] La tesis de Chodkiewicz no le convence porque en un apartado del texto se dice que el Sanador de las

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[75] Emilio Tornero, "La filosofía andalusí frente al sufismo", 12; Averroes, *Sobre filosofía y religión*, 114-115.
[76] Rafael Ramón Guerrero, *Averroes. Sobre filosofía y religión*, 115.
[77] Cf. Telaranta, *Aristotelian Elements*, 293-322.

Heridas falleció, mientras que Idrís ascendió en vida al cielo. Entre el *Mudāwī* y Empédocles, habría en cambio, demasiadas semejanzas: el discurso ante los discípulos antes de partir hacia la muerte, la capacidad sanadora, el recurso a la palabra como terapia, el dominio del saber alquímico... La mención a las cervices que se separan de los cuerpos sería, además, una alusión a las cabezas sin cuellos de Empédocles, una imagen que Averroes conocía perfectamente, gracias al *De caelo* y el *De Anima*, y que simbolizaría un conocimiento que se produce de forma intuitiva, como la *noesis* aristotélica, en un instante y sin mediación de la razón discursiva. De este modo, el joven Ibn ʿArabī demostraría haber leído mucho más de lo que estaba dispuesto a admitir. Aunque esta hipótesis es, sin duda, original y sugerente, consideramos que genera algunas dificultades innecesarias. Por un lado, resulta inverosímil que un autor tan crítico con la filosofía griega como Ibn ʿArabī, reconociese un papel tan destacado a Empédocles.[78] Las referencias constantes a Muhammad, Abraham, Ḫaḍir o la filiación judía de la doctrina sobre los elementos no parecen apuntar tampoco en esa dirección. Y, sobre todo, no nos parece necesario recurrir a una lectura compartida de Aristóteles para explicar el diálogo. Según hemos visto, es la faceta teológica de Averroes y no la de comentarista la que aporta mayor coherencia y claridad a la narración akbarí.

Por otro lado, Stephen Hirtenstein apuntala y desarrolla la tesis de Chodkiewicz.[79] En un magnífico estudio sobre el texto de Ibn ʿArabī establece conexiones con otros pasajes de *Futūḥāt* que muestran una gran coincidencia entre los conocimientos del *Mudāwī* y la sabiduría de Idrís. Si bien, reconoce también analogías con el discurso de Jesús en la Última Cena y advierte que es difícil restringir un nombre, y una actividad, como la de "Sanador de las Heridas" a una sola figura. Por nuestra parte, consideramos que este enfoque enlaza suavemente con la profunda apertura simbólica del texto akbarí, que vincula el conocimiento alquímico con la sabiduría profética de Abraham, al tiempo que remite a Muhammad como el único y verdadero polo. También engarza con aquello que no hemos dejado de ver en nuestro trabajo: la fidelidad a una realidad insondable, que no deja de ofrecerse en infinitas formas.

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[78] Sobre su relación con los filósofos, véase Bashier, "Ibn al-ʿArabī's Encounter with Ibn Rushd".
[79] Cf. Hirtenstein, "The Healer of Wounds".

ARITHMETIC AND THE REALITY OF NUMBERS IN THE LATE LATIN MIDDLE AGES

LA ARITMÉTICA Y LA REALIDAD DE LOS NÚMEROS EN LA BAJA EDAD MEDIA LATINA

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Abstract

The late Middle Ages (ca. 1270-1400) in the Latin West witnessed an extraordinary rise of interest in the metaphysical status of numbers. This paper is a case study of one of the most popular arguments in favour of realism about numbers: the view according to which numbers are extramental entities distinct from the things that they number. Part one is a reconstruction of the realist argument, which is based on the commonly accepted division of sciences into real sciences and rational sciences. It is an equally commonly accepted claim that arithmetic is one of the real sciences. On the realist interpretation, for a science to be real, its object must be real. Thus, since the object of arithmetic is number, numbers must have extramental reality. Part two is an analysis of several most interesting anti-realist rebuttals of the above argument.

Keywords

Metaphysics; Medieval Philosophy; Metaphysics of Numbers

Resumen

La Baja Edad Media (ca. 1270 y 1400) fue testigo de un extraordinario aumento del interés por el carácter metafísico de los números en el Occidente latino. Este artículo es un estudio de caso de uno de los argumentos más populares a favor del realismo de los números: la idea de que los números son entidades extramentales distintas de las cosas que numeran. La primera parte es una reconstrucción del argumento realista, que se basa en la división comúnmente aceptada de las ciencias en ciencias reales y ciencias racionales. También es una afirmación comúnmente aceptada que la aritmética es una de las ciencias reales. Según la interpretación realista, para que una ciencia sea real, su objeto debe ser real. Por lo tanto, dado que el objeto de la aritmética es el número, los números deben tener realidad extramental. La segunda parte es un análisis de varias refutaciones antirrealistas muy interesantes del argumento anterior.

Palabras clave

Metafísica; filosofía medieval; metafísica de los números

Introduction

The late Middle Ages (ca. 1270-1400) in the Latin West witnessed an extraordinary rise of interest in the metaphysical status of numbers. While the debate concerning numbers consisted in a cluster of questions, the central one throughout this period and beyond remained the same: Is a number a thing distinct from the numbered things, and if so, does it possess extramental existence?[1] Many prominent mathematicians of the twentieth and twenty-first century took a *realist* stance on this issue by giving an affirmative answer to the above question. The main rationale that one comes across over and over again is that items such as equations, proofs, and so on are not something that one invents but rather something one discovers; and that, should mathematical objects not be *real* in some sense, there would be nothing to study, or maths would prove not to be a genuine science.[2] However, there is one key difference between the way contemporary mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics understand realism about numbers and the way it was understood in the late medieval debate that I want to present and study here. Namely, while for most contemporary philosophers of mathematics endorsing realism about numbers would entail positing them as some kind of abstract objects (so that, for example, there is, properly speaking, just one number five instantiated by all numbers five used in equations etc.), for medieval thinkers debating this issue the only option on the table is a more moderate version of realism, whereby a number is an individual accident (belonging to the category of discrete quantity) of the numbered things, and each collection of numbered things has its own number that is

[1] For the summary of the debate concerning this key question, see esp. Maria Sorokina, "Numbering the Divine Persons: Mental Existence of Numbers in Duns Scotus, Henry of Harclay, and Peter Auriol", *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 87/2 (2020): 417-439; and Kamil Majcherek, "Can an Accident Inhere in More than One Subject? A Problem for Medieval Realism about Numbers", in *Pre-Modern Mathematical Thought: The Latin Discussion (13th-16th Century)*, edited by C. Crialesi (Leiden: Brill, 2025), 77–92.

[2] For just one example, see Godfrey H. Hardy, *A Mathematician's Apology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 123–124: "I believe that mathematical reality lies outside us, that our function is to discover or observe it, and that the theorems which we prove, and which we describe grandiloquently as our 'creations' are simply our notes of our observations." On mathematical Platonism, see, e.g., Øystein Linnebo, "Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by E. N. Zalta and U. Nodelman (Summer 2024 Edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/platonism-mathematics/>.

numerically distinct from the number of another collection of numbered things: for instance, the number five of these five stones is an accident inhering in these five stones that is numerically distinct from the number five of these five horses.[3]

The camps in the late medieval debate can be roughly divided into three main groups. *Realists* about numbers claim that numbers are distinct from the numbered things and that they exist in the extramental reality. Many realists frame their view in hylomorphic terms, whereby the counted things are the proximate matter, i.e., the subject, of number, in which there inheres the form of a given number making the counted things be of a certain number. *Conceptualists* about numbers hold that numbers are distinct from the numbered things, but they exist not in the extramental reality but in the human mind: in the mind of the person doing the counting or thinking of a certain sum. *Reductionists* about numbers argue that numbers are not distinct from the numbered things: in their view, a number is nothing more than an aggregate of the numbered things, that is, the numbered things taken together.[4] For the purposes of this paper, I shall subsume both the conceptualists and the reductionists under the broader term *anti-realists* since the representatives of both camps deny the extramental existence of numbers.

The late medieval realists have several standard arguments in their repertoire.[5] This paper is a case study of one of them, focused on the connection between the notion of arithmetic as a *real science* and the reality of its object, numbers.[6] From among the texts that remain from our period, the argument appears in the works of authors such as the Dominican Thomist Bernard of Auvergne (d. after 1307), the Franciscan Scotist Francis of Meyronnes (ca. 1288-1328), the Carmelite Guido Terreni (ca. 1260/70-1342), and another Dominican Thomist Peter Nigri (1434-1484). It was thus ecumenical, so to speak, in that it was used by authors belonging to different religious orders and different philosophical schools; but what they all had in common was their intention to defend realism about numbers, along the lines sketched out above.

This paper shall proceed in a simple way. I shall first sketch out the usual structure of the 'arithmetic-as-real-science' argument put forward by the realists. After that, I shall

[3] For reasons why the 'Platonic' kind of realism about numbers is never seriously debated in the late Middle Ages, see, e.g., Kamil Majcherek, "Can an Accident Inhere in More than One Subject? A Problem for Medieval Realism about Numbers", in *Pre-Modern Mathematical Thought: The Latin Discussion (13th-16th Century)*, edited by C. Crialesi (Leiden: Brill, 2025), 77-92, at 95-96.
[4] For more detail on these three camps, see Sorokina, "Numbering the Divine Persons", and Majcherek, "Can an Accident Inhere", 91-96.
[5] For a case study of another standard argument from the realist repertoire, see Kamil Majcherek, "What Is It to Be Real? Numbers as Real Species of a Category in the Late Medieval Debate about the Ontological Status of Numbers", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 107/2 (2025): 421-262.
[6] The terminology used in the texts I study in this paper is not completely uniform as some authors refer to numbers as *objects* of arithmetic whereas others call them *subjects* of arithmetic; but in both cases they mean the same thing, that is, what arithmetic investigates as a science. For the sake of clarity, in my translations, I shall render both *obiectum* and *subiectum* as 'objects' of arithmetic.

present several representative and particularly interesting anti-realist rebuttals of the argument, all but one of which consist in reformulating the notion of *real science*. Finally, I shall conclude by looking briefly at the debate from a vantage point and ask if it is possible to declare the winning party of the debate.

1. Number as an Object of a Real Science

I begin with a summary of the realist argument. The argument is based on a commonly accepted distinction between (a) *real sciences* and (b) *rational sciences*, where (a) real sciences are ones occupied with how things are in extramental reality, whereas (b) rational sciences, of which logic is a prime example, are concerned with our concepts and thinking more generally. The key assumption of the argument, which the anti-realists usually do not challenge, is that:

1. Arithmetic is a real science.

Arithmetic is a real science because it is ultimately concerned with how things are in extramental states of affairs: for example, that there are five stones in that pile, or that there are twelve people in the classroom.[7]

The key, and very contentious, move that the realists then need is to argue that:

2. If numbers (including their forms) did not have extramental existence, arithmetic would not be a real science.

As some of the realists make clear, this inference holds because a science derives its reality from the reality of its object: that is to say, that science is real whose proper object is real. For example, Guido Terreni says that:

3. A science is called *real* thanks to the reality of its object.[8]

Peter Nigri makes the same point in a similar fashion by stating that:

3*. No subject of a real science is made by the soul [...] because a science is called *real* by extrinsic denomination thanks to <its> real object.[9]

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[7] As said above, this will no doubt come across as counterintuitive to many contemporary readers, but it has to be borne in mind that the medievals are focused on the status of numbers *in concreto*, that is, as individual accidents of (groups of) individual subjects, rather than as numbers *in abstracto*, that is, as universals.

[8] Guido Terreni, *Quodlibet* (henceforth *Quodl.*) I, q. 8 (ms. Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, cod. Borgh. 39, 14r-241v), 26va: "Scientia dicitur realis a realitate sui subiecti."

[9] Peter Nigri, *Clypeus Thomistarum* (ms. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, cod. Clm 26722), f. 102va; (ed. Venice 1481, 102va): "Nullum subiectum scientiae realis est factum ab anima. Sed numerus qui est quantitas discreta est subiectum scientiae realis. Igitur etc. Maior nota, quia scientia dicitur [...] realis ab obiecto reali." See also, e.g., how this argument is summarised by Francis of Marchia in *Scriptum in I Sententiarum* (henceforth *Scriptum*), d. 24, a. 3 (unpublished

Given that the proper object[10] of arithmetic is number, if arithmetic is to be a real science, it must be the case that:

4. Numbers have extramental existence.

And because, as we know, numbers are conceived by most realists as hylomorphic composites, and because on this understanding what makes each number a number and what makes a number a number of a given kind is its form, it is necessary that it is not only the *matter* of the number but also the *form* of the number that has extramental existence. This is made explicit by, for example, Bernard of Auvergne, who concludes from the above that:

5. Therefore, it is necessary that a number exist outside <the soul> not only in respect of its unities which are its matter but also in respect of its form.[11]

2. Anti-Realist Critique of the Argument and Realist Reply

2.1. *Henry of Harclay*. *Reformulating the Reality Criterion*

I now turn to the anti-realist camp. I begin with the Franciscan Henry of Harclay (1270-1317). In his *Sentences* commentary, Henry formulates the realist argument in the following way, narrowing it down to three *scientiae reales*:

> There are three real sciences, as is said in Book VI of the *Metaphysics*: natural science, mathematical science, and the science of the divine. But arithmetic is the first of

edition by G. Etzkorn), 40: "Item, obiectum scientiae realis est reale, *quia scientia specificatur ex obiecto*. Sed numerus est per se subiectum arithmeticae, quae est scientia realis; ergo etc." (italics mine). For other examples of this argument, see, e.g., Bernard of Auvergne, *Reprobationes Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet* (henceforth *Reprobationes Henrici*) IV, q. 6 (ms. Bologna, Biblioteca Communale dell'Archiginnasio, cod. A.943), 21ra: "Forma denarii est aliquid extra intellectum, [...]. Nisi enim esset aliquid extra intellectum, [...] arithmetica non esset realis scientia. Unde oportet quod numerus sit ab extra non solum secundum unitates materialiter se habentes sed etiam secundum formam"; Terreni, *Quodl.* I, q. 8, 26va: "Scientiae reali oportet dare obiectum reale, quia scientia dicitur realis a realitate obiecti. Sed arithmetica est scientia realis, sexto *Metaphysicae*, cuius obiectum est numerus. Ergo numerus est ens reale"; Francis of Meyronnes, *In I Sententiarum (Conflatus)*, d. 24, a. 1 (ed. Venice 1520), 79rb: "Illud quod est obiectum scientiae realis est reale. Sed numerus est huismodi, quia est obiectum arithmeticae. Maior est communiter concessa. Ergo etc."

[10] I here use the terms 'subject of science' and 'object of science' interchangeably because the later medieval philosophers did so themselves; the *subject* or *object* of a given science is what that given science investigates per se.

[11] See Bernard of Auvergne, *Reprobationes Henrici* IV, q. 6, 21ra: "Sic ergo patet quod numerus est aliquid extra animam, non solum quantum ad materiam sed etiam quantum ad formam."

> mathematical sciences. Therefore, this science is real, and hence so its subject, too, is a real being outside the soul. But its subject is number. Therefore etc.[12]

In response to this objection Henry puts forward a reformulation of what it means for a science to be real. Recall that for the realists, a science derives its reality from its object, so that for a science to be real its object must first be real as well. According to Henry, real sciences study not individual real beings but rather *primary intentions*: the concepts under which these real beings fall. A science is called *real* as long as it is occupied with primary intentions, whereas it is a rational science if it studies *secondary intentions*, which, as Henry puts it, are "produced by the intellect in the soul" (*fabricantur ab intellectu in anima*).[13] Sciences are general, so they need concepts (encompassing the individuals of a given species) to work on. Since these primary intentions are acquired by abstraction from individual, real, extramental entities, in this case, numbered things, there is (provided the abstraction is conducted in the right way) no fiction or distortion in the coming to be of their concepts, and this is why the sciences operating on them are called *real*. Indeed, Henry holds that fiction or deception would be involved if a number were depicted as differing from the numbered things in reality since, according to Henry (for reasons that I shall not explore here), a number is distinct from the numbered things not in reality but only in the intellect.[14]

2.2. *Peter Auriol. Science as Working on Universals*

Another Franciscan, Peter Auriol (ca. 1280-1322), follows Henry's account quite closely, for example, by holding that "for something to be an object of a real science it suffices that it [i.e., the subject] be a primary intention". But Auriol also adds some new considerations over and above those laid out in Henry's text. He emphasises that every science is occupied with universals, not individuals (a point inspired by Henry). Thus, if

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[12] See Henry of Harclay, *In I Sententiarum,* q. 48 (d. 24) (henceforth *In I Sent.* 48), edited by M. Sorokina, "Henri de Harclay sur l'ontologie des nombres: à l'origine d'un désaccord entre Pierre Auriol et Thomas Wylton", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 89 (2022): 35-94, 90: "Praeterea, tres sunt scientiae reales, sexto *Metaphysicae*: naturalis, mathematica et divina. Sed arithmetrica est prima scientiarum mathematicarum. Igitur illa scientia est realis; ergo et eius subiectum est ens reale extra animam. Sed eius subiectum est numerus; ergo etc." See Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, lib. VI, c. 1, 1026a18-19.

[13] There is an extensive body of literature on intentionality in the late Middle Ages, though not on Harclay specifically. For a starting point, see, e.g., Dominik Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2020).

[14] Henry of Harclay, *In I Sent.* 48, 92: "Ad secundum dico quod arithmetica est realis scientia, quia non considerat res secundae intentionis, quae fabricantur ab intellectu in anima. Sed nihil prohibet artificem realem considerare rem primae intentionis, quae est in anima facta a re extra. Sic dico quod geometriae subiectum est ens solum in anima sub illa ratione qua est subiectum geometriae; quia quantitas abstracta non habet esse nisi in intellectu, aliter enim abstractum esset mendacium. Ita dico quod numerus in re non est aliud a rebus numeratis, sed ut distinguitur a rebus numeratis habet tantum esse in intellectu." See Sorokina, "Henri de Harclay", 48.

universals were not identical with the concepts considered by the scientists, universals would need to be posited in reality; a conclusion that Auriol finds unacceptable.[15] (Needless to say, he would face a fierce opposition from many more realistically minded contemporaries and posteriors on this point).

As has been said, Auriol's point of departure seems to be the thesis that a science is occupied not with individuals but with universals—an assumption most of his contemporaries would share (albeit with different thinkers understanding it in very different ways, depending on their metaphysical commitments regarding universals, and also their view on the object of science). In Auriol's case, the reasoning seems to be that, since a science works on universals, the universals need to be posited somewhere. If they are not posited in the mind, they have to be posited in reality (Auriol seems to treat this as an exhaustive alternative); and since, according to Auriol, there are no universals in reality, they must be posited in the mind, as its primary intentions. The reason why a science must be posited to be occupied with universals is simple: the conclusions of each science must be general; that is to say, each science needs to make a conclusion not about just one or a few individuals of a given species but about all individuals of that species, which means working on universals rather than individuals or any sets smaller than entire genera.

Auriol clearly seems to assume that if he can show that the properties of arithmetic do not exist in extramental actuality, or at least do not need to so exist for arithmetic to be a real science, then it will be shown that the reality of arithmetic does not depend on the reality of its object in the way conceived by the realists. Auriol proceeds by drawing an analogy with the properties studied by the geometer, which he also holds do not need extramental existence. It is not fully clear, though, how Auriol's reasoning unfolds. Auriol tells us that "the equality of three angles to two right angles is not in actuality outside the intellect since the two are not always right in actuality when the triangle exists". What he seems to mean is that what is always there are only the three angles but not the two angles being right; as a result, it is only the human intellect that can establish that the triangle's angles are equal to its two right angles. From this, in turn, it follows that the property of equivalence, which is an instance of a primary intention, does not exist in the extramental reality. This is so because this property is a relation, and a relation cannot have actual existence if one of its terms does not actually exist, as is the case here.[16] Auriol

[15] On Auriol on universals, see, e.g., Francis E. Kelley, "Walter Chatton vs. Aureoli and Ockham Regarding the Universal Concept", *Franciscan Studies* 41 (1984): 222-49, and Christian Rode, "Peter Auriol on Universals and the Notion of Passive Conception", in *Universals in the Fourteenth Century*, edited by F. Amerini and L. Cesalli (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2017), 139-154. On Auriol on intentionality, see, e.g., Russell L. Friedman, "Peter Auriol on Intentions and Essential Predication", in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, edited by S. Ebbesen and R. L. Friedman (Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999), 415-430.

[16] See Peter Auriol, *Scriptum in I Sententiarum* (henceforth *Scriptum*), d. 24, a. 1 (unpublished edition by M. Sorokina), 17: "Non valet etiam octavum, quia subiectum scientiae realis non oportet esse realiter extra, prout subicitur passionibus quae inquiruntur in scientia; alioquin sequeretur quod

then extends the same point to the case of properties studied by the arithmetician, such as the property of being a square of; such a property too has no actual existence; rather, it only exists in the soul. While this remains implicit here, it is clear on the basis of what has been said above that Auriol infers from this that arithmetic does not need the actual existence of its object to be a real science, as long as it operates based on universals abstracted from extramental individuals. The arithmetician brings numbers and their properties out of the potency of extramental individuals, as it were, but the actuality that she imposes on them only has mental existence.[17]

If this interpretation of Auriol's somewhat elliptical statements is correct, then it seems quite evident to me that his opponent would remain unimpressed. If we take Auriol's example of being the square of, Auriol does not give us any proof for why this property cannot have actual extramental existence; and clearly to the realist the opposite would be obvious, that since there are extramental numbers, they also stand in certain extramental relationships to each other, and one of them is one number being the square of another. If we go one step back and look at Auriol's geometrical example, the only rationale that he seems to give us for why the property of equivalence cannot have extramental existence is that a triangle can exist while its two angles may not always be right. But I do not see how that would convince, or even bother, the realist: after all, the number of, say, the sheep in a given flock can fluctuate, but the realist does not think that this is any evidence that number itself has no extramental existence. Indeed, this seems to be the murkiest moment in Auriol's reasoning, since, more generally speaking, I cannot see why the fact that a certain property does not always obtain while its bearer, or bearers, do would constitute evidence that this property does not have extramental existence. I must therefore leave it to the reader to decide, also on whether my reading of Auriol is correct.

2.3. *Francis of Marchia. Arithmetic and Other Real Sciences*

I now turn to another great Franciscan, Francis of Marchia (ca. 1285/90-after 1344), whose theory builds upon both Henry of Harclay and Peter Auriol. Francis's reply to the

universalia essent in rerum natura, cum de universalibus sit omnis scientia et non de singularibus, ut dicitur septimo *Metaphysicae*. Sufficit ergo ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum scientiae realis quod sit intentio prima. Et confirmatur ex passionibus quas geometra inquirit aut arithmeticus. Non enim aequalitas trium angulorum ad duos rectos est in actu extra intellectum, cum nec duo recti semper sint in actu dum est triangulus. Nulla autem relatio est in actu termino non existente."

[17] See Peter Auriol, *Scriptum*, 17: "Nulla autem relatio est in actu termino non existente. Similiter quadratura et superficialitas aut esse cubitum, quae circa numeros considerat arithmeticus, non habent esse nisi per apprehensionem intellectus numeros comparantis ad continuas quantitates. Sic igitur numerus pertinet ad scientiam realem, quia res extra sunt in potentia ad formam numeri, sicut res particulares sunt in potentia ut abstrahantur inde universalia de quibus est omnis scientia subiective."

present objection is in fact extraordinarily long and detailed. What distinguishes him somewhat from the other two thinkers is his focus on comparing arithmetic to metaphysics and physics; regarding all of these he clearly assumes that they are real sciences. Francis begins by stating openly that arithmetic, geometry, metaphysics, and physics (to which he also later adds moral sciences) are all disciplines that are "essentially concerned with being in the soul" rather than extramental being.

According to Francis, this is clear with regards to (a) metaphysics (understood as *scientia divina*), which has as its object the causality of the First Cause; Francis holds that this causality "is formally a being of reason, because the relation of each cause and the relation of the principle and the relation of eminence and the relation of first priority towards beings are relations of reason". These claims seem to be based on the commonly accepted claim that there is no real relation between God and creatures going from God towards creatures; rather, all such relations are, as Francis himself says, relations of reason.[18] Thus, metaphysics is a real science despite the fact that its object is a being of reason. (b) Physics, according to Francis, is primarily occupied with the First Mover. But, for the same reason (that is, because there is no real relation from God towards the creature), the relation of the First Mover towards what is moved is a relation of reason too; so, the object of physics is a being of reason. (c) Geometry considers measures such as being two cubits long etc., which, according to Francis, are relations of reason as well.[19] (d) Finally, Francis even goes on to add the moral science, which, he says, is a real science too (since it is concerned with extramental reality): its object are things such as agreements, deposits, and purchases, which are all mere relations of reason—hence the same conclusion as before follows.[20]

[18] The main reason for the denial that the relations going from God towards creatures are real is the worry that this would undermine the divine simplicity. On medieval theories of relations, see, e.g., Mark Henninger, *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1325* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[19] It is an interesting question, which has been brought to my attention by the anonymous referee, why Francis holds that being of a given dimension, e.g., being two cubits long, is a relation of reason. One possible interpretation, also suggested by the referee, with whom I am inclined to agree, is that this is because measuring involves the application of a certain unit of measure, and as such it is an activity performed by the (human) mind; which makes the dimension or measure itself a mere being of reason.

[20] See Francis of Marchia, *Scriptum*, bk. I, d. 24, a. 1, 48-49: "Ad secundam rationem dico quod arithmetica non est magis scientia realis quam metaphysica et physica et geometria, et quaelibet istarum est per se de ente in anima. De metaphysica patet, quia est de causalitate primae causae, cuius causalitas est ens rationis formaliter, quia relatio causae cuiuscumque et relatio principii et relatio eminentiae et relatio primitatis in ente primo ad alia entia est relatio rationis; et tota metaphysica est principaliter de hoc. Similiter in physica principaliter tractatur de primo motore; relatio autem motoris primi ad mobile est relatio rationis. Similiter geometria per se considerat mensuras bicubiti, tricubiti et de aliis, quae sunt relationes rationis. Similiter scientia moralis, quae est scientia realis, per se considerat pactiones, contractus, pignora, mutua,

In light of this enumeration of real sciences having as their objects *entia rationis*, Francis proposes his own reformulation of the criteria of what counts as a real science. He states that there are two possibilities. Firstly, a science can be called 'real' for the simple reason that it concerns real being. (Given how exhaustive Francis's enumeration above was, however, I find it difficult to think of a science that would fulfil this criterion, since regarding each of the real sciences listed above Francis claimed that their objects are *entia rationis*.) The second possibility is that a science is called 'real' "because it concerns a being of reason in a real being"; that is to say, it concerns a being of reason insofar as it is founded upon real being and not upon another being of reason detached from real being. (This is in contrast with a rational science, which studies beings of reason as abstracted from all real being; for instance, "logic concerns the second intentions abstracted from all primary intentions".) All of the real sciences listed above, Francis seems to believe, satisfy this latter criterion, that is, studying beings of reason as founded upon real beings. For example, the moral sciences study the relations of reason such as selling or making contracts; but the foundations of these relations of reason are people entering contracts or selling things, who are real beings.[21]

This is not the end of the story, however, since Francis's opponent, be that real or imaginary, holds his ground and objects to what has been said by stressing that the above considerations do not suffice to make arithmetic a real science, because "arithmetic concerns a number in an absolute way, as abstracting from all matter, not as concerning determinate matter". From this it follows, against Francis, that arithmetic is not a real science because the connection between the being of reason (number) and the real being (numbered thing) is severed.[22]

Quite extraordinarily, Francis contemplates three different replies to this further objection. The first possible reply begins with a distinction between two different kinds of being of reason. Some of them are second intentions (concepts which concern other concepts, e.g., *genus*); they are the subject matter of sciences such as logic and grammar, which are thus not real sciences. Others, on the other hand, are primary intentions (concepts which concern things outside the mind, e.g., *human*); even though they are objectively in the soul, they are based on extramental real beings that the soul grasps primarily and directly rather than reflexively and discursively. The latter, thanks to the

deposita, emptiones et venditiones, quae omnia dicuntur relationes rationis, et tamen est scientia realis."

[21] See Francis of Marchia, *Scriptum*, bk. I, d. 24, a. 1, 49: "Ideo dico quod scientia realis dicitur vel quia est de ente reali, vel quia est de ente rationis in ente reali, inquantum fundatur super ens reale, et non est de ente rationis ut abstrahit ab ente reali, sicut sunt omnes scientiae praedictae. Scientia vero rationalis dicitur quia est de entibus rationis ut abstrahit ab ente reali, sicut logica est de intentionibus secundis abstractis ab omnibus intentionibus primis."

[22] See Francis of Marchia, *Scriptum*, bk. I, d. 24, a. 1, 49: "Sed illud non videtur sufficere, quia arithmetica est de numero absolute, ut abstrahit a qualibet materia, non ut concernit materiam determinatam. Si ergo numerus est ens rationis, sequitur quod arithmetica non erit scientia realis."

connection to real beings that I have just described, can be the proper object of a real science.[23] This reply is closely connected to what we have seen Francis say above about the *entia rationis* as founded upon real being, but it also nuances his claim and further elaborates upon it.

The second possible reply to the realist rejoinder that Francis contemplates is brief: It could be said that when the opponent speaks of an abstract number, he speaks of a number that, even though it belongs to the genus of discrete quantity, is nevertheless not the object of arithmetic but rather belongs to metaphysics, because of its perfectly abstract status. By contrast, the number considered by the arithmetician is a material number present in material things that have quantity.[24] As before, making the distinction and pointing to the second kind of number as one studied by arithmetic secures, in Francis's view, the status of arithmetic as a real science because it preserves its connection to real being.

Incidentally, this is another opportunity to point out the peculiar (from a contemporary point of view) late medieval approach to studying the metaphysical status of numbers: the Latin philosophers in 1250-1400 are much more interested in the latter kind of number, that is, numbers as present in material things, and it is concerning their status that they conduct all the debates analysed here; whereas the first kind of number, the abstract number, never gets singled out as a topic for a special debate, and if anything, seems to simply be subsumed under the general discussion concerning universals.[25]

Finally, the third possible reply contemplated by Francis is based on a fourfold order of being that he lays out. The order is a matrix based on two criteria. The first criterion is whether a given being *is objectively in the soul*. To be objectively in the soul means to be thought of by the soul but in such a way that a given thing would not exist without being in the soul; nevertheless, the soul does not make up its object; rather, the object of thinking is based on how things are in reality. The second criterion is whether a given being *is effectively from the soul*. Unlike the first criterion, where the soul thinks of something that is, at least in a sense, independent of it, in that the soul does not make it

[23] See Francis of Marchia, *Scriptum*, bk. I, d. 24, a. 1, 49: "Potest dici quod entia rationis sunt in duplici differentia: quaedam sunt intentiones secundae, et de talibus est logica et grammatica; ideo non dicuntur proprie scientiae reales. Quaedam sunt intentiones primae; et talia, licet sint tantum in anima obiective, tamen se habent ad actum animae sicut intentiones extra, quia apprehenduntur in prima apprehensione et directe, non per reflexionem. Et quantum ad hoc scientia de eis potest dici scientia realis, quia est de obiectis constitutis per intellectum quasi modo naturae, absque discursu et collatione."

[24] See Francis of Marchia, *Scriptum*, bk. I, d. 24, a. 1, 49-50: "Aliter potest dici quod numerus abstractus ab omni materia, licet sit quantitas discreta, non tamen pertinet per se ad arithmeticam, sed sic abstractus numerus pertinet ad metaphysicum; ad arithmeticam vero pertinet consideratio numeri materialis in rebus habentibus quantitatem, et sic arithmeticus est artifex realis."

[25] For a somewhat more detailed attempt at explaining this late medieval assumption, see Majcherek, "Can an Accident Inhere", 95.

up, if something comes from the soul effectively, it is produced by the soul and thus entirely dependent in what it is on the soul.[26]

With these preliminaries in mind, we can examine Francis's fourfold order of being. (1) First, there are beings that are neither objectively in the soul nor effectively from the soul. An example that Francis gives are natural beings, which are a given to our intellects: they have entirely extramental existence (although, of course, they can be grasped by our intellects: it is just that in their essence and existence they do not depend on being thought of by our intellects). (2) Second, there are beings that are both objectively in, and effectively from, the intellect only: for example, all second intentions fall under this category: e.g., genus, individuum, proposition, and syllogism. All of these exist only in (and so depend for their existence on) the mind and are produced by the mind. (3) Third, there are beings that are outside the mind, and are thus like natural beings, but are effectively from the mind, thus being in this respect closer to primary intentions. Francis's example are artefacts: they are effectively from the intellect of the artificer but once they have been produced, they are independent of the intellect. Finally, (4) fourth, some beings are objectively in the soul only but are not effectively from the soul unless, as Francis puts it, it be "indirectly and accidentally". It is under this category that numbers fall. They exist as objects of thinking only but are not in any way conjured up by the soul.[27]

[26] Francis's third solution, and its reliance on the distinction between being effectively by the soul vs. being objectively in the soul, was first pointed out by William O. Duba, "Three Franciscan Metaphysicians after Scotus: Antonius Andreae, Francis of Marchia, and Nicholas Bonet", in *A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, edited by F. Amerini and G. Galluzzo (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2014), 413-493, at 458. I am indebted to the anonymous referee for this reference. For more on Francis of Marchia on intentionality, see, e.g., William O. Duba, "Neither First, nor Second, nor... in his Commentary on the *Sentences*. Francis of Marchia's *intentiones neutrae*", *Quaestio* 10: 285-313.

