Venality or Venalities? Economic analysis of the office sales in modern Castile (1543-1714)

Abstract

This article analyzes the different sales channels of local offices in Castile during
the 16th and 17th centuries. To do so, we use a newly created database that includes 1,910
sales and 4,157 resignations of regidores and veinticuatros (aldermen), procuradores del
número (solicitors of the number), escribanos del número (notaries of the number), and
other escribanos (notaries or clerks) from several Castilian cities between 1543 and 1714.
By analyzing this dataset, we classify the sales channels into two groups (direct and
indirect), and demonstrate that the choice of each channel by the Crown depended upon an
economic reason, which was based on increasing transaction costs and decreasing returns
of office sales. Moreover, we show that the Crown was at least as efficient as individual
proprietors selling offices, and negotiated sales prices were not statistically different from
public auctions prices. This suggests that office markets did not suffer from private
information problems and were competitive.