[27] See Francis of Marchia, *Scriptum*, bk. I, d. 24, a. 1, 50: "Aliter potest dici ad istam rationem et ad omnes sequentes quod licet numerus sit tantum in anima obiective, non tamen est per se ab anima effective. Unde potest poni quadruplex ordo entium. Quaedam sunt entia quae non sunt ab anima effective, nec sunt tantum in anima obiective, sicut sunt entia naturalia, quae non dependent ab anima obiective nec effective. Quaedam vero entia sunt quae sunt tantum in anima obiective et per se ab anima effective, sicut sunt secundae intentiones omnes, ut intentio generis et individui, propositionis, syllogismi, quae non sunt nisi tantum in anima obiective et ab anima effective. Quaedam vero entia sunt quae sunt tantum ab anima effective et sunt extra animam subiective sicut sunt entia artificialia, quae sunt ab intellectu effective et non a natura, sed sunt extra subiective. Quaedam vero entia sunt quae sunt tantum in anima obiective, sed non sunt per se ab anima effective nisi tantum indirecte per accidens, sicut sunt omnes species numerorum quae, licet sint tantum obiective in anima, non tamen sunt per se effective ab anima, sed quaelibet earum consequitur unitates quodam ordine conceptas, et sicut res extra consequuntur proprie accidentia extra, ita unitates quodam ordine conceptas consequitur propria forma numeri secundum diversam proportionem unitatum conceptarum quae non consequitur eas extra, quia unitates extra distinguuntur subiecto et loco; eadem autem forma accidentalis non potest simul fundari in diversis subiectis loco et subiecto distinctis. Sed unitates conceptae apud intellectum

However, the way in which Francis's third reply proceeds seems to put the connection between numbers and reality at jeopardy, since he seems to deny any relation or correspondence between the order of unities within a number and the order of extramental unities. Francis begins on a note that could seem to suggest the opposite: he again reiterates that numbers are not effectively from the soul but are only in it objectively. Then he adds that each number "follows unities conceived in a certain order", and the unities conceived in their order "are followed by the proper form of number in accordance with the diverse proportion of conceived unities". (This, then, is an example of an emergentist theory of the form of number, whereby the form arises from a given order of unities.)

Then, however, Francis adds that the diverse proportion of unities in the mind does not correspond to, or follow from, how things are outside the intellect. The reason that he gives, which I cannot discuss here in detail, is one of the standard arguments against realism about numbers: one form needs one subject; but the unities that would be the subject of the extramental form of number are not unified into a single subject since they are themselves distinct in subject and can also be distinct in place.[28] This problem obviously does not plague unities present in the intellect, since these are "distinct neither in place nor in subject". For Francis this implies not only that the form of number has no extramental existence but also that the form of number arises not from the unities in the extramental reality but from the unities as conceived by the mind. At this point it looks almost as if Francis has noticed that his considerations have cast serious doubt onto the reality of the object of arithmetic and hence onto the status of arithmetic as a real science. As a last-ditch attempt (which, to my mind, is entirely unconvincing), he returns to the distinction between rational and real sciences by saying that:

> And thus this is the difference between the second intentions considered by logic and the primary intentions considered by arithmetic, because logic concerns second intentions, which are only in the soul and from the soul, and for this reason it is not a real science; but arithmetic concerns primary intentions, which are not from the soul but follow from things according to the mode of being in the soul; and in that respect arithmetic can be called real.[29]

non distinguuntur loco nec subiecto. Ideo forma numeri consequitur eas apud intellectum et non consequitur eas in re extra. Et tunc haec est differentia inter intentiones secundas quas considerat logica et intentiones primas quas considerat arithmetica, quia logica est de intentionibus secundis quae sunt tantum in anima et ab anima, ideo non est scientia realis; sed arithmetica est de intentionibus primis quae non sunt ab anima sed consequuntur res secundum modum essendi in anima, et quantum ad hoc potest dici realis."

[28] For the text, see n. 25. For a discussion of this problem, see Kamil Majcherek, "Can an Accident Inhere".

[29] Francis of Marchia, *Scriptum*, bk. I, d. 24, a. 1, 51: "Et tunc haec est differentia inter intentiones secundas quas considerat logica et intentiones primas quas considerat arithmetica, quia logica est de intentionibus secundis, quae sunt tantum in anima et ab anima, ideo non est scientia realis;

As I have said, I find this explanation unconvincing. In his third reply, Francis has divorced numbers so far from the state of reality that he can no longer reconnect the two, and ends on a very weak note: arithmetic can be called *real science* in some respect, namely, insofar as it considers primary intentions; as opposed to rational sciences, which consider second intentions. But, given the strong divide between arithmetic and reality, one might have serious doubts about whether this really suffices to make arithmetic a real science; this is, I take it, the source of Francis's qualification that arithmetic can be called *real* in a certain respect only.

2.4. *William of Ockham. Rejection of Real Science*

William of Ockham famously defends an original view of science as an aggregate of pieces of knowledge.[30] This, however, has little influence on what he says about the realist argument I am presently discussing. Ockham denies that "sciences have real distinct subjects"—rather, in his view, they are occupied with concepts. Thus, the only element of *reality* involved in a science are the concepts in my mind, which are real qualities (habits of my mind; Ockham is a realist about several kinds of quality), in the sense that they are distinct from my mind but obviously not in the sense that they exist outside the mind.[31] Therefore, Ockham's case involves not, as in the authors discussed above, an attempt to accommodate the assumption about the reality of the science of arithmetic but rather the rejection of this assumption; for this reason, I am only mentioning him very briefly here.

Ockham refuses to take the talk of *real objects* and *sciences* seriously. One of the examples he gives is this. I can certainly gain knowledge (*scientia*) of people. People exist outside the mind, so the science concerning them that gets developed would need to count as a real science. Yet it is clear that "people do not signify some one thing really and totally distinct from each human being, nor one <thing> composed of them." According to the realists, each science has its own proper subject. But the science of the people is different from the science of an individual human being because it proves different properties of its subject. Furthermore, the science of the people should, as I said, count as a real science, and yet its subject is *not* real because there is no such thing, Ockham says, as people—there is just this individual human being, that individual human

sed arithmetica est de intentionibus primis, quae non sunt ab anima, sed consequuntur res secundum modum essendi in anima, et quantum ad hoc potest dici realis".

[30] On Ockham's theory of *scientia*, see Jenny Pelletier, *William of Ockham on Metaphysics: The Science of Being and God* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2012), Chapter 1.

[31] See Ockham, *Ordinatio in I Sententiarum* (henceforth *Ordinatio*), d. 24, a. 2, in *Guillelmi de Ockham Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Distinctiones XIX–XLVIII*, edited by G. Etzkorn and F. Kelley, vol. IV of *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Theologica*, edited by G. Gál et al. (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 2000), 115: "Numquam scientiae de quibus loquitur Philosophus habent subiecta realia distincta, nisi ponatur quod conceptus sit qualitas subiective in anima." On Ockham's realism about quality, see, e.g., Marilyn McCord Adams, *William of Ockham* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 277-286.

being, and so on. Claiming that the science of the people is somehow just a science of a human being taken in the plural will not do, since, as I said, the properties proven by the science of the human being differ from the properties proven by the science of the people, so the two must be distinct. The only concession that Ockham is ultimately willing to make is to admit that arithmetic (and each other science) has one subject matter, because the concept of number is one and distinct from others.[32] A reply somewhat similar to Ockham's was also given by another reductionist about numbers, William of Rubio. Rubio's purpose in his response to the argument is to show that it is not necessary that when one science is really distinct from another, their subjects must be really distinct too. In a nutshell, his main point is that the same thing, or things, can be considered from different perspectives in virtue of the fact that one and the same thing "can have both diverse acts and diverse habits". For example, I derive a different concept from whiteness when I consider it absolutely, that is, in itself, and a different concept when I compare it to another whiteness and thus grasp its similarity to the other whiteness. Thus, I can also have a different concept of things taken together as numbered together and a different concept of each of them taken separately.[33]

3. Conclusion

Is it possible to declare a clear winner in the debate I have reconstructed and analysed above? It seems to me that it is not: the two camps employ two very different criteria of the reality of science; for the realists, the reality of science depends on the reality of its object in the sense that the object of a real science must itself have extramental reality, whereas for the anti-realists, the reality of science depends on the reality of its object in a different sense, whereby the object, as a primary intention, is based on how things are

[32] See Ockham, *Ordinatio*, lib. I, d. 24, a. 2, 115-16: "Ad tertium diceretur quod numquam scientiae de quibus loquitur Philosophus habent subiecta realia distincta, nisi ponatur quod conceptus sit qualitas subiective in anima. Nec etiam semper subiecta distincta distinctarum scientiarum supponunt vel stant pro rebus realiter et totaliter distinctis. Unde alia scientia potest esse de homine et de populo. Unde de homine possum scire quod homo est risibilis, quod est susceptibilis disciplinae, quod est beatificabilis, et sic de aliis. De populo possum scire quod exercitus debet eligere ducem vel principem, quod debet unanimiter congredi contra inimicos, et sic de aliis conclusionibus quae sunt distinctae scientiae. Et tamen exercitus vel populus non significat aliquam unam rem realiter et totaliter distinctam a quolibet homine, nec etiam unum compositum ex eis. [...]. Et si dicatur quod unius scientiae est unum subiectum, concedendum est quod est unum subiectum, quia iste conceptus 'numerus' est conceptus unus et distinctus conceptus."

[33] See Rubio, *In I Sententiarum*, d. 24, a. 2 (ed. Paris 1518), 168va-b: "Non omnes scientiae realiter distinctae habent subiecta in re extra distincta, cum eiusdem rei possunt esse tam actus quam habitus specie diversi. Sicut enim alium conceptum habeo de una albedine quando eam intelligo absolute, et alium quando comparo ipsam ad aliam intelligendo quod est talis qualis illa, et per consequens ipsi similis, ita consimiliter alium conceptum et habitum habere possum de pluribus rebus simul sumptis ab earum numero distinctis, et alium de quaelibet ipsarum tantummodo per se sumptis. Quare etc."

in the extramental reality, but the object itself does not have to possess extramental reality. The two sides are hence able to sustain their very different conceptions of the metaphysical status of number against each other's objections. It is worth emphasising that these two different understandings of reality of science are by no means an *ad hoc* manoeuvre used by the two sides; rather, they are considered views of our authors on what an object of science and what the reality of science consist in, the articulation of which was necessitated by the realist argument tying the reality of number to the reality of the science of arithmetic. This, however, leads me to my final conclusion, which is that in the debate at hand, both sides seem to a large degree to be speaking past each other: what is at stake is the extramental existence of numbers, but what informs the arguments and rebuttals used in the debate about this issue is the set of background assumptions concerning the reality of science, which sets the two camps so far apart that one can have serious doubts about whether these arguments and rebuttals ever reach their targets.

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ANTECEDENTES ESCOLÁSTICOS DE LA SEMIÓTICA: LOS FUTUROS CONTINGENTES EN EL *COMENTARIO A LAS SENTENCIAS* DE ROBERT HOLCOT (LIB. II, Q. 2)

SCHOLASTIC ANTECEDENTS TO SEMIOTICS: FUTURE CONTINGENTS IN ROBERT HOLCOT'S *COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES* (LIB. II, Q. 2)

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Resumen

La propuesta de este trabajo es reseñar el contenido general de la argumentación de Robert Holcot respecto del problema de los futuros contingentes en el *Comentario a las Sentencias*. Analizaremos la tesis del dominico referente a que los eventos del futuro no se tornan necesarios al ser revelados, pues esto llevaría, según su criterio, a anular el libre albedrío, sino que permanecen contingentes, *mutatis mutandis*, como lo sostuvo otrora Aristóteles. De la misma manera, mostraremos cómo, para sostener esto, se debe admitir la posibilidad, al menos lógica, de que Dios –quien tiene *scientia* de los sucesos futuros– sea engañador en tanto puede hacer profecías que después no se cumplen. Posibilidad que, ejemplificada con pasajes de la Escritura y refrendada por la autoridad de Agustín, hace admitir a Holcot que puede darse la salvación a personas con base en una falsa creencia.

Palabras clave

Dios; engaño; futuros contingentes; Holcot; valor de verdad

Abstract

The position about future contingents that Holcot presents in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, although central and much debated in his time, is little known today. The aim of this paper is to review the general content of *quaestio* 2. We will analyse the Dominican's thesis that future events do not become necessary when revealed, as this would, in his view, nullify free will, but remain contingent, *mutatis mutandis*, as Aristotle once argued. Similarly, we will show how, to sustain this, one must admit the possibility, at least logically, that God—who has *scientia* of future events—is deceitful insofar as he can make prophecies that are not fulfilled. This possibility, exemplified by passages from Scripture and endorsed by the authority of Augustine, leads Holcot to admit that salvation can be granted to people based on a false belief.

Keywords

God; Deception; Future Contingent; Holcot; Truth Value

Introducción

Específicamente, el problema de los futuros contingentes surge del *De interpretatione* de Aristóteles donde el Estagirita establece el principio de la bivalencia, *i.e.*, que toda proposición es verdadera o falsa según se corresponda o no con los hechos.[1] Para el capítulo 9 del tratado (18a18-19b4), el Estagirita acota el alcance de tal regla: solo se aplica a las proposiciones enunciadas en presente o pasado que refieren a lo que es o fue, respectivamente ¿Por qué tal recorte? Dicho muy sucintamente, porque las proposiciones contingentes acerca del futuro (por ejemplo, "mañana habrá una batalla naval") no tienen un suceso presente o pasado al cual corresponder, y ser verdaderas, o no corresponder, y ser falsas, de donde se sigue que no puede determinarse su valor de verdad.[2] Estos pasajes llevan a un dilema que ha dividido aguas entre los filósofos que han estudiado este problema: o bien los futuros están realmente indeterminados y no puede haber ningún tipo de presciencia al respecto, o bien hay una precognición posible, pero al costo de anular la libertad humana y divina, y de admitir un determinismo absoluto respecto de los eventos futuros.[3]

En el Medioevo latino, este problema se complejiza porque tal *dictum* debe ponerse en conjunción con la idea de que Dios tiene conocimiento de los eventos futuros. De tal tensión, surgen propuestas variadas, incluso algunas que anulan la contingencia de los futuros convirtiendo todo suceso, incluso la condena o salvación de las almas particulares, en un producto de la necesidad o de la determinación divina.

Respecto de tal problema hay una *quaestio* de sumo interés. Escrita a principios de la década de 1330, poco estudiada pero fundamental, la *quaestio* II del *Comentario* de Holcot a las *Sentencias* de Pedro Lombardo viene a colaborar a la comprensión de su particular postura sobre los futuros contingentes presentada de forma más detallada en sus *Quodlibet*. Postura que, aunque fue central y muy discutida en su tiempo, es poco conocida hoy día.

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[1] Jeremy Byrd, "The Necessity of Tomorrow's Sea Battle", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 48/2 (2010): 160-176.
[2] John Slotemaker y Jeffrey Witt, *Robert Holcot* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 87-88.
[3] Slotemaker y Witt, *Robert Holcot*, 90.

La intención de este trabajo es reseñar la propuesta general de la *quaestio* titulada "*Utrum deus ab aeterno sciverit se producturum mundum*" (Si Dios desde la eternidad sabía que él habría de producir el mundo o no). El objetivo de Holcot allí es dar solución al problema de la contingencia de la creación, *i.e.*, que, si Dios conoce desde la eternidad su condición de creador, entonces no podría crear nada distinto que eso que conoce –que queda, por ende, determinado– y no lo haría libremente sino por necesidad.[4] Al hacer lo anterior, (1) presentaremos la tesis del dominico referente al valor de verdad de los enunciados contingentes acerca del futuro, así como algunas de las consecuencias más destacables de aquella a nivel (2) lógico, (3) doctrinal y (4) práctico.

(1) Respecto al primer punto, contra la postura tradicional que aspiraba a solucionar el problema apelando a la distinción del ámbito humano de la sucesión temporal y el ámbito divino de eternidad, Holcot sostiene que la presciencia divina se inserta en la temporalidad a la hora de hacer profecías, saliéndose de su eterno presente al hacer referencia a eventos puntuales con categorías espaciotemporales. Esto porque que Dios exista y piense desde la eternidad no significa que al mentar proposiciones futuras, pueda extraer el carácter temporal de aquellas. Su solución es que los eventos del futuro no se tornan necesarios al ser revelados, pues esto llevaría, según su criterio, a anular el libre albedrío, sino que permanecen contingentes, *mutatis mutandis*, como lo sostuvo otrora Aristóteles, incluso aunque hayan sido profetizados.[5] De sostener que la proposición "Dios sabía que Él habría de crear el universo" es verdadera desde la eternidad, Holcot entiende que se anula la libertad divina y que la creación se convierte en un evento necesario. En la misma línea, si la proposición *a* es contingente y futura, siempre tiene indeterminado su valor de verdad hasta realizado o no el hecho mentado por ella.

(2) La consecuencia más tangible a nivel lógico de dicha posición es la relativización –aunque parcial– del sistema lógico binario de Aristóteles en pos de un valor de verdad *sui generis* para los enunciados que refieren a futuros contingentes. En otras palabras, el acercamiento del sistema lógico de Holcot a una lógica modal o trivalente, donde hay más variables que verdadero o falso a la hora de clasificar a los enunciados.[6] Así, lo contingente queda en un punto intermedio entre lo necesario, siempre verdadero y lo imposible, siempre falso, como eso que es tan posible que se dé como que no se dé y, de ahí, que los enunciados del pasado no son absolutamente necesarios, sino necesarios *per accidens*, y los enunciados acerca del futuro pronunciados en el presente o el pasado tienen un valor

[4] Gustavo Fernández Walker, "*Person of Interest*. La máquina de senderos que se bifurcan", *Verba Volant. Revista de Filosofía y Psicoanálisis* 2 (2017): 80-92.
[5] Robert Holcot, *In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Quaestiones, Quaestio II, Libri secundi. Utrum Deus ab aeterno sciverit se producturum mundim* editado por P. Streveler y K. Tachau, *Seeing the Future Clearly. Questions on Future Contingents by Robert Holcot* (Toronto: PIMS, 1995), 147, 795; 180, 1415.
[6] Hester G. Gelber y John Slotemaker, "Robert Holkot", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/holkot/>.

de verdad indeterminado y no se tornan necesarios hasta darse realizados, incluso aunque sean parte de una profecía divina.[7]

(3) En tercer término, entre las implicancias doctrinales de lo anterior se destaca la admisión de la posibilidad, al menos lógica, de que Dios –quien tiene *scientia* de los sucesos futuros– sea engañador.[8] En tanto la necesidad de los eventos profetizados por dios a través de Cristo o la Escritura es para Holcot inadmisible porque limita la omnipotencia divina (de hacer algo diferente a lo que dijo) y porque anula la libertad humana (para ganarse la salvación o la condena por sus propios actos), la dificultad del dominico es defender la honestidad de Dios y la veracidad de la Escritura en tanto parecen contraponerse a la contingencia de los hechos profetizados. En esta línea, Holcot defiende que "engañar" puede entenderse de muchas maneras, y que como capacidad divina no es un vicio sino una perfección que lo habilita a poder profetizar algo que luego no suceda o a decir algo diferente de lo que es.[9] Holcot ejemplifica tal cualidad con pasajes de la Escritura y apelando a las cualidades divinas: debe poder engañar a los demonios, Cristo nace de una virgen para engañar al Diablo, Rebeca y Jacob engañan a Isaac, etc.[10] Apela también al respecto a la autoridad de Agustín quien, refiriendo a Reyes III, afirma que Dios engañó a los malos ángeles y a los malos hombres y que hizo que los israelitas engañaran a los egipcios.[11]

(4) Finalmente, la posibilidad de engaño divino lleva a problemas prácticos. En la cosmovisión cristiana, hay gente que actuó en consecuencia a profecías divinas y fue salvada. A su vez, hay otro grupo de personas que actuó contra ellas y fue condenada. Ahora, al ser contingente tal profecía, puede darse la salvación o la condena a personas con base en una falsa creencia.[12] La solución de Holcot es descartar la creencia adecuada como requisito para la salvación y admitirla incluso para quienes fueran justos a pesar de su desconocimiento de las Escrituras.[13]

La hipótesis interpretativa que guía la lectura es que la solución de Holcot al problema de los futuros contingentes presupone un gran esfuerzo por mantenerse en los márgenes de los presupuestos aristotélicos y católicos que regían en la universidad de su tiempo. En otras palabras, que el ataque de Holcot contra las profecías y su defensa del engaño divino son condición de posibilidad para garantizar la libertad de la acción tanto humana como divina. Asimismo, entiendo que hay una retroalimentación entre las tesis teológicas y las

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[7] Hester G. Gelber, *It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300-1350* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004), 178-179, 172.
[8] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 153, 907-914; 154, 930-935; 171,1251-1264.
[9] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 131, 419-420.
[10] Joseph Incandela, "Robert Holcot, O.P., on Prophecy, the Contingency of Revelation, and the Freedom of God", *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 4 (1994): 165-188.
[11] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 155, 940-157, 970.
[12] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 130, 404-407; 154, 930-155, 935; 156, 950-157, 976; 165, 167, 1120-1125; 1179-1264; Incandela, "Robert Holcot, O.P., on Prophecy".
[13] Incandela, "Robert Holcot, O.P., on Prophecy".

tesis lógicas defendidas por el dominico inglés: su lógica trivalente y su embate contra la determinación del valor de verdad de los enunciados que refieren a futuros contingentes son condición necesaria y suficiente para admitir la posibilidad de que Dios engañe, para anular la posibilidad de una profecía y para descartar la creencia adecuada como criterio para obtener la salvación o el castigo.

1. Futuros contingentes, tiempo y eternidad

Respecto del problema de los futuros contingentes en el ámbito cristiano, es célebre la solución que dio Boecio, para quien la contradicción entre la contingencia de los futuros y la precognición divina era solo aparente. Lo anterior lo justificaba apelando a que, mientras que en la temporalidad los seres humanos eligen libremente y los sucesos futuros pueden suceder, no suceder o ser diferentes, Dios prevé todos los fenómenos, pero no bajo el lente de la sucesión temporal, sino en el presente constante en el que consiste la eternidad.

Como señalé más arriba, Holcot descarta soluciones afines a la anterior por entender que los enunciados pronunciados por Dios se someten a la sucesión temporal al momento de enunciar un evento sobre el futuro. Para el dominico inglés, cuando Dios interviene en el mundo de la creatura se somete a las mismas reglas que aquella, *i.e.*, a que lo enunciado en el presente acerca del futuro tiene un valor de verdad indeterminado e indeterminable, sin importar si esto fue enunciado por Dios o por un profeta. Hay un pasaje en el que Holcot ejemplifica el estatuto de las proposiciones contingentes que refieren al futuro:

> Del mismo modo, algunas proposiciones acerca del futuro son verdaderas, aunque no lo serán sino hasta cierto momento, por ejemplo: 'Sócrates pecará mañana', 'el día del juicio sucederá' y, de este modo, pueden antes de ese tiempo nunca ser verdaderas o jamás haber sido verdaderas. No obstante, no pueden antes de ese tiempo ser verdaderas y falsas sucesivamente, o cambiar de verdad a falsedad.[14]

Así, las proposiciones contingentes acerca del futuro tienen indeterminado su valor de verdad hasta un momento dado en el tiempo. Enunciados como "Sócrates pecará mañana" o "Sucederá el día del juicio" carecen de valor de verdad hasta determinado momento en el tiempo. El principio que establece verdad por correspondencia con los hechos a los enunciados sintéticos en conjunción con la inexistencia actual de los eventos futuros imposibilita la asignación de un valor, tanto verdadero como falso, para dichas afirmaciones. Aunque el día del juicio o el pecado de Sócrates sean enunciados por Dios, en tanto pronunciados, se salen del ámbito de la eternidad y deben someterse a las reglas propias de la contingencia. Hasta que no se haya transitado el día siguiente a aquel en que

[14] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 147, 795-799: "Similiter, aliquae propositiones sunt de futuro ques sunt verae, et non erunt verae nisi ad certum tempus, sicut: 'Sortes peccabit cras', 'dies' juidici erit', et huiusmodi possunt ante tempus illud non esse verae et numquam fuisse verae. Non tamen possunt ante tempus illud esse verae et falsae successive, vel mutari de veritate in falsitatem".

se enuncia "Sócrates pecará mañana" no puede establecerse el valor de verdad de tal afirmación y este permanece indeterminado. Solamente cometido el pecado al día siguiente de pronunciar esa proposición o al tercer día en caso de no haberse realizado es que la proposición, ya no futura sino pasada, tendrá un valor de verdad determinado por los sucesos presentes y/o pretéritos: verdadero en el primer caso o falso en el segundo. El ejemplo del día del juicio es más difícil de precisar en tanto refiere a un momento indeterminado del tiempo. A diferencia de la de Sócrates, que específicamente hablaba del día siguiente, esta permanece indeterminada a menos que efectivamente suceda el día del juicio y no hay un día último en el que esta pase a ser falsa.

Ya desde la pregunta que motiva la *quaestio*, Holcot busca defender la acción libre de Dios y la indeterminación de los eventos futuros. Se pregunta "si Dios desde la eternidad sabía que el habría de producir el mundo o no".[15] Su respuesta solo puede ser negativa. Si Dios hubiera sabido lo que iba a crear, toda la creación queda determinada. ¿Por qué? Porque la *scientia* divina presupone una correspondencia exacta con el objeto intencionado. Si Dios hubiera conocido el universo desde la eternidad, queda anulada la posibilidad de acción libre por parte del Creador y de la creatura, así como queda anulada la contingencia. La libertad queda anulada por la determinación que supondría la *scientia* divina acerca de ese mundo aún por crear. Específicamente, la libertad divina de crear se anula y la creación pasa de ser libre a mecánica. De la misma manera, la contingencia desaparece, así como toda posibilidad de cambiar el devenir predeterminado por la cognición divina.

En esta misma línea es que Holcot desestima la posibilidad de hacer profecías y sugiere no darles crédito. Su definición de profecía es la siguiente:

> Inspiración divina que anuncia el resultado de las cosas con verdad inmutable. Luego, si se profetiza que algo sucederá en el futuro, eso inmutablemente se dará en el futuro, y más aún: va a suceder necesariamente en el futuro.[16]

La anulación de la posibilidad de profetizar –tanto por parte de Dios, de un ángel o de un mortal– está dada por la negación de la estabilidad del valor de verdad de los enunciados contingentes acerca del futuro. Ninguna profecía es eficaz en tanto toda proposición contingente que refiere a hechos futuros es indeterminada hasta que suceda el hecho profetizado. La definición de profecía como enunciado sobre el futuro con valor de verdad determinado es, en la concepción de Holcot, un oxímoron porque si un enunciado es acerca del futuro, necesariamente tiene un valor de verdad indeterminado.

[15] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 112: "Utrum Deus ab aeterno sciverit se producturum mundum".
[16] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 134, 497-500: "[P]rophetia est divina inspiratio rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians. Ergo, si aliquid est prophetatum esse futurum, illud immobiliter erit futurum, et ultra: necessario erit futurum".

2. El valor de verdad de las proposiciones contingentes sobre el futuro

A criterio de Gelber, la propuesta de Holcot en referencia al valor de verdad de las proposiciones contingentes que refieren al futuro presupone una ruptura con el principio aristotélico de bivalencia y un acercamiento a una lógica modal o trivalente. Si la proposición *a* es un futuro contingente y es conocida por Dios, aun así puede ser falsa, pues en tanto refiere al futuro puede devenir falsa. A este tipo de oraciones que refieren a fenómenos contingentes que pueden o no suceder en un futuro, Holcot, siguiendo a Pedro Lombardo y a otros autores medievales, llama "de pasado contrafáctico".[17] Las características principales de estos enunciados son que: son verdaderos de un modo tal que podrían nunca haberlo sido, y que tuvieron un valor de verdad indeterminado hasta una vez sucedido el hecho predicho por ellos.

De este modo, contra la bivalencia entre lo verdadero y lo falso, lo contingente es un intermedio entre lo necesario y lo imposible, *i.e.*, algo a lo que siempre le fue posible ser y al mismo tiempo siempre le fue posible no ser. En otras palabras, lo contingente pudo nunca haber sido o haber sido siempre. El análisis de Holcot acerca de la contingencia hace a cada evento contingente necesario o imposible dependiendo del mundo posible que se tome como base y de las afirmaciones a él asociadas.[18] La propuesta modal de Holcot habilita a sostener la libertad divina y la contingencia en la medida en que se admiten infinidad de historias paralelas del mundo en función de asignar valores verdaderos o falsos a diferentes proposiciones contingentes. El pasado no se torna necesario sino *per accidens:* necesario para la sucesión de eventos que llevan al presente, pero no necesario *per se*. Solo es necesario como lo puede ser algo que sucedió efectivamente, pero que podría jamás haber sido.[19]

La posición de Holcot en referencia al valor de verdad supone, entonces, el entrecruzamiento de diversas taxonomías a nivel ontológico y lógico. A nivel ontológico, la primera taxonomía es temporal: hay sucesos pretéritos, presentes y futuros. Eventos que o bien sucedieron, o bien no; que suceden o no, en el presente; y que sucederán o no, en un tiempo futuro. A nivel lógico, una primera clasificación de las proposiciones contingentes según su valor de verdad que incluye a los enunciados contingentes acerca del futuro supone la ruptura de la bivalencia aristotélica: hay proposiciones verdaderas, que se corresponden con la realidad pasada o presente ya realizada; falsas, que enuncian algo diverso de los hechos presentes o pretéritos; y la novedad de Holcot supone admitir un tercer grupo de proposiciones con valor de verdad indeterminado. Esas últimas proposiciones con valor de verdad indeterminado son aquellas que refieren a los futuros contingentes y que, de devenir verdaderas, *i.e.*, en caso de que suceda el hecho predicho se volverán verdaderas. Verdaderas, pero con una verdad que podría no haberse dado, verdaderas de un modo en el que podrían no haber sido nunca verdaderas. Esto abre la puerta a la tricotomía entre proposiciones necesarias, imposibles y contingentes. Las

[17] Gelber, *It Could Have Been Otherwise*, 171-172.
[18] Gelber, *It Could Have Been Otherwise*, 177-178.
[19] Gelber, *It Could Have Been Otherwise*, 179.

proposiciones contingentes son un intermedio entre lo necesario y lo imposible y devendrán necesarias por accidente en caso de volverse verdaderas por la sucesión de eventos posteriores a su enunciación.[20]

3. ¿Dios engañador?

Para Holcot, entonces, no se puede establecer de antemano el valor de verdad de un enunciado contingente que refiere al futuro. Este no es ni verdadero ni falso y permanece indeterminado hasta ser verificado o refutado por haber devenido presente o pasado el hecho predicho o su contrario. Tal verificación no convierte al enunciado en necesario, salvo *per accidens* porque es verdadero, pero de un modo en el cual podría no haber sido jamás verdadero.

De lo anterior se sigue que la profecía es imposible. Más arriba señalé que la definición de profecía del dominico inglés suponía referencia al futuro, inspiración divina y verdad necesaria. No obstante, Holcot no admite que se pueda establecer la necesidad de proposiciones del tipo "Sócrates pecará mañana" y similares. Esta anulación de la verdad necesaria que proveería la profecía lleva a un problema teológico de sumo interés: ¿qué sucede con la suma bondad divina? Que las profecías sean contingentes supone que ellas no son necesariamente verdaderas. En otras palabras, la definición de profecía provista por el dominico inglés es un oxímoron en tanto no puede haber una verdad necesaria en referencia a los futuros contingentes. Así, Dios sería engañador en el sentido de que sus dichos acerca del futuro –sean directos o tomados de las Escrituras– no dejan de ser contingentes y, por ende, pueden no cumplirse. La falibilidad de los vaticinios divinos *prima facie* va contra una tradición según la cual Dios es suma bondad y, por ende, no comete pecados como el engaño.

Contra lo anterior, Holcot va a argumentar que Dios tiene que poder engañar. Asimismo, va a defender que su capacidad para engañar no atenta en absoluto contra su suma bondad. Finalmente, provocativamente, sostiene que, si Dios no pudiera engañar, no sería omnipotente.

Lo anterior rompería con la caracterización que hace Anselmo de Dios como aquello de lo cual no puede pensarse nada mayor:

> Dios no puede dar seguridad a ningún hombre sobre algo futuro y contingente, tampoco ningún hombre puede vivir con certeza o tener esperanza en lo que Dios promete sin ser

[20] Holcot distingue entre dos modos en que una proposición puede ser verdadera. Por una parte, una proposición es verdadera *simpliciter* cuando refiere al pasado o al presente, y, por ende, no remite a nada futuro. Por otro, una proposición es verdadera "de otro modo" (*aliter/secus*) cuando versa sobre futuros contingentes y, por esto, admiten la posibilidad de que su contraria sea verdadera. Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II 146, 759-760; 127, 336-338. Cf. Natalia Jakubecki, "Robert Holcot: El conocimiento de Dios y los futuros contingentes en las *Quodlibet* III, *questiones* 1 y 2", *Temas Medievales*, 31(2023), 1-30, 8-9.

> engañado, porque no importa cuánto Dios pueda afirmar que algo sucederá en el futuro, incluso después de su afirmación o promesa, Dios puede hacer que suceda lo opuesto en ese tiempo, sin importar la promesa o revelación de Dios, lo que prometió se mantiene tan contingente después de su revelación o promesa que antes.[21]

Con lo anterior, el dominico inglés presenta lo más escandaloso de su tesis: Dios puede engañar y el hombre no puede fiarse de los vaticinios divinos. La posibilidad de que Dios engañe está supuesta en su omnipotencia. La omnipotencia divina en conjunción con el estatuto contingente de los enunciados futuros –con valor de verdad indeterminado hasta sucedido el hecho referido– hace que Holcot defienda la posibilidad del engaño divino. Asimismo, el hombre debe cuidarse de creer lo supuestamente profetizado por Dios o por la inspiración divina en la medida en que, aunque una proposición sobre el futuro fuera pronunciada por Dios, esta no deja de ser contingente y, *a fortiori*, su valor de verdad permanece indeterminado.

La defensa de Holcot de la posibilidad de que Dios mienta nos lleva al siguiente interrogante: ¿Es mentir una perfección? En otras palabras, ¿el poder de mentir de Dios lo vuelve menos bueno, *i.e.*, pierde su carácter de suma bondad? Pues bien, el dominico inglés parece entender que sí. Efectivamente, Dios tiene que poder decir que sucederá algo que luego no sucede. Al respecto suministra varios ejemplos bíblicos de engaños realizados por el Creador: Dios tiene que poder engañar a los demonios, ordenó que los hijos de Israel engañaran a los egipcios, hizo que Cristo naciera de una virgen para engañar al diablo.[22]

Establecido que Dios tiene la capacidad de engañar, Holcot señala algunas diferencias respecto de mentir, cometer perjurio y engañar. Esto da luz sobre en qué consiste la capacidad divina de engañar y cómo se diferencia en la acción inmoral realizada por los hombres:

> Yo, no obstante, no veo que se siga una contradicción si se concediera que Dios afirma lo falso a sabiendas; pero que Dios miente o comete perjurio, o que sea falso del mismo modo que del mentiroso se dice que es falso, eso no lo concedo porque según Agustín, en el libro De mendacio, capítulo iii, 'la mentira es la significación falsa de un discurso con la intención de engañar'. Y esto debe entenderse así: con intención desordenada de engañar. No obstante, Dios no puede tener intención desordenada en nada de lo que hace, y, por esto,

[21] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 133, 471-476: "[...] Deus non posset certificare hominem de aliquo futuro, nec posset homo certitudinaliter credere vel sperare illud quod Deus promittit nisi deciperetur, quia quantumcumque asseruit se aliquid esse facturum, potest post assertionem vel promissionem facere oppositum, quia tale dictum, non obstante revelatione vel promissione Dei, manet contingens post dictum vel promissionem sicut ante".
[22] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 136, 545-137, 565.

> Dios no puede mentir ni cometer perjurio, aunque Dios puede afirmar lo falso a sabiendas y con la intención de engañar a la creatura porque eso no implica contradicción en Dios [...].[23]

Así, mentir y cometer perjurio no se dan en Dios en tanto implican engañar a partir de una intención desordenada. Son moralmente malas, *i.e.*, contrarias a lo correcto por naturaleza. Dios no puede hacer eso porque es suma bondad. Del mismo modo que no puede cometer homicidio o robar, tampoco puede cometer perjurio o mentir. Nótese que para el dominico inglés hay una diferencia entre mentir (*mentiri*) cometer perjurio (*peierare*), por una parte, y engañar (*fallor*) y decir algo falso (*asserere falsum*). Las primeras dos –mentir y perjurar– presuponen la intención desordenada implicada en una acción inmoral. En cambio, los conceptos de la segunda dupla –engañar y decir lo falso– parecen ser moralmente neutrales en Holcot. Engañar sí se da en Dios, implica el objetivo de que su creatura tome lo falso por lo verdadero, es moralmente neutral. En términos más literales, en tanto ese engaño no provenga de una intención desordenada y devenga así perjurio o mentira, puede darse en Dios.

4. Futuros contingentes, profecía y salvación

Uno de los interrogantes que sigue abierto y que es enfatizado por lo expuesto más arriba es: ¿se puede dar crédito a las profecías? ¿Su contenido es necesario o contingente? Siguiendo a Incandela, una respuesta afirmativa presupone admitir un determinismo que anula la libertad, así como el sistema teológico de premios y castigos.[24] Si las profecías existen y son tal y cual fueron definidas –necesarias, aunque refieran al futuro– no hay elección libre y tampoco puede haber legítimamente premios y castigos. Esta última anulación sería consecuencia de que las acciones a premiar o castigar no podían evitarse por ser necesarias. Para Holcot no pueden admitirse profecías tal como las descriptas en tanto el valor de verdad de los enunciados sobre el futuro no se determina hasta realizarse el hecho referido:

> Así puede responderse al argumento acerca de la negación de Pedro, según el cual durante todo el tiempo intermedio entre que Cristo dijo 'me negarás tres veces' y la negación de Pedro, esta proposición fue contingente: 'Pedro negará a Cristo', y [entonces] Cristo afirmó algo falso. Y concedo que era potestad de Pedro hacer que Cristo hubiera dicho algo falso; más aún, era potestad de cualquier otro que estuviera con Pedro, porque en ese tiempo

[23] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 155, 945-156, 954: "Ego autem contradictionem non video sequi se concedatur Deum asserere falsum scienter; sed Deum mentiri vel peierare, vel Deum esse falsum eo modo quo mendax dicitur esse falsus, non conceditur quia secundus Augustinum, libro *De mendacio*, capitulo iii, 'Mendacium est falsa vocis significatio cum intentione fallendi'. Et hoc debet sic exponi: cum intentione deordinata fallendi. Sed Deus non potest habere intentionem deordinatam in aliquo facto suo, et ideo Deus non potest mentiri nec peierare, tamen Deus potest asserere falsum scienter et cum intentione fallendi creaturam, quia non includit contradictionem in Deo [...]".

[24] Incandela, "Robert Holcot, O.P., on Prophecy", 167-171.

intermedio alguien podría haberle cortado la cabeza a Pedro, y no sería el caso que Dios al punto lo resucitara.[25]

Con el ejemplo de la negación de Pedro, Holcot insiste sobre la capacidad que Dios, Cristo y los profetas tienen para engañar. Asimismo, argumenta contra la verdad necesaria de una profecía. La realización de la profecía de Cristo no depende ni del mismo Cristo, ni de Pedro. Depende de la sucesión de eventos futuros a la pronunciación de la proposición "me negarás tres veces". En otras palabras, la profecía de Cristo no vuelve necesario al hecho profetizado. Si hubiese sido voluntad de Pedro, este podría haberlo negado dos o cuatro veces y así volver contrafácticamente falso al enunciado de Cristo. De la misma manera, un tercero podría haber imposibilitado la negación de Cristo por parte de Pedro y, nuevamente, hacer falsa la profecía. En síntesis, los enunciados acerca del futuro siempre son contingentes, no importa la fuente que los enuncie. La profecía queda anulada en tanto se la entiende como una verdad necesaria sobre el futuro, lo que es imposible en la visión del dominico inglés:

> Concedo que ahora es mi potestad hacer que alguien muerto hace mil años haya sido un profeta, porque este término 'profeta' es connotativo, cuyo significado es 'alguien que predice algo verdadero'. Y es evidente que si predijo que yo haría algo que puedo hacer o no hacer libremente, se sigue que puedo hacer que él haya sido profeta o que no lo haya sido, porque puedo hacer que aquello que él dijo resulte verdadero o falso; esto es, puedo hacer que esta proposición sea verdadera o falsa, según me plazca: 'ese hombre fue un profeta', tomando 'profeta' en sentido estricto según su definición. Y por lo tanto el tiempo transcurrido continuamente entre el momento que alguien predijera el futuro y el momento en que ese futuro se cumple, la proposición 'ese hombre realizó una profecía' es contingente, por lo que se demostró.[26]

[25] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 171, 1190-1197: "Secundum hoc potest dici ad argumentum de negatione Petri, quod toto tempore intermedio postquam Christus dixerat 'ter me negabis' usque ad tempus negationis Petri, haec fuit contingens: 'Petrus negabit Christum'. Et Christus asseruit falsum, et conceditur quod in potestate Petri fuit facere Christum aseruisse falsum; immo in potestate cuiuslibet alterius fuit cum Petro, quia medio tempore potuit Petrus fuisse occisus, quia medio tempore homo potuit amputasse sibi caput; et non oportuisset quod Deus eum statim resuscitasset". Cf. Fernández Walker, "*Person of Interest*", 88.

[26] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 172, 1282-173, 1299: "Ad 8.4 ad quartum, concedo quod modo est in potestate mea facere aliquem mortuum a centum annis fuisse prophetam, quia iste terminus 'propheta' est terminus connotativus, cuius significatum est aliquis praedicens verum. Et planum est quod est quod si de me aliquid predixerit me facturum quod possum facere et non facere libere, consequens est quod possum facere eum fuisse prophetam et non fuisse prophetam, quia possum facere quod ipse dixit verum et falsum; id est, possum facere quod haec propositio sit vera et falsa, sicut mihi placet: 'talis homo fuit propheta' stricte accipiendo 'prophetam' iuxta definitionem prophetae. Et ideo post tempus quo aliquis praedixit futurus continue donec illud fuerit impletum, haec est contingens: 'ille prophetavit', illo demonstrato". Cf. Fernández Walker, "*Person of Interest*", 89.

En la misma línea, Holcot señala la falibilidad de las profecías y del carácter profético de un personaje del pasado. Toda proposición enunciada en un momento pretérito que refiriese al futuro adquiere su valor de verdad solamente después de que haya transcurrido el momento referido por aquella. Así, si alguien en un momento 0 –pasado para nosotros, aunque presente para aquel– hubiese referido a un momento 1 –futuro para él, aunque presente para nosotros–, el carácter profético de su enunciado se determina recién una vez que haya transcurrido ese momento 1. En otras palabras, los sucesos futuros son el criterio que hace profeta o engañador a quien supuestamente emitió una profecía desde el pasado.

Hay un problema ulterior de orden práctico que es al que llevan estas consideraciones: los criterios para salvar o castigar a alguien *post mortem*. La religión cristiana presupone la idea de que admitir la verdad de ciertas proposiciones –"Dios es unitrino", por ejemplo– es condición de posibilidad para el acceso a la salvación. Del mismo modo, suele aceptarse que negar dichas afirmaciones es causa de acusaciones y de castigos, sea en vida, sea tras la muerte.

Ahora bien: ¿qué hace que una persona pueda ser salvada o castigada? Salvaguardar la contingencia garantiza la posibilidad de elección libre y de ahí que pueda ser premiado quien actúa moralmente bien y castigado. No obstante, si no se puede dar crédito a las profecías divinas del tipo "el día del juicio sucederá", "los justos serán salvados", etc. qué criterio debe tomar el sujeto para guiar sus acciones de modo que pueda asegurarse la salvación y evitar el castigo eterno. Más aún, ¿es legítimo castigar a quien desconoció las Escrituras, habida cuenta de que no hay allí verdades necesarias sino proposiciones contingentes? Holcot responde a estas dificultades admitiendo que pueden ser salvados todos los justos, aunque hayan desconocido las Escrituras o no hayan profesado la fe cristiana:

> Y así alguien mereció [la salvación] en la falsa fe, y la fe de Abraham que fue verdadera puede ser falsa pasados muchos miles de años, y los santos pueden ser engañados, porque los ángeles creen que el día del juicio existirá en el futuro.[27]

La desestimación que Holcot hace de las profecías lleva a la posibilidad de que los ángeles y los santos sean engañados y engañadores. Admitido esto último, la salvación no puede depender de la creencia en la necesidad de enunciados cuya verdad está aún indeterminada. La lógica del dominico inglés hace que los premios y los castigos no puedan depender de la fe ciega en enunciados aun no verificados, es decir, en enunciados como "sucederá el día del juicio" y otras *supuestas* profecías afines. Habilita así la salvación para toda persona justa, aun cuando esta haya vivido antes de Cristo o profese una fe diferente de la cristiana.

[27] Robert Holcot, *In Sententias* II, 130, 404-407: "Et sic aliquis potest meruise in fide falsa, et fides Abrahae que fuit vera, multis millibus annorum elapsis potest esse falsa, et beati possunt decipi, nam angeli credunt diem iudicii fore futuram [...]".

Conclusión

La concepción de Holcot acerca de los futuros contingentes es enriquecedora para la lógica y la filosofía contemporánea, así como para la historia de los conceptos y del pensamiento. Muchas de las tesis presentadas por el dominico inglés se adelantan a descubrimientos y problemas que reaparecieron recién con en análisis lógico del siglo XIX. Asimismo, releer y traducir autores que fueron centrales en su tiempo, pero casi ignotos en las reconstrucciones de la historia del pensamiento es imprescindible para cartografiar más fielmente la concatenación de discusiones que llevan al estado actual de la filosofía.

En la primera sección presentamos los elementos básicos contra los que Holcot embate en su análisis de las proposiciones contingentes sobre el futuro. En primer término, rompe con la idea de que se puede resolver el problema apelando a la distinción entre tiempo y eternidad. Segundo, Holcot muestra cómo la definición de profecía es autocontradictoria en tanto presupone la posibilidad de determinar la verdad de un enunciado sobre el futuro, lo que considera imposible.

En la segunda sección, se reconstruyó la base de la argumentación lógica que Holcot presenta al referir a los futuros contingentes. Un enunciado contingente sobre el futuro tiene un valor de verdad indeterminado hasta tanto suceda el hecho predicho por aquel. En caso de ser verificado no se torna necesario sino *per accidens* y esto por ser verdadero, pero de un modo en el cual podría no haber sido jamás verdadero. Asimismo, esto hace que las predicciones sobre el futuro que se hayan luego verificado sean "contrafácticas de pasado", pues, aunque se volvieron verdaderas, podrían haber sido falsas o podría nunca haberse determinado su valor de verdad. Para terminar de elucidar este punto, se puede considerar la posibilidad de referir a "contrafactuales potenciales" cuya *necessitas per accidens* hace que estas proposiciones sean verdaderas, pero precisamente no en sentido absoluto. Aristóteles habría dicho que todo lo que es, en cuanto es, es necesario que sea, pero no es necesario que sea. Lo anterior mienta: "todo lo que ha ocurrido, en cuanto ha ocurrido, es necesariamente (*per accidens*) verdadero, pero no es necesariamente (*absolute*) verdadero". Justamente, esta potencialidad es capaz de desmentir la profecía enunciada en el pasado.

En la tercera sección presenté la principal consecuencia teológica de la propuesta de Holcot en referencia a los futuros contingentes. El dominico inglés sostiene que Dios debe poder engañar y que ese acto es una perfección. Para establecer lo anterior, establece una diferencia entre perjurar y mentir, por un lado, y engañar y decir lo falso por lo verdadero, por otro. Mientras que las primeras acciones son inmorales y presuponen una motivación desordenada, engañar es un recurso que puede llevar al bien y, *a fortiori*, es moralmente neutral. Holcot suministra ejemplos bíblicos donde Dios se sirve del engaño en pos de ejecutar sus fines. También señala que negarle a Dios la capacidad de engañar rompe con la definición de Anselmo según la cual Dios es aquello de lo cual no puede pensarse nada más perfecto.

En la cuarta y última sección analicé las consecuencias escatológicas y morales de la anulación de las profecías. No puede darse crédito a las profecías en tanto estas no tienen una verdad necesaria y solamente se determinan como verdaderas o falsas una vez ocurrido el hecho que mientan o su opuesto. De aquí se sigue que el criterio para el castigo o la salvación postmortem no puede ser la creencia en profecías, sea que ellas provengan de Dios, de Cristo o de las Escrituras. El hombre es salvado o castigado en función de los actos que realiza y del valor moral de estos, no en función de si da o no crédito a proposiciones referentes al futuro que, como tales, tienen indeterminado su valor de verdad.

Queda por determinar cómo Holcot reconstruye una ética cristiana que prescinda de la creencia en las profecías y en las Escrituras como condición de posibilidad de la salvación. Asimismo, cabe destacar que el Dios engañador defendido por el dominico inglés busca ser congruente con la suma bondad y la omnipotencia atribuidas al Creador y no romper con la cosmovisión católica.

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MARSILIUS OF PADUA AND 15TH-CENTURY CONCILIARISM: A COPY OF THE *DEFENSOR PACIS, DICTIONES* II & III, IN THE LIBRARY OF GIMIGNANO INGHIRAMI (1370-1460)*

MARSILIO DE PADUA Y EL CONCILIARISMO DEL SIGLO XV: UNA COPIA DEL *DEFENSOR PACIS, DICTIONES* II Y III, EN LA BIBLIOTECA DE GIMIGNANO INGHIRAMI (1370-1460)

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Abstract

This article presents a preliminary study of a previously unexamined copy of Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor pacis*, *Dictiones* II and III, now preserved in MS Q.VIII.5 (22) in the Biblioteca Roncionana in Prato. This witness, misattributed to William of Ockham, belonged to and was annotated by the canonist Gimignano Inghirami (1370-1460), an auditor of the Roman Rota and a key figure in the Florentine diocese, who actively participated in the fifteenth-century councils from Pisa to Ferrara-Florence. The study provides: (I) an overview of Gimignano's biography and library within their historical and cultural context; (II) a preliminary analysis of this witness, its glosses, and its possible placement within the textual tradition of the *Defensor pacis*; (III) an investigation on the misattribution to Ockham, considered in the context of the manuscript tradition of the *Defensor* and its reception in the *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate* by Laurentius of Arezzo (d. post 1447).

Keywords

Manuscript Tradition; Marsilius' Reception; Conciliarism; William of Ockham; Laurentius of Arezzo

Resumen

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Este artículo presenta un estudio preliminar de una copia hasta ahora no examinada del *Defensor pacis*, *Dictiones* II y III, de Marsilio de Padua, actualmente conservada en el MS Q.VIII.5 (22) de la Biblioteca Roncioniana en Prato. Este testimonio, erróneamente atribuido a Guillermo de Ockham, perteneció al canonista Gimignano Inghirami (1370-1460), auditor de la Rota Romana y figura clave en la diócesis florentina, quien participó activamente en los concilios del siglo XV, desde Pisa hasta Ferrara-Florencia. El estudio ofrece: (I) una visión general de la biografía de Gimignano y de su biblioteca en su contexto histórico y cultural; (II) un análisis preliminar de este testimonio, sus glosas y su posible ubicación dentro de la tradición textual del *Defensor pacis*; (III) una investigación sobre la atribución errónea a Ockham, considerada en el contexto de la tradición manuscrita del *Defensor* y su recepción en el *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate* de Laurentius de Arezzo († después de 1447).

Palabras clave

Tradición manuscrita; recepción de Marsilio; conciliarismo; Guillermo de Ockham; Laurentius de Arezzo

Introduction

Despite earlier scholarly efforts to portray Marsilius of Padua as a forerunner or even an inspiration for fifteenth-century conciliarism, it has long been established that tracing the reception of his ecclesiological theories both during and in the decades following the Great Western Schism (1378-1417) is anything but straightforward.[1] While some authors—such as Dietrich of Niem (c. 1345-1418) and possibly Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464)[2]—were directly familiar with his work and engaged with it, Marsilius was more

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[1] For an overview of Marsilius' complex legacy, see Thomas M. Izbicki, "The Reception of Marsilius", in *A Companion to Marsilius of Padua*, edited by G. Moreno-Riaño and C. J. Nederman (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), 305-334. Examples of scholarship that overly emphasize Marsilius' influence on conciliarism include Walter Ullmann, *The Origins of the Great Schism: A Study in Fourteenth-Century Ecclesiastical History* (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1948); Matthew Spinka (ed.), *Advocates of Reform: From Wyclif to Erasmus* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953); as well as the 'Marsilian' interpretation of Gerson's ecclesiology presented in Paul de Vooght, "L'ecclésiologie des adversaires de Huss au Concile de Constance", *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* 35 (1959): 5-25; and id., "Le conciliarisme à Constance et à Bâle", in *Les concile et les conciles. Contribution à l'histoire de la vie conciliaire de l'église*, edited by B. Botte (Paris: Cerf, 1960), 143-181. For a critique of de Vooght's perspective, see G. H. M. Posthumus Meyies, *Jean Gerson – Apostle of Unity. His Church Politics and Ecclesiology* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1999), 342-348. For a recent study that challenges the *topos* of a 'conciliarist' Marsilius, see Raúl Morales Muñoz, "¿Fue conciliarista Marsilio de Padua? Reflexiones en torno a la teoría eclesiológica marsiliana", *Espacio, tiempo y forma* ser. 3 36 (2023): 867-906.

[2] By way of example, see Paul E. Sigmund, "The influence of Marsilius of Padua on XVth-Century Conciliarism", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 23 (1962): 392-340; and Cary J. Nederman, "Empire and the Historiography of European Political Thought: Marsiglio of Padua, Nicholas of Cusa, and the Medieval/Modern Divide", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 66 (2005): 1-15.

often known and cited second-hand. Amongst supporters of papal supremacy, in particular, he was primarily invoked as a "papalist bogey"[3] and discussed mainly through the reiteration of the five errors attributed to him in the *Licet iuxta doctrinam*, issued by Pope John XXII in 1327.[4] This was also the case, for instance, with Juan de Torquemada (1388-1468), one of the most resolute critics of conciliarism in the aftermath of the Council of Basel (1431-1449). In his *Summa de ecclesia*, completed in 1453 and later a key reference for supporters of papal prerogatives, Torquemada dedicated a section to listing the errors of both Marsilius and John of Jandun.[5] Yet his critique appears to have been based on John XXII's bull rather than any direct reading of Marsilius' work.[6]

Charting a history of Marsilius' reputation by examining how he was portrayed and discussed by later philosophers, theologians, and canonists—regardless of whether they had actually read his writings—is a legitimate scholarly pursuit.[7] However, it is crucial to distinguish this approach from the study of the actual impact of his texts: how they were circulated, read, and referenced by his audience.[8] The period of the Schism and the great councils is particularly relevant to this line of research. Those decades saw a renewed interest in the *Defensor pacis*, as evidenced by the fact that most surviving manuscripts date from the late fourteenth to the first half of the fifteenth centuries. In this context, Marsilius' treatise spread widely and reached an international readership, sometimes

[3] Izbicki, "Reception of Marsilius", 306.
[4] Even the earliest papalist responses to the *Defensor Pacis*, including those composed to assist Pope John XXII in preparing the bull, appear not to have been based on direct knowledge of the text; cf. Thomas Turley, "The Impact of Marsilius: Papalist Responses to the *Defensor Pacis*", in *The World of Marsilius of Padua*, edited by G. Moreno-Riaño (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 47-64, and Frank Godthardt, "The Papal Condemnation of Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor Pacis*: Its Preparation and Political Use", in *Religion, Power, and Resistance from the Eleventh to the Sixteenth Centuries*, edited by K. Bollermann, T. M. Izbicki, and C. J. Nederman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 127-138.
[5] Juan de Torquemada, *Summa de ecclesia* IV.2.37 (Venice: apud Michaelem Tramezinum, 1561), f. 409r-v; cit. in Izbicki, "Reception of Marsilius", 33.
[6] See Thomas M. Izbicki, "Tarring Conciliarism with the Brush of Heresy: Juan de Torquemada's *Summa de ecclesia*", in *Religion, Power, and Resistance*, 139-152.
[7] For a case study on the use of Marsilius as an 'anti-*auctoritas*' by a thinker who did not have direct access to his work, I refer to Serena Masolini, "Between Venice and Sant'Elmo. Tommaso Campanella, Marsilius of Padua, and a 'Modern Theologian'", in *Marsilius of Padua Between History, Politics, and Philosophy*, edited by A. Mulieri, S. Masolini, and J. Pelletier (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023), 323-358.
[8] On this point, see Izbicki, "Reception of Marsilius", 306. For an analysis of Marsilius' reception in early modernity that effectively integrates both perspectives, the key reference remains Gregorio Piaia, *Marsilio da Padova nella riforma e nella controriforma: Fortuna ed interpretazione* (Padua: Antenore, 1977). In choosing this dual approach—reception of Marsilius' image and textual transmission—Piaia rejects a third perspective aimed at studying the impact of his thought based on a mere "coincidence of ideas" (i.e., establishing alleged Marsilian doctrines and searching for them in later authors); cf. ibid., p. 2, where he criticizes Orio Giacchi, "Osservazioni sulla fortuna delle idee di Marsilio da Padova nell'età del giurisdizionalismo", in *Marsilio da Padova: Studi raccolti nel VI centenario della morte*, edited by A. Cecchini and N. Bobbio (Padua: CEDAM, 1942), 170.

circulating anonymously or erroneously attributed to William of Ockham.[9] A further perspective can thus be added to the two mentioned above: how Marsilius' work was transmitted, read, and referenced while being ascribed to another author. The case examined in this article is precisely an example of this dynamic.

The Biblioteca Roncioniana in Prato preserves a manuscript that provides a compelling case of the transmission of the *Defensor pacis*. As the opening text in a collection of ecclesiological treatises by Pierre d'Ailly (1351-1420), Juan de Casanova (1387-1436), and Juan de Segovia (1395-1458), one finds a copy of the second and third *Dictiones* misattributed to William of Ockham (f. 1r: "Dictio secunda (!) Guiglelmi de Occam in Derisorio suo"). The manuscript in question, Q.VIII.5 (22), belonged to and was annotated by Gimignano Inghirami (1370-1460), a canonist from Prato who had a distinguished career as an auditor of the Sacra Rota. Actively involved in nearly all the major councils of the fifteenth century—from Pisa to Ferrara-Florence—Gimignano was a firsthand witness to the resolution of the Schism at Constance, the papal efforts to reassert primacy over the council during and after Basel, and the attempt to reunify the Western and Eastern churches. This codex thus serves as concrete evidence of how the *Defensor*, albeit attributed to another author, was received by a well-connected figure who found himself at the center of such turbulent moment in Church history.

Gimignano's codex is documented in the catalogues of medieval manuscripts of the province of Prato[10] and has been examined by Francesco Santi, who centered his research on the section containing the three texts by Juan de Casanova.[11] The copy of the *Defensor* in this manuscript, however, has never been the subject of a specific study. Moreover, it appears to have gone totally unnoticed by scholars of Marsilius, as it was neither included

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[9] Richard Scholz, "Einleitung", to Marsilius von Padua, *Defensor pacis*, I, XLVIII-XLIX. For an overview of the readership of Marsilius and Ockham's political works between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, see Jürgen Miethke, "Marsilius und Ockham. Publikum und Leser ihrer politischen Schriften im späteren Mittelalter", *Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 6 (1980): 543-567.

[10] Francesco Santi, "Prato, Biblioteca Roncioniana", in *Catalogo di manoscritti filosofici nelle biblioteche italiane*, VIII: *Firenze, L'Aquila, Livorno, Prato, Siena, Verona*, edited by G. M. Cao et al. (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1996), 93-96; Simona Bianchi et al. (eds.), *I manoscritti medievali della provincia di Prato* (Florence: SISMEL–Edizioni del Galluzzo, 1999), 96-97; Marisa Boschi Rotiroti, *I manoscritti datati delle provincie di Grosseto, Livorno, Massa Carrara, Pistoia e Prato* (Florence: SISMEL–Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2007), 77, nr. 64.

[11] Francesco Santi, "Gimignano Inghirami (1370-1460) lettore del *Tractatus de potestate papae* di Joan de Casanova: il manoscritto Q VIII.5 (22) della Biblioteca Roncioniana di Prato", *Revista catalana de teologia* 38 (2013): 767-785. This codex was a crucial asset for determining Juan Casanova's authorship of these three texts. On this topic, in addition to Santi's study, see Josep Perarnau i Espelt, "Raphael de Pornaxio, Joan de Casanova o Julià Tallada? Noves dades sobre l'autor del *De potestate papae et concilii generalis* (i obres complementàries), publicat a nom de Juan de Torquemada", *Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft* 1, 29 (1978): 457-482, and his review of Santi, "Prato, Biblioteca Roncioniana", in *Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics* 17 (1998): 930.

in the critical editions realized by Charles W. Previté-Orton[12] and Richard Scholz,[13] nor referenced in later studies on the textual tradition of this work.[14]

The aim of this article is to offer a first study of this overlooked chapter in the reception of Marsilius. It provides: (I) an overview of Gimignano's biography and library within their historical and cultural context; (II) a preliminary analysis of the copy of the *Defensor* in MS Q.VIII.5 (22) and its glosses; and finally, (III) some observations on its misattribution to Ockham, examined in relation to the manuscript tradition—especially MS Vat. lat. 3974—and the notes on this topic found in the *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate* by Laurentius of Arezzo (d. post 1447).

I. Gimignano Inghirami, the Fifteenth-Century Councils, and His Library

Our knowledge of Gimignano's life comes primarily from a collection of autobiographical notes preserved in MS Prato, Biblioteca Roncioniana, Q.V.19 (37), which was edited under the title *Ricordanze* by the nineteenth-century philologist Cesare Guasti.[15] Born in Prato in 1370 into a family of jurists, notaries, and physicians, Gimignano studied in Bologna under renowned canonists such as Gaspar Calderinus (ca. 1345-1399)—with whom he obtained his title of *doctor decretorum*—, Antonius de Budrio (1330-1408) and Petrus de Ancharano (ca. 1333-1416). Before the age of thirty, he became vicar to the bishop of Pistoia and later served as provost. Within a few years, he was already active in the Roman Curia. He participated in the Council of Pisa (1409) and after a couple of years he was sent to the court of Ladislaus of Anjou, King of Naples, as papal ambassador. By 1411, he had already been appointed as an auditor of the Sacra Rota, and, in 1414, he attended the opening of the Council of Constance (1414-1418). He then followed Pope Martin V to Italy, where he witnessed the intricate attempts to convene a council in Siena

[12] Charles W. Previté-Orton, "Introduction" to Marsilius of Padua, *Defensor Pacis*, edited by C. W. Previté-Orton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), XXVI-XLII.
[13] Scholz, "Einleitung", V-L.
[14] Among the most recent contributions on the manuscript tradition, see Alexander Fidora and Matthias M. Tischler, "Zwischen Avignon, München und Tortosa. Die *Defensor paci*s-Handschrift des Marsilius von Padua in der Bibliothek Benedikts XIII.", *Scriptorium* 69/2 (2015): 179-189, and Jürgen Miethke's "Einleitung", to Marsilius von Padua, *Defensor pacis, Der Verteidiger des Friedens*, translated by H. Kusch (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2017), XLIII-XLVIII.
[15] Geminianus de Inghiramis, *De rebus praesertim ecclesiasticis ab anno 1433 ad annum 1452*, at ff. 210r-211r, 215r-217v, 221r-224v, edited by Cesare Guasti, "Ricordanze di Messer Gimignano Inghirami concernenti la Storia ecclesiastica e civile dal 1378 al 1452", *Archivio storico italiano* ser. 5 1 (1888): 43-68. Gimignano's account of the Council of Ferrara-Florence was later republished in Georg Hofmann (ed.), *Fragmenta protocolli, diaria privata, sermones*, Concilium Florentinum: documenta et scriptores, III/2 (Rome: Pontificium institutum orientalium studiorum, 1951), 31-40. For a comprehensive biography, see Isabella Gagliardi, "Inghirami, Gimignano", in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani* (Rome: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia, 2004), LXII, 376-379. Further annotations by Guasti on Gimignano are found in MS Prato, Biblioteca Roncioniana, *Carte Guasti* 59, nr. 6.

(1423-1424), all while advancing his ecclesiastical career—first as prior of San Frediano and later as a canon of Santa Maria del Fiore in Florence.

In 1433, after being appointed dean of the Sacra Rota, Gimignano witnessed Sigismund of Luxembourg's journey to Italy and his imperial coronation by Pope Eugenius IV in the Basilica of St Peter in Rome. In his *Ricordanze*, he recounts that, four days before the ceremony, he visited Sigismund at his residence and delivered a speech in his honor.[16] Sigismund's coronation was a moment of great political and symbolic significance, and it provides a key insight into the relationship between Rome, the papacy, and the Empire at the time of the Council of Basel. Carefully orchestrated to signal a renewed reconciliation between the two universal powers, the event became an act of mutual legitimization, with the pope and the emperor presenting themselves as the guarantors of peace and the unity of Christendom in a period of fragility for both. Gimignano's account offers a unique perspective on the coronation ritual, as his role as dean of the Sacra Rota required him to stand in close proximity to the ceremony, holding the papal mitre.[17]

Gimignano maintained strong ties with the Medici family, cardinal Giordano Orsini, and the Roman Curia. He was also very close to Eugene IV, whom he accompanied from 1437 to 1443 during his travels through Bologna, Ferrara, and Florence to organize the council aimed at uniting the Greek and Latin churches ("pro unione fienda inter Grecos et Italicos").[18] Later, he attained the ranks of apostolic protonotary (1451) and provost (1452) of Prato, where he spent his remaining years balancing his ecclesiastical duties with his scholarly interests and his activity as a patron of the arts. Among his notable artistic commissions were the decoration of the main chapel of the Pieve of Santo Stefano in Prato—eventually executed by Filippo Lippi after Beato Angelico declined the task—and the altarpiece *Funeral of St. Jerome*, also by Lippi, which includes a portrait of Gimignano himself, depicted kneeling with hands joined in prayer.[19] Furthermore, he was closely connected with those who oversaw the commission of the new external pulpit by Donatello and Michelozzo, intended for the public display of the relic of the Virgin's Holy Girdle. When, in the wake of the closing of the Council of Florence, the Byzantine Emperor John VIII Palaeologus officially visited Prato to see the pulpit, it is likely that Gimignano

[16] Geminianus de Inghiramis, *De rebus praesertim ecclesiasticis*, 46-47.

[17] For an analysis of Sigismund's coronation based on the accounts of direct witnesses, including Poggio Bracciolini, Andrea Santacroce, Paolo dello Mastro, and Gimignano himself, see Veronika Proske, "*Pro duobus magnis luminaribus mundi.* Das Papst-Kaiser-Treffen 1433 und seine humanistische Rezeption", in *Emperors and Imperial Discourse in Italy, c. 1300-1500*, edited by A. Huijbers (Rome: École française de Rome, 2022), 129-156. For a broader study on Sigismund's journey to Italy and his use of political and symbolic communication to assert his authority, see ead., *Der Romzug Kaiser Sigismunds (1431-1433). Politische Kommunikation, Herrschaftsrepräsentation und -rezeption* (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna: Böhlau, 2018).

[18] Geminianus de Inghiramis, *De rebus praesertim ecclesiasticis*, 48.

[19] Eve Borsook, "Fra' Filippo Lippi and the Murals for Prato Cathedral", *Mitteilungen des Kunsthistorischen Institutes in Florenz* 19 (1975): 1-148.

played a direct role in the event.[20] He died in 1460, at the age of ninety, leaving behind a collection of writings and a rich library.[21] Currently, 22 manuscripts definitively traced to Gimignano's collection are preserved in the Biblioteca Roncioniana in Prato, while at least another 57 are housed in the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana in Florence.

Further insight into the contents of his original library comes from inventories compiled in different circumstances. One, drawn up in 1416, lists his movable belongings, including six volumes, he had with him in Constance during the Council. Other lists record codices sent by him from Rome to his hometown.[22] Most notably, a 1442 inventory, compiled as part of Gimignano's testamentary wishes, documents 71 items bequeathed partly to the Oratory of San Girolamo, "pro commoditate et evidenti utilitate virtuosorum hominum" (nr. 1-57), and partly to his nephew, Niccolò di Matteo Inghirami, as well as to any future members of his family, male or female, who might wish to study law (nr. 58-71).[23] A few years later, Gimignano modified his will, redirecting part of the books originally intended for San Girolamo to the Canons of Santa Maria del Fiore, who at the time were establishing a public library (1451).[24]

His collection was primarily composed of juridical works, including: (i) a few texts of civil law, particularly by or attributed to Bartolus of Sassoferrato, often interwoven with writings on canon law; (ii) essential readings from the thirteenth-century canon law tradition, such as those of Raymond of Peñafort, William of Rennes, Goffredus of Trani, Innocent IV, and Guillaume Durand; and (iii) a substantial number of works by fourteenth- and early fifteenth-century canonists, reflecting Gimignano's engagement with the latest legal scholarship. This last category comprised writings by his own

[20] In a recent study, Francesco Santi has contextualized the construction of the pulpit within the theological and political context of the early fifteenth century, in which Gimignano played an active role ("Il pulpito di Donatello e Michelozzo e la reliquia di Maria a Prato. Ipotesi sulla cultura della committenza di una sacra rappresentazione", in *Fleur de clergie. Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-Yves Tilliette*, edited by O. Collet, Y. Foehr-Janssens, and J.-C. Mühlethaler (Genève: Droz, 2019), 149-168). Santi suggests that this enterprise reflected the Marian devotion of the time, revitalized by the debates on the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of Mary at the Council of Basel. This renewed Marian sensitivity, shared with the Greek Church, was likely used by Pope Eugenius IV as an additional means of establishing a relationship with the Greek Fathers and Emperor John VIII Palaeologus so to promote the union of the two churches (ibid., esp. 156-163).

[21] Cf. Bianchi et al. (eds.), *Manoscritti medievali*, 14-19 and 37-69 (Roncioniana), and Lorenzo Fabbri, "'Sapientia aedificavit sibi domum': una biblioteca pubblica nella Canonica di Santa Maria del Fiore", in *I libri del Duomo di Firenze. Codici liturgici e biblioteca di Santa Maria del Fiore (secoli XI-XVI)*, edited by L. Fabbri and M. Tacconi (Florence: Centro Di, 1997), 33-56, esp. 53-56 (Laurenziana).

[22] The 1416 inventory and other lists are edited in Guasti (ed.), "Ricordanze", 22-23 fn. 4, and Bianchi et al. (eds.), *Manoscritti medievali*, "Appendice Documenti. III.2. Elenchi sparsi di libri di Gimignano Inghirami", 92-93. Cf. Giovanni Fiesoli and Elena Somigli (eds.), *RICABIM. Repertorio di Inventari e Cataloghi di Biblioteche Medievali dal secolo VI al 1520*, I: *Italia. Toscana* (Florence: SISMEL–Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2009), 263, nr. 1568.

[23] The inventory is edited in Bianchi et al. (eds.), *Manoscritti medievali*, "Appendice Documenti. III.2. Volontà testamentarie del 1442", 93-97.

[24] Santi, "Gimignano Inghirami (1370-1460)", 774-776; Fabbri, "'Sapientia aedificavit'", 33-56.

teachers—Gaspar Calderinus, Antonius de Budrio, and Petrus de Ancharano—as well as works by jurists such as Simon of Borsano, Guido de Baysio, Johannes Andreae, Henri Bohic, Fredericus of Siena, Recupero of San Miniato, Paulus de Liazari, Lapo of San Miniato, Johannes of Legnano, Dominicus of San Gimignano, and Ludovicus Pontanus.[25]

Beyond canon law, his library also encompassed classical literature, history, theology, and philosophy: Virgil's *Aeneid*, Eutropius' *Breviarium ab urbe condita*,[26] the *Fons memorabilium universi* by Domenico Bandini of Arezzo, numerous works by Jerome, to whom he was especially devoted,[27] Augustine, Hugh of Saint-Cher, Thomas Aquinas, Nicholas of Lyra, as well as Thomas Waley's commentary on the *De civitate Dei*, and a copy of Francis of Meyronnes' commentary on the *Sentences*, Books II and IV.[28] Item nr. 51 in the inventory records a volume containing "quodlibet et questiones disputate fratris Petri (!) de Aquasparta, Sinonima Ysidori et Anselmi et Secreta secretorum Aristotelis in uno volumine in cartis pecudinis",[29] while nr. 53 mentions a copy of the "Liber de minoralibus (!) in cartis papiri". Unfortunately, neither of these volumes can be identified among the surviving codices.

Especially significant for this study is item nr. 25 (also lost), which contained a compilation of writings on the Schism in the context of the Councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basel, including treatises by Franciscus Zabarella, Petrus de Ancharano, and Antonius de Butrio.[30] Alongside the manuscript that is the focus of this article—corresponding to

[25] For a study of Gimignano's juridical library, see Domenico Maffei, "La biblioteca di Gimignano Inghirami e la *Lectura Clementinarum* di Simone da Borsano", in *Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, edited by S. Kuttner (Vatican City: Biblioteca apostolica Vaticana, 1971), 217-236, esp. 223-224.

[26] In the 1442 inventory, it is identified with "Paulus Orosius ab origine mundi in cartis papiri" (cf. Bianchi et al. [eds.], *Manoscritti medievali*, 45 [Q.V.5 (8)], and "Appendice Documenti. III.2", 97, nr. 55).

[27] In addition to the altarpiece *Funeral of St. Jerome* that he commissioned from Filippo Lippi (*supra*, fn. 19), Gimignano also promoted the construction of the Oratory dedicated to St. Jerome to which he bequeathed his books in the will of 1442. Santi notes that this preference for Jerome reflects his humanistic taste ("Pulpito di Donatello e Michelozzo", 162).

[28] This last item can be identified with MS Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, Edili 69, although here only Book IV is extant. This codex also contains a compendium of Peter Auriol, penned by Johannes Tollener of Dyedem (one of Gimignano's main copyists) and misattributed to Bonaventure. Cf. Bianchi et al. (eds.), *Manoscritti medievali*, 96, nr. 49.

[29] Bianchi et al. (eds.), *Manoscritti medievali*, 96. Cf. the entry on MS Edili 164 in Fabbri, "'Sapientia aedificavit'", 55: "164: Quaestiones Fr. Petri de Angl. et Fr. Matthaei de Aquasparta"; cf. *Carte Guasti* 59, nr. 6, f. 16r, 80v.

[30] Bianchi et al. (eds.), *Manoscritti medievali*, 95: "Item in uno volumine de cartis papiri mediocribus de factis scismatis Pisani, concilii Constantinensis et Basiliensis videlicet: tractatus editus per dominum Franciscum de Zabarellis cardinalem Florentinum; tractatus domini Petri de Ancharano, tractatus domini Antonii de Butrio et domini Mactei et aliorum doctorum opuscula in eadem materia."

the immediately following items of the inventory (nr. 26, 27, and 28)—this lost codex attests to Gimignano's keen interest in conciliar matters.

Finally, among the manuscripts from Gimignano's collection, one also finds his own writings: *allegationes*, *consilia*, *causae*, *informationes* and *dubia iuris* related to his work as an auditor of the Sacra Rota, as well as his *Repertorium per rubricas interpretum iuris canonici* (or *Repertorium per rubricas Decretalium Gregorii IX*), a compilation of patristic and canonistic sources on which he worked from the 1430s for at least two decades.[31]

The content and organization of Gimignano's library suggest that it was primarily conceived as a tool for his professional activities. Scholars have observed that he was less of a bibliophile and more of a pragmatic user of books, driven by necessity rather than a collector's passion.[32] However, this does not mean that his interests were strictly limited to canon law, as evidenced by the presence—albeit not predominant—of classical and patristical works in his collection.[33] His humanistic sensibility emerges most clearly in his contribution to the foundation of public libraries, such as that of San Girolamo in Prato and the Library of the Canons of the Cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore in Florence, as well as in his support for artistic commissions for figures like Filippo Lippi and Beato Angelico.[34] Perhaps this openness to broader intellectual horizons was nurtured by Gimignano's exposure to the exchange of people, ideas, and texts during the fifteenth-century ecumenical councils he attended, as well as by the challenge of navigating a period of tension, shaped by the frictions between conciliarist demands, efforts to reinforce papal authority, and the desire for Church reform.

A closer examination of the surviving records of the cases he adjudicated could offer further insight into how the books he read influenced his legal reasoning and decision-making. At present, this material exists in a highly fragmented and disorganized state, with much of it remaining largely unexplored. One exception is the research of Martin Cable, who analyzed three cases overseen by Gimignano, specifically in the context of disputes over benefices and the application of the principle of 'real obedience' from the decree *Omnia et singula*.[35] The decree *Omnia et singula*, issued at the Council of Constance,

[31] See Santi, "Gimignano Inghirami (1370-1460)", 772-774. For the list of Gimignano's writings, see Roberto Gamberini (ed.), *BISLAM. Bibliotheca Scriptorum Latinorum Medii Recentiorisque Aevi*, II: *Censimento onomastico e letterario degli autori latini del medioevo. Identificazione, classificazione per genere letterario e bibliografia fondamentale*, 2 vols. (Florence: SISMEL–Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2010), I, 652-653, and Roberto Angelini, *Geminianus de Inghiramis* in *Compendium Auctorum Latinorum Medii Aevi (500-1500)* (Florence: SISMEL–Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2012), IV.2, 146-147.
[32] Bianchi et al. (eds.), *Manoscritti medievali*, 14-15.
[33] Santi suggested that the limited presence of patristic and classical texts in his library may have been due to the availability of other collections, such as Orsini's, which Gimignano might have accessed ("Gimignano Inghirami [1370-1460]", 766).
[34] On this point, see Santi, "Gimignano Inghirami (1370-1460)", 772-776.
[35] Martin J. Cable, "Resolving Benefice Disputes after the Great Schism: The Survival of the Council of Constance's 4 July 1415 Decrees *Omnia et singula* and *Pro majori pace* in Two Disputes from Auch and Rieti Brought before the Rota Auditor Gimignano Inghirami at the Time of the Council of

aimed to facilitate the reunification of the 'Pisan' and 'Gregorian' obediences by legitimizing all acts carried out by Pope Gregory XII within his obedience before his abdication. Rather than determining which obedience was the 'true' one, it sought to preserve legal continuity for offices and benefices granted by the rival pontiffs, while also providing a framework for resolving disputes. In cases where two ecclesiastical officials contested the same benefice, each appointed by a different pope, the quarrel was settled by validating the appointment made by the pope recognized within the community where the ecclesiastical office was located. Essentially, *Omnia et singula* ensured legal security for individuals who had received an ecclesiastical benefice from a particular pope, provided that the appointment occurred within the boundaries of a community that had acknowledged his authority.

Cable demonstrates that this principle was invoked in the cases examined by Gimignano even two decades after Constance. Furthermore, he proposes a thought-provoking interpretation of its significance by drawing a parallel with the later principle *cuius regio, eius religio*, introduced in the wake of the Peace of Augsburg (1555) to resolve conflicts between Protestants and Catholics. According to this interpretation—partially revised by Phillip H. Stump in a recent study—, the decree *Omnia et singula* would represent a shift from a legal system based on personal allegiance to one rooted in territorial jurisdiction. Additionally, it would mark a move towards secularization, as, within this framework, temporal authorities would play a decisive role in determining which papal obedience prevailed within their domains.[36] Without delving into this interpretive debate, which falls beyond the scope of this study, it is nonetheless noteworthy that Gimignano, in his role as auditor of the Sacra Rota, frequently handled disputes of this nature. While there is no evidence that his familiarity with the *Defensor pacis* influenced his legal approach or verdicts, it is worth considering how the jurisdictional challenges he encountered in his daily work—including resolving conflicts

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Basle", *Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum* 38 (2006): 321-424; and id., "'Cuius Regio eius ... Papa?' The Decree on 'Real Obedience' at the Council of Constance (1414-1418). Konrad von Soest and the Contest for a Parish Church in the Diocese of Regensburg Brought before the Rota Auditor Gimignano Inghirami", *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Kanonistische Abteilung* 94 (2008): 66-102. See also id., *'Cum essem in Constantie...' Raffaele Fulgosio and the Council of Constance 1414-1415* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015), IX-XI.

[36] Cable, "Resolving Benefice", 325: "It meant that where a particular town, kingdom or region had publicly recognised Gregory as pope, his actions within its territorial frontiers were valid. [...] that decision was to be made in terms of how a particular territory had behaved in the schism; and the individuals who had in effect decided how a territory should behave were its territorial, and thus often secular, rulers. Real obedience, in short, put the choices of territorial prince over and above those of their ecclesiastical counterparts. It made *their* choice of obedience the one which would decide which of the papal contenders was to be considered as having properly wielded papal power in their territories." For Phillip H. Stump's account of Cable's interpretation and his own considerations on this matter, see *Conciliar Diplomacy at the Council of Constance (1414-1418): Unity and Peacemaking in a World Historical Perspective* (Leiden: Brill, 2024), 87-89.

between competing authorities—may have intersected with the theoretical issues he explored in his readings.

II. The *Defensor pacis* in MS Q.VIII.5 (22)

II.1. *The Codex*

MS Q.VIII.5 (22) is a composite manuscript, consisting of at least three distinct codicological units, corresponding to items nr. 26, 27 and 28 of the 1442 inventory.[37] These units remained separate at least until that time. However, they were likely collated into a single codex relatively early, most probably at Gimignano's own initiative. I provide here the list of contents, including the transcription of possible colophons, rubrics with titles and author attributions, along with the corresponding entries in the inventory.

I. ff. 1-101 (XV[1])

1. ff. 1ra-101vb: Marsilius de Padua, *Defensor pacis, Dictiones* II and III

f.1ra: (mrg. *b*) *Dictio secunda (!) Guilelmi de Occam in Derisorio suo.*

(Invent. nr. 26: *Item tractatus Guillelmi de Occam in Derisorio suo de potestate pape et concilii.*)

II. ff. 102-117 (12 marzo 1437, Edinburgh)

2. ff. 102ra-114vb: Petrus de Alliaco, *De ecclesiae concilii generalis, Romani pontificis et cardinalium auctoritate.*

f. 102r: (mrg. *b*) *Tractatus domini cadinalis Cameracensis*

f. 114r: (text) *Scriptus in Scocie regno in Edymburgho, anno Domini MºCCCºXXXVIIº die duodecima mensis Marcii.*

(Invent. nr. 27: *Item tractatus de potestate pape et concilii generalis editus a reverendo in Christo patre domino Petro cardinali Cameracensi editus in sacro concilio Constantiensi.*)

[37] The units have been identified based on codicological analysis; for a more detailed description of the codex, especially from a material perspective, I refer to Santi, "Prato, Biblioteca Roncioniana", 93-936, and Bianchi et al. (eds.), *Manoscritti medievali*, 56-57, who identified three codicological units. Boschi Rotiroti has instead identified four codicological units, further subdividing the third one, see *infra*, fn. 38 and 39 (*Manoscritti datati*, 77, nr. 64). For the entries in the inventory, see Bianchi et al. (eds.), *Manoscritti medievali*, 96.

III: ff. 118-214 (XV[1])

3. ff. 118ra-146vb: Iohannes de Casanova, *Tractatus de potestate papae et concilii generalis*

f. 118ra: *Incipit tractatus de potestate pape et concilii generalis editus a reverendissimo in Christo patre et domino, domino Johanne titulo Santi Sixti sacrosante Romane ecclesie presbitero cardinali.*

4. ff. 146vb-156ra: Iohannes de Casanova, *Quaestio de potestate papae*

5. ff. 156ra-162rb: Iohannes de Casanova, *Quaestio quid venit nomine Ecclesiae*

(ff. 162v-166v blank)

(Invent. nr. 28: *Item tractatus de eadem materia a domini Iohanne titulo Santi Sisti Cardinali*)[38]

<IV: ff. 167-214 (XV[1])?>[39]

6. ff. 167ra-214rb: <Iohannes de Segovia>, *Tractatus decem advisamentorum*

f. 214rb-va: Tabula tractati decem advisamentorum (f. 214b: (text) *Tractatus decem avisamentorum ex sacra scriptura de sanctitate ecclesie et generalis concilii auctoritate.*

The hypothesis that the codicological units were combined very early is supported by the presence of glosses and organizational marks that are consistent across all of them. These annotations were made by two fifteenth-century hands: one belonging to Gimignano (*g*), and another more cursive hand (*b*), which also appears in some of his other codices. Hand *b* is responsible for inserting cross-references within the codex, linking one unit to another (f. 101v, f. 117v, and f. 166v).[40]

[38] The inventory only records the first work by Casanova. It is possible that the unit expanded after the inventory was compiled—this later addition seems particularly likely in the case of text nr. 6 by Juan de Segovia, which begins with a new quire without using the blank folios left at the end of Casanova's *Quaestio quid venit nomine Ecclesiae* (ff. 162v-166v); cf. Bianchi et al. (eds.), *Manoscritti medievali*, 57.

[39] Although this section appears homogeneous with the preceding one in terms of hands and layout, Boschi Rotiroti identifies it as a distinct codicological unit (*Manoscritti datati*, 77, nr. 64); cf. *supra* fn. 37.

[40] At the end of the first and second units, hand *b* records the title of the first text of the following unit. The final reference, on f. 166v, appears at the end of the quire containing the last text by Juan de Casanova, just before the beginning of the text by Juan de Segovia.

The ownership note appears on f. 1r, and follows the formula found in Gimignano's manuscripts dating prior to 1451: *Iste liber dominis Geminiani d<e> Inghyramis de Prato canonici Florentini, et auditoris sacri pallatii apostolici c<a>usarum* (f. 1r) (see Fig. 1).[41]

II.2. R_o *and Its Glosses*

Let us now turn to the copy of the *Defensor*. For convenience, I will refer to it as *R_o*.[42] The rubric on f. 1r, which identifies the text as the "Second *Dictio* of William of Ockham in his *Derisorium*", was added by hand *b* (see Fig. 2). This information is also recorded in the 1442 inventory, where the editor notably included the phrase "on the power of the pope and the council", likely reflecting Gimignano's primary interest in the text. A crucial point to highlight is that the manuscript contains not only the Second *Dictio*, but also the Third. The mistake made by both hand *b* and the editor of the inventory may stem from the fact that three chapters of *Dictio* III are rubricated in the margins as chapters 31, 32, and 33 of *Dictio* II. This misidentification regarding the actual extent of the text is also present in the Roncioniana catalog and in modern studies referencing this codex. I have not found any indication in Scholz's edition that this peculiar division of the text appears in other witnesses of the *Defensor pacis.*

The loss of a folio—the first half of the fourth bifolio in the fifth quire—has resulted in a textual lacuna. More specifically, the text breaks off at f. 43vb with "[...] induximus per apostolum quoque ac sanctorum" (DP II.17.6; cf. ed. Scholz, vol. II, p. 360, l. 25) and resumes at f. 44ra: "aut curatus, sicque in reliquis minoribus ecclesiasticis officiis" (DP II.17.11; ed. Scholz, vol. II, p. 365, l. 16). Additionally, a copying error due to homoeoteleuton can be observed at f. 83vb. After the passage "Quod sapere videtur glosa, cum dixit: Trine negacioni redditur trina confessio, ne minus amori lingua serviat, quam timori" (DP II.28.9; cf. ed. Scholz, vol. II, p. 538, l. 27), the text erroneously continues with "Ex hoc autem non aliud convincitur [...] testatur autem dictis, quod ecclesia catholica" (DP II.28.8; cf. ed. Scholz, vol. I, p. 237, ll. 19-25). This misplaced section is crossed out, and from that point, the scribe resumes the correct text with: "Hoc enim certissime constat".

The text features filigreed initials at the beginning of each chapter and employs black ink paragraph marks to separate sections. Hand *b* adds chapter numbers and, occasionally, brief titles. Both the titles and the textual divisions do not correspond to those found in the modern edition. Citations are generally not underlined, though some exceptions can be found, particularly at DP II.3 (ff. 3vb-4rb), II.4 (ff. 5va, 6rb-6vb, 7vb, 8rb), II.5 (9ra, 9va), II.6 (12vb-13ra), II.19 (f. 48vb), II.28 (81vb, 84rb, 88vb, 91ra-91vb), and II.29

[41] Gimignano's coat of arms was once present in the middle of the inscription; its removal resulted in the loss of some characters. Ownership formulas posterior to 1451 include Gimignano's titles as *protonotarius sedis apostolicae* and *praepositus* of Prato, reflecting his later positions and status; cf. Bianchi et al. (eds.), *Manoscritti medievali*, 16.

[42] I opted for *R_o* (short for *Roncionianus*) to avoid confusion with the sigla of the manuscripts used by Scholz for his edition.

(92vb-93va, 95vb). Throughout the manuscript, *maniculae*, crosses, and vertical marks highlight points of interest. Both *b* and *g* contribute to the marginal glosses, though Gimignano's interventions are more frequent. The glossing remains dense and consistent throughout the text until II.30, where it becomes noticeably sparser. *Dictio* III is left unglossed, with the only exception being the numbering of the first five *conclusiones* of the first chapter (f. 99v, rubricated here as II.31).

The glosses generally fall into three categories:

(i) Names of cited authorities and Biblical passages (added by both *g* and *b*);

(ii) Cross-references, though relatively few. For instance, in the margins of II.27 ("On some objections to what was determined in chapter 15 of this discourse and in other chapters subsequently"[43]), here at ff. 79ra-79va, hand *b* added references to the arguments in the previous chapters, introduced with the words: "Responsio infra c. [*nr.*]". At ff. 82ra-98ra, corresponding to DP II.28 ("On the replies to the said objections"), II.29 ("On the solution to the objections adduced from Scripture in chapter 3 of this discourse, to show that bishops have coercive jurisdiction and that the Roman bishop, as such, has supreme coercive jurisdiction") and II.30 ("On the solution to the objections introduced in the same chapter 3 to the same end, and concerning the transference of the Roman empire or any other principate, sc. to what extent it both should and can take place according to right reason"), it is Gimignano himself who identifies the references, using the expressions: "Ad [*nr.*] instantiam..." and "Ad illud...".

(iii) Excerpts or summaries of key definitions and relevant passages of the text, written by both *g* and *b*. These are almost always verbatim quotations from the text, usually abridged, although occasionally they feature slight variations in wording or more freely paraphrased passages.

With respect to this latter type of annotations, see, by way of example, the following passages from the *Defensor* in R_o (left) accompanied by Gimignano's glosses (right):

[43] For convenience, I use the chapter titles from the modern edition (as found in Brett's English translation) to refer to the content of the chapters, even though they are absent from R_o.

DP II.2.3, R_0 f. 2rb (cf. ed. Scholz, vol. I, p. 144)	
Rursum, secundum aliam significacionem debet hoc nomen ecclesia, et omnium verissime et propriissime secundum primam imposicionem huius nominis seu intencionem primorum imponencium, licet non prima seu secundum modernum usum **de universitate fidelium credencium** et invocancium nomen Christi et de huius universitatis partibus omnibus, in quacumque communitate, etiam domestica. Et hec fuit imposicio prima huius diccionis et consuetus usus eius apud apostolos et in ecclesia primitiva.	*Ecclesia est* ***congregatio fidelium credentium*** *et invocantium nomen Christi, et prima huius* (add. *vocis** sed del.) *ditionis et consuetus usus eius apud apostolos in primitiva Ecclesia, et hec est proprissima et verissima significatio.*[44]
DP II.15.7, R_0 f. 38ra-b (cf. ed. Scholz, vol. II, p. 332)	
Unde non plus sacerdotalis auctoritatis essencialis habet **romanus episcopus** quam alter sacerdos quilibet sicut in beatus Petrus amplius ex hac habuit ceteris apostolis.	*non plus sacerdotalis auctoritatis essentialis habet* ***romanus pontifex*** *quam alter sacerdos quilibet.*
DP II.18.2, R_0 f. 46rb (cf. ed. Scholz, vol. II, p. 376)	
Quesita ergo proposita reddere temptaturis oportebit de ipsis intendere: primum quatenus processerunt de facto et circa eorum origines; deinde vero quantum iuri divino et humano ac recte racioni sic facta conformiter se habuerint aut habere debuerit ...	***Quomodo pontifices romani acquiserunt sibi iurisdictionem coactivam.*** *Et de eorum origine. Et quantum iuri divino et humano ac rationi recte se habuerint.*

In the first example, Gimignano reproduces Marsilius' definition of *ecclesia*, slightly abbreviating it and making a small change by replacing *universitas fidelium* with *congregatio fidelium*. In the second case, he transcribes the text verbatim, altering only the papal title—i.e., substituting *romanus episcopus*, as found in Marsilius, with *romanus pontifex*. The third gloss takes a freer approach, making the theme of the passage explicit—namely, indicating that the text explores how popes acquired coercive jurisdiction. The decision to replace *romanus episcopus* with *romanus pontifex* is certainly noteworthy. Gimignano and *b* often opt for *pontifex*—usually when the text does not specify a title and in many cases even when *episcopus* appears in the original passage. This choice may suggest a politically motivated adjustment, emphasizing the Petrine primacy in contrast to Marsilius' theory, which rejected the preeminence of the bishop of Rome over other bishops. However, this pattern is not consistently applied across the glosses, as *episcopus* is also frequently

[44] Unlike the scribe of the main text, Gimignano's spelling introduces the *-ci-/-ti-* distinction. I have therefore chosen to reproduce it here faithfully as it appears in the manuscript.

retained.[45] Therefore, although the choice is significant, its inconsistency suggests that it should not be overinterpreted as a strongly politicized decision.

More generally, as far as I have been able to ascertain, the glosses do not deviate further from Marsilius' text; a closer examination could help determine whether there is consistent pattern of subtle lexical substitutions and whether these hold any significance. In any case, what stands out here is that, even without providing interpretative glosses or elaborating on the text's content, Gimignano engaged with the *Defensor* meticulously, reading it line by line with great attention. This manuscript was not part of his collection out of mere bibliographic interest: he studied it closely, added rubrics to facilitate the retrieval of key passages, and annotated the most relevant definitions—perhaps to commit them to memory and reference them at a later time. Just as he did with the works of Pierre d'Ailly, Juan de Casanova, and Juan de Segovia, Gimignano may have examined the doctrines of the *Defensor* with the intent of better understanding and contributing to the conciliar discussions taking place in his social circles.

A particularly long and significant gloss appears at f. 53va, DP II.21.7 (Fig. 3). This chapter discusses who holds the coercive authority to convene a council and to establish binding norms under penalty of excommunication. At §7, Marsilius cites an edict beginning with the words *Imperatores Caesar Theodosius et Valentinianus*,[46] and comments that it aligns with three conclusions he previously advanced:

> the first, that it is expedient to define anything that is doubtful about the divine law; the second, that this definition does not belong to the authority of a single person or college, but to a general council; and the third, that the authority to call or command a council of this nature, to establish and determine the persons suitable to it, to lay it down that those things that have been defined and ordered by this council should be observed, and to suppress transgressors of those things that have been laid down, <in and for the status of this present world,> belongs to the faithful human legislator alone or to the prince by its authority.[47]

Rather than summarizing the passage, Gimignano transcribes all three conclusions verbatim and in full, without shifts in wording or significant omissions. His interest for this passage is worthy of attention, considering his close ties to Pope Eugenius IV. Indeed,

[45] For *romanus pontifex*, see for instance the chapter titles added by *b* at II.24 (f. 62vb), II.25 (f. 66rb), II.26 (f. 71rv) and the gloss at II.18.3 (f. 46va; cf. ed. Scholz, vol. II, p. 376). Gimignano uses *pontifex* at II.6.9 (f. 14va; cf. ed. vol. I p. 207), II.15.7 (f. 38ra-b; cf. ed. vol. II, p. 332), II.18.2 (f. 46rb, cf. ed. vol. II, p. 376), II.21.3 (f. 52ra; cf. ed. vol. II, p. 404), II.22.20 and 23.1 (f. 60; cf. ed. vol. II, p. 440), II.24.2 (f. 63ra; ed. vol. II, p. 452), II.24.14 (f. 65ra; cf. ed. vol. II, p. 462), II.25.2 (f. 66va; cf. ed. vol. II, p. 468), II.25.7 (f. 68ra; cf. ed. vol. II, p. 473), II.28.13 (f. 87ra; cf. ed. vol. II, p. 544). For the sake of brevity, I do not list here the instances where *episcopus* appears (e.g., ff. 3vb, 4rb, 41va, 47va, etc.) but I have counted occurrences in at least 18 folios, sometimes more than once per page.

[46] For the identification of this particular reference, see Scholz' edition, vol. II, 409.

[47] DP II.21.7, transl. Brett, 383. I have used angle brackets to indicate text absent from Gimignano's gloss.

Marsilius' ideas on this matter stand in clear counterpoint to the position defended by the supporters of papal supremacy, to which Gimignano was likely exposed in the context of his professional activity and social interactions. Perhaps he was intentionally recording the opposing theses to his own faction—studying the enemy, so to speak.

II.3. *Notes on* R$_0$*'s Place Within the Manuscript Tradition*

According to Previté-Orton and Scholz, the manuscripts of the *Defensor pacis* can be divided into two families: the French group, derived from the version completed in Paris in 1324, and the German group, which spread from the copy that Marsilius had with him while at the court of Ludwig of Bavaria.[48] A key witness for both traditions is MS Tortosa, Arxiu Capitular de la Catedral, 141 (= *T*). The copy of the *Defensor* preserved in *T* aligns with the French group, yet it contains numerous corrections and marginal annotations—introduced by at least two hands over different stages[49]—that are found incorporated into the text in witnesses of the German family. A study by Alexander Fidora and Matthias M. Tischler has confirmed that the revisions in *T* (= *T'*) were likely overseen by Marsilius himself (or by a close collaborator) while in Munich.[50] From Germany, the manuscript had reached Avignon by the time of Pedro de Luna—the last pope of the Avignon obedience with the name of Benedict XIII (1394-1423)—, where it became part of his library. After Benedict XIII's death, it found its way to Tortosa.[51] From a philological perspective, this

[48] Previté-Orton, "Introduction", XXVI-XLII; Scholz, "Einleitung", V-L. An updated list including codices unknown to the two editors, bringing the total to 36 known manuscripts and excerpts, is provided in Miethke, "Einleitung", XLIV fn. 75-76. I include the list here for convenience, without specifying the shelf marks. French group = *A, B, C, D, E,* and *F* (Paris), *G* (Auxerre), *K* (Vienna), *L* (Vatican), *M* (Florence), *O* and *Y* (London), *Q* (Oxford), *R* (Cambridge), *U* (Bruges), *W* (Ulm), and *N* (Turin). German group = *H, I,* and *J* (Vienna), *P* (Oxford), *S* (Bremen), *V* (Freiburg i. Ü.), *X* (Ulm) and *Z* (Weimar), Z^n (Nuremberg), and a manuscript copied from the *Editio princeps* (Hannover, 17th cent.); the *Editio princeps* (Basel: Valentinus Curio, 1522) stems from the German tradition, having likely been copied from the same manuscript on which *Z* may also depend. *T* (Tortosa) is at the intersection between the two traditions. Among the manuscripts unknown by Scholz, Miethke lists, for the French group, Vatican, Ottob. lat. 2078, Reims 885, and Bruges 226; for the German group, Florence, Bibl. Naz., Conv. soppr. E.3.379, as well as the fragments in Kassel, Murhardsche und Landesbibliothek, theol. 168, f. 168, and Lucerne, Zentralbibliothek, 18, ff. 14v-15v.

[49] For an analysis of the hands, see Fidora and Tischler, "Zwischen Avignon, München und Tortosa", 182-183.

[50] Fidora and Tischler, "Zwischen Avignon, München und Tortosa". The main argument for attributing the authorship of this revision to Marsilius (or a close collaborator) is that many of the textual additions, particularly regarding biblical citations, precisely match passages found in the *Defensor minor*.

[51] Miethke considered the possibility that it reached Tortosa via the book trade at the Councils of Constance or Basel ("Marsilius und Ockham", 557 fn. 48). On the other hand, Fidora and Tischler suggest that, after the death of 'Papa Luna', the manuscript was transferred to Guillem Cardona, a Catalan nobleman, as compensation for his services to the papal court. Through Cardona it then arrived in the Kingdom of Aragon and eventually in Tortosa.

manuscript holds particular significance as it stands at the intersection of the two textual traditions, preserving both the earliest form of the text and the later additions that define the German family. A comparison with this witness is therefore essential to determining where a copy of the *Defensor* fits within the stemma.

At this stage of my research, I do not have sufficient evidence to determine R_o's exact position within the tradition. To clarify this, it would be necessary to conduct a more thorough examination of R_o's textual variants and reassess Scholz's stemma in light of any new data on the codices that might have emerged over the past nearly hundred years.[52] For the purposes of this article, I will therefore limit myself to offering some preliminary observations that might contribute to a tentative placement of R_o within the broad framework outlined by Scholz. My analysis will focus on the *loci critici* from *Dictio* II that, according to Scholz's reconstruction, are crucial for distinguishing between the two traditions.[53] The key aspect to examine is whether R_o includes the additions from *T'* at II.4.5, II.4.11, II.9.2, II.14.8, and II.14.24, which are entirely absent in the French group.

The table below presents the text from Scholz's edition on the left—with asterisks * marking *T'* 's additions and square brackets [ ] indicating the corrections introduced by *T'* to the original text of *T*—and the text from R_o on the right. The next row lists the textual variants found in both traditions, followed by a preliminary note on the similarities and discrepancies observed which I will expand on later.[54] I also include here the stemmata of the French and German groups according to Scholz's reconstruction.[55]

[52] Despite the challenges posed by such a complex tradition, Scholz's edition of the *Defensor* has been recognized as solid. However, more precise studies on textual variants and the history of the codices could provide fresh insights into the manuscript tradition as a whole.
[53] Scholz, "Einleitung", XXIV-XXV and XLV-XLVI.
[54] I have relied here on Scholz's apparatus, which, unfortunately, does not seem to record all the variants of the manuscripts known to him. Both Previté-Orton and Scholz have, in fact, only reported the variants they considered most relevant.
[55] Scholz, "Einleitung", XXV and XLVI.

French Group (A)



German Group (B)



(a) DP II.4.5	
ed. Scholz, vol. I, p. 162	*R_0* f. 5vb
Ecce de quo regno docere atque disponere venit, quoniam de actibus quibus pervenitur[1] ad regnum eternum fidei scilicet ac reliquarum theologicarum virtutum[2]; ***neminem tamen ad hoc cogendo, ut infra patebit.***[3] Duo namque coactiva dominia[4] non subinvicem posita ***ac**[5] **respectu eiusdem**	Ecce de quo regno docere atque disponere venit, quoniam de actibus quibus pervenitur ad regnum eternum fidei scilicet ac reliquarium theologicarum virtutem, **neminem tamen cogendo ad hoc, ut infra patebit**. Duo namque coactiva dominia non subinvicem posita **eciam respectu eiusdem** se impediunt, ut in 17º prime monstratum est

<table>
<tr><td>multitudinis*[6] se impediunt, ut in 17º prime monstratum est.</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">[1] provenitur T [2] virtutem R_o [3] neminem—patebit] om. L, Q, V, I, J, X, W, A, K, G, N; add. mrg. T'; in textu H, R_o, Z, Ed. prin. [4] add. secularia L, Q, K, A, G, W; add. coactiva sed del. T [5] eciam R_o [6] ac—multitudinis] add. supr. lin. T'; om. L, Q, K, A, G, W; in textu sed post dominia I, J, V, Z, X; in textu sed om. multitudinis H, R_o

The first addition from T' (*neminem—patebit*) is absent in all witnesses, both German and French, except for H, Z, the Editio princeps, and R_o. The second (*ac—multitudinis*) is absent in the French manuscripts but present in the German ones, as well as in R_o. Moreover, R_o shares exclusively with H both the placement of this addition in the text (following posita instead of dominia, as in the other German manuscripts) and the omission of the final word, multitudinis.</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">(b) DP II.4.11</td></tr>
<tr><td>ed. Scholz, vol. I, p. 171</td><td>R_o f. 7va</td></tr>
<tr><td>Constat autem eciam[1] Christum neque Petrum filios fuisse Cesaris secundum carnem, neque secundum spiritum. *Adhuc, quid quesivisset Christus questionem[2] premissam omnibus enim constat filios regum secundum semen non solvere tributa parentibus.*[3] Non igitur[4] fuisse videtur exposicio Ieronymi sic consona scripture, quemadmodum[5] Origenis.</td><td>Constat autem eciam Christum neque Petrum filios Cesaris fuisse secundum carnem, neque secundum spiritum. *Adhuc, quid quesivisset Christus questionem premissam omnibus enim constat filios regum secundum semen non solvere tributa parentibus.* Non ita fuisse videtur exposicio Ieronimi sic consona scripture, quemadmodum Origenis.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">[1] om. L, Q, A, W [2] per questionem H [3] adhuc—parentibus] om. L, Q, W, A etc.; add. marg. T'; in textu H, I, R_o, V, X, Z, Z^n, Ed. prin. [4] ita R_o [5] quamadmodum a.c. R_o

adhuc—parentibus is absent in all French manuscript and present in the German ones, the Editio princeps, and R_o. In this case, R_o does not share H's reading per questionem.</td></tr>
</table>

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">(c) DP II.9.2</td></tr>
<tr><td>ed. Scholz, vol. I, p. 232</td><td>R_o f. 19va</td></tr>
<tr><td>Frustra enim ad hec[1] quemquam cogeret, quoniam observatori[2] talium coacto nihil[3] ipsa proficerent ad eternam salutem, *quemadmodum per Chrysostomum, quinimo per apostolum evidenter ostendimus 5º[4] huius, parte 6ª[5]*[6].</td><td>Frustra enim quemquam cogeret, quoniam observacioni talium coacto nisi ipsa proficerent ad eternam salutem, *quemadmodum per Chrysostomum, quinymo per apostolum evidenter ostendimus 2º huius, parte*.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">[1] hoc L, A [2] observacioni R_o [3] nisi R_o [4] 2º R_o [5] 6ₐ om. R_o [6] quemadmodum—parte] om. L, Q, A, C^b, F, G, K, I, V, W, X, Z^n; scr. marg. T' et iter. per Chrysostomum quinymo; in textu H, R_o, Z; parte 6ª om. Ed. prin.</td></tr>
</table>

quemadmodum—parte is absent in the French manuscripts and in several of the German ones. Thus, R_o, which includes it (though omitting *6^a*), shares this reading only with *H*, *Z*, and *Ed. prin.* (which omits *parte 6^a*).

(d) DP II.14.8	
ed. Scholz, vol. II, p. 307	R_o f. 33ra
et da pauperibus. ***Dato igitur secundum heresim aliquorum Christum in quantum hominem habuisse dominium omnium temporalium rerum, eas vendidit, aut consilium quod ad perfeccionem tradidit non servavit. Si ergo ea vendidit, illa sibi ex successione Christi non potest vendicare Romanus aut alter episcopus neque collegium sacerdotum***[1]**,** sive talia fuissent ab eis habita in proprio sive eciam in communi.	et da pauperibus, sive talia fuissent ab eis habita in proprio sive eciam in communi.
[1] **dato—sacerdotum]** ***add. mrg.*** **T’,** ***in textu*** **H;** ***om. ab omnibus aliis codicibus*** **dato—sacerdotum** is attested only in *T’* and *H*, while it is absent in all the other manuscripts, both French and German, including R_o.	

(e) DP II.14.24	
ed. Scholz, vol. II, p. 324	R_o f. 36va
Vel dicendum, quod[1] de tali dominio, scilicet[2] temporali, non sensit ibi[3] beatus Iohannes, imo[4] de dominio regni eterni, ***vel quantum ad regnum eternum***.[5] Unde glossa subdit: Rex regum, id est, super omnes sanctos. **[Hii autem sunt in patria, non in via]**.[6]	Vel dicendum de tali domino scilicet temporali non sensit beatus Iohannes ymmo de domino regni eterni. Unde glossa subdit: Rex regum, id est, super omnes sanctos. **Hii autem sunt in patria, non in via.**
[1] *om.* R_o [2] *om.* V. [3] *om.* R_o [4] X^o H [5] **vel—eternum]** ***om.*** **L, Q, A, W, R_o;** ***add. mrg.*** **T’;** ***in textu*** **H, V, X, Z, Ed. prin., I, J** [6] **Hii—via]** ***del.*** **T;** ***om.*** **H, V, X, Z, Ed. prin., I, J;** ***in textu*** **Q, L, W, A, G etc.** **vel—eternum** appears in *T’* as an addition correcting a marginal annotation. It is incorporated into the text in the German manuscripts but not in the French ones, nor in R_o. R_o diverges from the German tradition and aligns more closely with the French group also by preserving [*His—via*], which had been deleted by *T* and omitted in the German manuscripts.	

In the first three passages examined, R_o includes the additions from Tortosa; thus, this copy can be classified within the German group. One can also note that in two instances (i.e. [a] II.4.5, *neminem—patebit* and [c] II.9.2, *quemadmodum—parte*) R_o reports additions that are found only in *H*, *Z*,[56] and the *Editio princeps*, while are absent from other German manuscripts. Notably, R_o seems to present some distinctive readings found only in *T'* and *H*. The latter (*H* = Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 464) is a significant witness within the textual tradition.[57] Dated to the mid-fourteenth century, it was acquired in 1407 by Franciscus de Retz (c. 1343-1427), a professor of theology at the University of Vienna who participated in the Council of Pisa and later took part in the preparations for the Council of Constance.[58] According to Previté-Orton and Scholz, *H* is a direct and faithful copy of *T'*.[59] Scholz states that *H* neither corrects nor adds to *T*', reproduces its errors, and includes readings that can only be attributed to misunderstandings of this witness. Most notably, *H* integrates some of *T'* 's marginal notes that were not originally meant to be part of the text.[60] Among the three cases of this phenomenon signaled by Scholz, one is also present in R_o. At DP II.5.3 (ed. Scholz, vol. I, p. 181), *H* introduces the sentence "nota quod per seculare negocium exponit Bernardus iudicium actuum contenciosorum", which was originally a marginal comment in *T'*. According to Scholz's apparatus, this addition is absent from any other known witness. Yet, remarkably, R_o includes it, albeit with *regimen* instead of *negocium* (f. 9va). Gimignano took note of this passage and repeated some words of the text in the margin (Fig. 4).[61]

With respect to passages (d) II.14.8 and (e) II.14.24, R_o does not incorporate *T'* 's revisions. The omission of *dato—sacerdotum* in (d) II.14.8 is unsurprising, as this reading is attested only in *T'* and *H*. The long integration appears in a chapter addressing the issue of Christ's universal *dominium* within the broader debate on Franciscan poverty.[62] Both

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[56] *Z* = Weimar, Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek (olim Thüringische Landesbibliothek), Fol. 74, aligns almost perfectly with the *Editio princeps* (Basel 1522). Scholz suggests that it may be a direct copy of the source used for the edition (cf. "Einleitung", XLIII, XLIV). Cf. Betty C. Bushey, *Die lateinischen Handschriften bis 1600*, I: *Fol max, Fol und Oct* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004), 204-205.
[57] Scholz, "Einleitung", XXXII-XXXIV. Cf. Franz Unterkircher, *Die datierten Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek bis zum Jahre 1400*, 2 vols. (Weimar: Böhlau, 1969), I, 25.
[58] Gundolf Gieraths, "Franz von Retz", *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 5 (1961): 372. The ownership note is accompanied by an entertaining warning: "Istum librum emit m. franciscus de Retz a. 1407 in die gordiani et epimachi pro 1 den. Wienn, *qui valde caute legendus est, quoniam pocius offensor pacis quam defensor est*". The manuscript was later owned by Jakob von Hoogstraeten (d. 1527) and eventually incorporated into the Dominican library in Vienna. Cf. Scholz, "Einleitung", XXXII and Miethke, "Marsilius und Ockham", 552.
[59] Michael Bihl did not fully endorse this interpretation (review of "Marsilius von Padua, *Defensor pacis*, herausgegeben von Richard Scholz", *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 27 [1934]: 284).
[60] Scholz, "Einleitung", XXXIII.
[61] R_o f. 9va, marginal note by Gimignano: "secular Regimen secundum Bernardum est iudicium actuum contemptiosorum". The other two marginal notes that Scholz mentions as being incorporated into the text by *H* are absent in R_o; Cf. II.18.3 (ed. Scholz, vol. II, 377; R_o f. 46vb) and II.23.3 (ed. Scholz, vol. II, 442; R_o f. 60vb). The former incorporation is not unique to *H* but is also found in other witnesses of the German tradition.
[62] While commenting on Mt 19:21, *Go and sell all that thou hast, and give unto the poor*, the integration adds: "Therefore, granted that (according to the heresy of some) Christ as man had dominion of all temporal things, he must have sold them, or he did not keep the counsel of perfection which

Previté-Orton and Scholz viewed this passage as a later revision introduced by Marsilius himself in response to John XXII's bull *Quia vir reprobus*, issued on 16 November 1329. As a result, they set the year 1329 as the *terminus a quo* for the final redaction of the revisions in *T'*.[63] Kerry E. Spiers has challenged this interpretation, arguing—quite convincingly—that the issue at stake in this passage had already been debated before 1329, making it insufficient as conclusive evidence for dating the addition in *T'* as post-*Quia vir reprobus*.[64] According to Spiers, this section could have been introduced at any point after Marsilius' flight to Germany in 1326.[65] Regardless of this debate on the dating, it is certain that the copy from which R_o derives did not include this revision.

Turning to the final passage, (e) II.14.24, we find a more substantial divergence. Scholz's apparatus reports that *vel—eternum* was added as an integration to a marginal correction ("in *T'* als Ergänzung des Korr. am Rande"), while *Hii—via* was deleted from the text ("in *T* ausgestrichen"). Here, R_o does not include either of these revisions and, in both instances, aligns with the French group against the entirety of the German tradition.[66] To sum up, the analysis of the *loci critici* suggests that R_o derives from a copy of the German group which occasionally shared distinctive readings with *H* but predated both the introduction of (d) *dato—sacerdotum* and the revisions in (e). At this stage, drawing more definitive conclusions about its precise position within the manuscript tradition would be premature. On the other hand, an aspect that warrants further consideration is the attribution of this text to Ockham, as it may provide additional insight into the history of the codex and, more broadly, the reception of the *Defensor pacis* in the fifteenth century.

III. On the Trail of Ockham's *Derisorium*

III.1. *The Attribution to Ockham in the Manuscript Tradition of* DP

Fifteenth-century papalists often failed to clearly distinguish between the ecclesiological theories of Marsilius of Padua and those of William Ockham. While Marsilius was invariably condemned, Ockham was, to some extent, considered acceptable; nevertheless, they were frequently mentioned side by side, both accused of having contributed to the emergence of conciliarism. Even Juan de Torquemada, despite holding the two authors in different regard and employing Ockham's arguments in other contexts, grouped them together in the *Summa de ecclesia* as part of his critique of his contemporary conciliarist opponents. He suggested that Marsilius and Ockham—along

he had given. And if he sold them, then neither the Roman nor any other bishop, nor any college of priests, can claim them for themselves as successors of Christ" (DP II.14.8, transl. Brett, 293).

[63] Ed. Previté-Orton, xxxvi, 248 fn. 3, and ed. Scholz, xxviii, xxxiv, 307 fn. 1.

[64] Kerry E. Spiers, "Pope John XXII and Marsilius of Padua on the Universal Dominium of Christ: A Possible Common Source", *Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 6 (1980): 471-478.

[65] Spiers, "Pope John XXII", 477-488.

[66] Both revisions are also found in MS Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conv. soppr. E.3.379, which was not taken into account by Scholz; cf. Bihl, review of "Marsilius von Padua", 285.

with their so-called "accomplices"—had a shared doctrinal influence on the decrees of the Council of Basel, which sought to depose the legitimately elected Pope Eugenius IV.[67] This association between the two exiles who both found refuge in Munich is also reflected in the manuscript tradition of the *Defensor pacis*. Like R_o, at least four (or perhaps five) other witnesses—two (or perhaps three) from the French group (*L*, *O*, and possibly *D*) and two from the German group (*I* and *J*)—misattribute the work to Ockham.

Among the witnesses of the German tradition, manuscript *I* (Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 809) bears on its spine the inscription "Gulielmi Occami", later crossed out, with a modern annotation above it correcting: "Marsilii de Maynardino, Defensor pacis". This copy belonged to Martin Tissnowiensis (*aka* von Tischnowitz), a Moravian Hussite attested as a scribe in Humpolec between 1443 and 1452. The manuscript was likely written in Germany at the beginning of the conciliar movement and later came into the hands of the Hussites in Bohemia.[68] Similarly linked to Hussite circles is *J* (Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 4516), in which the *Defensor* appears alongside a copy of Wyclif's *Trialogus* dated 1440. *J* carries notes by a fifteenth-century hand ascribing the work to Ockham on the front flyleaf "Defensorium Occam. / Trialogum" and on the front cover ("N. 253 Occam. Trialogus. 6tus"); on the back cover, a modern hand reiterates: "Guiliemi Occam Defensorium et Wiclefi Trialogus".[69] Scholz dates both *I* and *J* to the first half of the fifteenth century, before 1440.[70]

Turning to the French family, the attribution to Ockham appears in *O* (London, British Museum, Royal X. A), which belonged to the Oxford chancellor Thomas Gascoigne (d. 1458) and was later passed on to Lincoln College. The title of the *Defensor* in this

[67] Juan de Torquemada, *Summa de ecclesia* II.100, f. 240r: "[...] sicut fuit Marsilius de Padua Ocham cum complicibus suis, ex quorum doctrina extracta sunt pro magna parte decreta illa praefata Basilien", cit. in Izbicki, "Reception of Marsilius", 307. The connection between Marsilius and Ockham became even stronger during and after the Reformation. According to Izbicki, "Tarring Conciliarism", 145-146, this may have resulted from a revisionist approach to the history of dissent promoted by the Reformers. One of the key figures behind this reinterpretation was Matthias Flacius Illyricus, who, in his *Catalogus testium Veritatis, Qui ante nostram aetatem reclamarunt Papae* (Basel: per Ioannem Oporinum, 1556), listed Marsilius and Ockham—alongside other authors—as potential precursors of the Reformation. For a more detailed account of this association in the early modern period, see Piaia, *Marsilio da Padova*, passim.

[68] Scholz, "Einleitung", XXXVII-XXXVIII. Cf. Maria Theisen, *Mitteleuropäische Schulen VII (ca. 1400-1500). Böhmen – Mähren – Schlesien – Ungarn*, 2 vols. (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2022), I, 94-95.

[69] Scholz, "Einleitung", XXXVIII-XXXIX. Cf. Franz Unterkircher, *Die datierten Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek von 1401 bis 1450*, 2 vols. (Wien: Böhlau, 1971), II, 100; Theisen, *Mitteleuropäische Schulen VII (ca. 1400-1500)*, 134-135. The manuscript is available for consultation at <https://onb.digital/result/115D8A55>.

[70] Scholz, "Einleitung", XLVIII fn. 4.

manuscript reads: “Incipit doctor Okkam fratris minoris in suo defensorio”.[71] By contrast, *D* (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, ms. lat. 14619) presents a more ambiguous case. This manuscript was in the possession of Simon Plumetot (d. 1443), *consiliarius* of the French Parliament, who later donated it to the convent of St. Victor in Paris.[72] In this codex, the *Defensor pacis* is followed by the *Tertia pars* of Ockham’s *Dialogus* and, further on, by a list of *articuli erronei Joh. Wyclef heresiarche*. On f. 169r, one finds the inscription: “Hunc librum continentem *defensorium pacis et partem dyalogi Ockan* (!) dedit ecclesie sancti Victoris Parisiensis magister Symon Plumetot...” (italics mine). Whether this statement attributes Ockham’s authorship solely to the *Dialogus* or also to the *Defensor pacis* remains uncertain.

The most intriguing case, however, is that of *L* (Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3974), which contains a copy of the *Defensor* written during Easter in April 1401.[73] The flyleaf features an entertaining note penned by four different hands, forming a sort of back-and-forth conversation (Fig. 5):

> [h_0 + h_1] The Defender of the peace [h_0] \ by brother Petrus [*added above the line by* h_1] / of Prato [h_0], minister of the province of St. Francis of the Order of Friars Minor [*added by* h_1].[74]
>
> [h_2] You are mistaken, for it was Ockham<’s>, according to the testimony of Laurentius of Arezzo, a most reverend doctor of both laws and auditor.
>
> [h_3] However, in the same minor volume, treatise 3, chapter II, § VIII, at the beginning, Laurentius attributes this *Defensorium*, which he calls *Derisorium*, to Marsilius of Padua.[75]

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[71] Cf. Scholz, “Einleitung”, xxii; Miethke, “Marsilius und Ockham”, 554; and Neil R. Ker, “Oxford College Libraries before 1500”, in *The Universities in the Late Middle Ages*, edited by J. IJsewijn and J. Paquet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1978), 307-308 esp. fn. 73.

[72] Cf. Scholz, “Einleitung”, xv-xvi and Miethke, “Marsilius und Ockham”, 553-554. On Plumetot’s collection, see Gilbert Ouy, “Simon de Plumetot (1371-1443) et sa bibliothèque”, in *Miscellanea codicologica F. Masai dicata*, edited by P. Cockshaw and M.-C. Garand (Ghent: Story-Scientia, 1979), bookset pt. II, 353-381.

[73] Cf. Scholz, “Einleitung”, viii-ix. The manuscript is available for consultation at <https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.lat.3974>.

[74] Brother Petrus, mentioned by hand h_1, should be Petrus de Conzano, the 25th Minister General of the Franciscan Order of Roman obedience (1383-1384). However, I am unsure how to interpret the reference to Prato recorded by h_0 (without h_1’s integrations, the inscription would simply read: “Defensor pacis de Prato”), which seems like one of the many coincidences that we will encounter in this story.

[75] *L* f. 2r: “Defensor pacis [h_0] \ fratris Petri [*scr. mrg.* h_1] / de Prato [h_0], ministri provinciae sancti Francisci ordinis minorum [*add.* h_1]” / “[h_2] Errasti quia fuit Occham, Teste Laurentio Arretino, iuris utriusque doctore reverendissimo et auditore” / “[h_3] Qui tamen Laurentius in eodem suo minori volumine tractatu 3, c. II, § VIII in principio atribuit Defensorium hoc, quod nominat Derisorium, Marsilio de Padua”.

This spirited exchange not only reflects the uncertainty surrounding the authorship of the *Defensor pacis* but also hints at an existing scholarly debate on the matter. The key witness cited by h_2 and h_3 is Laurentius of Arezzo, who directly addressed the issue in his *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate*. Here we may be facing a coincidence worth exploring: another Tuscan canonist, an *auditor causarum sacri palatii* under Pope Eugenius IV, referenced and actively discussed the attribution of the *Defensor.* Moreover, he did so using the very same pun—*Defensorium/Derisorium*—that appears in the Roncioniana manuscript.

III.2. *The Testimony of Laurentius of Arezzo*

Born in Arezzo, less than 100 km from Gimignano's birthplace, Lorenzo was the son of Domenico Bandini (b. c. 1335), author of the *Fons memorabilium universi*—a work that Gimignano owned in his library.[76] He studied in Padua under Francesco Zabarella (1360-1417) and served as secretary to Pope Gregory XII during the Council of Pisa.[77] He later became chaplain of Pope Eugene IV and auditor of the Sacra Rota. Given that Gimignano and Lorenzo held the same position under the same employer, it is hardly far-fetched to assume that they knew each other.

The *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate* consists of six treatises in which Laurentius systematically compiles all the doctrines formulated up to that point on ecclesiastical power, both by *papistae* and *antipapistae.*[78] Written during the pontificate of Eugenius IV, it serves as a valuable repository of sources for the history of ecclesiological literature up

[76] A. Teresa Hankey, "Bandini, Domenico", in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani* (Rome: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia, 1963), V, 707-709.

[77] For biography, bibliography and list of manuscripts, see the entries "Laurentius de Aretio" (<https://geschichtsquellen.de/autor/1666>, 03.11.2023) and "Liber de ecclesiastica potestate" (<https://www.geschichtsquellen.de/werk/1719>, 08.02.2002) in the digital Repertorium *Geschichtsquellen des deutschen Mittelalters* of the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften.

[78] The six treatises are: (i) *De ecclesiastica potestate in genere sumpta*; (ii) *De potestate papae*; (iii) *De potestate inferiorum praelatorum*; (iv) *De potestate ecclesiae sive concilii*; (v) *De superioritate papae ad concilium, et si fas est dicere, concilii ad papam;* (vi) *De schismate et remediis contra schisma*. This work has been by studied—though it remains largely unexplored to this day—by Ludwig Hödl, "Kirchengewalt und Kirchenverfassung nach dem *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate* des Laurentius von Arezzo. Eine Studie zur Ekklesiologie des Basler Konzils", in *Theologie in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Michael Schmaus zum sechzigsten Geburtstag*, edited by J. Auer and H. Volk (München: Karl Zink, 1957), 255-278; Anton-Hermann Chroust and James A. Corbett, "The Fifteenth Century *Review of Politics* of Laurentius of Arezzo", *Mediaeval studies* 11 (1949): 62-76; Martin Grabmann, *Studien über den Einfluß der aristotelischen Philosophie auf die mittelalterlichen Theorien über das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat* (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1934), *passim*, and Karla Eckermann, *Studien zur Geschichte des monarchischen Gedankens im 15. Jahrhundert* (Berlin-Grunewald: Walther Rothschild, 1933), 5-12.

to the Council of Basel.[79] The text is preserved in five codices preserved at the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Two of these (Vat. lat. 4110-4111, containing Treatises I-III) are fair copies written by a professional scribe, while the remaining three (Vat. lat. 4112-4114, Treatises II-VI) are autographs.[80] As evidenced by the marginal annotations and corrections in the autograph manuscripts, Laurentius revised and reworked the text through multiple stages and over an extended period. The shift in Laurentius' attribution of the *Defensor pacis* from Ockham to Marsilius—which h_3 reports in the Vatican manuscript *L*—reflects this layered process of compilation and revision.

There are two key points where this shift is particularly evident. The first is in the *Prohemium* to Treatise II, and the second—referenced by h_3—appears at the beginning of Treatise III, Chapter 2, §8. For both passages, we possess both Laurentius's autograph, which contains numerous corrections and marginal additions (Vat. lat. 4112 pt.1, ff. 1v-2r, 4r-v, and Vat. lat. 4113 pt.1, f. 40r, respectively), as well as the fair copies (two copies for the *Prohemium*: Vat. lat. 4110, ff. 70v-71v, 73r-v and Vat lat. 4111, ff 68r-69r, 70v, and one for Treatise III, Chapter 2, §8: Vat. lat. 4110, f. 304r). These fair copies offer a polished text that integrates Laurentius's notes while losing any trace of how he modified and updated his work. Of the two, only the *Prohemium* to Treatise II has been edited—three times, in fact—but all three editions were based on the fair copies. As a result, the editors overlooked crucial information about how the text evolved over time and in response to new evidence that Laurentius encountered.[81]

In the prologue to Treatise II, Laurentius presents a descriptive bibliography, listing over thirty authors he consulted to examine different perspectives on the relationship between papal authority and conciliar power.[82] The first author he mentions, indeed, is

[79] Hödl proposed dating the work to 1431-1437 ("Kirchengewalt und Kirchenverfassung", 256) whereas Chroust and Corbet place it between 1437 and 1439 ("The Fifteenth Century *Review of Politics*", 63).

[80] The five Vatican manuscripts are available for consultation at <https://digi.vatlib.it/>. Cf. Thomas M. Izbicki, "A Collection of Ecclesiological Manuscripts in the Vatican Library: Vat. lat. 4106-4193", in *Miscellanea Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae* IV (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1990), 93-94. A further copy of the *Prohemium* to Treatise II is found in MS Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, P 253 sup., ff. 39r-42v.

[81] This is the only section of the *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate* that has been edited so far: Chroust and Corbett, "The Fifteenth Century *Review of Politics*", 64-76; Grabmann, *Studien über den Einfluß*, 134-144; and Eckermann, *Studien zur Geschichte des monarchischen Gedankens im 15. Jahrhundert*, 161-168. I am currently working on the edition of further parts of Laurentius's work. An edition of the opening section of Treatise III, Chapter 2, § 8 will be published in Serena Masolini, "Ockham or Marsilius? The *'Derisorium' pacis* in Laurentius of Arezzo's *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate*" (forthcoming).

[82] Alongside with William of Ockham and Marsilius of Padua, the sources mentioned in the *Prohemium* to Treatise II are: Alvarus Pelagius, Adam Magister, Augustine of Ancona, Richard FitzRalph, Antonius de Butrio, Matteo Mattesillani of Bologna, Franciscus Zabarella, Petrus de Ancharano, Petrus Mauracenus, Johannes de Podio, Alfonso Carrillo, Cathaldinus de Buoncompagnis de Visso, Antonio Rosselli of Arezzo, Thomas de Birago, Herveus Natalis, Gaspar

William of Ockham, whom he initially defines as an "excellent man of profound knowledge" and one of the first theologians to explore the relationship between the papacy and power of the council, particularly in his *Dialogus* and his response to Pope John XXII's 1314 proceedings against Michael of Cesena (most likely, the *Opus Nonaginta Dierum*). Here, Laurentius criticizes Ockham for being presumptuous and reckless in some of his statements—a trait he attributes to the *artistae*, whom he dismisses as wasting their learning in idle chatter ("fere omnem eorum doctrinam in garrulitate consumunt").[83] He further accuses Ockham of employing "fox-like deception" (*vulpina astutia*) in his work, pretending to be a supporter of John XXII while covertly crafting a text intended to denounce the pope as a heretic. By using the dialogue form rather than a traditional *quaestio*, Ockham was able to conceal the extent of his hostility, making it seem as though the critiques of the papacy came from his interlocutors rather than himself. Laurentius acknowledges that some defended him, claiming that he disguised his critiques out of fear of Pope John XXII's tyranny, and he concedes that in those texts Ockham maintained a degree of formal restraint. For this reason, Laurentius initially continued to respect and praise him for his great learning. However, he adds,

> nearly three years after I had written these things, I came across one of his books, entitled *Defensor pacis*, in which he openly revealed that all the schismatic and heretical opinions he had described in his *Dialogus*—pretending that they were not his own but belonged to others—were in fact his own. This made me realize that he was a most iniquitous man and not only an enemy of the Roman Pontiffs and prelates but of the entire Roman Church, as is evident from the conclusions he presents in that work.[84]

The disgraceful conclusions to which Laurentius refers are primarily those in which Ockham asserts that neither the clergy nor the Church have any right to temporal dominium ("in qua temporalitatem nullam clericis vel ecclesie competere constanter affirmet"), a doctrine that, he claims, later became the foundational ideology for

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of Perugia, or Prodoccius of Padua, Ludovicus Pontanus, Dominicus of San Gimignano, Petrus de Palude, Iohannes de Ragusio, Johannes Maurosii, Johannes Gundisalvus, Juan de Casanova, Julian Tagliada, Juan de Segovia, Pierre d'Ailly, Juan de Torquemada, and James of Viterbo. In the final addition found in the autograph manuscript Vat. Lat. 4112 pt. 1, f. 5r-v, Laurentius incorporates further sources, including Alexander of San Elpidio and a sermon delivered by Johannes de Montenigro in Basel on 29 June 1437.

[83] Laurentius of Arezzo, *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate*, prohem. II tr., ed. Chroust and Corbet, 65.

[84] Laurentius of Arezzo, *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate*, prohem. II tr., ed. Chroust and Corbet, 65-66: "Sed fere per tres annos posteaquam hec scripseram, cum ad me devenisset quidam ex libris suis, quem Defensorium Pacis intitulavit, in quo omnes oppiniones dampnatas scismaticas et hereticas, quas in Dyalogo suo descripserat, fingendo quod non sue sed aliene essent oppiniones, in libro hoc Defensorii clare manifestavit suas fuisse et esse talia dicta a cunctis quasi com muniter aliena: ex quo quidem intellexi pro tunc iniquissimum fore virum et non solum Romanorum pontificum seu prelatorum, sed totius Romane ecclesie inimicum, ut in conclusionibus ibi positis comprobatur."

Hussites.[85] Laurentius expresses strong disapproval of these ideas, noting that he has discussed them in tr. III ch. 2 §8—we will analyze this passage later. It is at this point that, in the autograph (Vat. Lat. 4112 pt.1, f. 2r), he adds a marginal note, which was later incorporated into the main text in the cleaned-up copies of the work (Fig. 6):

> However, many defend him, asserting that the book called *Defensor pacis* was not written by him, but rather by a certain Marsilius of Padua, with some passages from Sacred Scripture interwoven. They argue that this is evident above all from the style, which is entirely different from William's in the *Dialogus*, although they appear to agree in their conclusions.[86]

The fact that this annotation was inserted into the text of the scribal copies (as well as by modern editors) without indicating that it consisted of a later addition may cause some confusion in the reader, especially when, a few paragraphs later, Laurentius refers to the *Defensor* once more, again attributing it to Ockham without referencing Marsilius:

> A certain book, called *Defensor pacis*, came into my hands, written by William of Ockham in favor of Emperor Henry (!) against the Roman Pontiff, the Roman Curia, and the universal state of the Church. This book contains many profane, erroneous, and heretical statements. He was outraged against the Pope and the clergy because he saw that promotions were granted not according to virtue but for temporal interests, and that the militant Church was being ruled and governed by unworthy individuals. He lamented this situation in various passages of his work.
>
> Since he did not believe that the governance of the Church could be properly reformed unless temporal dominions were removed—so that only truly virtuous and dedicated individuals would bear worldly burdens against the tribulations of the world as princes and prelates—he longed for such a time to come. As a result, he fabricated many falsehoods against the state of the Church and, to the best of his ability, incited secular powers. While I do not deny that he desired to crush and suppress the incompetence of corrupt prelates, his claim that ecclesiastical jurisdiction could not be exercised by churchmen is by no means in harmony with ecclesiastical writings.[87]

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[85] As noted above, at least two witnesses of the *Defensor* ascribed to Ockham contained texts by Wyclif (*J*) or related to Hussite circles (*I*). The *Defensor* also circulated together with works by Wyclif also in *D* and *B*; cf. Scholz, "Einleitung", XVI, XVIII, and XLIX fn. 1.

[86] Laurentius of Arezzo, *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate*, prohem. II tr., ed. Chroust and Corbet, 66: "Excusant tamen eum quam plurimi asserentes librum illum, qui *Defensorium Pacis* appellatur, per eum non fuisse compositum sed per Marsilium quemdam de Padua aliquibus tamen Sacre Scripture auctoritatibus intermixtis, quod dicunt maxime pater ex stilo, qui totaliter diversus a stilo Guiglielmi in dicto *Dyalogo*, quamquam in conclusionibus concordare videantur."

[87] Laurentius of Arezzo, *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate*, prohem. II tr., ed. Chroust and Corbet, 73: "Devenit insuper ad manus meas liber quidam, qui Pacis Defensorium nuncupatur, editus a Guiglielmo de Occam in favorem Henrigi (!) imperatoris contra Romanum pontificem et Romanam curiam et contra universalem statum ecclesie, in quo multa prophana et multa mendosa et heretica continentur. Commotus [est] contra papam et clerum, quia cernebat non

Did Laurentius believe that the *Defensor* was Ockham's work, as h_2 claims in *L*, or that it was written by Marsilius, as h_3 asserts? In this passage, Laurentius appears to take Ockham's authorship for granted, seemingly overlooking his earlier statement concerning the possible attribution to Marsilius. The key detail—which becomes evident only when examining the autograph—is that when Laurentius wrote this part of the text, he had not yet come across the claim that Marsilius was the author. h_3 was correct: Laurentius later changed his mind and ultimately acknowledged Marsilius' authorship. He takes a clear stand on the matter in tr. III ch. 2 §8, while discussing the earlier debates on ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It is in this section that he also uses the pun *Defensorium-Derisorium* that we found both at f. 1r of Gimignano's manuscript and in *h*3's inscription in *L*:

> \ Later, however, ~~the same Ockham~~ **Marsilius of Padua** [*in the margin*] **/,** in the book he titled ***Defensorium pacis***—which would have been **more appropriately called *Mockery* rather than *Defense***—in the final chapter of the first treatise, willing to present his own doctrine on the said power, gradually leads to the conclusion, starting from remote premises, that by Christ's institution no priest had coercive power over another priest or any other person. This is the very position that **\ William** [*above the line*] / had initially put forth as a doubtful claim in the fifth book of his *Dialogus*, in the chapter on these conclusions. Hence, **\ Marsilius** [*above the line*] / states that Christ "first instituted his own apostles as teachers of the law and priests' [!] ministers, granting them, through the Holy Spirit, the authority of this mystery, which the faithful of Christ call 'priestly authority' [...]" [DP I.19.5].[88]

Here too, the process of Laurentius's shift in opinion is visible only in the autograph, as the scribe's copy (Vat. lat. 4110, f. 304r) does not record the deletions and annotations

juxta virtutes sed ob temportalitates promotiones fieri et ecclesiam militantem per indignos regi et gubernari, super quo in variis locis querelanter multa promebat. Unde cum non videret regimen ecclesie apte reformari posse nisi, temporalitate summota, quo tunc tempore soli virtuosi constantes essent onera mundana portare adversus tribulationes seculi faciendo se principes et prelatos, id tempus videre optabat; ob quod contra statum ecclesie falsa multa confingens, ad quantum in eo fuit seculares potentias animabat. Optabat ergo ineptias iniquorum prelatorum contundi et reprimi, quod non infitior, sed quod ecclesiastica iurisdictione uti non possint ecclesiasticis libris consonum nequaquam existit."

[88] Laurentius of Arezzo, *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate*, III.2.8, Vat. lat. 4113, pt. 1, f. 40r: "Postea vero Marsilius de Padua [*a.c.* Idem Guiglielmus *sed del.*] [*scr. mrg.*] / in libro quem intitulat *Defensorium pacis*, quem aptius *Derisorium* quam *Defensorium* vocavisset, in ultimo capitulo primi tractatus, volens de dicta potestate suam dare doctrinam, aliquantis per incipiens a remotis effectualiter concludit quod ex institutione Christi nullus sacerdos in alium sacerdotem vel alium quemlibet potestatem habuit cohactivam, quam sentenciam dubitative primo posuerat \ Guiglielmus [*sup. lin.*] / in Dyalogo suo libro V, capitulo de istis conclusionibus. Unde dicit \ Marsilius [*sup. lin.*] / quod Christus *legis doctores et sacerdotum secundum ipsa* [!] *ministros primum instituit apostolos suos ipsis per Spiritum Sanctum auctoritatem huius ministerii conferens quam sacerdotalem appellant Christi fideles*"; cf. DP I.19.5-13. For the edition and a more in-depth analysis of this section of the *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate*, I refer to Masolini, "Ockham or Marsilius?" (forthcoming).

through which he reshaped this passage, transferring the attribution from one author to another. Laurentius's revisions reveal a clear progression of thought, with at least two additional layers of changes beyond the original draft (see Fig. 7). Initially, he adds a marginal note (on the right), at the end of which he attributes the *Defensor* to Ockham. Later, he changes his mind: he crosses out Ockham's name, replaces it with Marsilius of Padua, and, in the main text, clarifies their respective roles—writing Ockham's name above the line when referring to the *Dialogus* and Marsilius's name when referring to the *Defensor*.

This reworking is lost in the scribe's copy. However, in that version, at the very line where the pun *Defensorium-Derisorium* appears, a marginal annotation clarifies: "Note: the *Defensor Pacis* is by Marsilius of Padua, of which elsewhere it is said that Ockham was the author" (Fig. 8).[89] The handwriting of this note is strikingly similar to h_3's—and in all likelihood, it is the same h_3. This strongly suggests that h_3 had consulted the manuscripts of Laurentius' *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate*, noted this information in the margin, and then recorded both Marsilius' authorship and the reference to '*Derisorium*' on the flyleaf of the Vatican manuscript *L* of the *Defensor pacis*.

And what about Gimignano's manuscript? Where does it fit into this story? Was it a common joke to refer to the *Defensor pacis* as *Derisorium*, or does this hint at a deeper connection between Laurentius and the Roncioniana manuscript Q.VIII.5 (22)? Further research is needed to determine whether a direct link exists, but another intriguing coincidence deserves attention. Immediately after stating in the *Prohemium* to Treatise II that he had received a copy of the *Defensor pacis* attributed to Ockham, Laurentius lists a series of authors and texts that subsequently came into his possession. The next three texts he mentions are the same ones found alongside the *Defensor pacis* in Q.VIII.5 (22). After Ockham's *Defensor*, Laurentius received:

1) A treatise defending papal rights, "domino Johanne tituli Sancti Sixti presbitero Cardinali compositum", later followed by an *additio* to this work allegedly prepared by Julianus Tallada (d. 1445). These can be identified with the *Tractatus de potestate papae et concilii generalis* by Juan de Casanova (cf. R_o, ff. 118ra-146vb).[90]

2) A *Summa* titled *Advisamenta*, divided into ten chapters. Initially, Laurentius did not know the author's name but later discovered that it was Juan de Segovia. This work is identified as the *Tractatus decem advisamentorum*, which is also preserved in manuscript R_o, ff. 167ra-214rb, without an explicit author attribution.

[89] Vat. lat. 4110, f. 304r, *mrg. dx.*: "Nota: de Marsilio de Padua est defensorio pacis, cuius alibi dicit Occham fuisse auctorem." For the possible identification of the author of this note with h_3, see, for instance, the similar forms of *s*, *f*, *p*, as well as the letter shapes in "de" and "Padua" in Fig. 5 and Fig. 8.

[90] For the attribution to Casanova and a discussion of the Tallada's possible contribution, see Perarnau i Espelt, "Raphael de Pornaxio", 466-482, and Santi, "Gimignano Inghirami (1370-1460)", 779-785.

3) The treatise by "Petr*us* Cameracensis Cardinalis vulgariter nuncupat*us*", whom Laurentius rather ungenerously defines as "a man of great simplicity and not at all meticulous in scholarly matters". This would be Pierre d'Ailly's *De ecclesiae concilii generalis, Romani pontificis et cardinalium auctoritate* (cf. R_o, ff. 102ra-114vb).[91]

At this stage, I am unable to determine whether the treatises that passed through Laurentius's hands were the very same ones which later ended up in Gimignano's library, whether Gimignano had them copied from Laurentius's collection, or if both were independently acquired copies of the same texts through the same scholarly network.[92] What is clear is that these works circulated within Eugenius IV's intellectual circle and were regarded as fundamental sources for discussions on the relationship between papal power and the council. Gimignano's case was not unique: the *Defensor pacis* was read among canonists at the times of the great fifteenth-century councils, sometimes attributed to Ockham, and it was studied—perhaps as a way to know the enemy—alongside more pro-papal readings.[93]

Some Conclusions

The manuscript Q.VIII.5 (22) at the Biblioteca Roncioniana uncovers a small but significant thread in the broader history of how the *Defensor pacis* was attributed, transmitted, and read at the time of the fifteenth-century ecumenical councils. Far from being merely a collector's item, this copy of the *Defensor pacis* exhibits clear signs of careful reading, indicating that its owner, Gimignano Inghirami, actively studied the text. While his marginal notes do not reflect extensive personal reinterpretation, they demonstrate a serious engagement with the material, suggesting that he used the text as a resource to

[91] In the scribe's copy, and thus in the modern editions, between the references to the works by Juan de Segovia and Pierre d'Ailly, one reads the mention of a copy of the sermon delivered by Johanns de Montenigro in Basel for the Feast of Saints Peter and Paul in 1437. However, in the autograph manuscript, this is clearly a later addition, as the text extends beyond the usual lower margin before continuing as a marginal note in the top left corner. The original sequence of works that Laurentius came into possession of was: the *Defensor pacis*, ascribed to Ockham, Juan de Casanova's work, Juan de Segovia's, and Pierre d'Ailly's.

[92] A preliminary comparison between the excerpt from *Dictio* II in Laurentius's *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate* and R_o seems to suggest that they were not copied from the same manuscript, as they exhibit divergent readings, cf. Masolini, "Ockham or Marsilius?".

[93] One potential line of inquiry into the reception of the *Defensor pacis* in Gimignano's intellectual and social *milieu* is to investigate the possible circulation of the anonymous Florentine vernacular translation of this work, completed in 1363; cf. Marsilio da Padova, *Defensor pacis nella traduzione in volgare fiorentino del 1363*, edited by Carlo Pincin (Turin: Einaudi, 1966) and the studies by Lorenza Tromboni, "Looking for Peace in Fourteenth-Century Florence: The *Difenditore della pacie* in Context", in *After Civic Humanism: Learning and Politics in Renaissance Italy*, edited by N. S. Baker and B. J. Maxson (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2015), 93-113; and "Filosofia politica e cultura cittadina a Firenze tra il XIV e XV secolo: I volgarizzamenti del *Defensor pacis* e della *Monarchia*", *Studi Danteschi* 75 (2010): 79-114.

deepen his understanding of the political and ecclesiological issues debated in his time. The presence of the *Defensor pacis* in Gimignano's collection is particularly meaningful, offering a concrete case study of how the work was received by a figure who, though not a leading intellectual, was a highly influential professional, serving in a key position close to Pope Eugene IV, and playing an active role in ecclesiastical administration throughout the conciliar period.

The textual analysis of the *loci critici* signaled by Scholz seems to suggest that this copy of the *Defensor pacis* (R_o) belongs to the German manuscript tradition. This witness shares some readings found in *H*, absent in other manuscripts of the same group, while also exhibiting features that align it with the French family—for instance, it does not include two revisions found in *T'*, which are generally present in the German group. Further research on the textual variants could offer new insights into the philological development of the German family and its relationship with the different phases of revision of the Tortosa manuscript.

The attribution of this copy of the *Defensor pacis* to Ockham is not unique but follows a broader tradition found in both French and German groups. A notable similarity emerges between Gimignano's copy and the Vatican manuscript *L*, where the same wordplay *Defensorium/Derisorium* appears. This expression was recorded in *L* by reader h_3, who found it in the *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate* by Laurentius of Arezzo—like Gimignano, an auditor of the Sacred Rota and a member of Pope Eugene IV's circle.

In his *Liber de ecclesiastica potestate*, Laurentius indeed demonstrated an awareness of the ongoing debate regarding the text's authorship. Moreover, he recognized this work as a key source in the literature on papal and conciliar powers up to the Council of Basel. Like Gimignano, Laurentius also handled and studied the *Defensor pacis*—which he initially attributed to Ockham before later recognizing it as the work of Marsilius—alongside the writings of Juan de Casanova, Juan de Segovia, and Pierre d'Ailly. Further investigation could reveal whether there is a deeper connection between the copies of these ecclesiological writings handled by Laurentius and those owned by Gimignano, offering yet another layer to the history of their transmission in the fifteenth century.

Images



Fig. 1 – Prato, Biblioteca Roncioniana, Manoscritti roncioniani, Q.VIII.5 (22), f. 1r. Incipit of *Dictio* II, with Gimignano's ownership note in the bottom margin.
By courtesy of Biblioteca Roncioniana, Prato (Italy).



Fig. 2 – Prato, Biblioteca Roncioniana, Manoscritti roncioniani, Q.VIII.5 (22), f. 1ra.
Inscription by *b*: *Dictio secunda Guiglielmi de Occam in derisorio suo.*
By courtesy of Biblioteca Roncioniana, Prato (Italy).



Fig. 3 – Prato, Biblioteca Roncioniana, Manoscritti roncioniani, Q.VIII.5 (22), f. 53va.
Gimignano's gloss on DP II.21.7. By courtesy of Biblioteca Roncioniana, Prato (Italy).



Fig. 4 – Prato, Biblioteca Roncioniana, Manoscritti roncioniani, Q.VIII.5 (22), f. 9va. Marginal note of *T'* on DP II.5.3, here incorporated into the main text as in *H*, accompanied by Gimignano's gloss. By courtesy of Biblioteca Roncioniana, Prato (Italy).



Fig. 5 – Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3974, f. 2r. © [2025] Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Inscriptions by h_0, h_1, h_2, and h_3 concerning the attribution of the *Defensor pacis.*



Fig. 6 – Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4112 pt. 1 (autograph), f. 2r. © [2025] Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Laurentius's addition in the *Prohemium* to Treatise II regarding the possible attribution of the *Defensor pacis* to Marsilius of Padua.



Fig. 7 – Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4113 pt. 1 (autograph), f. 40r. © [2025] Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Laurentius's revisions to Treatise III, Chapter 2, §8, altering the attribution of the *Defensor* from Ockham to Marsilius of Padua.



Fig. 8 – Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4110 (copy), f. 304r. © [2025] Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. The fair copy of the passage from *Treatise* III, Chapter 2, §8, with Laurentius's changes integrated into the text and a marginal note by a reader (possibly h_3) pointing out the previous attribution to Ockham.

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PEDRO DA FONSECA AND LUIS DE MOLINA, ON ANIMAL FREEDOM. A WAY TO UNDERSTAND CONTINGENCY

PEDRO DA FONSECA Y LUIS DE MOLINA, SOBRE LA LIBERTAD DE LOS ANIMALES. UNA FORMA DE ENTENDER LA CONTINGENCIA

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Abstract

The question of whether or not there is a vestige of freedom in irrational animals has been present throughout all the stages of the history of philosophy. Yet, in the sixteenth century, the Jesuits deepened their studies on this subject in a rather particular way. In this paper we will show how, by pointing to the possibility of finding a trace of freedom in irrational animals, the Jesuits sought to identify the very basis of the concept of freedom, to make it clear that, while signs of freedom can be found in some developed levels of irrational life, freedom is, in a most singular way, the fundamental characteristic of human beings. In this paper we analyze the Jesuit doctrines on animal freedom that can be found in texts, either published or handwritten, from the teachings of two Jesuits who worked in Portugal during the second half of the 16th century: Pedro da Fonseca and Luis de Molina.

Keywords

Animal Freedom; Contingency; Dignity; Pedro da Fonseca; Luis de Molina

Resumen

La cuestión de si existe o no un vestigio de libertad en los animales irracionales ha estado presente a lo largo de todas las etapas de la historia de la filosofía. Sin embargo, en el siglo XVI, los jesuitas profundizaron sus estudios sobre este tema de una manera bastante particular. En este artículo mostraremos cómo, al señalar la posibilidad de encontrar un vestigio de libertad en los animales irracionales, los jesuitas trataron de identificar la base misma del concepto de libertad,

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para dejar claro que, si bien se pueden encontrar signos de libertad en algunos niveles desarrollados de la vida irracional, la libertad es, de una manera muy singular, la característica fundamental de los seres humanos. En este artículo analizamos las doctrinas jesuitas sobre la libertad animal que se pueden encontrar en textos, tanto publicados como manuscritos, de las enseñanzas de dos jesuitas que trabajaron en Portugal durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVI: Pedro da Fonseca y Luis de Molina.

Palabras clave

Libertad animal; contingencia; dignidad; Pedro da Fonseca; Luis de Molina

1. Introduction

The question of whether or not irrational animals have some kind of freedom is a central topic in contemporary debates on the philosophy of mind. However, although today this discussion benefits from advances in knowledge in the fields of consciousness and sentient life, the issue has been debated at all stages of the history of philosophy.

Ancient and medieval philosophers developed their thinking about the distinction between human and non-human life based on an analysis of the distinction between the powers and functions of irrational animals and humans, trying to identify the psychological mechanisms and metaphysical structures which establish the boundary between the two. However, as Anselm Oelze rightly observes, ancient and medieval philosophers were not interested in this subject as an object in itself, but rather for the heuristic value that the analysis of animal behavior provided them with, so that, by contrast, they could better understand the nature of human behavior.[1]

In the 16th century, the Jesuits also directed their attention to this theme in their teaching of theology and philosophy. In this article, we present the arguments on this subject explained at the end of the 16th century by the Jesuits Pedro da Fonseca and Luis de Molina. Their metaphysical doctrines on freedom were innovative and played an important role both within the Society of Jesus and in the further development of the theme. Their approach to the question "do irrational animals have freedom?" clearly shows the scope of their philosophical and theological concerns: to explain how human

[1] Anselm Oelze, *Animal Minds in Medieval Latin Philosophy. A Sourcebook from Augustine to Wodeham* (Cham: Springer, 2021), 7: "[...] within the medieval academic curriculum, animals seldom were the explanandum, that is, the scholarly object that is to be explained (seldom, because there were exceptions to that rule such as the commentaries on Aristotle's zoological writings). Instead, they mainly functioned as an explanans, that is, the factor by which something else is explained. Therefore, they became a topic whenever a discussion in metaphysics, ethics, theology, or any other subject seemed to benefit from a look at the minds of nonhuman animals." See also Juhana Toivanen, "Making the Boundaries. Animals in Medieval Latin Philosophy", in *Animals. A History*, edited by P. Adamson and G. F. Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 121-122.

dignity is rooted in the exercise of reason and freedom and to defend a metaphysical model contrary to all forms of determinism. In our conclusion, we will show how relevant this model still is today and the advantages of promoting these philosophical principles in contemporary society.

2. On Animal Freedom: Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Scotus

To understand how innovative this approach resulted in the 16th century, we must go back to the context of the 13th-century controversy over the nature of the human will, its relationship with the intellect and with the lower faculties of the soul.[2] One of the characteristics of this controversy is that it revolved around the different interpretations assumed at the time by various teachers of Aristotle's doctrine regarding the characteristics of rational and irrational action. To explain the nature of human action, Aristotle had developed a rather complex theory about the active powers of living beings. On the basis of this theory, he explained the difference between rational and irrational living beings through the powers or faculties of the soul and through the analysis of the difference between the actions derived from these powers. For Aristotle, sensory cognition and the appetite for good characterize irrational animals. However, he considered that man, a rational animal, also possesses this type of cognitive and appetitive activity. Hence, what is the difference between irrational and rational action? Concerning the mechanism of cognition, irrational life is limited by sensory perception, which is produced by the organs and faculties of the external and internal senses. Human life, in turn, is characterized by having, in addition to these faculties, the power of judgment. This power consists in the ability to compare the properties of known objects and to establish relationships between them.

In addition to sensory cognitive power, Aristotle considered that all living beings are also endowed with an appetitive power or desire. The activity of this power is to move the living being toward the possession of certain objects or ends. As with cognition, Aristotle also sought to establish differences between irrational and rational desire. He considered that both the desire associated with the powers that support and preserve life and the desire generically considered as a movement toward the good, are common to all living beings, rational and irrational. Conversely, the desire that results from a deliberation of reason is characteristic only of rational beings, as it stems from a judgment of practical reason or decision.[3]

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[2] For a state of the art, see Monika Michałowska and Riccardo Fedriga (eds.), *Willing and Understanding. The Complexity of Late Medieval Debates on the Will* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2023), spec. 1-13 for a historical-systematic summary of the problem of the will from antiquity to the 13th century; and Robert Pasnau, *Construire la volonté. Débats sur le libre arbitre à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris: Vrin, 2025), 131-161.

[3] For this typology of desire, see Devin Henry, "Aristotle on Animals", in *Animals. A History*, edited by P. Adamson and G. F. Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 14: "Aristotle typically

Based on the distinction between these powers and activities of irrational and rational life, Aristotle analyzed the characteristics of choice. He considered that the act of choosing is a voluntary movement but stated that there is a difference between this movement and choice. Since the field of voluntary action is broader than the field of choice, the latter is integrated into the former. This distinction allowed Aristotle to affirm that the actions of children and animals are voluntary, without, however, being considered a rational way of acting—that is, done through choices.[4] In turn, the essential characteristic of choice is that it is an act that results from deliberation.[5]

Aristotle's explanation of human action had an enormous impact on debates about the nature of free action that took place in the 13th century. Scholastic philosophers and theologians directed their attention to Aristotle's explanations for the actions of rational and irrational living beings because of the novelty and explanatory potential of these two types of actions. However, they considered that some interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine conflicted with either aspects of religious belief or of Christian anthropology. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus played important roles in this controversy, and although they took opposing positions on the subject, both positions influenced the 16th-century Jesuit doctrine on this matter.

Thomas Aquinas resumed the Aristotelian doctrine which understood voluntary action as an intrinsic principle of the agent's movement toward the good. Therefore, he

distinguishes three forms of desire: (1) sensual appetite (epithumia), (2) wish (boulēsis), and (3) decision (proairesis). Appetite is a non-rational desire for food, drink, and sex, while wish and decision are both types of rational desire that are directed toward an agent's conception of the good. Wish is a desire for certain ends—ultimately for happiness, which Aristotle thinks is the supreme end of all our actions—while decision is a desire to execute those actions that deliberation has shown to be the best means for achieving those ends. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1111b26-29, 1113a14, *Eudemian Ethics*, 1226b7-17, *Magna Moralia*, 1189a7-11)."

[4] A canonical text in which Aristotle explains the nature of both the voluntary and the involuntary, allowing us to distinguish between voluntary action in general and voluntary action by deliberation, is *Nicomachean Ethics* III, 2-3. The first type of voluntary action is not necessarily accompanied by cognition. The essential characteristic of voluntary action considered in a broad sense is that it is a type of action or movement whose principle is intrinsic to the agent. A particular case of voluntary action is choice (EN III, 2, 1111b). This is a type of free action in which "children and other animals" do not participate, whereas voluntary action derived from anger or desire is characteristic of them (EN III, 2, 1111a).

[5] See Aristotle, EN III, 3, 1113a. Choice is distinguished from appetite and passion or desire: "for choice is not common to animals, but appetite and passion are." On the contrary, choice is a movement of reason followed by an appropriate desire: "after deciding as a consequence of deliberation, we have desires in accordance with this." Every choice is preceded by a prior judgment of reason and by the decision, taken by the agent, to organize the different alternatives presented to them in a certain direction in order to achieve a certain end. The rational voluntary movement is therefore distinguished from the irrational voluntary movement (characteristic of children and other animals) precisely by the fact that the former originates in a judgment which, prior to the action, decides the circumstances of the agent with regard to contingent things. Conversely, living beings that are not capable of deliberation do not act by choice, but by appetite or passion.

adopted the distinction between two types of voluntary movement, imperfect and perfect. The first one results from an intrinsic principle of movement toward an end, but without cognition of the end, while the second one implies knowledge of the end.[6] This knowledge, in turn, admits degrees that are established according to the greater or lesser perfection of the cognitive activity of living beings. According to Thomas, given that man knows the end of his action perfectly, it is in the rational agent that the perfect voluntary is found in the highest degree.

Thomas also follows Aristotle in regard to the nature of choice.[7] When analyzing the question "whether choice is appropriate for irrational animals", he admits that there is only power of choice if there is the power to decide between alternatives.[8] Now, this power of choice is different from the sensitive appetite insofar as the latter is determined toward one thing only.[9] Thus, while the imperfect action of animals is rooted in the sensitive appetite and does not allow for choice, the human power of choice stems from rational deliberation, which is made precisely in consideration of alternatives. Like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas also admits that the human will is determined toward one thing only: the common good. But, as human will is directed toward the common good through choices, Thomas admits that it is an indeterminate power in relation to the particular goods on which the choice precisely falls.[10] Now, according to Thomas, this indeterminacy of the volitional power in the face of particular goods depends on deliberation and does not belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore, he concludes that choice does not apply to irrational animals.[11]

Duns Scotus takes a totally different position on this issue. He also starts from an analysis of the types of cognition, human and irrational. In this respect, therefore, his position does not differ substantially from that of Aristotle and Thomas. However, Scotus

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[6] On this subject, see e.g. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, question 6, art. 1, in *Opera Omnia*, edited by Leonis XIII P.M. (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1891), 55-56. All translations of this text are ours. The example Thomas gives is that of a stone moving toward the center of the earth. The stone moves 'from itself' to its natural place, according to Aristotle's explanation for the fall of heavy objects. But the stone, as a non-cognitive being, does not know the lower place as 'its natural place'.

[7] See e.g., Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 13, a. 1: "Whether choice is an act of the will or of reason." For Aristotle, choice is an act of practical reason, which is itself the root of the voluntary. Unlike Aristotle, Thomas admits two truly distinct faculties of the soul, intelligence and will, and asserts that, as an act, choice is generated by both.

[8] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 13, a. 2, resp. According to Aquinas, "since election is the preference of one thing over another," choice implies, in order to be exercised, the existence of alternatives. Therefore, if a power is "determined toward only one thing", it is not capable of electing.

[9] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 13, a. 2, resp.: "[...] for that [appetite] is determined to something particular according to the natural order."

[10] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 13, a. 2, resp.: "The will behaves in an indeterminate manner towards particular goods."

[11] Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 13, a. 2, resp.

expounds his reasoning mainly through an analysis of the animals' faculties which are in action when it acts according to the model of the virtue of prudence. In his commentary on Book I of *Metaphysics,* Scotus criticizes Aristotle's idea that living beings endowed with memory are capable of producing a prudential judgment. Unlike Aristotle, Duns Scotus says that, in regard to the actions of irrational beings, one can only speak of prudence metaphorically, since what Aristotle attributes to prudence in irrational beings depends solely on their instinct to preserve the species. For Scotus, prudence is not based on memory, a sensory faculty. On the contrary, prudence is a deliberative habit that concerns not the end sought, but the choice of means to that end. Such a habit, therefore, exists only in rational living beings.[12]

Contrary to Aristotle's proposal, Scotus does not admit that the experience acquired by animals derives from the ability to relate past and future events through a comparison similar to a judgment. According to Scotus, it is totally inappropriate to attribute prudence to irrational beings, since the type of deliberation characteristic of this virtue implies the capacity of establishing causal relationships between past events and future situations. This operation requires a complex judgment, which is part of the deliberative process, resulting in a movement generated in and by the agent toward the means to achieve an end. To Scotus, the human agent shows in his acts that they have mastery over both the information stored in their memory and the way they organize their future. As none of these operations is possible for irrational animals, even if it can be said that irrational animals possess within themselves the intrinsic principle of movement, in the proper sense they are not agents of themselves.[13] Although Scotus acknowledges that, along with their knowledge of the present, some animals seem to act "as though they were providing for the future",[14] this is a conclusion that we establish by analogy with human action, for in fact irrational animals "act necessarily and not out of any precognition, nor is there any freedom; hence we have only the appearance of prudence in their case."[15]

[12] John Duns Scotus, *Questions On the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, translated by G. J. Etzkorn and A. B. Wolter (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1997), I, q. 3, 75-76.
[13] Scotus, *Questions On the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, 78: "[...] where any action is involved, they [irrational animals] do not act but are rather acted upon and therefore they are not properly speaking masters of their acts, nor do they provide for the future on the basis of a memory of the past, but they seem to act by reason of their natures as if they were moved to act in this way [by prudence]."
[14] Cf. Scotus, *Questions On the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, 78. According to Scotus, this type of natural movement depends on the sensory experience of the animal which is limited to the present, but which, in some species, may be associated with the perception of what could be useful for the future: "But among animals some know only the present and have an instinct about what is to be done that would be useful for the future. Others, however, have along with such present knowledge an instinct about how to act as though they were providing for the future."
[15] Scotus, *Questions On the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, 78. It is true that animals use their cognitive experience to act on contingent things, that is, things that could be otherwise. But Scotus refuses to

What, then, does it mean for Scotus to act freely? In his commentary on Book IX of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Scotus analyzes the distinction made by Aristotle (and followed by Thomas Aquinas) between rational powers and free powers. Although Scotus admits that a distinction must be made between these powers, he shows that Aristotle made it in an equivocal and inadequate way, because such distinction does not correctly define the specificity of free action. In his analysis, Scotus shows that if we accept Aristotle's distinction, we are led to conclude that these two types of powers are essentially identical: they act determinedly toward a single object.[16] Since both are determined, they are not free powers. He states that the distinction between rational and irrational powers must be based not on how they act (since both are intrinsic powers of the living), but on how they elicit their own acts. To differentiate them correctly, Scotus introduces his famous distinction between natural powers and free powers. The former act according to nature, that is, they elicit their own act insofar as, if not prevented by an extrinsic element, such powers cannot help doing what they are determined to do. Their power acts necessarily. Conversely, free powers are those which, by themselves, are not determined to act. They have the power to act or not to act, to act in one way or in another. And this type of power is called will.[17]

The idea of an active power that acts contingently, this being the nature of freedom and rationality, as opposed to natural necessity, leads us to think of God's own action toward the world as rational and free. Now, if, according to the definition given by Scotus, freedom requires contingency; and if God is free, then God's action must contain some kind of contingency, at least regarding his creative action. For those who adopt this way of explaining free action, it becomes difficult to accept that there can be any kind of determinism in the world. And even if it is necessary to accept this determinism, it will mainly affect the actions of natural, non-free beings, those in whom the essence of reason, that is, freedom, is least manifested.

In the 16th century, the Jesuits dealt with deterministic explanations of the world and refuted these theories. They considered these interpretations a threat to the proper

admit any kind of freedom or voluntariness in the movement of irrational agents and considers that their action should properly be called passion.

[16] Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics* IX, q. 15, art. 1, in *Selected Writings on Ethics*, edited and translated by Th. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2. The rational power of man (intelligence) is determined to one thing only—truth and goodness: it cannot fail to know the truth or deliberate on goodness. Now, Scotus shows that this is precisely the way irrational powers act: they act determined to one thing only, in accordance with the instinct of preservation of the species.

[17] Scotus, *Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics IX*, q. 15, art. 2, 4: "Now there can be only two different ways in which a power elicits its proper activity: either (1) it is of itself determined to acting, such that, as far as it depends on the power itself, it cannot act when it is not impeded by something extrinsic, or (2) it is not determined of itself, but can do this act or its opposite act, and can also act or not act. The general term for the first sort of power is 'nature'; the second is called 'will'." Such a power is, of itself, "indeterminately a power for this action or its opposite, or for action or non-action."

understanding of the world and of man and rebutted them mainly on the theological, ethical, and political levels.

3. Freedom and Contingency: Pedro da Fonseca and Luis de Molina

Having to face the challenges that arose in the 16th century both on philosophical and theological grounds, the Jesuits felt the need to develop a doctrine on human nature. This would lead to generate innovative thinking about the definition of a free agent. Their explanations on the question "whether animals have any kind of freedom" were addressed in their philosophy and theology lessons, that is, as a heuristic tool for understanding the rational and free specificity of human action.

Throughout his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599) analyzes the nature of irrational animals at various points. In his commentary on Book I, he discusses the nature of empirical cognition, which is common to both rational and irrational beings, and, as Scotus had also done, he too analyzes the role of memory in this process. Fonseca observes that, in the cognitive experience of recollection, there is a difference in level between irrational animals and man. In the former case, the experience is "quasi-material and [consists] in a habit of memorizing the past through the production of many memories." In the case of humans, however, the experience of memorizing is quasi-formal and results from the act of comparing things or events memory holds by means of this habit.[18]

These two ways of exercising the habit of remembering distinguish the imperfect cognitive experience, typical of irrational beings, from the perfect cognitive experience, typical of humans. And what makes the experience specifically human is the fact that it is produced by the act of collating, or comparing, one thing with another. Now, as this act implies deliberation, it is associated with the process of choice. Therefore, to Fonseca, human experimental cognition is not subject to the force of nature, but is committed to an exercise of freedom of choice. Conversely, in irrational animals, experimental cognition is operated by instinct or by the force of nature.[19] It is true that, as in irrational beings, man also has a natural appetite for science. However, according to Fonseca, man acquires all types of science through the elicitation of a free appetite. In man, therefore,

[18] Pedro da Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae libros libros. Tomus primus* (Rome: Franciscum Zanettum, 1677), I, cap. 1, explanatio, 38: "Denique illud adverte [Aristoteles], in experientia proprie dicta duo spectari: unum est, multi habitus memorandi praeterita ex multis recordationibus geniti, quod est quasi materiale; alterum collatio rerum, sive eventorum, quae his habitibus memoria tenentur, quod est quasi formale."

[19] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum libros. Tomus primus*, I, cap. 1, explanatio, 38: "Quod enim in homine facit collatio unius rei cum alia, id facit in brutis animantibus instinctus, sive vis naturae."

science is an achievement of freedom and not an imposition of nature.[20] Fonseca admits that human reason, as power to produce knowledge, is a natural power in man. To this extent, like Aristotle, Fonseca also admits, on the one hand, that the desire to know is a natural appetite [21] and, on the other hand, that man desires science for the sake of science itself.[22] Therefore, because of the former, in the case of man too, knowledge cannot but be sought.[23] This approximation between irrational and rational beings regarding the fact that knowledge, especially in terms of empirical experience, is a necessary habit of cognitive power, could legitimize the assertion that irrational and rational beings have in common, if not theoretical science, at least practical science. Fonseca, however, rejects this thesis.

When commenting on the distinction established by Aristotle between practical and theoretical sciences, Fonseca draws on his knowledge of classical languages and observes that, among the Greeks and the Romans, the term *praxis* had a very broad meaning which Aristotle does not include. According to Fonseca, Aristotle uses the term *praxis* to distinguish practical sciences from contemplative ones, referring to the type of action involved in each of them. Now, the type of action that produces them is the deliberation or evaluation inherent to reasoning. Hence, according to Fonseca, Aristotle denied that irrational animals possessed either of them, since the actions that produce them—practical judgment and contemplative judgment—"are by their nature free, and are not exempt from deliberation and evaluation [considerationem]." Conversely, the absolutely first movements of the will occur without deliberation. They result from nature and the force of habit and, although they also generate actions, they occur without knowledge.[24]

[20] Man tends toward science with his natural appetite. In this respect, there is a common root to the pursuit of knowledge in man and irrational beings. However, man also tends toward science with an elicited appetite. Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum. Tomus primus*, I, cap. 1, q. 1, sect. VI, 51: "[...] itaque, etsi libere elicimus actum appetendi scientiam, si tamen nihil obstaret, nec ex parte rerum externarum, nec ex molestia corporis, nec ex prauo aliquo animi affectu, nemo esset qui perfectae cognitionis, si non frequenter, certe aliquando appetitum non eliceret: atque hoc pacto intelligimus in hac conclusione omnes homines appetitu elicito scientiam appetere."

[21] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum. Tomus primus*, I, cap. 1, q. 1, sect. VI, 51: "Omnes homines naturaliter appetere scientiam ipsius scientiae causa." Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, 980a.

[22] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum. Tomus primus*, I, cap. 1, q. 1, sect. VI, 51: "Ita enim homines appetunt scientiam, ut eam, quatenus scientia est, nullo modo reijcere possint." Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, 982a25.

[23] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum. Tomus primus*, I, cap. 1, q. 1, sect. VI, 53: "Nihil magis appeti ab hominibus quam scientiam contemplativam." It is mainly in this respect that human beings, being animals, excel irrational animals, on the one hand, and on the other, being rational, participate in the condition of divine substances whose intellect is not known through sensory experience. Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum. Tomus primus*, I, cap. 1, q. 1, sect. VI, 51: "Deinde, quia id rationi consentaneum est, hominem magis appetere naturaliter, quo maxime et excellit brutis animantibus, et participat conditionem diuinarum substantiarum, quod nemo negauerit esse scientiam contemplatiuam."

[24] Pedro da Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae libros. Tomus tertius* (Cologne: Lazari Zetzneri Bibliopolae, 1615), VI, cap. 1, q. 5, sect. II, 39: "[...] merito Aristoteles,

In this sense, although science and action, since they result from a natural appetite, are carried out by first movements of the will, the natural appetite for science (specific to human beings) inclines them more toward the knowledge of things than toward action.[25] And although it is possible to find in some irrational animals "certain traces of human actions", no trace of rational activity is found in them.

Now, if it is not through cognitive activity that Fonseca admits there is something in common between irrational and rational beings, in what consist then these traces of human action, which Fonseca finds in the former? Moreover, what is the point in studying these traces, which would be like common principles between irrational animals and humans, if, since such traces do not belong to reason, they do not contribute in any way to a better understanding of human nature? As we shall see below, Fonseca pays great attention to the question of the traces of human actions in irrational beings. He places the approach to this subject at the core of his metaphysics, precisely by explaining the issue he claims to be the most important in all philosophy—the nature of contingency.

Fonseca formulates the problem as follows: "whether there is anything contingent in purely natural things."[26] In his answer, and following Aristotle's explanation in Book VI of *Metaphysics*, he begins by distinguishing three types of contingency: the one which occurs without intention (the casual or fortuitous); contingency *in essendo* and contingency *in eveniendo*. Of these three types, he considers that the problem he is dealing with only legitimately arises for the third type: contingency *in eveniendo.* Fonseca then reformulates the question of contingency in the natural world in a way that Aristotelian metaphysics could hardly support: "in purely natural things, is there anything that follows so certainly from their causes that, given those causes, it cannot fail to follow?"[27] In his answer, he recalls that there are two strongly opposing positions on this subject: that of Thomas Aquinas, who admitted a certain contingency in the natural world, and that of Scotus, who considered that the natural world is opposed to the free world, admitting no contingency whatsoever in the former. The question of contingency, says Fonseca, is absolutely crucial to philosophy and needs to be answered for two reasons.

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quandocumque practicas scientias a contemplativas divisit, nomine actionum eas solas intelligendas esse voluit, quae liberae sunt, et quatenus tales considerantur: has enim solas, ut huiusmodi sunt, actiones esse dixit, et ea ratione in brutis animantibus esse negavit, quod omnes operationes ab illis ex necessitate naturae prodeant, per easque magis ipsae agantur, quam agant. Nam neque actiones, quae natura sua sunt liberae, a nobis ut liberae prodeunt, cum sine ulla deliberatione, aut consideratione exercentur, ut patet in motibus voluntatis omnino primis, quos primo primos appellant, qui nec meriti, nec poenae ullius digni sunt, quod a nobis solius naturae, aut consuetudinis impetu proficiscantur."

[25] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum libros. Tomus tertius*, VI, cap. 1, q. 5, sect. II, 51: "[...] quia appetitus naturalis nos ad rerum cognitionem magis, quam ad actionem inclinat; [...] quia actionis humanae quaedam quasi vestigia in brutis animantibus cernuntur, ad contemplationis nullum."

[26] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum libros. Tomus tertius*, VI, cap. 2, q. 2, sect. I, 82.

[27] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum libro. Tomus tertius*, VI, cap. 2, q. 2, sect. I, 82 D: "[...] num in rebus pure naturalibus detur aliquid contingens huius generis, quod nimirum ita eueniat a suis causis, ut ab eisdem possit non evenire."

One is circumstantial and has to do with the errors of the Lutherans and pagans regarding human freedom. The other is fundamental and consists in the need for human beings to know their own nature and dignity.[28]

Fonseca's response is thorough and reveals the complexity of the problem. As this is a crucial issue and given that, in complex matters of philosophy and theology, the Jesuits were asked to follow the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, one would expect Fonseca to support the Dominican master's doctrine. However, not only does Fonseca fail to do so, but in analyzing Thomas' arguments, he shows that they only discuss contingency in the two aforementioned genres—casual or fortuitous, and *in essendo.* As so, the Thomistic analysis of contingency does not go beyond the cosmological and epistemological level. Now, according to Fonseca, the root of contingency is not instantiated in these two domains, but in the realm of the freedom of the rational agent.[29] From Fonseca's perspective, the crux of the problem is whether, in a causal process driven by purely natural agents, there can be room for a type of contingent agency *in eveniendo.* In contemporary language, to Fonseca, the question is whether, in a world totally determined by natural (or even supernatural) forces, there is room for the contingency of human action. In fact, it is precisely in order to distinguish contingent causality from human free will that Fonseca analyzes the behavior of irrational animals, children, and the insane. The purpose of this analysis is to define exactly what free action consists in and to show that this mode of action is the only true cause of contingency.

From the way he frames the question—"whether there is indifference in the actions of children, of the insane, and of irrational animals"—it is clear that Scotus's position on freedom plays a fundamental role in Fonseca's response. On this subject, Fonseca explains, there are those who admit that the actions of living beings that do not have or do not use reason are characterized by indifference "because when they are offered various equally desirable, equally close, and equally accessible objects, they can determine themselves for this or for that one."[30] Others go even further, stating that children and the insane, and even the irrational, have some kind of freedom, "not enough freedom to warrant merit or demerit, but enough to consider that their actions (or at least some of them) are within their power—which others also extend to the irrational in their

[28] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum libros. Tomus tertius*, VI, cap. 2, q. 2, sect. I, 82 D: "Lutheranorum insaniam hac de re scripserunt. Si quis tamen in hac vita ipsam animæ nostræ essentiam quiditative cognosceret, non dubium, quin per eam priori liberi arbitrii nostræ facultatem demonstrare possit. Itaque in hac re ostendenda laborandum nobis non est, cum id ignorare nemo possit, nisi qui se hominem esse non meminerit."
[29] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum, libros. Tomus tertius*, VI, cap. 2, q. 2, sect. I, 82 F): "[...] contingentia in eueniendo, hoc est, quæ eveniunt, ab illa quidem aliquando; sed tamen ita eueniunt, ab iis ipsis, a quibus eueniunt, possunt non euenire; cuiusmodi sunt ea quæ à liberis agentibus fiant."
[30] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum libros. Tomus tertius*, VI, cap. 2, q. 2, sect. III, 83 F: "[...] in belluis autem idem ex eo probantur atque appetibilia aeque propinqua, et quae aeque facile adiri possint."

actions."[31] Fonseca rejects both positions and therefore accepts that the actions of irrational agents can be characterized as "free". However, he admits that "in certain acts of children and the insane, a semblance of freedom can be distinguished, and also sometimes, in irrational animals, a certain obscure trace of freedom can be found."[32]

In what do then this simulacrum and this vestige of freedom found in irrational living beings consist? Like Scotus, Fonseca admits that the action of these agents is open to opposites. Nonetheless, he introduces a distinction in the way these agents are open to opposites and refers to a neutral presence of the agent in the face of alternatives. Such neutrality occurs due to the absence of deliberation. But, as we saw earlier, to Fonseca there can be no true freedom without deliberation.[33] This neutral condition of deliberation in the face of opposites corresponds to a neutral freedom.[34] It is this freedom that Fonseca says is present in children and the insane as a similitude or as vestige. This simulacrum and this vestige consist in the presence of the natural spontaneity of the actions of living beings incapable of reason. However, it is not freedom in the proper sense, but only a simulacrum or vestige of it. In fact, the spontaneity that is found in it does not mean that such beings can indifferently turn to this or that or refrain from any act—and even less can this be granted to irrational animals. It only means that, in these living beings, there is a certain indeterminacy of action or a non-coercion on the part of a specific opposite because "when confronted with equally desirable and equally proximate things that can be obtained with equal ease [such agents] are not determined by one more than by the other."[35]

Luis de Molina (1535-1600), in turn, presents a complete summary of his position on the question of freedom in animals in parts I and IV of *Concordia liberii arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione* (1588). In the first part, he explains the meaning of freedom as opposed to necessity and defines the free agent as one who, "once all the requirements for action are in place, can act or not, can do one

[31] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum libros. Tomus tertius*, VI, cap. 2, q. 2, sect. III, 84 B: "Et quidem, quod attinet ad pueros, et amentes, non desunt, qui vtrisque non indifferentiam modo, sed etiam libertatem aliquam tribuant; non quidem, quæ satis sit ad meritum, et demeritum; sed quæ sufficiat, vt eorum operationes (saltem aliquæ) dici possint esse in eorum potestate."

[32] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum libros. Tomus tertius*, VI, cap. 2, q. 2, sect. III, 84 C-D: "Verum etsi in quibusdam puerorum, et amentium actibus quædam expressior libertatis similitudo cernitur, et aliquando in brutis animantibus quoddam osbcurius vestigium libertatis: neutrum tamen modo in iis omnibus est vera libertas [...]."

[33] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum libros. Tomus tertius*, VI, cap. 2, q. 2, sect. III, 84 E-F: "[...] nulla omnino libertas vera dari potest in pueris et amentibus, brutisque animantibus neutra poteſt esse deliberatio: ergo neutra libertas."

[34] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum libros. Tomus tertius*, VI, cap. 2, q. 2, sect. III, 84 D-E: "Ad argumentum igitur dicendum, in pueris ante vsum rationis, et in amentibus neque esse libertatem vllam veram, sed quandam expressiorem libertatis similitudinem, ut dicendum est: neque etiam spontaneum in eis ita cerni, ut indifferenter in hoc, vel illus ferantur, aut, ab actu se cohibeant: multoque minus id concedendum esse in brutis animantibus."

[35] Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum libros. Tomus tertius*, VI, cap. 2, q. 2, sect. III, 84 F.

thing or its opposite."[36] Following this definition, he explains that the action of the will must be preceded by the judgment of reason.[37] But freedom and free will are rooted in the will.[38] The will takes the form of free will whenever it can choose or not choose an act or its opposite indifferently.[39] And neither the objects to be chosen nor the judgment of reason can force the will to perform an act. Reason shows the will the nature of the act, including its moral quality, but this knowledge does not determine the will. The will may, indifferently, choose or not choose the act.[40]

Based on these premises, Molina analyzes the capacity for free action of causes that neither have an exclusively necessary action nor possess a complete use of reason through which they could discern and deliberate between different moral qualities associated with the action. Children, the insane, those who sleep, or simply adults who do not have the preparation or time to deliberate adequately about the actions they perform are in this condition.[41] To Molina, even though it is not possible for causes that do not have full use of reason to make a complete deliberation of acts, they are still free agents endowed with will. Since neither the object of choice nor reason can determine the will, the will remains free insofar as it can choose its acts indifferently.[42] The free agent can thus be distinguished from the natural agent, insofar as the action of the natural agent is not characterized by an indifferent choice of acts, in a way that "it is not in his power to act or not to act" for, once "all the requirements for acting are in place, he will necessarily act."[43]

In the fourth part of the *Concordia*, Molina returns to this question to identify the different roots of contingency in the universe. God, the angels, and human beings are the roots of contingency with different degrees of perfection. On the contrary, natural beings are not roots of contingency in themselves, because their effects are produced by necessity of nature, without being able to choose indifferently between contrary acts.

[36] Luis de Molina, *Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia*, edited by I. Rabeneck (Oniae-Matriti: Collegium Maximum S. I.-Soc. Edit. 'Sapientia', 1953), I, q. 14, art. 13, d. 2, 3: "[...] agens liberum dicitur quod positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest agere et non agere aut ita agere unum ut contrarium etiam agere posit."
[37] Molina, *Concordia*, I, q. 14, art. 13, d. 2, 3.
[38] Molina, *Concordia*, I, q. 14, art. 13, d. 2, 3.
[39] Molina, *Concordia*, I, q. 14, art. 13, d. 2, 5.
[40] Molina, *Concordia*, I, q. 14, art. 13, d. 2, 6.
[41] Molina, *Concordia*, I, q. 14, art. 13, d. 2, 6-8.
[42] Molina, *Concordia*, I, q. 14, art. 13, d. 2, 6.
[43] Molina, *Concordia*, I, q. 14, art. 13, d. 2, 3: "[...] agens liberum in hac significatione distinguitur contra agens naturale in cuius potestate non est agere et non agere, sed positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum necessario agit et ita agit unum ut non possit contrarium efficere."

However, as free causes establish relations with natural causes, natural causes can produce contingent effects. All purely natural beings can be included in this condition.[44]

Animals can be included among natural beings. However, since Molina's definition of free action is characterized by indifferent choice, it is necessary that animals be in some way a cause of contingency and that their condition be distinct from that of purely natural beings. Animals occupy an intermediate hierarchical place between the place of natural beings and that of free causes whose condition does not allow them to make full use of reason. It is therefore not possible to recognize in animals the same degree of freedom that can be identified in children or in the insane, but it is possible to affirm that there is an innate trace of freedom in animals that allows them some indifferent choices.[45] Molina clarifies, however, that he does not recognize such a great level of freedom in animals that when an animal has knowledge of an object and its sensory appetite inclines it toward this object, the animal may not choose it. The trace of freedom gives animals the ability to perform a variety of acts in a contingent manner, whenever knowledge of an object, an appetite, or another stimulus does not prevent it.[46] Molina argues that it is not necessary to have either complete use of reason, deliberative capacity, or knowledge of the end, to admit a vestige of innate freedom in animals.[47] Simple knowledge of space and the natural capacities with which the animal is endowed are enough to enable the animal to perform some acts with minimal freedom.[48] If in free causes freedom is rooted in the will, in animals the trace of freedom that is innate to them resides in the sensitive appetite.[49] Molina finds proof of the existence of an innate trace of freedom in animals in the fact that, when exposed to two objects with equivalent power of attraction, suited to the animal's appetite and without interference from other causes, the animal will lean toward one of the objects. The cause of the animal's inclination toward one of the objects is neither the power of attraction nor the better suitability of the object (since both are equivalent), nor is it the influence of extrinsic causes, but the freedom that the animal

[44] Molina, *Concordia*, IV, q. 14, art. 13, d. 47, 11. Molina gives the example of a lamp that projects light. The light projected by the lamp is a contingent effect that may or may not happen, but the root of the contingency is the free cause that lit the lamp.
[45] Molina, *Concordia*, IV, q. 14, art. 13, d. 47, 5 and 7.
[46] Molina, *Concordia*, IV, q. 14, art. 13, d. 47, 5 and 7.
[47] Molina, *Concordia*, IV, q. 14, art. 13, d. 47, 7.
[48] Molina, *Concordia*, IV, q. 14, art. 13, d. 47, 8: "[...] dicendum deinde est ad vestigium libertatis brutorum satis esse notitiam ampli spatii per quod gradiendo, volando aut natando possunt iter conficere; satis item esse, quod notitia objccti. ex cujus imaginatione ducuntur, non tam vehementer moveat, ut pro qualilate appetitus bruti illum necessitet ad actus exercitium, ut explicatum est; neque necessarias esse cognitiones, collaliones, et demonstrationes quae in argumento commemorantur, ut etiam explicatum est" ([...] it is also sufficient that knowledge of the object from whose image they are guided does not move them so vehemently that the appetite of the brute necessitates the exercise of the act [...] nor are the cognitions, collations, and demonstrations mentioned in the argument necessary).
[49] Molina, *Concordia*, IV, q. 14, art. 13, d. 47, 7 and 13.

has by nature, which makes it a root of contingency and distinguishes it from beings endowed with strictly necessary action.[50]

4. Concluding Remarks

As we said at the beginning, the question of whether or not irrational animals have freedom has always aroused the interest of philosophers. Especially with the current development of advanced computing technologies that seem to surpass and challenge the limits of human rationality, the question of defining the boundaries between types of rationality is an increasingly topical issue. In the field of the history of philosophy, studies on how the difference between human and non-human rationality has been understood, have also been promoted. This type of approach is usually centered on two major themes. On the one hand, these studies focus on understanding how different philosophers have interpreted the boundaries between humans and irrational beings in terms of the scope of cognitive faculties. On the other hand, following on from the discussion about whether irrational beings are endowed with some kind of rationality, current studies seek to understand the philosophical positions on whether irrational beings are free agents and to what extent they can be subjects of rights.[51]

The perspective of the two Jesuits whose conception of animal freedom we study here is, after all, somewhat different, without deviating entirely from an analysis of the issue within the scope of the theories of animal life available at the time. Fonseca and Molina are in fact committed to understanding the extent to which it is possible to attribute some kind of free agency to irrational animals. And there is no doubt that both are interested in knowing how to identify, in human beings, a minimum level of rationality from which they can be held morally accountable. However, the root of this investigation, in both Jesuits, is not merely psychological, but metaphysical. It is the identification of the main principle and root of contingency, present in the natural world, that both seek to identify. In their response to this question, Fonseca and Molina express the doctrinal diversity that characterizes Jesuit teaching on animals' freedom. Fonseca openly rejects Molina's doctrine when he criticizes the positions of those who admit that the actions of living beings that do not have or do not use reason are characterized by indifference (the power that these beings have to be determined to one object or another) or the positions of those

[50] Molina, *Concordia*, IV, q. 14, art. 13, d. 47, 13.

[51] This is, for example, the content of various studies compiled in the work by Adamson and Edwards, *Animals: A History.* The same line of analysis can be found in the work by Anselm Oelze, *Animal Rationality. Later Medieval Theories (1250-1350)* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2018). Unsurprisingly, Oelze studies animal rationality in texts by medieval authors based on the theories of cognition and action they developed, focusing on the differences between human and non-human rationality and agency. An innovative and particularly rich aspect of Oelze's study is the comparison between similarities and differences between medieval authors' theses on cognition and behavior and current developments in cognitive science in these fields. See spec. Oelze, *Animal Rationality*, 209-227.

who attribute some form of freedom to children, the insane and the irrational. However, this diversity of doctrines does not exclude a theoretical unity at the level of principles and conclusions. The Jesuit teaching placed extraordinary value on contingency as an undeniable and central characteristic of the physical world. But the Jesuit interest in contingency did not involve reducing this concept to the scope of the judicial power of reason. The Jesuits advocated the idea of an expanded rationality, according to which human dignity resides in free will and human action, the expression of that free will, effectively intervenes in the seemingly fixed structures of the natural world and accentuates the contingent nature of the world. A concept of broadened rationality, which takes into account aspects already defended by the Jesuits in the 16th century, may be relevant today as an alternative to models of technological rationality, of a computational and algorithmic nature, which increasingly interpret rational nature in a reductive way.

Being free by nature, human will is capable of uncondictionally acting in any direction. Therefore, both freedom and dignity can only be lost through the action of one's own free will, whenever it inclines, against the natural order. Human beings have all the natural conditions to freely act upon the physical world , bulding a world where they achieve maximum dignity and fulfilment.

Finally, Jesuit teaching also contributed to the debate on the status and dignity of animals. For Fonseca and Molina, animals participate actively in the contingency of the natural world. Even though they do not possess the judicious power of reason, animals are endowed with other forms of sensation, thought, and language that allow them to participate in the experience of freedom. But if animals are recognized as having freedom, it is necessary that they also be recognized as having their own constitutive and irreducible dignity.

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RESEÑAS DE LIBROS | BOOK REVIEWS

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Lorena Velasco Guerrero, editora de esta monografía de investigación de autoría múltiple y autora del último capítulo, es una joven profesora e investigadora de la UFV, jurista, constitucionalista más en concreto, aunque con alma de filósofa, como demuestra su condición de miembro desde 2013 del *Seminario permanente de Filosofía del Derecho-UCM*. Doctora por la UCM con la tesis doctoral de 2018, de título *El concepto de persona en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional* (*Respublica*, Madrid, 2020, pp. 823), está interesada en cuestiones de historia del derecho, sobre todo desde el punto de vista de los principios constitucionales.

Desde el 2018 trabaja en el grupo de investigación formado en torno a dos Proyectos competitivos de investigación del Plan Nacional I+D+i: "Sociedad Política y Economía. Proyecciones de la Escolástica española en el pensamiento británico y anglosajón" (MINECO-AEI, FFI2017-84435-P, 2018-21) y "Salvación, Política y Economía. El comercio de ideas entre España y Gran Bretaña en los siglos XVII y XVIII" (MICIU-AEI, PID2021-122994NB-I00, 2022-25). De su fecunda colaboración en ambos proyectos de investigación han resultado, entre otros, los siguientes trabajos: "La jurisdicción civil y el extranjero en la escolástica española" (en *Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía* 39/2 [2022] 489-497), "The binding nature of civil norms in foreigners in the Treatise *De legibus ac Deo legislatore* by Francisco Suárez" (en L. J. Prieto López y J. L. Cendejas Bueno [eds.], *Projections of Spanish Jesuit Scholasticism on British Thought* [Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2023], 274-290), "El pensamiento de Johann Gottlieb Heineccius 'Heinecio' en torno al origen, fin y límites del Derecho Político" (en L. Velasco (ed.), *La Escuela de Salamanca ayer y hoy* [Valenica: Tirant Lo Blanch, 2024], 283-308), "Fuentes y fin del derecho en el origen del constitucionalismo inglés: Edward Coke (1553– 634)" (en *Res publica. Revista de historia de las ideas políticas* 28/2 [2025] en preparación).

En la monografía que presentamos participan los siguientes autores, cuyos trabajos se ordenan alfabéticamente: Héctor Álvarez García, profesor de Derecho Constitucional de la Univ. Pablo de Olavide (Sevilla), con un trabajo titulado "Los derechos naturales *versus* la resignificación de los derechos humanos" (pp. 19-52); Marta Asín Sánchez, profesora de Derecho Canónico y Eclesiástico del Estado de la Universidad Francisco de

[1] Este trabajo ha sido realizado en el marco del Proyecto de investigación "Salvación, política y economía. El comercio de ideas entre España y Gran Bretaña en los siglos XVII y XVIII" (Programa de generación de conocimiento 2021, referencia: PID2021-122994NB-I00), financiado por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, la Agencia Española de Investigación (AEI) y el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER), del que el autor es el IP primero.

Vitoria (Madrid), con la aportación "Influencias de la doctrina del matrimonio de Francisco de Vitoria en el Concilio de Trento: forma jurídica y significación sacramental" (pp. 53-78); Cecilia Font de Villanueva, profesora Titular de Historia Económica de la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, con el trabajo "El proceso de formación de las ideas económicas. Antecedentes y proyecciones de la doctrina escolástica en torno a la cuestión del justo precio" (pp. 79-96); María Goenechea Domínguez, profesora de Dirección Financiera, de la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, con el trabajo "Influencia de la filosofía tomista en las políticas públicas actuales" (pp. 97-112); Ramón de Meer Cañón, profesor de Filosofía del Derecho de la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, con "El bien común y lo político en santo Tomás de Aquino. Elementos definitorios esenciales y su incompatibilidad con la modernidad" (pp. 113-132); Francisco Javier Rubio Hípola, Profesor Titular de Epistemología de la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, con "La influencia de la doctrina de Tomás de Aquino en el pensamiento de Richard Hooker. Fundamentación metafísica del orden del mundo y del hombre como 'capaz de Dios'" (pp. 133-148); Juan Palao Uceda, Profesor de Fundamentos y Teoría del Derecho de la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, con "El indulto y la amnistía. Contribuciones desde la Filosofía de Derecho y la doctrina del Aquinate" (pp. 149-170); y finalmente, la propia Lorena Velasco Guerrero, con el trabajo "La herencia escolástica y tomista en el derecho político decimonónico. La continuidad de la tradición escolástica en el siglo XIX".

En la "Presentación" la profesora Velasco Guerrero nos recuerda la necesidad de hallar respuestas en los principios humanistas a los desafíos de nuestro mundo, tal como se viene haciendo en la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria. Por ello, en el marco de una triple efeméride de Tomás de Aquino (de su nacimiento, 800 años en 2025; de su muerte, 750 años en 2024; y de su canonización, 700 años en 2023), esta monografía pretende invitar al estudio de este insigne teólogo y filósofo, "reconociendo su influencia en el pensamiento filosófico y teológico de la tradición escolástica". En el contexto de este vastísimo conocedor de la herencia filosófico-teológica griega y cristiana que es Tomás de Aquino, las investigaciones de esta monografía "analizan los principios y postulados de otras figuras destacadas, como Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suárez, Juan de Mariana y Domingo de Soto, entre otros pensadores, que forman parte de lo que se conoce como la 'Escuela de Salamanca'", término con el que se denomina –no entramos ahora en si más o menos acertadamente– a los autores que, con gran audacia, "se enfrentaron a los transcendentales acontecimientos históricos que definieron los siglos XVI y XVII". A través de su labor intelectual –dice la profesora Velasco Guerrero– "estos pensadores construyeron un *corpus* robusto, cuyos fundamentos continúan ofreciendo valiosas perspectivas para abordar los desafíos sociales, políticos y económicos de nuestra época". En breve, estos eminentes pensadores, vinculados principalmente a las universidades de Salamanca y Coímbra durante el Siglo de Oro español, respondieron tanto secundando como desafiando la tradición a cuestiones claves como "el descubrimiento de América, la Reforma protestante, la legitimidad y los límites del poder político, las relaciones entre la Iglesia y el Estado, el trato hacia otros pueblos en el ámbito de las relaciones internacionales o la organización de la actividad económica".

Por nuestra parte, dada la extensión permitida a una reseña, nos limitaremos a una sucinta presentación y valoración de los trabajos de Lorena Velasco Guerrero y Francisco Javier Rubio Hípola.

El trabajo de la profesora Lorena Velasco Guerrero analiza la influencia de la doctrina de Tomás de Aquino y de los autores escolásticos que la actualizan en la enseñanza del derecho constitucional del siglo XIX. Como ella misma indica, "el objetivo principal de este trabajo es determinar si la Constitución de 1812 representó una ruptura o una continuación de las ideas constitucionales previas", para lo cual se procede "analizando las influencias de la doctrina escolástica mediante el examen de citas contenidas en obras clave del siglo XIX sobre Derecho político, escritas por autores como Antonio Alcalá Galiano, Ignacio María de Ferrán, Vicente Santa María de Pareces, Rafael de Olóriz y Enrique Gil Robles", además de estudiar "algunas obras divulgativas relevantes, como *El libro del buen ciudadano*, de José María Mañas, y una serie de obras denominadas 'catecismos', que abordaban cuestiones constitucionales de manera accesible al público general" (pp. 16-17).

Siguiendo tres criterios fundamentales (la condición de catedrático de Derecho político de su autor, la publicación de estas obras en el ámbito del derecho público, constitucional o administrativo; y que en ellas se aborden cuestiones sustanciales del derecho constitucional), nuestra autora elige para su estudio las siguientes obras: *Lecciones de Derecho político constitucional* (1843), de Antonio Alcalá Galiano, titular de la cátedra de Derecho constitucional del Ateneo de Madrid; *Derecho político y administrativo* (1873), de Ignacio María de Ferrán, catedrático de la asignatura en la Universidad de Barcelona; *Curso de Derecho político* (1880), de Vicente Santa María de Pareces, catedrático de la Universidad de Valencia; *Estudios de Derecho político* (1897), de Rafael de Olóriz, también catedrático de la Universidad de Valencia ; y el *Tratado de Derecho político* (1899) de Enrique Gil Robles, catedrático de la Universidad de Salamanca. Se atiende también en este trabajo a ciertas obras de carácter divulgativo relevantes por su contenido, importancia o difusión, particularmente a *El libro del buen ciudadano* (1869), de José María Mañas, una obra relevante, de un total de 2761 páginas, en la que "se realiza un exhaustivo recorrido por los cambios constitucionales ocurridos hasta su publicación", "aportando una valiosa información sobre el contexto histórico de la época al compilar las referencias de todos los periódicos contemporáneos que cubrieron los procesos constituyentes, así como los distintos discursos y votos relacionados" (p. 174). La autora "considera también un conjunto de obras publicadas a lo largo del siglo XIX, que abordan, entre otras, cuestiones de índole política, utilizando un formato de preguntas y respuestas", por lo que recibieron en sus propios títulos el término de *Catecismo*. Se estudia de entre ellas el *Catecismo político* (1820) de Fernando de Corradi; el *Catecismo religioso, moral y político* (1821), de Manuel López Cepero; el *Catecismo político* (1840), de Tomás Beltrán Soler; el *Catecismo político para uso de la* *juventud* (1848), de A. H.; el *Catecismo político de los progresistas demócratas* (1850), de Victoriano Ametller y Vilademunt; y el *Catecismo político del pueblo* (1851), de Nicolás Pizarro Suárez.

De tales análisis, la profesora Velasco Guerrero concluye que queda patente "la presencia de referencias explícitas a santo Tomás de Aquino y Francisco Suárez, y en menor medida, también a otros autores escolásticos (Vitoria, Soto, Belarmino, etc.), o a la escolástica como corriente de pensamiento", si bien "estas menciones no son uniformes ni generalizadas, sino que dependen del contexto ideológico y de los objetivos específicos de cada autor" (p. 190). En términos generales, "los autores escolásticos y sus doctrinas son considerados como teólogos o grandes doctores del catolicismo, lo que hace que su citación sea más frecuente entre autores de corte 'tradicionalista', mientras que los autores identificados como 'revolucionarios' tienden a omitirlos, o los citan únicamente en aquellos aspectos en los que sus teorías pueden ser reinterpretadas bajo los principios de la revolución. Este fenómeno es especialmente evidente en los autores 'radicales', quienes ignoran deliberadamente el pensamiento anterior a la revolución, incluso para cuestionarlo, mientras que los autores 'conservadores' buscan en figuras como Suárez un fundamento tradicional que sirva para justificar su pensamiento dentro del marco revolucionario". De ahí que "las referencias a Suárez sean más recurrentes en temas relacionados con la relación entre la Iglesia y el Estado, así como en las discusiones sobre la soberanía nacional" (p. 191).

En su trabajo "La influencia de la doctrina de Tomás de Aquino en el pensamiento de Richard Hooker. Fundamentación metafísica del orden del mundo y del hombre como 'capaz de Dios'", el profesor Rubio Hípola ofrece una visión general de los principales argumentos que los estudiosos han expuesto para sustentar sus posiciones respecto a la influencia de la doctrina de Tomás de Aquino en el pensamiento de Richard Hooker, sustentando por su parte la opinión de que el teólogo anglicano puede ser considerado como tomista "en sentido amplio o ecléctico", particularmente en lo que se refiere a su enfoque sobre la ley natural y la utilización de ésta como un medio para el conocimiento de Dios.

El "juicioso Hooker" (1554-1600), como llama Locke en diversas ocasiones, fue uno de los teólogos más importantes en la práctica del anglicanismo isabelino como *via media* entre el catolicismo y la reforma del luteranismo y calvinismo. "En este sentido –dice Rubio Hípola– Hooker fue uno de los pilares de los *divine* que, en las primeras décadas del siglo XVII, representaron la postura latitudinaria en el gran debate entre *laudianos* (o arminianos) y *puritanos* (o calvinistas) en Inglaterra" (p. 135). En torno a él y su obra principal, *Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie* (1604) se ha abierto un doble proceso de recuperación en los siglos XIX y XX, consistente sea en la *reivindicación* de la figura de Hooker como el campeón de la *via media* y uno de los fundadores de la tradición de la *High Church* anglicana por parte del Movimiento de Oxford de J. H. Newman, J. Keble, etc., sea en la *reinterpretación* del pensamiento de Hooker dentro del mundo reformado. Uno de los aspectos de este proceso de reinterpretación de Hooker se refiere precisamente a las fuentes de su pensamiento, en especial en lo que se refiere a su posible dependencia de Tomás de Aquino. Desde luego, dando por seguro el carácter sistemático de este teólogo, “creemos –dice el profesor Rubio Hípola– que se puede demostrar su dependencia del tomismo en tres cuestiones estructurales [...], en cuyo foco aparece una concesión cosmológica jerarquizada y ordenada fruto de la participación de la mente de Dios. Este orden manifiesta una ley de índole divina que se conoce en primer lugar en el orden natural del universo, en la naturaleza del Estado y sus leyes, y en la naturaleza del ser humano y sus leyes” (p 139). De ahí que se puedan colegir tres ideas fundamentales sobre su dependencia con Tomás de Aquino: 1) la noción de ley natural de Hooker, como en el Aquinate, es entendida como una participación de la ley eterna, que se expresa en el ser humano por vía de la razón práctica y en el mundo como orden y jerarquía; 2) también la ley positiva, en lo que se refiere a la vida del Estado, refleja un orden (similar al del mundo físico sujeto al gobierno divino), que, como en Tomás de Aquino, es expresión intramundana de la justicia de la ley eterna, así como por su carácter social debe tender al bien común; 3) en general, tal orden y jerarquía posibilitan el conocimiento de Dios por su medio. Nuestro autor presenta aquí una interesante cita de Paul Dominiak, profesor de Cambridge, de su trabajo “Hooker, Scholasticism, Thomism, and Reformed Orthodoxy” (en W. Bradford Littlejohn-Scott N. Kindred-Barnes (eds.), *Richard Hooker and Reformed Orthodoxy*, Reformed Historical Theology, Vol. 40 [Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2017], 101-126), que reproducimos: “In the metaphysical account of law in Book One, for example, Hooker clearly adopts a Thomistic account of act and possibility, as well as of causality and participation, in order to explain how the manifold species of law participate in God’s eternal law (...) The Thomistic ideas transmit the Dionysian concept of mediating hierarchies, the legal dispositions that move creature to return to their creator” (pp. 139-144).

En breve, Rubio Hípola cree justificado concluir que “el pensamiento de Richard Hooker se sostiene sobre una fundamentación metafísica y teológica que es esencialmente tomista”. Más aún, cree que “esta influencia tomista no es accidental ni secundaria, como parecen sugerir muchos intérpretes”, por lo que “podría situarse a Hooker como un tomista en sentido *amplio* con matices de *ecléctico*” (p. 145). Para corroborar esta idea, Rubio Hípola cierra su trabajo con una nueva y oportuna cita de Dominiak, que creemos merece la pena reproducir: “Hooker’s Thomism therefore does not abrogate his Protestant or Reformed credentials. Rather, it helps set him as a wide, eclectic, and Protestant or Reformed Thomist, part of a broader phenomenon already emerging in the period of early orthodoxy as one particular expression of Protestant commitment” (p. 145).

Daniel A. Di Liscia and Edith D. Sylla. Eds. *Quantifying Aristotle: The Impact, Spread and Decline of the* Calculatores *Tradition.* Leiden: Brill, 2022. 479 p. ISBN: 9789004499829. Hardback: 167€

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The premodern rise of analytic language to demonstrate the quantitative variation of the qualities —physical and metaphysical— is revealed in boundless detail in this volume. The complexity of its manifestations and its European impact through broad textual circulation persisted into modernity. Scholars who write in this book display diverse outlooks on the quantitative analysis of physical changes, which extend from medieval formulations of logical paradoxes to the dilemma between dynamic/kinetic description of motion and qualitative alterations in terms of mathematical proportional variations, also involving modifications in "essential forms", interpreted as causal forces enduring beyond the physical nature. The editors are aware of the ambiguous term *calculatores*, proposed by Roger Swineshead, which is slightly biased, given the widespread adoption of analytical methods for explaining physical change. Ranging from the redefinition of the categories that describe motion to the mathematical vocabulary that locates the specific "instant" at which an intense or gradual alteration of motion occurs, as well as the relationships between the impressed force, the increase in speed, and the passivity of the medium regarding local motion. Additionally, the multiple commentaries on Aristotelian physics, the editing of *Sophismata* by Kilvington, Bradwardine, Heytesbury, and Swineshead, introduce the vocabulary of analysis to describe the physical conditions of motion, attesting how quantitative variations are expressed through variable proportional measures.

That is the case addressed by Trifogli regarding Thomas Wylton's definition of the "instant of change". "Instant" does not compose the variation of motions, nor is it a part of physical change. Therefore, instant is defined by the changing subject to continuously measure the temporal extension of motion, bounded by the "instants" of the beginning and end. Those limits of measure and the precise definition of the instant at which change occurs avoid the infinity of time associated with local motions. The reinterpretation of change and its descriptive composition, according to the extreme limits, is a precedent for the questions proposed by Kilvington and Bradwardine, as introduced by Jung. Indeed, they introduce a new perspective on motion based on the proportional relationship between the power of the mover driving the movement and the increase in the velocity of the moving object. However, Kilvington focuses on the logical paradox of whether there is a power that exceeds the velocity impressed by the moving object, increasing velocity or the force decreasing due to medium resistance. Unlike Aristotle and Averroes, who advocate an equivalence between potential force

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and velocity, Kilvington points out the paradox of an increase in force without any proportional effect on velocity. The Mertonians, Bradwardine, and Pippewell introduced a mathematical perspective for researching the potential ratio of the moving object's force and its velocity increase. This ratio represents the doubleness of the impressed force and the overcoming of the medium resistance, which is a geometric proof based on the observation of the elementary spheres and the proportion between their motions. The proportional ratio applied to local motion, dissolving, in Bradwardine's terms, "the clouds of ignorance" in favour of the "demonstrative winds" provided by the mathematical proportions feasible in the physical description of motion (*ignorantiae nebulis demonstrationum flatibus effungatis, superest ut lumen scientiae resplendeat veritatis*).

The "demonstrative winds" summoned by Bradwardine stand out among the manuscripts of *De proportionibus* studied by Podkonski, since mentions of Swineshead are detected in the manuscript tradition, possibly connecting *De motu locali* with Bradwardine's ideas and Heytesbury's *Sophismata* on difform motions. Thus, the local displacement has a velocity that increases or decreases uniformly from the midpoint of the velocity maximum pick. Swineshead quotes the rule of uniform difform local motion from Heytesbury but adds a further assumption about the proportionality of difform motion, since at the middle point of motion, there is a continuous increase or decrease, doubling its velocity. Podkonski presents two versions of the proportional analysis found in Heytesbury, emphasising the importance of the midpoint at which motion accelerates or decelerates proportionally. Regarding the mathematical interpretation of local motion and the increasing or decreasing according to a proportional relationship between geometric quantities, Lukács offers Bradwardine's approach on this language through the description of divine causality. In *De causa dei*, the portrayal of the proportional increase of the divine infinite power, which can only increase and increase, is related to the miraculous healings of the Gospel. The experience of the biblical account reveals healing, but without introducing us to the language of the continuous increase of divine power, whose virtues unfold in a proportional order according to the latitude of divine power, which represents its infinite expansion. In this case, mathematical language provides imaginative support for conceiving this infinite increase, diverting the possibility of nature's persistence in time, depriving it of embodying infinity. This recalls the problem of justification, since in creation an infinite increase of divine grace cannot occur concerning a limited number of individuals. However, we can imagine this infinite grace without limiting its constant increase to the series of individuals who receive it. The theologians and the *falsigrapho*, possibly Kilvington, assume an uncertain number of individuals or the possibility of infinity that challenges the latitudinal increase of divine power.

Read confronts, one more time, Kilvington and Bradwardine in the liar paradox. Among the sentences considered *insolubilia*, this statement does have multiple meanings or can be interpreted as a meaningless proposition. Verifying the meaning of *Sortes dicit falsum* leads us to ask whether it indicates falsehood or is true in a restricted way. Heytesbury advises employing the terms in their most familiar meaning, so we can determine whether the statement is true or false. Read translates "insoluble scenario" as *casus de insolubili*, which makes it easier to point out the meaning degree concerning a specific or restricted language use, and its probability. Swineshead introduces another variable, the sufficiency or insufficiency of this type of proposition, which implicitly generates diffuse degrees of probability regarding its meaning. In contrast, Dumbleton develops a classification of "scenarios" of meaning connected to Bradwardine's position and his implicit meaning multiplicity. Both "scenarios" and the context of the *obligationis* suggest a further analysis of the terms without leaving the initial assumption of the ambivalent or multivalent meanings. Returning to the dynamics of local motion, Rommevaux-Tani describes, based on the *Tractatus de sex inconvenientibus* by an anonymous author, but in the context of the *schola oxoniensis*, the problems introduced by the proportional analysis of changes in velocity about the movements of generation, alteration, and local displacement. The treatment of each of these "inconveniences" involves the exposition of the most accepted analysis versus the solution suggested by the *Tractatus* itself. For each issue, she describes the "inconvenience" and the pursuit for a solution acquired from the study of each question. Rommevaux-Tani is the author of the critical edition of *Tractatus de sex inconvenientibus*. Besides, her article introduces an additional issue: the Prague manuscript (Národní Knihovna, VIII. G. 19), in which the *Tractatus* remains surrounded by other Oxonienses pamphlets by Kilvington or Bradwardine, along with other anonymous opuscula. Remarkably, the optical treatises and their references on the analysis of local motion and the proportional measures applicable to variations in light incidences on spherical "scenarios".

Thakkar opens a fundamental section of this book by including Wycliff among the continental successors of the Oxonienses, or *calculatores*. His generation, which included Giovanni da Casale, Oresme, and Holland, is an interesting example of the historiographical discussion about who was part of the "Bradwardine Circle" or "Schule", as Maier labelled it. While Weisheipl pointed out that Mertonians had no direct contact, they did adopt Bradwardine's methods. Thus, among *calculatores,* not everyone who is an Oxonian is a Mertonian, nor are all Mertonians or all Oxonians; therefore, not all *calculatores* are Oxonians or Mertonians. A curious *insolubilia* that Sylla condensed into a pragmatic assumption: the use of "new measure languages" which describe Bradwardine's followers and the authors who constructed a method to elucidate the analytical problem of motion and indicate the proportional measure of its variations. Thakkar's answer with a question: what exactly did the *calculatores* calculate? A question about the new descriptive language of motion, focusing on increase and decrease, and how these variations take place. Language employed by Wycliff, who uses analytical expressions about motion (*gradus, motus uniformis, motus difformis*) to explore physical questions like "mathematicians treat [them] like empiricist philosophers (*sensibiles philosophi*)".

Berger stresses the *calculatores* posterity through the figure of Helmoldus de Zoltwedel, who developed his career in Prague around 1390. His studies on *insolubilia* place him in the wake of the calculators, especially for his exposition of the liar paradox and other issues. His criticism of Heytesbury, who he claimed often used evasive words (*verba evasiva*), is striking. Helmold emphasises the elusiveness of the multiple meanings associated with these propositions. He seeks to establish distinctions, whether the statement is false, has a reference, or is nonsensical, allowing the "moderns" to assume this contradiction and resolve the meaning issues. The article presents the critical edition of the *Questions on Insolubilia* (*Questiones parvorum logicalium*), which mentions Helmold's teacher, Conradus Soltow, and his more nuanced interpretation of the liar paradox. Biard studies Blasius of Parma's outlook on physical variations of accidental qualities, based on the gradual concept of quality intensity and its remission. The problem of attributing accidental quality is related to exploring its relationship to the subject, for example, the degree of increase in heat and the consequent cooling. Those qualities are mixed with the parts of the subject, or are there inherent qualities that suddenly emerge? Accidental qualities are studied by comparing them with the subjects that display them and the proportional variations of their changes. Once the proportions of variations are known, it remains to find the quality's nature, which does not depend merely on subjects, since qualities are forms that, similar to causal principles, gradually acquire or lose intensity. Blasius adheres to the gradual acquisition or loss of intensity as an explanation of the forms' physical operations, which are not material parts of substances. It seems a succession of qualitative unfolding, but not all cases of qualitative increase or decrease support formal continuity. The increase in speed, for example, is attributed to a moving object, but occurs in a medium that itself possesses other qualities.

Szapiro deals with the problem of uniformly difform qualities of the medium regarding light refraction and the distortions of stargazing. This issue is addressed by Nicole de Oresme, whose origins date back to *Meteorologica*, the *Almagest*, and Ptolemy's Optics. The question is whether an observer has a proportional deviation of the sun's altitude caused by the light refraction, which modifies the observation of stars or not. The observer, who is not located at the centre of the sphere, implies that the rays' incidence may have a degree of inclination produced by the density of the medium, the Earth's atmosphere. Oresme's hypothesis about the density of the uniform difform medium is reproduced in three mental experiments showing the deviation of the sun's position regarding the observer's spot. The density change demonstrates the introduction of the analytical vocabulary of motion applied to the resistance of the medium in which light refraction occurs. Szapiro maintains that proportional change is a particular application of the Merton Rule, in which the degree of inclination varies from 1/2 to 1/4, up to 1/8, demonstrating the refraction degrees that connect with the Merton Rule regarding the proportional increase or decrease of motion velocity. The two and three-dimensional diagrams, offered by Szapiro, clearly represent the application of proportional language to different phenomena, such as light refraction and the density of the medium. That is a remarkable example of *calculatores* tradition and its applications.

Di Liscia, editor of the volume, addresses the performance of analytical language concerning qualitative variations of perfections or "essential forms". *De perfectione specierum* is an issue easily found in the *Sententiae* commentaries, for instance, John of Naples or Augustine Nifo. Although the Neoplatonic echoes regarding the influence of the first causes on the second natural causes and the physical explanation of their "influence" on substantial change, Di Liscia tackles the signification framework that eventually leads to carelessness perfections to study the analytical measure of physical alterations. The comparison between the geometric language of Oresme and John of Naples exemplifies the setting of early analytical processes applied to substantial species, which seek their perfection by nature, configured in proportional alterations. Remarkably, it is the ascription to Jean Legrand of a manuscript, which Murdoch took as an anonymous treatise, allowing Di Liscia to locate in France the spreading of *De perfectione specierum* all around Europe. Legrand's *Compendium utriusque philosophia* displayed the analytical vocabulary that links it with the study of the species perfectible process from the minimum degree until it reaches its maximum intensity of perfection. Although described progressively as a numerical series, Legrand draws a diagram illustrating the tendency of species toward perfection, based on a circle whose centre represents the divinity, using the radius to draw a sequence of triangle sides, which gradually represent the species' perfection degrees. The "triangle of zero degree" represents divine perfection, as seen in Nicholas of Amsterdam's treatise, which demonstrates the application of geometric language proportions to describe species alterations and their ultimate perfection. The case of Paul of Venice recalls the issue of the "triangle of zero degree", as well as its reference to the problem of latitudes, species, and their variations leaning toward essential perfection. Blasius of Parma condensed geometric analysis into imaginative tools to analyse species alterations. However, assimilating the analytical geometric model to leave behind perfections opens the way to another language, which later becomes the analytical framework for the new physics. Di Liscia's chapter addresses the dissemination of dynamic-metaphysical issues, revealing the pathways of premodern science language, whose core was the causal influence of perfections that "flowed" freely in nature.

Oosterhoff introduces the gradual contraction of the approval of analytical tools. Lefevre d'Etaples' critical statements resonated among the editors of Aristotelian works, a group obsessed with a set of tools that are nothing more than geometric representations. Early print culture argued with late scholasticism about a teaching program more closely tied to philological and historical interpretation of texts than to an approach to proportional language that expresses the physical nature of change and motion. Lorenzo Valla, a philological spirit of the first half of the 16th century, addressed the emergence of Platonic mathematics, dismissing the merging between physical explanation and the analytical language of geometry.

Seller introduces an Italian commentator of Heytesbury, Angelo Fossambruno. The *Expositio de tribus praedicamentis* focused on the kinetic variations of velocity and uniform-difform local motion, representing the Italian reception of Heytesbury, whose *De regule* was the logic teaching text in Padua in 1496 and circulated in the University of Bologna. Seller recalls the crossroads between the Aristotelian definition of velocity, which increases in a passive medium due to the activity of the moving body and the quantification of increasing through a geometric language to spot the degrees of intensity and the velocity increases. Regarding motion in a vacuum, Fossambruno contemplates a solution *ad imaginationem* that envisions the conceptual conditions of local motion. Imagining void space whose passivity is like a medium that lacks resistance, Fossambruno sketched a mental experiment to speculate on the variation of motion qualities according to its causal conditions, which are favourable in a vacuum. The *ad imaginationem* method is replicated in the treatment of the infinite intensity of motion. This possibility may arise if a motion resistance decreases or increases its latitude indefinitely (*latitudinem motus esse infinitam versus extremum intensius*).

Sylla closes this volume by outlining the historiographical steps of the *calculatores* tradition in the 20th century, mentioning Maier, Duhem, Murdoch, and Clagett. Not without first recalling Leibniz's affinity for Richard Swineshead, who pointed out the need to reprint the *Liber calculationum*. While Leibniz often "looked back" to recognise the relevance of *calculatores* for historiography, it represented a challenge against the singularity of the 17th-century scientific revolution. Sylla illustrates the phases of a personal unfinished project that highlights the intellectual affinity between Leibniz and the science of his time, which employed mathematical methods to transform Aristotelian physics into a new language suitable for studying nature. Leibniz wrote on dynamics around 1690 with a conscious use of the *calculatores* vocabulary. Sylla highlights the intensive and the gradual increase of motion of those *scholastici quidam maxime Angli moliti sunt singulares quosdam calculos admodum subtiles circa intensiones et remissiones qualitatum et formarum [...]*. Sylla raises an even more complex issue concerning the dismissed transmission of the *calculatores* during the 17th century and how Leibniz found himself in an intellectual context in which everyone studied those *scholastici*, as shown in the appendix of the Leibnizian texts that explicitly quote them. It is feasible for Sylla that Leibniz, based on his reading of Alvaro Thomas and Swineshead, could have carried out the project of the *calculatores* by following *le chemin par l'infini et l'infiniti de l'infini.*

Ana Tropia and Daniele De Santis. Eds. *Rethinking Intentionality, Person and the Essence. Aquinas, Scotus, Stein*. Investigating Medieval Philosophy, Vol. 21. Leiden: Brill, 2024. 243 p. ISBN: 9789004693456. Hardback: 132,50€

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This edited volume brings together ten essays that revisit core metaphysical and phenomenological problems, namely, intentionality, personhood, essence, and individuation, through the lenses of three pivotal figures in the Christian philosophical tradition: Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and Edith Stein. Framed by both historical depth and systematic ambition, the volume seeks to recontextualize medieval metaphysical insights and to rethink their implications in dialogue with phenomenological method and concerns.

Each chapter engages one or more of these thinkers, frequently in comparative fashion. The opening section focuses on scholastic treatments of consciousness and cognition. Perler examines Aquinas's notion of *conscientia* and its connection to reflexivity and personal identity. Pini revisits Scotus's account of intentionality, emphasizing its irreducibility to naturalistic or causal explanations. Tropia focuses on Scotus's theory of singular cognition in the present state, showing its relevance for understanding individuation and epistemic access to particulars.

In the second part, contributors explore Stein's integration of medieval and phenomenological traditions. LaZella draws from both Scotus and Stein to argue for a metaphysics of singularity rooted in love rather than mere formal distinction. Cory investigates the concept of vital striving in Stein and Aquinas, questioning whether intentionality can be understood in terms of dynamism and self-transcendence. De Santis offers a technical reconstruction of Stein's engagement with the *principium individuationis*, navigating between early phenomenology and scholastic metaphysics. Borden Sharkey provides a detailed comparative study of Stein and Scotus on the status of universals, focusing on the metaphysical implications of essential being and less than numerical unity.

The final section turns to the affective, embodied, and cosmological dimensions of Stein's philosophy. Calcagno traces the evolution of Stein's view of personhood across her corpus, with special attention to the breakdown of personal unity and the metaphysical persistence of the personality core. Vendrell Ferran offers a comprehensive taxonomy of affective intentionality in Stein, distinguishing between object, horizon, and personal forms. Tommasi advances a bold metaphysical interpretation of *Potency and Act*, arguing that Stein attributes to matter an analogical form of intentionality and personality, rooted in its participation in divine createdness.

Collectively, these essays build a nuanced case for the ongoing relevance of scholastic metaphysical categories when interrogated through phenomenological frameworks. The volume reveals Edith Stein not only as an inheritor of Aquinas and Scotus, but as a metaphysician in her own right, one whose work continues to challenge and enrich contemporary philosophical debates.

The strength of this volume lies in its integration of historical depth with conceptual clarity. By placing Aquinas, Scotus, and Stein in sustained dialogue, the contributors offer a rare triangulation of scholastic and phenomenological approaches, namely, one that neither collapses distinctions nor merely juxtaposes them. The result is a dynamic reappraisal of metaphysical and anthropological categories that reanimates the stakes of intentionality, essence, and personhood for contemporary philosophy.

One major contribution of the volume is its reframing of intentionality beyond its traditional epistemological confines. Several chapters, notably those by Vendrell Ferran and Tommasi, emphasize intentionality's affective and ontological dimensions. Vendrell Ferran's chapter deepens the early phenomenological account of affect by showing that affective intentionality is not monolithic but comes in multiple forms, namely, what she terms object-, horizon-, and personal-intentionality. This refined typology not only expands affective phenomenology but also links Stein's stratified theory of emotions to a realist account of value, suggesting that different affective states disclose different layers of evaluative meaning.

Tommasi's contribution offers a metaphysical provocation: in *Potency and Act*, Stein proposes that matter is never merely passive but bears the imprint of spirit through its createdness. Drawing on Hedwig Conrad-Martius's *Metaphysische Gespräche*, Tommasi shows how Stein extends the analogy of being into an "analogy of the person". This allows even non-rational nature to manifest traits of intentionality and personal character; not metaphorically, but analogically and ontologically. His interpretation opens new avenues for considering how spiritual structure might inform material being within a theologically grounded metaphysics.

Sarah Borden Sharkey's chapter provides a careful reconstruction of the problem of universals in Scotus and Stein, clarifying the stakes between "essential being" and "less than numerical unity". Her analysis elucidates how Stein positions herself within the debate between moderate and extreme realism, offering a distinctive account that affirms the integrity of the common nature while preserving its non-individuated status. Sharkey's comparative approach succeeds in bridging the technical scholastic vocabulary with Stein's phenomenological rearticulation of essence.

Antonio Calcagno's chapter turns to the complex terrain of personhood. He traces how Stein's account evolves from her early phenomenology of empathy to her later metaphysical synthesis in *Potency and Act*. His analysis centers on Stein's distinction between living and being, and raises a pointed challenge: can personhood be both essential and experientially intermittent? Introducing the concept of "occasional personhood", Calcagno confronts the tension between metaphysical persistence and lived fragmentation, especially under the weight of trauma, despair, or soullessness. His reading invites a critical rethinking of what it means to affirm an irreducible personal core.

What emerges from the volume is not a unified metaphysical system but a constellation of interwoven concerns. Each chapter contributes to a shared aim: to rethink classical metaphysical categories, i.e. intentionality, individuality, essence, and value, in light of phenomenological experience and theological insight. Rather than treating the medieval heritage as a closed archive, the volume shows it to be a living resource, capable of engaging contemporary debates about embodiment, affect, and the conditions for personal identity.

This volume offers a distinctive contribution to current efforts to bridge medieval metaphysics and phenomenology. Rather than merely tracing influence, it demonstrates how sustained engagement with Aquinas and Scotus can yield new interpretive frameworks within Stein's phenomenology and vice versa. Through its blend of rigorous historical scholarship and innovative systematic reflection, the volume invites scholasticists and phenomenologists alike to rethink familiar problems through unfamiliar juxtapositions.

For readers invested in Aquinas and Scotus, the essays by Perler, Pini, Tropia, Cory, De Santis, and Borden Sharkey provide valuable insights. They revisit classical topics such as the nature of conscience, the cognition of singulars, the problem of universals, individuation, and the analogy of being, not only within their historical contexts, but in light of phenomenological challenges concerning embodiment, lived temporality, and affective life. These engagements shed new light on medieval categories by setting them in dialogue with concerns drawn from 20th-century and contemporary philosophy.

For scholars focused on Stein, the volume is a significant contribution. Chapters by Calcagno, Vendrell Ferran, De Santis, and Tommasi expand the interpretive horizon of Stein scholarship, moving beyond *On the Problem of Empathy* to probe the complexities of *Potency and Act*, *Finite and Eternal Being*, and *The Structure of the Human Person*. These contributions show how Stein rethinks classical metaphysical categories in a phenomenological key, whether in her analysis of affective life, personal unity, essential being, or the spiritual structure of nature.

The volume also has an interdisciplinary reach. Philosophers of religion, philosophical anthropologists, and scholars in affect theory will find these chapters to be valuable resources for rethinking spiritual life, value-apprehension, and personhood. In particular, Vendrell Ferran's typology of affective intentionality, Calcagno's account of "occasional personhood", and Tommasi's argument for the analogical intentionality of nature speak directly to ongoing debates about the limits of personhood, the role of affect in perception, and the ontological status of non-human beings.

That said, this is not an introductory volume. While rewarding for those with the relevant background, it presumes significant familiarity with scholastic and phenomenological terminology and debates. Its detailed textual work, frequent recourse to untranslated primary sources, and intricate conceptual distinctions render it most appropriate for experienced researchers. It is unlikely to be viable as a graduate seminar textbook outside of highly specialized settings. Rather than offering survey-level exposition, the volume demands expert engagement and rewards it with philosophically rich contributions to contemporary metaphysics and Stein studies.

The volume stands out for its careful historical contextualization and its balanced combination of textual exegesis and philosophical analysis. Contributors demonstrate deep familiarity with Stein's corpus, including her major metaphysical works, namely, *Finite and Eternal Being*, *Potency and Act*, and *The Structure of the Human Person*, as well as her early phenomenological writings, such as *On the Problem of Empathy*. These texts are examined alongside primary Latin and German sources from Aquinas and Scotus, with sustained attention to terminological nuance and doctrinal precision.

Throughout the volume, the methodology remains pluralistic yet coherent, reflecting the disciplinary strengths of each contributor. Tropia and Pini offer meticulous historical-philological reconstructions of Scotus's views on cognition and intentionality, situating his thought within precise doctrinal and textual contexts. Tommasi likewise adopts a historical approach but expands it by drawing on Conrad-Martius to illuminate Stein's metaphysics of nature. Cory and De Santis blend close textual exegesis with speculative analysis, tracing conceptual continuities and transformations between Aquinas, Scotus, and Stein on individuation, vital striving, and essence. Calcagno employs a more systematic and phenomenologically informed approach, bringing Stein's early and late works into conversation to develop the notion of "occasional personhood". Vendrell Ferran applies phenomenological methods such as stratification and intentional analysis to articulate a typology of affective life. LaZella and Borden Sharkey also engage in conceptual reinterpretation, the former through a comparative analysis of love and singularity in Scotus and Stein, and the latter through a layered reading of universals and essential being. This methodological range, spanning historical scholarship, phenomenological analysis, and speculative metaphysics, allows the volume to explore Stein's thought from multiple disciplinary angles while maintaining a shared focus on core metaphysical questions.

This diversity of approaches is not merely additive but converges in a shared comparative methodology that bridges medieval philosophy and phenomenology in substantive ways. Rather than treating scholastic and phenomenological frameworks as parallel or complementary, several chapters structurally enact their integration. Phenomenological tools such as intentional analysis, eidetic variation, and experiential stratification are used to reframe scholastic categories like essence, *haecceitas*, and *analogia entis*. This methodological fusion enables a dialogue in which metaphysical questions are revitalized through phenomenological insight, while phenomenological concerns are anchored in historical and doctrinal precision. It is this interplay between traditions, methods, and conceptual registers that gives the volume both its scholarly rigor and its philosophical vitality.

The volume's strengths are considerable: it offers a nuanced and philosophically sophisticated engagement with Stein's metaphysics, foregrounds her position in the historical lineage from Aquinas to Scotus, and does so with careful attention to both textual and conceptual precision. The comparative framework of juxtaposing Stein's phenomenological insights with scholastic metaphysics is especially valuable, and the volume fills a clear gap in Stein scholarship by demonstrating how her metaphysical project cannot be fully understood apart from its medieval antecedents.

While the volume succeeds admirably in bridging scholastic metaphysics and phenomenological analysis, one notable limitation lies in the relative underrepresentation of critical engagement across chapters. Although each essay offers a rich, standalone contribution, there is little in the way of direct dialogue or critical tension between the positions advanced by different contributors. For instance, alternative readings of Stein's appropriation of Scotus appear in Chapter 7 and Chapter 10, but without being brought into explicit conversation. In Chapter 7, Borden Sharkey presents Stein as developing Scotus's account of *quidditative* being into a more refined notion of essential being, thereby positioning her firmly within an extreme realist framework. Meanwhile, in Chapter 10, Tommasi emphasizes Stein's theological transformation of metaphysical categories, highlighting her claim that even matter bears traces of spiritual intentionality; a view shaped more by Conrad-Martius than by Scotus himself. These complementary but divergent readings are never set into dialogue, missing the opportunity for a comparative synthesis that could have deepened the reader's understanding of Stein's metaphysical project.

A similar missed opportunity occurs in the discussion of personhood. In Chapter 8, Calcagno raises the provocative question of "occasional personhood", challenging the coherence of Stein's claim to an irreducible personal core in light of lived experiences of fragmentation. Yet this does not engage directly with the more metaphysically robust treatments of personal identity found in Cory's or De Santis's chapters, where Stein's Thomistic commitments are taken to secure the enduring unity of the person. Likewise, the affective analyses in Vendrell Ferran's chapter could have been fruitfully contrasted with Calcagno's notion of peripherally lived personhood, particularly on the question of whether emotional responsiveness presupposes a stable self.

A more dialogical editorial structure, perhaps through internal cross-referencing or a synthetic afterword, would have allowed such tensions and convergences to emerge more clearly, sharpening the volume's internal coherence and amplifying its philosophical payoff.

Despite this, the collection represents a significant contribution to Stein studies and to the broader philosophical project of reconciling phenomenology with scholastic metaphysics. It will be particularly valuable for researchers working on Stein, medieval thought, or the phenomenological tradition. The volume is a rewarding and at times provocative read for the trained eye. It will serve as a touchstone for future work on Stein's metaphysical commitments and her engagement with medieval intellectual sources.

Another potential area for further development is the engagement with contemporary metaphysical debates. While the historical and phenomenological analyses are consistently rigorous, the volume tends to remain within the bounds of intra-traditional dialogue between scholasticism and early phenomenology. This is intellectually fruitful, but it somewhat limits the volume's reach beyond its core audience. A more explicit engagement with current issues in analytic metaphysics such as debates on essence and modality, the grounding of intentionality, or the metaphysics of personhood, could have revealed how Stein's metaphysical framework might offer alternatives to or critiques of dominant paradigms. For instance, Stein's stratified model of affectivity and her account of essential being could contribute meaningfully to contemporary discussions on layered minds or non-reductive essentialism. Similarly, the feminist philosophical potential of Stein's thought, particularly her treatment of embodiment, the soul-body unity, and relationality, remains largely untapped. Engaging with currents in feminist metaphysics or philosophy of gender could have opened new interpretive and critical pathways, especially in light of Stein's complex views on the nature of personal identity and spiritual vocation. Broadening the horizon in this way would not only enhance the volume's interdisciplinary appeal but also demonstrate the contemporary philosophical vitality of Stein's legacy.

Despite these minor reservations, the collection is highly recommended. It not only deepens our understanding of Stein's metaphysics but also models a fruitful method for engaging the historical philosophical tradition through phenomenological reconstruction. It will be of particular interest to scholars in phenomenology, medieval philosophy, metaphysics, and theology, and it contributes meaningfully to the ongoing effort to situate Stein as a systematic thinker in her own right.

David Torrijos Castrillejo. *Pedro de Ledesma y los orígenes de la controversia* de auxiliis. Madrid: Editorial Sindéresis, 2024. 384 p. ISBN: 9788410120334. Paperback: 34€

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A controvérsia *de auxiliis* foi um dos grandes acontecimentos da história do pensamento teológico-filosófico peninsular entre o final do século XVI e os primeiros anos do século XVII. A controvérsia surgiu no âmbito da discussão sobre as difíceis questões dos auxílios da graça, da presciência, da providência e da predestinação divinas e da sua compatibilidade com o livre arbítrio humano, à luz dos novos desafios impostos pelo movimento reformista e humanista. Apesar dos informados estudos realizados sobre a história desta controvérsia e dos seus principais intervenientes, justifica-se plenamente a necessidade de trabalhos inovadores que matizem e complementem as investigações já realizadas, uma vez que subsistem aspetos históricos que precisam de explicações mais detalhadas, desenvolveram-se ideias imprecisas acerca de argumentos, conceitos e posições teóricas adotadas pelos intervenientes (dentro e fora das ordens referidas) que exigem uma análise crítica renovada e persistem fontes e documentos inéditos e menos conhecidos que precisam de ser estudados e publicados para que possa ser desenhado um retrato mais exato da rica diversidade de doutrinas discutidas neste período. A obra de David Torrijos Castrillejo, que resulta de uma tese doutoral apresentada na Universidade de Navarra, aporta contributos significativos em todos estes domínios, promovendo um melhor conhecimento da intervenção dos teólogos dominicanos na controvérsia *de auxiliis*, desde uma perspetiva histórica, doutrinal e documental. Não obstante, estes contributos fazem-se no âmbito do estudo, bem orientado, da participação do teólogo dominicano Pedro de Ledesma na controvérsia, incidindo de uma forma particular sobre a doutrina da premoção física.

A obra inicia com um prefácio oportuno de Serge-Thomas Bonino e uma extensa introdução de David Torrijos que justifica e explana claramente as ideias que serão desenvolvidas nos diferentes capítulos e que evidencia a excelência da metodologia de investigação que está na base da construção deste trabalho.

O primeiro capítulo oferece uma introdução histórica sobre a controvérsia *de auxiliis*, dividida em duas partes: a primeira parte define o sentido e alcance dos conceitos "molinismo", "congruísmo" e "bañecianismo", permitindo a distinção entre a influência dos argumentos defendidos pelo jesuíta Luis de Molina (molinismo), a adaptação dos argumentos de Molina a uma perspetiva mais moderada pelos também jesuítas Francisco Suárez e Roberto Belarmino (congruísmo) e os argumentos defendidos pelos dominicanos Domingo Báñez e Diego Álvarez (bañecianismo). As distinções sintetizam os argumentos defendidos por jesuítas e dominicanos, sem descurar as posições de teólogos de outras ordens; a segunda parte oferece uma história da controvérsia, dividida em diferentes etapas (origens, publicação da *Concordia* de Molina, intervenção da Inquisição de Espanha, congregações *de auxiliis* em Roma e influência da controvérsia).

Após a preparação contextual e conceptual feita no primeiro capítulo, o segundo capítulo disponibiliza uma biografia completa de Pedro de Ledesma, especialmente focada nas questões teológicas, e uma análise da relação histórica deste teólogo com a controvérsia *de auxiliis*. A análise pormenorizada da participação de Ledesma na controvérsia é um importante contributo científico, dado que esta participação reclamava estudos mais aprofundados.

Tendo em conta a semelhança entre o manuscrito que contém as lições de 1589-1591 de Ledesma sobre a primeira parte da *Suma de teologia* e o manuscrito com as lições de 1584-1585 do também dominicano Juan Vicente Astorga à mesma parte da *Suma*, o terceiro capítulo centra-se no estudo detalhado da doutrina de Astorga sobre o concurso divino.

O quarto capítulo, apoiado no trabalho realizado no capítulo anterior, analisa os elementos de continuidade e de rutura de Ledesma com Astorga, o que permite definir com maior clareza as diferenças entre os dois autores no âmbito da doutrina sobre o concurso divino e mostrar como Ledesma refuta a doutrina da premoção moral defendida por Astorga.

Demonstradas as caraterísticas próprias da posição de Ledesma através das análises feitas no terceiro e quarto capítulos, o quinto capítulo introduz argumentos inovadores sobre os contributos de Ledesma para a controvérsia *de auxiliis*, ao identificar, situar e analisar o parecer de 1594 de Ledesma sobre a *Concordia* de Molina. No âmbito deste parecer, discutem-se as conclusões do tratado de Ledesma sobre a premoção física, a graça eficaz e a liberdade humana, mostrando como estas conclusões resultam na rejeição das doutrinas molinistas.

O sexto capítulo analisa o desenvolvimento das questões sobre o concurso divino e a graça eficaz naquele que é o mais importante escrito de Ledesma sobre o tema, o *Tractatus de divinae gratiae auxiliis*, concluído em 1601 e publicado em 1611. No capítulo evidenciam-se as diferenças entre os argumentos de Ledesma e os de Astorga, de Pedro Herrera e de Francisco Zumel, assim como do congruísmo, e perspetiva-se Ledesma como defensor de uma "ontologia deflacionária da premoção física". A discussão sobre o concurso divino proporciona também um estudo de caso da diferença de posições assumidas entre os teólogos dominicanos, contrariando a ideia imprecisa, muitas vezes defendida, que atribui a esta ordem uma homogeneidade doutrinal. No final do capítulo analisa-se ainda o manuscrito com os comentários de Ledesma sobre a vontade divina, de 1605.

A conclusão geral surge depois do sexto capítulo e proporciona uma síntese clara do itinerário percorrido na obra e dos seus principais contributos para o estudo do tema e do autor. Deve acrescentar-se que cada capítulo contém uma conclusão própria e todas elas são um importante apoio para o leitor e para o bom resultado dos argumentos desenvolvidos.

Mas a obra oferece ainda um valioso apêndice, que contém a transcrição do manuscrito com o parecer de Ledesma sobre a *Concordia* de Molina, estudado anteriormente, o *Tractatus de gratia seu auxilio preveniente seu suficienti et eficaci*, de 1594. O apêndice disponibiliza assim uma fonte inédita, que complementa as informações disponíveis nos melhores trabalhos sobre a controvérsia *de auxiliis*, e contribui sobremaneira para o conhecimento da obra de Ledesma e da evolução da sua doutrina sobre o concurso divino e a eficácia da graça.

No final da obra, destaca-se a rica bibliografia, dividida em cinco partes. As duas primeiras constituem um verdadeiro catálogo atualizado das obras impressas e manuscritas de Ledesma. A terceira e quarta listam outras fontes primárias impressas e manuscritas, e por fim, na quinta parte, compila-se uma vasta lista de fontes secundárias.

Esta obra de David Torrijos é um trabalho de investigação exemplar, da maior qualidade, que tem um valor inestimável para o estudo da controvérsia *de auxiliis*, da biografia e obra de Ledesma, das doutrinas sobre o concurso divino, a eficácia da graça e a liberdade humana e da diversidade e evolução das doutrinas discutidas neste contexto. Permanecerá certamente como uma obra de referência para o estudo destas questões.